The Aftermath of the War in Chechnya: What Next for the North Caucasus?

Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov
and
Rousbek Bisoultanov

The Caucasus and the Caspian: 1996–1998 Seminar Series
March 6, 1998

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
John F. Kennedy School of Government

Presentation

Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov: Thank you very much. I am delighted to be here with you, and I am pleased to be speaking with Rousbek Bisoultanov, the former Prime Minister of Agriculture of Chechnya.

Much is said today about the geostrategic situation of the North Caucasus, particularly in connection with the independence of Chechnya and the situation in Dagestan. The North Caucasus is an area where the interests of a number of states intersect — particularly Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Iran, Turkey, and even the United States.

In the mass media you will not find very much about the interests of the North Caucasus republics themselves. Few in Moscow, for example, talk very much about what it would mean to lose Dagestan. Chechnya has defended its interests in its own way, but Dagestan is not ready to follow that path. Even though we in Dagestan have a feeling of solidarity with our Chechen brothers because of our common history under Tsarist Russia and under the leadership of Sheikh Shamil in the 19th century, there is not among us an enormous feeling of enthusiasm for the Chechen cause. The raid of Chechen field commander Salman Raduev on the Dagestani cities of Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye, in particular, has reinforced this sentiment.

We in Dagestan ask ourselves: “What have the Chechens really gained from their war?” There is no doubt that they have demonstrated incredible courage and valor; they have raised the prestige of Chechnya; and, to an extent, have moderated the ambitions of the Moscow “hawks” to pursue their nineteenth-century ambitions. They have basically forced the Russians to take notice of them. However, the Chechens certainly cannot ignore some of the results of the war, such as the sixty thousand people killed, the delayed status of their independence, passports that are not recognized, the destruction of villages and towns, as well as a certain amount of emigration. For example, seventy thousand displaced persons have found refuge in Dagestan. Furthermore, a number of field commanders have spoken about making Chechnya an Islamic state, and mention the leading role of one million Chechens among the one billion Muslims of the world. The kidnapping of individuals continues, including approximately 36 to 50 Dagestanis. In addition, adventurist opinions and pronouncements have been advanced about territorial pretensions to the city of Khasavyurt and the Khasavyurt region. It must be noted that practical steps directed toward establishing a demographic imbalance in the favor of the Chechens in this region of Dagestan, toward political flirtation with the Kumyks and Nogais who live here in the struggle for power, toward the holding of a referendum “on the special status of the Khasavyurt region” and so forth are in fact being taken. The number of acts hostile to Dagestanis before the war (robbery on the railways and highways), during the war (the sadly famous raid of the city of Kizlyar and the town of Pervomaiskoye by Salman Raduev, who threatened to turn everything into “hell and ashes”), and after the war (kidnapping, the raiding of cattle, animal-drawn transport, and of automobiles) has been excessively high.

I am not trying to over-dramatize the state of Dagestani–Chechen relations. Dagestanis and Chechens are indeed brotherly people. Sooner or later, our relations will have to come back to a normal course. You must agree, however, that when you are dealt a dirty deed by one of your relatives, it is much more insulting than when it comes from somebody that you do not know. I say all this with considerable regret. The worsening of relations with the Dagestanis is harmful above all for Chechnya itself. The fact is that the Chechnya of today needs immediate help — economic, political, and moral support from the rest of the world community.

As the Northern Caucasus is in general, Dagestan is undergoing a very difficult and complicated period in its history. The population is in a state of prostration, and the leaders of the republic are not able to explain to their people what Dagestan is and where the republic is headed. Furthermore, there is an enormous difference between what is written in the constitution and the actual situation on the ground. In reality, the republic is largely controlled by criminal groups, and corruption has gone so far as even to invade the sphere of education. The local, municipal, and republican elections seem to be controlled by mafia groups, or, possibly, by ethnic groups that have been bribed.

Out of the eighty-nine subjects of the Russian Federation, Dagestan occupies last place in its standard of living and first place in social illnesses, particularly tuberculosis. The republic of Dagestan was subjected to an information and economic blockade during the war, which Chechnya conducted. Today the situation is hardly any better, as eighty percent of our budget is created through subsidies from Moscow. Authorities in Dagestan spend too much time trying to wheedle money out of the central government of Russia. One hears proclamations that Dagestan is an inalienable part of Russia, and that Russia is trying to force Dagestan out of its Federation, just as it was forcibly admitted. Meanwhile, pensioners are not receiving their pensions on time, and teachers and doctors are not receiving their pay. Our industry is only working at twenty to thirty percent. Eighty percent of goods purchased in Dagestan come from various countries such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. Because of the unemployment situation and the difficult conditions in Dagestan, many are leaving — not just the Russians, but the Dagestanis, particularly able-bodied young people and the intelligentsia.

