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The United States, Europe, and the New Security Threats
Robert D. Blackwill and Kristin Archick
"The Asia Crisis: Economic and Political Implications"
New York
April 15, 1998
Introduction
Transnational challenges, which range from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to environmental problems to migration, have been receiving greater attention in foreign policymaking circles on both sides of the Atlantic since the end of the Cold War. Some strategists assert that many of these issues represent new threats to the security of the nation-state and to the stability of the international community. The globalization of financial markets, the spread of advanced technologies, and the rapid diffusion of information have combined to produce an increasingly interdependent world and call into question the significance of geopolitical boundaries. Cyberterrorism renders important information systems vulnerable. International organized crime and its attendant money laundering weakens the stability of global finances. Precisely because these new threats cross territorial borders, they also blur the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy. 1 Civil strife within the territory of one state, for example, may become internationalized if it produces refugee flows into another.
These analysts acknowledge that this will not necessarily result in conflict between nations, but that such events could aggravate stresses within the receiving country and in some cases stimulate ethnic clashes, urban unrest, and general instability. They say that ultimately this transnational turbulence could affect transatlantic national interests if it upsets trade and economic relations with the West and generated humanitarian disasters that produced Western military intervention and increased foreign assistance. 2 A number of experts therefore argue that due to the size and complexity of transnational concerns, close cooperation between nations is required to address them effectively. 3 Atlanticists often claim that the United States and Europe are obvious partners in managing the risks posed by these global problems. Reflecting this notion, the United States and the European Union (EU) launched the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in December 1995 at the U.S.-EU summit in Madrid. The NTA is a comprehensive initiative that seeks to expand transatlantic cooperation on a wide range of issues, including the global challenges of nuclear safety, terrorism, degradation of the environment, international crime, drug trafficking, mass migration, and disease.
Other experts, however, are skeptical. They question the extent to which at least some transnational issues actually threaten Western interests. The environment is a particular case in point. Some commentators in this camp contend that much of the scientific evidence used to buttress charges of dangerous environmental degradation is inconclusive (as in the case of global warming). 4 Others disagree with one of the central premises expounded by environmentalists--that critical natural resources are growing increasingly scarce--believing, instead, that market-driven human ingenuity will overcome resource depletion by producing substitutes that serve the same purpose. 5 Critics also doubt the degree of global interdependence that exists, maintaining that a far-off humanitarian crisis, for example, need not impinge on the national interests of transatlantic countries. Besides questioning the degree of danger posed by transnational concerns, this group is pessimistic that the transatlantic relationship offers a viable vehicle to protect Western interests from these issues in the unlikely event that they do come to constitute threats. They note differing U.S. -European policies on issues such as how best to deal with nations intent on acquiring WMD capabilities, climate change, and the vulnerability of information systems. In addition, they view Europe's internal preoccupations and the European Union's lack of a common foreign and security policy as factors that decrease the possibility of transatlantic cooperation on these global challenges.
This paper explores the likelihood of transatlantic collaboration in managing emerging threats to U.S. and European national interests from a variety of new sources. It focuses on policy similarities and differences between the two sides of the Atlantic toward the following salient transnational issues likely to face the West in the period ahead:
Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction
Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and biological--is perhaps the most important challenge currently facing the United States and its European allies. Many analysts observe, however, that managing the risks posed by the spread of WMD has been a particularly contentious issue for both sides of the Atlantic. Some fear that these transatlantic policy divisions could seriously undermine the cohesion of the alliance and inhibit the ability of the United States and Europe to address effectively this increasingly dangerous transnational threat. This issue has three key dimensions: the security of Russia's nuclear inheritance; WMD acquisition by threshold states; and WMD capabilities of non-state actors.
The Security of Russia's Nuclear Inheritance
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security of Russia's vast nuclear arsenal and immense weapons complex emerged as a significant concern in parts of the West. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left 30,000 nuclear weapons and bomb-usable material for an additional 70,000 scattered in more than 100 sites. 6 It quickly became apparent that the disappearance of strong centralized control, growing political and economic turmoil, demoralized military, and organized crime and corruption were creating conditions ripe for the smuggling of fissile materials. Many feared that these materials would wind up in the hands of rogue states or disaffected subnational groups. Several incidents of theft of weapons-grade nuclear materials from Russia have been documented since 1992. In December 1994, for example, police in Prague seized 2.72 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the back seat of a parked car. 7 In September 1997, the former head of Russia's Security Council, General Alexander Lebed, claimed that one hundred of the former Soviet Union's suitcase-sized bombs could not be unaccounted for. 8 Although these allegations were quickly dismissed by the Russian government, they raised further worries about Moscow's ability to prevent nuclear leakage. And most recently, in late November 1997, Romanian authorities conducted a sting operation that netted 380 grams of uranium believed to have originated in one of the former Soviet republics. 9
The United States was the first and only Western nation to begin seriously addressing the dangers posed by the inadequacies of Russia's fissile material inventory control and accounting system. In 1991, the U.S. Congress established a wide-ranging security assistance initiative--the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Its purposes include to facilitate the elimination, as well as the safe and secure transportation and storage, of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction; to promote the safe and secure storage of fissile material, weapons components, and weapons-related knowledge and expertise; and to expand bilateral military contacts. 10 Supporters credit this program with assisting the safe removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; the destruction of 129 Russian ICBMs, 165 ICBM silos, 20 bombers, 80 SLBM launchers; the removal of 4,700 warheads from strategic systems aimed at the United States; and the sealing of 99 nuclear test tunnels. 11 The cumulative seven-year cost of this program to the United States is estimated to be under $3 billion--less than one-third of one percent of the Defense Department's annual budget. 12 In addition to Nunn-Lugar, in 1994 Russia and the United States concluded an HEU Purchase Agreement, in which the United States agreed to buy (at a price of $12 billion) 500 tons of Russian HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons over the next 20 years in order to ensure its peaceful use as civilian reactor fuel. The implementation of this deal, however, has been slow and problematic. 13
Some argue that the European allies have been generally supportive, at least rhetorically, of U.S. efforts to manage issues related to nuclear leakage in Russia. Observers note that the European members of the Group of Seven (G-7) participated in the April 1996 Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security held in Moscow and that the issue was addressed in the G-7 summit that occurred this past June in Denver. The EU and some individual European countries have provided modest assistance to Russia to promote nuclear safety and secure radioactive waste disposal. Germany and the Netherlands have offered a few million each for the destruction of Russian chemical weapons. 14 However, many believe that the assistance Europe has given to help counter the threats posed by loose Russian nuclear materials is a pittance compared to that of the United States and is hardly sufficient. A number of analysts assert that while many nations, particularly those in Europe and Japan, share a vital interest in promoting the security of Russia's nuclear inheritance, ". . . the gap between their interests and their behavior has been wide. . . . [I]t seems that the allies have either seriously underestimated the threat of nuclear leakage to their own security, or have been content to sit it out and hope that the Americans and Russians would take care of the problem." 15 Some note that European budgetary difficulties have exacerbated the tendency to free-ride on U.S. efforts. 16 Given the seriousness and magnitude of the problem, these analysts stress that the European allies must do more to assist the United States in its efforts to reduce the risks posed by loose Russian nuclear and fissile materials.
Question 1: Should the European allies take more responsibility peaceful use as civilian reactor fuel. The implementation of this deand spend more money to deal with the challenges posed by Russia's nuclear weapons complex?
WMD Acquisition by Threshold States
U.S. and European policy differ on how to best combat the aspirations of states such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Americans frequently complain that Europeans suffer from strategic myopia with respect to the acquisition of WMD capabilities by these states, arguing that the European Union is pursuing economic interests in the Middle East at the expense of Western security concerns. According to some Americans, the most blatant and dangerous example has been the tepid European support for recent U.S. actions aimed at securing Iraq's compliance with the requirements set out by the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) for the destruction and removal of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities. For the past several months, Baghdad had been refusing to allow U.N. inspectors unlimited access to all suspected weapons storage sites, as required by the United Nations after the end of the Gulf War in 1991. The Clinton administration, growing frustrated with Saddam's intransigence, had been slowly preparing to undertake air strikes against Iraq to ". . . significantly diminish the capacity of the Iraqis to reconstitute, to develop, to deploy their weapons of mass destruction, and to threaten their neighbors." 17 In a final effort to avoid another military confrontation with Iraq, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan met with Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein, in Baghdad for three days. On February 22, 1998, Secretary General Annan reached an agreement with the Iraqi leader that Annan says permits UNSCOM unrestricted and unconditional access to eight "presidential sites" suspected of concealing WMD. 18 These locations had previously been off-limits to U.N. weapons inspectors. 19 In a televised address, President Clinton announced his tentative approval of this deal, stating, "If fully implemented, and that is the big if, this commitment will allow UNSCOM to fulfill its mission." 20 But he cautioned that there would be "serious consequences" if Iraq failed to abide by this latest promise and ordered U.S. military forces built up in the Gulf to remain in position. 21
During the crisis, significant support from the international community for military action against Iraq had not been forthcoming; especially troubling to some in the United States was the lukewarm response (at best) from most European capitals. Of all its European allies, only Britain pledged to join the United States in a military attack on Iraq to force Saddam to allow unfettered access to all suspect sites. 22 Germany announced it would allow American forces to use German bases, if needed, in the event of a strike against Iraq but experts interpreted this offer as a gesture with more political than military significance. 23 In Washington's view, France was particularly vehement in its opposition to the use of military force in Iraq, asserting that an imperfect diplomatic solution was preferable to military action, which France believed would only serve to kill innocent Iraqi civilians and weaken Western interests throughout the Middle East. 24
Some Americans were especially irritated by France's unwillingness to support air strikes against Iraq because they perceived French policy as having played a role in engendering the crisis. They asserted that France's decision in the U.N. Security Council to block tougher sanctions on Iraq in October 1997 in response to concerns that Baghdad was concealing large stores of biological weapons contributed to Saddam Hussein's decision to deny entry to U.N. weapons inspectors. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune opined, "The resultant disarray in the U.N. Security Council emboldened Hussein to believe he might finally be able to split the international coalition that has imposed sanctions on his country since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Hussein already knew that countries like France were growing impatient with the sanctions and were salivating for the day when they could enter into lucrative oil contracts with Iraq." 25 Indeed, Matthew Gledhill reports that, "Even in the corridors of the Elysee Palace . . . aides concede that France is looking after its own interests in Iraq. French politicians, investors and political analysts admit that a partial lifting of U.N. sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime would help erase Iraq's estimated $7.5 billion debt to France and open up profitable new trade opportunities in oil and construction." 26
France maintains that its underlying rationale for wishing to see sanctions lifted is based on political principles, not commercial opportunities. In short, like some of the other members of the EU, France believes that the U.S. policy of attempting to isolate Iraq has failed, that sanctions have only led to suffering among the Iraqi people, and that engagement of Iraq is a better means of encouraging Baghdad to forego its desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 27 The United States rejects these assertions, maintaining that Saddam's relentless efforts to pursue WMD capabilities and his willingness to forego a minimum of $100 billion in oil revenues in order to avoid relinquishing his WMD arsenal make it fanciful that economic engagement with Iraq will persuade him to end conclusively his weapons programs. 28 On the contrary, the administration believes that lifting the U.N. sanctions and allowing economic interaction with Iraq would make Saddam even more deadly, enabling his regime to begin vigorously rebuilding its WMD capabilities and conventional weapons systems in earnest.
