From the CIAO Atlas Map of Asia Map of Middle East 

email icon Email this citation

CIAO DATE: 12/99

The Challenges and Complexities of Mediation Initiatives

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Naomi Chazan,
Adel Safty and Giandomenico Picco

13–14 November 1997

Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity

 

Day 1

As the final stage in the Art of Mediation Project, a second, more internationally focused conference was organised. The conference was aimed at a wide range of individuals and groups from policy makers, community and residents groups, members of the loyal orders, negotiators, politicians, academics and mediators alike and ran over 2 days, the 13 and 14 of November 1997.

The conference began with an evening session at which a keynote panel of speakers presented international perspectives on conflict transformation and mediation initiatives from a number of distinct regional perspectives and experiences.

Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu began the session by highlighting the experiences of attempts at mediation in Sri Lanka. Professor Naomi Chazan talked about the many difficulties which faced mediators in the Arab Israeli Conflict as well as highlighting the needs of a reconciliation process and the techniques of mediation which must be involved. Professor Adel Safty presented some examples of mediation from the Middle East experience and considered the linkages between leadership and mediation and finally Giandomenico Picco spoke of his own personal experiences as a mediator for the United Nations. The following is a summary of the main points of their papers.

 

The Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict
Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Dr Saravanamuttu began by highlighting the fact that there have not been many attempts made at mediation between the parties in Sri Lanka and, in fact, the one initiative which was partly attempted ended in failure. As a result of this failure, subsequent mediation efforts and views on mediation in the country have not been positive. However, the main problem with mediation in Sri Lanka appears to be that the principle protagonists to the conflict still see the use of force as their most potent tool. They are not,therefore, at a stage where they feel mediation is either effective or necessary.

There are also few local actors who can act as mediators in this context. In Sri Lanka the very notion of mediation is deemed ‘foreign’ and it is actually foreign external mediators who have become involved in any mediative attempts. This involvement carries with it its own emotional baggage which must be dealt with in the first instance.

The one example of mediation which occurred in Sri Lanka took place in 1987 when India intervened in an attempt to solve the conflict. However, this involvement was viewed differently, depending on the perspective. The Sri Lankan government saw India as acting out of of imperial design, while the Tamil Tigers perceived India as assuming the right to negotiate on their behalf. India saw itself as an honest broker attempting to bring together the warring factions. This intervention failed and the LTTE resumed hostilities, targeting Indians.

Dr Saravanamuttu suggested that here was a significant lesson to be learned from this one attempt to mediate the conflict; that mediators should not have had any prior involvement in the conflict (as India had had). For mediation to succeed, the third party must be an actor from outside of the region. However, reliance upon external forces for mediation has problems of its own. Governments fear that external interests will favour the Tamil Tigers and are thus suspicious of it. . There is a circularity about the issue; although Sri Lankan are suspicious of foreign mediators, they do not seem willing to use local mediators to solve the dispute.

In addition, there is a lack of local actors who can play a mediatory role in the conflict. As a result of the pervasiveness of the conflict, a diverse range of actors are caught up in the actual conflict, including religious leaders. The media’s involvement in the conflict is also perceived to be rather negative. Furthemore, many Sri Lankans do not appear to understand the complexities of the conflict fully, partly due to the fact that it is mainly confined to the north and east of the country. This creates the added problem of attempting to develop a powerful peace constituency among the citizens of the country.

 

The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Professor Naomi Chazan, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset, Israel

Professor Chazan began her presentation with a brief description of the Arab Israeli conflict, highlighting its long term nature which was punctuated with intense violence on both sides. Due to the fact that it is a highly emotional conflict, where two sides live on one land which they believe they both have an exclusive right to occupy, a certain power symmetry is created between the Israelis and Palestinians which makes negotiation difficult.

