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Iraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in BaghdadIraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in Baghdad (Full Text, PDF, 34 pages, 60 KB)
c) Why Not Withdraw?
It seems illogical that Saddam Hussein did not grasp at one of the many diplomatic ropes cast his way by Soviet, Arab and French intermediaries before and during the coalition forces' attack on Iraq that began on January 16, 1991. Given the size and technical superiority of the American-led coalition forces against him, and Washington's evident willingness to use force, a withdrawal from Kuwait that spared his army almost certain defeat and his country vast destruction would have seemed to be the best course of action for him. His army would have remained intact, and U.N. sanctions would have been lifted. But he chose the more risky path of military resistance, suffering a crushing defeat. Understanding Saddam's perceptions of his opponents and of the costs to him and his regime of withdrawal will help us to grasp why he followed the course he did.
From the August 2, 1990 occupation of Kuwait through the end of 1990, despite the build-up of American and coalition forces and the series of U.N. Security Council votes that went against Iraq, it seems that Saddam believed that he could avoid a serious military defeat. al-Samara'i reports that the political team around Saddam was convinced that the United States would hesitate to use force against Iraq, and the crisis would turn into a long political contest of wills. He says that Saddam described the strategy on a number of occasions as "holding on to the elephant's trunk," patiently waiting and drawing things out. 43 Saddam believed that, even in the event of an attack, his forces could hold out long enough for the coalition to fragment, as Arab public opinion rose up against Arab members of the coalition and as France and the Soviet Union split from the United States. As American forces sustained casualties, Saddam believed, public opinion in the United States would also turn against the war. As late as January 10, 1991, he told officials from military intelligence that "America is a weak country¨. We will not retreat from Kuwait and we will prevail!" 44
As January 15, 1991, the deadline for withdrawal from Kuwait established in U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, loomed closer, and after the air war against Iraq began on January 16, it became increasingly clear that Iraq would have to fight a large-scale war. al-Samara'i reports that Iraqi military intelligence sent numerous reports to Saddam Hussein that war was inevitable and that Iraq was not well positioned to resist. As the air war began, these reports warned of the very negative consequences for Iraq of a ground war. 45 Iraqi military intelligence also informed Saddam, during the air war, of large-scale Iraqi army defections within Kuwait. 46 While Saddam was receiving these reports and the air war began, he also saw that the coalition remained intact and that Arab coalition members were able to manage whatever public opinion problems they might have had. According to al-Samara'i, shortly after the air war began Saddam ordered Ali Hassan al-Majid, his cousin and son-in-law whom he appointed military governor of Kuwait, to prepare for the destruction of the Kuwaiti oil wells and other Kuwaiti installations, an indication that he was at least entertaining the prospect that he could not hold on to Kuwait. 47 With his original strategy revealed as badly flawed, Saddam might have been expected to reassess the costs and benefits of remaining in Kuwait and to seek out a diplomatic solution. However, he did not.
Saddam's own rhetoric changed about this time, from claims that Iraq would win a military confrontation (or at least not lose), to assertions that withdrawal from Kuwait would not bring to an end the "real cause" of the war – the perceived international conspiracy against his regime. On January 14, 1991 he told a visiting delegation from Yemen, "We have no guarantees if we withdraw¨. Why should we surrender at the last moment?" 48 On the eve of the ground war, after more than a month of sustained air attacks, he told Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov (who was trying to negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait), "If America decided on war it will go to war whether I withdraw from Kuwait or not. They are conspiring against us. They are targeting the leadership for assassination. What have the Iraqis lost? They might yet gain!" 49 After the war, Tariq Aziz was asked on the PBS documentary The Gulf War why Iraq did not withdraw when defeat seemed inevitable. He replied: "Iraq was designated by George Bush for destruction, with or without Kuwait. Inside Kuwait or outside Kuwait. Beforethe 2nd of August or after the 2nd of August." 50
In effect, since Saddam did not see withdrawal from Kuwait as removing the threat to his power, he was willing to take the very risky course of absorbing the coalition’s military attack, knowing from his own military intelligence that he was very likely to lose on the battlefield. The hope, against the odds, that something good might come for his regime from the destruction that his army and his country were enduring drove him to persevere. In a strange way, the fact that he survived in power despite the war, the popular uprisings against his rule after the war, and continued economic sanctions, confirmed the twisted wisdom of his choice.
Endnotes
Note 44: Ibid., pp. 237-38. Back.
Note 45: Ibid., pp. 237, 246-47; al-Samara'i interview with PBS, (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samarrai/1.html) Back.
Note 46: al-Samara'i PBS interview, (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samarrai/1.html) Back.
Note 47: al-Samara'i, hatam, pp. 284-85. Back.
Note 48: al-Bazzaz, harb, p. 265. Back.
Note 49: Ibid., p. 399. Back.
Note 50: Tariq Aziz interview, PBS documentary website, (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/2.html) Back.
Note *: F. Gregory Gause, III is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont, and director of the University's Middle East Studies program. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University, and was Fellow for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He has published two books — Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (Columbia University Press, 1990) and Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994) — and numerous articles on the international politics of the Gulf and the Middle East. He received in Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University (1987), and studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo (1982-83) and at Middlebury College (1984). Back.
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