The population of Dagestan often wonders why there is no law and order in the republic. They wonder why the government of a republic that is supposed to be an inalienable part of Russia doesn’t protest to Russia against the denigration of the dignity and honor of Dagestan people, against discrimination against people of Caucasian nationality, as well as against fascist-like, armed Cossack formations in the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions. Dagestanis often question why the republic has been turned into an open passageway for all sorts of different criminal groups, religious sects, and traders in arms and narcotics. Yet they receive no answers to these questions.

The discontent of the population, particularly of those who cannot find work, is growing. In such a situation, the growth of radical Islam is a real danger. The official, traditional spiritual leadership in Dagestan does not interfere in state policy, and does not create opposition to the existing secular power. In my view, it is correct in doing this. Yet this position of the “traditionalists,” which conforms to the Constitutions of Dagestan and is normal for the civilized world, is subjected to attacks from Wahhabism, a radical form of Islam. The political and religious activity of the Wahhabite community has already formed an opposition to the legal system. In Dagestan today there are up to ten thousand Wahhabis, according to different counts. These are mostly people who have been educated in Saudi Arabia, or who have received a temporal education. They are by no means an ignorant mass of people. They have money and arms, special dress, beards without moustaches, and they don’t recognize the traditional Islamic law of Dagestan, which dates back to the eighth century. They vow to build in Dagestan an Islamic state, getting rid of banditry, corruption, drunkenness and drug-taking. Not long ago, they demonstrated their military capabilities by launching an attack against a military division in Buinaksk. Were they to come to power in Dagestan, they would create the sort of authority that you see in the Talibans of Afghanistan. About six weeks ago, the government of Dagestan declared Wahhabism against the law. In my opinion, this is a worse step than legalizing them.

In June, the term of office of Magomedali Magomedov, the Chairman of the State Council of Dagestan, will come to an end. He cannot be reelected according to the constitution, although now there is talk about amending the constitution, so that he might have another term. If this happens, June of 1998 will become a very hot month. Among the candidates for the presidency is a person known as “the Caucasian Roosevelt,” Said Amirov, who became the Mayor of Makhachkala in February of this year, as well as Ramazan Abdulatipov, the Vice Premier of the Russian Federation, who could get a boost if he defends the interests of Dagestan within the Russian Federation, and not the other way around.

Dagestan does not have the same degree of sovereignty and autonomy that it had in the post-Stalin period of Soviet history. Today, few officials speak up about the independence of Dagestan, as actions to this effect could lead Russia to take away the northern part of Dagestan, such as the Kizlyar and Nogai regions, which some of the Chechens also threaten us with at times. Within Dagestan, there are also fears of the worsening of ethnic relations, including the creation of ethnic states by Kumyks, Lezgins, Nogais. There are other potential ethnic problems: for example, the Lezgins, Avars, and Tsakhours of Azerbaijan, which number 200,000 to 400,000, live less comfortably than the 100,000 Azeris who live in Dagestan.

Looking at more optimistic developments, Dagestan also has many resources from which it should benefit. For example, Dagestan has petrol and oil pipelines. By sea and railroads, it is connected with southern Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. Occupying such an important geographic location, Dagestan cannot and should not seek to become a zone of political instability. Dagestan was and should remain a tolerant area, a buffer state with no external enemies. It should avoid interethnic conflict and war. Dagestan should benefit from the transit trade between Iran and Azerbaijan, and from trade with the south of Russia. It can benefit from exploiting its own oil shelf, the transit of Azeri oil across Dagestan, and also, most importantly, from the economic potential of its own industrial, talented, and able-bodied people.

Excuse me if that which I have told you has seemed rather grim, and let me come to the end of my remarks. In his book, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin wrote that the Caucasus stands aside from world history. Today former Leninists say that not the Caucasus, but Lenin himself stood aside from world history. However, Lenin’s calling Russia “a prison of peoples” has been impossible to deny. Some peoples have already left this prison, others still want to leave it, and yet other groups don’t care to leave it. The Caucasus has had a dignified past, and it will have a dignified future as well; this is particularly true of Dagestan.