A number of measures are needed before reconciliation processes can be effective: The political outcome must be clear. Unless there is political agreement over the main issues, nothing else is effective. These agreements must lead to long term changes being made which will lay the groundwork for reconciliation between people on the ground. Those involved in the reconciliation process cannot exclude themselves from their own community - they have to identify with their own communities. Some outline is needed as to where the solution lies. It is difficult to go into negotiations without some sort of political agreement between the parties. One should never negotiate over history. Overcome the demonisation of the other. Human contact and a personal involvement is a very important element in this. Many initial steps of negotiation are informal and secret but they are meaningless unless the participants have some access to power. Discretion is very important. Be aware of media intrusion. You do not want to compromise your position in your own community. Peace needs to be at the centre of the public agenda. Keep it there. There has to be a commitment to reaching an accommodation. A full understanding that there is no alternative to building firm relationships. This is the most illusive quality.

Recognition must be given to the rights of both sides.

The main elements which have proved necessary in the Arab-Israeli context:

  1. Every Israeli peace treaty has had third party involvement. It appears the protagonists need this type of intervention from another party.
  2. Direct negotiations are needed. Without this, the process is meaningless.
  3. Non-Governmental activity has been crucial.

 

Mediation and Leadership
Professor Adel Safty, Director, UNU Leadership Academy, Jordan

Professor Safty began his presentation by briefly describing the background to the Leadership Academy Conference held in June 1997 when potential ‘leaders’ from a wide variety of countries and backgrounds came together to learn more about ‘leadership’. He highlighted the differences there are in definition of ‘leadership’ and the way in which the United Nations University and the Leadership Academy deals with the concept of leadership, as a service to the community.

He sees a clear connection between leadership and mediation, recognising that a mediator must have a number of personal traits including a clear vision, a commitment to certain values and vast amounts of energy. The leader acting as mediator must also possess credibility, be able to approach the fundamental causes which are inherent in the dispute and recognise the relationship of power which exists between, not only the protagonists, but also the mediators.

 

Mediating for the United Nations
Giandomenico Picco, GDP Associates, New York, USA

Mr Picco began by explaining to the conference participants that he does not come from an academic setting, where mediation is studied and analysed as a distinct concept but is ‘a manual worker’ who has acted as a mediator in a diverse range of settings.

According to Mr Picco, the basis of success for a mediator lies in the credibility he or she possesses. Complete impartiality is not necessary and it is a trait he has yet to find in a mediator. These two concepts are not irreconcilable and one does not have to be impartial to be credible in the eyes of the disputants. For example, the Americans cannot be seen as being impartial in the Middle East; they are part of the scenario because they can ‘deliver’ the Israelis. If they could not perform this task, they would be useless.

The importance of the individual is tremendously important. Institutions, history and religion do not rape and murder. Individuals do. Decisions are not made by institutions but by individuals and it is time to make individuals accountable for their actions. As an Italian, Mr Picco looked on in horror at what was occurring in the neighbouring regions which made up the former Yugoslavia. By looking back at history it was clear that Serbs and Croats never fought each other on the basis of their ethnic origin. This is a recently created myth. History has helped the process of mystification which covers the actions of individuals.

In a concluding point, Mr Picco asserted that the most important lesson that a mediator must learn is that, if you take on a mediation role, you must also take on all the responsibilities that that entails.

 

 

Day 2

The following day, the main findings of the research into mediation of parades disputes was presented, and subsequently participants broke into working groups in order to discuss the issue of mediation more fully. The afternoon session consisted of two speakers, Naomi Chazan and Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu, who both responded to the research and provided their own insights into the differences and similarities between the situations in their own countries, Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka.

The following is a synopsis of their presentations.

 

Professor Naomi Chazan
Respondent from the Middle East

Firstly, I wish to begin by making a preliminary comment about my following response to the report on mediation of parades disputes in the Northern Ireland context. I do not intend to give any advice, rather I hope to highlight the importance of comparative politics which lies, not only in finding the similarities between conflicts, but often more importantly, in highlighting the differences. Therefore, this response takes the form of an exercise in a comparative analysis of differences.

