

The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy

Within hours of President Obama's announcement of Osama bin Laden's May 2 death, pundits and politicians from both the right and left were calling for a speedier withdrawal from Afghanistan. The discovery and targeted killing of bin Laden in a compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad, Pakistan, located less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy, dramatically amplified concerns about elements of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) maintaining links with al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. Many argued that the death of al-Qaeda's leader meant that our post-9/11 mission had been accomplished, and our expensive presence in Afghanistan was no longer needed amidst an era of mounting debt and budget fights.

The president had already told the American people that the 2009–2010 surge of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was critical for our nation's security, while simultaneously telling them that we had to begin withdrawing those troops in July 2011.¹ Unfortunately, this not only sent a conflicting message to Americans and our allies in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but also encouraged Afghans and Pakistanis to hedge against a NATO withdrawal by double-dealing with the Taliban or other militant groups. This double-dealing is most obvious with regard to the ISI, as multiple reports indicate that it continues to maintain links with Taliban groups such as the Haqqani Network.²

Dr. David M. Abshire is President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. He co-founded CSIS in 1962 and was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State (1970–1972) and U.S. Ambassador to NATO (1983–1987). Ryan Browne is the Director of International Security Studies at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress.

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Many others responded after bin Laden's death that withdrawing troops would risk reversing the gains that have been made by a nearly 10-year military effort and could cause Afghanistan to reemerge as a destabilizing pariah that violates human rights and supports terrorist groups which threaten international security. Prior to the recent covert operation heard around the world, there had been multiple independent reports indicating that the arrival of thousands of "surge" forces had resulted in substantial tactical gains for ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces in the former Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan. A hastened withdrawal could recreate the anarchy that followed the 1989 Soviet withdrawal and subsequent U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan. That anarchy enabled the rise of the Taliban, which severely destabilized Afghanistan's neighbors and served as a critical enabler for a wide variety of terrorist groups

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which carried out attacks against the United States, Europe, India, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Conversely, a stable Afghanistan that sits on the crossroads between Central, South, and East Asia would help bring stability and prosperity to Eurasia, while simultaneously enhancing the credibility of the members of ISAF and dealing a major blow to regional extremist movements.

Yet, although an immediate or accelerated withdrawal would be tremendously ill-advised, our current military-centric strategy in Afghanistan is also unsustainable and suffers from a debilitating credibility deficit. A complementary long-term, coordinated regional economic and entrepreneurial development program is needed to help consolidate our current military gains and foster sustainable Afghan and regional stability over the long term. Our security-focused strategy needs to place a greater emphasis on appropriately addressing regional dynamics and promoting sustainable economic development, which helps to unify the region in the interest of shared stability and prosperity. Such a development would help establish a politically neutral Afghanistan and decrease regional tensions.

An Unsustainable Course

The United States and Afghanistan have recently launched the Security Consultation Forum, tasked with devising a long-term security partnership agreement that will outline the future of the U.S.-Afghan strategic relationship. Yet, while such an agreement is critical to ensuring that Afghanistan and its

neighbors understand the United States is committed to the region's security, a broader long-term commitment that goes beyond security and wins over Afghans and their neighbors is needed to guarantee the region's stability.

Despite the president's June 22, 2011 speech and NATO's announcement at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 that the transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces will not be completed until the end of 2014, much ambiguity remains regarding the pace of the transfer after summer 2012 as well as what ISAF's post-2014 presence will look like. The people of the region fear that we will abandon them as we did in 1989. Consequently, Afghanistan's neighbors have begun jockeying for influence in a bid to gain the upper hand in the region's future balance of power. This struggle for regional hegemony greatly undermines both our current efforts as well as South and Central Asia's long-term stability. The president's June 22 announcement, combined with a number of bipartisan figures who are using bin Laden's death to call for a hastened withdrawal from Afghanistan, will only fuel these feelings of impending abandonment. Furthermore, as our troops struggle to bring security to Afghanistan, Afghans are being asked to choose between two daunting futures: the first consisting of life under a corrupt and ineffective government headed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the other a return to the harsh medieval-style rule of the Taliban regime.

