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Early Warning and Early Response, by Susanne Schmeidl and Howard Adelman (eds.)
Dr. Abdur Rashid
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) has been assigned the mandate of constantly monitoring the global food supply and demand situation and alerting the international community to countries or regions threatened by serious food shortages or which have exceptional surpluses of food requiring donor assistance for disposal. In a period when the number and complexity of food emergencies has been growing, GIEWS continues to provide policy makers and relief agencies throughout the world with the most up-to-date and accurate information available. Yet having an effective early warning system is no guarantee that timely and adequate interventions will follow. Emergency assistance is not always mobilised in sufficient volume, or it arrives too late to avert famines and save lives. However objective early warning information continues to play a crucial role in ensuring that timely and appropriate action can be taken to avoid human suffering and loss of life. This paper outlines the experience of GIEWS in linking early warning with response mechanisms in recent food emergencies. It shows how effective early warning, rapid national/regional coordination and adequate international support have resulted in successful relief efforts which averted threats of famine and saved many lives.
1.Introduction
Hunger and famine are not new afflictions but are an endemic part of man’s history. In today’s modern world, however, enormous expansion of productive power should mean that no man, woman or child need go hungry, let alone die of starvation, though sadly this is not the case. Although, world per caput supplies of food for direct human consumption are today some 18 percent above what they were 30 years ago, this impressive progress has unfortunately bypassed a large number of countries and population groups. As a result, today over 800 million people suffer from chronic undernutrition. Most of these affected people live in 82 countries, classified as being low-income and food-deficit countries (LIFDCs). 1 These countries are caught in a trap: unable to produce sufficient food to feed their people while many of them are too poor to purchase food commercially on the world market. While the main thrust in mankind’s battle against hunger and malnutrition must clearly focus on this group of countries, concerted action is required to achieve food security for present and future populations in all parts of the globe. Fortunately, there are signs of optimism. The 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action lays the foundation for diverse paths to a common objective — food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels. It entails a pledge of political will and common and national commitment on the part of Heads of State and Government to achieving food security for all and to an ongoing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of undernourished people to half their present level no later than 2015. 2
At present, there are 26 countries facing food emergencies of varying intensity with millions of people affected by acute food shortages or threatened by famine due to man-made and/or natural disasters. Famine may be defined (in simpler terms) as a situation when a population group’s normal access to food collapses completely and mass starvation starts. Its causes are complex. However the assumption that if food production is affected by adverse weather, people will inevitably starve, is a misleading simplification. Nevertheless, crop failures could be a major contributory factor to famine. What distinguishes famine from endemic hunger is that famine is an acute breakdown of society with political repercussions while hunger remains the permanent lot of millions. It is not the intention of this paper to analyse the genesis of famine or its socio-economic and political implications but to briefly illustrate GIEWS experience of how relief operations have responded to early warnings in some recent food emergencies, to head off threats of acute food shortages and famines caused by natural disasters.
2. Early warning and response linkages
Food supply difficulties and problems arise from different sources and with different speeds. Difficulties could be the result of natural or man made factors, they could be abrupt or gradual or indeed, predictable or unpredictable. An appreciation of these different facets of food supply problems, however, is important in determining the nature of the overall problem and what appropriate interventions need to be put in place. From an early warning perspective the focus of systems like GIEWS is to raise awareness of problems in time, hopefully, to prevent or minimize the ultimate scale of future devastation. The ultimate merit of the System, therefore, is its ability to provide information in a timely and effective way to prompt action. Our experience and assessments also show that immediate/abrupt food problems may sometimes only compound more gradual long-standing and underlying problems. By alerting the international community of this distinction, GIEWS aims to ensure that appropriate and meaningful responses are made not only to address the immediate problem but also to draw attention to food supply difficulties in the medium and long term. A recent example of this is GIEWS assessments of the food supply problems in Korea DPR, as outlined below.
Increasingly, we are seeing that it is important to focus on sections of the population that are most vulnerable to food shortages or famine. We know that extreme food supply difficulties can persist in the midst of plenty and that specific vulnerable groups are constantly under threat of starvation or malnutrition. In addition to more ‘traditional’ examples of this type of vulnerability, in Africa and Asia, there are now emerging groups in transitional economies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). GIEWS is continually involved in developing methods and systems to address the issue of vulnerability. The task is not easy as there are a host of complex and multicorrelated factors that affect the ability of any one individual or a group to access food. On the whole, therefore, knowledge of the communities vulnerable to food insecurity and their behavioural response, when threatened by acute shortages, are important ingredients in an effective early warning system.
Unfortunately, in many instances, early warning does not necessarily mean early response, or indeed any response at all. Examples of this include areas where civil strife or war hamper relief distributions, or where political factors prevent intervention. Added to this is the factor of donor fatigue due to resource constraints. This brings us to the point therefore that early warning is an essential but not necessarily a sufficient component to prompt response. Nevertheless there is an increasing recognition that early warning aimed in preventing disasters, or at least limiting their effects, is far more cost effective than actually having to deal with the effects of the disaster. Recent examples where this has occurred include Somalia and the Great Lakes Region, where prevention measures would have been much more cost effective, and saved many lives, than the expense of billions of dollars in post disaster interventions.
