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Foreign Policy
Winter 1998–99
Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?
By Michael O’Hanlon *
This abstract is adapted from an article appearing in the Winter 1998–99 issue of FOREIGN POLICY. The Cold War ended nearly 10 years ago, but the troops have not come marching home...at least not all of them. American forces abroad still account for about 250,000 uniformed personnel, more than one-sixth of the active-duty military, at a cost of several billions of dollars per year. Troops in Korea and Bosnia, as well as Navy sailors and Marines at sea, face months away from their families. Sizable deployments abroad are often a source of irritation between the United States and its allies, and can be a focal point for terrorists, as evidenced by the deadly 1996 bombing against Air Force units in Saudi Arabia.
How much nicer it would be if U.S. troops could stay at home until called upon in a crisis or conflict. Then they could lash out rapidly, intercontinentally, and lethally with spacepower, long-range airpower, and other elements of a so-called reconnaissance-strike complex. This vision of future warfare is frequently peddled by proponents of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)—and if it sounds too good to be true, that’s because it is. High technology will not allow the United States to be, in effect, an “isolationist global power.”
Looking past the hype, a glimpse into the future of warfare suggests that many RMA proponents are ignoring enduring technical and strategic constraints. Lots of overseas bases will be needed in any future war. And if many would be needed in wartime, it makes good sense to keep some in peacetime as well.
One reason bases will still be needed is to establish air superiority. Air superiority will remain important, among other reasons, to make good use of stealth ground-attack aircraft such as the B–2 bomber. The B–2 is not invisible or invulnerable; it can be visually detected—and hunted—in sunlight, thereby requiring fighter-aircraft escort. But the fighter aircraft that establish air superiority will continue to require overseas bases indefinitely, since jet engine and airframe technologies are not progressing nearly as rapidly as the electronics and computer systems that RMA proponents like to talk about.
Additionally, in future warfare, the United States will need to retain the capability to seize and hold territory. It may have to consider overthrowing an extremist enemy regime that is developing nuclear weapons or committing genocide. Or a friendly country may be attacked and defeated before U.S. forces respond, making it necessary to evict the aggressor from the conquered territory. To do these things, large numbers of ground troops will remain essential.
To be sure, the twenty-first-century soldier will benefit from several new capabilities, such as sensors deployed by miniaturized robotics, that could make smaller forces more effective. But all sensors have limitations due to the basic and immutable laws of physics. Visible-light and infrared detectors cannot see through heavy clouds. Radar waves can penetrate clouds and rain, but cannot do any better than visible and infrared sensors at seeing through metal, water, or most kinds of soil. Most x-ray, particle-beam, acoustic, and magnetic sensors have very short ranges. Consequently, ground forces will still need to establish a strong and dense presence in many situations to find and fight the enemy.
Future ground units may become lighter, smaller, and more agile than today’s, but they will still be large, heavy, and relatively unwieldy to deploy. So the only practical way to move large numbers of them will continue to be by sea. The need to deploy forces by sea, in turn, means that moving large forces from the United States will take time. Ground forces that must be on hand early in a fight—for example, to protect airfields and ports needed by reinforcements arriving later—will have to be based in the region or at least have most of their equipment stored there.
These stubborn technical facts may disappoint RMA proponents, but they should be generally welcomed. Deterrence is strongest when a potential aggressor knows that U.S. forces would suffer casualties in any attack it might attempt—as was the case in Europe during the Cold War and as has been the case in Korea since 1953. Furthermore, if we cut back forward presence, American military engagement in places such as Bosnia and joint exercises with other countries’ militaries would suffer. In pursuing our fascination with technology, we could weaken deterrence and traditional alliances, as well as our support for the values that make other countries generally respect and trust the United States.
Consequently, undue haste to get technologically ready for the next war could wind up making that war more likely. It could increase the odds that we would have to fight alone, and without access to forward bases to facilitate a rapid response. If these things happen, the very revolution in military affairs that promised sanitary long-range combat will in fact have made future warfare more lethal, not less.
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| Source: Author’s predictions |
Military Revolutions Throughout History
Further Reading
Stephen Biddle’s “Assessing Theories of Future Warfare” (paper presented to the 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, August 1997)
James Blaker’s “Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century Defense,” Defense Working Paper No. 3 (Washington: Progressive Policy Institute, January 1997)
Jeffrey Cooper’s “Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs” in John Arquilla and Paul Dibb’s “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security” (Survival, Winter 1997–98)
Trevor Dupuy’s The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: Da Capo Press, 1990)
Lawrence Freedman’s The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
Theodor Galdi’s Revolution in Military Affairs? (Washington: CRS Report for Congress, 1995)
Colin Gray’s The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997)
Martin Libicki’s “DBK and its Consequences” in Stuart Johnson and Libicki’s Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1996)
Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen’s Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993)
Andrew Krepinevich Jr.’s “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions” (National Interest, Fall 1994)
Krepinevich’s The Conflict Environment of 2016: A Scenario-Based Approach (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996)
Numerous articles in Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jane’s International Defense Review, Armed Forces Journal International, and Defense News
Charles Perry, Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., and Joseph Conway’s Long-Range Bombers and the Role of Airpower in the New Century (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1995)
Barry Posen’s Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986)
David Ronfeldt’s In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1997)
Stephen Peter Rosen’s Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994)
Tom Stefanick’s Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987)
Martin van Creveld’s Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1991)
Alan Vick, David Orletsky, John Bordeaux, and David Shlapak’s Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996)
Endnotes
*: Michael O’Hanlon is a scholar at the Brookings Institution and author of How to Be a Cheap Hawk (1998). Back.