Peace and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

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Peace at the Central Stage on the Korean Peninsula

South Koreans did not recognize the importance of "the positive peace" until the Kim Dae-jung Administration came to power in 1998. Before then, the concept of "the negative peace" had long been engrained in the minds of South Koreans and Americans. The United States and South Korea have been successful in deterring war up to now. Although North Korea insisted that they should conclude a peace treaty with the United States, their true intent was not to establish "the positive peace" on the Korean peninsula. Herein, the positive peace means that there is neither a war nor a competition, and there is cooperation toward similar or common goals between different states. The Kim Dae-jung Administration began its reconciliation and cooperation policy to create conditions favorable to making positive peace on the Korean peninsula.

Instead, Pyongyang has long held the view that peace has two distinct steps. The first is the peace in slavery. Under that condition, a country lives peacefully, not because it has selected voluntarily such a condition, but because other imperial states or feudal lords have forced it to acquiescence to their rule. Therefore, this peaceful situation is doomed to break down finally. The second is the peace without an imperialist's rule or intervention. Under this condition, a country can truly live peacefully and independently. Based on this peace concept, Pyongyang demanded that the United States keep its hands off the Korean peninsula, leaving South Korea alone. Otherwise, Pyongyang will liberate South Korea from the U.S. imperialists by fighting against the United States with military means. According to their peace concept, war is inevitable and unavoidable so long as the United States stations its armed forces in South Korean soil. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have maintained this view, and, accordingly, they have insisted upon concluding a peace treaty with the United States to create conditions favorable for pursuing their style of unification. In their

eyes, South Korea has been a slave and puppet to the United States, thereby necessitating their liberation endeavor.

At the end of the Cold War, situations changed so significantly as to affect North Korea's peace concept and change its unification strategy. There has been no substantial agreement with North Korea, so we can conclude safely that their unification strategy and peace concept have not really changed. However, there was a thaw in the inter-Korean relationship first in 1992 as result of the inter-Korean reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchange and cooperation agreements, and the joint statement at the first-ever inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000. In fact, the historic summit demonstrated North Korea's *de facto* recognition of the South Korean government as having legitimate sovereignty.

Some contend that Kim Jong-il merely attempted to utilize South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy as long as he has wanted to assist North Korea economically. Kim Jong-il's real intention is not to go one step further in order to recognize South Korea as a partner peacefully coexisting on the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong-il still requests that the United States conclude a peace treaty or make peace arrangements with North Korea. As far as the military issues on the Korean peninsula are concerned, Kim Jong-il seems to regard the United States as a legitimate negotiating partner, not South Korea.

Those who believe that North Korea is simply earning a breathing space with temporary South Korean economic assistance cite the evidence that President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il did not mention anything about peace and threat reduction in their June 2000 joint statement. This omission aroused concern in South Korea and in the United States. It remains questionable whether North Korea really accepted South Korea as a cooperative and coexisting partner.

Despite the lack of security-related agreements at the first inter-Korean summit, it is undeniable that the two heads of state began political confidence-building between them. They are leading the reconciliation process by preventing the process in their respective societies from going back to the hostile relationship as in the past. If the two leaders can survive the rising contention against the reconciliation policy in their own society as well as from abroad, mainly from the United States, the second summit meeting will take place and an agreement pertaining to peace will be more feasible.

It is, however, not easy at all for the two Koreas alone to strike a deal on peace on the Korean peninsula. To repeat, North Korea is not interested in peace arrangements with South Korea at all. The Bush Administration's new North Korea policy might complicate the inter-Korean reconciliation process in light of North Korea's long-held

position to address military issues with the United States. As the United States government commits itself to the dialogue with North Korea on three accounts such as the nuclear issue, the missile issue, and the conventional military issue, it is likely that South Korea will be sidelined again by North Korea as it was during the U. S .-DPRK nuclear talks.

Nevertheless, conventional arms control is needed on the Korean peninsula in tandem with negotiations to reduce or eliminate North Korea's threats of mass destruction weapons. Therefore, South Korea and the United States should sit down together to design a common scheme for a comprehensive arms control negotiation. It is not an easy task to replace the truce regime with a permanent peace regime all at once. Abolishing the truce regime without an actual threat reduction on each side endangers the security of South Korea and the United States, not to speak of North Korea's security. Hence, we need to have carefully designed arms control policy alternatives.

