U.S.–Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: Appendixes

Appendixes

Independent Task Force Report
U.S.–Cuban Relations in the 21st Century

January 1999

Statement on Cuba by President William J. Clinton
Released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary

January 5, 1999

Last March, in the wake of Pope John Paul’s historic visit to Cuba, I authorized measures designed to ease the plight of the Cuban people and help them prepare for a democratic future. The restoration of direct passenger flights, resumption of family remittances, expansion of people–to–people contacts, and increases in the sale of medicines since then have had a positive impact. They demonstrate the United States’ compassion for the Cuban people, our strong interest in building bonds between the citizens of our nations, and our determination to provide the people of Cuba with hope in their struggle against a system that for four decades has denied them even basic human rights.

Building on the success of the measures I announced last March, I am today authorizing additional steps to reach out to the Cuban people:

Expansion of remittances by allowing any U.S. resident (not only those with families in Cuba) to send limited funds to individual Cuban families as well as to organizations independent of the government.
Expansion of people–to–people contact through two–way exchanges among academics, athletes, scientists, and others, including streamlining the approval process for such visits.
Authorization of the sale of food and agricultural inputs to independent non– governmental entities, including religious groups and Cuba’s emerging private sector, such as family restaurants and private farmers.
Authorization of charter passenger flights to cities in Cuba other than Havana and from some cities in the United States other than Miami in order to facilitate family reunification for persons living outside those cities.
An effort to establish direct mail service to Cuba, as provided for in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.

At the same time, we are taking steps to increase the flow of information to the Cuban people and others around the world, by strengthening Radio and TV Mart’ and launching new public diplomacy programs in Latin America and Europe to keep international attention focused on the need for change in Cuba. The United States will continue to urge the international community to do more to promote respect for human rights and democratic transition in Cuba.

I am also pleased to announce that I intend to nominate Mr. Jos* “Pepe” Collado and Ms. Avis Lavelle as members of the Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting. I further intend to designate Mr. Collado as chairman upon confirmation by the Senate. This important advisory body has been without a chairman since the death of Jorge Mas Canosa more than a year ago. We are processing other nominations and, in cooperation with congressional leaders, will continue to name members of this bipartisan board.

These steps are designed to help the Cuban people without strengthening the Cuban government. They are consistent with our policy of keeping pressure on the regime for democratic change—through the embargo and vigorous diplomatic initiatives—while finding ways to reach out to the Cuban people through humanitarian efforts and help in developing civil society. They are also consistent with the Cuban Democracy Act and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. They reflect a strong and growing bipartisan consensus that the United States can and should do more to work with the Cuban people toward a future of democracy and prosperity.

Statement on Cuba by Secretary of State Madleine K. Albright
Released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State

January 5, 1999

Good afternoon. Last March, in response to Pope John Paul II’s inspired pilgrimage to Cuba, the Clinton Administration took steps to reach out to the people of that country to make clear our concern for them and to help make their lives more tolerable.

Today, after consultations with concerned non–governmental organizations and leading members of Congress, we’re announcing additional steps in furtherance of that policy. Our goal is to encourage the development in Cuba of peaceful, civic activities that are independent of the government, and that will help the Cuban people prepare for the day when their country is once again free.

First, we will seek to expose additional elements of Cuban society to democratic practices and values by encouraging additional religious, scientific, educational, athletic and other exchanges between our two peoples. We will do this by streamlining visa and licensing procedures for travel between Cuba and the United States by qualified persons other than senior Cuban government officials.

Second, we will expand direct licensed passenger flights to Cuba by authorizing flights from cities other than Miami and to destinations in Cuba other than Havana.

Third, we are broadening the categories of eligible recipients in Cuba for the receipt of financial remittances from the United States. Under this policy, all U.S. residents will be authorized to send up to $300 each quarter to any Cuban family, except for senior government and party leaders. In addition, U.S. citizens and non–governmental organizations will be licensed on a case–by–case basis to send larger remittances to entities in Cuba that are independent of the Cuban government.