3. Case Studies on Effective Early Warning and Responses
There are numerous examples where early warnings provided by GIEWS have prompted effective responses leading to successful relief operations. In this connection, two recent case studies dealing with Southern Africa and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are outlined below:
3.1 Southern Africa
3.1.1 Background
Southern Africa comprises 12 countries with an estimated total population of 125 millions in 1996. The sub-region shows a marked diversity in economic conditions with per caput GNP ranging from less than US$ 250 in the poorer countries (Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique) to over US$.2,500 in relatively affluent countries (Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa). Although in recent years the sub-region has achieved a remarkable degree of peace and political stability, two countries affected by past civil strife, Angola and Mozambique, are still faced with serious problems. Prolonged civil strife has dealt a heavy blow to these economies and resulted in massive displacement of population. Major challenges to revitalize the economy include the settlement of millions of demobilized soldiers and returnees, implementation of comprehensive demining programmes, rehabilitation of infrastructure and the restoration of service sectors. Nevertheless, with the strengthening peace process, the situation is gradually improving.
Southern Africa possesses a tremendous agricultural potential. Although the sub-region contains some 20 per cent of total population of sub-Saharan Africa, it accounts for 27 per cent of the total cereal production. Per caput cereal output in the sub-region, estimated at 196 kg is significantly higher than 146 kg for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. With some two-fifths of the very limited irrigated land of sub-Saharan Africa located in Southern Africa (mainly Madagascar and South Africa), yields in sub-region were some 50 per cent higher than the rest of the region in 1996. In normal production years, the sub-region is self-sufficient in coarse grains (with South Africa and Zimbabwe as traditional exporters) but imports small quantities of wheat and rice. However, serious weather anomalies frequently result in substantial drop in production necessitating large increases in cereal imports, including food aid.
3.1.2 Drought-Induced Food Emergencies
The sub-region has periodically been hit by droughts. The 1991/92 drought, the worst for many decades, devastated the subregion’s agricultural production and resulted in unprecedented import requirements. As a result of the drought, cereal production in the subregion dropped 50 percent from average and the cereal import requirements more than doubled. Some 18 million people faced the prospect of starvation. Fortunately, early warnings, rapid regional coordination and adequate international support resulted in a successful relief effort which effectively overcame widespread food shortages and the threat of famine. The sub-region was again gripped by drought in 1994/95 which seriously reduced food production. The impact of this drought, though serious, was much less devastating than in 1991/92.
1991/92 Drought
The rainy season started on time (in October 1991), but subsequent precipitation was below normal, seriously retarding crop development in several countries. Until early January 1992, crop conditions were still good in most parts. However, prolonged hot and dry conditions in January and February during the crucial pollination stage severely affected crop growth throughout the subregion except in Angola, causing widespread crop failures or seriously reducing yield potential. Rains in March came too late to save crops in most countries as, although they did benefit pastures and limit the drought’s impact on the livestock sector in some countries, irreversible damage to food crops and livestock had already occurred in most areas. The chronology of the evolution of the 1991/92 drought emergency and response is described below.
| 1991/92 Drought |
| Dates | Early Warning and Monitoring Activities | Action Taken |
|---|---|---|
| Oct. 1991 | Rains and crop season start | Normal regular monitoring |
| Dec. 1991 | FAO and REWU gave initial early warning of impending drought following below normal rainfall | Close monitoring starts: GIEWS, NEWU/REWU |
| Jan/Feb 1992 | Drought situation confirmed, widespread crop failures, severe food and water shortages, low levels of food stocks, poor state of livestock and population movements reported. | Contingency planning initiated by countries of the region |
| March/April | FAO/WFP Missions fielded to the sub-region | Emergency Operations approved jointly by FAO and WFP to cover urgent relief needs |
| April 1992 | Special Alert issued by FAO/GIEWS to international community on need for massive assistance requirements in food and other items. | Regional Task force set up by SADC countries to coordinate relief efforts, including procurement, allocation and transport of food imports Regional Logistic Advisory Centre established with assistance from WFP and donors |
| June 1992 | 1992 UN/SADC Consolidated Appeal based on FAO/WFP missions findings issued, requesting: - 4.1 million tons of food aid; 1.8 million tons of targeted food aid (82% covered by donors); 2.3 million tons of programme food aid (89% covered by donors); US $ 223 million for non-food assistance (water, health care, agriculture and livestock inputs) received less attention; logistics: more than double of requirements covered by pledges; concessional loans from World Bank allowed commercial imports |
1994/95 Drought
The 1994/95 cropping season in Southern Africa was characterized by delayed and below normal rains. This resulted in reduced plantings and necessitated replantings in several parts. Cereal fields and production were seriously reduced. However, cereal import requirements and the general impact of the drought was much less severe than the previous one.