Retrospect and Prospect for Arms Control in Korea

It is often forgotten that Korean arms-control issues were discussed seriously nearly a decade ago. Indeed, the scope of prior discussions was remarkable. In 1991 and 1992, the South and North discussed how to improve their overall relationship and how to reduce military tension in the wake of the Cold War's end. The two Koreas agreed to resolve differences peacefully through dialogue and negotiation, pledged not to use force against each other, and agreed to establish a South-North Joint Military Commission (JMC) to discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction. These were to include the mutual notification and control of large-scale military maneuvers and exercises; the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); exchanges of military personnel and information; phased arms reductions, including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and offensive capabilities; and verification of such elimination.

In large part because discussing U.S. forces was regarded as out of the question, the South demanded in the negotiations that confidence building should take place before any arms reduction talks, whereas the North demanded that arms reduction should take place first. The South proposed that the two Koreas agree to the notification and observation of military exercises and maneuvers, peaceful utilization of demilitarized zones, exchange of military personnel and information, and verification and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, whereas the North proposed prohibiting military exercises with foreign countries, changing the DMZ into a peace zone, staging force

reductions from 300,000 men to 100,000, with the phased withdrawals of U.S. forces in Korea being proportional to the reductions made by the two Koreas, reducing offensive weapons in proportion to manpower reduction, and suspending the acquisition of advanced weapons from abroad. Although the North's proposals were patently one-sided in many respects, their ambitiousness was considerable, and discussions proved possible. The two sides also agreed that subsequent negotiations would take up confidence building and arms reduction measures at the same time.

A sub-agreement signed in September 1992 as part of a process to move toward implementation went even further. It prohibited the intrusion of regular or paramilitary forces into the other's territory and any use of any force against the other. It also gave the JMC a mandate for further discussions about prohibiting: military build-ups along the DMZ, reconnaissance activities against the other side, the hindering or blocking of a side's air and sea access, and threats to the security of each side's capital. The parties also agreed to establish a hot line communication link between Defense Ministers.

Progress, then, appeared to be considerable. However, the action-officer meeting on the hot line was suspended when Seoul linked the resumption of the Team Spirit exercise with Pyongyang's acceptance of South-North nuclear inspections. The agreed measures were never implemented for at least three reasons. First, the issue of North Korea's nuclear program emerged, and the focus on that issue (particularly by the United States) blocked any potential progress on conventional arms control. Second, South Korea and the United States decided to resume the Team Spirit exercises when North Korea refused to accept special nuclear inspections. Third, the North unilaterally violated some provisions, such as its commitment not to vilify and antagonize the South and not to introduce regular or paramilitary forces into the South. It continued its espionage and sent submarines into Southern waters. Some of these efforts were detected and raised tensions. And, finally, the North did not even want to talk with the South on security issues after it had enjoyed direct talks with the United States on nuclear matters.

Although the inter-Korean arms control discussions yielded important results, it is sobering to make a net assessment. North Korea achieved some of its aims in the conventional military arena and gained a good deal from the nuclear discussions as well. Consistent with its objectives, Pyongyang saw a complete pullout of U.S. nuclear weapons from Korea and permanent cancellation of the Team Spirit exercises, which had been symbolic of a the highly developed ROK-U.S. military alliance. Moreover, it achieved its goal of direct security talks with the

United States—"over the head" of Seoul. North Korea now contends that there are two remaining tasks: withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea and a complete cessation of the U.S.-ROK military alliance. In contrast, South Korea and the United States ultimately gained nothing from the 1991 conventional arms control efforts because nothing was implemented.

Where South Korea and the United States arguably made some gains was on nuclear and missile issues, although those matters remain contentious. In the inter-Korean nuclear talks of December 1991, which were prompted by the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, the two Koreas agreed to the principle of the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This was the result of a quid pro quo between South Korea's canceling Team Spirit and North Korea's accepting nuclear safeguards and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 1993 and 1994, the U.S. and South Korea achieved a freeze of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program (the true extent of which remains in question) in exchange for providing heavy fuel oil and light water nuclear reactors to Pyongyang and the lifting of economic sanctions. The United States used the resulting momentum to stimulate talks on North Korea's missile program. North Korea agreed to a moratorium on its missile test launches, and the U.S. lifted economic sanctions and removed the label of "rogue" state. However, there is still no permanent agreement on development, testing, or export of missiles. Despite some optimism following discussions between Kim Jong-il and Russian President Putin, it appears that North Korea will try to use its missile-related bargaining chip again and again. Ultimate results remain ambiguous. Moreover, they appear to be valued more by the United States (and perhaps Japan) than by South Korea.