In addition to the WMD threats posed by Iraq, countering those emanating from Iran and Libya have also brought the United States and its European allies into disagreement. The most obvious focal point of tension has been over the possible effects of a major piece of U.S. sanctions legislation--the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), also know as the D'Amato Act. ILSA is aimed at economically isolating Iran and Libya, thereby decreasing their ability to pursue the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and support terrorism. It requires the President to implement at least two, out of six, mandatory penalties on foreign companies that invest more than $40 million in either country's oil or gas sectors. 29 If a violation is identified, the Act allows the President to waive sanctions if it is in the national interest or delay sanctions pending consultations with the governments primarily responsible for regulating the companies concerned. 30 The European Union strongly opposes this piece of legislation, objecting in particular to its extraterritorial reach. The EU argues that the United States has no jurisdiction to extend its laws beyond its borders and punish corporations for activities they conduct completely outside U.S. territory. They say that by doing so, the United States is infringing on the sovereignty of other nations. 31 Furthermore, the countries of the European Union differ with the United States on the philosophical underpinnings of these sanctions, maintaining that isolating Iran will not yield the behavior modifications hoped for by the United States. At the most recent U.S.-EU summit in December 1997 in Washington, the president of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, "tried to make clear that they [the Europeans] are just as determined as the United States to fight terrorism, but they differ on the methods for conducting that struggle." 32
Also this past December 1997, at a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright urged her European counterparts to recognize the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region as the "overriding security interest of our time." 33 She stressed that the proliferation of WMD should be the new "unifying threat" that binds the United States and Europe together. 34 In noting that the threats posed by WMD emanate largely from the Middle East and Eurasia, Secretary Albright added "Europe is especially at risk," given its geographic proximity to these regions. 35 Despite this European vulnerability, a number of American strategists and defense experts point out that the United States bears the burden of protecting Western interests against WMD proliferation and other security challenges in the Persian Gulf. The presence of American forces on the ground in the Gulf also makes the United States more vulnerable to WMD attack, contributing to U.S. frustration with the commercial policies of its European allies. Secretary Albright acknowledged these difficulties in forging a common approach, stating, "I know there is a sense among some Europeans that the United States is too inclined to act unilaterally and too quick to pull the sanctions trigger. . . . There is likewise a sense among some Americans that too often the United States takes the heat for dealing with difficult issues while others take the contracts." 36 A number of pundits observe that these differing U.S. and European perceptions must be overcome before the two sides of the Atlantic will be able to effectively address the new security threats posed by states intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
Question 2: Why are most European nations so hesitant to join the United States in military action regarding the WMD threat?
Question 3: If the United States sustains casualties in an eventual military operation against Iraq, undertaken largely without European military support, will the long-term cohesion of the Atlantic alliance be threatened?
Question 4: How serious an irritant in the transatlantic relationship is ILSA? Is there a likely way out?
Question 5: What broader strategies, if any, should the United States and its European allies employ to counter WMD threats?
WMD Capabilities of Non-state Actors
Many defense experts observe with increasing alarm the possibility of non-state actors, whose ranks include terrorists, religious cults, ethnic minorities, disaffected political groups, and organized crime syndicates, acquiring WMD. They point to incidents over the past several years of the acquisition and/or use of chemical weapons of mass destruction as well as the possession of biological agents by radical individuals and organizations. Examples include the release of sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 by Japanese doomsday cult, Aum Shinrikyo (which killed 12 and injured more than 5,000); an aborted 1994 plot by two members of a U.S. militia-style organization to use ricin (a highly concentrated pathogen that can kill in minutes if ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin) to assassinate federal agents and other federal employees; and the attainment of freeze-dried bubonic plague bacteria by a former member of a white supremacist organization. 37 In addition, some believe that the Islamic fundamentalist group responsible for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center (in which six people were killed and 5,000 injured) had laced the bomb with cyanide in order to produce a poisonous gas cloud over New York City; they surmise that instead of vaporizing, the cyanide burned up in the explosion. 38
Experts assert that several factors have combined to contribute to the prospective ability of non-state actors to acquire nuclear-related materials, chemical and biological weapons. As noted above, the demise of centralized Soviet control left many Russian weapons facilities poorly protected; financial pressures and the shrinkage of Russia's military-industrial complex has led some former Soviet weapons scientists to sell their expertise abroad. 39 In addition, with the advent of the Internet, access to sophisticated technical weapons know-how is now easier. This problem is complicated by the dual-use nature of many of the products used in chemical manufacturing and biotechnology. John Sopko observes that the same technologies and organisms used to produce pesticides, medicines, and solvents could easily be diverted to manufacturing chemical and biological weapons; he notes that some of these ingredients may even be found under a kitchen sink. 40
Moreover, analysts stress that not only has the ability of subnational groups to acquire WMD capabilities changed, but so have the motivations of non-state actors for using these weapons. Non-state actors are increasingly driven by their resentment of the dominant role played by the United States and the West in the international political, economic, and security landscape. Consequently, it is feared that the territory, citizens, and military forces of the United States and Europe would likely be the principal focal point of such possible attacks. And given American conventional military superiority, vividly demonstrated by the Persian Gulf War, WMD would provide peripheral groups and individuals with an "asymmetric" means to attack Western interests. 41 Chemical and biological weapons have the potential to be especially advantageous for non-state actors in this respect because they are relatively inexpensive to produce and often require only crude delivery and dispersal systems. The delivery system used by the Aum in the Tokyo subway consisted of plastic bags of sarin punctured by the tips of umbrellas.
In addition, experts long held that a central tenet of terrorism had often been a degree of self-restraint; too many casualties inflicted on a targeted group or population would destroy sympathy and support for a terrorist's cause. However, it appears that this no longer holds true for at least some of the new non-state actors engaged in terrorist activities. 42 Although the attack by Aum Shinrikyo proved deadly, possible casualties could have neared 10,000 if the sarin had dispersed as intended. 43 In the World Trade Center bombing, hundreds of thousands could have been killed if the bomb's alleged cyanide had vaporized. 44 Richard Betts notes that it is likely that eventually such groups will prove more competent. 45
Despite the likely increase in the deadly capabilities of non-state actors, some experts maintain that neither the United States nor Europe have devoted sufficient attention or resources to address this problem. They note that Western intelligence knows little about several of these groups and individuals potentially equipped with weapons of mass destruction. Numerous U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officers testified before Congress after the subway incident that the Aum had not been on any agency's "radar screen," even though the religious cult had purchased two Russian-made helicopters, tested biological agents in the Australian desert, and sprayed sarin gas over an apartment complex in Matsumoto, Japan in June 1994 (killing 7 and injuring 500). 46
There are indications that Washington is gaining a fuller appreciation of the WMD dangers posed by non-state actors as well as the need to work with U.S. allies in managing such threats. In October 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a report entitled DOD Responses to Transnational Threats, which was the culmination of a summer task force study conducted by the Defense Science Board. Among its recommendations, the task force advocated an initiative to develop an international database on non-state actors and groups to improve the amount and quality of intelligence available on the more than 40 that have been identified. 47 The DOD report stated, "The United States must get smarter about transnational threat groups--their motives, organization, sources of support, and operational means. There is a need for a two-way global information system. . . ." 48 Such a system would integrate existing databases belonging to the Departments of Defense and Justice, the FBI, CIA, state and local police, and then correlate the information obtained from these sources with that collected by the national intelligence agencies of America's partners abroad. The Science Board asserted that establishing this Secure Transnational Threat Information Infrastructure could be done relatively quickly, coming on line in the continental United States within a year, and available to the global community within three. 49
In addition, the CIA has reportedly begun to focus more sharply on the issue of non-state actors, among other transnational threats. 50 And the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act recognizes the need to better train, equip, and coordinate emergency-response personnel in the United States to handle terrorist incidents involving nuclear, chemical, or biological agents. It also provides the U.S. customs service with additional funds and equipment to prevent smuggled weapons and materials from entering the United States. 51 Nevertheless, defense experts stress that greater international cooperation will be necessary to deal with the challenges posed by non-state actors as they improve their abilities to wreak havoc and mass mayhem. 52 And such collaboration is especially imperative for the United States and Europe, many emphasize, as they are likely to be the primary targets of such attacks.
Question 6: What additional cooperative steps, if any, can the United States and Europe take to better protect their national interests from non-state actors capable of carrying out terrorist attacks with WMD?