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The current strategy's deficiencies are somewhat unique when compared to previous U.S. military engagements. Traditionally, the United States has produced comprehensive post-war plans, as it did for post-World War II Western Europe and Japan. In both instances, these post-war plans helped to ensure the long-term strategic stability of both regions. Regrettably, there exists no comparable endgame for today's conflict in Afghanistan. To win the region's hearts and minds, we need to offer a new narrative, one filled with the promise of an enduring U.S. and international commitment which will provide a better future based on economic opportunity, access to jobs, and regional peace and stability.

In a December 2009 poll, a plurality of Afghans (34 percent) listed the economy, poverty, and jobs as the biggest problems in Afghanistan. Among those surveyed who cited another issue as their number one concern, an additional 34 percent chose the economy, poverty, and jobs as Afghanistan's second biggest challenge.³ An endgame based on a narrative of increased prosperity and improved living standards will give Afghans greater cause to embrace the

international stabilization effort in Afghanistan, thereby lessening the appeal of the Taliban and other extremist groups.

Unfortunately, at present, most foreign economic development funding is targeted toward centrally-planned development projects which often involve overly ambitious large-scale infrastructure or education projects not driven by local needs. The funding for these projects is frequently channeled through either a sometimes corrupt, overly centralized, and bureaucratic Afghan government or through foreign contractors who wind up spending money outside of Afghanistan on compliance costs or salaries for foreign workers and who are often hesitant to leave the confines of their highly-guarded compounds. The Afghan government also lacks the capacity to effectively deliver the aid money it does receive. In fiscal year 2010, the Afghan government was only able to disburse \$937 million (or about 40 percent) of the \$2.3 billion that had been placed in its development budget.⁴ Furthermore, many of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel who oversee development projects rotate out of Afghanistan after a year, preventing them from building sustained experience and capacity while simultaneously hampering continuity in development efforts. Both foreign contractors and the Afghan government are anathema to Afghanistan's historically decentralized society, and are often detached from local needs. As a result, these centrally-planned projects fail to affect the lives of average Afghans and win over their hearts and minds.

Attempts to address this disconnect between aid administrators and Afghans in need resulted in the creation of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Afghan National Solidarity Program (NSP). CERP, which proved quite successful in Iraq, gives U.S. battalion-level commanders the flexibility to distribute money for the needs they identify on the ground, such as granting relatively small amounts of aid dollars to local projects and entrepreneurs. U.S. troops in Afghanistan have spent about \$2 billion over six years on 16,000 grassroots humanitarian projects through this program. However, an audit by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has shown that these infrastructure projects often fall apart after being transferred to Afghan stewardship.⁵

The NSP, run by the Afghan government, has been widely celebrated as one of the most successful development programs in Afghanistan. It distributes modest grants to village-level elected organizations called Community Development Councils (CDCs). These CDCs identify local priorities and implement small-scale development projects, thereby avoiding the bureaucracy of the central government and/or foreign contractors. This grassroots approach goes a long way toward ensuring local goodwill for the government in the areas where the NSP operates. Since its inception in 2003, the NSP has received

approximately \$900 million from international donors, has operated in all 34 Afghan provinces, 22,000 CDCs have been elected, and more than 41,000 village-level projects have been completed. Unfortunately, the NSP has suffered from a lack of funding. While the United States provided \$10.4 billion in assistance to Afghanistan in FY 2009, Congress only allocated \$150 million of that aid to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which provides the funding for the NSP and is administered by the World Bank.⁶

While the efforts of the NSP and CERP are tremendously important, the lack of indigenous capacity to manage the projects they fund over the long term, and Afghanistan's continued heavy reliance on outside aid (foreign aid provides roughly 97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP), mean the projects are unsustainable.⁷ As Afghans and ISAF seek to transfer security responsibility to an increasingly competent and growing Afghan military and police, Afghanistan is in desperate need of increases in tax revenue to sustainably fund its indigenous security forces as well as the aforementioned internal development projects.

