U.S.–Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: Task Force Recommendations

Task Force Recommendations and Current Policy

Independent Task Force Report
U.S.–Cuban Relations in the 21st Century

January 1999

With the end of the Cold War, substantial strains on the Cuban economy, and the end of Cuban support for armed revolutionary movements in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. policy toward Cuba has evolved through the 1990s. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) both strengthened economic sanctions against the Castro regime and authorized the president to implement a range of measures to promote exchanges and contacts between Americans and Cubans and take unspecified measures “to support the Cuban people.” Following passage of the CDA, the administration reached an agreement with Cuba that restored direct phone service between the two countries, permitted the opening of news bureaus in Havana, and began to ease travel restrictions for scholars, artists, and others. At the same time, the CDA tightened the embargo by blocking trade between third–country U.S. subsidiaries and Cuba. In 1994 and 1995, the United States and Cuba signed immigration accords under whose terms 20,000 Cuban citizens are allowed to emigrate to the United States each year, including up to 5,000 Cubans per year who qualify as political refugees. Cubans attempting to enter the United States irregularly are returned to Cuba.

In 1996, following the downing by Cuban MiGs of two American planes and the deaths of three American citizens and one legal resident, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (popularly known as Helms–Burton) passed Congress and was signed into law by the president. The new law further defined U.S. policy toward Cuba. Title I seeks to strengthen international sanctions against the Cuban government through a variety of diplomatic measures. Title II delineates the conditions under which the president may provide direct assistance for and otherwise relate to a new or transitional government in Cuba. ₁ Title III further internationalizes the embargo by exposing foreign investment in nationalized Cuban properties to the risk of legal challenge in U.S. courts by American citizens who formerly owned such property, including individuals who at the time of confiscation were Cuban nationals but who have since become U.S. citizens. A provision of the law allows the president to prevent legal action in the courts by exercising a waiver of Title III every six months. Title IV denies entry into the United States to executives (and their family members) of companies who invest in properties confiscated from persons who are now U.S. citizens.

In the aftermath of the 1996 attack on U.S. civilian planes, the administration tightened sanctions against Cuba, including suspending direct flights from Miami to Havana. The administration continued to exercise its semiannual waiver authority, preventing American citizens from taking legal action pursuant to Title III of Helms– Burton.

U.S. policy evolved following John Paul II’s historic visit to Cuba in January 1998, as a bipartisan consensus began to emerge in the Congress and the executive to explore ways to increase the flow of humanitarian aid to the Cuban people. On March 20, 1998, the administration restored daily charter flights and renewed the right of Cuban Americans to send remittances to family members on the island. Tensions between the two countries remain, however. In September 1998 the United States arrested ten Cuban citizens in connection with an alleged spy ring operating in South Florida. In relation to those arrests, in December 1998 the United States expelled three diplomats at the Cuban mission to the United Nations.

In spite of these continuing problems, we favor increasing people–to–people contact between American and Cuban citizens and with Cuban civil society and further facilitating the donation and distribution of humanitarian aid. Building on the provisions of existing law and policy that opened the doors to these wider contacts, our recommendations call for substantially stepped–up people–to–people contact and intensified and decentralized humanitarian relief efforts. We believe that beneath the surface of Cuban communism a modest transition has begun, both in the attitudes of many Cubans living on the island and in emerging church, civic, and small–scale private sector activities. Clearly, the challenge to U.S. policy is to encourage and support this inevitable transition.

Framework of Recommendations

While we no longer expect Cuban communism to survive indefinitely or spread, it should remain a clear objective of U.S. policy neither to support nor to appear to support the current regime. A broad, bipartisan consensus in the United States now exists that the U.S. government should use its influence to support democratic development throughout the Americas. This recognition is axiomatic in U.S. foreign policy and remains the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to promote regional economic integration. The Cuban dictatorship merits no exception to U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. This is the first principle that guided us in developing our recommendations:

No change in U.S. policy toward Cuba should have the primary effect of consolidating or legitimizing the status quo on the island. On the other hand, every aspect of U.S. foreign and economic policy toward Cuba should be judged by a very pragmatic standard: whether it contributes to rapid, peaceful, democratic change in Cuba while safeguarding the vital interests of the United States.

Endnotes

Note 1: The impact of Title II on U.S. policy is disputed. When the president signed Helms–Burton into law, he stated that, “consistent with the Constitution, I interpret the act as not derogating the president’s authority to conduct foreign policy.” Noting that Title II “could be read to state the foreign policy of the United States,” he announced that he viewed the Title II provisions as “precatory,” or as a petition by the Congress. Many congressional leaders do not support this view. Back.