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Map of Europe |
CIAO DATE: 5/00
Volume XXXIIV No. 3 (July-September 1999)
Opinions
The new Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is calling for peace in his country wounded by eight years of civil war. However before achieving the peace he promises, he has to overcome two obstacles. The first is posed by the high ranking officers who designated him as their candidate in late April, but set a “red line” that he must not cross in negotiations with the Islamists. The second obstacle is posed by the Islamists who are asking the President to give some proof of his power through the removal of some of the senior officers involved in the crackdown on the Islamists after the cancellation of the January 1992 elections won by the FIS. Until now, Bouteflika has succeeded in dividing the Islamists. Will he succeed in dividing the top officers as well, allowing him to implement his goals?
The NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo was the first operation in history to be carried out using air power alone, but it also marked the end of deterrence and revealed the need for a reassessment of the alliance and Europe’s role in it. The article discusses, among other things, the problems of NATO’s military capabilities and decision making that emerged during the action and Europe’s approach to both. In order to build the necessary capabilities, Europe will have to overcome the idea of total independence and voluntary cooperation among individual defence establishments. To this end, the recent linkage between foreign policy and defence policy in the framework of the European Union’s second pillar is considered a step in the right direction.
In the new debate on a common defence policy for the European Union some factors must be taken into consideration. The first is a commonly agreed functional approach to the issue: the idea is to start cooperation in the military and economic fields, through a process of practical convergence. A kind of EMU in the defence sector, through what is called macrodefence criteria. The second is represented by the Cologne European Council’s decision to transfer some WEU competencies to the European Union and the impact of this on the decision-making system. The third is a necessary follow-up of the first two factors, that is, a gradual process of institutional adaptation and convergence to the new competencies and a coherent decision-making system inside the Union.
Essays
The euro represents a major change in the international monetary scene but its success s will be the function of two factors: the robustness of the structural elements underlying the potential of the euro as a global currency and Europe’s capacity to exploit the new currency to exit from its long lasting situation of slow growth and persistent unemployment. This aspect is discussed by relying on the concept of “endogenous currency areas”, according to which monetary integration leads to transformations in the integrating economies that make them more suitable to adopting a single currency. Some evidence in this respect is provided. Perspectives for the definition of a common EU policy up to the challenge of the single currency are also discussed.
Implications of the Kosovo Conflict
The UN Charter contains a general prohibition on the threat and use of force. Armed intervention is lawful only in the case of individual and collective self-defence and under authorisation of the Security Council. Are there any other cases in which the use of force is legitimate? Can the recent armed intervention in Kosovo be justified under the theory of humanitarian intervention? Until now humanitarian has not been justified under customary international law, unlike the use of force for protecting nationals abroad. This article ponders whether it would not be possible for the SC to adopt a general resolution under Chapter VIII of the Charter authorising states to use force in humanitarian emergencies.
Given the geographical proximity to Southeast Europe, Italy has vested interests in maintaining stability in the region, in avoiding large-scale displacement of people and in fostering economic penetration. Added to Italy’s political goal of enhancing its international status and role in multinational fora, the centre-left government was left with little space for manoeuvre but to support the NATO attack in Kosovo during spring 1999. This analytical reconstruction of Italy’s management of the crisis identifies the crucial turning points of the latest Balkan crisis, highlighting the country’s specific priorities and means of pursuing them, against a backdrop of divided public opinion and a degree of perplexity over the changing objectives of war that occasionally surfaced even at the level of top policy-makers. It is argued that Italy managed to weather the storm, nonetheless, and to maintain a coherent position with respect to the alliance by walking a fine line.
An overview of the situations resulting from the NATO air campaign in spring 1999 in the various Balkan countries closest to Kosovo (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, Kosovo itself, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania). The article stresses that instability remains the chief problem in the region and that Serbia’s political stability and economic development appear to be at the heart of the region’s stability. It stresses that the international community should establish a special strategy towards the entire region rather than take a piecemeal approach.
The dynamics of Mercosur
The EU and Mercosur relationship takes its significance from the importance both attach to having special links to all partners, rather than from particularly strong interests between them. Mercosur is not a major trading or investing partner for the EU. For Mercosur, the EU is important in both trade and investment, but the area in which it would like to improve trading access is agriculture, the most difficult for the EU to offer. Each needs to avoid treating the other less favourably than partners like the US or Asia.
The article assesses the results of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) - which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay - brought about by the Brazilian devaluation of the real in January 1999. The author briefly describes the evolution of the process of economic integration and political dialogue that is taking place in South America since the early 1990s, and analyses some of the current difficulties regarding how to deepen the integration process. The article then considers the prospects for the evolution of the area towards a common market, with respect to the current developments in the regional and global trade regimes.