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CIAO DATE: 12/99
Peacebuilding in War-Time Societies: Workshop Report
Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva
December 1996
Table of Contents
This is a report of the workshop which the Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) jointly organized from 5 to 7 December 1996 at QUNO’s offices in Geneva. Participants were representatives from international and governmental agencies and other organizations involved in peacebuilding efforts in war-torn societies or related activities (see Appendix C). The objective was to share past experiences and current programmes, and to explore new approaches and perspectives for the future. The worskhop was designed in such a way as to maximally exploit participants’ own practical experiences and dilemma’s and create an atmosphere of creative interaction and intellectual exploration.
The workshop began after lunch on Thursday 5 December, and ran until lunchtime on Saturday 7 December 1996. The detailed programme is to be found in Appendix A. A great deal of the discussion during the workshop centred upon the participants own experiences within the peacebuilding field. Theexpression of these experiences was not limited to a discussion of anecdotes or specific examples but broadened out to the critical analysis of the wider issues of coordination and division of labour between agencies and organizations. Participants were also encouraged to deal critically with their shared understanding of peace and peacebuilding, in the context of organizational mandates and tasks, by taking part in, and later reflecting upon a hypothetical case study (see Appendix B). Some participants also gave presentations on the work of their own organizations in order to facilitate a wider understanding of that work.
The report begins with the background and objectives for the workshop as they were formulated by the organizers and circulated to all participants. This is followed by a summary of the issues raised during the workshop, not so much in the form of a narrative, but rather as a thematic compilation of the individual contributions, presentations and group discussions. Inevitably, not everything that was said made it into the report and not everything in the report will have the backing of all or even the majority of participants. We think, however, that the report does reflect the main concerns and positions as they were expressed at the time. The frequent use of the pronoun ‘we’ should be taken as referring to the wider community of agencies, organizations and individuals involved in peacebuilding activities in war-torn societies, rather than the group of people who attended the workshop.
As organizers we would like to thank Diana Francis, Kenny Gluck, John Carlarne, Linda Cundy and Helene Culioli Atwood. for their help and support. Kenny was willing to take the place of Mary Anderson who at the last moment had to cancel her participation, while Diana played a major role in the design of the workshop, as well as in the actual preparations and in its facilitation. John prepared the draft on which this final report is based. Linda was a great help in keeping the administration and communication going and Helene provided us with great food. We also thank Agneta Johanssen for her presentation of preliminary findings of the War-Torn Societies Project. Warm thanks to them all, as well as to INCORE whose financial contribution made this workshop possible and QUNO, who made its premisses available.
“Only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation” (Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace)
Background
As internal armed conflict has become the predominant form of war in the post-Cold War world, the involvement of international agencies and regional bodies in these situations has grown accordingly (both the number of situations and the number of agencies). The clearest example is of course the UN itself, which has mounted more peacekeeping operations in the last 5 years than in the previous 45 years, and has played different mediating roles in an even greater number of other conflict situations. Most of these missions and interventions concern internal conflicts rather than inter-state wars.
The nature of these interventions has also changed considerably, from purely military peacekeeping and policing to multi-dimensional operations involving a number of different components—humanitarian assistance, election observation and human rights monitoring, institution building, conflict resolution, confidence-building, mediation, etc. Staff of the UN and its specialized agencies and of all other international organizations involved, whether in the field or in a policy-making capacity, have been forced to adapt to these new tasks in a very short period of time. Complex emergencies, wider peacekeeping and multi-dimensional operations have become the stock-in-trade of many international agencies.
Military personnel from member states, and a growing number of civilians from a wide range of professional and cultural backgrounds, are required to operate in these new contexts and need to be prepared for their tasks. The same applies to non-UN agencies and organizations—governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental—who are increasingly working in areas of internal war and ethnic strife. They perform a range of tasks related to peace-making (during the violent stage of conflict), peace-keeping (after some form of settlement or cease-fire) and peace-building (when violence has ended).
Not only do different organizations perform different tasks, they also operate at different ‘levels’, that is to say, they ‘deal with’ or ‘impact on’ groups and individuals at different places in the social structure of the society in question. The relationship between outside ‘interveners’ and inside actors of different sorts is more than a matter of practicalities, however—it involves important and difficult ethical choices. One of the big questions of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, where so many groups, organizations and agencies are playing a part, is how the activities at the different levels relate to each other and to the broader aim of social and material reconstruction and, eventually, reconciliation—and how the collective effort of the international community can be directed towards supporting rather than undermining the constructive role of local actors. Synergy and empowerment are often part of the objectives which are put forward.