1. Definition

The first major difference relates to an issue hinted at in the morning sessions - definition. The term mediation has been used in the report in ways that I associate with other terms and not necessarily with mediation. In some instances the way it has been presented relates more to arbitration. To my mind the major differences between mediation and arbitration is that arbitration is binding. Arbitration is a decision-making exercise, mediation is not necessarily so. Therefore, to confuse arbitration and mediation is not helpful. I prefer precision to fuzziness. I have also found that sometimes mediation had been used in the report to refer to facilitation. Mediation is not facilitation. Facilitation means getting different sides together, but not doing their job for them. There is a great deal of difference between facilitation and mediation. Frankly, therefore the first difference I have found is in terminology. As an academic, terminology is tremendously important, as practitioners like to know what they are doing. I think essentially in Northern Ireland you are doing all of the above - mediation, negotiation, facilitation, arbitration. However, each one has a different outcome.

2. Tone

I have been following the conflict in Northern Ireland from afar and I do not know enough about it. However, I can comment on tone. When we, in the Middle East, discuss politics and are at odds with each other we are very nasty, very rude and very provocative. We can kill each other with words. You are so polite here it is amazing. I listen to the words behind the tone and find it is so different from what I am used to. I am not sure which tone is better, however, I am pinpointing the fact that there is a difference. I have always found that tone is an integral part of conflict resolution. Sometimes yelling and screaming at each other is very helpful, as it means that you are not doing other things which can be much more destructive. Sometimes if you are overly polite it may lead you to actions which are far less acceptable. There is, as far as I can see, a major difference in tone between Northern Ireland and the Middle East.

3. Predicable and Communal

Having followed the discussions over parades it seems to me that they are one of the most ritualised forms of conflict I have ever seen. It is a conflict focus which is totally outside of my experience, for two major reasons. Firstly, our problems come up when we are least expecting them, rarely where we know they are going to happen. While I listened to the presentation this morning I was nearly envying you because you know where the conflict is going to happen and I do not. There is a large measure of predictability to the parades disputes, to my mind. The second major difference is in the form or type of the disputes. The parades disputes immediately makes the dispute a communal dispute and not necessarily a political one, even though everyone talks about politics in Northern Ireland. In my rather naive mind, communal disputes are identity disputes and sometimes involve identity confusion. I can understand this very well because, for fifty years as an Israeli, I had the luxury of knowing exactly who I was because I could define the enemy very precisely. When the peace process began in our area I found myself, both personally and in society, for the first time in fifty years having to define myself in terms of myself and not in terms of an enemy. We are beginning to experience communal disputes within Israel that we did not have to deal with before because we never had to look in the mirror and wonder who we are, where do we want to go, or what the values are that guide us. Identity crises are the most painful problem that I have experienced; more painful than trying to overcome conflict with Palestinians.

4. Prevention or Alternatives?

A lot of the activity around the parades disputes, be it arbitration, facilitation or mediation is about prevention - nothing more. For me prevention is almost the last thing that I devote a lot of effort to, because I know very clearly in Israel what failure means. Failure means violence, failure means conflict. Therefore, I do not engage in trying to prevent this by putting it on the table; I try to find alternatives to it because that is a constructive endeavour for me. I know this is a painful point but it seem to me that in Northern Ireland you spent an enormous amount of time and energy on prevention. I am not sure which way is right - to put your energy into prevention or to put your energy into alternatives. However, I do sense this as a big difference between our experience and your experience.

In Israel I feel that we may be better at providing an alternative political vision. For many years people compared South Africa, Palestine-Israel and Northern Ireland. These comparisons have filled libraries and have provided many with successful academic careers, tenure and more. The comparison has always been there. Nobody who has been making the comparison has been unclear about two of the three problems in terms of political solutions. It South Africa it has been clear for many years that the political solution would lie in a democratic, multi-ethnic, multi-racial state. The question was how to overcome apartheid and achieve a fully democratic, representational, integrationist solution. In the Arab-Israeli situation there is no one who has seriously dealt with the conflict who does not understand that the political solution in our region is separation, the precise opposite of the political solution in South Africa. In the Arab-Israeli conflict we are trying to find out how to successfully disengage so that we can interact in different ways. I am unclear as to what the political vision is in Northern Ireland. My hunch is that it is somewhere in the middle, between disengagement and integration. However, it is not precise and this absence creates a great discrepancy between the communal efforts and the political ones, because the communal efforts are not linking up to a political vision. It is very hard to constantly make an effort unless you are somewhat clear where you are going.