Rousbek Bisoultanov: Thank you very much. We Caucasians — I don’t want to divide us into Azeris, Chechens, or Dagestanis — are the kind of people who have our own traditions. We do not forget the bad or the good for a long time; we are people with certain emotions and ambitions. Of course, this stands in our way of becoming unified in the Caucasus.

I would like to dwell on a more general issue, dealing with the geopolitical and the geoeconomic situation of not only the Caucasus, but of the whole world for the past ten to twenty years. These years witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union—a regime which covered one sixth of the whole world, upon which was forced a certain system of government. The collapse of the Soviet Union could not happen accidentally, and we should not be surprised by this. Mr. Magomedkhanov has described the recent years of this process very well, using the example of Dagestan and the Chechen republic. This does not imply that one nation has gone further in its evolution and another has not gone as far; instead, it implies that all the people and nations who lived in the Soviet Union were not allowed to evolve naturally. Russians and Caucasian people alike were stifled in the Soviet period.

I fully agree with Mr. Magomedkhanov about what is happening in the Caucasus today. But I will also tell you that what is happening to us is not by our choice. The Caucasians have a saying: “If a man is told forty times that he is a fool, he becomes a fool.” That is why today we should not dwell on the many differences we have in the Caucasus. And we should not build our vision on bad examples.

By the early 1990’s, the system which had been built for seventy years was destroyed, but failed to be replaced by a new system. No new statehood was created. The problem is that those politicians who were brought up in and were in charge of the old system found themselves in charge of a new system with which they were not familiar. Though the first of the former Soviet Union states to declare its sovereignty was the Russian Federation, Russian leaders could not understand that other states might have the same wish. Russia was indeed against the Soviet Empire, but it could not forget its own old Russian Empire. We should all understand from history, however, that no world empires — Indian, Ottoman, Byzantine, Russian — have been viable. All of them collapsed, and people suffered.

Russia needed a scapegoat for all of the evils committed in the country — this became the Chechens. We were singled out not because we love freedom more than other nations — I don’t want to boast of that. All nations love freedom to the same degree, but they gain it differently. The option of the Chechen War was not a simple one. Before the war, I observed the propaganda of the “Chechen question”, or the “Chechen syndrome”; the same process exists today, in different forms. Before the war, the world media was screaming about the existence of Chechen mafia, Chechen terrorism, Chechen banking frauds. I cannot imagine that so much importance was attached to this small nation, and that so much of it had to do with sympathy toward this nation. Naturally, any thinking person understands what ideological preparation is, and how it created this domino effect. During this barbaric war, the whole world was silent. There has never before been a war where a state with a population of 300 million tried to annihilate a nation of 1 million people, and this 300 million-strong state was economically helped in its annihilating process by granting it credit of more than 6 billion dollars.

The Chechen War was one of the stages of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. However, a reverse process will take place today — the formation of independent democratic republics in the Caucasus, and in all the regions of the former Soviet Union. We in Chechnya categorically oppose the idea of stopping at a stage today that would provide us with regression, not progress. Today we need progress not in a separate and closed-off space, but in co-development with all our neighboring states and the whole world community. We have proven ourselves capable of defending our freedom. Today we have the task of proving that we can live together with others in universal cooperation, adopting all the laws of the civilized world, respecting our neighbors and our neighbors’ traditions. We are not nationalists. I assure you that there has never been nationalism in the Caucasus. Our vision is not of an enclosed state, but of maintaining good relations with all states with which we have been friendly and have had common economic ties, even including the Russian Federation.

I will focus now on some points about rebuilding the post-war Chechen economy, and provide my vision for the economy of the whole Caucasian region. The Caucasus is a unique region, not only in its beauty, but also in its natural resources and geographic location. We cannot imagine today a Near Eastern or even Russian economy without the Caucasus being a part of it. In the past, the Caucasus played a significant role in the economy of these states, such as during World War II, when it was the main provider of energy resources for the Soviet Union. Today the prospects for this region, especially in the energy sector, are well known.