In practical terms the challenge is how to specify the precise role of each actor, how to coordinate their different activities, how to set up linkages and channels of communication that enhance rather than jeopardize the total effort. The workshop was designed to begin tackling these questions of coordination and division of labour between international agencies and their relationship to local actors at different levels.
Objectives
The exploratory workshop aimed to produce new understandings, models and concepts for constructive collaboration and communication between different types of agencies and organizations intervening in war-torn societies.
More specifically, the workshop’s objectives were:
To bring together and foster contacts between officials and policy-makers from international agencies working in war-torn societies, and between international, or ‘outside’ actors and local, or ‘inside’ actors.
To exchange and reflect upon experiences, learn about the approaches developed by others, the problems they encounter and the ways they try to overcome them.
To explore future forms of coordination and joint action—either at the policy-planning stage or in the field, e.g. training, convening further workshops, setting up forums or task-forces, formulating guidelines or norms of practice, or other.
Introduction
The following is an overview of the discussions about different understandings of peace and peacebuilding. It includes participants’ responses to the questions: (1) What are the requirements for lasting peace however it is defined—what would peace mean, what would need to be in place, what process would need to be navigated to get there? (2) If as organizations we were able to put peace at the top of our agenda, what would be the organizational possibilities and what the obstacles for contributing to a lasting peace—given the nature of the mandate?
Defining peace
One of the issues considered was whether we need a definition of peace to operate, and if so, what this should be. As in any such discussion there was an implicit tension between universalist and relativist stances, further complicated by the pragmatic considerations that we must all deal with when working in the field—“doing it in the real world” (workshop participant). With regard to issues of relativism and universalism, it is important for the integrity and effectiveness of our organizations that we have a clear idea of what peace is for us, or else we run the risk of engaging in things that do not square with our own ethical vision. This might ultimately come down to our own understanding of what a human being is and what it is that helps the development of that individual. There is however a danger that in doing this we impose our own, possibly unrealistic definitions upon situations and cultures where they are not appropriate. Furthermore, we might be looking for levels of non-violence in other societies that are not present in our own ‘home’ societies.
“A returning member of CPT’s [Christian Peacemaker Teams] Haiti team (...) began CPT’s Current project in urban peace-making after personally experiencing urban violence in Washington, DC and concluding that it was ’ludicrous that Haiti turned out to be safer than my own neighbourhood and that too many of us activists have to walk over bodies in our front yards to get into a cab, to go to the airport, to go far away, to ‘make’ peace for someone else” (Lisa Schirch. Keeping the Peace: Exploring Civilian Alternatives in Conflict Prevention. Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1995. p.15).
We need therefore to consider what peace means for the ‘recipients’ of our interventions. Just because an intervention has run smoothly does not mean that it has done ‘the right thing’ for local people. Our own organizations can facilitate this process by providing a ‘space’ for people in a war-torn society to come together to discuss what peace means for them. Furthermore, once a ‘local’ understanding of peace is arrived at, positive and negative incentives can be used to encourage discussion and collaboration along those lines.
While it may not be possible for organizations working in situations of conflict or post-conflict to construct a consistent ‘definition’ of peace, it may be more important to have an understanding of peace that brings local consensus and own ethical framework together. We must take special care that our own (generally Western) values and their linguistic and behavioural expressions do not interfere with local processes.
Requirements for a lasting peace (as listed by participants):
(1) functioning government; (2) functioning and fair legal/ justice system; (3) local government structures; (4) representative system; (5) inclusive political processes; (6) employment opportunities; (7) cohesive social policy; (8) fair economic, land and water policies; (9) re-training and re-organization of the army and police; (10) re-assessment of the media.
Peace and Organizational Mandates
Pragmatic considerations which face any organization in the field can further complicate matters. By incorporating peace into our organizational mandate, which may include putting justice on the agenda, we may put at risk our organization’s ability to fulfil its original purpose, which is e.g. the provision of emergency relief or agricultural development or health care.