Fourth, we will authorize the sale of food and agricultural inputs to private entities and farmers in Cuba. This will also be done on a case–by–case basis and for the purpose of promoting economic activity that is independent of the Cuban government.

Finally, we will seek to restore direct mail service between the United States and Cuba.

These steps are neither designed nor expected to alter our relations with the Cuban government. But taken together, they constitute a major advance in our effort to reach out to the Cuban people. They should help all Cubans to understand that the United States is on their side in the search for economic choice and prosperity, in the quest for the freedom of religion, expression and thought, and in the desire to fulfill Jos* Mart’’s dream of a Cuba where all may participate freely in the political life of their country.

One year ago, Pope John Paul II brought to Cuba a message of hope and justice, liberty and love. Thanks to him, the right to celebrate Christmas has been restored to the people of Cuba. Unfortunately, the Cuban government has shown no interest in restoring other freedoms. On the contrary, authorities have been heavy–handed in crushing efforts to express dissent or to mobilize support for internationally recognized human rights.

It is the responsibility of the United States, our partners in the hemisphere, and the world at large to maintain pressure for democratic change. To this end, the Clinton Administration will continue to support adequate funding for broadcasting to Cuba. We will ask the Broadcasting Board of Governors to study possible additional broadcasting sites, and we will intensify our efforts through public diplomacy to promote international support for those in Cuba who are struggling to gain the freedoms to which people everywhere are entitled.

As President Clinton emphasized in his own statement today, our policy is designed to promote closer ties between our people and those of Cuba without providing aid and comfort to a repressive and backward looking regime. Our policy recognizes the importance of helping Cuban families to overcome the divisions imposed by immigration and exile. For as one Cuban American leader told us, in building civil society the strongest non–governmental organization is the family.

Before closing, I want to note with appreciation the constructive proposal put forward by Senators Warner and Dodd and others concerning the possible creation of a bipartisan commission on U.S. policy towards Cuba. Although we do not support establishing such a commission at this time, we will continue to work with them and others on constructive ideas for encouraging a democratic transition in Cuba.

Next year, the world will begin a new century. In Cuba, where the population is especially young, the personalities and policies, the leadership remained mired in the past but the focus of the people is rightly on the future. We and the people of Cuba must act with tomorrow in mind. Fully aware of present obstacles, we share a faith in the power of liberty to inspire peaceful but far–reaching change. Although we cannot foretell how soon, we know the day is drawing closer when the community of freedom will once more encompass the pearl of the Antilles, and the hemisphere of the American democracies will be complete.

Thank you very much.

Fact Sheets on U.S.–Cuba Policy Initiatives
Released by the Bureau of Inter–American Affairs, U.S. Department of State

January 5, 1999

Direct Flights

U.S. Policy On January 5, 1999, the President announced his decision to expand direct passenger charter flights to Cuba.

As the President has said, we want to continue to find ways to support the Cuban people without strengthening the regime. Our objective, building on the visit of the Pontiff to Cuba, is to support the development of peaceful independent activity and civil society in order to help the Cuban people prepare for a transition to a free, independent, and prosperous nation.

New Measures

In addition to the existing licensed direct passenger charter flights to Havana from Miami, departures from some other U.S. cities will be authorized. In order to facilitate the licensed travel of individuals whose relatives live outside of Havana, direct flights will also be authorized to Cuban cities other than Havana.

The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State will develop implementing procedures in the coming weeks, and will continue to license qualified carrier service providers.

Background

The United States is expanding direct passenger charter flights as a way to facilitate family reunification and to promote people–to–people exchanges through licensed travel.

This will promote the development of peaceful independent activity and civil society within Cuba.

Travelers on all flights must be licensed. In addition to persons traveling once a year to visit close relatives, by far the largest category, other licensable travel includes persons traveling for clearly defined religious or educational activities, cultural activities, persons belonging to recognized human rights organizations and other non–governmental groups, journalists, and official U.S. government travelers, among others.

Direct Mail

U.S. Policy On January 5, 1999, the President announced his decision to seek to re–establish direct mail service with Cuba.

