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“Here is the question—still unanswered—who are the masterminds behind Duca, Legija, and Zveki? Although some politicians have hinted and part of the public is convinced they exist, the official investigation has not clearly indicted anyone. . . . The process of returning Serbia to a normal state and its transformation into a well-governed country appears to be irreversible. But what has the assassination of Zoran Djindjic brought to those who were using political dogmas, prejudices, and ideology as an excuse for this crime? Milos Vasic[i] This is how Milos Vasic ended his excellent book Atentat na Zorana in 2005, two years before the Special Court for Organized Crime sentenced twelve men, including Milorad Ulemek, also known as “Legija,” and Zvezdan Jovanovic, also known as “Zveki,” to a total of 378 years for the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Dr. Zoran Djindjic.[ii] We are now in 2012 and the question asked by Vasic remains unanswered. Djindjic’s assassination was not only a personal loss for his family and friends, but it was also a defining event of the period that came after the toppling of dictator Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000. This article argues that the assassination was the result of a struggle between organized crime forces and modernizing and democratizing forces in Serbia. It was also an attempt to secure impunity for war criminals still active in the Serbian police and military forces. It was a show of power that serves even today as a warning to anyone who dares to democratize Serbia by building strong democratic institutions and securing the rule of law. In this sense, the bullet that went through Djindjic’s heart was aimed directly at the future of democracy in Serbia. As long as the political sponsors responsible for his murder are not put on trial, this bullet will continue to rip through weak Serbian institutions and serve as a warning to any progressive individual or group not to rock the boat. Additionally, given that Serbia is one of the most influential countries in the western Balkans, such obstacles to emerging democratic institutions could have ramifications for the stability of the region. Therefore, it is crucial for both Serbia and the region to probe into the political background of the assassination and to prosecute those responsible to the fullest extent of the law. In November 2010, seven years after the assassination, Srdja Popovic, Djindjic’s family lawyer, filed criminal charges against the Special Operations Unit(JSO), for its participation in the 2001 rebellion. The rebellion is a crucial event for understanding the political background of the assassination. The JSO was an elite police unit founded in the 1990s by Milosevic and Jovica Stanisic, the chief of the State Security Service. The State Security Service was later renamed the Security Information Agency (BIA). Led by Milorad Ulemek, an ex-French Foreign Legionnaire, the unit served Milosevic and his wife by conducting political assassinations, smuggling operations, and other tasks to protect the regime in general.[iii] Ulemek had strong personal ties with the criminal underground in Serbia, especially with the Zemun Clan, whose bosses were Dusan “Siptar” Spasojevic and Mile “Kum” Lukovic. The clan’s drug trafficking network extended from Bulgaria and Macedonia in the north, through Kosovo in the south, and stretched into Western Europe.[iv] This nexus between state officials, special police forces, and multiethnic organized crime groups with cross border activities, established during the 1990s and best described in the popular saying, “every state has its mafia, but only in Serbia the mafia has its state,” managed to survive long after Milosevic was toppled in 2000.[v] According to an investigative reporter with expertise in organized crime, Dejan Anastasijevic, the main source of revenue for the Zemun Clan before Djindjic’s assassination—apart from kidnappings, extortion, and contract murders—was drug trafficking. For this, the Zemun Clan tapped the routes that were used to traffic oil and cigarettes during the UN-imposed sanctions in the 1990s. These routes were controlled by the BIA, whose role was to ensure a smooth transition of goods through Serbian territory. The final destination for most of the shipments was Western Europe. Interestingly, these operations involved organized crime groups not only from Serbia, but also from neighboring countries.[vi] One of the best examples of this nexus is given by Anastasijevic below, whose work earned him an assassination attempt in 2007—a hand grenade went off right outside the bedroom window of his downtown Belgrade apartment.