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Russia And The Outside World: A New Agenda For The 21st Century
Rapporteur
Pavel Kandel
Translator
Alexander Ogden
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
December 12–14, 1997
John F. Kennedy School of Government
The German Society for Foreign Affairs
Preface
This monograph represents part of a series of publications of the "Whither Russia?" project of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, based at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.
The group behind this monograph, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), is a non–governmental public association of influential Russian politicians, public figures, government officials, scholars, businessmen, and members of the news media. It is chaired by Sergei Karaganov, who is also Deputy Director of Russia’s Institute of Europe. The Council promotes research on foreign and defense issues of concern to the Russian Federation and its citizens. I am pleased to be able to present their ideas to a Western audience.
On December 12–14, 1997, the Council convened an international conference on "Russia and the Outside World: A New Agenda for the 21st Century." The German Society for Foreign Affairs and Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government also acted as organizers of the conference. Conference participants included scholars, specialists, and practitioners from Russia, Germany, and the United States; a list of participants is appended. The conference’s premises were the necessity for a fundamental renewal of Russia’s "agenda" to correspond with the qualitatively new challenges and threats of the 21st Century, the pressing need to overcome worn–out stereotypes in international affairs, and the importance of imparting new impulses to Russian–American–European global cooperation after the Cold War. These points were first laid out in an earlier publication, "Creating a New Democratic Fellowship," written by Karl Kaiser of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Karaganov, and myself.
The Conference Program considered five basic issues:
I. Achievements and failures of adapting to a post–Cold War world: the need for a new agenda.
II. New imperatives and possibilities for economic cooperation.
III. Cooperation in the sphere of energy resources: ideas for a common energy strategy.
IV. Combating terrorism, the internationalization of crime, and drug trafficking.
V. Common geostrategic "threats" and perspectives: the proliferation of "loose nukes," Islamic extremism, and the China factor.
The conference concluded with an exchange of opinions on which themes should be included in the "new agenda," and with the recommendation of concrete proposals for planning future work.
The following summary was produced by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and reflects in abridged form, but as fully as possible, the most characteristic positions and interesting moments of the debate. Several reports on the basic themes, in an unavoidably condensed form, are also provided. The aim of the summary is to describe, in keeping with the vision of the speakers, the parameters of the problems analyzed and the impediments to their resolution; to accentuate the ideas expressed; and to show similarities and differences in approach. The points of view of the participants are presented without attribution.
The text of this summary was translated by Dr. Alexander Ogden, under the guidance of the Council. From 1997–1998, Dr. Ogden was a Post–Doctoral Fellow at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian Studies. In Fall 1998, Dr. Ogden left Harvard to become an Assistant Professor at the University of South Carolina at Columbia. Funding for the "Whither Russia?" project has been provided by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
In our efforts to present Western scholars and policy makers with the broadest range of views within Russia, we have solicited a range of opinions on highly controversial topics. The opinions expressed in the monographs are those of the authors and do not represent the views of Harvard University, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, or the translators and editors.
Graham Allison, Director
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
The Conference Proceedings
I. The Need for a New Agenda
The conference’s first theme, stemming logically from its name, was "Achievements and failures of adapting to a post–Cold War world: The need for a new agenda." The basis for discussion was provided by the initiators’ (Graham Allison, Sergei Karaganov, and Karl Kaiser) presentations laying out the idea of a "new agenda." In the discussions, a conceptual opposition to the announced approach was also manifest. In essence, the rigid differentiation of an "old" and "new" agenda, and the characterization of the first as confrontational and the second as permeated by a spirit of cooperation, were considered methodologically unsound and not fully realistic. Thus, for example, one of the questions most at issue in Russia’s relations with Western powers—the issue of NATO expansion—paradoxically relates specifically to the new agenda. It is a phenomenon of the period which has succeeded the Cold War. It is in no way tied to European security, which in principle does not need strengthening, and only requires the prevention and regulation of isolated conflicts of the Bosnian type, a point on which the debate participants were in agreement. However, NATO expansion is inseparable from questions of leadership after the Cold War, and it changes the structure of the Euro–Atlantic fellowship as the most significant center of world power and Russia’s position in relation to it. Therefore, as before, elements of partnership and cooperation coexist with elements of conflict and clashes of interest. For example, three spheres may be singled out in the structuring of Russia–U.S. relations:
To summarize this position, the new agenda is permeated by unresolved old problems. Therefore, having excluded questions that remain fully topical, although they also look archaic, there is a great risk of finding oneself imprisoned by inadequate conceptions of the situation today and tomorrow.
Such an approach aroused natural objections from the originators of the "new agenda" idea. In and of themselves, divergences in opinion between Russia and her partners are natural, and to take into account still–dominant former stereotypes is not surprising. The differences are all the more normal considering that they are also present in interactions between the U.S. and the E.C., the U.S. and France, and within NATO. Therefore Russia, too, like the Western European countries, could use the mechanism of the NATO–Russia Council for expressing its position and working out coordinated resolutions. Establishing differences does not remove the necessity of discussing them, the desirability of achieving agreement, or the expediency of cooperation. On the contrary, these basic differences of opinion actually spark a coming together.
There is an urgent need actively to form and focus the opinion of scholarly and political associations in the spirit of the "new agenda." After all, old problems, even acknowledging their current topicality, are capable of reimposing themselves due to the force of ingrained prejudices and gigantic bureaucratic inertia. If they are consciously moved to the foreground, they unavoidably push aside new and unusual issues that are even more significant. So turning NATO expansion into the main dividing line that has swallowed up a significant part of the time and energy of debate participants during the past two years has overshadowed much more important and forward–looking issues. It is therefore necessary to move against this trend and aim higher at an attainable point, fully taking into account that by the strength of the current we will constantly be carried back to those political and military aspects of everyday reality that hinder efficient policymaking.
The backward movements in nuclear strategy of both the U.S. and Russia were an important subject that attracted the attention of participants in the discussion. President Bill Clinton’s recent directive on issues of nuclear strategy was cited as a manifestation of this kind of negative tendency. A tendency toward greater reliance on nuclear containment was also noted in Russia’s defense doctrine. All this in essence means that the U.S. and Russia continue to view each other as potential adversaries and do not have a nuclear strategy that is adequate to the realities of the post–Cold–War world, a point on which all speakers agreed. In spite of an objective commonality of purpose, there is no one approach to the non–proliferation of nuclear weapons. Given the universal obsession with the peripheral and largely far–fetched problem of European security, the conceptual security vacuum in Asia, where the absence of an coordinated policy is especially felt, remains beyond the field of view.
Alongside obvious signs of archaic tendencies in international relations, symptoms of progress were also noted. Ideas of a "new agenda," characterized at the moment of their appearance as starry–eyed and romantic, were reflected in the communiqué on the results of the Helsinki meeting of the American and Russian presidents. The meeting of leaders of the 1997 G–8 meeting in Denver served as further evidence of the vitality of these ideas (as outlined by Aleksander Livshits’ in his presentation at the "new agenda" conference).