Environmental Degradation
Many commentators assert that the global environment represents one of the most pressing challenges facing the two sides of the Atlantic now and in the years ahead. Some key components of this issue are air pollution, especially as it relates to climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer; conservation of renewable (water, soil, forests, fisheries, biological diversity) and nonrenewable resources (metals, minerals, and fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and gas); sustainable development; and population growth. Experts opine that environmental degradation threatens global security in two respects. First, many scientists argue that issues such as the ozone hole in the atmosphere and global warming threaten the general well-being of the planet and future generations. The hole in the ozone layer, attributed to the production of chemicals known as chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) once used widely in refrigeration and aerosols, allows harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun to hit Earth, potentially causing higher rates of skin cancer and cataracts for humans and disrupting ecosystems for plants and animals. 53 Similarly, numerous scientists believe that the emissions produced from the burning of fossil fuels trap heat, leading to a warming of the earth's atmosphere that could have terrible global consequences. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the U.N. Environment Program, predicts that if emissions continue to rise at their present rates, global temperatures could increase by 1 to 3.5 degrees Celsius (1.8 to 6.3 degrees Fahrenheit) by 2100, resulting possibly in a rise in the sea level by 15 to 95 centimeters (6 to 37 inches) and a shift in climate zones by 150 to 550 kilometers (93 to 342 miles) in the mid-latitude regions. 54 If true, rising oceans could threaten coastland and island developments and mosquito-borne tropical diseases such as malaria, cholera, and dengue fever could migrate northward. (It should be noted that while discharges of these so-called "greenhouse" gases are increasing in the atmosphere, skeptics assert that the evidence linking these emissions to global warming is not conclusive and even if proven, scientists debate the extent to which climate change would be catastrophic for the planet.) 55
These worried analysts also argue that environmental degradation often generates scarcities of natural resources that may contribute to violence in areas of the world where societies continue to rely on agriculture as their main source of income, where population growth outpaces the renewal of resources, and where ethnic, nationalist, or class conflicts are already pronounced. 56 Thomas Homer-Dixon emphasizes that some countries likely to be increasingly affected by resource scarcities and subnational strife are so-called "pivotal states"--South Africa, Mexico, India, Pakistan, and China--that are key to the stability of their regions. 57 He states, "In coming decades . . . we can expect an increasing bifurcation of the world into those societies that can adjust to population growth and scarcity--thus avoiding turmoil--and those that cannot. If several pivotal states fall on the wrong side of this divide, humanity's overall prospects will change dramatically for the worse." 58
Thus, given the transnational character of the risks posed by environmental degradation, experts look to the transatlantic community for leadership in dealing with these threats. As noted earlier, the United States and the European Union have pledged in the context of the New Transatlantic Agenda to increase their efforts to work together bilaterally and in multilateral forums to preserve the global environment. U.S. and European leaders at G-7 meetings often focus considerable attention in their communiqués on environmental problems. At the most recent summit in Denver in June 1997, which Russia also attended, participants pledged to enhance their cooperation in addressing freshwater- and ocean-related issues, among others, and welcomed the 1996 entry into force of the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification. 59 However, many assert that diverging policy preferences toward several issues related to protecting the environment hold the potential to inhibit such collaboration and to increase tensions among the transatlantic allies, possibly negatively affecting the overall relationship. Fundamentally, the transatlantic divisions stem from different perceptions of the environmental risks and economic costs involved on the two sides of the Atlantic.
Many observers view Europeans as generally more concerned with environmental issues and more respectful of the need for conservation than Americans. Elizabeth Gleick writes that, "Daily smog reports, recycled toilet paper and canvas shopping bags have become a way of life on the continent; Green parties have representation in 11 out of 15 European Union parliaments; and polls show that the vast majority of citizens place the environment at or near the top of their lists of vital concerns." 60 Europeans pay four times as much for gas as do Americans and while "Europe subsidizes trains and trams, America subsidizes highways and parking lots." 61 In short, many on the Continent and elsewhere believe that Europe takes environmental concerns and their implications for the security and welfare of the planet more seriously, and consequently, is more willing to make economic sacrifices to prevent further degradation.
However, some Americans argue that European environmentalism is more rhetoric than reality. For example, these critics point out that Europe has failed to deal with the problem of auto exhaust; many European nations, including Greece, Spain, and Portugal, still rely on leaded gas while about 20 percent of new passenger vehicles sold in Europe run on diesel fuel, which produces more particulate and nitrous-oxide emissions than does gasoline. 62 In addition, a number of U.S. commentators maintain that American environmental laws and regulations are as rigorous as those of Europe, if not more so. In June 1997, President Clinton endorsed new air quality regulations proposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that set tougher standards for soot and smog-causing ozone pollution. 63 John McElroy states, "Our air and water are cleaner than that of most countries. We were the first to ban lead in gasoline, and have far tighter standards on a host of toxic substances." 64
These conflicting transatlantic economic and environmental policies are perhaps best exemplified by the events leading up to the conclusion of a multilateral agreement in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan aimed at reducing emissions of several climate-altering gases that are believed to cause global warming. The negotiations that eventually resulted in the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (agreed to at the U.N. Rio Summit) proved long and arduous. In 1992, signatories to the Convention agreed to report their greenhouse gas transmissions and the developed nations pledged to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels (3.3 billion tons) by the year 2000. 65 However, at that time, delegates had been unable to reach a firm decision on the long-term action needed to respond to the climate change problem but agreed to continue negotiations; the Kyoto Summit was intended to be the capstone of these talks. 66 This process exposed key differences between the United States and Europe over how each measured the economic and environmental tradeoffs of setting limits on greenhouse gas emissions.
The EU sought to stake out the moral highground early in the negotiation process, initially proposing an ambitious plan that would have committed the industrialized nations to decrease their emissions of three of the most damaging gases to levels 15 percent below 1990 amounts. 67 The EU argued that this percentage was necessary to reduce emissions 1 or 2 percent per year for the next century (because carbon dioxide, chief among the greenhouse gases, remains in the atmosphere for an average of one hundred years). 68 The United States regarded these targets as unrealistic. 69 In October 1997, the Clinton administration tabled a starkly contrasting opening position: to decrease current emissions to 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 and to work toward further reductions in the five-year period thereafter. The administration's plan also called for an international system of emissions trading to be implemented after ten years, which would enable companies that failed to meet their discharge targets to "buy" pollution credits from those firms and plants in other countries that had come in below their goals. 70 Moreover, unlike Brussels, Washington announced it would not assume binding emission obligations unless "key developing nations meaningfully participate in this effort." 71 In unveiling the U.S. proposal, President Clinton stated, "both industrialized and developing countries must participate in meeting the challenge of climate change. The industrialized world must lead, but developing countries also must be engaged. . . . If the entire industrialized world reduces emissions over the next several decades, but emissions from the developing world continue to grow at their current pace, concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will continue to climb." 72 At the same time, the administration announced a wide-ranging list of incentives (including $5 billion in tax concessions) to U.S. industry to reduce its reliance on coal and oil through energy efficiency and greater use of renewable sources of power.