As the President has said, we want to continue to find ways to support the Cuban people without supporting the regime. Our objective, building on the visit of the Pontiff to Cuba, is to support the development of peaceful independent activity and civil society in order to help the Cuban people prepare for a transition to a free, independent, and prosperous nation.

New Measures

The U.S. government will contact the Cuban government to work out the details of establishing direct mail service.

Background

Direct mail between the United States and Cuba is authorized by the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. It was suspended in 1962.

Currently mail is sent to and from Cuba via third countries, causing significant delays and sometimes losses.

Establishing direct mail will facilitate people–to–people contacts, and will significantly expand the flow of information to the Cuban people.

Food Sales

U.S. Policy On January 5, 1999, the President announced his decision to authorize licensing of sales of food and agricultural inputs to independent entities in Cuba.

As the President has said, we want to continue to find ways to assist and support the Cuban people without strengthening the regime. Our objective, building on the visit of the Pontiff to Cuba and following up on the measures we announced last March 20, is to promote the development and evolution of peaceful independent activity and civil society. This will help promote a transition to a free, independent, and prosperous nation, and will help prepare the Cuban people for that goal.

New Measures

Licensing, on a case–by–case basis, sales of food to entities independent of the Cuban government. This could include religious groups, private restaurants, and other such entities.
Licensing, on a case–by–case basis, the sales of agricultural inputs to entities independent of the Cuban government. This could include private farmers, farmers in cooperatives raising food for sale in private markets, and other such entities.

U.S. government financing for such exports will not be authorized.

The Departments of Commerce, the Treasury, and State will develop licensing procedures in the coming weeks.

Background Sales of food and agricultural inputs were suspended in 1963.

Sales to independent entities and non–governmental organizations will be licensed as a way to promote the development of activity independent of the government in order to encourage a peaceful democratic transition.

The embargo remains in place, except for licensed activity, and will continue to be enforced.

Increased Public Diplomacy

U.S. Policy The United States has an active public diplomacy effort around the world focusing on the deplorable human rights situation in Cuba.

As the President has said, we want to continue to find ways to support the Cuban people without supporting the regime, and to support the development of peaceful independent activity and civil society. The United States will intensify efforts to bring the reality of Cuba to the attention of the world public opinion and world governments.

New Measures

USIA will study alternative broadcast sites in order to try to improve reception of Radio Mart’ and TV Mart’.

We will be seek to identify funding for a new aerostat for TV Mart’ broadcasts to Cuba.

A new Presidential Advisory Board on Broadcasting to Cuba will be named. USIA and State Department will enhance public diplomacy programs to better inform Latin America and the EU countries on the reality of Cuba today.

Increased People–to–People Contacts

U.S. Policy On January 5, 1999, the President announced his decision to expand people–to–people contacts.

New Measures

We wish to encourage an expansion of educational, cultural, humanitarian, religious, journalistic and athletic exchange, and other appropriate people–to–people contacts. For example, the Baltimore Orioles organization will be licensed to explore the possibility of playing exhibition games where profits would benefit Caritas–Cuba.

These people–to–people contacts will be expanded in two ways: by facilitating travel of persons from Cuba to the United States who qualify for visas; and by streamlining licensing procedures for qualified U.S. persons traveling to Cuba.

Travel from Cuba to the United States:

Qualified Cubans who are not senior members of the Cuban government or party will continue to be given visas.
The visa process will be streamlined and accelerated.

Travel to Cuba from the United States:

Licensing procedures will be streamlined for qualified U.S. persons traveling to Cuba.
We will also develop procedures to license multiple visits for qualified individuals and groups in the above–mentioned categories.
Travel for recreation or tourism, or travel otherwise in contravention of the embargo, continues to be prohibited.

The Departments of Treasury, Justice, and State will develop licensing procedures.

Background Expanding educational, cultural, journalistic, athletic, religious and humanitarian exchanges to and from Cuba will facilitate people–to–people contacts, specifically supporting the development of peaceful activities in Cuba independent of the Cuban government and promoting a peaceful transition to democracy.

The revised visa procedures are not intended to expand contacts or relations between the U.S. and Cuban governments. Visa applications by senior–level Cuban officials will continue to be reviewed in Washington on a case–by–case basis.