Such practical confirmation of the good sense of "romanticism" impels one toward a new intellectual breakthrough. The present conference was also intended to contribute to the conceptual rethinking of policy in order to respond to the needs of the 21st century; we have initiated a series of international forums and joint projects within the framework of a "new agenda."
II. New Imperatives and Possibilities for Economic Cooperation
Discussion of the second theme, "New imperatives and possibilities for economic cooperation," centered around three basic issues:
The importance of economic interrelations between Russia and her Western partners is attested to by the fact that the E.C., and Germany in particular, are Russia’s strongest trade partners. At the same time the Russian portion of Germany’s commodity circulation amounted to approximately 17 million dollars in 1997. Among the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, Russia occupies second place (after Poland) in German trade. This is both an acknowledgment of Russia’s significance and an indicator of still unutilized opportunities. Overcoming the heritage of political and military confrontation opens up new spheres of cooperation, the fundamental basis of which remains mutual profit. The conference participants’ conceptions of this gain naturally differed, although points of rapprochement and shared aspects of their respective positions were also revealed.
Full unanimity was observed in acknowledging the necessity of foreign investment in Russia, Russia’s entry into the WTO, and reforms of the Russian tax system. While Western participants in the discussion took the reconciliation of Russia’s legislation with commonly–accepted standards as their premise for Russia’s acceptance into the WTO, those from Russia accentuated the necessity of concessions on the part of the World Trade Organization. In a similar way, the question was posed of prospects for Russian cooperation with the E.C. and the opportunities for Russian association with it. The further development of their relations assumes: first, easing Russia’s access to European markets and the abolition of numerous discriminatory limitations; and second, the calculation of Russian interests in a customs union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan and in a free trade area within the CIS.
In spite of agreement regarding the role of foreign investment in improving Russia’s economy, different nuances in approach were apparent here as well. Western partners suggested that it is up to Russia itself to define in principle to what degree and in what areas it is ready to allow the participation of foreign capital. For now actual practice in this sphere of cooperation seems to confirm the well–known saying about the passionate attraction to foreign investments, coexisting with an antipathy for foreign investors. Concrete examples illustrated such things as the aversion of certain Russian directors and regional leaders to respecting the rights of foreign investors in decision–making, the doctoring of extraction results post facto with the aim of supplanting a foreign partner, or the Russian Finance Ministry’s lack of readiness to cope with agreements about avoiding double taxation. The creation of conditions for attracting foreign investments into Russia requires the formation of a necessary legal base, reform of the tax system, admittance of foreign investors to the process of privatization, the establishment of a realistic conversion rate for the ruble, the conclusion of long–term treaties on the participation of foreign capital in the exploitation of natural resources (first and foremost in the oil and gas sector), and the conversion of the military–industrial complex.
From the Russian side it was evident that Russia’s lack of acceptance of private foreign investments is characteristic not only of the national–Communist camp, but also of the new capitalist class, which does not want external competition in the early stages of privatization. However, completion of this process and consolidation of control of national capital over basic branches of the Russian economy create a basis for a change of mood in favor of attracting foreign investors. It is not surprising that the latter undertake no little effort to keep the value of shares of Russian companies as low as possible in the new period. These same motives evidently partly stimulate a campaign in the Western news media to create a negative image of Russia as an unstable and unpredictable "free crime zone."
Other Russian participants looked at the problem from another angle. Although on the regional level certain hindrances to foreign investors exist, on the stock market there are no such "phobias." Furthermore, foreign firms dominate the market, and two thirds of share purchases on the corporate securities market take place on behalf of non–residents. But in spite of outwardly brilliant results (the growth in share value of Russian companies was 88 percent in 1997 and threefold during the past four years), the significant predominance of short–term speculative investments over long–term investments in industry makes the situation very unstable. Therefore the issue is not the volume of foreign participation in the Russian economy but the ratios between speculative and strategic investors. The latter, whether Russian or foreign, suffer equally from the imperfection of Russian legislation. Examples, however, although rare, already exist of direct foreign industrial investments (in particular the "Sakhalin–2" project).
The problem of speculative foreign capital showed a new face in light of the crisis in Southeast Asia. The concern here is not so much the typological similarity in economic situation and, correspondingly, a similar type of danger, although in spite of all differences between Russia and South Korea an excessive volume of short–term state obligations is equally characteristic of both. In a crisis, both Russia and the states of Southeast Asia face interlinked and interdependent threats: a tense situation in the stock markets of Southeast Asia and an increased need for currency stimulated the mass "shedding" of Russian securities, thus unintentionally provoking a stock and currency crisis in Russia. In this way the desired integration of Russia into the world economy also raises the risk of instability for the Russian economy. To lower this risk it is necessary to seek out supplementary sources to increase currency reserves.
However, an increase in currency reserves alone, a subject which also attracted attention, is not a panacea, given the dominance of short–term speculative investors in Russia. After all, the main source of the accumulation of foreign currency was not oil and gas exports, revenue from which in large part is concealed abroad, but rather currency that the Central Bank bought up from non–residents. These foreigners invest the rubles they receive in government treasury bonds. As a result, the growth of currency reserves is equated with an increase of state internal debt, which adds further instability to the situation in the currency and stock market.
The theme of an increase in Russian currency reserves was also present in the context of the interrelation of economic cooperation and international security. Differences in the Russian and American approaches to the Iraq problem, and Russian armaments sales to "problem" states (from the American point of view) are often motivated by Russia’s economic interests. Therefore, several questions were raised. Would it be worthwhile for the United States to buy up Russia’s Iraqi promissory notes ($7 billion)? Should the United States seek to acquire Russian military technology, and consider compensation to Russia for its refusal to supply that technology to unstable regions, following the example of the deal between the U.S. and Moldova on the purchase of Moldovan MIG–29s? In the course of a lively discussion, the idea was deemed too exotic and not realistic. It did, however, give rise to more promising ideas, in particular about the possible partial writing off of Russian debts.
III. Cooperation in the Sphere of Energy Resources—Ideas for a Common Energy Strategy
Consideration of problems of economic cooperation found a natural continuation within the framework of the third theme, "Cooperation in the sphere of energy resources—ideas for a common energy strategy." The starting point for the discussion was an analysis of the condition and prospects of the world market of energy repositories, Russia’s role in it, and the opportunities for cooperation in the sphere of energy resources (as outlined in the presentations by Vitaly Bushuev, Andrei Konoplyanik, and Nikolai Yegorov at the conference). A balance record of energy consumption shows that the Western hemisphere has attained self–sufficiency in energy resources. Europe, which now is quite a saturated oil and gas market, awaits future growth in the demand for gas from 4.6 to 15 million barrels per day. The most significant growth in energy consumption, to 36 million barrels a day by 2015, is expected in Southeast Asia and the Asian–Pacific region, where China, Japan, South Korea, India, and Thailand will become the main importers. Consequently, Russian–Asian cooperation in the energy sphere has virtually limitless potential. Russia possesses definite prospects in the European oil market as well. At present, Europe’s energy use relies on Russian natural gas (50 percent) and on Russian oil (20 percent). However, a predicted reduction in the extraction of oil in the North Sea after 2001 (25 percent of European consumption) and instability in the Middle East (which still provide 25 percent of European demand) requires further diversification in sources and import routes of oil, giving Russia additional opportunities. But Russian production of oil fell from 8.6 to 6 million barrels per day and could drop to 4 million barrels. With new investment, oil extraction is capable of rising to 7–8 million barrels per day by 2010. Without long–term capital investment in the oil and gas sector, a situation is likely in which the country will not even be able to satisfy internal consumption with its resources.