European governments and environmentalists roundly criticized the U.S. proposal, noting that by extending the timeframe for implementation to 2008 at the earliest, it fell far short of the targets established by the 1992 Rio Conference that Clinton had promised to support four years ago. 73 Moreover, they pointed out that the United States is the world's biggest polluter, emitting one-quarter of global carbon-dioxide emissions. 74 EU environment commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard stated that she was disappointed with the "very weak level" of U.S. objectives. 75 The administration responded that in 1993, when President Clinton initially pledged to abide by the terms set out for developed nations at the 1992 summit, he had not anticipated how fast U.S. industrial output would grow and any attempt to stabilize emissions below 1990 levels by 2000 would likely seriously damage not only the American but also the world economy. 76 Thus, to many Europeans, it appeared that the United States was pleading the cause of economic interests over other important national interests, in this case the environment--in the same way that Washington often accuses Brussels of behaving vis-à-vis security issues such as slowing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 77 Indeed, this sentiment among Europeans had been palpable since the June 1997 Summit of the Eight in Denver and the subsequent U.N. Earth Summit. Despite the exhortations of European leaders at these meetings, President Clinton, under pressure from U.S. industry, refused to propose a specific target or timetable for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, asserting that his administration needed more time to study the issue. 78 This led one European expert to observe that "All Clinton seemed to care about was the booming U.S. economy: `It's the economy, stupid.' It's not the environment." 79
As for the issue of developing country participation, the Europeans called this idea unrealistic, asserting that the industrialized world must first lead the way. 80 One European editorialist opined, "we in Europe can only ask, is it really now the established political practice of the world's undisputed leader to say that "the meek shall lead or I will not follow?" 81 Developing countries also argued that the industrialized world accounts for 70 percent of current and 66 percent of past emissions, and should therefore bear the responsibility for solving the problem that it created; in addition, developing nations maintained that they have a right to catch up economically, and expressed strong opposition to attempts to coerce them to match the anti-pollution measures of the industrialized nations, which could hinder their development. 82
The final accord reached in Kyoto represents a compromise between the United States and its European allies. It commits the industrialized nations to reduce emissions of six greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by the end of the first decade of the next century. Specifically, the United States agreed to reduce its emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrus oxide, and three halocarbons by 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2012; the European Union agreed to an 8 percent cut and Japan to a 6 percent reduction. The pact also endorsed the U.S. proposed market-based mechanisms by which a company in one country can invest in a project that reduces emissions in another country and receive credit for those reductions at home. 83 However, delegates were unable to agree on the question of whether developing nations must abide by emissions limits, leaving this issue unresolved at least until the next international conference in November 1998 in Buenos Aires. Officials hope that this meeting in November will be the culmination of a year of work aimed at signing up key developing nations such as China, India, Brazil, and Mexico. It appears that in the end, the administration was persuaded to sign on to this more ambitions proposal in order to preserve U.S. influence in future negotiations on the environment. Journalist Dan Balz observed that Washington came to view the issue "very much in foreign policy terms--as the beginning stage of what they expect could be a decade-long series of international negotiations that, step by step, will lead the world's countries to agree on collective action to safeguard the planet." 84 According to Gene Sperling, the head of the White House National Economic Council, the United States began to recognize that it could be either "an international leader on climate change, with considerable leverage" or "an international outlier who would have had little credibility to keep pushing the process forward." 85 European leaders expressed the belief that they had succeeded in achieving a meaningful plan, although they were somewhat disappointed that it fell short of their original goals. Bjerregaard commented, "We pushed the United States and Japan as far as we could, and we are sorry we could not take them further." 86
On the other side of the Atlantic, the agreement received a less than warm welcome from the Republican-dominated Congress. This reaction, however, was not unexpected. In July 1997, the Senate had adopted a resolution 95 to 0 stating, "the U.S. should not make any new commitments to limit or reduce emissions for developed countries, unless the agreement also mandates new specific scheduling commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for developing countries within the same compliance period." 87 In September, a broad coalition of corporations, unions, and other economic lobbying groups launched a $13 million advertising campaign to convince Americans that curbs on greenhouse gases would damage the U.S. economy, raise gasoline prices, and shift American jobs to nations overseas that were not subject to the same restraints on burning fossil fuels. 88 Some studies estimate that the Kyoto agreement could lead to a loss of 600,000 jobs by the year 2000 and eventually as many as 1.6 million, increase the cost of a gallon of gas by as much as 44 cents, and raise electric bills by 48 percent. 89 Furthermore, opponents stress that the 7 percent U.S. reduction below 1990 levels by 2012 essentially means cutting emissions by up to 40 percent compared to what they otherwise would have been 14 years from now at the current rate of increase. 90 And even if the protocol is fully ratified and implemented, some scientists suggest that the decreases in emissions mandated would barely dent the world's output of greenhouse gases; if countries strictly adhered to their Kyoto limits, by 2010 greenhouse gases in the atmosphere would still be 8 percent higher than 1990 levels (and this is only 0.4 percent lower than they would have been if no actions were taken). 91 Thus, experts note that such figures indicating only modest environmental benefits are likely to be used by the accord's opponents to argue that the sacrifices Kyoto entails are hardly worth the effort. 92
Recognizing that the protocol currently has little chance of passing the Senate, the Clinton administration has announced that it will delay submitting it for ratification until 1999 in order to attempt to persuade major developing nations to agree to limits on their discharges of greenhouse gases and give the administration time to make its case to the American public. Administration officials have insisted that the 7 percent U.S. cut below 1990 levels is not much different from its initial proposal to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels because of the way this decrease will be calculated, allowing countries to count growing forests (which absorb carbon dioxide), for example, as part of their reduction efforts. In addition, the higher emission levels recorded in 1995 will be used as the baseline for three of the six gases covered. Thus, some have claimed that the U.S. target in reality represents no more than a 3 percent reduction. 93 The administration has also announced that it will forego imposing any new taxes in order to reach the agreement's goals, relying instead on fuel efficient technology, such as hybrid gas and electric cars, and business incentives, such as tax breaks, to further greater energy efficiency and reduce energy consumption. In turn, it says that this shift to environmentally cleaner fuel sources could create new markets--for products such as silicon solar cells, and fiberglass wind turbines--that could prove to be one of the largest new growth sectors in the decades ahead and produce approximately 400,000 new jobs by 2010. 94
Nevertheless, at present, it remains doubtful as to whether the Senate will ratify the protocol negotiated at Kyoto. In addition to the problems with the agreement noted above, many members of Congress as well as a number of experts resent the European Union's "greener-than-thouness" attitude. Some maintain that, "the reason the EU has pushed for slashing greenhouse emissions to 15 percent below 1990 levels is to get the best of both worlds: credit for a righteous stance, plus the knowledge that the final agreed-upon figure won't be so draconian"--largely because the United States would reject this percentage. 95 Moreover, some Americans were frustrated by what they perceived as a European double standard toward emissions-trading. The Union proposed a "bubble" concept for itself, in which European pollution would be considered collectively, rather than on the basis of individual countries, thereby allowing less advanced members such as Greece and Portugal to increase their output of pollutants as long as countries such as Britain and Germany were to compensate with more drastic improvements. At the same time, however, Brussels opposed Washington's suggestions to create an emissions-trading "umbrella" with other countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, and Russia. The EU particularly objected to the inclusion of Russia in this group, arguing that this could result in a large loophole in the accord because the country's economic difficulties have decreased its emissions far below its 1990 level. With huge quantities of Russian allowances to sell, this might divert other countries from doing as much as possible to cut emissions at home. 96
Although U.S.-European differences over climate change have received the bulk of recent attention, a number of other environmental concerns have also produced a degree of disagreement between the two sides of the Atlantic. This past June, at the Denver Summit of the Eight, and again at the U.N. Earth Summit immediately following, the European Union and Canada proposed elevating the non-binding Statement of Forest Principles adopted at the 1992 Rio Summit to a comprehensive, legally binding convention that would set global standards for sustainable forest management and cultivation. The United States, under pressure from private forest owners and the logging industry not to submit to foreign standards, opposed the conclusion of such a formal agreement. Consequently, the Denver summit's final communiqué regarding forest preservation was much less ambitious; it called upon all countries to make a long-term political commitment to achieve sustainable forestry practices and eliminate illegal logging. 97 The U.N. General Assembly has also rejected the adoption of an international convention at present, postponing the decision on whether to undertake such negotiations until 1999. 98 In addition, the United States and the European Union came into conflict at the Earth Summit over the imposition of a tax on aviation fuel (proposed by the EU). The Europeans argued that such a tax was necessary not only because emissions from airplanes are one of the fastest-growing sources of greenhouse gases but also to provide revenues with which to help developing nations achieve sustainable development. 99 The latter reason was deemed especially important because of the growing frustrations of the poorer nations with the lack of developmental assistance provided by the industrialized countries, despite pledges made at the 1992 Rio Summit. At that time, rich nations agreed to aim for an overseas aid target of 0.7 percent of their gross national products; since then, however, aid provided to developing countries has averaged only about 0.27 percent. 100 The United States opposed the EU's tax initiative, arguing that it would damage the U.S. economy and the U.S. airline industry. 101 Consequently, no agreement was reached.
Similar U.S.-EU divisions became apparent in September 1997 during the ninth meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol (held in Montreal to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer). Although the 1987 Montreal Protocol called for industrialized countries to cease producing and exporting CFCs by January 1996 and for their complete elimination by 2005, it granted a longer timeframe, well into the next century, for phasing out two other ozone-destroying substances. 102 At the September 1997 meeting, considerable discussion was devoted to speeding up the timetable for the developed world to eliminate these two compounds--methyl bromide, a pesticide, and hydro-chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which are widely used in the West as interim replacements for the more destructive CFCs. Although the EU objected to the American proposal to halt methyl bromide production by 2001, the Union assented to a compromise agreement that would do so by 2005. 103 At the same time, the United States adamantly resisted European demands to accelerate the ban on HCFCs, arguing that U.S. manufacturers required more time to recoup their investments in HCFCs. 104 As a result, the meeting failed to achieve an accord on HCFCs.
Another incident over an environment-related concern that proved irritating for the U.S.-EU relationship occurred in May 1997 when the European Union challenged proposed U.S. regulations intended to end definitively a WTO dispute brought against the United States by Venezuela and Brazil. At issue was a 1993 amendment to the U.S. Clean Air Act that required improvements in the cleanliness level of gasoline sold in the United States; Venezuela and Brazil alleged that the law had been written to apply a higher standard to imported gasoline than to that manufactured in the United States. The WTO agreed with these claims, forcing the United States to either change its environmental rule or face trade sanctions from the plaintiff countries. Following the EPA's May announcement of proposed alterations to the law in order to abide by the WTO decision, the EU expressed concern that certain aspects of the regulations were still discriminatory. 105 The position taken by the Union in the dispute was viewed by some as particularly ironic and somewhat disturbing given that the U.S. law was initially intended to improve air quality and reduce pollution. Some worried that the WTO ruling would allow dirty gasoline into the U.S. domestic market. 106
Question 7: What will be the consequences for the relationship if, as likely, the U.S. Senate fails to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on global warming? How will Europe respond?
Question 8: Can the United States and Europe pursue more coordinated environmental policies? If so, how?
Question 9: Will U.S.-European disputes over the environment weaken the transatlantic relationship?