Remittances

U.S. Policy On January 5, 1999, the President announced his decision to expand legal remittances to the Cuban people.

As the President has said, we want to continue to find ways to support the Cuban people without strengthening the regime. Our objective, building on the visit of the Pontiff to Cuba, is to support the development of peaceful independent activity and civil society in order to help promote a transition to a free, independent, and democratic state.

New Measures Under a general license, any U.S. citizen will be authorized to send up to $300 each quarter of the year to any Cuban family, except for senior–level Cuban government and communist party officials. Cuban Americans will continue to be permitted to send remittances to family members.

Remittances may be sent for humanitarian purposes, i.e., to support Cuban families.

U.S. citizens and non–governmental organizations will be licensed, on a case–by– case basis, to send larger remittances to entities in Cuba that are independent of the Cuban government.

The Departments of the Treasury and State will develop licensing and monitoring procedures.

Background Legal remittances by Cuban Americans to close family members in Cuba for humanitarian purposes were reinstituted in March 1998.

Many Cubans are able to meet the most basic necessities of life for their families only by receiving humanitarian packages and financial assistance from relatives in the United States.

Expanding remittances helps promote greater individual freedom. Recipients will be less dependent on the state and less subject to its economic pressures.

Expanding remittances beyond close family members of Cuban Americans to other Cubans helps them for humanitarian purposes, reduces their dependence on the State and promotes independent civil society.

1998 Report on the Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security
Defense Intelligence Agency

November 18, 1997

This report has been prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the National Security Agency, and the United States Southern Command Joint Intelligence Center pursuant to Section 122B of Public Law No. 105–85, 111 Stat. 1943–44, November 18, 1997.

Cuban Armed Forces Significantly Weakened

The disintegration of the Soviet bloc in 1989 triggered a profound deterioration of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), transforming the Institution from one of the most active militaries in the Third World into a stay–at–home force that has minimal conventional fighting ability.

The end of Soviet economic and military subsidies forced Havana to cut the military’s size and budget by about 50 percent after 1989.
In 1989 Cuba was the largest Latin American military on a per capita basis. Today the FAR is estimated to have about 50,000 to 65,000 regular troops and is comparable on an active duty per capita basis to countries like Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and El Salvador.
Severe resource shortages have forced the FAR to reduce training significantly.
A substantial portion of the FAR’s military heavy equipment is in storage. Cannibalization of equipment is used to sustain active duty equipment and make up for shortages of spare parts.
Economic support and sustainment tasks have become as important as protecting the national territory, further weakening the FAR’s conventional capabilities.
The FAR must now grow its own food and raise money to pay for some of its own expenses. Significant numbers of active duty forces are devoted to agricultural, business, and manufacturing activities that help feed the troops and generate revenues.
The military has also increased the level of economic and social services it provides to the civilian sector. The FAR now supplies more construction, engineering, manufacturing, health, and transportation services than it did in past years.
These tasks diminish conventional military training efforts and further weaken the FAR’s conventional capabilities.

Residual Strengths

The FAR retains some residual combat support strengths that are essentially defensive in nature.

The military’s intelligence and counterintelligence systems directed at the United States appear to have suffered little degradation. Cuba has shared intelligence with other countries including U.S. adversaries.
Cuba has an agreement with Russia which allows Moscow to maintain a signals intelligence facility at Torrens also known as Lourdes which is the largest such complex outside the Commonwealth of the Independent States.
Cuba’s military early warning radar systems are aging but remain generally intact.
The military leadership is combat–experienced and disciplined.

Army

The ground forces remain primarily armor and artillery units. Their readiness level is low due to severely reduced training.

The FAR generally is not capable of mounting effective operations above the battalion level.
Most equipment is in storage and unavailable on short notice.

Navy

The Navy has no capability to sustain operations beyond its territorial waters and focuses on defense of the Cuban coast.