5. Highly structured

In many respects the groups involved in the communal efforts mediating the parades disputes are standard groups that have been known ahead of time, as well as individuals that represent them in one form or another. What I have found very absent, and for us what has become a crucial source of change, has been the introduction of civil associations which are not structured along conventional or traditional lines. For example, both women’s peace associations and professional associations (such as business people, lawyers, teachers and nurses) have broken away from the standard divisions and, by establishing these groups, have brought new organisational structures into the scene at crucial points. The civil society aspect, which is sometimes innovative for very important reasons, I find is absent in Northern Ireland, in many cases. It appears that the emergence of new civil associations which cut across standard divisions has been significant in Israel and may be lacking here. Civil associations deal with parts whereas traditional and religious associations are holistic - they have all the answers to all the problems and that is why they are very dangerous and complex situations. Therefore, I pose the question: is there enough of a proportion of partial groups in Northern Ireland?

6. Education and Timing

I noted this morning that you spent a long time talking about long-term education - either directly or indirectly. In our experience, in Palestine-Israel this is a chicken and egg question. Political solutions are urgent; they do not do not suffer too much delay. Politics are never static and political time frames are very tight. Educational efforts are long-term. If there is not some kind of alliance between the political timeframe and the educational timeframe, education for change occurs in a vacuum and therefore everything around defies what one is educating for. However, you know if you do not educate towards something else you will also face problems. It may be a paradox but timing is so important that we have to go very quickly in order to go very slowly and therefore we have to calibrate the timing all the time. Even children relate to what is going on around them, so we have to make sure that what is going on around them is different, in order to make the education work.

7. Compassion and Emotion

We have learned that during conferences between those involved in the Middle East conflict, be they Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians or others, the first day must entail a venting of emotions. People must first be allowed to express their emotions before any serious discussions can be reached. This ventilation of emotions is, to my mind, extremely important because you have to recognise the emotions in others. I feel in Northern Ireland you may have a capacity not to do this. You may be right - I am merely highlighting this as a difference.

8. The Media

The media is marvellous; if it didn’t exist we would invent it. However, the media is seen as a common enemy by all sides in a conflict who believe that the media is discriminating against them. A failure in our conflict as regards the media (and I suspect here in Northern Ireland too) is that the meeting points for real communication are very absent. The media does play a role in the conflict. I have noted that when the cameras are turned on in the Knesset the tone changes, the language changes, the substance changes and the outcome changes. I am not sure if I want to blame the media. I am sure that I want to use it for my end.

9. Power vacuums

You cannot do without politicians. However, politicans do seem to lose their own personalities and become collective ‘you’. It is very difficult to do without politicians. We must raise questions about what kind of connections they have with people on the ground and how much they represent the people. If there are more opinions there should be more politicians to deal with them. I find in Northern Ireland a certain lack of connection which, for better or worse, we do not suffer from. Our conflicts move, at least much more openly, from the personal all the way up to the political much more consistently than I sense here.

 

Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
Respondent from Sri Lanka

I think a lot of what I am going to say is, in some senses, a reaffirmation of what Professor Chazan has already said, in terms of differences of contexts. There are a number of points that I wish to make:

1. Predictability

An interesting observation made by Professor Chazan regards the predictability of the whole parades question. There is very definitely an annual symptom that you can expect which gives expression to the conflict and perhaps also serves as a barometer of the intensity of the conflict at any point in time. We do not in the Sri Lankan context have a comparable situation like that at all. There is no particular event that crystallises attitudes, which involves the community, where there is an expectation of violence, somewhere you can look to see an event played out, as some kind of gauge of the health of the conflict resolution process, on an annual basis.

