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Iraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in BaghdadIraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in Baghdad (Full Text, PDF, 34 pages, 60 KB)
Historical Controversies
a) Is Kuwait really a part of Iraq?
After the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi government justified its action by claiming that Kuwait was legitimately part of Iraq (its "19th province"), broken off from Iraq by British colonialism. The Iraqi claim is based on the fact that the Ottoman Empire never relinquished its claim to Kuwait, considering it part of the province of Basra. The League of Nations mandate, which established the state of Iraq, referred to it as being composed of the former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Therefore, in the Iraqi logic, Kuwait should have been part of Iraq from the outset. Twice before Iraqi governments have raised this claim. In 1938, the Hashemite monarchy asserted the claim, but did not act upon it. In 1961, upon Kuwait's independence from Great Britain, the Iraqi government of Abd al-Karim Qasim revived the claim, and moved troops toward the border. Great Britain immediately sent troops to defend Kuwait, and a number of Arab states that were opposed to Iraq on other grounds also sent troops to support Kuwaiti independence. Ironically, it was the Ba'thist regime that formally recognized Kuwaiti independence by sending an Iraqi ambassador to the country.
The area around what is now Kuwait City has been under the control of the Al Sabah family, the ruling family of Kuwait, since the 18th century. At times, when it served their purposes, they would accept Ottoman officials in the city and fly the Ottoman flag. But the Al Sabah rulers would also expel those Ottoman officials and conduct direct relations with other powers if that served their purpose. In 1899, Shaykh Mubarak Al Sabah, then the ruler, entered into an agreement of protection with Great Britain. The British kept the agreement secret, so as not to complicate their relations with the Ottoman regime. From that point onward, Great Britain was the dominant outside power in the politics of Kuwait, up to Kuwaiti independence in 1961. Kuwaitis argue that the ability to make and keep international agreements is a sign of independence, and thus take the 1899 agreement as a sign that Kuwait was, in reality, independent of the Ottoman Empire before there was any thought of a state of Iraq. In 1913, British and Ottoman representatives initialed a draft agreement in which London recognized Ottoman formal sovereignty over Kuwait in exchange for an Ottoman declaration that Kuwait was an autonomous district of the empire and an Ottoman promise of non-interference in Kuwaiti internal affairs. That agreement, invoked by the Iraqis during the Gulf War, was never ratified, as it was overtaken by World War I and the subsequent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
Legal questions aside, the best test for whether Kuwaitis think that Kuwait is part of Iraq is how they reacted to various Iraqi claims. In 1938 there seemed to be some popular sentiment in Kuwait for union with Iraq, on Pan-Arab and anti-British grounds. By 1961, Kuwait's oil wealth was well-established, and public support for its independence was high. There was little public support in Kuwait for the Iraqi claim then. In 1990, no prominent or even semi-prominent Kuwaiti was willing to serve in the Iraqi occupation authority. There was considerable popular resistance within Kuwait to the Iraqi occupation. 51 Again, setting legal questions aside, it seems clear that a substantial portion of Iraqi opinion holds that Kuwait should be part of Iraq, and that it was only through British colonial manipulation that Kuwait retained its independence.
b) Was there an American plot against the Iraqi regime in 1989-90?
This question will only be answered definitively (if it can be answered definitively) when the American diplomatic archives on the period are opened. Until then, the best that can be said is that there is no evidence of a concerted American policy to destabilize the Iraqi regime in 1989-90. American policy might better be described as working at cross-purposes to Iraq. The United States was clearly becoming concerned during this period with Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear and other non-conventional weapons. Financial scandals revolving around agricultural credits granted to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War were making news and raising concerns in Washington. Important members of Congress questioned whether the American "tilt" toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War should be continued, andSaddam's increasingly bellicose rhetoric in early 1990 was criticized by American officials. However, the Bush Administration, in both its diplomatic contacts with Baghdad and its public statements, emphasized that it wanted a cooperative relationship with Baghdad. It opposed the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq, a prospect raised in Congress. Reassurance, not threats, was seen as the best way to moderate Iraqi behavior. 52
One does not have to accept the fact that there was an American-led conspiracy against Iraq to accept that Saddam's belief in such a conspiracy profoundly affected his decision-making in this crisis. Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq through conspiracy, suspected other Iraqis of conspiring against him and saw regional politics through the prism of conspiracy. It is not surprising that he would piece together bits of evidence of American hostility, read into the actions of others a purposefulness that was not there, and come to interpret his own difficulties as the result of the machinations of others. It is said that even paranoids have real enemies, and Saddam certainly had his share. But the characteristic trait of paranoids is to create enemies where none existed. Saddam Hussein certainly fits the bill.
c) Why not use chemical weapons against the coalition?
While subsequent investigations by U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq established that Iraq was closer to developing nuclear weapons in 1990 than was generally thought, it seems that Iraq did not have a nuclear capacity during the Gulf War. However, Iraq had a clearly established chemical weapons capability. Iraqi chemical weapons had been used against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and against the Iraqi Kurdish city of Halabja in 1987, after it had been briefly occupied by Iranian forces. There is evidence that Iraq armed missile warheads with VX nerve gas in the period leading up to the coalition attack in January 1991. 53 Iraq launched missile attacks, armed with conventional warheads, on Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain during the fighting. If Iraq had chemical weapons and the capacity to deliver them, why were they not used?