Cyberterrorism, Organized Crime, And Narcotics Trafficking
These three issues are growing more entwined and more worrisome. Many see a direct correlation between the growth of transnational crime since the end of the Cold War and the computer and information technology revolution. 107 Advances in computer and communications systems have vastly improved the ability of global criminal syndicates to launder their profits from all manner of international crime (from drug trafficking to counterfeiting to the smuggling of illegal immigrants), transferring billions of illicit funds electronically in nanoseconds into apparently legitimate investments. It is estimated that such laundered funds total approximately $1 to $1.3 trillion a year. 108 In the United States alone, it is believed that $300 to $500 billion in dirty money, much of it from the drug trade, is cycled through the U.S. financial system annually. 109 Moreover, some warn that "the speed, security, and anonymity of new Internet payment systems could make time-tested methods of tracing tainted funds obsolete. There is no need to smuggle currency anymore. Technology allows nameless transactions outside the regulated banking sector." 110 Many argue that both the volume and stealth of such money laundering threatens the stability of the world's financial and banking systems and could even put national economies at risk. 111 For the past several years, criminal hackers have also successfully penetrated banks, financial institutions, and major corporations, raiding millions of dollars from accounts in countries in which they have often never stepped foot. It is believed that nearly 400 of the Fortune 500 companies have been infiltrated by hackers. 112 Also disturbing to many is that, "The technology explosion, coupled with the Internet . . . give criminals the incentive to do more, better and faster. It gives them instant global capabilities. Most law-enforcement agencies on their own simply don't have the resources, manpower, training or equipment to target the crime syndicates." 113
Arnaud De Borchgrave and Frank Ciluffo observe that in extreme mock information warfare scenarios, "we have seen that telephone signaling systems can suddenly go on the fritz, jamming communications; trading on the New York Stock Exchange can be frozen; automated teller machines can go haywire, crediting and debiting amounts at random; the Social Security system could no longer function; air traffic control centers and railroad and shipping computers can be disabled. . . . This is a field of battle where the individual can take on a superpower." 114 Experts stress that it is not just the computers and mainframes of financial institutions that are at risk but also those used by the defense and intelligence communities, thereby rendering a state's national security vulnerable. How to best address and counter the growing vulnerability of information systems from cyberterrorists and criminal hackers has proven to be an issue of some discord between the United States and the European Union. At the center of the debate is encryption technology, used to scramble computer data in order to protect the privacy of financial transactions, business communications, medical records, and so forth. 115 According to Ira Magaziner, President Clinton's senior advisor on Internet issues, electronic commerce currently totals about $2 billion per year and this figure is expected to reach $300 billion by 2002. 116 However, secure communication remains the main inhibitor of such transactions, especially over the Internet. In order to boost consumer confidence in the security of global information networks, European leaders have called for fewer restrictions on the use of encryption technology, asserting that this is essential to unlock the true potential of electronic commerce. 117 But the United States has sought to persuade the members of the European Union and other nations that controls should be placed on encryption products, especially those whose codes are so effective that they cannot be deciphered without a digital key (known as "strong" encryption technology). Washington insists that law enforcement agencies should be able to possess such software keys to decode encrypted files if necessary for security reasons. At present, the United States prohibits the export of "strong" encryption technology. 118
The U.S. government argues that such measures are necessary because encryption poses potential serious risks to public safety and national security. Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, has testified before Congress that, "Uncrackable encryption . . . will continue, with ever increasing regularity, [to] allow drug lords, terrorists and even violent gangs to communicate about their criminal intentions with impunity and to maintain electronically stored evidence of their crimes impervious to lawful search and seizure." 119 He noted several examples of the use of nonrecoverable encryption by international criminals, among them terrorist Ramzi Yousef, who was planning to blow up 11 U.S.-owned commercial airliners when he was arrested and whose laptop was found to contain encrypted files concerning this plot. 120 While acknowledging that the United States shares Europe's interest in making commercial encryption widely available in order to promote the full development of electronic commerce, Washington emphasizes that its insistence on access to software keys that allow encrypted material to be recovered creates a measure of balance. 121 Although the United States and the European Union issued a joint statement on electronic commerce at the end of the December 1997 U.S.-EU summit, in which they pledged to continue bilateral discussions on encryption technology, some observe that this issue remains unresolved. 122
A number of commentators emphasize that despite this problem, there has been considerable movement toward greater U.S.-European collaboration in addressing threats posed by organized crime and drug trafficking. Most recently, in accordance with the New Transatlantic Agenda, U.S. and European leaders announced several initiatives at the conclusion of the December 1997 U.S.-EU summit aimed at deepening police cooperation, sustaining U.S.-EU counternarcotics programs in the Caribbean, and combating a growing white slave trade in which women from Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (NIS) are lured to other nations with promises of well-paid jobs or marriage but are then forced to work as prostitutes. 123 To counter this latter problem, the European Union and the United States will launch an information and prevention campaign in Poland and the Ukraine, two countries especially affected. 124 The two sides also agreed to exchange law enforcement officers in the hopes of enhancing coordinated efforts against organized crime. Louis Freeh notes the importance of such cop-to-cop relationships, without which, he asserts, the United States and its partners would "not have the commonality of purpose and open communication required for effectively combating international crime." 125 He attributed the success of the cooperative effort between U.S. and Italian law enforcement agencies against the Sicilian mafia as an example of the tangible benefits that can be derived from such exchanges. 126
Some observers were surprised by this agreement to expand U.S.-EU police relations since Washington sometimes perceives the Union as lax in developing intra-European coordinated policies toward international crime. 127 A number of analysts are dismayed that Europol, an elite Europe-wide intelligence network designed to supply information to national police forces, is still not functional largely because of disputes among EU members regarding the extent of its jurisdiction and authority. 128 Several experts suggest that the willingness of the United States to pursue enhanced law enforcement cooperation with Europe in spite of these problems demonstrates Washington's seriousness about coordinating policies toward international crime and terrorism with Brussels and bodes well for future collaboration on such transnational issues.
Question 10: What additional strategies, if any, should the United States and its European partners pursue to protect their financial networks and communications, and combat organized crime and narcotics trafficking?
Migration and Refugees
The United Nations estimates that there are currently 22.7 million refugees and displaced persons worldwide. 129 To many, mass migrations of refugees represent sources of instability for states on two key fronts. First, refugee flows may generate or exacerbate tensions between sending and receiving states. This might occur, for example, if the refugees are opposed to the regime of their home country and attempt to wage cross-border attacks or raise funds and political support from the territory of the host country. 130 This reasoning has caused the international community, often led by the United States and Europe, to intervene in various situations over the last several years in which large migrations have produced humanitarian crises. Second, sizable influxes of people fleeing their home countries may foster or intensify political, economic, or racial strains within a receiving state if the refugee population is viewed as a financial burden to the society of the host state or a threat to its cultural identity. Thus, it is argued, significant migratory movements can affect the security of a nation-state itself. 131
Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has been subjected to increased flows of refugees and others seeking asylum because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The bitter and bloody conflict in the Balkans produced the worst refugee crisis on the Continent since the end of World War II; it is estimated that 950,000 persons have arrived in Western Europe from all the territories of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 when war first broke out between Serbia and Croatia. Of this figure, approximately 540,000 have been Bosnians. 132 In recent years, the United States has also experienced waves of new immigrants due to political unrest in countries such as Haiti and Cuba. Increasingly, some
The United Nations estimates thsegments of the populations in the United States and Europe have felt themselves under assault from these new refugee influxes. Consequently, both sides of the Atlantic have undertaken efforts to tighten border controls, strengthen immigration laws relating to illegal aliens, and refine asylum legislation.
The mutual concerns of the United States and the European Union about illegal immigrants, the number of asylum seekers, and the reemergence of ethnic and nationalist rivalries around the globe that may generate mass migrations and humanitarian crises are recognized in the New Transatlantic Agenda. The NTA, inter alia, commits the United States and the EU to strengthen information exchanges on illegal immigration, asylum trends, and asylum reforms; cooperate in the fight against the traffic in illegal immigrants; and establish common responses to refugee crisis situations, especially through early warning mechanisms. 133 Thus, some perceive collaborative trends between the United States and Europe regarding migration and refugee issues. At the June 1997 Summit of the Eight, for example, members issued a statement warning Balkan officials to permit refugees from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to return peacefully to their homes or face a cut-off of economic assistance. 134 Recently it has been observed that in a shift in policy, U.S. and European leaders have begun to express more vocally their concerns about the violence and civil strife that have beset Algeria since 1992. 135 It is estimated that over 65,000 Algerians have been killed in the conflict between the government and Islamic militants. 136 Since late December 1997, however, the bloodshed has escalated, with more than 1,000 people killed in the first two weeks of January alone. 137 The new intensity of the violence prompted both the United States and the European Union in January 1998 to offer help to Algeria's government in investigating these murders and exploring ways to end the carnage. 138 The Europeans proposed sending an EU delegation to exchange views with Algerian officials on means to halt the terrorism. 139 The United States initially called for an international inquiry into the Algerian massacres but this suggestion was quickly rejected by the government of Algeria; in response, the United States changed its position, supporting instead a visit by a U.N. rapporteur. 140 It has been noted that at least part of the motivation behind the West's new willingness to initiate a dialogue with Algeria stems from fears that the escalating violence will produce increasingly larger outflows of Algerian refugees, destined in particular for Europe. 141
Others, however, argue that attempts by American and European policymakers to address unsettling refugee flows and the humanitarian disasters that often accompany them, have generated far more discord than cooperation and have only served to produce transatlantic friction. They list a number of refugee crises in which U.S.-European policy differences stalled international intervention missions or derailed them completely. For instance, following the eruption of violence in Rwanda in April 1994 that led hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to flee into neighboring countries, the United Nations authorized sending a 5,500 peacekeeping force to the region. The United States, however, delayed the deployment of this force for several months, until a detailed concept for the operation was completed, in accordance with its more cautious approach to peacekeeping in the wake of the disaster in Somalia. 142 Frustrated by this slow response and the foot-dragging of the Americans in particular, France initiated its own humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, which was only narrowly endorsed by the Security Council in June 1994. Similarly, in late 1996 and early 1997, as civil war engulfed then-Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), trapping thousands of Rwandan refugees between government and rebel forces along the border of the two countries, France called for the initiation of an international relief operation to aid the starving and dying Rwandans. The United States opposed the mission and as a result no forces were deployed. 143 Furthermore, these skeptics argue that neither the United States nor Europe usually have enough political will to mount humanitarian operations of the size and kind necessary to deal with mass migration flows. They note that even when Albania, a Balkan country, collapsed into anarchy in March 1997, both the United States and its European allies were initially unenthusiastic about a military intervention to end the violence in the Continent's poorest country, despite fears that a refugee exodus could ignite a wider conflict in the region. 144 Thus, these analysts doubt the ability of the transatlantic allies to manage effectively the security challenges stemming from the movement of large volumes of refugees and see little evidence of a more effective U.S.-European approach to mass migrations.
Question 11: What concrete measures, if any, can the transatlantic partners initiate to prevent mass migrations and refugee flows that are likely to generate humanitarian crises and regional disorder?
Question 12: To what extent do the tensions that often arise between the United States and Europe as a result of large-scale migratory movements and their regional consequences affect the broader relationship?