As mentioned above, after initiating direct negotiations with Washington over nuclear weapons, North Korea consistently pursued discussions only with the United States. The United States and South Korea were, of course, sensitive to this divisive tactic. In 1996, they proposed the four-party talks (two Koreas, the United States, and China), which would meet in Geneva and address tension reduction and confidence building. South Korea and the United States tried to raise these issues in the resulting talks but blocked North Korea's efforts to include U.S. forces in the agenda. North Korea resisted any progress, at least in part for this reason.

Against this background, what is the context for new negotiations? Despite the 1991 South-North agreement to pursue military confidence building and arms reduction simultaneously, the Kim Dae-jung government still believes that confidence building should take place

before any arms reduction talks. It worries that any premature arms reduction talks will entail reconfiguration and reduction of U.S. troops in Korea, thus jeopardizing deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Some officials believe that such talks will also be "more than the traffic would bear," an opinion often expressed over the years by U.S. officials focused on nuclear issues. In contrast, North Korea maintains that arms reduction should take place first, although, notably, it has indicated several times a willingness to compromise on the future role of U.S. forces in Korea so long as the United States changes its status to one of neutrality or peacekeeping.

Perhaps most important, the June summit and subsequent meetings suggest that many changes have occurred in the security premises held by the North. North Korea's utmost concern seems to be in assuring its regime's survival. This suggests that defense planners in Seoul and Washington can think anew about reciprocal conventional threat reduction and how to reach unification peacefully, while maintaining Korea's long-term stability and regional status in East Asia. In sum, the first chance for conventional threat reduction failed in the early 1990s, but the conditions may be more auspicious now. If the United States shows a strong interest in conventional arms control, the chances for a negotiated settlement on this issue will increase substantially. The prospect for progress in the nuclear and missile issues will be higher when pursued with the conventional issue at the same time than when the United States negotiated only on the missile issue with North Korea.

Objectives and Principles for Conventional Arms Control

Objectives of Conventional Arms Control

One place to look for potential objectives is experience elsewhere, particularly in Europe during the 1980s. The Korean situation, however, is quite different. The differences include the depth of hostility and distrust between the DPRK and ROK, the special circumstance of having a superpower involved in what would otherwise be a purely local matter, the conflict within a single people, and the need to think about the post-normalization strategic balance in East Asia.

Upon reviewing the issues afresh, while focused on Korea rather than historical events elsewhere, the most suitable objectives appear to be the following:

- Facilitating peace, normalization, and potential eventual reunification
- Deterring invasion or other acts of attempted aggression

- Avoiding crisis and, if that fails, assuring crisis stability
- Cutting back on the arms competition to enhance strategic stability, but also to permit increased allocation of resources for social and economic development
- Laying the groundwork for a military transition of the Koreas (and U.S. forces) consistent with the strategic interests of a post-normalization Korea (or two Koreas) in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

Although it may look like fluff to those familiar with Soviet-Western arms control history, the first objective is in fact a core issue in Korea, given the long history of rancor between them. If the strategic decision has been taken by the DPRK to forego unification by force and to instead pursue peace and normalization, then it will be very important to facilitate the shifts of perceptions—at all levels of society—that will be necessary for that normalization to succeed.

This said, the fact remains that the DPRK still represents a serious and immediate threat to the South. This is perhaps the single most important reality to be kept in mind. Moreover, it is likely that the DPRK harbors fears of invasion from the South or attacks from U.S. forces—if not under normal circumstances, then under plausible circumstances of domestic unrest. Such substantive security issues, not just perceptions about them, have a fundamental role in any negotiation. Deterring invasion and other acts of aggression, then, should have top priority. Deterring invasion involves making surprise attack much more difficult than it is today. Since the DPRK has systematically and asymmetrically mounted an immediate surprise-attack threat against the South by establishing forward-deployed invasion forces and a huge number of special-operations forces trained specifically for invasion, and because of geographic asymmetries, conventional arms control should also be asymmetric in its immediate implications. The principle, however, would be symmetric: neither side should fear surprise attack. In practice, "fear of surprise attack" would be measured differently by the two sides because Seoul is near the border and Pyongyang is not.