I am the Vice–President of the International Energy Academy, based in Baku. The Academy researches the possibilities of different projects developed in Azerbaijan and in other regions. As Caucasian scholars, we were not in agreement with many of the projects. For instance, I was once an expert on the European Energy Charter. A project was proposed for all the energy routes of Central Asia passing through the Caucasus. However, this project was not viable as the region’s geopolitical situation was not taken into account. If we look at geoeconomics without geopolitics, we do so at the expense of missing out on promising projects. This is why today we have arrived at two factors that have to be considered in the Caucasus: first, geopolitics should help—or at least not stand in the way of—geoeconomics, since the stabilization of the Caucasian region is of prime importance. The time of conflict has passed; today Caucasians think differently from the way they did up to 1991. If in 1991, after brandishing slogans of patriotism and nationalism, one could lead a whole people, today not one politician could use slogans to satisfy or brainwash anyone. I have become convinced that today only businessmen, or sound politicians in symbiosis with businessmen will solve the problems of the Caucasus. A professor of Harvard University has data on the expected need for energy resources, including oil, in twenty years time. This number is quite significant, constituting 100 million barrels of oil a day. The portion produced in the Causcasus region will be 50 million barrels. The numbers show that interest towards this region will indeed prevail. Indeed, today we are observing that the United States has a significant interest in a healthy, peaceful Caucasus region. If investments were to be made today in the energy sector and in the most important transportation sector, the Caucasian economy, being as promising as it is, would occupy a strategic place in fifteen to twenty years.

For instance, look at the case of Azerbaijan, which has a normal business structure and normal business conditions. Azerbaijan serves as an example to other states and republics of the Caucasus. We all know that Azerbaijan has had no fewer problems than the others: refugee problems persist to this day, as well as the undecided issue of Nagorno–Karabakh. Nevertheless, today one can talk of business in Azerbaijan. This is why Azerbaijan is the site of investment for the largest companies in the world. Such companies as British Petroleum, Amoco, Lukoil of Russia, and others are now aware that their interests in Azerbaijan are no less than those they have in other regions of the world. I will cite an example: when you enter any state, especially in the former Soviet Union, you can judge it by the way you are received. One can approach Azerbaijan from three sides (Iran, Georgia, and Dagestan), as well as from the airport. Judging from the treatment that international travelers receive from customs upon entering the country, it seems clear that the customs chief of Azerbaijan was once a businessman. This example is ridiculous, but it drives home the point that the new post-Soviet governments should be comprised of people who understand what is going on in business and what the problems in business are. I have no doubt that this will happen in the near future in Dagestan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other republics. People will understand that they should be governed by those who know something about the economy; and then we’ll be sure that the government will at least not stand in the way of the people.

Before this meeting I spoke with Mr. Magomedkhanov, and I came to the following conclusion: fifty percent of our problems can be solved if we cut down on officials’ privileges, as fifty percent are intimately connected with a power struggle. If state officials were to give up some of their privileges, I believe that many people would become less eager to get into government or to create as many conflicts there.

I will conclude by saying that we are all Caucasians, including the forty-some Dagestan nations, with their great culture, traditions and customs. Nobody will be able to separate us Chechens from them, although, with our traditions, language barriers, and customs, we are probably separated by nature. However, the territory which we inhabit — Chechnya, Dagestan, Stavropol, or Russia — can not be transported into a vacuum by any politician. This is why we should live together and develop in normal, civilized ways. We invite you to the Caucasus, despite the fact that the media is scaring everyone away from it. I am inviting you to the Caucasus, where it is not yet forgotten what a guest is.

 

Discussion

Question: I have a question for both gentlemen. It has to do with the pipeline being built around Chechnya for the oil from Azerbaijan. Is this likely to create tensions, and what are the advantages and the dangers of this structure?

Bisoultanov: The one advantage of this pipeline is that it has been operating for a long time, traditionally handling up to sixty or seventy tons, which would in the future guarantee the safety of this business. As to Dagestan and the Chechen republic, apart from the percentage fees we can receive from the pipeline, a political interest exists as well. Speaking of its negative side, a vivid example is the Chechen War and the ensuing struggle over this pipeline. You know that there are several projects today around which there is struggle.

Question: Forgive me, my question was dealing with the pipeline going around Chechnya.

Bisoultanov: I think it would be a very foolish thing to build a pipeline around Chechnya; only a fool could waste money on this. This is why I would term these statements by Mr. Nemtsov and other young Russian politicians — who build mostly for their own advantage, emotions and ambitions, while calling themselves Russian patriots — as erroneous. Although we also deal with some sober-minded Russian politicians and economists, we have never seen an economically sound project presented by Russians concerning this pipeline. Moreover, setting themselves and the international community up for conflict with the Chechen state holds no advantage for Russia itself; such a project could only be proposed by an enemy to Russia and the Russian economy. There is no sense in it.

