CIAO DATE: 11/2011
Volume: 34, Issue: 4
Autumn 2011
Doubling Down on Iran (PDF)
Ray Takeyh, Kenneth M. Pollack
Since taking office in 2009, the Obama administration has patiently pursued a two-track policy which seeks to persuade the Iranian leadership to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions by creating a series of reinforcing positive and negative incentives. It is time to acknowledge that the current version of the two-track policy has reached its limits, and is unlikely to achieve its objectives with the current Iranian regime. Recognizing this reality should not, however, make U.S. policymakers believe that there is no hope of persuading Iran to relinquish its nuclear program and end its other dangerous activities. This is the conclusion of many on the far right and the far left, who argue that since both Bush’s sticks and Obama’s carrots (and sticks) now have failed to move Iran, the United States needs to “face facts” and simply make the awful choice between waging war on Iran to destroy its nuclear program (and perhaps overthrow the regime) or else simply accept a nuclear Iran and learn to live with it. At some point, the United States may have to face that Hobson’s choice, but not yet. And because both of those alternatives are so unpalatable, if there is anything else that the United States and its allies can try, they should. All is not lost, and there is still reason to believe that the United States can achieve its goals without the use of force. It is still possible to craft an Iran policy that could compel Tehran to relinquish its nuclear ambitions, adhere to prevailing norms on terrorism and human rights, and respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. Nor is it necessary to jettison all aspects of the existing policy, as it has broadened the international coalition pressing Tehran. Nonetheless, it is time to appreciate that the only manner of inducing meaningful change in the Islamic Republic’s behavior without the resort to war is to otherwise imperil its very existence.
Updating the China Model (PDF)
Bruce J. Dickson
China’s development model is undergoing dramatic change. No longer relying solely on cheap labor to manufacture exports, the Chinese Communist Party is updating its approach in three distinct but interrelated ways. First, it is actively trying to create “national champions” so that Chinese brands—not just Chinese goods—can compete in the global market. Second, it is moving away from its reliance on low-wage, low-skilled labor and encouraging the growth of a middle class and increased domestic consumption to spur economic growth. Third, long accustomed to investing vast amounts of capital on infrastructure projects, it is now devoting more resources toward other types of public goods in order to improve the quality of local governance. Each of these endeavors presents major challenges as well as opportunities for China, its neighbors, and other countries, including the United States. Collectively, they represent a significant updating of the now familiar China model based on export-led growth and a strong state.
Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus (PDF)
Andrew Bast
In recent years, Pakistan has developed the world’s fastest-growing nuclear weapons program. The most current estimates are that Pakistan now possesses enough fissile material for more than 100 warheads, which makes it the world’s sixth largest arsenal, and is stockpiling enough material to manufacture as many as 20 additional weapons a year. These current growth rates will almost undoubtedly be proven to be conservative over the next 20–30 years, given the revelation in May that Islamabad is constructing a fourth plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site about 140 miles south of the capital. That newest reactor will come online as soon as 2013 and significantly increase Pakistan’s production capacity. Considered in a global context, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal looks even more extreme. In the next decade, only two states—Pakistan and India—are expected to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal. (North Korea also could weaponize its program, and many in theWest believe that Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions.) Granted, the United States and Russia still possess more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, but those two countries have now spent decades negotiating reductions of their arsenals and are expected to continue slashing for decades to come. By 2021, however, Pakistan is expected to double the number of weapons in its arsenal to at least 200, surpassing the United Kingdom. Soon thereafter, analysts say there is a good chance that Pakistan will even surpass France to become the world’s third largest nuclear-armed state. The author argues that the decisions being undertaken in Islamabad are both strategic and rational. At the same time, it is unclear what the West is currently doing to disincentivize Pakistan from stockpiling fissile material and expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal. What is clear, however, is that to devise any long-term strategy to reverse the momentum in Islamabad, and in turn increase the trust and cooperation necessary to address the questions of nuclear security, one must understand exactly where Pakistan’s nuclear program is heading, and why it is on a trajectory at odds with nearly every other nuclear-capable country in the world.
Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? (PDF)
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
Is it time for the United States to rethink its Taiwan policy and walk away from Taiwan? Prominent Americans in influential publications insist that it is. The argument is not unprecedented. In a long and often discordant history of dealings between Washington and Taipei, there have been repeated calls for severing this uncomfortable and dangerous relationship. Taiwan has been characterized as a strategic liability, an expensive diversion, and most often, an obstacle to more important U.S.—China relations. In the past, a prosperous, strong, and self-confident United States chose to ignore such calls. Today, however, China is rapidly becoming more powerful, and many fear the United States teeters on the brink of decline. Is U.S. support for Taiwan about to end? Would it be a good idea? Taiwan remains the single issue which could spark war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, a war that might quickly go nuclear but would be devastating even were it to remain conventional. Apart from being a potential trigger for war, Taiwan impedes improvement in U.S.–China relations because of suspicion and mistrust. Beijing firmly believes that Washington seeks to keep the PRC weak and divided to obstruct China’s rise. Meanwhile, Americans are adamant that resolution of the cross-Strait impasse happen peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan, although the United States is uncommitted to any specific resolution. China, therefore, is the most critical variable in determining future U.S. policy toward Taiwan. There will occasionally be times when U.S. officials are angered by Taiwan’s policies or distracted by crises at home and abroad. But if anyone in the U.S. government thinks about severing ties with Taiwan, or significantly reducing them, it is because of China. Diplomats, statesmen, and politicians in and out of government—as well as businessmen, scholars, and the military—agree that good relations with the PRC will be vital in the new Pacific century. The big questions are whether sacrificing Taiwan would improve those relations, whether conditions are ripe for such a determination, and in what ways a change would affect other U.S. interests, including American friends and allies in the region. Careful examination of these variables leads us to conclude that the United States should neither abandon nor reduce its commitments to Taiwan, but strengthen them.
The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy (PDF)
David M. Abshire
Within hours of President Obama’s announcement of Osama bin Laden’s May 2 death, pundits and politicians from both the right and left were calling for a speedier withdrawal from Afghanistan. The discovery and targeted killing of bin Laden in a compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad, Pakistan, located less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy, dramatically amplified concerns about elements of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) maintaining links with al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. Many argued that the death of al-Qaeda’s leader meant that our post-9/11 mission had been accomplished, and our expensive presence in Afghanistan was no longer needed amidst an era of mounting debt and budget fights. Many others responded after bin Laden’s death that withdrawing troops would risk reversing the gains that have been made by a nearly 10-year military effort and could cause Afghanistan to reemerge as a destabilizing pariah that violates human rights and supports terrorist groups which threaten international security. Prior to the recent covert operation heard around the world, there had been multiple independent reports indicating that the arrival of thousands of “surge” forces had resulted in substantial tactical gains for ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces in the former Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan. A hastened withdrawal could recreate the anarchy that followed the 1989 Soviet withdrawal and subsequent U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan. That anarchy enabled the rise of the Taliban, which severely destabilized Afghanistan’s neighbors and served as a critical enabler for a wide variety of terrorist groups which carried out attacks against the United States, Europe, India, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Conversely, a stable Afghanistan that sits on the crossroads between Central, South, and East Asia would help bring stability and prosperity to Eurasia, while simultaneously enhancing the credibility of the members of ISAF and dealing a major blow to regional extremist movements. Yet, although an immediate or accelerated withdrawal would be tremendously illadvised, our current military-centric strategy in Afghanistan is also unsustainable and suffers from a debilitating credibility deficit. A complementary long-term, coordinated regional economic and entrepreneurial development program is needed to help consolidate our current military gains and foster sustainable Afghan and regional stability over the long term. Our security-focused strategy needs to place a greater emphasis on appropriately addressing regional dynamics and promoting sustainable economic development, which helps to unify the region in the interest of shared stability and prosperity. Such a development would help establish a politically neutral Afghanistan and decrease regional tensions.
A Detour Strategy for the Test Ban Treaty (PDF)
Liviu Horovitz
The U.S. Senate defeated the CTBT in October 1999 (it had been opened for signature in 1996 after many decades of negotiations). Although 154 states have ratified the treaty and 182 have signed it, the remaining nine “nuclear capable” countries—China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United States—whose consent is needed but still pending, wield a de facto veto over the treaty’s future and impede its entry into force (EIF). Among them, the United States is often seen as a linchpin for further progress. As such, the CTBT is widely portrayed as a catalyst for further nonproliferation and disarmament measures. While both Democrats in the U.S. government and CTBT supporters outside of it want the treaty ratified, at this point there is no agreement on the best way to achieve that goal. Congress seems skeptical about the prospects for ratification. Not wanting to close any potential doors, government policymakers remain unspecific. In the non-governmental world, opinions are also divided. While some, such as former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, contended that “the priority now is to ratify the separate treaty banning nuclear testing,” many others, such as former Secretary of Defense William Perry, immediately recognized that the CTBT does not stand a chance in the near future. A short-term approach toward CTBT ratification remains unrealistic. What is needed is a potentially more successful detour strategy that resets the agenda to get CTBT ratification. Test-ban supporters should work on parallel but mutually reinforcing fronts in three countries—the United States, China, and Israel—that have the potential to strengthen the chances of the treaty being ratified before 2015. In the United States, a strong campaign from both within and outside of government has to shape the public discourse about how a complete prohibition of nuclear testing can strengthen U.S. security. The technical prerequisites for ratification must be debated and clarified until they are no longer in question. In China, political leaders need to be convinced that ratification could bolster their country’s position as a responsible global stakeholder. Finally, in Israel, test-ban supporters should explain why ratifying the CTBT would be a useful counter to criticism of Israel at nuclear conferences. All of these efforts need to be completed before the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2015 in order to push countries with nuclear weapons into action. This approach is neither defeatist nor lacking ambition. It represents a concerted effort with a real chance of success.
The Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted (PDF)
Jon B. Alterman
Judging by the popular press, in January 2011 Twitter and Facebook went from being simply engaging social diversions to become engines of political change that upended decades of Arab authoritarianism. It is tempting to be swept away by this narrative, which suggests that social media prompted hundreds of thousands, and then millions, of Tunisians and Egyptians to pour into the streets and peacefully demand change. Brittle authoritarian regimes had little choice but to comply, and in this way, social media irrevocably changed the future of the Middle East. Following the logic to its conclusion, it would suggest that the Middle East is on the brink of a period of democratic consolidation, as the ideals and tools of revolutionaries lead the region forward into a period of anti-sectarianism, liberalism, and hope. Such a narrative glosses over much of what is important about what has happened in the Middle East in early 2011. As we look ahead into the post-protest period, the limitations of social media are becoming more apparent. Social media are not evidently helpful in facilitating political bargaining in constitution-writing processes, and social media have only played a limited role in helping form new political parties. In both cases, old-fashioned political horse trading and solid field operations seem to be decisive. Getting the analysis right on what has happened will help observers and participants think more clearly about what might yet happen.
Liberty, Democracy, and Discord in Egypt (PDF)
Tarek Masoud
If hope was the dominant psychology of the protests that unseated Hosni Mubarak, then fear is proving to be that of their aftermath. The unity of the disparate forces that made history during those 18 days in Tahrir Square has given way to discord. Optimism about Egypt’s future and belief in the imminence of the country’s return to glory appears to have yielded to a season of grim pessimism, as erstwhile allies impute dark plans to each other. And given that Egypt’s revolution is decidedly not over, this dissension in the ranks of its revolutionaries bodes ill for the country’s democratic future. The schism that divides those who just a few short months ago stood united in their call for an end to torture, poverty, unemployment, and corruption is on the face of it a technical dispute over the timing of elections. On one side stand those who want to move quickly to legislative polls; on the other, those who believe they should be postponed. The former argue that immediate elections are the only way to establish civilian government; the latter that more time is needed for political parties to organize themselves, and that a new constitution (or at least the general outlines of one) should be agreed upon beforehand, so as to ensure that Egypt’s next charter represents the aspirations of more than just those who are best at campaigning. This is more than just a procedural disagreement. The dispute represents a fundamental disagreement over what democracy is, what it should produce, and what its limits should be. The liberals fear that the people will elect Islamists who will erect a new order every bit as illiberal as the previous one. The Islamists fear that the liberal fetish for freedom will go too far, rendering Egypt unable to defend and preserve its culture and faith. At present, each group has turned to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—the junta to which Mubarak delegated power on February 11—to arbitrate the dispute, but that organization seems content to play the forces for change off against each other in a bid to retain its preeminence. In other words, a mere eight months after Mubarak’s overthrow, we are left with a political landscape bitterly divided between liberals who—as the jurist Tariq al-Bishri put it—fear democracy and democrats who fear liberty. Five years from now, Egyptians will not remember the precise details of the current quarrel over election timing and constitution writing, but the cleavage that the disagreement represents will not fade so easily. The country’s revolutionaries—liberal and Islamist—will have to find some way of managing their differences if they are to have a hope of bequeathing the legitimate government that Egyptians deserve.
American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What's the Big Idea? (PDF)
Michele Dunne, Uri Dadush
How can Europe and the United States support democratic transitions in a way that is acceptable to the Arab countries, effective in inducing genuine change, and affordable at a time when both continents are confronting fiscal crises? The best instruments available are enhanced trade agreements that not only promote market access, but even more importantly maximize competitiveness-enhancing and job-promoting reforms in the Arab countries. The pre-uprising Western Policies—pressing recalcitrant Arab leaders to undertake top-down political reforms while building civil society capacity to generate bottom-up demand—have been overtaken by events in at least a significant minority of countries. There is now an explicit commitment to democratize, deeply-rooted in the general will of the people. The question is not whether, but how to do it. Analogous to the process that successfully drew the formerly planned economies of Eastern Europe to liberal democracy, what is needed is a new and compelling vision for closer and more equitable economic relations both among Arab countries and between them and the trans-Atlantic community. Reflecting the global interest in successful transitions, the initiative should also mobilize assistance from large oil-importing countries outside of Europe and the United States. It should also draw on help from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States which, though clearly ambivalent about the democratic transitions in their Arab neighbors, have a vital interest in their growth and stability. To these ends, new trade agreements should be far deeper and more comprehensive than those currently in force and contain many of the elements included in Eastern European countries’ accession agreements, including a bold multi-year trade assistance initiative designed to bolster competitiveness and the role of the private sector in the Arab countries.