Cuba no longer has any functioning submarines in its inventory.
Perhaps a little over a dozen of its remaining surface vessels are combat capable.
The Navy retains a weak antisurface warfare capability using fast attack boats that carry STYX surface–to–surface anti–ship missiles. The Navy also retains an extremely weak antisubmarine warfare capability. The Cuban Navy can pose a more substantial threat to undefended civilian vessels.

Air Force

The Air and Air Defense Forces are now incapable of defending Cuban airspace against large numbers of high–performance military aircraft. Slower or less sophisticated aircraft, however, would be vulnerable to Cuban air and air defense systems.

The Air Force probably has less than 2 dozen operational MiG fighters.
Pilot training is judged barely adequate to maintain profi–ciency.
Fighter sorties have declined significantly in recent years.
Cuba would rely on its surface–to–air missiles (SAM) and its air defense artillery to respond to attacking air forces.

Special Operations Forces

Cuba’s special operations units are smaller and less proficient than they were a decade ago, but they can still perform selected military and internal security missions.

The FAR retains a battalion–size airborne unit and other special operations forces.
Special operations training continues, albeit on a smaller scale than in the past.

Unconventional Forces

Cuba’s paramilitary units—the Territorial Militia Troops, the Youth Labor Army devoted to agricultural production, and the naval militia—have suffered considerable degradation of morale and training over the last seven years. However, their core personnel still have the potential to make an enemy invasion costly.

Negligible Conventional Military Threat to the United States

Cuba’s weak military poses a negligible conventional threat to the United States or surrounding countries.

The Cubans almost certainly calculate that any attack on U.S. territory or forces would draw a swift, forceful U.S. reaction.
Cuba could theoretically threaten small, undefended countries in Latin America. However, such action would run counter to its efforts in recent years to improve relations with neighboring countries. There are no current indications that Cuba would undertake any such action.

Biological Warfare Threat

Cuba’s current scientific facilities and expertise could support an offensive BW program in at least the research and development stage. Cuba’s biotechnology industry is one of the most advanced in emerging countries and would be capable of producing BW agents.

Threat of Mass Migration Currently Low

The threat of another government–sanctioned mass migration from Cuba is assessed as low as long as domestic political conditions remain stable.

The 1994 accord indefinitely permits 20,000 Cubans per year to enter the United States, the largest legal annual number since the U.S. airlifts of 1965–1971. The Cuban government uses such a safety valve to help minimize social tension prompted by the poor economy.
The 1995 accord, which provides for the return of illegal migrants to Cuba, also deters many Cubans from leaving unlawfully. The perception by the Cuban populace that Washington can and will repatriate most illegal migrants has sharply reduced the flow of rafters and will remain a key determinant of migration volume.
Moreover, mass illegal migration discourages tourism and foreign investor confidence, two factors that Havana—now dependent on dollars from abroad—urgently needs to keep its economy afloat.

Nonetheless, pressures for migrants to flee to the United States despite Cuban and U.S. prohibitions would increase substantially if Cuba’s economy—currently growing slowly—resumed a downward spiral, if the government was perceived to relax its position on illegal departures, or in the event of sustained political upheaval.

Potential for Internal Strife

The prospects for widespread civil unrest in Cuba that involves U.S. citizens, residents, or armed forces currently appear to be low.

There is undoubtedly widespread desire for greater economic and political freedom and weariness with continuing hardship, deprivation and repression. Nonetheless, relatively few Cubans now appear willing to risk the consequences of pressing for sweeping political changes.

Over the long term, stability is likely to depend on the circum–stances under which Castro leaves the scene. Pressures for change are likely to grow that the regime may find difficult to manage.

Threat of Attacks on U.S. Citizens and Residents

Cuban attacks on U.S. citizens or residents while they are engaged in peaceful protest in international airspace or waters currently appear unlikely.

During exile commemoration ceremonies since Cuba shot down two unarmed U.S. aircraft in international airspace in February 1996, the Cuban government has acted with restraint.

Conclusions

At present, Cuba does not pose a significant military threat to the United States or to other countries in the region. Cuba has little motivation to engage in military activity beyond defense of its territory and political system.