[vii] An interesting insight into the way the crime gangs cooperate can be gleaned from the case of Qamil Shabani, an ethnic Albanian from Urosevac. Shabani was a close associate of Metush Bajrami, an ethnic Albanian from Macedonia with a Bulgarian citizenship, who supervised heroin transports via Turkey, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. But Shabani was also linked with the Serbian crime ring known as the Zemun Clan. . . . Until the ring was busted, members of the Zemun gang were regularly picking up heroin shipments from Shabani’s warehouse in Urosevac and transported them into Serbia through the Presevo valley; thanks to their connections with BIA, their vehicles were often escorted by Serbian security officers, ensuring that trucks could pass through police checkpoints without being searched. The scheme worked until the leaders of the Zemun Clan and their BIA accomplices were arrested in 2003, after they organized the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, Serbia’s Prime Minister.[viii] Most members of Balkan organized crime groups tend to be ultranationalists in public.[ix] However, when it comes to their personal interests, the closest business ties are being established even among so-called worst enemies—Serbs and Albanians.[x] Indeed, Yugoslavia has never ceased to exist for the organized crime world in the Balkans. This clearly shows that transnational organized crime networks are extremely resistant; they can survive even during and after an open ethnic conflict. Such hypocrisy became visible during the trial for Djindjic’s assassination when it was established that “the leading members of the Zemun Clan underwent ‘special training courses’ by the BIA, and that the agency routinely provided protection for the gang members. The only explanation from the BIA’s officials was that the gang members were providing the agency with ‘valuable data on Albanian terrorists in Kosovo’.”[xi] In November 2001, the JSO rebelled against the Serbian government because it feared that Djindjic’s cooperation with the Hague tribunal could lead to the arrest of many JSO members and their protectors for committing war crimes during the 1990s. The JSO, fully armed and with the use of combat vehicles, occupied part of the highway that runs through the center of Belgrade to prevent this outcome. After the 2001 rebellion, Djindjic practically lost even the very limited oversight he had of the BIA, while control over the army and its secret intelligence arm, the Military Security Agency (VBA), was never achieved. He tried to regain some control over the BIA in 2002 and in the first few months of 2003, came very close to succeeding.[xii] Resolved to crushing the JSO and allied mafia clans, he declared 2002 the year of the fight against organized crime. The Djindjic government even adopted the Law on the Fight against Organized Crime in July of that year. However, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and their Montenegrin allies blocked the passage of the law in federal parliament until December 2002.[xiii] After learning that the mafia was obtaining secret security information from the BIA, Djindjic decided in January 2003 to replace the deputy chief of the BIA, who was said to be allied with Ulemek.[xiv] Exactly one week before the assassination, a new office of the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime was formed in Belgrade, and a new special prosecutor was appointed by Prime Minister Djindjic to serve in the post.[xv] On 11 March 2003, the special prosecutor had testimonies signed by crucial witnesses from the newly established witness protection program in Serbia and was ready to issue warrants for the arrest of Ulemek and other important figures.[xvi] Unfortunately, the assassins struck first. On 12 March 2003, at 12:25 p.m., Dr. Zoran Djindjic, the first democratically elected prime minister of Serbia, was killed by a sniper in front of a government building in downtown Belgrade.[xvii] During the trial in 2010, apart from the members of the JSO, including those already convicted for the assassination such as Ulemek and Zvezdan Jovanovic, criminal charges were also filed against Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time of the rebellion, and his chief of the VBA, Aco Tomic.[xviii] The charge was filed against Kostunica because, “contrary to the constitution, as the commander of the state armed forces, he did not end the uprising of the special operations unit.”[xix] Instead, Kostunica expressed his support and understanding for the rebels. Furthermore, Aco Tomic, was accused of frequently meeting with Ulemek and Spasojevic, one of the Zemun Clan bosses, both at the Army Security Directorate building and in Tomic’s private apartment before the assassination.[xx] As commander in chief of the armed forces, Kostunica was directly responsible for appointing him to this post.[xxi] In addition to this, the national security adviser in Kostunica’s cabinet, and later the chief of the BIA, met with Tomic, Ulemek, and Spasojevic during the rebellion.[xxii] Several months later, and only a day before the eighth anniversary of Djindjic’s assassination, on 11 March 2011, the state prosecutor for organized crime stated that Kostunica would be questioned during the investigation into the political background of Djindjic’s assassination.[xxiii] On the same day, the minister of justice expressed hopes of uncovering the backers of the 2001 rebellion, which she alleged was a precursor to the assassination.