The structure of world energy needs, and the potential opportunities and needs of Russia, make the development of a global American–European–Russian energy strategy the optimal goal. The correspondence of interests of the partners depends on several factors. The consumer nations of oil are interested in a diversification of energy sources and supply routes in order to heighten the security of energy resources. At the same time, this strengthens stability in the regions of extraction and transit, raising the significance of Russia, among others. The removal of balance in energy consumption in favor of natural gas serves the same ends and is also advantageous for Russia. Russia’s access to the newest technologies and investments it can receive, combined with its strategic alliances concluded with major Western companies, raise the country’s specific share of the world energy market, and also further stabilize it. Cooperation between Russia, the U.S., and Europe in developing energy sources in the Caspian basin is important in order to harmonize common interests. In this way, a common energy strategy confirms one of the ideas of the "new agenda," that concerning the predominance of collective interests of the sides over their individual interests. In the context of these prospects, several issues were addressed to the Russian side:
In the opinion of Russian specialists, the stagnation in the Russian oil and gas sector is due to the fundamental absence of domestic demand. This, by the way, does not cancel the need for investments to increase extraction. Fifty percent of exported oil goes to Europe through Novorossiisk and the Bosphorus, which requires maintaining the stability of that transport corridor. However, development of oil terminals is foreseen both in the Baltic, including near Saint Petersburg, and in the Far East. Aside from the basic "Yamal–Western Europe" gas export route, a Scandinavian option and others are being studied. The integration of the energy systems of Russia and Western Europe and the creation of a Siberia–China energy bridge is also promising. In approaching the problem of the Caspian basin, Russia expects its Western partners at a minimum not to attempt to supplant it from an area of its legitimate interests, not to impede economic integration in the CIS, and not to strive to replace Russia in the regulation of conflicts in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The maximum of Russian expectations is cooperation. The resolution of questions about the legal status of the Caspian and the technological preparation for mastering its reserves must develop side by side, without putting them in opposition to each other.
Participants’ attention was also drawn to concrete projects of possible cooperation, in particular to the Elgin deposit of coking coal in the Yuzhno–Yakutsk coal–field. Exploitation of the basin began in the mid–1970s, after a general agreement was concluded on the delivery of Yuzhno–Yakutsk coal from the Soviet Union to Japan and about the delivery of equipment, machines, materials and other goods. From 1979 to 1996, at the main section of the Yuzhno–Yakutsk basin, approximately 170 million tons were extracted by Neryungrinsk, of which 50 million tons was exported. According to the level of exploitation of the Neryungrinsk basin the Elgin deposit was also explored. Today the needs of the coal market of Southeast Asia are valued at 150–160 million tons, of which Russia provides around 6 million tons. Upon the construction of the Elgin deposit, Russia can significantly raise its participation in supplying energy–rich coking coal, additional volumes of which could make up from 5 to 10 million tons. A high quality of coal is a distinguishing feature of the Elgin deposit. Approximately 80 percent consists of reserves of coking coal bearing the deficit mark "Zh" and approximately 20 percent consists of high–quality energy–rich coal. The coal pieces are distinguished by a high yield of volatile substances (35–40 percent), a very low content of sulfur (less than 0.3 percent), and a high caloric capacity (approximately 6.5–7.5 kilocalories per kilogram of mass).
Other than the countries of Southeast Asia, Germany is the main consumer of coal. The delivery of coking coal to Germany will turn out to be fully advantageous if it is fulfilled with cargo displacing approximately 200 thousand tons. Given such cargo, a terminal could be built near the port of Vanino in the Muchka Bay. In this way the coking coal of the Far East links the area not only with the Pacific Region, but with Europe as well. For Russia, the given project is important not only for expanding the export of Far East energy resources, but also as a means of creating new jobs to secure the region’s population. By the calculations of an English consulting firm, in order for the Elgin deposit to yield approximately 15 million tons in a year, it is necessary to invest around $1 billion during the repayment period of the project, which is six to seven years.
An interesting illustration of the significance and peculiarity of the natural–gas problem in post–Soviet countries is provided by the Ukrainian experience, which encapsulates domestic and international political issues as well as its economic ones. In the current situation, natural gas (its transit and sale) either becomes an instrument for aggravating foreign political relations, capable in certain cases even of leading to confrontation, or plays a positive role and further promotes the integration of neighboring states.
At the same time, natural gas acts as an important instrument of domestic policy. In the current Ukrainian pre–election campaign, literally every candidate has a point in his or her program about solving the problem of supplying natural gas in the region from which he or she is a candidate. The damming of pipelines or the cessation of natural–gas delivery are capable of significantly changing the political spectrum of Ukraine and other countries of the near abroad. Finally, under current conditions, natural gas is an important element of the shadow economy in that, according to estimates, "gas" money comprises no less than 50 percent of illegal circulation.
The huge interest in the natural gas problem in public opinion and the press is not surprising. Several Kiev newspapers even have a regular column entitled "The Natural Gas Sector," which enjoys great popularity. Gazprom is the central hero of many publications, in light of which Russia almost appears to be a "quasi–state separatist formation" on the territory of Gazprom. In Ukrainian public consciousness, several myths have coalesced that are tied to the transit and delivery of natural gas and the image of Gazprom. These include a conviction about the politicized nature of the company, which in its strategy allegedly is guided more by political than economic considerations. Another current myth concerns certain ill intentions of Gazprom, which is supposedly playing an often destructive role in Russian–Ukrainian relations. There is also a widespread conception of the omnipotence of the "gas monster," which in its degree of influence on Russia’s foreign policy ostensibly surpasses all other factors.
To shatter these harmful myths is fully feasible. Involving Russian gas–extracting, gas–transporting and gas–selling structures in the process of Ukrainian privatization makes accusations regarding its excessive politicization not very convincing. Important, too, is the increase in professionalism, in that in both Ukraine and Russia, highly–qualified natural–gas sellers, capable of high–quality marketing in the gas market, are in short supply. The education of consumers is also a necessity; thus far, neither people nor organizations are "accustomed" to paying for gas, imagining it as some sort of free heat, delivered into their homes by some miraculous power. The internationalization of structures selling and transporting gas, in the spirit of the latest agreement between Gazprom and Shell, also makes political gambles difficult.
The discussion of pressing and discordant energy problems was generally calm and reassuring in that its participants saw not only the contradictory interests of the sides in the energy sector, but also the advantages of cooperation.
