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The Development of the European UnionThe Development of the European Union (Full Text, PDF, 41 pages, 58 KB)
V. Theories of European Integration
It is a common dictum in international relations that states are sovereign and thus juridically autonomous. Yet it should be clear from the narrative so far, that states in the European context have cooperated with each other, even to the point of surrendering some of their sovereign prerogatives. States that for decades had been locked in mutual antagonism and suspicion have kept the peace and moved to ever closer union. What has motivated these states to do so?
A variety of key theories in the international relations literature have grappled with potential answers. Neorealists start with the assumption that states are unitary actors. Given that the international system is anarchic and lacks central authority, self interested rationality dictates that states must be foremost concerned with survival. Consequently, they calculate the relative gains of particular policies.
Neorealists, therefore, explain European cooperation by a common threat: the need to balance the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the American security guarantee diminished tensions between the West European states themselves. Hence, West European states could more easily cooperate and focus on absolute gains rather than pursue relative gains vis-à -vis each other. 5
Neorealists, furthermore, tend to emphasize the relative balance of power among the cooperating states. According to hegemonic stability theory, cooperation depends on the presence of a dominant state to overcome collective action problems and prevent the other states from pursuing short run self-interest. American leadership in security affairs, and regional leadership by Germany in economic affairs, were thus key ingredients of European integration. 6
Neoliberals agree with their neorealist counterparts that states a priori have certain preferences. Contrary to neorealism, however, they see states largely propelled by the pursuit of economic gains. States, perceived as unitary actors, are more inclined to pursue cooperation since such policies lead to joint gains. Absolute gains from interaction rather than relative gains predominate states' decision making. Neoliberals would thus explain European regional integration by the constant quest for economic gains to be had by reducing barriers to trade, by enhancing the free movement of labor, and the general reduction of transaction and information costs that come with regional fragmentation and diversity. While some neoliberals might concede that the relative distribution of power matters, they do not consider it a necessary or sufficient explanation. The presence of a dominant actor might help the emergence of cooperative regimes, but hegemons are not essential for either the emergence or the continuation of cooperation. 7
A third theoretical orientation takes issue with the unitary state assumption of neorealism and neoliberalism. Instead scholars in this vein argue that one must disentangle the domestic tug and pull behind particular policies. Various domestic actors might have security and/or economic concerns in mind, and one must inductively examine what their preferences are and how they try to advance them. Preferences and calculations by political entrepreneurs and domestic actors are necessary components of any complete explanation.
One might thus explain the Single European Act by the convergence in political outlook of Mitterrand, Thatcher, and Kohl, in the early 1980s. One could also argue, more generally, that political leaders focus on the provision of public goods so as to maximize their chances for re-election. Since expansion of the European market provided efficiency gains, political leaders had strategic incentives to supply such policies. 8
Within this same approach one might meld the international systemic approach with domestic analyses. At the international level, pressure by the U.S. in the negotiation rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the rise of the Japanese economy, required a European response. At the domestic level, multinational companies wished to meet such competition by regionally integrating their operations and pursue efficiencies of scale. 9
In short, a variety of approaches in international relations theory have been fruitfully applied to the study of the EU. European cooperation, however, has also generated more narrowly focused theories that are explicitly oriented to explaining regional integration. One such set of arguments traces its origins to Karl Deutsch’ s views on the impact of increasing interactions and communications. Deutsch argued that the growth of mobility and the increasing volume of communications would diminish tensions and divisions among populations. The result would be a security community, a community of distinct units between which war had become obsolete. Such communities could amalgamate and become one (the United Kingdom, for example), or they could be pluralistic and retain their independence (e.g., Canada and the U.S.). In this sense, the European Union might be explained as a gradual shift from state anarchy to a pluralistic security community, which in the very long run might amalgamate.
Functionalist theory, advocated particularly by David Mitrany, also sees dynamic and increasing returns to cooperation. But it does so largely from a technical perspective. Cooperation on one issue will lead to technical spillover in other areas. This will create a cascade of ever further cooperation in many areas previously not envisioned. For example, if one wished to liberalize trade in coal and steel, one would soon come to the conclusion that this also would require standardization of railroad gauges, working hours, safety standards, and so forth.
Neofunctionalism, particularly associated with the works of Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, emphasizes not only the result of technical spillover but also the political dynamics involved. Rather than assume some technological process of ever increasing integration one must ask whether there are political benefits for certain actors to advocate further integration. If this occurs one has political spillover. Neofunctionalists realized that domestic interests and interventionist governments could halt technical spillover. In order to keep integration on track one needs to create political groups and leaders who have an incentive to keep the process of regional cooperation going. Two such actors might be interest groups who benefit from further integration and supranational bureaucracies. The latter, as with all bureaucracies, will seek to expand and increase their functions and budgets. Hence, from this perspective, the European Commission has a vested interest in pursuing ever further integration.
Scholars have found merit in various elements of all these theories. In general though it seems fair to conclude that systems level theories that take states as unitary actors, or process theories that look at long term underlying dynamics, are better at delineating possible trends rather than particular policy decisions. For the latter one needs a more refined look at the internal dynamics within specific countries and the demands by private actors for further integration, coupled with an account of the strategic incentives facing politicians to ignore or cater to such demands. The broader systems and process theories fail to capture the aspects of individual agency, the multi-dimensionality of European integration, and the stop-go nature of such integration in the past decades.
Endnotes
Note 5: See Grieco 1995.Back.
Note 6: For a discussion of various theoretical approaches, see George 1996; Nelsen and Stubb 1994.Back.
Note 7: The argument is made most explicitly by Keohane 1984.Back.
Note 8: Mattli 1999 makes this argument.Back.
Note 9: See Sandholtz and Zysman 1989.Back.
Note *: Lucy E. Lyons is Coordinator for Social Sciences in the Collection Development Division of the University Libraries of Arizona State University. She is authoress of several articles, including bibliographical works in military and political sciences. Prior to her present position, she was a bibliographer and reference librarian at the Central Research Library of the New York Public Library. Back.
Note **: Hendrik Spruyt is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Arizona State University. His book The Sovereign State and Its Competitors won the J.David Greenstone Prize for best book in history and politics, 1996. He has published more than a dozen chapters and articles in, a.o., International Organization, The Review of International Political Economy, The International Studies Review, and The Review of International Studies. He was formerly Associate Professor at Columbia University and a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He is currently working on a book explaining the various modes of territorial dissolution in the post-war period. Back.
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