Dissenting Views

Independent Task Force Report
The Future of Transatlantic Relations

February 1999

Council on Foreign Relations

 

   Ian J. Brzezinski, Paula J. Dobriansky, Charles Gati, Michael H. Haltzel, Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, F. Stephen Larrabee,
Kenneth A. Myers III, Simon Serfaty, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Marc A. Thiessen, Gregory F. Treverton.:

We endorse the broad thrust of the report but append this dissenting view regarding the specific assertions and recommendations concerning NATO enlargement.

NATO enlargement must be a process driven by the interests of the alliance, taking into account the ability of those European democracies aspiring for membership to make a net contribution to the security and capabilities of the alliance. NATO’s decision to extend membership only to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at this time recognizes that not all new applicants are equally ready to be security allies. Some may never be. But at the same time, NATO must not prejudge Europe’s future by imposing any arbitrary time lines. To do so would contradict the very essence of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the alliance’s open-door policy as enshrined in the Madrid Declaration.

Thus, the three- to five-year artificial pause in the NATO enlargement process prescribed in the report would be a mistake, raising again the specter of a Europe divided. The U.S. Senate, in its ratification debate on enlargement, recognized this danger and therefore rejected such a pause, lest its actions precipitate a destabilizing backlash or a loss of momentum in the reform processes of NATO aspirants and neighbors. Although we must not allow NATO to collapse under its own weight, insinuating that the accession of additional members would turn the alliance into a debating club is misleading. Furthermore, the alliance must not cede its freedom (formally or informally) to make a determination on future members at the appropriate time out of concern for Russia’s possible reaction. For all these reasons, the assertions and recommendations in the report regarding NATO enlargement would certainly not serve the transatlantic interest in expanding the zone of peace and stability throughout post-Cold War Europe.

 

   Ian J. Brzezinski, Marc A. Thiessen:

Although we endorse the broad thrust of the report, we disagree with the statement that today’s U.S. Congress is “less attentive to foreign affairs than any since the 1930s.” Congress is far more informed and engaged in foreign affairs than it used to be. This is due to many geopolitical and domestic factors, but above all it is due to the information age. Today, Congress is deluged with information and perspectives on world affairs. The result has been not ignorance but debate and dissent. Developing consensus in Congress consequently may be a greater challenge, but the degree of difficulty has lately been escalated more by a lack of confidence in the executive branch than by the absence of knowledge.

 

   Robert R. Bowie:

Although I endorse the broad thrust of the report, the prescriptions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process do not confront the divisive challenge that this issue seems certain to pose for the allies during the coming year.

By the Oslo Accords, Israel and the PLO agreed that the permanent status of the occupied territories (covering borders, settlements, security, refugees, and Jerusalem) would be based on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and begin no later than May 4, 1999. Resolution 242 calls for “Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories” and mutual recognition and respect for territorial integrity and security within recognized borders.

Netanyahu and his Likud regime clearly have no intention of complying with the Oslo commitments or Resolution 242. To provide a pretext, Netanyahu demands impossible perfection in preventing violence (consider Rabin’s murder and Goldberg’s massacre), meanwhile stalling the transitional withdrawals, expanding settlements, and taking other provocative actions. In general, he has defied the United States, which has proved to be a paper tiger. His government’s intentions for the permanent status are indicated by naming Ariel Sharon (an extreme hawk) as permanent status negotiator and by several draft maps, which show Israel annexing over half of the West Bank (including some 140 of the illegal settlements) and leaving the Palestinians with two or three separate, noncontiguous areas, plus Gaza. These areas would be wholly surrounded by the Israeli-annexed territory and crisscrossed by Israeli highways serving the Israeli settlements. The Palestinian regime, in effect, would remain at the mercy of Israeli coercion and control, and could not become a viable independent state.