Magomedkhanov: I would like to add that this is not very intelligent. Such a great strategist as Nemtsov should understand that the Chechens and the Dagestanis could get together even at night and [destroy or blow up the pipeline]. Seriously, I am surprised by how many resources and metals Russia has, judging from the barbed wire going around the borders of the Chechen republic. However, such stratagems are not promising, and I say again that it is very foolish to separate the Caucasus and divide it into many parts. However much we are being restrained, we will escape from the barbed wire.

Bisoultanov: We may yet be forced to develop new technology to further our progress, as Israel has done: the Jews were persecuted for many years, causing them to become extremely progressive and intelligent people. This is why the Chechens have quieted down upon studying the history of Israel. The more they try to hinder and isolate us, the more progress we’ll have. This is why, when human beings are put in tough situations, more adrenaline is being pumped by their bodies. Hence, we Chechens can prove today to the whole world that we are a civilized nation. If we have to do it the Israeli way (I hope not), I think it will have quite an effect. Judging from the example of our Israeli brothers, we see great promise for the development of economy and of the Chechen people as a whole. This is not a joke, but a circumstance of our hard life. As a scholar, I once drew an example by showing the correlation between Israel and Japan. We were studying the co-dependency of natural energy resources and levels of literacy. There are the Arab countries where you can get as much as you want from under ground, in contrast to Israel and Japan with practically no resources. Where such resources exist, the level of literacy is 3 to 4 percent, and where they do not exist at all, it is one hundred percent. This is why, as the conditions created for Caucasians get tougher, our people have greater prospects for the future.

Question: [Rousadan Gorgaladze, advisor to President Shevardnadze of Georgia] Thank you very much for your presentations, particularly Mr. Magomedkhanov’s description of the North Caucasus. One could not but completely agree with Dr. Bisoultanov about the future stabilization of the Caucasus, and about cooperation and future promise in the broad sense of the word. However, as a Georgian working in the Caucasus, I have to take in the less positive news we receive, such as: Salman Raduev claims that he is to answer for the recent assassination attempt on our Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze. The President says that he is certain there was no intervention by the Chechen authorities, but, on the other hand, we see absolutely no reaction from the Chechen side. Meanwhile, the Abkhazian representative in the US has written a letter saying that Shevardnadze is lying, and that no one should invest in Georgia and the Caucasus, since the pipeline cannot be defended and no stabilization is to take place. Here is this letter. In this context, while I agree with your sentiments, I cannot reconcile them with what is happening in reality today.

Bisoultanov: Rusudan, I welcome you to this hospitable American land, which attracts such good thinkers. I would like to respond to your remarks in one way, as the gortsy [highlanders] are not wont to say much about themselves. There were a lot of speeches made about the Chechen War and its consequences. Today, I would like to discuss with you its future rather than its problems. The easiest thing is to discuss one’s own and others’ past shortcomings. These problems are known to all, as they are historical. Concerning the latest incursion into Georgia, I will tell you exactly what I know; everybody knows the facts, but not everybody knows the conclusions. Conclusions have been made by the intelligence service of Georgia and by Georgian politicians, including the Georgian President Mr. Shevardnadze. We are completing the building of a road which would link together Georgia and Chechnya, and, as never before, we are developing the closest ties with Georgia. My company is now opening its branches on Georgian territory. I know for sure the attitude of the Georgian President toward Chechnya, and toward the problems of continuing the war.

For some reason, it so happens that Chechen people and politicians such as Aslan Maskhadov and [Acting Premier] Shamil Basaev find an alternative solution to all these issues. Regardless of the old injury of the Abkhazians, something incomprehensible is happening: there was an assassination attempt on the Georgian President and the abandoned corpse of a Chechen with a passport on him was found nearby [apparently, this was the assassin]. Our intelligence and some Chechen politicians organized a gathering of all veterans of the Chechen War, where Raduev was invited to explain his behavior as a man, as a Caucasian, and as a Chechen. At the gathering he took an oath that he had never been a part of any intelligence services, that his speech was misinterpreted in the mass media, and that he did not accept responsibility for this act of terrorism. He only talked about the decision taken at the Caucasian House as to [former Georgia President] Gamsakhurdia. The Chechen authorities even initiated a prosecution process. The whole people and the authorities officially condemned Raduev’s act of terrorism.

However, our lack of substantial means of mass media is our huge problem and setback. This is why the following issue arises. If you had access to the real events happening, you would probably not say that the Chechen government was taking the wrong actions in this direction. On the next day after the assassination attempt, I myself travelled to Georgia, although warned against it by many. In such difficult moments, our two peoples have to put their heads together and find a solution.