Meanwhile, there have been some notable successes in building an effective Afghan Army. It is expected to reach its November 2011 target goal of 171,000, and the Army currently holds an approval rating of 70 percent among the Afghan public.⁸ Furthermore, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point has succeeded in helping to establish an Afghan equivalent, the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), which gives Afghan cadets a four-year, college-level education. These cadets are proportionally representative of Afghanistan's 34 provinces and main ethnic groups. The NMAA's first class of officers graduated in 2009. Lastly, the government of Afghanistan has authorized the creation of 10,000 U.S. Special Forces-trained Afghan Local Police officers. These units, which are drawn from the local population, have proven effective in establishing bottom-up security in their local communities, and U.S. military planners want to see the program increased to as many as 24,000.

Yet, the high costs associated with maintaining the Afghan security forces highlight the immediate need for increased and sustainable revenue. While the Afghan government currently spends more than a third of its revenues on its security forces (\$450 million), this represents a very small portion of the security forces' current budget. President Obama is expected to request somewhere around \$12.8 billion to build and support Afghan security forces in 2012. Furthermore, as the United States and other members of ISAF face growing fiscal challenges and implement an increasing number of austerity measures, international funding for Afghan development projects could face severe cuts. The new "Tea Party" members of the U.S. Congress are putting additional pressure on U.S. foreign aid budgets, as members of the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party are openly hostile to foreign assistance programs.⁹

A more effective long-term strategy would promote the emergence of new local enterprises.

The Untapped Power of the Private Sector

A more effective long-term strategy would promote sustainable economic growth fueled by the emergence of new local enterprises. This kind of entrepreneurial economics has driven economic growth in the West for decades and will allow the Afghan government to increase its revenues, thereby helping it counter its near-total dependence on foreign aid. At present, Afghanistan's tax

revenue totals a paltry \$1.4 billion per year as compared to \$13 billion in U.S. aid to Afghanistan in 2010.¹⁰

In his 2010 article "Expeditionary Economics," the Kauffman Foundation's Carl Schramm ably argues to realign foreign assistance away from traditional centrally-planned development projects and instead calls for greater emphasis on encouraging an indigenous private sector as a driver of development. Schramm correctly cautions against a sequential approach to stability, development, and the growth of private enterprise. He instead argues that business creation can occur even in unstable environments, and that the growth of small enterprises can help drive the local economy, thereby simultaneously fueling stability and development on an indigenous/grassroots level.¹¹

The effectiveness of this approach was observed in Iraq, where small infusions of CERP cash to small business owners and entrepreneurs helped promote job growth and encouraged locals to buy into the ongoing stabilization effort.¹² Unlike some of the CERP-funded infrastructure projects that have become dilapidated, these businesses were able to prosper as the entrepreneurial efforts did not require a high degree of indigenous capacity to sustain them.

Attempts to build the Afghan private sector have been hampered by Afghanistan's current business climate, a product of more than three decades of armed conflict. Afghanistan ranks 167 out of 183 countries on the World Bank's 2011 Ease of Doing Business index.¹³ Yet despite this difficult environment, some industries have managed to enjoy robust growth. The successful industries not only include the well-known telecommunications sector (Afghanistan, with a population of 29 million, boasts 12 million cell phone users)¹⁴ and media giants, but also smaller and medium-sized firms. Afghanistan's beverage industry, consisting of both international companies such as Coca-Cola as well as indigenous enterprises such as the Etihad Beverage Company, has also enjoyed rapid growth. (While some reports indicate that 100 percent of Afghan beverages were imported in 2003, the share of imported beverages had decreased to five percent in 2010.¹⁵)

While some attempts have been made to stimulate the Afghan private sector, a much greater emphasis is needed to bolster this critical enabler of Afghan stability. The Task Force for Business & Stability Operations (TFSBO), under the leadership of U.S. Defense Department Deputy Undersecretary Paul A. Brinkley, has worked to strengthen Afghanistan's private sector by bringing in foreign investors and explaining to them the benefits of investing in Afghanistan.¹⁶ The TFSBO has enjoyed some successes in convincing foreign companies to invest in more stable areas, such as Herat, but these critical efforts should be greatly expanded and given a much higher profile, as more work is needed to help persuade businesses to invest. Unfortunately, the U.S. Congress has recently demanded that the Task Force be merged with USAID and Brinkley, who has run the TFSBO since its inception in 2006, stepped down in June. Many at TFSBO are considering resigning as they fear that a merger with USAID will cause the Task Force to lose much of its critical independence and dynamism, as well as bring about major budget cuts, increased bureaucracy, and risk aversion.