This outcome would make a mockery of Oslo and 242 and be a formula not for a “just and lasting peace” seeking “historic reconciliation,” as Rabin and Arafat had hoped, but for continued conflict, terror, and repression (consider Hebron). It would ratify, not reverse, past Israeli illegalities. The Palestinian Authority will surely reject such a permanent status and might precipitate a major crisis by proclaiming a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999. Only forceful pressure on Israel will offer any hope for a constructive outcome. If, for the reasons discussed in the report, the United States does not provide such leadership, the European Union, which has substantial leverage through its trade with Israel, should chart its own course for achieving a just and durable peace.

 

   Peter W. Rodman:

If the thrust of the report is transatlantic solidarity, I strongly concur. But I have some concerns.

The report probably understates the challenge. With the Soviet collapse, a Gaullist theme is heard in Europe (and elsewhere) that American dominance is one of the world’s major problems and that counterweights are needed. Many U.S.-European disagreements are thus not merely “tactical,” as the report says, but structural. Indeed, as European defense spending shrinks, Europe will become all the more dependent on the United States in the security realm even as it asserts a new economic and foreign policy independence—further complicating relations.

On specifics, I have to reject the “pause” in NATO enlargement. NATO should deliberate on this at whatever pace is natural. A fixed hiatus is gratuitous, tendentious, and probably destabilizing.

There is a certain escapism about the security of some aspirant countries. The clear implication is that the Balts, for example, are excluded because of Russia’s reaction—as if the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact were our guiding policy. NATO cannot possibly tolerate a new Russian domination of the Balts, on any pretext, whatever the best formula for deterring this. Similarly Ukraine.

The Russia problem, in general, is understated. Whatever Russia’s internal weakness, its increasingly nationalist foreign policy (weapons to Iran and China; bullying Latvia) should warrant some consideration as the West ruminates on further bailouts.

The Mideast discussion is cliched. U.S. policy is criticized for not “confronting” Netanyahu enough. This misunderstands the real problem. Netanyahu has been telling us for two years that the incrementalism of Oslo (designed for a Labor government) is a nightmare for him, and a different procedure (i.e., moving directly to final status) would have made flexibility easier. The United States has mishandled this, but not in the manner suggested.

On Turkey, I fear that a relaxation of U.S. badgering of the EU would only perpetuate the EU’s strategic shortsightedness.

 

   Robert E. Hunter:

I endorse the broad thrust of the report but append the following dissenting view. This report contains much excellent analysis and many prescriptions with which I concur. With others, however, I differ. For example, NATO must be clear-sighted in what it does next on enlargement, especially to ensure that its strength is in no way compromised. Yet I believe that the commitment represented by NATO’s “open door” policy does not permit the mandating of a pause, formal or informal, in further invitations to join. Nor do I believe NATO should defer to Russia in deciding on the pace or direction of enlargement—as important as it is to help Russia succeed internally and play a positive role in European security. Indeed, the report should be even more forthcoming about Western support for Russian economic recovery. Further afield, on Arab-Israeli peacemaking, I do not accept the conclusion that Europeans can expect Washington to “confront directly and strongly” either party, “when their policies are thwarting the peace process.” My experience has been that building confidence, not confrontation—especially with Israel—better sustains the peace process. Also, while I would welcome greater European involvement in the “Greater Middle East,” I believe that making this a necessary task for NATO would likely undercut its role closer to home. In general, I take a more positive view than much of the report about the current state of transatlantic relations, and thus I am also more optimistic about their future.

 

   Fred W. Reinke:

Although I endorse the broad thrust of the report, I disagree with the prescription that “The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act should be removed from the Congressional books.” The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) has been extremely effective in deterring many U.S. and non-U.S. companies from making significant investments in Iranian and Libyan oil and gas projects. Multinationals have been hesitant in responding to Iran’s 1995 international tender of 11 large projects, primarily owing—as Iranian officials themselves concede—to the economic and political uncertainty generated by ILSA and other U.S. sanctions targeted against Iran. Libya similarly has had no success in attracting significant investments.

Even last year’s $2 billion agreement of the Total/Gazprom/ Petronas consortium to develop the South Pars oil field off the coast of Iran must be seen as an anomaly. Earlier this year, the State Department waived sanctions against these investors or other non-U.S. companies that might invest in Iran in the future. Yet, no other major investments in Iran have occurred since the waiver was announced. An earlier agreement to develop South Pars was signed in 1993, but the project never moved forward.