In dealing with the realities of issues such as this, the integrity of an institution or organization can ultimately be put at risk, resulting in a loss of face or even the ability of carry on working in a specific country. Organizations might seek to minimize this risk, e.g. by dividing mandates, or by allocating different tasks to various elements within the whole organisation. Separate external and ‘expendable’ groups or organizations could be used to conduct work that requires institutional risk-taking, but which does not demand long-term operational continuity. Such organizations would be employed to achieve specific goals in the short-term, with the expectation that they could need to be recalled fairly quickly from the field.
“Doing nothing does no harm” (workshop participant).
We must recognize that to intervene is to take risks, and that the more we become directly involved the greater the risks to ourselves, to our own institutions and to the ‘recipients’ of our interventions. Peace-building deals with lasting peace and organizations should hold themselves responsible for the negative elements of their policies, both locally and in a global context. It is not enough to mean well; we need to be responsible or accountable for all our actions, but we should conduct work with the intention of achieving positive outcomes (contribute to constructive conflict transformation) rather than merely avoiding negative consequences (“do no harm”).
Organizational policies and training
It is important that we maintain a clear distinction between doing work in a manner that does not exacerbate conflict (the ‘Do No Harm’-concept) and the deliberate inclusion of conflict transformation—‘peace’—within a mandate.
In order to reinforce the ‘peacebuilding message’ within humanitarian and other organizations, recommendations from evaluations should be turned into programme guidelines at the earliest opportunity, while the values they represent should be made explicit throughout the organization—right through to the point of delivery. This can be further reinforced by training of staff.
It is often difficult to implement conflict-related training within larger international organizations because few people within them are willing to co-ordinate such programmes. Often there is a fear of setting in motion something that might be difficult to control and that might have negative outcomes. Yet many organizations work with methodologies like ‘people oriented planning’ and so they posses many of the institutional structures necessary for integrating the themes of peace and conflict resolution into their training programmes.
Suggested follow-up activities
Conflict and human rights training:
A decentralised programme might be developed to continue the work by one organization on the production of training modules for people involved ‘in the field’. This programme should deal with the issue of conflict transformation and human rights. This might build upon the experiences of this and other organizations in order to develop further training packages that would assist organizations in carrying out their mandates.
Coordination of training:
A workshop or similar event could be organised in which trainers from organizations with an involvement in conflict and post-conflict situations might come together to discuss ways in which they might build peace and reconciliation issues into their own training programmes.
We must also be aware of a ‘middle ground’ where ‘traditional’ reconstruction tasks are carried out in a way that positively contributes to conflict transformation. Funding plays an especially significant role here. For example, for many years projects had to be mainly relief oriented to get any funding. Indeed, there have been many instances where development aid has come to a standstill within a country while relief aid has been ‘piled up’ in anticipation of an ‘inevitable collapse’. It is vital, therefore, that the ‘ethic of peace’ not be limited to agencies and organizations that work within war-torn societies, but that it be fostered among the donor groups that fund their work.
This ‘ethic of peace’ can also be extended into informal contacts. Informal means of coordination might, therefore, be just as useful as formal channels. Different organizations deal in unique ways with different levels within local and international hierarchies. Informal contact among these organizations and institutions might ensure that the issues involved in peacebuilding are presented at all levels.
Participants advocated the desirability of a code of conduct for peacebuilding programmes. We might follow the lead of the humanitarian field to develop a code of conduct that could form the basis of an integrated framework of principles within our work. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights might provide a solid and well known framework upon which to build a code of conduct, as can the body of Humanitarian Law on which the ICRC and the Red Cross movement bases its work. This could provide an area of common ground between our conduct and the values that we are seeking to project and encourage among those that we aim to assist.
Evaluation and research
Organizations involved in peacebuilding in war-torn societies must ensure that their interventions are informed by the realities of the local situation from the outset, so that planning can take these into account. While there is a clear need for criteria and frameworks, there might not be a single ‘magic’ formula for working in all the ‘sticky’ situations in which we might find ourselves.