[xxiv] The only response from Kostunica was a brief statement in which he accused the state prosecutor of becoming a puppet of the government and anticipated that any prosecution against him would be a political show trial staged by those who wanted to destroy Serbia.[xxv] Apart from some public statements made by other DSS members, this was Kostunica’s only move. It was a strangely calm reaction from someone who was about to be questioned and possibly accused of a very serious crime. However, a whole year passed before the state prosecutor decided to turn his words into action. On 9 March 2012, three days before the ninth anniversary of Djindjic’s assassination, the state prosecutor for organized crime pressed charges against eight former JSO members for organizing the armed rebellion. No charges were filed against Kostunica, however. According to the prosecutor, despite all the aforementioned evidence, his involvement could not be proven.[xxvi] It can be surmised, however, that someone had instructed the prosecutor to act on this case at a time when the Serbian public was most likely to remember Djindjic—on his death anniversary. Still, the lack of political will is not only evidenced by Kostunica’s de facto amnesty, but also by the fact that to this day, the government has not published the Korac’s Committee Report in its entirety. The report deals with the failures of the system that was supposed to protect Prime Minister Djindjic, and the committee also investigated the role of the BIA and VBA in the assassination. Such an investigation was justified by the fact that the JSO was a military wing of the BIA—a truly unique case, at least in Europe, that an intelligence agency has a military branch—and by the fact that Kostunica’s chief of the VBA, Tomic, had direct contacts with Ulemek and Spasojevic right before the assassination.[xxvii] In an interview given to a Serbian broadcaster in 2008, Zarko Korac, deputy prime minister in Djindjic’s government and head of the committee, said that the report was rejected by the Serbian police and the BIA without any explanation. He added that, although the report’s conclusion clearly pointed at some people within the Serbian police and military, an indictment had never been raised; instead, the report had been declared a state secret.[xxviii] The former deputy minister of the interior of Djindjic’s government, and one of the closest allies of the late prime minister, surmised that a possible reason why the current Serbian government was keeping parts of this document under the veil of secrecy was because of the lack of reform within the secret agencies in Serbia.[xxix] While the BIA has gone through some changes in the last decade, the VBA remains untouched. Of particular importance is the fact that during the JSO rebellion in 2001, one of the demands was for the resignation of the BIA chief appointed by Djindjic.[xxx] Djindjic, left with no choice, agreed, and lost his already weak control over the BIA. The fact that a military unit founded by Milosevic was trying to control the top appointment of a state organ shows that somebody else was directing them. Furthermore, whoever that person or group was, it is clear that control of the BIA was at the top of their agenda. When Kostunica became Prime Minister in 2004, the BIA was allegedly purged of all so-called negative elements, which allowed most of the Milosevic’s old cadre to become active again. In addition to this, Kostunica’s security adviser—arrested after the assassination, along with Tomic, for having contacts with Ulemek and Spasojevic—became the head of the BIA. The role of the VBA and BIA in Djindjic’s assassination was never seriously looked into, nor was any internal investigation ever carried out by these institutions. Moreover, to this day, some of those who worked for the Milosevic regime continue to occupy senior posts in the security services and government. For example, the recently appointed chief of staff to the minister of justice has been accused by the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Vuk Draskovic, of being a member of an infamous “sixth department” of the State Security Service (the precursor to the BIA), whose purpose was to physically eliminate political opponents of Milosevic.[xxxi] This department consisted of five of the most loyal State Security agents and seven Special Operation Unit soldiers under Ulemek’s command.[xxxii] The head of this department, along with two other agents, was sentenced in June 2012 to twenty-two years in prison for the attempted murder of Vuk Draskovic in 2000.[xxxiii] The sixth department was dissembled in 2001, immediately after Djindjic’s government came to power.[xxxiv] Furthermore, five years after the assassination, Boris Tadic, former president of Serbia and also president of the “purged” Democratic Party, decided that the time had come for national unity. He signed a political declaration of reconciliation between the Democratic Party and Milosevic’s unreformed Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), represented by Ivica Dacic.