The answer seems to be effective deterrence. James Baker delivered a blunt threat to Tariq Aziz in their meeting in Geneva on January 9, 1991. If chemical or biological weapons were used against U.S. forces, Baker said, the American response would be to eliminate the current regime in Baghdad. Although Baker relates in his memoirs that President Bush had already decided not to retaliate with American nuclear or chemical weapons, he deliberately left the impression that Washington might "go nuclear" in response to an Iraqi attack with non-conventional weapons. 54 al-Samara'i told the makers of the documentary The Gulf War that the warning was "quite severe and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high." In the same program, Tariq Aziz, asked why Iraq did not use its non-conventional weapons, replied, "It was not wise to use such kind of weapons in such kind of war, with such an enemy." When pressed whether he meant an enemy with nuclear weapons, he said, "You can¨make your own conclusions." 55
Israel, also a nuclear power, probably conveyed a similar warning, indirectly, to Iraq, or perhaps such a warning was not necessary. The Iraqis knew of Israel's nuclear capacity and the high probability of an Israeli nuclear response to any chemical weapon attack on Israel.
Theoretical Relevance
The question of why leaders decide to go to war remains central to the study of international relations. Scholars working from different theoretical perspectives have tried to explain the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as fitting within their general explanations for war. Some have emphasized the personality of Saddam Hussein as the central factor: his aggressiveness, his ambition, his proclivity, both personal and political, to violence. 56 Without denying these descriptions of Saddam, I question whether his personality alone is enough of an explanation. His personality is a constant, and he had been the major force in Iraqi politics since at least the 1970's. Moreover, he had shown in the past an ability to retreat in the face of superior force. Undoubtedly a less ambitious, more risk-averse, more conflict-avoidant leader, facing the same circumstances that Saddam did in 1990, would have chosen a path other than invasion of Kuwait. But it was those circumstances, and not simply Saddam's personality, that triggered Saddam's decision to invade.
Another approach has been to look for an explanation of the Iraqi decision in the domestic political economy of Iraq. Scholars in this school emphasize the economic difficulties the Iraqi regime was facing, and see the invasion of Kuwait as a quick money grab by Saddam's regime aimed at alleviating a domestic economic and political crisis. 57 However, if domestic economic motivations were the central driving concern behind Saddam's decision, it is puzzling that he did not accept Kuwaiti financial offers before the invasion, pocket that money, and then come back to the table for more. Equally puzzling is why, in 1980, Saddam chose to go to war against Iran, even though Iraq was in the best financial and economic condition it had ever experienced. While it is possible that Iraq's 1980 and 1990 war decisions were made on completely different bases, an explanation that is consistent with both decisions is more intellectually satisfying and reliable.
Other scholars have emphasized the international systemic inducements for Iraq to invade. Kuwait was a weak country, an easy target for Iraq. Kuwait's oil riches would add to Iraq's power in the Middle East, and help Saddam achieve his goal of regional leadership. No regional power could block the invasion; Iran was immobilized after its own war with Iraq, and other Arab countries were either aligned with Iraq or afraid of it. In this view, the American policy of reassurance probably encouraged Saddam to believe that the United States would not take a strong stance against an Iraqi fait accompli. 58 This "offensive realist" rationale for an attack on Kuwait, however, had existed for some time. The military balance always favored Iraq over Kuwait. Both the Arab states and the United States needed Iraq more in the 1980's, when the Iranian revolution was young and seemingly poised to sweep through the Middle East. Moreover, if Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was based simply on a favorable cost-benefit analysis, it would have made much more sense for him to wait a year or two until his nuclear program had produced usable nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iraq might have made potential adversaries think twice about whether the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty was worth the risk.
The explanation put forward in this case study borrows elements from all three "levels of analysis" described above. But it filters them through the prism of Saddam Hussein's belief that threats were mounting to his regime and his hold on power. His personality is certainly important here, but more in terms of his conspiratorial view of politics than in terms of his ambitions. He saw his domestic economic crisis not simply as a matter of incorrect policies, but as part of a conspiracy to weaken him. He thought he could "get away" with the grab of Kuwait and strengthen his domestic and regional position, but the evidence from Iraqi sources is that the invasion was not a long-planned, well-considered diplomatic-military coup. Rather, it was a reaction to what was perceived to be an increasingly difficult and threatening set of circumstances.
The sense that trends were moving against him, that he was in danger of losing power domestically and being targeted internationally, that something had to be done before things got worse, dominates Saddam's thinking in my reconstruction of Iraqi decision-making. The fact that Saddam exaggerated the threats against him does not detract from their importance. His perceptions of threat were crucial in framing his decision to take the risk of going to war against Kuwait, and in his decision to risk almost certain defeat by the coalition's military forces. This sense of threat as a spur to the risky decision to go to war is also consistent with his decision-making in 1980, as he saw the contagion effects of the Iranian Revolution as a potential threat to Ba'thist rule in Iraq itself.
