CIAO DATE: 06/2012
Volume: 14, Issue: 1
May 2012
At a Time of Uncertainty, Count on North Korea (PDF)
Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman
There was a brief period – 16 days to precise – when a breakthrough seemed possible in the stalemate with North Korea when it pledged to freeze al nuclear and missile tests; then Pyongyang announcing a planned satellite launch, pulling the rug out from under Washington (and itself) and business as usual (or unusual) returned to the Peninsula. While hopes of a new round of Six-Party Talks were seemingly dashed, other multilateral initiatives seem alive and well. The BRICS met, mostly to complain one again, while ASEAN’s leaders gathered in Phnom Penh to pat themselves on the back. The Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) took a step forward by reaching agreement on a trilateral investment treaty. In elections around the region, continuity prevailed in Taiwan, as it did in Korea’s National Assembly elections (much to the surprise of most pundits) and Russia (to no one’s surprise). Meanwhile, Beijing seems to have taken a few steps back as a result of the Bo Xilai and Chen Guancheng affairs, although the impact on transfer power to the fifth generation remains to be seen.
Back to Normal? (PDF)
Michael J. Green, Nicholas Szechenyi
There is an old Japanese saying that no one should be prepared “to wait even three years sitting on the rock” (“ishi no ue ni mo sannen”). After three tumultuous and frustrating years as the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) tried to find its sea legs, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko finally made the first official visit to Washington of a Japanese prime minister since the spring 2009. Noda had his hands full this quarter: pursuing an increase in the consumption tax, trying to convince a wary public to support some continuation of nuclear power, cobbling together domestic support to move ahead with Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, and facing the perennial struggle to make progress on relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa. By the time of his Washington visit, Noda had started to line up support for the consumption tax backed off temporarily on TPP, and waited on restarting nuclear plants. However, he did manage to complete an agreement to move ahead with de-linking the move of about 9,000 US Marines to Guam and other locations in the Pacific and setting aside (but not give up on) the Futenma Relocation Facility (FRF). That announcement was a rare victory and set a positive tone for the summit and the joint statement Noda and President Obama made pledging to revitalize the US-Japan alliance. The prime minister returned home on May 1 facing the same stack of difficult domestic political challenges, but with an important if limited accomplishment in foreign policy.
Xi Visit Steadies Ties; Dissident Creates Tension (PDF)
Bonnie Glaser, Brittany Billingsley
China’s next leader, Xi Jinping, traveled to the US for a visit that went smoothly and laid a foundation for a strong bilateral relationship after the 18th Party Congress this fall. Senior US and Chinese officials delivered speeches to mark the 40th anniversary of Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, highlighting the progress made and the importance of the bilateral relationship while recognizing the deep mutual strategic mistrust. The third Asia-Pacific Consultation was held to manage suspicious and enhancement cooperation. President Obama met Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and coordinated planned responses to North Korea’s satellite launch. Friction increased with the filing of a complaint with the WTO that charged China with manipulating prices of rare earth elements. Beijing angered the Obama administration at the UN Security Council by vetoing a resolution that called for Syria’s president to step down. But as the violence worsened, the Council passed a resolution that authorized observers to monitor the ceasefire. China rebuffed US entreaties to reduce tis oil imports from Iran and the US imposed sanctions on a Chinese company for selling refined oil to Iran. A Chinese dissident sought assistance by entering the US Embassy, creating potential new challenges for the relationship.
North Korea's Rocket Launch (PDF)
Victor Cha, Ellen Kim
The most significant news in early 2012 centered on North Korea’s rocket launch. In a slightly different twist to the pattern, this latest provocation came just two weeks after reaching what seemed to be a new deal with the US to freeze its missile and nuclear programs in exchange for food assistance. After Pyongyang went ahead with the launch in defiance of its international agreements and its so-called “Leap Day” deal with the US, it felt like Groundhog Day. The question soon became how soon a nuclear test might be in the offing. Meanwhile, the KORUS FTA finally took effect after seven years of deliberation, and US sanctions on Iran and US beef imports to the ROK also reemerged as issues for the relationship.
Conflict in the East; Opportunity in the West (PDF)
Catharin Dalpino
US attention in Southeast Asia was focused on two sides of the region: in the east on tensions in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines, which have energized the US-Philippine alliance; and in the west on the impact of the April by-elections in Burma, which have the paved the way for a quantum leap in US engagement with the country. Beneath these headlines, attacks and explosions in Thailand and the Philippines were a reminder that terrorism is still a serious threat. Policy debate in the region over the US “pivot” to Asia was stimulated by a US request to double the number of littoral combat ships to be docked at Singapore as ell as b discussion between Washington and Manila on the rotation of US troops through Philippine bases. Both represent modest steps toward a configuration of “flexible bases” in Southeast Asia. Also, there will be an unprecedented number of US joint exercises and other forms of military cooperation in 2012, suggesting the “pivot” is an ongoing and incremental process that has been underway for years.