Furthermore, programmes should be evaluated according to the extent to which they build peace, or hinder it. These evaluations should focus on ‘real outcomes’ and ideally would be carried out by as many of the following as possible: (i) representatives of the organization being evaluated, (ii) the people the organization being evaluated seeks to benefit, and (iii) other organizations engaged in the same field
We should try to avoid making the same mistakes as those that often occurred in development work, such as disempowering local people, undermining existing local institutions or creating isolated ‘islands’ of development and prosperity. Thus, while it is not clear whether peacebuilding interventions run the same risks, we must still think about conducting our activities in the most responsible and culturally sensitive manner possible. For example, we know that ‘expert intervention’ from outside is often inappropriate and that it is preferable to build upon local resources. Proper evaluation can allow us to continue to learn as we go.
Research topics proposed by workshop participants:
Comparative studies
It might be especially useful to conduct a comparative study to look at the differences and similarities between ‘torn’ and ‘war-torn’ societies. This would limit the variables that future studies of peacebuilding in war-torn societies would need to take into account. A study might also be conducted to compare development with peacebuilding.
Studies of success
Greater attention needs to be paid to the investigation of successful peacebuilding efforts, especially successful local initiatives.
Studies of social impact
It would be useful to conduct research into the social and cultural effects of peacebuilding activities within different societies.
The War-Torn Societies Project is currently combining an investigation into peacebuilding with facilitation of political processes. It reported that the research process can in fact contribute to peacebuilding efforts.
Peacebuilding and Collaboration
“There seems to be a lack of sitting down together in the actual situation.” (workshop participant)
The title of the workshop emphasized issues of collaboration for inside actors and outside interveners. The case study (see Appendix B) proved especially useful as a means of drawing out issues surrounding co-operation and the peacebuilding process. During this case study participants took on the roles of various ‘players’ within a hypothetical conflict/post-conflict scenario. The following is a summary of insights gleaned throughout the workshop including the case study. The summary starts at the macro ‘external’ level of outside interveners, and moves towards the micro ‘local’ level of inside actors.
Collaboration at the international level
Donors, especially governments, by the way they allocate funding, can and do strongly influence what work is carried out ‘on the ground’, for how long and by whom. It is therefore important that collaborative strategies for peacebuilding seek to include donors.
Donors are becoming increasingly aware of their role within the complex field of peacebuilding and are acting accordingly. E.g. the Dutch Government has responded to this challenge by: (1) delegating a great deal of responsibility to its embassies in countries where peacebuilding is occurring; these embassies have been strengthened to deal with the extra work; and (2) integrating government departments that deal with political and development issues. Thus, the same umbrella directorate might have within it two bureaux, one of which deals with humanitarian issues and organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations, and NGOs, while the other deals with conflict prevention, including the assessment of assistance and the management political activities such as sanctions and negotiations.
Collaboration at the regional level
Local conflicts are often set within an atmosphere of regional tension, but in peacebuilding interventions a regional perspective is often absent. While national partners might already exist, regional partnerships are often still to be constructed and in this outsiders can play a catalyzing role. by encouraging national partners from different countries within a region to communicate and collaborate. A strong regional structure of local partners would provide more avenues for dealing with an issue, especially when that issue has trans-border implications, as most conflicts nowadays do. It is also important to realize that such regional structures cannot be built overnight.
Collaboration at the national level
“Who is the [war-torn] country when we bring them into the discussion? Who is the government? Who is invited, and who does the inviting?” (workshop participant).
“What is the role of [local] state structures in this [peace-building]? What role does the state play?” (workshop participant).
“What do you do if the military and the warlords form the government?” (workshop participant).
Concepts of ‘nation-state’ and its corresponding institutions and structures are often problematic for peacebuilding and cannot be taken for granted. This is because war-torn societies by definition are often subject to the kind of conflict—civil war—that renders national structures defunct, contested or inappropriate.
Peacebuilders are frequently left with the difficult choice of deciding who to work with, when, and in what context. They are often faced with the prospect of balancing collusion against success. The following is a list of suggested ways for beginning to come to terms with such issues:
(I)NGOs and others must begin to recognize that their general emphasis on the rebuilding of civil society must take into account the significance of democratic state structures at different levels.
“We all face the dilemma of ‘what should be built’” (workshop participant).
It is important to recognize the significance of capacity building as a means of fostering the development of appropriate state structures. A vibrant and functioning ‘civil society’ cannot exist in a vacuum. In thinking about ‘local capacities’ (see below) we mustn’t forget the importance of ‘the state’, e.g. in providing legal frameworks, a criminal justice system, infrastructure, health and education, etc.