2. Community Involvement

Another comment I wish to make as regards the report into the mediation of parades disputes is that it does involve a fair amount of community involvement at a local level. There is, from what I can gather, at least a feeling amongst the community that this is something that does affect them very directly and that they have a role to play in its resolution. There is an assumption of empowerment which leads community leaders and local activists to take part in that process in a very direct way and indeed in some of the case studies presented, has succeeded.

In the Sri Lankan case it this does not happen, for a number of reasons. The most important point which must be taken into account is the simple fact that we are a developing country in which the degree of empowerment amongst the people is very low. When there is a conflict or dispute there is an expectation that it is something for the government to resolve - not for those at local level. There is not the same sense of taking responsibility and affecting change at a local level and, in that sense, civil associations and civil society organisations do not play the type of role that they would get in the Northern Ireland situation.

As a corollary of that, because you have this expectation that you must have either government or institutional sponsors to be effective, civil society can also be defined according to their partisan loyalties rather than have any space to manoeuvre it, to manage or be able to guide it into processes of resolution. In Sri Lanka, the independent civil society does not exist in the same way as Northern Ireland.

The civil society organisations which do exist are involved in conflict resolution processes in a more indirect way, in terms of being able to earn their livelihoods, live on a day-to-day basis in a context of conflict. This existence requires them to ad hocly acquire some mediation techniques. For example, in an impoverished border village in the conflict zone in Sri Lanka (mainly the north and eastern provinces of the country) villagers often have to dig wells in order to get water. Once they do that the well becomes a resource for that area. Because it is a border area the army also has access to the well. As far as the villagers are concerned they need the water. On a day-to-day basis they are forced into a situation where they must negotiate with the army and the guerillas over the use of this resource. In dealing with these situations the villagers are making it clear that although the army and the guerillas are allowed to use the well, this does not mean that they are either pro-government or pro-LTTE. In this instance the villagers are gaining a certain level of local empowerment on the basis of day-to-day existence. The macro or strategic issues, the political vision is something that psychologically is relegated very much to the politicians and they do not see themselves particularly involved in that.

3. Political Discourse

In Sri Lanka at the present moment there has been a tremendous preoccupation at the highest levels with the whole question of the structure of the state and the social contract and the relationship between the majority and the minority. Should we be unitary? Should we be federal? Terms such as asymmetrical, federalism and others are being thrown about and been accepted however unpleasant they are. However, this debate has a role to play in the resolution of the conflict. I do not see that kind of debate with regard to the conflict in Northern Ireland. I think that this might well stem from the fact that, at a local level, the sense of empowerment leads you to resolve an issue at a local level, as a self-contained issue. Maybe in the case of Sri Lanka a lot of hot air is being expended trying to define what a federal state is, whether we should be federal or not, or what the relationship between majority and minority should be. Whilst these conversations are taking place a lot of violence is occurring at the grassroots level between communities. Perhaps our way of doing things may be more foolhardy than yours and yours might make day-to-day existence probably more manageable for people caught up in the conflict than ours. For us, we see very strongly an exercise in which all of society is involved in terms of wanting to change itself. The paradox is that you place a much greater role and responsibility on the politicians to be able to resolve this than at the community level.

4. The Church

I have already made the point that civil society organisations do not have that sense of empowerment and consciousness of being effective that exists in Northern Ireland. A great tragedy in the Sri Lankan situation is that the whole society has been caught up in the conflict and there are some crucial distinctive features that prevent the obvious categories that have been outlined in the report, like the media, the church, religious leaders from being able to perform the role of mediators. There are 12 million Singhalese in Sri Lanka of a population of 18 million. We say that we have a majority with a minority complex. The Singhalese do believe that there is no other place on earth where Singhalese live and can call their home. There are Muslims elsewhere in the world, there are Tamils elsewhere in the world, and closely associated with this notion is the particular type of Buddhism that they practice. You have 72% of the population, its religious representation, very strongly committed to a notion of majoritarian democracy.

