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Foreign Policy
Winter 1998–99
An Exceptionally Blunt Instrument
Among the most controversial features of the U.S. embargo against Cuba is the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, better known as the Helms-Burton law (1996). Its sponsors, Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton, had hoped it would deal the final blow to a Cuban economy badly weakened by the collapse of the Soviet system.
The law has four sections: Title I imposes additional sanctions intended to deepen the isolation of Cuba’s economy; Title II instructs the U.S. president to develop an assistance plan for a post-Castro transition government; Title III calls for the return of properties expropriated by the Cuban government and allows U.S. citizens to sue anyone who currently invests in these properties; and Title IV directs the U.S. State Department to deny visas to executives of foreign companies who are deemed to benefit from these holdings.
International criticism of Helms-Burton has centered on Title III, which has caused a serious diplomatic rift and near-trade war between the United States and some of its closest allies. As Sir Leon Brittan, the European Union’s Trade Commissioner, remarked in July 1996 when President Bill Clinton imposed Helms-Burton sanctions (but temporarily suspended the implementation of Title III), “The best way to get change in Cuba is not to clobber your allies, and that’s what they have done.”
For their part, Cubans worry that Title III will bankrupt the country. As Ricardo Alarcón, president of Cuba’s National Assembly, has said, “We can’t pay the estimated $100 billion we supposedly owe to those who left,” he said. “It represents for us 50 years of exports.”
Even more offensive to many Cubans, however, is Title II, which specifies that an “acceptable” transition government must legalize all political activity, release all political prisoners, establish an independent judiciary, and commit publicly to holding free, multiparty elections within 18 months. Most importantly, the new government must not include President Fidel Castro or his brother Raúl. Such sweeping conditions help explain why Helms-Burton has actually strengthened Castro’s domestic support. The government has translated the law and made it widely available, deepening its citizens’ distrust of the United States.
More importantly, perhaps, Helms-Burton has fallen far short of its goals. Although Cuban officials have admitted that the law has slowed credits to Cuba and deterred prospective investors, foreign direct investment has continued to flow, and Cuba’s economy has continued to expand.
—FP