It is important to look at the needs of all factions/parties/groupings.
Intervening organizations and agencies often want ‘democracy’ to happen quickly and often become compromised because they construct the time-scale of events within a country in terms of their own mandates. They should recognize that the social and political situation might take longer to develop than they have allowed, seek to conduct realistic assessments of these factors, and then act accordingly.
Outside organizations should take some responsibility for the media presentation of the country in which they work. They must be careful that in justifying their presence, they do not present an inflammatory picture of the situation that might prevent subsequent cooperation, e.g. with existing government structures.
Meetings might be arranged outside the country, which could be attended by regional actors, as well as by significant figures from within the war-torn society. Such meetings may or may not include members of the ‘government’ depending upon the local situation.
Collaboration at the local level
The main thesis of Kenny Gluck’s introduction to the workshop was that it is possible to locate local capacities for peace. Aid and relief agencies can work with local partners in ways as to lessen conflict. Not everyone, however, was convinced that this local capacity can really be found everywhere—sometimes it is difficult to find local NGOs to support or to collaborate with, e.g. because your traditional partners are or were implicated in the violence or there are too many unknowns in relation to their background or functioning. Where reliable local NGOs are operating, humanitarian intervention can under certain circumstances be rather undermining than supportive. Instead of eroding local capacities, outside interveners should ensure that peacebuilding and development continue after they have left. Capacity-building is therefore a key issue.
The following is a list of suggestions for improving collaboration with ‘local’ actors as well as with other agencies and organizations:
Local actors and humanitarian agencies should be involved in the planning stages of peacebuilding initiatives in order that: (1) the process becomes inclusive so that they can invest in the process; (2) ‘cultural’ pitfalls be avoided. This also encourages ‘local ownership’ of the peacebuilding process.
It is important to consider who the local actors are. It is vital that the range of collaborators should reflect the variety and spectrum of the local population. The criteria for the selection of collaborators should be clear, logical and transparent.
Some of the local organizations that are working in difficult situations may be able to do so precisely because they are not neutral. Collaboration with such organizations might compromise incoming agencies and organizations.
Peacebuilding organizations should try to minimize the conflict amongst themselves. They should seek to develop coordinated strategies at the macro-level and ensure that these are reflected ‘on the ground’.
Those who come to build peace should not come with weapons.
It is important to be clear what is meant by expressions like ‘mechanisms of collaboration’, e.g., frequent meetings between NGOs and local actors, the development of work-teams and the streamlining of procedures.
Organizations should try to create a working climate with less ethnic tension than in the rest of society, thus creating a space for non-hostile voices—promoting collaboration among local actors as well as with local actors.
NGOs in particular should be aware of the politicization of their work, at the local level as well as at the macro level. It is unavoidable that, if you are working on the ground, you will come into conflict with the parties to the conflict.
Organizations involved in peacebuilding should not bribe local ‘war lords’, as this reinforces undesirable activity. There is however a difference between recognizing warlords or warring factions and taking their views into account. It is important to attempt to include all those who might disrupt the process of building a sustainable peace.
International organizations should take care that meetings and discussions with local actors do not become a place for the public expression of political grievances and propaganda.
The commercial sector of a war-torn society is rarely brought into the collaborative process. This must change, because this sector is vital to the rebuilding process and the reinforcement of local capacities. The commercial sector at all levels should be encouraged to participate.
International organizations must take a long-term approach, and should not see events such as elections as the opportunity to ‘wash their hands’ of the situation. Elections are in most cases the beginning rather than the end of the building of a lasting peace.
The criminalization of the economy of relief
There is one particularly sinister facet in the relationship between funding governments (at the international level) and peacebuilding activities (at the local level), that is often not being addressed. This might be referred to as the “criminalization of the economy of relief” (workshop participant). It might be summarized thus:
Within the UN, the shift from cold-war polarization to the privatization of relief and general peacebuilding activities means that intervention activities must generally be compatible with the interests of the (permanent) Security Council members. Sometimes the interests and activities of these and other governments contradict peacebuilding—as in the case of asset stripping and arms dealing.