Procurement of goods, particularly food stuffs and clothing, is another area in which the international community can help to bolster the Afghan private sector. The hundreds of thousands of international military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan should attempt to procure as much as possible from local sources. Importing things that can be easily manufactured in Afghanistan wastes an opportunity to give Afghan businesses a much needed boost. ISAF's mandate that international forces procure bottled beverages locally, for example, helped enable the rapid growth of the Afghan beverage industry. ISAF and other international organizations should issue similar mandates (the recent decision to procure the Afghan National Army's boots locally is a small step in the right direction).

The reduction of tariffs on Afghan goods is another way in which the international community can encourage the growth of Afghan enterprises. In an effort to promote economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. Congress passed legislation establishing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in both countries. The legislation was intended to reduce or eliminate tariffs on many Afghan goods being imported into the United States. However, due to political pressure exerted by the U.S. agricultural and textile lobbies, many tariffs remain on textile and agricultural products, which constitute the vast majority of Afghan exports.

Securing Afghanistan's Future: Forming a New Economic Strategy

While changes to procurement and tariff policies will be helpful in the short term, a longer-term private sector development strategy is needed. Creating a

transitional body that can oversee USAID and military development programs while indigenous capacity is still being developed will be critical to having a successful Afghan economic development program. Such an organization would begin strengthening NGOs and nonprofit entities already operating in Afghanistan to help create a healthier business climate. NGOs have already done great work in Afghanistan and were critical to the establishment of the NSP's Community Development Councils. Additionally, the Aga Khan Development Network, the largest non-profit NGO operating in Afghanistan, played a key role in setting up Roshan, Afghanistan's leading telecommunications provider and taxpayer. This new organization should be set up outside of government, as recent reports have shown that many of the traditional nonprofit aid groups running effective bottom-up development projects wish to remain independent of U.S. government programs.¹⁷

As its efforts progressed, this new Afghan Enterprise Development Organization (AEDO) would then identify regional economic sectors with the most growth potential, provide local entrepreneurs with the capital they need to grow their businesses, offer incentives to international businesses in order to bring in foreign investment, supply needed technical assistance and operational support as well as business plan and human resource development, and enhance access to export markets. AEDO investment successes could convince wealthy Afghan ex-pats in Dubai, for example, to invest some of their sizeable assets in

Afghan companies. The organization, run primarily by Afghans with Western financial training, would be independent with an internationally recognized board of directors responsible for strengthening the fund's credibility and transparency.

Two helpful models exist for this kind of program. One such model is the Qatar-based Silatech, an independent organization founded by Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-Missned. Silatech promotes large-scale job creation, entrepreneurship, and access to

capital and markets for young people by helping to provide an array of services to entrepreneurs in the Arab world.¹⁸

Another helpful model is the Enterprise Funds that were established in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the region's communist regimes. In 1989, President George H. W. Bush announced the creation of Enterprise Funds to help Central and Eastern Europe develop private enterprise, and Congress subsequently authorized \$1.2 billion to finance 10 Enterprise Funds. These government funds were managed, without political interference, by

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qualified and independent boards of directors selected from the private sector. The funds sought to encourage private sector development through strategic loans and investments in sectors with high-growth potential. Enterprise Funds invested in small and medium-sized enterprises, provided technical assistance, attracted outside investment, and supported critical sectors such as finance, telecoms, and construction. These Enterprise Funds operated in former communist countries that, much like Afghanistan, suffered from both a lack of legal infrastructure and almost no private enterprise experience. Yet despite these challenges, the funds proved very successful in helping to create a thriving private sector (nine of the funds' beneficiaries are now in the European Union). Furthermore, the funds managed to recoup their original funding through profitable investments and loans.¹⁹

