CIAO DATE: 01/2009
Volume: 5, Issue: 2
Fall / Winter 2001
Overcoming the Cold War Legacy in Korea? The Inter-Korean Summit One Year Later (PDF)
Young Whan Kihl
The move toward rapprochement between the leaders of North and South Korea, symbolized by their well-documented embrace at the June 2000 summit, gave reasons for hope and new expectations for reconciliation between the two Koreas. The enthusiasm and euphoria generated by this summit, however, failed to move forward to concrete steps toward genuine peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The reason has less to do with the enthusiasm of the summer as the hard realities of the political and economic issues confronted by each Korea and the geopolitical situation surrounding the Korean peninsula. So far Seoul's engagement policy toward North Korea has given an impression of one side giving and yielding without due reciprocity by the other side. This work will address the post-summit developments in inter-Korean relations, marking the one-year anniversary of the June 2000 Korean summit. It will reassess the meaning and significance of the summit talks by reevaluating the sunshine policy of ROK President Kim Dae Jung, analyzing the progress and problems for implementation of the June 15, 2000, joint declaration, and speculating about the DPRK's possible opening and its reform policy measures.
Russian Policy toward the Korean Peninsula, 1991-2001 (PDF)
Jane Shapiro Zacek
In July of 2000, Russian Federation (RF) President Vladimir Putin spent two days in Pyongyang, North Korea, the first Russian (or Soviet) head of state ever to visit that country. Newly elected President in his own right in March 2000, Putin wasted no time promoting his East Asia foreign policy agenda, including presidential visits to South Korea, China, and elsewhere in the region within the past year.
Indeed, it is fair to say that Russian foreign policy has undergone a major sea change over the past five years. Between 1991-1995, the RF clearly was preoccupied with improving relations with western Europe and the United States. Yel 'tsin worked hard to bring his country fully into the G-7 group of industrialized nations, succeeding in June 1997 in having the G-7 officially renamed the G-8. (Since that 1997 meeting in Denver, Russia has attended the annual political but not the economic meetings of the Group.) In January 1996, however, Andrei Kozyrev, the western-focused "architect" of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, was replaced as Foreign Minister by Evgenii Primakov (former head of Soviet foreign intelligence), and Russian policy shifted rather quickly to one focusing on East Asia and the Third World, and on Asiatic Russia (east of the Urals) in addition to European Russia. Two-thirds of Russia lies east of the Urals, although only a small percentage of its population lives in that vast territory.
Taeho Kim
The future of China-Japan relations will have a decisive impact on post-Cold War East Asia's economic and political order. Japan and China embody the world's second- and, by PPP-based calculations, third-largest economies, respectively, and wield growing political clout in regional affairs. Militarily, despite the different nature and sources of their national power, both countries are the major factors to be reckoned with in any East Asian strategic equation.
The relative rise in influence of China and Japan in post-Cold War regional affairs is evident. Japan is the world's largest creditor nation and largest donor of official development aid in East Asia and in the world. It also maintains the world's second largest defense budget with $45.6 billion ($1=108 yen) in FY 2000.1 Japan's total armed forces are small—about 237,000 strong—and being reduced, but are buttressed by its vastly superior technological, industrial, and financial prowess. Seen from this perspective, Japan is already a potential major military power seeking a greater political and security role in post-Cold War East Asia.
Peace and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula (PDF)
Yong-Sup Han
Peace at the Central Stage on the Korean Peninsula
South Koreans did not recognize the importance of "the positive peace" until the Kim Dae-jung Administration came to power in 1998. Before then, the concept of "the negative peace" had long been engrained in the minds of South Koreans and Americans. The United States and South Korea have been successful in deterring war up to now. Although North Korea insisted that they should conclude a peace treaty with the United States, their true intent was not to establish "the positive peace" on the Korean peninsula. Herein, the positive peace means that there is neither a war nor a competition, and there is cooperation toward similar or common goals between different states. The Kim Dae-jung Administration began its reconciliation and cooperation policy to create conditions favorable to making positive peace on the Korean peninsula.
Power Dynamics of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Remedies (PDF)
Hyun-Kun Yoon
A decade after the Cold War ended, the world still seems to be in a transitional period. It is a dynamic time with drastic changes. There are opportunities that can consolidate sustained peace and future stability. There are also risks that could generate new instabilities and even conflicts in a fast-changing world. Northeast Asia, and the Korean peninsula in particular, is perhaps the best place to illustrate the uncertain situation.
Unlike some other regions of the world, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have been a central element in Northeast Asia.1 Despite the reduced danger of a major nuclear exchange among the major powers, the proliferation of mass destructive warheads and their delivery systems is emerging as a new source of insecurity for almost all countries concerned. In particular, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea) has allocated a tremendous amount of resources over the past decades to develop WMD. This has consequently altered the delicate security balance on the Korean peninsula as well as all of Northeast Asia. How to address the issue best has become a common priority on the regional agenda.
The Making of the Korean Financial Crisis: Financial Liberalization without Regulations (PDF)
Shalendra D. Sharma
In 1950, Korea was among the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of under US$150.1 Ravaged by a brutal war between 1950-53, a divided Korea was predicted to remain a "basketcase" for the foreseeable future. However, South Korea (hereafter Korea), defied the dire predictions — becoming in less than a generation the quintessential developmental success story — and a model for other developing countries to emulate. With the exception of a relatively short-lived recession in 1979-80, Korea enjoyed continuous economic growth between 1960 and 1997. With the economy expanding at an annual rate of over 8%, Korea's per capita income grew to US$10,973 by mid-1997, earning it membership in the exclusive OCED (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) group of nations.2 Already the world's eleventh largest economy in 1996, Korea publicly stated its ambition to outperform Japan technologically in the new millennium. Indeed, as the world's largest supplier of computer memory chips, the second largest shipbuilder, the third largest producer of semiconductors, the fourth largest maker of electronics and the fifth largest automobile maker, Korea hardly made an idle boast in its ambition.
The Role of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea (PDF)
Ralph A. Cossa
The geopolitical landscape in East Asia has changed dramatically, and one would hope permanently, as a result of last year's sudden and largely unexpected thaw in North-South Korean relations. The appearance of North Korea's formerly reclusive leader, Kim Jong-il, in the international spotlight through the much-heralded June 2000 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang and his high-profile meetings with Chinese leaders in Beijing and Shanghai and with Russian President Putin in Pyongyang have resulted in a remaking of both the North Korean leader's and his nation's international image. As one senior U.S. official noted at the time, North Korea has gone, almost overnight, from the "hermit kingdom" to the "hyperactive kingdom."
Political Future of the Korean Peninsula: A New Challenge to Unification Strategies (PDF)
Kook-Shin Kim
The launching of the Kim Dae-jung administration in February 1998 signified drastic changes in the erstwhile ROK policy toward North Korea. President Kim adopted a flexible policy toward North Korea, the so-called sunshine policy. The policy is based on three principles: 1) deterrence of armed aggression, 2) rejection of unification through absorption, and 3) realization of reconciliation and cooperation. President Kim Dae-jung has been consistent in carrying out his sunshine policy despite the provocative actions of North Korea (DPRK), such as the submarine incursion and missile launch a few years ago. The purpose has been to create a favorable environment for the government-level talks between the two Koreas to take place.