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CIAO DATE: 12/99

The United Nations University Experience

Peider Könz

Seminar on Research in a Divided Society
October 22, 1997

Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity

 

Abstract of address presented to INCORE/CCRU Seminar on Research in a Divided Society, Malone House, Belfast, 22 October 1997.

 

The United Nations University Institutional Setting.

How relevant is research to real policy issues? What is its impact? Can it help bridge over contrasting positions or viewpoints in a in a world divided by culture, language, religion, colour or wealth? Quite apart from its academic quality, no research effort in the broad area of governance can escape these fundamental questions, which relate both to research planning—i.e. structuring the research agenda, and defining its underlying paradigms—and to the choice of research tools and methodological approaches, as well as to the way in which the research results are transmitted to reach their intended target audiences.

These basic questions are of course relevant also in discussing the research role of the United Nations University (UNU)—an institution created by the General Assembly, more than two decades ago, as a broadly representative community of scholars mandated to address major issues of concern to mankind, and specifically also to provide support to the policy agenda and operational processes of UN and its component bodies.

This charter mandate, and the fact that the UNU is part of the UN system (albeit not with intergovernmental status), should—at least in theory ensure policy relevance and impact. Also, its supranational, essentially cross-cultural nature constitutes an ideal foundation for mediator or conciliator roles. One might indeed assume that, as a family member, the UNU would be party to a continued (and preferential) dialogue with UN policy organs, and that its research results would be readily absorbed at policy or operational level within the UN system. On the other hand, being “part of the family” (i.e. close to the political structures that commission or will its research) may also present a danger of political interference or bias in agenda-setting, in the choice of paradigms as well as in staffing—as has been the case for many research groups in the private and public sector. The ‘captive institution’ syndrome has in fact marked many in-house “think-tanks” attached to intergovernmental institutions. 1

Be that as it may, it is evident that—up to the present time—the UNU can hardly be called a captive institution of the UN-system. Quite to the contrary. As a non-Governmental body whose charter explicitly guarantees its academic freedom, substantially funded by endowment income, and guided by an academic council whose members are named ad personam, the UNU (with its Research and Training Centres and Programmes) operates in full academic independence, even though it remains subject to UN-system budgetary norms and processes, and to relatively inflexible UN-system staffing patterns designed for operational bureaucracies rather than for scholarly activity. On the other hand, there is no evidence that—occasional rhetoric notwithstanding, and with some notable exceptions such as, the seminal UNU/WIDER work in the area of poverty (led primarily by Amarthya Sen), and its contribution to development theory the UNU has been particularly close to, or had a direct impact on UN-system policy thinking. The UNU has thus accompanied, and focused on the follow-up of major events such as the Rio Earth Summit and its Agenda 21, the Cairo, Istambul and Beijing summits, and the Copenhagen Social Summit, but it has never assumed a lead role such as that played by UNRISD when it concentrated all its resources to feed both the governmental and non-governmental debate in the latter event.

Time will tell whether in years to come the UNU will emphasise its proximity to UN-system policy, whether it will further assert its autonomy, or both. In fact, if the UNU’s place in the UN family may constitute a comparative advantage in terms of relevance and impact, the value of UNU research to the UN system as a whole depends to a large extent on its objectivity and academic independence, i.e. on its intellectual autonomy. Current planning and programming practices, and the way in which the University’s research agenda is determined, seem quite appropriate to that end.

 

Basic Planning and Programming Tools

Programme development in the UNU—i.e. the definition of priorities, agenda setting, choice of methodology, resource allocation—involves two- (or two and-a-half) major stops: (1) A Medium-Term Programme Perspective (MTP), which represents in essence a general five year projection or prospectus of how resources permitting—the Rector intends to develop the programme aver the quinquennium, in what sectors, with what priorities, and with what fund-raising objectives. As such, it covers not only the centrally managed research activities, but also those of the autonomous Research and Training Centres, in which case the MTP generally reflects suggestions emanating from their respective steering boards. While the MTP is fully discussed in the academic council, and must receive its blessing (indeed, the original versions of the second and third MTPs were not approved in their first reading), it has a lesser normative value than the 5-year Medium Term Plans customary for other parts of the UN System and most of its Specialised Agencies. This distinction is important. The University’s Medium Term Perspective is a strategic planning document. By contrast—and although subject to formal approval by the General Assembly and the steering bodies of Specialized agencies, the UN Medium Term Plans are all too often articulated in unrealistic detail and are thus little more than exercises in budgetary science fiction.

The University’s Research and Training Centres 2   as well as some of its University’s decentralized and separately funded programmes, enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy under the UNU Charter. They produce their own strategic plans or perspectives, which are approved by their own steering bodies and taken into account both in the elaboration of the University-wide Medium Term Perspective, and in its biennial programme budget. Biennial Programme Budget: this is a normative instrument, formally approved by the UNU Council, with detailed proposals including inputs and expected outcomes, as well as resource allocations.

In fact both documents—though presented by the Rector (and, where Research and Training Centres are concerned, reflecting also the proposals of their respective directors and steering boards)—are broadly participative, often with roots in ongoing programmes and projections emanating from them.