The surprise-attack issue is especially important because it is arguably the most "real" of the military threats to either side. North Korea's military is far weaker today than in years past, whereas South Korea's is stronger. It is widely agreed by military experts that any full-scale invasion by the North would be doomed to failure—if the objectives were traditionally grandiose, as in conquering South Korea. The only issue is how long it would take for ROK and U.S. forces to devastate the North's army. However, the story looks different when considering a surprise attack with limited objectives such as the capture

or siege of Seoul. That scenario remains a nightmare. If we view the situation from the North's perspective, there is, of course, the theoretical potential for invasion from the South. Realistically, however, that would seem to be implausible without extraordinary provocation. Moreover, any invasion would likely be a long, costly, and bloody affair—in part because the North has developed what amounts to a defense in depth. The United States would rather obviously not see such an invasion in its interests unless severely provoked, and probably not even then. And South Korea would have substantial difficulties operating by itself, since its military system has long been so intertwined with that of the U.S.-led U.N. command. In short, the North has little to worry about (unless, conceivably, it goes into collapse and civil war, at which point chaos might ensue). The North's more plausible concerns would probably be different in kind: aircraft and missile strikes by the United States, launched not only from South Korea, but from aircraft carriers and distant air bases. Given the number and character of American interventions or near-interventions in the last decade, such a prospect might be a concern to North Korea. However, the severity of such a threat ultimately depends on the issues of long-range missiles and mass-casualty weapons, not the status of conventional forces on the Korean peninsula. It follows that neither side has a serious problem of military threat—*except* for the threat of surprise attack on the South. Thus, addressing this issue has special importance.

Another component of enhancing military security is avoiding the crises that could turn into wars or, failing that, assuring that crises would not lead to war as the result of misperceptions or instabilities. In particular, there should be no significant real or perceived advantage in initiating hostilities. This is related to surprise attack, but goes well beyond it. It relates to the ability of the sides to defend against attack. For example, if both sides' forces were designed, trained, and poised primarily for rapid offensive operations, then commanders at the time of crisis could reasonably conclude that the side moving first would have major advantages. In contrast, if the sides' forces—taking everything into account from weapon systems to deployment locations and doctrine—were well suited to defense, then any pressures for instigating war would be greatly reduced. Although the notion that individual weapon systems, or even type units, are either "offensive" or "defensive" has long since been discredited by detailed military analysis, it remains the case that a nation's military forces can have decidedly offensive, defensive, or mixed characters. Arms control negotiations should identify attributes of an end state suitable to crisis stability.

Moving beyond the core security concerns, the sides should have every incentive to reduce the magnitude of defense expenditures so that national resources can be put to more productive ends. Given the very large levels of current Korean forces, normalization would include substantial reductions in force levels and a significant reduction in absolute defense expenditures.

The last objective is in some respects the subtlest. Some well-intentioned actions taken under the rubric of peace, normalization, and arms control could prove, in the long run, to be not in Korea's interest. When normalization is achieved, Korea (or two cooperating Korean states) will exist in a highly dynamic region of the world with many opportunities, issues, and challenges. To the north will be a massive neighbor, China, whose long-term behavior may range from that of a good and powerful neighbor and competitor to that of a demanding would-be regional hegemon. There will likely be continuing tensions among China, Japan, and Korea; and problems may arise involving other regional states as well. It is because of the importance of the region and the many potential sources of security problems that the United States is widely recognized as an essential stabilizer. The United States, however, has difficulties in maintaining and operating effective forces in the region. Furthermore, U.S. forces are small in number in comparison with those of regional forces, and the United States will likely continue to avoid taking the lead in peacekeeping, peacemaking, or other activities not involving its vital national interests. Thus, if the United States is to play an effective role as stabilizer, it will do so through cooperation with regional states—including consistent and well-respected partners, and occasional ad-hoc participants. A question, then, is whether Korea sees itself as a significant player in the future regional security issues and, beyond that, as acting as a long-term partner with the United States and other nations.