IV. Combating Terrorism, the Internationalization of Crime, and Drug Trafficking
A lively interchange was sparked by the fourth theme, "Combating terrorism, the internationalization of crime, and drug trafficking." Neither the topicality of these problems, nor the international character of the given threat, nor the necessity of joining forces to stand against them were placed in doubt by any of the participants. Meanwhile overcoming the inherited and still–active negative stereotypes of Russia proved to be an important precondition for cooperation in combating crime. Many of the Russian participants drew special attention to this topic, pointing to stereotypes of Russia as an area of mass crime, criminalized through and through and ulcerated by the state’s corruption, as a base for drug trafficking, and as a home of the "Russian Mafia," which for now fortunately simply does not exist. In face of the dominance of such stereotypes, it is impossible to consider the Cold War’s "funeral" to be concluded. However, facts and figures reveal that the actual situation does not correspond to the sinister images of "Russia’s criminal threat to the world."
States with more rigid regimes, naturally, traditionally had a lower level of crime. As it proceeds down the path of economic and political transformation, Russia, like the other countries of Eastern Europe, has seen a sharp rise in the crime rate. But even in light of all this Russia today has a lower general crime rate than the majority of democratic countries. A comparison of such hard–to–falsify indicators as the number of murders and severe bodily injuries gives the following picture. The highest number of murders in Russia, 32,000, occurred in 1994. For the ten months thus far in 1997, 24,000 murders were committed, and of them 18,339 (76.4 percent) were solved. In the U.S., 24,500 murders were committed, and their average level of solution was 65 percent, in Germany, 3,800 with a level of solution of 87 percent. According to the figures for severe bodily injury, the annual indicators are as follows: Russia—67,000; the U.S.—1,135,000; Germany—88,000. But the level of solution varied: 76.7 percent in Russia; 55.5 percent in the U.S.; 81.3 percent in Germany. In this way, at the level of solving crimes Russia significantly outstrips the United States and in principle is on par with Germany.
For ten months of the current year in Russia (1997), 16,554 crimes using some form of weapon were committed, which at a minimum is an order less than in the United States. of these, 66 percent were solved. For the same period, 24 cases of terrorism were registered, of which 66 percent were solved, and 108 cases of seizing hostages. The level of solution for this form of crime was 80.2 percent.
Thus of five tendencies in the development of crime as noted by the UN, Russia has succeeded in avoiding two: a growth in crime (it was halted at the 1994 level, and in 1997 an 8 percent decrease from the previous year is expected), and a fall in the level of solved crimes, which on the contrary is consistently increasing in recent years, for serious and especially serious crimes as well. In particular, 118 contract murders were solved.
As for Russia’s general crime level, in comparison to the 14.5 million crimes registered yearly in the U.S. and approximately 6 million in Germany, Russian indicators (2.4 million), even taking into account hidden crime, do not exceed 7 million. These indicators might seem relatively successful, although, of course, they cannot be considered to be such.
In the opinion of Russian specialists, the excessive inflation of the "Russian Mafia" threat in the West looks no less invented and self–interested. Those political scientists and criminologists who have dealt for a long time with Colombian, Italian, Chinese, and other "mafias" can clearly take credit for the invention of the concept of a "Russian Mafia." But in reality the concept of a "foreign mafia" itself assumes a number of conditions. First, a significant number of territorially–concentrated and ethnically distinct groups is necessary, such as the Italians or Chinese in the U.S. Secondly, there must be a branching network of trade, transport, and service enterprises in the hands of a criminal formation, making possible the production and transport of items of illegal commerce, first and foremost drugs and weapons, but also the laundering of "dirty money." Third, the cultural, religious, or ethical norms of an ethnic group composing the backbone of an ethnic mafia must promote an extremist resolution of conflict. For a foreign mafia to arise, the totality of all factors here enumerated is necessary. Therefore announcements of the presence of the "Russian Mafia" abroad, beyond post–Soviet borders, are absolutely groundless.
Thus, for example, much has been said about Russian crime groups in Cyprus. But in the report that was discussed at a meeting of the Committee on Criminal Issues in the parliament of the Republic of Cyprus, information about the activity of the so–called "Russian Mafia" and about the laundering of "dirty money" on the island was analyzed from all sides. The facts introduced bore witness to the absence in the Republic of Russian organized crime. An effective legislative base and a strict system for preventing law infringement have not allowed criminal group activity to develop here. The lone attempts by Russian citizens in contact with their countrymen to bring a criminal racket into being in 1996 were cut short at the first signal from the law–enforcement organs. Cases of Russians visiting Cyprus with huge sums of money of dubious origin were established. However, opportunities for legalizing this money were severely limited by the legislation in effect in Cyprus and by internal bank rules, which prevent the use of the country’s financial system for laundering "dirty money," no matter where it comes from.
The real reasons for turning the "Russian Mafia" into an idee fixe must be sought far from any real danger posed by it. It is possible that an impact is felt from the demands of political circles in many countries that are trying to exert pressure on Russian leadership in the resolution of important inter–governmental tasks. Business and financial groups can also act as the clients, as they attempt to limit the penetration of Russian entrepreneurs into foreign goods and services markets. A tendency can also be sensed in the foreign and Russian news media toward gaining additional revenue by raising their ratings and circulation on the basis of publications on a hot topic.
The sensation in the press about a "Russian Mafia" provides Western public opinion with an opportunity to formulate a negative image of the country. In Russia, an apparently criminal and corrupt government has been formed, which cannot be treated as a civilized object of international law, and any capital investment or transactions in the Russian market are extremely risky. Naturally, a conclusion is drawn from this: such a state cannot help exporting crime to the West. Furthermore, in Russia there are allegedly forces at the governmental level as well that drive this process along. (A detailed analysis of similar stereotypes was given in reports prepared by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and presented to conference participants: "The Perception of Russia and Russian Business Abroad: Problems and Possibilities" and "Corruption in Russia and Ways to Combat It.")
At the same time it is fair to propose that the obsession with a "Russian Mafia" in Western Europe, the U.S., and other regions of the world is conditioned by the international expansion of Russian "shadow" capital. According to estimates by Russian and foreign experts, in the period 1990–1996 between $100 and $200 billion was exported to the countries of Europe and America by Russian "businessmen." In this way fear is evoked not so much by a serious criminal threat from the "Russian Mafia" as by the economic penetration of illegal capital, which could bring with it a loss of control of mechanisms enabling a balanced financial credit system. But it is necessary and possible to regulate this international problem by normal methods, not by rushing to inflate propaganda campaigns.
Russian specialists denied neither the existence of organized crime in Russia nor its attempts to penetrate abroad, but they underlined that the government and its special forces troops and law–enforcement organs are not coparticipants of criminal activity but the main tool in combating it. For this very reason opposing the merger of Russian criminal groups with transnational crime requires a realistic picture of what is happening and an accurate definition of the scale of these phenomena. But a political stir about the "Russian Mafia" and attempts to use it for narrowly mercenary goals is a poor contribution to the international coordination of the activities of organs of power, law–enforcement structures, and special forces troops of Russia and other countries.