The Spread Of Infectious Diseases
The newest of the emerging threats to be recognized by the global community as a transnational challenge is the spread of communicable diseases. The spectrum of new and reemerging diseases includes Ebola, pneumonic plague, AIDS, dengue, cholera, malaria, tuberculosis, and influenza, among others. Dennis Pirages writes, "Infectious diseases are potentially the largest threat to human security lurking in the post-Cold War world. . . . If all of the casualties of military combat in this decade, both international and domestic, are added together, their numbers do not begin to approach the annual toll from infectious diseases." 145 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), approximately 17 million people a year die from communicable diseases (50,000 each day). 146 It is estimated that one new HIV infection occurs somewhere in the world every ten seconds and in 1996, HIV/AIDS resulted in approximately 1.5 million deaths worldwide. 147 Currently there are over eight million new cases of active tuberculosis each year, a new infection every second, and about 53,000 deaths. 148 For many of these diseases, the sources can be found in the developing world; poverty, population growth, migration, and urbanization are all particularly prevalent, interrelated factors. 149 In the coming decades, it is predicted that 95 percent of population growth will be in developing countries and most of these increases will take place in cities. 150 Laurie Garrett observes, "High density need not doom a nation to epidemics and unusual outbreaks of disease if sewage and water systems, housing, and public health provisions are adequate. . . . But the areas in which density is increasing most are not those capable of providing such infrastructural support. They are, rather, the poorest on earth. . . . Some of these urban agglomerations have only one toilet for every 750 or more people." 151 The lack of adequate sanitation is also a primary concern of aid workers dealing with mass refugee populations. In July 1994, an outbreak of cholera swept through the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Zaire, killing thousands a day until U.S. military forces were deployed to establish and operate sanitation and water purification systems.
Analysts and policymakers stress, however, that although many of these communicable diseases have their sources in the developing world, they are by no means confined to it, especially in the current era in which the levels of world travel and trade are without precedent in history. Airplanes make it easy for humans to transport infectious diseases from one country to another in periods of less than 24 hours. Garrett comments, "Every day one million people cross an international border. One million a week travel between the industrial and developing worlds. . . . In the age of jet travel . . . a person incubating a disease such as Ebola can board a plane, travel 12,000 miles, pass unnoticed through customs and immigration, take a domestic carrier to a remote destination, and still not develop symptoms for several days, infecting many other people before his condition is noticeable." 152
In recognition of this phenomenon and the threat such communicable diseases pose to the developed and developing world alike, the United States and the European Union included managing the spread of infectious diseases as one of their action items in the New Transatlantic Agenda. At the most recent U.S.-EU summit meeting in December 1997, the two sides signed a Science and Technology Agreement to expand U.S.-European scientific cooperation, enabling greater collaboration between American and European scientists and research institutions in a variety of areas, including health and biomedicine. 153 This Agreement will facilitate training opportunities and professional exchanges in the area of communicable diseases, as outlined in the NTA. Also consistent with the NTA, at the June 1997 Denver Summit of the Eight the United States and the other industrialized countries renewed their pledge to a global early-warning system to detect outbreaks of infectious diseases as soon as possible, thereby increasing the chances that they can be quickly contained. 154 The summit communiqué specified the members' determination to foster, "more effective coordination of international responses to outbreaks, . . . development of a global surveillance network, building upon existing national and regional surveillance systems, . . . build public health capacity to prevent, detect and control infectious diseases globally. . . . Central to this work will be strengthening and linking existing activities in and among each of our countries, with developing countries, and in other fora, especially the World Health Organization." 155
Skeptics note that the above commitment, especially by the United States, to enhance the ability of the United Nation's World Health Organization to protect the global community from the dangers posed by emerging diseases is at odds with the level of financial support extended to the WHO. Colum Lynch observes that the WHO's budget "has shrunk in real terms over the last two years while it is being asked to undertake a crusade to rid the world of a new generation of infectious diseases from the Ebola virus to mad cow disease." 156 These budget cuts reflect the overall tough financial straits that the United Nations has fallen upon recently, which many attribute importantly to the refusal of the U.S. Congress to pay the more than $1.3 billion that the United States currently owes in past dues. 157 David Birenbaum, former U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations for Management and Reform has noted, "The U.N. continues to function at the sufferance of a number of other countries, particularly the Europeans, because they pay and many of them pay on a timely basis." 158
Note 1: Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162, 175. Back.
Note 2: See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity, Mass Violence, and the Limits to Ingenuity," Current History, vol. 95. no. 604 (November 1996), p. 359. Back.
Note 3: Support for this contention sometimes stems from neoliberal institutionalism. Gunther Helmann and Reinhard Wolf observe that according to this theory, "Because of the size and nature of many issues, states are often unable to address the underlying causes of these issues without the cooperation of other states." See Gunther Helmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), p. 13. Back.
Note 4: See Jennifer G. Hickey, "Flaky Climate Data Will Cost US Dough," Washington Times, December 15, 1997, p. 18; International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Politics of Climate Change: The Kyoto Summit," Strategic Comments, vol. 3, no. 9 (November 1997), p. 1; and "Plenty of Gloom," The Economist, December 20, 1997, pp. 19-21. Back.
Note 5: See Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity, Mass Violence, and the Limits to Ingenuity," p. 364; and Julian Simon, "The Infinite Supply of Natural Resources," in International Politics, ed. Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 500-501. Back.
Note 6: Graham Allison, "Nuclear Dangers; Fear Increases of Terrorists Getting Hands on `Loose' Warheads as Security Slips," Boston Globe, October 19, 1997, p. C1. Back.
Note 7: Ibid.; and John F. Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," Foreign Policy, no. 105 (Winter 1996-1997), p. 5. Back.
Note 8: David Hoffman, "Suitcase Nuclear Weapons Safely Kept, Russian Says," Washington Post, September 14, 1997, p. A23. Back.
Note 9: Charles Arthur, "Stolen Uranium: The Really Hot Stuff," The Independent (London), November 25, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 10: Senator Richard Lugar, "Strategic Opportunities, Strategic Impatience: Russian-American Relations Today," Congressional Press Releases, January 12, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 11: Senator Richard Lugar, "Lack of Nuclear Accountability Threatens US Security," Congressional Press Releases, October 2, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 12: Jason D. Ellis and Todd Perry, "Nunn-Lugar's Unfinished Agenda," Arms Control Today, vol. 27, no. 7 (October 1997), p. 14. Back.
Note 13: See Graham T. Allison, et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 103-106, 229-231. Back.
Note 14: See Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, no. 5 (Washington, DC and Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute of International Studies, forthcoming 1998). Back.
Note 15: Allison, et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, p. 154. Back.
Note 16: Telephone conversation with an official at the US Department of State, February 24, 1998. Back.
Note 17: Elaine Sciolino, "White House Struggles to Define Goals of War on Iraq," New York Times, February 15, 1998, p. 6. Back.
Note 18: John Lancaster, "Annan, Iraq Agree on Inspections," Washington Post, February 23, 1998, p. A1. Back.
Note 19: Some have observed, however, that the agreement apparently does not address the issue of other presidential properties not among the eight listed by Baghdad but that have been identified by UNSCOM as suspected weapons areas or places where crucial documents may be hidden. See Barbara Crossette, "Saddam Drops Most Demands on Weapons Inspections," New York Times, February 23, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 20: "Clinton's Statement on the UN Brokered Arms Inspection Agreement," New York Times, February 23, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 21: "Clinton Gives Iraqi Accord Chance to Work: US Forces to Remain for Some Time in Persian Gulf Area," New York Times, February 23, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 22: Steven Erlanger, "Clinton and Blair Issue New Warning to Iraq," New York Times, February 7, 1998, p. A1; and Steven Lee Myers, "US Will Not Ask to Use Saudi Bases for a Raid on Iraq," New York Times, February 9, 1998, p. A1. Back.
Note 23: Given Germany's distance from the Persian Gulf, experts argue that the United States would be unlikely to use German bases in a renewed confrontation with Iraq. See Steven Lee Myers, "Cohen Wins Measured Backing in Europe," New York Times, February 8, 1998, p. 6. Back.
Note 24: Elaine Sciolino, "Push for Diplomacy Shows Split Over Inspections," New York Times, February 6, 1998, p. 1. Back.
Note 25: "Punting in Africa, Scoring in Europe," Chicago Tribune, December 18, 1997, p. 26. Back.
Note 26: Matthew Gledhill, "US-Iraqi Drama Casts France in Familiar Role," Boston Globe, December 16, 1997, p. A1; and "Iraq's Damage Done," The Economist, February 14, 1998, p. 19. Back.
Note 27: Gledhill, "US-Iraqi Drama Casts France in Familiar Role." Back.
Note 28: "Iraq: UN Ponders Weapons Controls and Sanctions," Inter Press Service, February 26, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 29: The six measures from which the president must choose at least two to impose on companies found to have violated ILSA are: import sanctions; denying credits from the U.S. Export-Import bank; refusing export licenses for controlled goods and technology; capping U.S. bank loans to offending companies at a maximum of $10 million per year; banning federal procurement of goods and services from offending entities; and prohibiting banks that finance such projects from being primary dealers in US government bonds. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, "US-EU Trade Wars," Strategic Comments, vol. 2, no. 7 (August 1996), p. 1. Back.
Note 30: David Owens, "US Condemns Total's $2bn Iran Deal: France Warns Washington Against Retaliation," Financial Times, September 30, 1997, p. 1. Back.
Note 31: French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has stated bluntly, "Nobody accepts that the United States can pass a law on a global scale...American laws apply in the United States. They do not apply in France." See Roger Cohen, "France Scoffs at US Protest Over Iran Deal," New York Times, September 30, 1997, p. A1. Back.
Note 32: "No Give On Either Side in US-EU Sanctions Dispute," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 5, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 33: "Punting in Africa, Scoring in Europe," Chicago Tribune. Back.
Note 34: William Drozdiak, "US Pushes NATO on Arms Proliferation," Washington Post, December 17, 1997, p. A1. Back.