This question is easy enough to ask, but it deals with a drastically different Korea-U.S. relationship than exists today. Today, U.S. military leaders dominate planning for the security of South Korea, U.S. ground forces are permanently stationed in the very heart of Korea itself, and the United States would in some respects (e.g. air forces, naval forces, and command and control) play the lead role in any defense. In the post-normalization world, that relationship would be history. But what relationship would be suitable?

Although such matters will and should be discussed as events evolve, it seems to us that Korea will want to emerge with a much smaller but highly competent military suitable for: assuring national sovereignty, participating in regional security affairs in cooperation with other states, and—as an important part of that—working in long-

term partnership with the United States. This would not be partnership "against" someone (notably China, with whom one might actually expect Korea to have a long-term friendly relationship), but rather partnership "for" regional stability and continuing good relations and contacts among *all* the regional states. With this in mind, it is quite plausible that Korea will decide that it is in her long-term interest to host some U.S. forces and encourage regular or occasional visits by others—but all in the context of either (1) continuing help in assuring the peace between the Koreas or (2) promoting regional stability and development.

It follows that, in the long run, any U.S. force presence in Korea might logically shift from that of forward-deployed, combat-ready, heavy ground forces to an emphasis on naval forces, air forces, and multilateral ground forces for miscellaneous regional functions. Moreover, any such presence would logically shift toward the periphery of Korea. One possibility, with much to recommend it for the United States and the regional states benefiting from U.S. naval presence, would include providing the logistical services for a U.S. naval group to be serviced or even home ported (as one is home ported currently in Japan), having fairly frequent fly-ins of U.S. Air Force fighters for exercises and regional crises, and perhaps having some ground forces (with more of a U.N. character than U.S. character for continued monitoring and peacekeeping under benign conditions).

It follows that the ROK (and the United States) should follow a strategically adaptive strategy guided by at least three principles:

• The ROK should seek actions by the DPRK that more or less irreversibly reduce the threat it poses to the South. More specifically, the ROK should not rely on good intentions, but should recognize that intentions can change for the worse in a heartbeat, and that a "basket-case country" such as the DPRK could implode violently with unpredictable consequences.

• At the same time, the ROK should itself avoid premature irreversible measures. In particular, once any changes affecting U.S. ground forces occur, they are likely to be irreversible.

• The ROK should have, at each point of negotiation, options for opening or closing the valve for both economic assistance and military action.

We should expect the DPRK to have similar but opposite desires. This does not mean that we are dealing with a zero-sum game: when "the game" is viewed in the larger scheme, as discussed at the end of the section, a set of two-sided principles emerges that is consistent with a win-win outcome.

Reflecting the two sides' concerns

This discussion so far has identified potential ROK objectives. For any principle to be acceptable and negotiable, the views of the two opposing sides should be reflected in the principles. Therefore the following principles are suggested as even-handed ones to guide conventional arms control on the Korean peninsula.

- Both sides should be secure from surprise attack (i.e., surprise attack should be infeasible).
- Both sides should be reasonably secure from the threat of large-scale, deep, conventional invasion.
- Both sides should be secure from being coercively threatened by the other (as from missile attacks).
- Both sides should be secure in knowing that, even in crisis, neither side would have military reasons "compelling it" to initiate conflict. That is, the sides should be able to manage any crises that may emerge despite efforts to prevent them.
- Although some degree of military modernization should be expected and will be necessary, it should not be of a character or magnitude such as to upset the military balance.
- Eventually, the Korean peninsula should be free from foreign ground forces. In the interim, any such foreign ground forces should increasingly assume the character of peacekeepers with U.N. mandate rather than major combat forces. However, it is in the interest of both sides that any such transition occurs slowly, so as to avoid undercutting either the reality or the perception of assured deterrence and stability guaranteed by the U.S. presence.
- It is in the interest of both sides to achieve security and stability at substantially reduced force levels, and for both sides to spend smaller portions of their national products on military preparations than in previous years.
- Both sides should be secure from having misperceptions about the military balance that may cause political instability. As a result, there should be substantial transparency about the quantity, quality, and posture of the two sides' military forces. Regarding the WMD issues on the peninsula:
- The Korean peninsula should have no weapons of mass destruction or long-range missiles. This principle reflects the recognition that for Korea to have such weapons would not only be destabilizing on the peninsula, but would potentially cause substantial problems for international security as a whole (i.e., Korea would be seen as a "proliferator" causing trouble worldwide).