Western colleagues’ admission of the lawfulness of Russian claims is a comforting symptom of the readiness for coordinated efforts. It was noted that the misuse of the term "Russian Mafia" in the U.S. is provoked not so much by a dread of Russia as by a fear of the mafia itself. Noteworthy also was the ironic observation that application of the cliche "Russian Mafia" to Ukrainian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian crime groups is offensive to the national dignity and sovereignty of the independent post–Soviet states.
There is no irony in the next subject, the development of close contacts between the law–enforcement organs of the majority of the CIS member states. Since 1992, a Conference and later Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CIS has been in existence that meets regularly 3–4 times a year. In Moscow, a Bureau to Coordinate the Fight Against Organized Crime in the CIS has been formed, including representatives of all nations of the Commonwealth, although Ukraine and Turkmenistan have a special status. As a result of its work, a number of serious operations to curtail the activity of inter–state ethnic crime groups have succeeded. Today it is possible to speak of the possibility of giving this Bureau the status of an interregional Interpol representation for the CIS territory. An accord about this was reached at the Bakin conference of the CIS Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Police interactions among the former Warsaw Pact states underwent their own kind of "childhood illness" in the period 1991–93, when they in every way possible distanced themselves from Russian law–enforcement organs. However, professionals understood that their work was impossible without close cooperation not only with the West but with the East as well. At the current time a quite close, two–sided cooperation has formed, in particular with Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and a number of other countries.
The evident mutual understanding exhibited even in such a complex issue as the Chechnya question is characteristic. Russian participants in the discussion proposed that Western European and American colleagues incorrectly evaluated the very serious danger of the situation in the North Caucasus, and incorrectly understood the efforts of the Russian government directed against an armed separatist uprising on the territory of the Chechen Republic. As a result, a unified front in combating international terrorism was broken in this sector, although key figures in Chechnya included dangerous international terrorists and mercenaries previously active in a long list of countries. This cannot have a positive effect on the future development of either the Caucasus region or the Islamic world as a whole.
Chechnya, remaining a subject of the Russian Federation, in fact is a quasi–state formation that in its legal status calls to mind the Turkish republic in Northern Cyprus or Nagorno–Karabakh. At the same time, in a number of countries it was granted the opportunity to open its representative offices, pretending to the status of embassies of an independent state. This kind of quasi–state formation is illegally financed by commercial and criminal structures active not only in Russia but abroad, including in Western Europe. Tragic mistakes committed by Russia in the course of the war do not change the essence of this regime, a close analog of which would be the Medellin drug cartel. It is therefore illegitimate to interpret the Chechnya problem in the context of the struggle for independence on the analogy of events in the Baltic states in 1989–90, or to support it politically and morally.
No polemics, however, were provoked by the issue at hand. The interpretations offered by authoritative American and German specialists led to the acknowledgment that Chechnya is considered an inseparable part of Russia, that the lack of progress in resolving the situation gives rise to concern, but that the necessity of coordinating actions in particular for freeing hostages is unquestionable.
There was also no conflict of opinion on the final theme of this discussion, "Russian espionage," the personal bugbear of Western and Central European mass media. A high–ranking representative of the Russian intelligence services—having reassured the assembled group at the conference by pointing out that Moscow’s bureau does not sit without work any more than their colleagues in Langley or Pullach do—proposed that the discussion be governed by one of Helmut Kohl’s pronouncements: "It is not a king’s affair to rummage through spy stories." For the cooperation of special intelligence forces in combating international crime and terrorism (something that is gathering speed in Russo–German relations, for example), public hysterics about one "spy affair" or another are counterproductive. Meanwhile, mass psychosis, created around the "Aimes affair" in the U.S., suspended the cooperation that had taken shape between the CIA and Russia’s SVR. American participants in the discussion also regarded the Aimes incident as a manifestation of the heritage of the Cold War, which is inadmissible as grounds for reducing cooperation between the intelligence services of Russia and the U.S. in combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction and narcotics, and against international organized crime. It was shown in particular that in this sphere simple lawful cooperation and coordination of action were insufficient; the joint operational training of corresponding services would be necessary.
The problem of combating drug trafficking occupied a significant place in the discussion. In this area, the country has fallen victim to its economic and social changes, a fact acknowledged by Russian specialists. Before 1992, the inconvertibility of the ruble defended Russia from a mass influx of drugs from abroad. The "Iron Curtain" did its job, too. Today, on the other hand, Russia has encountered a very serious growth in drug addiction. The facts are as follows: for 10 months of 1997, 149,844 crimes involving the illegal circulation of drugs were registered. of them, 1,277 crimes (0.9 percent) were committed by members of organized groups. Growth by comparison with the year before consisted of 80.9 percent.
A realistic goal would be at least to contain the growth of illegal circulation at the current level, and not to allow the scale of the problem to reach the same level as in the U.S. and Western Europe. In Russia, the problem of drug addiction takes on an international character. One of its aspects is the sharp strengthening in recent years of the flood of drugs from the south, from Afghanistan and Pakistan by way of Central Asia. And although fairly good cooperation has been established at the level of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, it is not always possible to reach mutual understanding with other government structures in the newly independent states. A second international aspect of the problem is Ukraine’s transformation into a major supplier of poppy heads and opium. Ukraine’s six western regions in particular have been drawn into the delivery of these drugs. According to the available data, every second operation involving the transport or sale of drugs has an international link. If in 1992, 29 foreigners were arrested for illegal drug operations, then in 1996 this figure exceeded two and a half thousand. Among them are not only citizens of Nigeria, Afghanistan, and other developing countries, but also citizens of Great Britain, the U.S., and other highly–developed states. In this way a new route of drug transit has formed on Russian territory, and nipping it in the bud requires international cooperation.
Prices also demonstrate the spread of the drug market in Russia. Four years ago a portion of cocaine cost $220–$240, now its price has fallen to $130. Today in Russia there are nearly one million people who can be called drug addicts. Another approximately 2 million people use drugs irregularly. But in light of the tendency that has been revealed, it is not out of place to presume a growth in the number of drug users to 10 million people within a few years. If one considers that from 1992 to 1996 the number of women using drugs multiplied 6.5 times, it is not difficult to understand the national scale of the problem, which Russia is in no condition to battle alone. The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy’s special report on this theme serves as testimony to Russian anxiety over the problem of drug addiction.
European and American colleagues shared the Russian concerns. The following points were established: if, formerly, Russia approached this problem primarily in connection with drug transit, which moved the threat to the country itself into the future, now that "future" has arrived. A unique dual indicator represents the illegal circulation of drugs today. On the one hand, there is the expressive, although indirect, indicator of general international organized–crime level, in that drugs as a rule are tied to money laundering, the illegal arms trade, and terrorism. On the other hand, combating a drug mafia is the best indicator of the level of international law–enforcement cooperation reached thus far. Discussion showed that the aspiration to join forces in opposing the internationalization of crime is so high that even problems that seem debatable take second place. It was no less evident that from an agreement to act together to practical cooperation there is still a long road ahead to traverse, and only the first steps have been taken along it.