Note 35: Craig R. Whitney, "Albright, at NATO Meeting, Tells of Peril from Eurasia," New York Times, December 17, 1997, p. 1. Back.
Note 37: Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," pp. 4-6. Back.
Note 38: Ibid., p. 5; and Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 1 (January/February 1998), p. 29. Back.
Note 39: Jessica Stern, Former National Security Council Staff Director, Russia, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs, Testimony before Senate Intelligence Committee, Research and Development Subcommittee, October 1, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 40: Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," p. 9. Back.
Note 41: Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," pp. 28-30. Back.
Note 42: Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," p. 11. Back.
Note 43: US Department of Defense, DOD Responses to Transnational Threats, vol. 1, October 1997, p. 18. Back.
Note 44: Stern, Testimony. Back.
Note 45: Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," p. 29. Also see, Patrick M. Hughes, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its Interests Abroad," Prepared Statement before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Federal News Service, February 6, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 46: Arnaud De Borchgrave and Frank Ciluffo, "Transnational Crime: The New Empire of Evil," Strategy & Leadership, vol. 24, no. 6 (November 1996). Electronic Version. Also see Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," pp. 13-14, 16. Back.
Note 47: Stacey Evers, "Pentagon Wants NSA to Build `Threat' Database," Jane's Defense Weekly, October 29, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 48: US Department of Defense, DOD Responses to Transnational Threats, p. 37. Back.
Note 49: Evers, "Pentagon Wants NSA to Build `Threat' Database." Back.
Note 50: Jim Wolf, "US Faces Unprecedented Terrorist Threat," Reuters North American Wire, May 6, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 51: Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," p. 18. Back.
Note 53: Joby Warrick, "CFC Smuggling, Production Cool Optimism; Continued Demand, Defiance of Ban May Delay Mending of Earth's Ozone `Hole' for Decades," Washington Post, September 16, 1997, p. A3. Back.
Note 54: International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Politics of Climate Change: The Kyoto Summit," p. 1; and Sharon Begley, "Too Much Hot Air," Newsweek, October 20, 1997, p. 48. Back.
Note 55: Ibid.; Hickey, "Flaky Climate Data Will Cost US Dough." A century ago, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere measured about 270 parts per million; currently, it is above 360 parts per million. See Donella H. Meadows, "Immobilized by Propaganda," Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1997, p. B5. Many climate specialists also agree that land temperatures have risen during the past century (approximately 1 degree Fahrenheit). But skeptics question the link in temperature rise with the advance of man-made pollutants, noting that temperatures around the world have fluctuated dramatically throughout history and therefore, could be the result of natural phenomena. Also see Tucker Carlson, "Al Gore's Globaloney," The Weekly Standard, October 20, 1997, p. 21. Some note that scientists are still uncertain about how a warmer world will affect moisture in the lower atmosphere, which may be a key factor in determining how problematical global warming proves. If the troposphere (sea level to 10 miles up) gets drier as the world warms slightly, then further warming could be held in check; but if the troposphere becomes moister, global warming could accelerate dangerously. See Begley, "Too Much Hot Air." Back.
Note 56: See Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity, Mass Violence, and the Limits to Ingenuity," pp. 359-365. Back.
Note 59: Text, Final Communiqué of the Denver Summit of the Eight, June 22, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 60: Elizabeth Gleick, "Do As We Say; European Leaders Talk a Good Game About Saving the Planet, But Do They Back Up their Greener-Than-Thou Rhetoric with Action?," Time, November 1997, p. 70. Back.
Note 61: Meadows, "Immobilized by Propaganda." Back.
Note 63: The changes proposed are designed to make breathing easier for elderly people and asthmatics, especially children. William Douglas, "Tougher Air Quality Endorsed; Clinton Move Ends Months of Dispute," Newsday, June 26, 1997, p. A18; Joby Warrick, "Clinton Backs EPA's Tougher Clean Air Rules," Washington Post, June 26, 1997, p. A1. Back.
Note 64: John McElroy, "US: Don't Apologize for Global Warming," Automotive Industries, vol. 177, no. 12 (December 1997), p. 100. Back.
Note 65: Tom Rhodes, "Clinton Puts Limit on Global Warming Gas Cuts," The Times, October 23, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 66: At the 1992 Rio Summit, participating states were divided into "Annex 2" countries--the then-24 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, plus the former Warsaw Pact states--and "non-Annex 2" countries--i.e., the rest of the world. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Politics of Climate Change: The Kyoto Summit," p. 1. Back.
Note 67: Bruce Clark, "Gases Talks Underline EU-US Gap," Financial Times, November 5, 1997, p. 4; and James Gerstenzang, "Europe Seeks to Sway US to Meet Higher Standards for Emission Cuts," Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1997, p. A10. Back.
Note 68: Begley, "Too Much Hot Air." Back.
Note 69: The European Union disagreed with this assessment. In October 1997, the European Commission announced that it was "on track to beat its self-imposed target for the reduction of global warming emissions" to below 1990 levels by 2000, providing its new offer with greater credibility. Analysts surmised that three unexpected factors explained this success: Britain's shift from coal to gas-fired power stations (which critics argue was motivated by economics and not environmental concerns); the closure of obsolete and dirty factories in the former East Germany; and the European recession, which has reduced energy demands. See Begley, "Too Much Hot Air;" Martin Walker, "Environment Under Threat: Europe Sets Greenhouse Gas Example to America," The Guardian (London), October 2, 1997, p. 15; and Kevin Whitelaw, "All the World is Green on the Outside," US News & World Report, October 13, 1997, p. 39. Back.
Note 70: Walker, "Environment Under Threat: Europe Sets Greenhouse Gas Example to America." Back.
Note 71: Transcript, "President Clinton Delivers Remarks on Global Warming," Federal Document Clearing House, October 22, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 73: Rhodes, "Clinton Puts Limit on Global Warming Gas Cuts." Back.
Note 74: Michael Adler, "Global Warming Talks in Bonn Ending Without Agreement," Agence France Presse, October 31, 1997; and "US Turns Deaf Ear to Climate Change Concerns," Irish Times, November 19, 1997. Electronic Versions. Back.
Note 75: Bruce Clark, "Clinton Attacked Over Target for Cut in Greenhouse Gases," Financial Times, October 23, 1997, p. 18. Back.
Note 77: Gleick, "Do As We Say." Back.
Note 78: Ibid.; Charles Clover, "Clinton Accused of Summit Snub," The Daily Telegraph, June 25, 1997; and Nicholas Schoon, "Greenhouse Gas Pledge from Clinton," The Independent (London), June 27, 1997. Electronic Versions. Back.
Note 79: Gleick, "Do As We Say." Back.
Note 80: Clark, "Gases Talks Underline EU-US Gap." Back.
Note 81: Stephan Schmidheiny, "The New American Can't-Do Spirit," New York Times, December 13, 1997, p. A15. Back.
Note 82: Adler, "Global Warming Talks in Bonn Ending Without Agreement;" and International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Politics of Climate Change: The Kyoto Summit," p. 2. Back.
Note 83: "Deflated Expectations from the Kyoto Summit," Seattle Times, December 12, 1997, p. B4. Back.
Note 84: Dan Balz, "Defining the Kyoto Treaty Debate May Be Most Crucial Political Test," Washington Post, December 14, 1997, p. A10. Back.
Note 86: Peter Baker and Helen Dewar, "Long Road Ahead for Global Warming Pact," Washington Post, December 12, 1997, p. A1. Back.
Note 87: Hearing of the House International Relations Committee, "Global Warming," November 13, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 88: Bruce Clark, "Campaign Against `Warming' Treaty Launched," Financial Times, September 10, 1997, p. 5. Also see John H. Cushman, Jr., "Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty," New York Times, December 7, 1997, p. 28. Back.
Note 89: Sharon Begley, "Wake Up Call," Newsweek, December 22, 1997, p. 66; and Hickey, "Flaky Climate Data Will Cost US Dough." Back.
Note 90: Joby Warrick, "Reassessing Kyoto Agreement, Scientists See Little Environmental Advantage," Washington Post, February 13, 1998, p. A14. Back.
Note 92: Ibid. Some analysts are concerned that such predictions regarding the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol will be distorted in this manner by opponents. They assert that even if the agreement only produces a small decrease in the rate of increase in emission levels, this may still pay significant dividends in the long term. Robert Repetto of the World Resource Institute has argued, "Nobody thought in their wildest dreams that Kyoto would solve the climate problem...If implemented, the achievement at Kyoto will be to get nations off a business-as-usual trajectory and on to a path that peaks and then starts going down." Back.
Note 93: Baker and Dewar, "Long Road Ahead for Global Warming Pact." Back.
Note 94: John H. Cushman, Jr., "The Climate Accord: The Impact," New York Times, December 12, 1997, p. A16; and Christopher Flavin and Seth Dunn, "Boom--Huge New Energy Markets," Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1997, p. 18. Back.
Note 95: Gleick, "Do As We Say." Also see, Begley, "Too Much Hot Air;" and Whitelaw, "All the World Is Green on the Outside." Back.
Note 96: See Frank McDonald, "With One Day to Go, US and EU Are Still at Loggerheads Over Loopholes," Irish Times, December 10, 1997; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Kyoto Gets Off to an Icy Start," The Independent (London), December 2, 1997; and Nicholas Schoon, "US Proposes Swap Club for Emissions," The Independent (London), December 10, 1997. Electronic Versions. Back.
Note 97: Julian Beltrame, "Canada Stymied at G8 Summit: US Rejects Proposals for Forestry Regulations and Ban on Landmines," The Gazette (Montreal), June 23, 1997; "Political Will Lacking as Earth Summit Winds Up," Agence France Presse, June 27, 1997; Text, Final Communiqué of the Denver Summit of the Eight, June 22, 1997. Electronic Versions. Back.