[xxxv] The comeback of Milosevic’s cronies, now in control of the Serbian government, makes the probability of Kostunica’s prosecution highly unlikely. He is protected politically, because any deeper investigation into the background of the assassination would necessitate an investigation into the BIA and VBA. Such an investigation is unacceptable to many in Serbia today because it threatens to reveal much more than what is necessary for charging only Kostunica. As a result, the BIA and VBA present an obstacle not only to discovering the political background of the assassination, but also to the process of democratization in Serbia. In the words of a former BIA agent, “if you throw a bomb into this cesspool [the BIA] everyone will be covered in shit. But that is something we have to do.”[xxxvi] Unfortunately, the last person who was capable and ready to throw this bomb was “removed” on 12 March 2003. At the same time, by purging the Democratic Party of all elements associated with Djindjic, those within the BIA and VBA have ensured that no one like him can threaten them again. Djindjic’s assassination served not only to halt reforms but also to warn anyone against acting courageously like him in the future.[xxxvii] After the elections in May 2012, Ivica Dacic became prime minister of Serbia while continuing in his position as minister of interior. This means that the BIA today is under the control of Milosevic’s SPS party, led by Dacic. Furthermore, the current president of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolic, and Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vucic, are both former allies of Vojislav Seselj, who is the president of the extremist Serbian Radical Party (SRS).[xxxviii] Seselj is currently in the Hague tribunal standing trial for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war.[xxxix] None of these people would have been able to hold political office in the modernized and democratic Serbia that Djindjic and his allies had envisioned. Moreover, Kostunica’s protection from further investigation by the state prosecutor and the prevention of the full release of the Korac’s Committee Report justifies the suspicion that there is a lack of political will for revealing the political background of the assassination. Still, one recent arrest by the Spanish police is probably unsettling for some people in Belgrade. On 9 February 2012, four men were arrested while dining in a restaurant in Valencia in eastern Spain.[xl] One of them had been sentenced in absentia to thirty-five years in prison for his involvement in the assassination of Djindjic.[xli] Another was Luka Bojovic, who is alleged to have been a member of the Serbian paramilitary group, known as “Arkan’s Tigers.” A judge and spokeswoman for Serbia’s organized crime court said that the indictment against Bojovic “alleged that he took over and organized the fugitive members of the gang that killed Djindjic—presumably the Zemun Clan—after they fled Serbia in the aftermath of the killing.”[xlii] Two years earlier, in August 2010, Sretko “The Beast” Kalinic, another member of the Zemun Clan, was extradited from Zagreb, Croatia to Belgrade more than three years after he was convicted to thirty years in prison for his role in the assassination of Djindjic. After his arrest in Croatia, Kalinic admitted to involvement in the murders of two witnesses and alleged that Bojovic had ordered the murder of the third witness linked to the Djindjic assassination trial.[xliii] For these and other murders, he had received orders and instructions from Luka Bojovic. Currently, Bojovic and the others are still waiting to be extradited from Spain to Serbia. Given that Ulemek has been in prison since May 2004, the question that remains to be answered is who was giving instructions and information to Bojovic for these murders? Two of the murdered witnesses, both former members of the Zemun Clan, were ready to talk about the connections between the clan and the state institutions.[xliv] One of them testified that the clan leader, Spasojevic, had funded Vojislav Seselj’s election campaigns and the construction of his house and had even given him a jeep as a present.[xlv] According to the testimony, Spasojevic also tried to convince Seselj not to surrender to the Hague tribunal. Another protected witness, who is still alive, allegedly revealed that Spasojevic was Seselj’s informer, and that the character Laufer, on whom Seselj based his two books, was indeed Spasojevic.[xlvi] Current president, Tomislav Nikolic, who served as Seselj’s deputy in 2006, tried to defend Seselj and discredit this witness by saying that he was ready to implicate anyone to conceal his own responsibility.[xlvii] In addition, Bojovic was mentored by Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. Until he was killed in 2000, Arkan was the leader of “Arkan’s Tigers” and the Serbian underworld, and had very strong ties with the BIA, which could have been useful to Bojovic. Two potential scenarios are possible here: first, Bojovic’s own connections to the BIA could easily come to the surface when he faces a possible sentence of forty years in prison.