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Foreign Affairs
Is Turkey Ready for Europe?
By Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip L. Martin
Michael S. Teitelbaum is Program Director at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Philip L. Martin is Professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California, Davis, and the author of The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labor Migration to Western Europe.
Tussles In Brussels
Last December, the EU’s leaders formally agreed to expand their union in 2004 from 15 to 25 members—a historic broadening of one of the world’s most exclusive clubs. Europe’s politicians also set a schedule under which two more countries, Bulgaria and Romania, would be brought into the fold three years later.
During the months leading up to the December decision, Recep Tayyip Erdogan—leader of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, which won control of Turkey’s parliament in November—energetically toured Europe’s capitals, urging EU leaders to include his nation in their expansion plans and to set a definite date to begin accession talks. Ankara’s lobbying got strong backing from Washington: President George W. Bush even made a personal telephone call to the EU’s then president, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to make the case. After much debate, however, when the EU announced its decision at a summit in Copenhagen in December, Turkey was turned down. Instead of offering a concrete date, the EU’s leaders, in somewhat Delphic language, merely promised that if Turkey fulfilled the so-called Copenhagen criteria on human rights and democracy by December 2004, accession talks could then begin “without further delay.”
By waffling, Brussels in effect managed to push down the road what has become a fundamental debate on the continent: should Turkey ever be admitted to the EU? Brussels’ ambivalence reflected what has become the position of many of Europe’s individual leaders—an attitude that can best be described as “yes-but.” Many of Europe’s politicians now seem willing to recognize Turkey as an official candidate—but only once it becomes more like them. This means greater respect for human rights and a reduced role in government affairs for Turkey’s military. And it also means that Ankara must demonstrate sustained economic growth, enough to minimize the flood of Turkish emigration that many fear will result from its admission to the EU.
Some European leaders have also expressed darker concerns about Turkey. Most declarative, perhaps, have been the views of France’s former president, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the man now in charge of overseeing the drafting of a “constitution for a United Europe.” On November 8, speaking to an interviewer from Le Monde, Giscard d’Estaing flatly asserted that Turkey simply is not a European country. “[Turkey’s] capital is not in Europe,” he declared, “and 95 percent of its population is outside Europe. [It has] a different culture, a different approach, and a different way of life. It is not a European country.” EU membership for Turkey, he further declared, would mean “the end of Europe.”
Giscard d’Estaing is not alone in such sentiments. His comments have been echoed by West Germany’s former chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, who publicly voiced fears that the admission of Turkey “would open the door for similarly plausible full membership of other Muslim nations in Africa and in the Middle East. That could result,” he argued, “in the political union degenerating into nothing more than a free trade community.”
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