Proposing Arms Control Measures

With this background of objectives and principles, this section summarizes the numerous measures that would support the objectives and principles we have postulated. Confidence-building and tension-reduction measures focus on perceptions: if the summit was indeed a historical milestone reflecting strategic intentions to normalize, then CBMs can help that process by helping to change the perceptions that otherwise might remain linked to the "bad old days" (and bad they have truly been).

The constraints deal with militarily substantive issues on how forces are "operated." This involves where they are located, their states of readiness, the operations they prepare for and conduct routinely, and so on. Constraints on such matters can do much to reduce the likelihood of surprise attack and to reduce any incentive for a side in crisis to initiate conflict.

Finally, the arms reduction measures deal with "structural" arms control—i.e., limits on the size and character of the forces. These measures can bring about reductions in the cost of defense generally and—if guided by appropriate principles—lead to increased strategic and crisis stability, while simultaneously preparing Korea to play a vigorous role in the region's larger long-term security affairs.

There are some measures to avoid. These include: (1) reductions in defense capabilities and readiness that could undercut deterrence by making surprise attack possible or initiating war (in crisis) advantageous, (2) constraints on military modernization that might preclude Korea from having the weapons systems and forces that would enable it to have an independent, effective, long-term defense capability and that would permit it to operate readily and proudly with other nations' forces. Our measures are also unabashedly "asymmetric" in referring to force pullbacks from the border. The reason is simple: Seoul sits near the border, whereas the DPRK's capital is more distant. Further, the current military balance is highly asymmetric: the DPRK has deliberately mounted an immediate surprise-attack threat on the ROK's capital; the ROK has done nothing similar. It follows that draw-downs should also be asymmetric. The principle for a negotiated outcome, however, can and should be symmetric: both sides should be secure from surprise attacks on their capitals. The principal relevant lesson from Europe' s experience with conventional arms control is that a symmetric principle can hold sway even though the immediate implications are asymmetric: the Soviet Union *did* agree to equal ceilings, which meant highly asymmetric reductions. The biggest obstacle to that outcome was probably the argument by people within NATO that equal ceilings would be non-negotiable.

To foster peace and normalization, possibly leading to ultimate unification, CBMs should be instituted such as suspending underground insurgency and vilifying propaganda and allowing frequent exchanges at all levels, not only including political, economic, and social levels but also military personnel.

Constraints such as a temporary moratorium on large field exercises will be useful. However, unilateral change on U.S. and South Korean military posture will not be recommended. Regarding arms reduction measures, the U.S. and South Korea should acknowledge from the outset that changes in USFK is one component of subsequent negotiations with North Korea. The two Koreas should freeze defense expenditures with expectations of later reductions at the same time.

To deter war on the Korean peninsula—primarily by making surprise attack difficult—the two Koreas and the United States should install inspector teams to observe and monitor large-scale operations, including any that might occur on plausible invasion corridors. The purpose here is not nitpicking, detailed bean-counting, or intrusiveness, but substantive protective measures against surprise attack.

In this regard, the three countries should not only relocate forces to reduce the feasibility of surprise attack, but also create "red lines." A red line is a geographic line across which it is understood that a given side's military forces should not move—at least not beyond some agreed level. The crossing of a red line should be regarded as extremely serious provocation—so much so as to constitute a *casus belli.* Although red lines provide no guarantees of security, they can reduce ambiguities in crisis and increase the likelihood that decision-makers in crisis will recognize and act upon warnings of imminent threat. That, in turn, makes surprise attack more difficult to plan and achieve, and thereby enhances deterrence—not merely in some ethereal way, but in down-to-earth terms.

With respect to arms reductions, the three countries should reduce to common ceilings smaller than the current total of South Korea and U.S. forces. To cut back the military competition to permit increased emphasis on economic development and related non-military matters, the two Koreas should enter the joint discussion of modernization efforts, even to include ways to use military units as part of CBM activities (e.g., mine clearing, road building). As constraint measures, the two Koreas should reduce the level of overall readiness and the pace of training and exercising, while retaining high readiness of core forces, including those critical in deterring surprise attack.