(I)NGOs and other organisations are often unable to speak out against internal criminalization because of the vulnerability of their position—both locally and in terms of funding. Local people are disadvantaged by the criminal economy within which they must live, while criminal groups around them thrive. Thus, situations may arise where countries are, on the one hand, trading with(in) the criminal economy of a war-torn society while providing aid for the victims of the conflict. Self-interest at all levels seems to prevent the wider discussion of this issue.
All of the organizations that are aware of this issue need to deal with it together. They must also seek to collaborate with the media. (I)NGOs and other agencies ‘in the field’ might compensate for their vulnerability by collaborating with international human rights organizations and other less ‘exposed’ groups. These might then speak out against international and local institutions and individuals who are actively engaged in or sanction the criminalization of the peacebuilding process.
Suggestions for subsequent workshop
Coordination of political and humanitarian efforts:
A meeting or workshop in which people from the political and humanitarian spheres come together to discuss how to better conduct humanitarian work in a politically sensitive world. This might be country specific, or might deal with issues such as the above.
Contingency planning: Elaboration and playing out of some scenarios around vulnerable situations, in preparation for an eventuality. What lessons can be learned that can be brought to bear on these and as yet unknown situations? (Humanitarian agencies are quite bad at contingency planning, unlike e.g. the military).
Towards prevention
Many of the workshop participants noted that intervention focuses too much on (diplomatic, military, humanitarian) reaction rather than on proactive conflict mitigation and collaborative problem solving. The following suggestions were made as ways of achieving a more proactive approach in a collaborative framework:
Meetings could be organized to focus on vulnerable countries—countries that are slipping towards conflict. These meetings might be used to formulate policy before a serious crisis develops. Staff level representatives from (I)NGOs, UN and regional governments could be invited, rather than politically more vulnerable decision-makers. It might not be appropriate to invite politicians from the country being discussed, because such meetings might be a threat to their political position and/or dignity. To overcome this, such meetings might: (1) focus on a region, rather than on a specific country—develop regional networks and capacities and use the meetings as an opportunity to coordinate preventative strategies and build teams and networks outside that country; (2) include influential people who are not from the government of the county in question.
Organizations most used to the coordination of relief work, etc. might draw up contingency plans for possible future peacebuilding scenarios. Even if these are never carried out the process will encourage a proactive and collaborative approach to post-conflict reconstruction.
The whole process of peacebuilding should ideally start in times of relative peace, so that there is something to fall back upon when a crisis develops. Deep understanding of and involvement in local and regional realities is necessary for this to be feasible, as well as long-term commitment—currently, both of these points present problems for many international agencies and organizations.
This workshop illustrated that peacebuilding is entering a critical phase, during which the paradigms associated with traditional relief and development work are being challenged by the—partly new—realities of ethnic conflict, communal strife and related phenomena in the current global climate. In summary, the workshop participants identified the following issues, related to our understanding of peacebuilding in war-torn societies, which will need to be addressed if progress within peacebuilding is to be made:
The nature of ‘peace’ and ‘peacebuilding’ and their relationship to organizational mandates, policies, activities, and funding.
The role of evaluation within peacebuilding. In particular the question: What should be evaluated and by whom?
The relationship between evaluation and policy.
Training, education and peacebuilding: (1) the coordination of training within and among organizations involved in post-conflict peacebuilding; (2) training for peace and conflict resolution among the people who are seen as the ‘beneficiaries’ of peacebuilding activities—tying aid to a message.
The development of codes of conduct. Action linked to broadly established international principles will help to establish a reference point for both ‘interveners’ and ‘beneficiaries’ as well as give legitimacy to the action in the eyes of the wider public.
The relationship between funding and peacebuilding work—who is funded, to do what, by whom and for how long?
The development of greater collaboration between funders and organizations/agencies implementing the work on the ground.
The new international disorder and the ‘criminalization of peacebuilding’.
The development and improvement of regional structures for collaboration in peacebuilding work.
The collapse of states and the need to support the development of state structures which can provide the context in which collaborative initiatives in civil society can flourish.
The inclusion of commercial and business organizations at all levels within peacebuilding activities.
The choice of local partners—by whom and for what purpose?
The process of inclusion and exclusion and its effect on internal relationships within war-torn societies.
The development of a proactive and preventative approach to peacebuilding.
Appendix A: Workshop Programme
Thursday 5 December 1996 “Setting Out the Issues”
14.00 Introduction to the Workshop and to each other
14.30 “Intervening in Violent Conflict Settings: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem ?” (Kenneth Gluck, The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc.)