V. Common Geostrategic "Threats" and Perspectives: the Proliferation of "Loose Nukes," Islamic Extremism, and the China Factor
The concluding theme, "Common geostrategic "threats" and perspectives: the scattering of "loose nukes," Islamic extremism, and the China factor," was most directly linked with operative foreign policy. Therefore it proved to be rich ground for exposing those actual contradictions that can become a stumbling block to the practical implementation of a philosophy of cooperation in the spirit of the "new agenda." Equally naturally, within the bounds of the present theme, national and state interests affected the opinions of discussion participants particularly noticeably. For this reason, discussion was particularly instructive, showing clearly the priorities of the sides in their mutual expectations, fears, and interests.
The danger of the proliferation of "loose nukes," of fissionable materials and nuclear technology, and of other kinds of weapons of mass destruction proved for Western specialists to be an important subject of constantly–expressed anxiety. In their eyes, Russia appears to be the fundamental object of this anxiety, both as an insufficiently stable and secure place for the concentration of nuclear materials and technology, and as a state whose policies in relation to such countries as Iraq and Iran do not correspond with America’s. This supposedly carries a risk of dangerous technology transfer and hinders the complete liquidation of weapons of mass destruction in those countries. Many worried about factors such as the following: the reliability of the system of control, inventory and storage of fissionable materials in Russia; the possible migration of Russian specialists in producing weapons of mass destruction to "problem" countries; the delay in ratifying the START–2 treaty; Russian superiority in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; the insufficient rigidity of Russia’s position in relation to Iraq’s attempts to hide weapons of mass destruction; assumed cooperation with Iraq in perfecting its missile weapons.
Hopeful signs were seen in the Helsinki agreements between the U.S. and Russian Presidents, making it possible to secure ratification of the START–2 agreement, including the work of the International Scientific and Technical Center, which provides Russian specialists employment in the field of nuclear armament, and programs of international, inter–laboratory cooperation in converting weapons plutonium.
At the same time, the opinion was voiced that everything now undertaken in the field of heightening nuclear security is necessary but completely insufficient in light of the view from the 21st Century. After all, the process of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons as a whole, including the urgently unavoidable START–2 treaty and the forthcoming START–3 negotiations, emerges as earlier from a balance of nuclear power between East and West, U.S.S.R. and U.S.. All this reflects, speaking metaphorically, a "Ptolmeic" view of the universe while humanity is at the same time entering a "Copernican" era. If a build–up in China’s nuclear potential is predicted, if current and possible coalitions are taken into account, if conflict is imagined, for example, between India and Pakistan involving nuclear weapons, then an inherited balance of nuclear might looks archaic and is ineffective. A broader question about common tasks of nuclear strategy in the future must be asked.
Less preoccupation with problems of nuclear security and the non–proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was evident among Russian participants, although the palette of views was many–colored. In the opinion of some, there was no basis for pessimism in the traditional area of the limiting and reduction of nuclear weapons. However, in the sphere of non–proliferation the great powers in essence silently capitulated, proving incapable of creating political preconditions for concerted action. In some cases, attempts are undertaken to dramatize the situation, for example, North Korea. In others, Israel for example, the danger is passed over in silence.
Other speakers evaluated the cooperation of the leading world powers in preventing the proliferation of "loose nukes" and missiles as fully satisfactory and quite effective, having established an almost complete correspondence in interests and positions on this problem. At the same time, the ratification of the START–2 treaty by the Russian State Duma was not considered to be absolutely predetermined. Problems linked to NATO expansion and the American President’s new directive on nuclear strategy will hardly have a favorable effect on the passage of the treaty in the Russian parliament. In any case it could be ratified only along with the Helsinki accord regarding the modification of the periods of putting it into effect and the New York agreement about PRO, and only after the approval of the "package" by the U.S. Senate.
A useful enrichment of the discussion was provided by the proposal to distinguish "threats" as potential dangers, and "challenges" requiring both urgent and constant opposition. In the context of this methodological clarification, the scattering of "loose nukes" and missiles qualifies as a challenge for Russia as well, in that the majority of "rogue" states are located nearby or border on it. Concrete examples also speak to the seriousness of the Russian approach to the problem of non–proliferation of missiles and nuclear arms, for example, the recent eviction from Russia of the secretary of the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow, unmasked in an attempt to obtain secret information on these issues. Meanwhile attempts to link the problem of non–proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to completely different problems are groundless, for example, the character of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Russian–Iranian cooperation in building nuclear power stations, or Russian–Iraqi economic cooperation. Double standards also greatly complicate a joint fight against common challenges, whether the issue is "rogue" states or Islamic extremism. If Hezbollah is an extremist organization, then why does Chechen extremism or the Taliban in Afghanistan fail to arouse a like degree of dissatisfaction?
In connection with the danger of Islamic extremism, two approaches among the Russian participants became clear. According to one point of view, Russia will be compelled to suffer its first blow, which is already taking place in part in Chechnya. After all, Russia itself is populated not only by Orthodox, but by Muslims as well, and the majority of states where Islamic extremism is active are contiguous to it or are located nearby.
The other opinion took as its starting point the asymmetry of strategic challenges and non–equivalence of the threats for Russia and its Western partners. For Russia, threats of Islamic fundamentalism from Iran do not exist. Whereas for the United States, no particular danger is presented by Chechen zealots of sharia or jihad. The Afghan Taliban could be a Russian, Tajik, or Uzbek problem, but would become an American one only if it destabilized the situation in Central Asia, which would disrupt the construction of oil and gas lines and complicate the extraction of oil and gas resources. In general, Islamic extremism is much more dangerous for the U.S. and its allies, since they have direct economic and strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region whereas Russia thus far does not. Lukoil and Gazprom are interested in exploiting the oil and gas deposits in Iran and Iraq, but this is not vitally important for Russia. Several Arab regimes have as before better relations with Moscow than with Washington. This lets Russia play the role of intermediary and make its contribution to resolving the region’s problems. But Russia at the same time is distanced from the U.S. in that the degree of the threat for the two countries is not identical. Evidently there is a lack of correspondence of interests, even in the absence of their fundamental collision. Consequently, a dialogue about a common position and cooperation in the fight against asymmetrical challenges must be preceded by an answer to the question of what leads to a rapprochement in the face of a difference of interests?