The sides should also limit the extent and nature of modernization, but not modernization per se. Modernization can make reductions easier, reduce operations costs, and improve confidence in defensive

operations. On the other hand, some modernization could be destabilizing—particularly if well suited to large-scale offensives. Numbers matter here, not just names of weapon systems and unit types. Even defensive forces need "offensive weapons" such as tanks and tactical aircraft, but the overall nature of a force structure depends on the balance among component capabilities, deployment and readiness posture, and many other factors. To enhance crisis stability, the two Koreas and the United States should announce all large exercises one year in advance, and perhaps forego particularly large-scale exercises altogether. The Koreas might also install a hot line to facilitate discussions in crisis, although the hot line may simply be a symbolic matter in this era of worldwide communication technology. As constraint measures, the two Koreas and the United States should accomplish asymmetric pullbacks and create recognized red lines such as 40-50 km back from the DMZ on the DPRK side, and 20-30 km back from DMZ on the ROK side. The asymmetry here is important militarily, especially for the smaller pullbacks and South Korea's defense of its capital, Seoul. The two sides should prohibit force development suitable to rapid attack or invasion.

To increase the likelihood of long-term regional stability for South Korea or a unified Korea, the two Koreas in transition should encourage each other to participate in the discussion of Korea's role in regional security framework of different types, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, and other international mechanisms. As constraint measures, the two Koreas should discuss the transition of U.S. forces from a ground presence to a naval presence with naval servicing (even, potentially, home-porting) and air presence. As arms reduction measures, the two Koreas should establish eventual force levels adequate to assure Korean independence, freedom from coercion, and ability to participate in international peace actions. Our assumption here is that the two Koreas and the United States should focus on top-priority measures across the board, whereas lesser measures assume lower priority.

Negotiation Formats and Remaining Issues

In dealing with the WMD issue and conventional threat issue, the United States and South Korea should integrate their political, economic, and military inducements toward North Korea into one overarching strategy. The two allies should design integrated steps regarding how much and when South Korea and the United States will provide substantial economic assistance beyond the humanitarian aids to North Korea.

The United States and South Korea should link substantial

economic assistance to North Korea's concession on military threat reduction in both conventional and mass-destruction weapons. Considering the fact that the South Korean government has so far deferred the WMD issue and conventional threat reduction issue to the later stage, the United States had better take up the leading role to address the WMD issue and conventional reduction issue. In this sense, it is reassuring to see the recent U.S. announcement focusing its resumed talks with North Korea on the implementation of a 1994 nuclear deal between the United States and North Korea, the North's missile program and conventional military threats.

There are three ways to establish a close link between the progress on the resolution of the WMD issue and the progress on conventional arms control. The first one is to negotiate the two issues at one channel: trilateral arms control talks among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. This will require the United States to fold nuclear and missile talks into three-party talks. The United States should address the issue of chemical and biological weapons in the talks, too. For this option to be viable, it is important to get China's support for opening trilateral talks first. It is also equally important to incorporate all the military issues pertinent to the Korean peninsula, including the USFK issue in the trilateral talks. The United States is inextricably intertwined with the WMD issue and conventional issue on the Korean peninsula. Thus, it is doubtful what we can achieve by leaving the WMD issue to the United States and leaving the conventional military issue to the South-North talks.

Pros for the trilateral talks are: (1) they can integrate all security negotiations into one channel; (2) they can address the totality of military threats, WMD and conventional alike, in one channel; (3) it is easy to calculate the contribution of any deal to the entire security of South Korea and United States on the Korean peninsula; (4) they can avoid North Korea's divisive tactics between South Korea and the United States; (5) they can maximize the utility of all the economic incentives to be provided to North Korea; (6) they can reflect common security interests of South Korea and the United States; and (7) they can reduce the time and energy South Korea and the United States otherwise would have spent in coordinating their policy through different channels.

Cons for the trilateral talks are: (1) North Korea may not come to the table because it only wanted to hold WMD talks with the United States; (2) it remains questionable whether South Korea and North Korea will agree with this format of dialogue; and (3) South Korea may be isolated at the negotiation table because of North Korea's efforts to marginalize the South.

The second negotiation format is the U.S.-DPRK talks as were in the nuclear talks in Geneva between 1993 and 1994. These bilateral talks will take up all the security issues, including nuclear, missile and conventional threats. The South Korean government seems to have expressed disapproval for this format. Nevertheless, this option is possible if the United States is to discuss all the security issues pertinent to the Korean peninsula at the talks with North Korea.