15.20 Tea break
15.50 “The War-Torn Societies Project: Preliminary Findings from its Field-based Research” (Agneta Johannsen, WSP)
16.30 Examples and specific questions from participants’ own experience (small groups, followed by plenary)
18.00 Close for day
Friday 6 December 1996 “Organizational Roles and Interactions”
09.00—12.30 (with coffee break around 10.30)
Phase 1: Exploring organizational responses A hypothetical case study—based on an existing situation—designed to explore the relationships and interactions between the activities of different players: insiders and outsiders; those working at (inter)governmental level and grass-root organizations; organizations with different aims and mandates (e.g. relief, development, human rights, reconciliation).
13.00 Lunch
(Friday continued)
14.30 Phase 1 continued
15.15—18.00 (with tea break around 16.00)
Phase 2: Putting peace first In relation to the same scenario, what are the requirements for sustainable peace? What would it mean for the various organizations to put peace at the top of their agenda? Dilemmas and obstacles?
Saturday 7 December 1996 “What next?”
09.00 Pulling it together: Reflections on Friday’s work (Kenneth Gluck)
09.30 Current organizational initiatives in relation to violent conflict
10.30 Coffee break
11.00 Proposals for the future and workshop evaluation
12.30 Close
Appendix B: Hypothetical Case Study
LIWANDI—Introduction
We have called this a ‘hypothetical case study’ rather than a ‘simulation’ or a ‘role-play’—although it may have elements of both—since we want to avoid whatever connotations people may have with these (e.g. ‘simulation“: full-scale, long and detailed playing out of a given scenario; ‘role-play’: acting, etc.). We have chosen not to work on a real case, since, within our limited time-scale, it could distract from the general issues we aim to clarify and lead into discussions of ‘facts’ and bog us down in specifics.
The scenario is designed to explore, in a more active and creative way than would be possible in a ‘presentation + discussion’ framework, the issues that we put at the core of this workshop, viz. the roles different types of organizational actors play in war-torn societies, the relationships and interactions between them, and how their activities can contribute to or hinder the transformation of the conflict in a way that a peaceful and sustainable solution becomes possible.
We have tried to make the scenario as realistic as possible, but keeping it relatively simple and schematic. It is easy to recognize the country on which this hypothetical case is loosely based, but we have not felt bound by it and we strongly request participants to suspend their specific knowledge of events and/or activities of this or that organization (except in a general sense), and work on the basis of what is provided on paper. Take the case as if all similarities to existing people, organizations, events and circumstances are purely co-incidental—except for the general nature of those which kept their names, such as the different UN agencies. In working on the case, it is likely to be necessary to fill in certain details and make assumptions; we urge participants to be both creative and sensible in this respect and not to invent things (‘facts’) which will affect others but of which they have no knowledge. Equally, do not feel obliged to ‘use’ every item of information you have been given. Again, our purpose is not to work on a specific conflict situation, but to have a case on the basis of which we can explore the more general issues.
Liwandi is a relatively small African country with a population of around 5 million. It is situated on the coast which forms its northern boundary and its capital, Romota, is its main port. Roughly a third of the population lives in the capital, while the rest live off the land which is relatively fertile. The population falls into two main categories, the indigenous people of the area, belonging to different tribal groupings, and the descendants of slaves who returned from the US and founded the country as such. The three main indigenous ethnic groups are the Wendo, the Eka, and the Soma, who live in the West, East and South, respectively, and are equally represented in the capital’s population. The slave descendants still constitute a small elite living mainly in the capital.
The war started in 1990, when a LPF (Liwandese Patriotic Front) rebel force, made up mainly of Wendo volunteers, entered the country from the West, with the objective of ousting the ruling military government and instating a multi-party democracy. Thousands of refugees, also mainly Wendo, fled the heavy fighting between the rebels and the Government Forces and the atrocities that soon started to be committed by both sides. The LPF had almost captured the whole country and encircled the capital, when a Regional Peacekeeping Force (REFOR) led by Magnesia, the biggest regional power, intervened and broke the siege of the capital to let humanitarian aid come in and foreign citizens out. The fighting stopped and negotiations started under the chairmanship of Magnesia. Several peace agreements were signed but none of them was adhered to for any length of time, and the fighting has continued sporadically and viciously, at times on quite a large scale, while the rebel movement has split into different factions, partly along regional and ethnic lines, partly on the basis of personal ambitions. At the same time there is great war-weariness among soldiers and civilians alike.