Hu Visits Cambodia as South China Sea Simmers (PDF)
Robert Sutter, Chin-Hao Huang
Chinese interchange with Southeast Asia featured President Hu Jintao’s visit to Cambodia, displaying positive diplomacy laced with economic incentives. The unusual high-level attention to Cambodia was related to China’s efforts to manage disputes with Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea and Cambodia’s appointment as the chair of ASEAN. Playing host at the Boao International Forum, Vice Premier Li Kejiang in a meeting with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai supported Hu’s emphasis in Cambodia on managing disputes diplomatically. Several Chinese leaders endeavored to solidify Chinese relations during meetings in China with senior officials from several regional governments, emphasizing in particular the mutual importance of growing economic ties. Chinese commentary generally supported China’s South China Sea claims in carefully measured terms, through a widely publicized faceoff in April between Chinese and Philippine government ships over fishing rights in a disputed area of the South China Sea was accompanied by strong Chinese warnings to the Philippines as well as Vietnam, and repeated charges against eh US along with accusations against Russia and India.
Post-Election Continuity (PDF)
David G. Brown
In January, President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election and the KMT retained its majority in the legislature. Voters endorsed Ma’s gradual approach to developing constructive relations with the Mainland. In Beijing, the outcome validated President Hu’s “peaceful development” policies. Both sides have indicated there will be continuity in cross-strait relations with a focus on a busy economic agenda. While understanding the domestic factors constraining Ma’s willingness to discuss political issues, Beijing has emphasized the importance of building political trust and strengthening a common Chinese heritage. Meanwhile, the DPP’s defeat has provoked an internal debate on the party’s policy toward Beijing but no clear picture has emerged on whether or how party policy might eventually change.
Plumbing the Depths (PDF)
Aidan Foster-Carter
Covering inter-Korean relations for Comparative Connections has been a roller-coaster ride, given the peninsula's changeable political weather. Even so, the current state of affairs is unprecedented. Pyongyang has spent the whole of 2012 hurling ever ruder and angrier jibes at ROK President Lee; plumbing the depths even by North Korean standards. In April, KCNA published and trumpeted a set of vicious cartoons that depict Lee as a rat being gorily done to death. From the viewpoint of inter-Korean relations, the past four months essentially saw almost no interaction except this one-sided name-calling. Unsurprisingly Seoul did have a few words to say in response, which only served to rile Pyongyang more. Wading through filth is no fun, but duty must be done as we describe and try to interpret North Korea's slander campaign, which showed ominous signs of escalating from words to deeds. In some obscure way, one intended function may be to boost the callow Kim Jong Un, so we also briefly report his formal accession to the DPRK's top leadership posts.
China's Post-Kim Jong Il Debate (PDF)
Scott Snyder, See-Won Byun
The 20-year anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea may provide a pretext for more active diplomacy to meet a growing list of potential disputes in the relationship, including China's handling of North Korean refugees, illegal fishing in Korean territorial waters, territorial claims, and mutual suspicions regarding approaches toward North Korea. Presidents Hu Jintao and Lee Myung-bak have held two summits this year and there has been increased interaction among other senior leaders as well. These diplomatic exchanges have sharpened attention on the prospects for the bilateral partnership in the aftermath of Kim Jong Il's death. Meanwhile, high-level contacts between China and North Korea have stalled since December. Beijing made renewed calls for restraint on the Korean Peninsula following North Korea's failed launch of an "earth observation satellite" and a UN Security Council (UNSC) President's Statement strongly condemning the launch. This has dampened China's hopes for regional engagement. Marking the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, the attempted launch was made two days after Kim Jong Un's appointment as First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).
Happy 40th Anniversary...? (PDF)
James J. Przystup
With both Tokyo and Beijing intent on celebrating the 40th anniversary of normalization, bilateral relations started well in 2012 – and quickly went downhill. Contested history retuned in a controversy sparked by Nagoya Mayor Kawamura Takashi’s remarks questioning the reality of the Nanjing massacre. Repeated incidents in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands involving ships of China’s State Oceanic Administration Agency and Japan’s Coast Guard kept the volatile issue of sovereignty claims politically alive. Both sides engaged in island naming games to enhance sovereignty and EEZ claims in the region. In April, Tokyo Gov. Ishihara Shintaro announced plans for the Tokyo Municipal Government to purchase three of the Senkaku Islands. With that, the relationship moved into May and Prime Minister Noda’s visit to China.
Sisyphus (PDF)
David Kang, Jiun Bang
The most dramatic events affecting relations in early 2012 concerned North Korea. The power transition appears to be proceeding smoothly, although mixed signals give signs that a clear foreign policy has not yet been worked out by the leadership in Pyongyang. Meanwhile, relations between South Korea and Japan continued on their seemingly disconnected tracks. In economic relations and day-to-day issues, they continue to move closer together on issues from dealing with tax evasion to joint disaster relief planning. Yet, territorial claims or claims about history are a constant irritant that threaten to derail relations at any time. Both sides seemingly wanted relations to worsen by picking fights over Dokdo/Takshima and making claims about history. One could dismiss the squabbling as peripheral to the main relationship, but these disputes hinder coordination and planning over important issues, divert diplomatic attention, and remain salient for domestic politics of both sides.
Succession, Syria...and the Search for Putin's Soul (PDF)
Yu Bin
By any standard, the first four months were a rough start to the year for both Russia and China. While succession politics gripped first Russia and then China, Moscow and Beijing coordinated closely over the crises beyond their borders (Syria, Iran, and North Korea) and promoted enhanced multilateralism through summitry with the BRICS and the SCO. Toward the end of April, the Russian and Chinese navies held the largest joint bilateral exercise in seven years, codenamed Maritime Cooperation-2012 (海上联合-2012; Morskoye Vzaimodeystviye-2012), in the Yellow Sea. Meanwhile, China’s future premier Li Keqiang traveled to Moscow to met Russia’s future-and-past President Putin in Moscow.