[xlviii] His trial could become a test of strength for the justice system and democracy in Serbia. This could also be the last chance to “throw a bomb into the cesspool” in the hope of bringing the real organizers of Djindjic’s murder to justice. However, given the fact that people who are in power currently in Serbia are the ones who were closely connected to Milosevic and Seselj, this scenario is highly unlikely. The other scenario is that Bojovic’s case will be left on the backburner, or, if he does eventually face trial in Serbia, the case will be presented to the public as a gang-related feud without making any connections to the BIA or Djindjic’s assassination. The fact remains that although it has been more than seven months since their arrest, Bojovic and others are still waiting to be extradited to Serbia. The trial was recently postponed, and there is even speculation that Bojovic will stand trial in Spain instead of being extradited to Serbia.[xlix] If that happens, he will face charges only for crimes committed on Spanish territory and not for those committed elsewhere, including the murders of witnesses in Djindjic’s trial.[l] For those in Belgrade hoping that the instigators behind Djindjic’s assassination will never be known, this will be the best outcome. Kalinic recently confessed that he committed murders for Bojovic out of friendship. He is no longer mentioning the issue of murdered witnesses in light of the Djindjic trial.[li] In fact, in early October 2012, Kalinic switched his story about the murder of one of the witnesses to being a gang-related feud whose underlying cause was money.[lii] The question that remains is why Kalinic is confessing now, and whether this is a smoke screen to make the public look in the wrong direction. Finally, we should not forget that the Zemun Clan and their allies in the world of transnational organized crime have managed to amass an enormous amount of material wealth that is visible in parts of Europe. A street in the southern Spanish city of Marbella is locally known as Serbian Street because of the sheer number of Serbian-owned real estate properties and businesses on it.[liii] Wealth aside, Bojovic and his gang are accused of committing “twenty murders in Serbia, Holland and Spain and are under investigation in Switzerland, Romania, Holland, Spain, and the United States for several robberies and drug trafficking.”[liv] Bojovic also owns a group of companies called TAEDA through an associate who is a close friend. It is registered in Delaware, the United States, as well as in Croatia and Serbia.[lv] This company was established at the exact same address as four other companies owned by the fugitive drug kingpin, Darko Saric.[lvi] Documents establish a potential connection between Bojovic and Saric, one of the most powerful fugitive drug kingpins in the Balkans.[lvii] Unknown to the public, in October 2009, when more than two tons of cocaine was seized near the Uruguayan coast in an international police operation, it emerged that Saric was involved in cocaine trafficking from South America—namely, Colombia, Argentina, and Uruguay—through Balkan countries, to Italy and Slovenia and further on into western Europe.[lviii] He laundered billions of euros through companies in Serbia, Montenegro, and some western European countries.[lix] Such massive wealth gained through international drug trafficking can certainly have an impact on weak and corrupt Serbian state institutions. Whether Bojovic has some of that money at his disposal is not known, but the fact that there is a possibility that he will not be extradited to Serbia where he would have faced charges for witness elimination in Djindjic’s trial should raise some concerns. Prosecuting those responsible for organizing Djindjic’s assassination will open the possibility of finally cracking down upon what are likely two of the last unreformed secret intelligence agencies in Europe, namely the BIA and VBA. Such a process may reveal that these two agencies are really the powerhouses of organized crime in Serbia and the region. In addition, Kostunica’s prosecution could also politically remove at least some of the most influential nationalists gathered around him in the Serbian public scene. The society would benefit from such a prosecution not only for the sake of justice, but also politically, since it would return Serbia back on the path to becoming a stable state with strong democratic institutions. Finally, removing the extremists from the political stage in Serbia would be beneficial for regional stability in the western Balkans and would foster good neighborly relations as “the nexus between organized crime and political extremism can be a serious challenge to enduring democratic reform.”