An internationally-supported AEDO based on these models could be expanded beyond Afghanistan to include countries within the region. This would include working with ongoing regional development efforts in Afghanistan, such as India's successful grassroots development projects totaling \$1.5 billion and involving two-thirds of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. India provides more aid to Afghanistan than any other country in the region, ranks sixth among all nations contributing aid to Afghanistan, and plans to commit another \$500 million over the next five years. Included among this aid are capacity-building programs and a \$50 million credit facility for small and medium enterprises.²⁰

By going directly to local leaders and asking them what projects they need, Indian development projects have dramatically bolstered the country's standing in Afghanistan, as India currently enjoys a favorability rating of 71 percent (the U.S. favorability rating stands at 51 percent despite committing more than 20 times as much aid as India).²¹ India also is a major importer of Afghan goods (23 percent of Afghan exports went to India in 2010).²² Furthermore, India is investing in Afghanistan's rich mineral resources, with 15 of the 22 firms bidding for the mining rights to the 1.8 billion-ton Hajigak iron ore deposit in Bamyan province.²³

The AEDO could also be integral to ensuring that China plays a positive role in the region's economic development and stabilization. As the world's largest importer of iron ore and an importer of 40 percent of the world's copper, China is best positioned to reap the benefits from Afghanistan's significant untapped mineral wealth (including gold, lithium, cobalt, iron ore, copper, and lapis lazuli deposits estimated to be worth over \$1 trillion).²⁴ In 2007, China purchased mining rights for the massive Aynak copper mine in Logar Province. While a resource-hungry China has invested billions in Afghan resources, many analysts fear that Chinese extraction and business practices will not contribute to the sustainable development of the Afghan economy. The Aynak and other resource

acquisitions have been dogged by allegations of bribery. Many fear that China's historic practice of importing Chinese labor to work on projects in the developing world fails to provide employment for local workers, thereby significantly reducing the stabilizing effect of these projects.²⁵ The international community could use AEDO as a mechanism through which Chinese investments could be modified so that they could better promote regional stability. The AEDO could provide Chinese firms with advanced Western extraction technology in exchange for guarantees that Chinese firms will employ and train Afghan workers, increase their transparency, and invest in the local Afghan economy.

Moreover, by including Afghanistan's neighbors, the organization will help further interconnect the region's economies and create vested interests in the stability of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has much to gain from regionalizing its economic development, including utilizing Pakistani transportation infrastructure, Central Asian oil, hydropower, and natural gas, and experienced Indian entrepreneurs. Proponents of the "Modern Silk Road" strategy for Afghanistan seek to bring economic development to Afghanistan by making it a key transportation hub for South and Central Asia. This strategy, envisioned by S. Frederick Starr and Andrew C. Kuchins in their report "The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy," advocates removing impediments to continental transport and trade across Afghanistan's territory and the construction of infrastructure linking Afghanistan and its neighbors.²⁶ Although grassroots entrepreneurs and private enterprises are critical to Afghanistan's and the region's sustained prosperity and stability, targeted and strategic infrastructure projects that integrate the regional economies will facilitate their development.²⁷

There has been some momentum in this direction with the announcement of the \$7.6 billion TAPI pipeline project, which will bring natural gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is funding the project, and the Afghan government will receive eight percent of its revenue. The ADB is also supporting the Central Asia/South Asia Regional Electricity Market, a \$500 million project that seeks to build a high-transmission power line conveying surplus hydropower electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through Afghanistan to Pakistan.²⁸ Also, USAID has spent \$1.8 billion in Afghanistan to re-develop 635 kilometers of the Ring Road (which connects the key cities of Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat) and 2,700 kilometers of other roads linking primary and secondary markets. The United States also built the large bridge connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan's neighbors are very interested in using Afghanistan as a regional interconnector. Uzbekistan, for example, hopes to develop an Uzbekistan-

Afghanistan–Iran road network that links the Uzbek capital of Tashkent to the Iranian ports of Bandar-Abbas and Chabahar. Other contributors to Afghanistan’s road network include India, Iran, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.