Saddam was certainly not blind to the benefits a successful absorption of Kuwait would have for him, his regime and for Iraq. His sense of the threats around him also did not "make him crazy." He was deterred from using non-conventional weapons during the war by clear American threats. Perhaps if Kuwait had invited American troops in while the crisis was developing, he would have been deterred from invasion in the first place. But a simple cost-benefit analysis cannot explain why Saddam took the risks he did, first in invading Kuwait and then in not withdrawing in the face of superior force. Only by factoring in his sense of the threats around him, his fear that the course of events, if not altered, would ultimately destabilize his hold on power, can we come to a complete explanation of Iraqi decision-making in the Gulf crisis of 1990-91.
Bibliographic Essay
Much of the information in this case study about Iraqi beliefs and perceptions is based upon books written by two Iraqis who were on the inside of the regime before and during the Gulf War, but who have subsequently defected to the West – Sa'd al-Bazzaz and Wafiq al-Samara'i. al-Bazzaz was general director of Iraqi Radio and Television from 1988-1990, and editor of al-Jumhuriyya, one of the major Iraqi newspapers, from 1990-92. Gen. al-Samara'i ended his career after the Gulf War as director of military intelligence in the Iraqi army. He was deputy director during the Gulf War, and in charge of military intelligence on Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. al-Bazzaz now runs an Iraqi opposition newspaper, al-Zaman, out of London. al-Samara'i is active in Iraqi opposition circles.
The credibility of accounts provided by such figures could naturally be questioned. However, I am confident that the information they provide is accurate for a number of reasons. First, both authors, because of their positions, had close contacts with the inner circle of the regime. al-Samara'i had regular access to Saddam himself during the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, which is discussed in his book hatam al-bawaba al-sharqiyya [The Destruction of the Eastern Gate], (Kuwait: dar al-qabas, 1997) The information they provide has the ring of authenticity about it. Second, al-Bazzaz wrote two books about the Gulf War, one when he was still affiliated with the regime and the other after he had severed his ties (harb tulid ukhra [One War Gives Birth to Another], Amman: al-'ahliyya lil nashr wa al-tawzi', 1993; and al-janaralat 'akhr man ya'lam [The Generals Are the Last to Know], Amman: al-'ahliyya lil nashr wa al-tawzi', 1996). While there is new information in the second book, the basic story he tells does not change from the first book to the second. Third, if these authors were looking to make Saddam Hussein out to be even worse than he is in fact, they would have portrayed him as plotting the invasion of Kuwait for years and lying about the feelings of threat and insecurity that Iraq emphasized in the period leading up to the invasion. However, both authors confirm that the regime actually did see a conspiracy taking shape against it. Memoirs can always be questioned as to their reliability as primary sources, but in these cases the private information contained in them corresponds with what the public record shows about Iraqi perceptions.
The major English-language sources on the Gulf War are discussed in the notes to the case. The best general account of the Gulf War, including diplomatic and military fronts, American, Iraqi and other parties' participation, is Lawrence Freeman and Efraim Karsh's The Gulf Conflict, 1990-91 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). The most interesting account of Arab politics during the war is Mohammed Heikal's Illusion of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1993). Heikal was the close confidante of Gamal Abdul Nasser, president of Egypt from 1954–1970, and was editor of al-Ahram, Egypt's major newspaper. His access to the upper levels of the governing elite of the Arab world is unequaled.
Endnotes
Note 51: For an account of Kuwaiti views on these legal questions, and for evidence of Kuwaiti popular opinion during the Iraqi occupation, see Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 138-147; 155-158. The best account of the long history of disputed Kuwaiti-Iraqi border claims is David H. Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.Back.
Note 52: See the sources referenced in notes 2 and 3 above for extensive accounts of American policy in the period leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Back.
Note 53: Washington Post, June 23, 1998, p. A1. Back.
Note 54: Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 359. Back.
Note 55: Tariq Aziz interview, PBS documentary website, (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/2.html). Back.
Note 56: See Jerrold Post, "Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile," Political Psychology 12, no. 2 (1991); Laurie Mylroie, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," Orbis 36, no. 1 (1993); and Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," Survival 33, no. 1. Back.
Note 57: Chaudhry, "On the Way to Market," and Fred Lawson, The Social Origins of Egyptian Expansionism during the Muhammad Ali Period, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 156-171. Back.
Note 58: See Richard Hermann, "Coercive Diplomacy and the Crisis over Kuwait, 1990-1991," in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed., Boulder: Westview, 1994; Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," In Baram and Rubin, eds. Back.
Note *: F. Gregory Gause, III is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont, and director of the University's Middle East Studies program. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University, and was Fellow for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He has published two books — Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (Columbia University Press, 1990) and Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994) — and numerous articles on the international politics of the Gulf and the Middle East. He received in Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University (1987), and studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo (1982-83) and at Middlebury College (1984). Back.
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