[lx] Unfortunately, we are facing the possibility that weak Serbian institutions will succumb to the power of drug money, in which case those responsible for Djindjic’s assassination will never face justice. Serbia today lacks democratic potential and the political will to fight systemic corruption and reform the security sector, which has been infiltrated by the organized crime networks that extend far beyond state borders. One thing that is lacking in Serbia more than any other is a leader with the intellect, courage, and integrity of Zoran Djindjic. In an interview given to Le Monde on 5 October 2001—the first anniversary of the revolution and toppling of Milosevic—Prime Minister Djindjic elucidated his political convictions: I believe that to deal with politics means to take responsibilities and not sit in churches. My political line has been the same for the past thirty years: I advocate an urban, civilized and European country in opposition to dictatorship. What makes me different from others is that in Serbia, intellectuals are the spectators, making analyses, smoking and grumbling. What I wish is to change the world.[lxi] By toppling Milosevic, Zoran Djindjic made Serbia better and changed the face of the Balkans. The least Serbia can do in return is to bring those responsible for his murder to justice. Nemanja Mladenovic is a graduate student at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs specializing in international security policy and international conflict resolution with a regional focus on Southeastern Europe. He spent the summer of 2012 working at the UN Department of Political Affairs and is currently working as a research assistant for the East Central European Center at Columbia University. Nemanja graduated summa cum laude with a BA in Political Science and Philosophy from Columbia University. [i] Milos Vasic, Atentat na Zorana. (Beograd: Narodna Knjiga, 2005), 172, http://ponude.biz/knjige/m/milos%20vasic%20-%20atentat-na-zorana-djindjica.pdf. [ii] “Djindjic Assassins Sentenced to 378 Years in Jail,” Balkan Insight, 23 May 2007, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/djindjic-assassins-sentenced-to-378-years-in-jail. [iii] “Jedinica za Specijalne Operacije,” Special Warfare Encyclopedia, http://en.specwar.info/special-forces/serbia/jedinica-za-specijalne-oper... “Death of a Balkan Hero,” The Guardian, 15 March 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/16/balkans. [iv] “Serbia’s Zemun Clan ‘Withdraws’ from Bulgaria,” Novinite, 19 June 2006, http://new.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=65208; “Heroin and cocaine routes cross in Balkans,” B92, 9 September 2012, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=09&nav_id=82152. [v] UNICRI, “The fight against organized crime in Serbia: from the existing legislation to a comprehensive reform proposal,” Trends in Organized Crime, 11, Number 4 (2008), 9. [vi] Dejan Anastasijevic, “Organized Crime in the Western Balkans” (paper presented at the First Annual Conference on Human Security, Terrorism and Organized Crime in the Western Balkan Region, organized by the HUMSEC project in Ljubljana, 23-25 November 2006), 3, http://www.etc-graz.at/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_Anastasijevic.pdf. [vii] Dejan Anastasijevic, “The Price of Speaking Out in Serbia,” TIME, 17 April 2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1611396,00.html. [viii] Anastasijevic, (2006), 4. [ix] Igor Jovanovic, “Veselinovic arrests stir controversy in Serbia,” SETimes, 22 December 2012, http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/12/22/feature-01. [x] “‘Balkan Route’ addressed in UN Drug Report,” Balkan Insight, 24 June 2010, http://www.flarenetwork.org/learn/europe/article/balkan_route_addressed_in_un_drug_report.htm. [xi] Dejan Anastasijevic, (2006), 5.  [xii] Dejan Anastasijevic, “What’s Wrong With Serbia?” 3-4, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/dejan_anastasijevic-what-is-wrong-with-serbia_april-2008.pdf. [xiii] Srdjan Cvijic, “Blocked political system’: Serbia 2000-2008,” Balkanologie, December 2008, 46-47, http://balkanologie.revues.org/index1293.html. [xiv] “Zavera cutanja?” B92 Insajder, 3 December 2012, http://www.b92.net/insajder/arhiva/arhiva.php?nav_category=1382&nav_id=610379. [xv] “Politicka pozadina atentata,” B92, 13 March 2008, http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?yyyy=2008&mm=03&nav_id=289530. [xvi] “Tihomir Loza: The Rest of the Story,” TOL, 17 March 2011, http://www.tol.org/client/article/22254-the-rest-of-the-story.html. [xvii] Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Ubijen premijer Srbije Zoran Đinđić,” 12 March 2003, http://www.arhiva.