Pros for this format are: (1) there is high possibility of negotiated settlement between the United States and North Korea because North Korea has insisted upon having direct security talks with the United States for a long time; and (2) it is the most effective dialogue format in light of the military structure on the Korean peninsula, where the United States maintains the wartime operational control over South Korean forces and the U.S. Commander in Chief takes the position of Commander of the United Nations Command.

Cons for this format are: (1) there is the possibility that the United States will reluctantly accept North Korea's proposal for a peace treaty; (2) South Korea's sovereignty will be undermined because South Korea will continuously be excluded from any security talks with North Korea; (3) South Korea's sunshine policy may come to end because of the U.S.-DPRK talks; and (4) South Koreans will have to oppose the U.S.-DPRK if the agreed outcome between Washington and Pyongyang benefits North Korea excessively.

The third negotiation format is the division of roles between the United States and South Korea. South Korea will deal with the conventional arms control issue exclusively with North Korea, whereas Washington will negotiate with Pyongyang on WMD issues. In this case, the United States should not allow Pyongyang to divide the issue and negotiate on an item-by-item basis. In terms of verification, Washington should bear in mind that it could not persuade Pyongyang to accept special nuclear inspections in 1991 and 1992 through the inter-Korean nuclear talks. In the conventional arms control talks, the South Korean government should pursue a holistic approach by allowing all the conventional issues at the talks: confidence-building measures, constraint measures, and arms reduction measures.

Pros for this option are: (1)this format takes into full account South Korea's principle of resolving the Korean issue first between the two Koreas; (2) it can attempt to change the security reality gradually, not radically; and (3) it is in line with the recommendation promulgated by the Perry Process as result of policy coordination among South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

Cons for this option are: (1) it presupposes that the United States should not address the conventional military threats with North Korea,

which is against U.S. policy; (2) North Korea would not accept this format; and (3) the United States may be lukewarm to this division of roles.

Comparing the pros and cons of the three negotiation modalities, we can say that the trilateral arms control talks is the best option of all. However, it requires Seoul and Washington to choose the best option after discussing all the benefits and costs of the modality and alternative arms control measures to persuade Pyongyang to accept it.

Conclusion

As emphasized in the new U.S. approach to North Korea's security problem from the holistic perspective, now is the time for us to take a new look at the engagement policies of South Korea and the United States from a holistic perspective. In designing the grand bargain with North Korea, establishing linkage between economic aid and military issue is inevitable because political debate inside South Korea as well as in the United States compels the governments to set up such linkages. For example, in constructing the Kaesung Industrial complex, the linkage between economic aid and military threat reduction is unavoidable in order for the South Korean government to gain political support for the project continuously.

If we are going to make the best use of North Korea's incentive to negotiate with the United States on security issues, it would be wise to connect the incentive to the U.S. and South Korea's demand for pullbacks of North Korean forces from the frontal area with economic benefits proportional to the degree of those pullbacks. This linkage could further prevent North Korea's one-time hit-and-run approach. By doing so, South Korea and the United States can take the initiative to build peace on the Korean peninsula. In building peace on the Korean peninsula, we need to take a building-block approach with a time frame of five to ten years because it takes time for the three parties to implement the ambitious arms control approach faithfully with adequate, if not too effective, verification measures in place.

Notes

1. For discussion of the 1991-1992 negotiations, see Yong-Sup Han, "Resolving the Arms Control Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula," in Bjorn Moller, ed., *Security, Arms Control and Defense Restructuring in East Asia* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998).

2. For other discussions of Korean-Peninsula negotiating history and suggestions for change, see Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999). Yong-Sup Han, "North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations," *The Nonproliferation Review,* Spring 2000.

3. This section depends exclusively on the author's collaborative work with Paul Davis and Richard Darilek. Yong-Sup Han, Paul K. Davis and Richard E. Darilek, "Time for Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula,"*Arms Control Today,* December 2000, Vol. 30. No. 10, pp. 16-22.

4. Yong-Sup Han, *Designing and Evaluating Conventional Arms Control Measures: The Case of the Korean Peninsula* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 120-124.

5. *Korea Herald,* June 9, 2001.