Beyond this, however, a practice has emerged for the Rector to convene top level, independent advisory teams to help develop research strategy in areas where he expects. major demand, opportunities and programme growth- A first such team met in 1993 to consider the academic follow-up of the Agenda 21 adopted by the Rio Earth Summit. A second team met in 1994 to discuss future programme action in the area of Peace, Security and Global Governance, taking as a starting point the Agenda for Peace proposed by the UN Secretary General, and building upon the research already undertaken under UNU auspices. 3

 

The Advisory Team Reports

The two reports were formulated by teams of high level, broadly representative personalities appointed ad personam by the Rector—13 in one case, and 19 in the other—whose deliberations had the benefit of background papers commissioned by the Rector, or requested by the particular Team for its second meeting.

Both Reports started by defining the specific role which the UN University could expect to play in their particular area. Although their subject matter varied, they coincided in several basic points:

The first Report, entitled ’UNU Agenda 21—Programme on Environment and Sustainable Development’, proposed three interrelated points of entry for the UNU programme: eco-restructuring, with emphasis on major technology shifts and economic and social changes; research on the carrying capacity of particular ecosystems; governance for sustainable development. In fact, the UNU programme followed up in all three perspectives: the newly created Institute of Advanced Studies, in Tokyo, started some major research and action programmes on eco-restructuring and changes in industrial technology; INTECH, the UNU Research and Training Center on Technological Change located in Maastricht, launched a programme on the impact of environment-friendly technology shifts; a series of projects and thematic conferences managed out of Tokyo focused on particularly vulnerable ecosystems (e.g. the Aral Sea, and particular river basins), while work in the area of governance concerned the teaching of international environmental law; the implementation of environmental accords; and, most recently, a series of multilateral diplomacy seminars organized by the Institute of Advanced Studies in preparation of coming international negotiations on the Framework Convention on Climate Change and other environmental agreements.

It is thus evident that that the 1993 Advisory Team Report had a major role in shaping the UNU programmes. It may, at this point, not be demonstrated that it influenced government policy but the work on eco-restructuring had a considerable impact in industrial and academic circles, and the multilateral diplomacy seminars will no doubt facilitate future inter-governmental negotiations in the context of environmental accords, as well as on such sensitive issues as trade and environment.

The second Advisory Team, convened in 1994, focused on the broad area of Peace, Security and Global Governance. Its Report to the Rector identifies and discusses the possible research approach in a number of important basic programme themes—ethical foundations of global coexistence; democracy; federalism; human rights; new actors in global governance. By contrast, the Advisory Team attached relatively low priority to infrastructural aspects of UN or regional action, since they were already the object of numerous studies, introspection and projections. The Report then suggests a number of themes related to conflict prevention and management by coercive and non-coercive measures at regional or global level, adjudicatory processes and post-conflict interventions, as well as disarmament, arms control and recycling. It concludes with a chapter on training or capacity building, in which major emphasis is placed on mid-career training, sabbatical arrangements and leadership support by the use of state-or-the art informatics/telematics technology.

The Advisory Team considered, and attached particular importance to the INCORE conflict- and conflict management programme, and concluded that the UNU should continue to co-sponsor and support R. Beyond this, some of the Advisory Team suggestions—though addressed to a broader universe than the UNU—found a place also in the current UNU work programme: a long-delayed colloquium and follow-up research on ethics and international coexistence; projects on the legitimacy and the ‘corporate culture’ (as opposed to the organizational structure) of international organizations; a project on the role of regional institutions in UN- peace-keeping operations; UNU/WIDER case studies on pre-and post-crisis economic situations, and some research and reflection on the future of adjudicatory mechanisms planned in the context of the Barcelona Governance Programme.

In concluding, it is evident that the perspectives suggested in the UNU Advisory Team Report, as well as other research and policy reflection efforts in the UN system 4   might indeed be particularly relevant to the Northern Ireland scenario: emphasis on informal mediation and conflict prevention; post-conflict measures, including social and economic reconstruction; and so on. In that sense, it may be hoped that INCORE will serve as a stimulus for a future UNU Peace and Global Governance programme along the lines suggested by the 1994 Advisory Team.

 


Endnotes

Note 1:  There have been instances, of course, where strong, charismatic leadership ensured autonomy to in-house research groups, at least for a time; this been the case for DIESA (the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs) in the days of Philippe de Seynes; for the OECD Development Center in its initial Buron/Goldsmith years and, later, under Louis Emmerij; for the Economic Commission for Latin America under Raul Prebisch; and, more recently, for UNRISD, the Geneva-based social development institute, under the leadership of Dharam Ghai).  Back.

Note 2:  UNU-WIDER, in Helsinki; INTECH, in Maastricht; IIAS, in Macau and the newly created Institute of Advanced Studies in Tokyo.  Back.

Note 3:  It is expected that in future these ad hoc Advisory Teams will be replaced by organic programming committees on Environment and Development and on Peace. Security and Global Governance (i.e. the regain themes current UNU programme) meeting periodically and open to outside experts, and both to in-house and external research, groups and agencies concerned with either theme.  Back.

Note 4:  E.g. the innovative approach of the UNRISD War-Torn Societies project, which combines participatory research with policy reflection among parties to a conflict; some of the programmes (especially those focusing on mid-career training) being considered by the UN Staff College in Turin.  Back.