Nonetheless, Cuba has a limited capability to engage in some military and intelligence activities which would be detrimental to U.S. interests and which could pose a danger to U.S. citizens under some circumstances.

Statement at the Occasion of the Signing into Law of Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 by President William J. Clinton
Released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary

March 12, 1996

Today I have signed into law H.R. 927, the “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.” This Act is a justified response to the Cuban government’s unjustified, unlawful attack on two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft that left three U.S. citizens and one U.S. resident dead. The Act imposes additional sanctions on the Cuban regime, mandates the preparation of a plan for U.S. assistance to transitional and democratically elected Cuban governments, creates a cause of action enabling U.S. nationals to sue those who expropriate or “traffic” in expropriated properties in Cuba, and denies such traffickers entry into the United States. It is a clear statement of our determination to respond to attacks on U.S. nationals and of our continued commitment to stand by the Cuban people in their peaceful struggle for freedom.

Immediately after Cuba’s brutal act, I urged that differences on the bill be set aside so that the United States could speak in a single, strong voice. By acting swiftly—just 17 days after the attack—we are sending a powerful message to the Cuban regime that we do not and will not tolerate such conduct.

The Act also reaffirms our common goal of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by tightening the existing embargo while reaching out to the Cuban people. Our current efforts are beginning to yield results: they are depriving the Cuban regime of the hard currency it needs to maintain its grip on power; more importantly, they are empowering the agents of peaceful change on the island. This Act provides further support for the Administration’s efforts to strengthen independent organizations in Cuba intent on building democracy and respect for human rights. And I welcome its call for a plan to provide assistance to Cuba under transitional and democratically elected governments.

Consistent with the Constitution, I interpret the Act as not derogating from the President’s authority to conduct foreign policy. A number of provisions—sections 104(a), 109(b), 113, 201, 202(e), and 202(f)—could be read to state the foreign policy of the United States, or would direct that particular diplomatic initiatives or other courses of action be taken with respect to foreign countries or governments. While I support the underlying intent of these sections, the President’s constitutional authority over foreign policy necessarily entails discretion over these matters. Accordingly, I will construe these provisions to be precatory.

The President must also be able to respond effectively to rapid changes in Cuba. This capability is necessary to ensure that we can advance our national interests in a manner that is conducive to a democratic transition in Cuba. Section 102(h), concerning the codification of the economic embargo, and the requirements for determining that a transitional or democratically elected government is in power, could be read to impose overly rigid constraints on the implementation of our foreign policy. I will continue to work with the Congress to obtain the flexibility needed if the United States is to be in a position to advance our shared interest in a rapid and peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

Finally, Title IV of the Act provides for the Secretary of State to deny visas to, and the Attorney General to exclude from the United States, certain persons who confiscate or traffic in expropriated property after the date of enactment of the Act. I understand that the provision was not intended to reach those coming to the United States or United Nations as diplomats. A categorical prohibition on the entry of all those who fall within the scope of section 401 could constrain the exercise of my exclusive authority under Article II of the Constitution to receive ambassadors and to conduct diplomacy. I am, therefore, directing the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to ensure that this provision is implemented in a way that does not interfere with my constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities.

The Cuban regime’s lawless downing of two unarmed planes served as a harsh reminder of why a democratic Cuba is vitally important both to the Cuban and to the American people. The LIBERTAD Act, which I have signed into law in memory of the four victims of this cruel attack, reasserts our resolve to help carry the tide of democracy to the shores of Cuba.

Joint Statement on U.S.–Cuba Immigration Agreement

May 2, 1995

The United States of America and the Republic of Cuba have reached agreement on steps to normalize further their migration relationship. These steps build upon the September 9, 1994, agreement and seek to address safety and humanitarian concerns and to ensure that migration between the countries is safe, legal, and orderly.

Humanitarian Parole

The United States and the Republic of Cuba recognize the special circumstances of Cuban migrants currently at Guantánamo Bay. Accordingly, the two governments have agreed that the process of humanitarian parole into the United States should continue beyond those eligible for parole under existing criteria. The two governments agree that if the United States carries out such paroles, it may count them towards meeting the minimum number of Cubans it is committed to admit every year pursuant to the September 9, 1994, agreement. Up to 5,000 such paroles may be counted towards meeting the minimum number in any one year period beginning September 9, 1995, regardless of when the migrants are paroled into the United States.