Note 98: Anne Penketh, "Earth Summit Ends Without Agreement on Global Warming, Other Issues," Agence France Presse, June 28, 1997; "Environment: Fiasco at Earth Summit II," European Report, July 2, 1997. Electronic Versions. Back.
Note 99: Paul Brown, "EU Seeks Tax on Aircraft Pollution," The Observer, June 22, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 100: Farhan Haq, "Failure of Rio Follow-up Meeting a Wake-up Call," Inter Press Service, June 27, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 101: Brown, "EU Seeks Tax on Aircraft Pollution." Back.
Note 102: Estrella Gutierrez, "Some Steps Taken on Methyl Bromide at Ozone Meeting," Inter Press Service, September 26, 1997. Electronic Version. Also see, Warrick, "CFC Smuggling, Production Cool Optimism." Back.
Note 104: Paul Weinberg, "Disappointment with Agreement on Methyl Bromide," Inter Press Service, September 18, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 105: John Maggs, "EU Joins Bandwagon Against US Gasoline Rules," Journal of Commerce, May 27, 1997, p. 3A. Back.
Note 106: Alan Tonelson and Lori Wallach, "We Told You So; The WTO's First Trade Decision Vindicates the Warnings of Critics," Washington Post, May 5, 1996, p. C4. Back.
Note 107: De Borchgrave and Ciluffo, "Transnational Crime: The New Empire of Evil." Back.
Note 108: Arnaud De Borchgrave, "The Bubonic Plague of International Crime," Washington Times, October 23, 1995, p. 40. Back.
Note 109: Steven Solomon, "Putting Banks on the Front Line Against Dirty Money," Business Week, July 21, 1997, p. 106. Back.
Note 110: Arnaud De Borchgrave, "Technology Explosion as Criminal Jackpot," Washington Times, August 25, 1997, p. 48. Back.
Note 111: Ibid.; De Borchgrave and Ciluffo, "Transnational Crime: The New Empire of Evil;" and "That Infernal Washing Machine," The Economist, July 26, 1997, p. 19. Back.
Note 112: De Borchgrave and Ciluffo, "Transnational Crime: The New Empire of Evil." Back.
Note 113: De Borchgrave, "Technology Explosion as Criminal Jackpot." Back.
Note 114: De Borchgrave and Ciluffo, "Transnational Crime: The New Empire of Evil." Back.
Note 115: US-EU differences over encryption technologies first began to gain increased public attention following the Clinton Administration's release of "A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce" on July 1, 1997. Shortly thereafter, the European ministers attending the EU's Global Information Networks conference in Bonn on July 6-8, 1997 issued a declaration addressing many of the same points raised by this Framework. Although largely similar in their recommendations, many noted that one key area in which the two documents contrasted was in regard to encryption. See Scott Bradner, "Making the World Safe for Dollars," Network World, July 21, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 116: Rebecca Cantwell, "Internet to be Key for Trade," Rocky Mountain News, August 19, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 117: Ralph Atkins, "Europeans Clash with US on Security for Internet," Financial Times, July 9, 1997, p. 4. Also see, "A Global Charter for the Net?," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 10, 1997. Electronic Version. The declaration issued at the conclusion of the July 1997 EU Global Information Networks conference in Bonn stated, "Ministers consider that Information Security is one of the key issues for the emergence of the Global Information Society and recognise the importance of the availability of strong encryption technology for electronic commerce. They will work to achieve international availability and free choice of cryptography products and interoperable services, subject to applicable law.... If countries take measures in order to protect legitimate needs of lawful access, they should be proportionate and effective and respect applicable provisions relating to privacy." See Ministerial Declaration, EU Global Information Networks Ministerial Conference, Bonn, July 6-8, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 118: Atkins, "Europeans Clash with US on Security for Internet;" Jeri Clausing, "Is the US Isolated on Data-Encryption?," International Herald Tribune, February 10, 1998, p. 14; and Karlin Lillington, "Brussels Will Not Rule on Encryption, Says Official," Irish Times, January 16, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 119: Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Prepared Statement before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, "Threats to US National Security," Federal News Service, January 28, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 121: William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary for Export Administration, Prepared Testimony before the House National Security Committee, "Administration Encryption Policy," Federal News Service, July 30, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 122: Several analysts assert that this statement, while setting out general principles to facilitate the market-driven development of electronic commerce, did not contain any substantive directives regarding encryption or authentication policies. Stewart Baker, "US-EU Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce," Mondaq Business Briefing, January 13, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 123: See Bruce Clark, "Police Cooperation Slow," Financial Times, December 6, 1997; European Union Summit Press Pack, Facts Brief 8: Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation, December 5, 1997; and New Transatlantic Agenda Senior Level Group Report to the EU-US Summit, December 5, 1997. Electronic Versions. Back.
Note 125: Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Prepared Statement before the House Committee on International Relations, Federal News Service, October 1, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 127: Clark, "Police Cooperation Slow." Back.
Note 128: Europol's precursor, the European Drugs Unit, was established in 1993 as an intelligence clearing house with the limited role of helping European states fight cross-border drug smuggling. In 1995, with the Europol Convention, its mandate was expanded to combat murder, corruption, environmental crime, racism, and xenophobia. Some view Europol as being the potential forerunner to a European equivalent of the FBI. But others worry that this expansion of Europol's portfolio will lead it to impinge on civil liberties. Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg have yet to ratify the 1995 Convention establishing Europol while the upper chamber of Germany's parliament is still debating a related protocol under which Europol officers would have immunity from prosecution under national legislation. Great Britain, the current holder of the EU's rotating presidency, has announced its intention to seek the remaining ratifications by the end of May 1998, which would enable Europol to become fully operational by this fall. See Jo Dillon, "Row Over `Untouchable' Euro Cops," Press Association Newsfile, February 14, 1998; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "The European Police State," Daily Telegraph, February 2, 1998; and Angus MacKinnon, "EU Police Force To Be Operational By Fall," Agence France Presse, January 30, 1998. Electronic Versions. Also see Jack A. Blum, Esq., Partner, Law Offices of Lobel, Novins, and Lamont, EU-US Summit, December 5, 1997. Electronic Versions.Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, "International Organized Crime: The Larger Issues," Federal Document Clearing House, October 1, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 129: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Statistical Summary," The State of the World's Refugees 1997-98. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 130: See Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 105-106. Back.
Note 132: Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, vol. 21, no. 1 (Summer 1996), p. 8. Back.
Note 133: Text of the New Transatlantic Agenda, December 3, 1995. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 134: Text, Denver Summit Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 22, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 135: See Carole Landry, "US Calls for Inquiry in Algeria and Stands Aside," Agence France Presse, January 6, 1998; and Ned Vanda, "Stop the Slaughter in Algeria," Denver Post, January 20, 1998. Electronic Versions. Back.
Note 136: "Help for Algeria," Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1998, p. 20. Back.
Note 137: Elizabeth Neuffer, "Algeria Rebuffs EU Plan for Visit as Too Low-level," Boston Globe, January 15, 1998, p. A2. Back.
Note 138: Ibid.; Deborah Seward, "Europe, US Seek Way to Quell Algeria's Bloodshed," AAP Newsfeed, January 12, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 139: The government of Algeria, which considers the conflict an internal matter, initially rebuffed this offer but relented when the Europeans agreed to send higher-ranking officials than those originally proposed. See Vanda, "Stop the Slaughter in Algeria." Back.
Note 140: Carole Landry, "US Scraps Proposal for International Inquiry Into Algerian Massacres," Agence France Presse, January 9, 1998. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 141: Ibid; and Seward, "Europe, US Seek Way to Quell Algeria's Bloodshed." A considerable number of Algerians have already fled to Europe since the start of the conflict. See Neuffer, "Algeria Rebuffs EU Plan for Visit as Too Low-level." Back.
Note 142: John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), p. 160; and Evelyn Leopold, "US and UN Council Agree to Deploy Rwanda Force," Reuters World Service, June 8, 1994. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 143: Gail Russell Chaddock, "France, US Heed Different Pasts in Trying to Help Zaire," Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 1997, p. 9. Back.
Note 144: William Drozdiak, "Europeans Reject Call for Help in Albania; NATO Reluctant to Intervene Despite Threat," Washington Post, March 15, 1997, p. A19. Back.
Note 145: Dennis Pirages, "Microsecurity: Disease Organisms and Human Well-Being," Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 4 (Autumn 1995), p. 11. Back.
Note 146: World Health Organization, Press Release, "Infectious Diseases Kill Over 17 Million People a Year," 1996. Electronic Version. Also see, Task Force Reports on Environmental Change and Security, "Infectious Disease as a Global Security Threat," Environmental Change and Security Project Report, no. 3 (Spring 1997), p. 67. Back.
Note 147: David L. Heymann, Director, World Health Organization, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, July 30, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 149: Ibid.; and Sally Shelton-Colby, Assistant Administrator, US Agency for International Development, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, July 30, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 150: Janet Welsh Brown, "Population, Consumption, and the Path to Sustainability," Current History, vol. 95, no. 604 (November 1996), pp. 366-367. Back.
Note 151: Laurie Garrett, "The Return of Infectious Disease," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996), p. 71. Back.
Note 153: "Signing of US-EU Science and Technology Agreement," PR Newswire, December 5, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 154: Press Conference with President Bill Clinton, Summit of the Eight, Federal News Service, June 22, 1997. Electronic Version. Back.
Note 155: Text, Final Communiqué of the Denver Summit of the Eight, June 22, 1997. Electronic Version. Also see Heymann, Testimony. Back.
Note 156: Colum Lynch, "UN Faces Its Biggest Financial Crisis; With US Debt, Other Nations Must Close the Gap," Boston Globe, December 21, 1997, p. A35. The United States, which currently pays 25 percent of the WHO's operating budget, wants to lower its contribution to 20 percent. See Betsy Pisik, "Who's the Chief?," Washington Times, January 19, 1998, p. A12. Back.
Note 157: Lynch, "UN Faces Its Biggest Financial Crisis." Back.
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