Magomedkhanov: In Dagestan, there is a saying that in one village, one idiot is enough. The fact that there is one Raduev in Chechnya does not change the essence of Chechen politics. Furthermore, I, as an ethnographer, am sure that this [assassination attempt] was not a North Caucasian operation as North Caucasians don’t leave corpses lying around. If there were one or two people, they would have taken the corpse back home. This has been the way since the last century. If there really were a second Chechen, he would have left the scene and would have told the parents of the first Chechen’s family about what happened. So, it was clear to me from the beginning that no North Caucasian formation was involved in the attack on Shevardnadze.

Gorgiladze: I am very sorry if my question was interpreted in this way. I was posing a completely different question. How can I realistically consider the positive vision of the future that Dr. Bisoultanov has presented if events such as these are happening in the Caucasus?

Bisoultanov: You asked a very good question. Thank you very much. I would like to say one thing in conclusion: if the Caucasus prospects lie in the hands of Raduev alone, this means that we shall never have any prospects and that we never have had any.

Moderator: Rusudan wanted to clarify that she did not want her remarks to be taken out of context because what she was really trying to say was, when you have people like Raduev or other irresponsible people running around the Caucasus enflaming things, it is very difficult to try to stabilize the situation. Dr. Bisoultanov’s response was that clearly you have individuals like this, but they are not the only representatives of the Caucasus, and people are trying very hard to stabilize the situation.

Question: This is following up on the issue of political instability and post-war state-building in Chechnya. There is evidence of tensions between the field commanders’ council and the Maskhadov government. It was reported that an attempt to generate censure against Raduev’s public declaration of responsibility was turned against Basaev, in that the field commanders and the veterans assembled actually declared their support for Raduev. What is the relationship and what are the tensions between the field commanders and the Maskhadov government and how is this affecting political instability in Chechnya, and where do we find clan leadership lining up on each side of the divide, if there is a divide emerging?

Bisoultanov: Thank you for the question, but I would like to answer that you have the wrong information. I advise you to carry out a general investigation to find out where you found that kind of information from, although I can answer to this as well. The real picture is that there are a multitude of unsolved problems in the Chechen republic today — probably more than anywhere else in the world. But, for some reason, journalists and politicians are always more concerned with non-existant problems than with existing ones. At the assembly of field commanders, Basaev, on the contrary, did not get such a reaction [of field commanders turning against him]. It was in fact decided that they should unite their efforts against possible provocations. This is a fact, and if you need any materials on the subject, I can provide them. As to the consequences of this, time will show. We have enough problems, and anything can happen. We are sure of one thing: that we should solve our problems by ourselves. There have been many similar statements connected with Raduev — unconscious, silent, unintelligent statements. What can we expect from a field commander with only a high school degree, who does not know politics or economics, and why should we take his spontaneous statements as coming from the government or the people? Such an approach is not right. After the Chechen War we now have multiple problems with veterans, as you Americans know from the Vietnam War. This is why we have to approach Raduev’s words carefully. I don’t want to say much on the subject of Raduev himself; he is one of those guys who have been through the war and are today national heroes. He personally has a lot of wounds, and in Georgia they even have a joke that he could be Shevardnadze’s blood brother as they both have survived so many terrorist acts. This is why many of his statements should not be taken as seriously as government policy — there is a real government out there making its own statements.

Question: Thank you, Dr. Bisoultanov, for your speech. I was very interested to hear that a new economic and political system, in fact a democratic one, is being built in Chechnya. How then, should one interpret the statements of Movladi Udugov, who talks about the creation of an Islamic republic and a support system based on the Shari’ia?

Bisoultanov: This is certainly a difficult question, but an interesting one. I would answer you from the stance of disagreeing with that particular interpretation of Udugov’s speech. Statements like these have been made not only by Udugov, but by other politicians of the Chechen republic as well. Most probably, such statements are made by people who do not understand much about politics. I am of the opinion that no politician can simply conjure up a state — he does not have this right. Questions such as these are today being put to referenda. I think that when the situation in Chechnya more or less stabilizes — for during the post-war period, we are experiencing certain difficulties — our politicians will conduct such a referendum, and the people will determine in what kind of a state they are prepared to live, judging from their historical development at the given stage. If the people vote for a certain system, we will have to accept their will. Knowing what to offer to the people, and in what kind of form, is the business of political institutions. These will probably involve not only Raduev and Udugov, but Bisoultanov as well.