Much more needs to be done, however, to integrate the region’s economies. Afghanistan currently lacks a functioning railway system, having only just completed its first significant 75-kilometer line linking the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif with the city of Hairatan on the Afghan–Uzbek border. And despite the recent signing of a trade-facilitating transit agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamabad continues to place restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and India, thereby preventing a major boom in Indian–Afghan trade. Despite these restrictions, India continues to seek increased trade with Afghanistan, and hopes to import agricultural products such as Afghanistan’s famed pomegranates.²⁹ Afghanistan’s ability to profit from its lucrative untapped mineral deposits will also be facilitated by expanding regional transportation networks. By bringing concrete economic benefits to Afghanistan’s neighbors, the AEDO would help to encourage them to guarantee Afghan neutrality and lessen the possibility of another “Great Game” in Afghanistan.

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Addressing regional dynamics is critical to bringing stability to Afghanistan and the surrounding area. India fears that a resurgent Afghan Taliban will once again provide safe haven for al-Qaeda-linked militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which are anti-India. For years, these groups have launched attacks in the disputed Kashmir region and within India itself, most notably the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and the 2008 Mumbai attack. During the 1990s, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan allowed LeT recruits to train in al-Qaeda-run camps in Kunar, Afghanistan.

Pakistan, which regards India as its primary strategic threat, similarly fears a strategic encirclement resulting from the burgeoning India–Afghanistan relationship. While Pakistan sees India as its principal rival, it is hardly an equal rivalry as India’s \$1.4 trillion GDP dwarfs Pakistan’s \$175 billion GDP.³⁰ Moreover, the Indian defense budget is more than four times Pakistan’s, and the Indian military is twice the size of the Pakistani military.³¹ This growing disparity in conventional military force has convinced Pakistan’s generals of the need to maintain links with anti-India militant groups while simultaneously expanding Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile (the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal).

A politically-neutral Afghanistan must be a major strategic goal.

While an international neutralization of Afghanistan will not cause an immediate and comprehensive rapprochement between India and Pakistan, it will address many Pakistani and Indian concerns, removing a major point of contention between those two nations. Therefore, this neutralization must be a major strategic goal of the international community, and it will be facilitated by an integration of regional economies. This will

also help to decrease the threat of regional extremist terrorism by enabling the Pakistani military to accelerate its campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuaries along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.

Conclusion

Henry Kissinger, an advocate for internationally-assured neutrality in Afghanistan, often points out that there is precedence for such neutrality providing stability.³² He appropriately highlights the example of Belgium as proof that the concept is viable. Historically, the area that comprises modern-day Belgium was a major point of contention among the European powers due to its strategic location at the crossroads between historical Western, Northern, and Central Europe, as well as its access to North Atlantic sea lanes. In the 19th century, European powers ended their strategic competition in Belgium by guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality in the 1839 Treaty of London. The arrangement lasted for nearly 100 years. In 1955, Austria avoided becoming a major flashpoint and source of conflict between the Soviet Union and NATO due to a similar international neutralization.

Our current strategy is insufficient to create the lasting stability and security the Afghan people deserve and regional stability requires after more than three decades of war. Once the aforementioned strategic investments in Afghan entrepreneurs get the Afghan economic engine moving, Afghanistan's neighbors will undoubtedly benefit from this economic renaissance and the establishment of new trade links. Therefore, Afghanistan's neighbors will be appropriately incentivized to discontinue their jockeying over Afghanistan and agree to an internationally established Afghan neutrality, lest they risk losing these economic benefits. A long-term commitment to the economic growth and prosperity of the region will create a vested interest in regional stability, thereby lessening the risk of another armed conflict between the nuclear-armed nations of India and Pakistan. In order to ensure that a stable, sustainable, and viable Afghanistan emerges, the United States must move quickly to focus its energy on

building a sustainable Afghan economy and establishing the Afghan Enterprise Development Organization, as mounting political pressure will eventually force President Obama and our allies to complete the withdrawal of ISAF forces.

Notes

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