Amongst the Christian religions, there is a distinction between the Catholic and Protestant organisations. The Catholic church is much more representative of the population at large, in class terms and is a much larger church. There is a perception that the Catholic church is veering towards the LTTE. This perception stems from the fact that you have parishes in the northern and eastern regions and their ability to be able to function arises from having to make certain compromises both with the army and the LTTE. More importantly, the clergy themselves come from the society and from the population and therefore, they too are caught up and share perceptions of discrimination along ethnic lines. The Anglican church, on the other hand, is disproportionately influential in Sri Lanka because it is very much a product of British colonial rule. In class terms it is much more influential and in economic terms and their position and perception of them is probably best illustrated by the fact that the last time the government of Sri Lanka negotiated with the Tigers the Anglican Bishop of Columbo was a member of the negotiating team. So that effectively draws lines in terms of public perception as to which side people are on.

5. The Media

Another factor which was highlighted in the report was the question of the media. It is very easy to slam the media but we cannot do without them and they do not always do what you want them to. Unfortunately, in the Sri Lankan case, the problem of the media is compounded by the fact that this is a conflict that, in rhetorical terms is fought in three languages - the language of the majority community (Sinhala), the language of the elite (English) and the language of the minority (Tamil). There is no attempt to support a trilingual or inter-community dialogue between them. You will have one publishing house which will have media organs in English, Sinhala and Tamil, and these organs often emphasise in their broadcasting and publications, sympathises, prejudices, biases, which will be favourable to that linguistic community. There is no attempt to have any kind of dialogue amongst them and as a consequence, the media too becomes part of the problem.

6. External Influences

There are, at the same time, internal resources for conflict resolution or mediation, be it in terms of the kinds of symptoms or localised disputes or in terms of pushing towards an eventual political settlement. However, the record is such that nothing has happened without external influence. Being a developing country with no particular global, geo-strategic significance, the reason why external influence will be so powerful in terms of mediation or facilitation is an economic one. The localised business community, having been bred in a culture of state control of the economy and only a decade since liberalisation, still relies upon the state to do things. Our business community will bleat about the destruction of the war but will not take any initiative in terms of conflict resolution which they see as the role of the politicians. I have been involved in a couple of initiatives, trying to draw them in, but time and again, they come out with this argument. Added to this, there is a small but significant minority of them making money out of arms and so they have a vested interest in the continuation of the conflict. However, is it the use of economic leverage to be able to establish to the government and to the LTTE that going further will only be more destructive in terms of political interest and agenda.

7. Definition of Mediation

There is one other point in regard to the report and that is the broad flexible definition of mediation. At an academic level, it is tremendously important to be very particular about the definition of these terms. However, from a particularly conflict resolution point of view I sometimes wonder whether the fuzziness is helpful and constructive. In the Sri Lankan context, mediation is a dirty word because it carries with it at the connotations of intervention etc. We have had to use these words like facilitation. Facilitation is seen to be particularly neutral and part of the members of the peace constituency at home (and it is a very small band of us) do not want to spell that out too much because facilitation is also going to involve the parity of esteem argument with regard to the Tamil Tigers. The moment that this is mentioned the champions of the Sri Lankan state asserted that there was absolutely no way they could sit around a table with a terrorist group. So, we have not yet been able to find a term that encapsulates all the apprehensions and concerns, but one thing we are sure about is that arbitration is definitely out because there is nothing to arbitrate. Negotiation is possible, mediation is to be avoided, and facilitation should be accepted only as a last resort rather than as the answer to the problem as such. So, in conclusion, at one level yes you do have a conflict resolution process which does have a predictability which you can respond to. In our case we do not.

As a half-serious point, the last week in November is the week in which the Tamil Tiger leader has his birthday and it is also designated Martyrs week by the Tamil Tigers. The entire political and security establishment is Sri Lanka expects there to be a terrorist attack in this week. This has been going on for the last ten years. It never happens. All the precautions are made, and as soon as the week is over we relax them and then the Tamil Tigers strike. So, any attempts to impose a predictability have not quite worked out.

What we have in our situation is a real serious attempt to restructure the nation and the state. That is what it is about. We are not dealing with the symptoms. We are trying to tackle the causes and my guess is that by a process of sheer exhaustion we might well come to succeed.