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/2003-03/12/334050.html. [xviii] Vesna Rakić-Vodinelić, “Above the law and under it,” Pescanik, 19 November 2010, http://pescanik.net/2010/11/above-the-law-and-under-it/. [xix] Bojana Milovanovic, “Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic’s Assassination still Raising Controversy,” SETimes, 26 March 2012, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/03/26/feature-02. [xx] Srđa Popović, “Criminal Complaint for Armed Insurrection,” Pescanik, 17 November 2010, http://pescanik.net/2010/11/criminal-complaint-for-armed-insurrection. [xxi] Ibid. [xxii] Kostunica’s national security adviser was Rade Bulatovic; “Kostunica aide arrested,” SEE Online, 9 April 2003, http://www.southeasteurope.org/subpage.php?sub_site=2&id=8711&s_word=zoran. [xxiii] Miljko Radisavljevic, prosecutor for organised crime. [xxiv] Snezana Malovic was the Minister of Justice; Izvor, “Kostunica ce biti Saslusan,” B92 News, 3 November 2011, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=03&dd=11&nav_category=11&nav_id=498543. [xxv] “МОНТИРАНИ ПРОЦЕС ПРОТИВ ДСС,” DSS Official Website, 3 March 2011, http://dss.rs/montirani-proces-protiv-dss/. [xxvi] After hearing this, Srdja Popovic stated that this decision goes against the evidence since “the evidence puts suspicion on Kostunica; there are testimonies in the Djindjic murder case. Let’s just remember that Kostunica wholeheartedly supported the JSO during the rebellion. There was a big conflict over the delivery of Milosevic to The Hague tribunal which Kostunica opposed, along with co-operating with the tribunal. Kostunica was trying to obstruct Djindjic at every step.” See “Bojana Milovanovic “Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic’s Assassination still Raising Controversy,” SETimes, 26 March 2012, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/03/26/feature-02. [xxvii] Only parts of this document can be found on the Internet today, but the validity of its source is questionable. See “The Report of Korac’s Commission,” Wikisource, http://sr.wikisource.org/wiki/Izve%C5%A1taj_Kora%C4%87eve_komisije#.C5.A..., (accessed 6 May 2012). [xxviii] “TV B92 Insajder Debata,” YouTube video, 1:43, posted by “LPPtv,” 16 March 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzUTA_aAZRw; In March 2010, B92 news reporters asked the government of Serbia to lift the secrecy from all parts of this document and to make it public. Although the government was legally required to make the document public in its totality, they refused to do so. Following this, B92’s legal team filed charges against the government of Serbia in the Constitutional Court but they have not received any response to this day. See B92, “Insajder Tuzio Vladu Srbije,” B 92, http://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav_id=418898 (accessed 6 May 2012). [xxix] Nenad Milic; “TV B92 Insajder Debata,” YouTube video, 1:43, posted by “LPPtv.” 16 March 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzUTA_aAZRw. [xxx] Goran Petrovic. [xxxi] Dejan Carevic. [xxxii] “Carevic ozloglaseni sef kabineta ministra pravde,” 021: SPO, August 30, 2012, http://www.021.rs/Info/Srbija/SPO-Carevic-ozloglaseni-sef-kabineta-ministra-pravde.html. [xxxiii] Ratko Romic, “Serbian State Security Bosses Sentenced,” Balkan Insight, 20 June 2012, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/state-security-bosses-sentenced. [xxxiv] Izvor, “DB-ovac u kabinetu ministra,” B92: SPO, 30 August 2012, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=08&dd=30&nav_category=11&nav_id=638839. [xxxv] The Democratic Party went through a “reverse lustration” by being purged of all the elements that were associated with Zoran Djindjic. The majority of current SPS officials were close allies of Milosevic and active at the time when JSO was operating. Tadic’s decision brought back Milosevic’s people to the limelight in Serbia and made Ivica Dacic Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and Minister of Internal Affairs; Ivica Dacic was a spokesperson of Milosevic’s party during the 1990s. See: “Milosevic Family Welcome Back in Serbia,” ABC News: Official, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/official-milosevic-family-back-serbia-17269698. [xxxvi] “TV B92 Insajder Debata,” YouTube video, 1:43, posted by “LPPtv.” 16 March 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzUTA_aAZRw. [xxxvii] Instead, a figure like Boris Tadic was brought to the scene after the assassination, and until recently, proved to be perfect for the role of someone who can present himself as acceptable to both the EU and secret services in Serbia. To the outside world, Serbia under Tadic seemed like a young democracy that is working hard to become a member of the EU. Internally, on the other hand, the fact that the investigation into the political background of Djindjic’s assassination is being obstructed by the government, and also that Milosevic’s people are back in positions of power, signals that Serbia is still in the claws of unreformed organizations without almost any civilian control, such as the BIA and VBA. [xxxviii] “Tomislav Nikolic beats Boris Tadic in Serbia run-off,” BBC, 20 May 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18134955. [xxxix] The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Vojislav Seselj,” http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ind/en/ses-ii030115e.pdf. [xl] Luka Bojovic, Vladimir Milisavljevic, Sinisa Petric and Vladimir Miljanovic were the individuals arrested in Spain; Cecilia Ferrara, “The end of the Serbian mafia?” Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, 22 February 2012, http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Serbia/The-end-of-the-Serbian-mafia-112188. [xli] Vladimir Milisavljevic also called “Vlada Budala.” [xlii] “Djindjic Killing Fugitive Arrested in Spain,” Al Jazeera, 10 February 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/02/2012210134142644219.html. [xliii] He admitted killing Zoran Pović and Vuk Vukojević in 2006 and accused Bojovic of ordering the murder Kujo Krestorac in 2004; Gordan Malić, “Sretko Kalinić Zver priznao i jednu likvidaciju u Hrvatskoj, onu Cvetka Simica?” Jutarnji List, 6 November 2010, http://www.jutarnji.hr/sretko-kalinic-zver-priznao-i-jednu-likvidaciju-u... T. Marković-Subota and V. Z. Cvijić, “Bojovic organizovao atentat na svedoka ubistva premijera,” Blic, 24 June 2010, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/195287/Bojovic-organizovao-atentat-na-s... Svetla Dimitrova and Igor Jovanovic, “Serbian Government Criticized after Key Djindjic Trial Witness Killed,” SetTimes, 6 May 2010, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2006/06/05/feature-01. [xliv] Vukojevic and Povic; For example, although Vukojevic’s testimony in April 2004 was closed to the public, he reportedly told the Belgrade Special Court that former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s son, Marko, had offered the Serbian mafia five million German marks for the prime minister’s assassination; Svetla Dimitrova and Igor Jovanovic, “Serbian Government Criticized after Key Djindjic Trial Witness Killed,” SetTimes, 6 May 2010, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2006/06/05/feature-01. [xlv] Vuk Vukojevic. [xlvi] Dejan Milenkovic. [xlvii] Dejan Milenkovic; “Seselj’s alleged ties with Zemun Gang revealed,” B92, 18 October 2006, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=18&nav_id=37431. [xlviii] Maximum prison sentence in Serbia. [xlix] Tamara Marković-Subota, “Španska istraga odlaze izrucenje Luke Bojovica,” Blic, 9 November 2012, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/342170/Spanska-istraga-odlaze-izrucenje-Luke-Bojovica. [l] Ibid. [li] “Kalinic: I was killing for Luka for friendship and not for money,” Blic, 9 June 2012, http://english.blic.rs/In-Focus/9013/Kalinic-I-was-killing-for-Luka-for-... Izvor, “Simovic negirao ubistvo Vukojevica,” B92, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=10&dd=05&nav_catego..., (accessed and translated 5 October 2012).  [lii] Ibid. [liii] “Bojovic to be Extradited as Serbia and Spain Jointly Tackle Organized Crime,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 11 April 2012, https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/1481-bojovic-to-be-extradited-as-serbia-and-spain-jointly-tackle-organized-crime. [liv] “Biography of Luka Bojovic,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 2012, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/biography.php?id=11. [lv] “Luka Bojovic,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 2012, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/profil.php?profil=11; Cvetko Simic, murdered in a gruesome killing in February, 2010, in Zagreb, Croatia by Sretko Kalinic, Bojovic’s associate, who told Croatian police that he killed Simic and threw parts of his body into Lake Jarun in Zagreb allegedly because he was in love with his wife; Tanjug, “Simovic: Cvetka Simica je ubio Kalinic zbog zene,” Blic Online, 16 December 2011, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/296369/Simovic-Cvetka-Simica-je-ubio-Kalinic-zbog-zene. [lvi] Petak, “Pljačkaš koji je postao bos,” Monitor, 27 August 2010, http://www.monitor.co.me/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1948:pljaka-koji-je-postao-bos&catid=1349:broj-1036&Itemid=2359. [lvii] Taeda Group, “Delaware documents,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, February 2009, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/documents/Luka_Bojovi%c4%8.... FINANCIAL ANGELS LLC, “Records from Delaware business registry,” February 2009, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/documents/Darko_Šarić,_Companies_287.pdf; Durability LLC, “Records from Delaware business registry,” August 2007, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/documents/Darko_Šarić,_Companies_492.pdf; Harvard Business Services, Inc., “Entity Details,” 17 April 2009, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/documents/Darko_Šarić,_Companies_934.pdf; Harvard Business Services, Inc., “Entity Details,” 26 November 2007, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/documents/Darko_Šarić,_Companies_973.pdf. [lviii] “Biography for Darko Saric,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, https://reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/biography.php?id=54, (accessed 27 September 2012). [lix] “Daily: Saric laundered billions,” Blic via B92, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=04&dd=10&nav... “Serbian cocaine kings earned and laundered billions,” Flare Network, 16 April 2010, http://www.flarenetwork.org/learn/europe/article/serbian_cocaine_kings_earned_and_laundered_billions.htm. [lx] James Dobbins et al., “The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005). [lxi] “Quotes,” Virtual Museum of Zoran Djindjic, http://www.zorandjindjic.org/en/quotes (accessed 7 May 2012).