Safety of Life at Sea

The United States and the Republic of Cuba reaffirm their common interest in preventing unsafe departures from Cuba. Effective immediately, Cuban migrants intercepted at sea by the United States and attempting to enter the United States will be taken to Cuba. Similarly, migrants found to have entered Guantánamo illegally will also be returned to Cuba. The United States and the Republic of Cuba will cooperate jointly in this effort. All actions taken will be consistent with the parties’ international obligations. Migrants taken to Cuba will be informed by the United States officials about procedures to apply for legal admission to the United States at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

The United States and the Republic of Cuba will ensure that no action is taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. Both parties will work together to facilitate the procedures necessary to implement these measures. The United States and the Republic of Cuba agree to the return to Cuba of Cuban nationals currently at Guantánamo who are ineligible for admission to the United States.

September 9, 1994, Agreement

The United States and the Republic of Cuba agree that the provisions of the September 9, 1994, agreement remain in effect, except as modified by the present Joint Statement. In particular, both sides reaffirm their joint commitment to take steps to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba which risk loss of human life and to oppose acts of violence associated with illegal immigration.

Joint Communiqué on U.S.–Cuba Immigration Agreement

September 9, 1994

Representatives of the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba today concluded talks concerning their mutual interest in normalizing migration procedures and agreed to take measures to ensure that migration between the two countries is safe, legal, and orderly.

Safety of Life at Sea

The United States and the Republic of Cuba recognize their common interest in preventing unsafe departures from Cuba which risk loss of human life. The United States underscored its recent decisions to discourage unsafe voyages. Pursuant to those decisions, migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter the United States will not be permitted to enter the United States, but instead will be taken to safe haven facilities outside the United States. Further, the United States has discontinued its practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reach U.S. territory in irregular ways. The Republic of Cuba will take effective measures in every way it possibly can to prevent unsafe departures using mainly persuasive methods.

Alien Smuggling

The United States and the Republic of Cuba reaffirm their support for the recently adopted United Nations General Assembly resolution on alien smuggling. They pledged their cooperation to take prompt and effective action to prevent the transport of persons to the United States illegally. The two governments will take effective measures in every way they possibly can to oppose and prevent the use of violence by any persons seeking to reach, or who arrive in, the United States from Cuba by forcible diversions of aircraft and vessels.

Legal Migration

The United States and the Republic of Cuba are committed to directing Cuban migration into safe, legal and orderly channels consistent with strict implementation of the 1984 joint communiqué. Accordingly, the United States will continue to issue, in conformity with United States law, immediate relative and preference immigrant visas to Cuban nationals who apply at the U.S. Interests Section and are eligible to immigrate to the United States. The United States also commits, through other provisions of United States law, to authorize and facilitate additional lawful migration to the United States from Cuba. The United States ensures that total legal migration to the United States from Cuba will be a minimum of 20,000 Cubans each year, not including immediate relatives of United States citizens. As an additional, extraordinary measure, the United States will facilitate in a one year period the issuance of documentation to permit the migration to the United States of those qualified Cuban nationals in Cuba currently on the immigrant visa waiting list. To that end, both parties will work together to facilitate the procedures necessary to implement this measure. The two governments agree to authorize the necessary personnel to allow their respective interests sections to implement the provisions of this communiqué effectively.

Voluntary Return

The United States and the Republic of Cuba agreed that the voluntary return of Cuban nationals who arrived in the United States or in safe havens outside the United States on or after August 19, 1994, will continue to be arranged through diplomatic channels.

Excludables

The United States and the Republic of Cuba agreed to continue to discuss the return of Cuban nationals excludable from the United States.

Review of Agreement

The representatives of the United States and the Republic of Cuba agree to meet no later than 45 days from today’s announcement to review implementation of this Joint Communiqué. Future meetings will be scheduled by mutual agreement.