The same diversity of opinion was also revealed in debates on the theme of China. Some proposed that the growing significance of China has particular impact on Russia. This is determined by three factors: a common border extending 4000 kilometers, a growing imbalance of economic potential, and a comparable dynamic of demographic processes. According to estimates, at the beginning of the 21st Century China will surpass Russia in population no more or less than by ten times. Russia here encounters a geopolitical, geo–economic, and demographic challenge. China’s actual expansion by means of illegal migration into Russian territory has already begun. Along with this it seems evident that Russia in the 21st Century will be in no condition to cope independently with the Far East and Eastern Siberia. Russia’s turn toward Asia is taking place before our eyes and is fully opportune. But Russian policy should also not dramatize the China factor. In the next 15–20 years the basic direction of China’s foreign policy activity will be directed southward. Western anxiety over military and technical cooperation between Russia and China is also groundless. This cooperation will be accomplished with a reckoning of Russia’s own national security, in order to preserve a technology gap of approximately 10 years.
The possibility of a common U.S.–Russian policy in relation to China was met with skepticism. First, Russia is no longer a heavyweight in this threesome, and China is becoming one. Secondly, for clear commercial, economic, and strategic reasons China inspires much greater interest than Russia in the U.S.. And now it is up to China itself to decide where and to whom to give preference. Consequently the issue is not one of two states defining a policy toward a third, but it at the very least concerns an isosceles triangle. The situation would change if China were transformed into an actual threat, but at present there is no basis for such assertions. Presented with no grave necessity of active mutual action, it would be artificial to expect it. Proceeding from each country’s actual interests, and not from some abstractly desired cooperation, after a period of confrontation the lack of ecstatic harmony in all policy areas is absolutely normal and should not be taken as a return to the Cold War. It is time for the United States to get beyond seeing any state that in any way does not support America as an adversary.
Russia’s China policy, according to yet another opinion, must avoid two equally mistaken extremes: complete isolation from China due to exaggerated fear of its expansion, and absolute openness toward it, in order to avoid uncontrolled migratory processes.
A dilemma arising in connection with China’s growing share in the world economy and world politics was formulated as follows. In the eyes of some, China is becoming a dangerous superpower. Others view China’s development in a somewhat different manner. China in the new age has not been too successful on the field of battle and likely despairs of reaching success in such a way. However if such a scenario in the development of events is allowed for, the question for our American and European colleagues becomes whether Russia will be as indifferent to the United States and to Europe in light of prospects that China will appear as a military superpower? The question in essence remained unanswered, in that mainly Russians were occupied by the China issue, which indirectly also characterizes the readiness for the drawing up of common approaches in this process.
An odd echo of Russian arguments between "neorealists" and "neoromantics" was found in the presentations of the American participants. The emphases in the American "realist" vision were set out as follows:
In the American picture of the world colored in "romantic" hues, the focus is somewhat different:
This summary of the discussion makes it possible for the reader to judge the degree of agreement and the depth of divergence of views and interests, the readiness for cooperation and the predisposition to suspicion, and to make a choice between "realism" or "romanticism" or to refrain from doing so. We will leave these decisions to the reader.
VI. Conclusions
The discussion of directions for further work on the "new agenda" provided a summing–up for the conference. The ideas and initiatives proposed had different degrees of specificity: from practical proposals for the implementation of particular measures, to the definition of themes worthy of further discussion.
A list of specific proposals:
Problems requiring further work touched on various aspects of international security, from military to informational and energy–related ones.
In the sphere of military security attention was directed toward the following areas:
Questions of information security arose in several areas: first, the vulnerability of computer networks to terrorism and international crime; second, in relation to the non–proliferation of information about weapons of mass destruction; third, the danger and inadmissibility of international informational confrontation and the use of information as a weapon; fourth, the influence of information technology on the development of humanity.
Questions of the security of energy resources were basically connected with problems of the Caspian region. But the proposal was also made to place them in the broader context of Eurasia’s role as the main supplier of sources of energy and the central area of their transit in the global energy market that is being formed. In connection with conflicts between Russia’s interests and those of its Western partners in the Caspian basin, as in other regions, attention has been turned to the necessity of developing a "code of conduct" of the sides in regions "sensitive" to one another in their spheres of activity. Also noted was the importance of considering the development of nuclear energy from the point of view of strengthening a regime of non–proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need for a long–term resolution of the problem of using nuclear waste. The ecological aspects of the energy issue were also touched upon and require the formulation of a common strategy.
The proposal to learn and rethink anew the role and possibilities of the U.N., the Security Council, and the G–8 in ensuring international security in the 21st Century can be considered the main conclusion of the conference.
The breadth and diversity of problems raised was such that, in the ironic observation of one participant, they were only within the power of a world government. But if any of the points of this "new agenda" prompt future success in drawing nearer to practical solutions, the leaders of the G–8 would receive a quite good intellectual start. Consequently the conference was not in vain.
Anatoly L. Adamishin
Minister for Cooperation with the CIS States
Viktor V. Aksyuchits
Advisor to the First Deputy Prime Minister
Vitaly V. Bushuev
Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy
Mikhail L. Berger
Editor–in–Chief
Segodnya daily news paper
Andrei G. Chernenko
Head of Department for Information and Public Relations
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Major General
Sergei Yu. Glaziev
Head of the Analyses Department
Council of Federation
Anton V. Danilov–Danil’Yan
Head of Economic Department
Administration of the President of Russia
Mikhail G. Delyagin
Advisor to the First Deputy Prime Minister
Yuri S. Deryabin
Deputy Secretary of the Security Council
Alexander A. Dynkin
Deputy Director
Institute of World Economy and International Relations
Russian Academy of Sciences
Andrei V. Fyodorov
Director
"Political Studies" Foundation; CFDP "Russia and the World" Program Director
Pavel E. Kandel
Head of Department
Institute of Europe
Russian Academy of Sciences
Sergei A. Karaganov
Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe
Russian Academy of Sciences; Member of the Presidential Council; Chairman
Board of the CFDP
Grigory B. Karasin
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Grigory B. Karasin
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Yevgeny A. Kiselyov
Vice President
Ntv Television Company
Oleg V. Kiselyov
Chairman
Mosexpo Joint Stock Company; Member of The Presidential Council
Vladimir N. Klimenko
Chief of Staff
Defense Council
Yuri G. Kobaladze
Chief of The Press Bureau