At present there is a Transitional Government in place, consisting of representatives from the 3 main armed groups and some independents. There are now more than 10 warring factions, the three main ones being the LPF, the MFL (Movement for a Free Liwandi—largely Eka) and Lipeco (Liwandi Peace Coalition—largely Soma), each of which controls part of the territory and is headed by a charismatic warlord. A large percentage of the male population is involved in the fighting, including many child soldiers.
The country is flooded with arms, especially small arms, and the main warring factions also have armoured cars and artillery at their disposal. Large parts of the infrastructure (roads, bridges, schools, hospitals) have been destroyed and social services are mostly not functioning anymore. There is a general shortage of consumer goods and other basic commodities and in the rural areas people have difficulty in working their fields because of land mines. There are tens of thousands of displaced people and equal numbers of refugees, who are returning to their homes every time the situation appears to improve.
Among the most active indigenous organizations are:
The Interfaith Council of Liwandi (IFCL), comprising Christians and Muslims, which runs a sizeable country-wide relief programme and has been instrumental in the past in bringing the warring parties together and in founding the Peoples’ Campaign for Disarmament (PCP).
Women for Development (WODEP) which has a strong rurally based programme. Originally focused on poverty alleviation and income-generating projects, in recent years it has turned its attention to women’s rights and needs in relation to the war and its effects.
The Civil Forum for Democracy and Peace (CFDP), a network of professional bodies and traders and farmers organizations. Their stated aims are to work for an end to the violence and the establishment of the rule of law and a multi-party democracy. They have come to prominence through the organization of several large demonstrations.
Kawasaka, a self-help scheme which organizes local relief and construction projects on a food-for-work basis, providing a route back into civilian life for many demobilized soldiers.
Among the international organizations still with programmes in the country are:
The UN, which has a small observer mission, headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The principal objective of the mission has been to monitor and assist REFOR in theprocess of encampment, disarmament and demobilization. The mission now has only 100 members and its deployment is confined to Romota and its surrounding areas.
The World Food Programme, which has concentrated its relief efforts on people displaced by the fighting.
UNICEF, which also runs emergency relief projects across the country with a focus on health and health education.
UNHCR, which is supporting returning refugees, especially in the West.
The International Committee of the Red Cross, which has concentrated its efforts on medical relief in areas directly affected by fighting, monitoring the treatment of prisoners and generally advocating adherence to international norms in relation to the effects of the war on civilians.
NORFAM, a Scandinavian development NGO with a long-standing programme across Africa and a special focus on integrated rural development; here working also in Romota’s slums.
SHARE, an American NGO which specializes in emergency relief and has a long track-record of organizing large-scale operations to supply food, shelter, water and medicines to people affected by famine, war or natural disaster.
Early Warning International, a human rights organization based in Brussels, which works mainly in areas of violent conflict; they are well-connected to the indigenous NGO world and have exposed human rights violations on all sides, though the LPF feels it has been singled out for criticism.
Recently there have been renewed outbreaks of fighting among some of the factions, especially in the capital. Because of this and internal political developments in Magnesia, REFOR may be withdrawn from the country in the near future. If that were to happen, the fear is that there would be renewed and intensified fighting between the armed factions across the country, especially in the capital and in the West between the LPF and the LPC.
In the light of these developments, the head of the UN mission and UNDP have taken the initiative to call a meeting of a number of agencies and local and international NGOs in order to explore how their joint efforts could be more effective in helping to improve the overall situation in the country.
Each participant is provided with additional information of around half a page regarding the background, current activities, etc. of the organization he or she is representing.
Phase 1—Exploring organizational responses
For several years you have been caught up in the need to react to a constantly changing political, military and humanitarian situation. This invitation provides you with the opportunity and challenge of taking a strategic look at your organization’s work in Liwandi. Review your programme in the light of the latest developments and formulate proposals for the coming months.
Phase 2—Putting peace first
In relation to the same scenario, what are the requirements for sustainable peace? What would it mean for the various organizations to put peace at the top of their agenda? Dilemmas and obstacles?
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