Of course, the extraterritorial aspect of ILSA has prompted severe criticism from European and Asian governments and businesses. Nevertheless, it is occasionally necessary for the U.S. government to finesse the rules of international law when matters of fundamental foreign policy interest are at stake. In November 1995, former Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff stated, “A straight line links Iran’s oil income and its ability to sponsor terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, and acquire sophisticated armaments.” Thus, it would be irresponsible to invoke principles of extraterritoriality and international comity as reasons for not taking effective steps to block these projects or make them more expensive. ILSA also gives the U.S. government more leverage (i.e., an offer to withdraw the threat of ILSA sanctions) in direct negotiations with Iran and Libya, should those countries choose to moderate their behavior.

 

   Marc A. Thiessen:

Because the report makes many good recommendations (e.g., working to ensure Turkey’s Western orientation, maintaining sanctions and being prepared to use force against Iraq, supporting Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, strong action in Kosovo, calling on our European allies to accelerate their military modernization, etc.), I do not dissent from the overall report. However, I have many serious differences with a number of the report’s other conclusions, particularly those concerning NATO expansion (which are discussed above in more detail).

Further, I strongly disagree with the recommendation for “giving more substance” to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). To the contrary, NATO must be vigilant in ensuring that the PJC remains nothing more than a forum for explaining—not negotiating—NATO policy with Russia. Russia must be given neither a voice nor a veto in NATO decision-making. And while NATO must indeed be prepared to meet the new security challenges of the next century, the way to ensure this is to make certain that NATO’s strategic concept and military planning remain firmly focused on territorial defense.

I also strongly disagree with the report’s recommendation that the United States continue pouring good money after bad into the dysfunctional IMF. With its bailouts, the IMF encourages risky, unwise investments that would not otherwise be made, and then imposes destructive high-tax and antigrowth policies on recipient countries, ensuring they cannot grow out of their debt. The IMF should be radically overhauled or abolished.

Most important, however, I object to the prescriptions related to Helms-Burton and ILSA. With the recent admission by the European Union (in the proposed U.S.-EU agreement) that their nationals have indeed been trafficking in stolen American property in Cuba, and the acknowledgment that adjustments are needed in international law to deter such illegal activity, the Helms-Burton law has been vindicated. For all the huffing and puffing and threats of recrimination, the European Union has conceded the basic principle of Helms-Burton: that trafficking in stolen property is wrong. Now, having admitted to the crime, our European friends are left only to complain about the punishment.

And even in those complaints, they are mistaken. The law is not extraterritorial, as the EU contends. It affects only those who traffic in stolen American property in Cuba—as long as they steer clear of such properties, Europeans are free to do business with Castro. And the penalties—denial of entry into the United States, judgments against their property in the United States—are not extraterritorial either. The United States has a right and an obligation to take actions within its borders to protect the property rights of its nationals. Until the EU is prepared to enforce ironclad measures against illegal trafficking, Congress is unlikely to enact any changes in the Helms-Burton law, much less repeal it.

The fact is that the Helms-Burton law works, despite its tepid enforcement by the Clinton administration. The STETT-ITT deal—in which a European trafficker was forced to compensate the legitimate American owners for the use of their property in Cuba—would never have happened without Helms-Burton. The law has discouraged investment in stolen properties in Cuba, denying Castro the use of these stolen properties to finance his machinery of internal oppression. Thus, the law has also helped increase the isolation of the Castro regime—an isolation that certainly played a role in Castro’s decision to invite the Pope to Cuba.

The sad fact remains that, faced with double-digit unemployment, enormous government regulation, and anemic economies struggling under statist fiscal policies, many European governments have begun to employ increasingly mercantilist foreign policies. The United States, by contrast, places moral (and security) considerations higher on its foreign policy agenda. This is the underlying cause of the tension between the United States and the EU over both Helms-Burton and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. These laws have simply exposed a fault line that separates the United States and Europe, and these differences will continue to be an issue of contention in the transatlantic relationship.