Foreign Intelligence Service
Major General
Andrei A. Kokoshin
State Military Inspector – Secre Tary of The Defense Council
Alexei P. Kondaurov
Head of Center For Liaison And Information
Menatep Bank
Stanislav N. Kondrashov
Political Feature Writer And Columnist
Izvestia Daily News Paper
Andrei A. Konoplyanik
Executive Director And Member of The Board of The Russian Bank of Reconstruction And Development
Sergei V. Kortunov
Department Chief – Deputy Chief of Staff
Defense Council
Vyacheslav V. Kostikov
Deputy Director General
&Quot;Media–Most&Quot; Company; Former Press Secretary of The President of Russia
Mikhail M. Kozhokin
Deputy Chairman of The Board
Unexim Bank
Yevgeny M. Kozhokin
Director
Russian Institute of Strategic Studies
Anatoly S. Kulikov
Vice Prime Minister – Minister of Internal Affairs
General of The Army
Vladimir A. Lepyokhin
Head of The Analyses Department
Directorate of Information Programs
Ort Russian Public Television Company
Alexander Ya. Livshits
Deputy Head of The Administration of The President of Russia
Vladimir P. Lukin
Chairman
Committee of The State Duma On International Affairs
Valery L. Manilov
First Deputy Chief of The General Staff of The Russian Armed Forces
Colonel General
Viktor N. Mironov
Deputy Chairman
Committee On Military Science And Technology of The General Staff of The Russian Armed Forces
Major General
Vladimir N. Mironov
President
Moscow–Paris Bank
Director
Institute of Politics
Nikolai V. Mikhailov
State Secretary – First Deputy Minister
Ministry of Defense
Sergei A. Mndoyants
Director General
Foundation For Development of Parliamentarianism In Russia
Vyacheslav A. Nikonov
President
&Quot;Politika&Quot; (&Quot;Polity&Quot;) Foundation
Valery N. Ochirov
Counselor To The Vice Prime Minister And Minister of Internal Affairs
Lieutenant General
Vladimir S. Ovchinskiy
Head of The National Central Bureau of The Interpol
Lieutenant General
Sergei B. Parkhomenko
Editor–In–Chief
Itogi Weekly Journal
Alexei I. Podberyozkin
Deputy Chairman of The Committee of The State Duma On International Affairs
Stanislav P. Polovnikov
President
&Quot;Kompomash&Quot; Corporation
Sergei E. Prikhod’Ko
Foreign Policy Assistant To The President of Russia
Valery V. Prozorovskiy
Head of Section For Liaison With State Agencies And Public Organizations
Lukoil Company
Alexei K. Pushkov
Director For International Relations
Public Russian Television (Ort); Member of The Board of Editors
&Quot;Foreign Policy&Quot;
Grigory A. Rapota
Deputy Director
Foreign Intelligence Service
Lieutenant General
Dmitry B. Ryurikov
Counselor To The Chairman of The Council of Federation
Vladimir A. Ryzhkov
First Deputy Chairman of The State Duma
Anatoly Ye. Safonov
First Deputy Director
Federal Security Service; Chairman
Committee On Security of The Belarus–Russia Union; Colonel General
Alexei M. Salmin
Chairman of The Council
Russian Social And Political Center; Member of The Presidential Council
Georgy A. Satarov
Director
Center of Applied Political Studies &Quot;Indem&Quot;
Alexander N. Shokhin
Member of The State Duma
Head of The &Quot;Our Home Is Russia&Quot; Faction
Vasily S. Sidorov
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei V. Stepashin
Minister of Justice
Anatoly V. Torkunov
Head of The Moscow State Institute For International Relations
Vitaly T. Tretyakov
Editor–In–Chief
Nezavisimaya
Gazeta Daily News Paper
Vladimir S. Velichko
Vice President of The National Advertising Association; President of The Rosvero Company
Vladimir P. Vorozhtsov
Counselor To The Vice Prime Minister And Minister of Internal Affairs
Major General
Dmitry I. Vydrin
Director
European Institute of Integration And Development (Kiev
Ukraine)
Igor Yu. Yurgens
Co–Chairman
Board of Trustees
Foundation For Development of Parliamentarianism In Russia Grigory A. Yavlinsky
Member of The State Duma; Chairman
Center of Economic And Political Studies Nikolai N. Yegorov
Deputy Minister For Atomic Energy
Mikhail M. Zadornov
Minister of Finance
Konstantin F. Zatulin
Director
Institute of Diaspora And Integration
Alexander A. Zdanovitch
Head of The Public Relations Center
Federal Security Service
Major General
Germany
Otto Wolff Von Amerongen
Chairman And Executive officer
Otto Wolf Industrieberatung Und Beteiligungen Gmbh; Chairman
German East–West Trade Committee
Peter Danylow
Managing Director
German East–West Trade Committee
Department of International Affairs–Bilateral Relations
Federation of German Industries
Karl Kaiser
Director
Research Institute of The German Society For Foreign Affairs
Andreas Von Knoop
Head of The Delegation
German Industry And Commerce In Russia
General Manager
Board of The German Business Association In Russia
Arndt Freytag Von Loringhoven
Member of Policy Planning Staff
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Friedbert Pfluger
Member of Parliament Committee On Foreign Affairs And Defense Committee
Alexander Rahr
Head
KÖRber–Unit For Russian/CIS Studies
Research Institute of The German Society For Foreign Affairs
Bernd Schmidbauer
State Minister
Member of Parliament
Bundeskanzleramt
Bruno Siefken
General Manager
Deminex–CIS
Deminex Wolga Petroleum Gmbh And Deminex Azerbaijan Petroleum Gmbh
Christian Wriedt
Member of The Board
KÖRber Foundation
United States
Graham T. Allison
Professor
JFKSchool of Government
Harvard University; Director of The Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Member of Defense Policy Board
The Honorable Jeff Bingaman
United States Senate
Richard N. Cooper
Professor of International Economics
Harvard University; Former Chairman of The National Intelligence Council
Former Under Secretary of State For Economic Affairs
And Deputy Assistant Secretary of State For International Monetary Affairs
Edward P. Djerejian
Director of The James Baker Center At Rice University; Former U.S. Ambassador To Israel And Syria
Former Assistant Secretary of State
Martin Feldstein
President of The National Bureau of Economic Research; Former Chairman of The Council of Economic Advisers Under President Reagan
Stephen J. Hadley
Attorney
Shea Gardner; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Under President Bush
Fred C. IklÉ
Center For Strategic And International Studies; Former Undersecretary of Defense Under President Reagan
Jack F. Matlock
Professor
G. Kennan Institute
Princeton University; Former U.S. Ambassador To Moscow
Joseph S. Nye
Dean
JFKSchool of Government
Harvard University; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Former Director of The National Intelligence Council
Brian Taylor
Post Doctorate Fellow
JFKSchool of Government
Harvard University
Siegfried S. Hecker
Los Alamos National Laboratory
John P. White
Professor
JFKSchool of Government
Harvard University; Former Deputy Secretary of Defense In The Clinton Administration
Richard Weitz
Post Doctorate Fellow
JFKSchool of Government
Harvard University
The Honorable Jack Reed
United States Senate
The goal of the "Whither Russia?" project is to illuminate for the international community the ongoing debate in Russia about the country’s identity, security, and interests. Our central question is: what will emerge as the dominant conception of Russian identity, Russian security, and Russian greatness? More specifically, we hope this project can help clarify: competing images of Russia across the political spectrum; how these competing images are reflected in policy; the shape of the debate in specific arenas; the views of the political elite and the public about the debate; differences between views in the regions and those at the center; common threads in the competing images of Russia; and, based on the conclusions drawn, Russia’s fundamental geopolitical and national interests.
As part of the project, we are publishing important works by leading Russian policymakers and academics addressing a set of three broad questions:
In our efforts to present Western scholars and policy makers with the broadest range of views within Russia, we have solicited a range of opinions on highly controversial topics. The opinions expressed in the monographs are those of the authors and do not represent the views of Harvard University, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, or the translators and editors.
Graham Allison, Director
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
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