| 1994/95 Drought |
| Dates | Early Warning and Monitoring Activities | Action Taken |
|---|---|---|
| Oct. 1994 | Start of rains and crop season | Normal monitoring starts |
| Dec. 1994 | Special alert issued by GIEWS indicating delayed and below average rains in several countries and its likely effect on crops | Intensified monitoring initiated by GIEWS in collaboration with SADC REWU |
| Jan. 1995 | Follow-up Special Alert issued by GIEWS confirming the onset of drought and impending food difficulties in most countries of the sub-region | Contingency plans initiated by the governments of affected countries (control of crop losses by pests and diseases and management of cereal stocks held in sub-region) |
| March/April 1995 | FAO/WFP Missions fielded to sub-region provided quantitative estimates of food production cereal import and food aid needs. | FAO and WFP took initiative of approval of advance Emergency Operations for seriously affected countries to avoid delays in distribution of relief assistance |
| June 95 | SADC appeal to international community issued | Donor pledges for 1 million tons of food aid received. Provision of agricultural inputs (quality seeds and tools) by FAO and other donors to farmers in affected countries to rehabilitate agricultural production. |
Results
Close monitoring by GIEWS in collaboration with REWU alerted the governments in the affected countries and the international community to an impending major food crisis. Effective coordination among countries of the sub-region and the UN system as well as positive response by donors averted the threat of famine in 1991/92. As a result of the experience of the 1991/92 crisis, the impact of the 1994/95 drought emergency, while serious, was much less devastating than the previous one.
GIEWS positive role in the drought induced food emergencies in the sub-region was commended by the international community. More recently, at the October 1996 session of FAO Council, a major donor delegation appreciated the System’s contribution in the following words: A In our view, the most important role of FAO in this (disaster preparedness and prevention) field is early warning. Here we feel that FAO has done excellent work over the years. Perhaps the best example was the Southern African drought when FAO was able to alert the world at a sufficient notice so that large quantities of food were moved in time to avoid starvation in Southern Africa. In our view, many lives were saved because of this very skilful handling of what could have been a major humanitarian catastrophe.
3.2 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
3.2.1 Background
Korea DPR is presently in the midst of an economic crisis, principally brought on by its difficulty in adapting to a changing world economy and the loss of traditional markets. The disintegration of the USSR, and much of its traditional barter trade, and the rapid pace of economic liberalization in China and much of the eastern bloc has effectively led to the cessation of privileged economic ties with these countries, on which the economy depended heavily in the past. In spite of this deterioration in trade, however, the country has resolutely followed an economic policy based on self-reliance. This, in turn, has reinforced its economic isolation and has meant that modernisation of the productive sector has failed to keep pace with that of main competitors in the region. These economic problems have manifest themselves in falling productivity and output in the agriculture sector, as domestic production of fertilizers and imports of essential chemical and other inputs, like fuel and spare parts, have fallen appreciably in recent years. In addition to these, food production is constrained by geography, land availability and climate, which have resulted in a system of agriculture which is characterised by short fallow periods, high plant densities, high doses of chemicals and very limited crop rotations. Inevitably such a system has led to declining soil fertility and precarious situation where more fertilisers and chemicals are needed to maintain output, but less are available because the country cannot afford imports. As a result yields have declined. The fine balance in agriculture, therefore, can easily be upset by natural calamities such as floods in 1995 and 1996, ecological damage and declining fertility.
Prevailing input and land constraints mean that the country can simply not produce enough food grains to meet demand and has growing dependence on imports. The capacity to import food commercially, however, is highly constrained by an extremely weak economy, the consequent lack of foreign exchange and large international debts. These factors together have meant that Korea DPR has had to resort to fairly desperate measures such as the use of barter trade to counter food supply problems over the last year. The terms of trade against such transactions, however, mean that it is costly in resource terms, whilst its unpredictability and lack of sustainability mean that it does not offer a long term solution.
Flood-Induced Food Emergency in 1995 and 1996
Even in normal weather years, food production and supply in Korea DPR are insufficient for its population given the state of its economy and agriculture. Against this back-drop, a serious food emergency developed in 1995, when widespread floods destroyed large crop areas and vital agricultural structures. Again in July 1996 a re-occurrence of extensive flooding reduced domestic food production further and exacerbated the ongoing emergency situation. In the circumstances, the country has had little recourse other than to appeal for international assistance. Through-out the emergency, FAO has played an important role in not only alerting the international community of the extent of the problem but also in promoting response. This has been all the more important as prior to 1995, when the first FAO/WFP mission was mounted to assess the food situation, little was known about the country. A brief background to the emergency and the sequence of early warning and response is outlined below.
| Dates | Early Warning and Monitoring | Background/Response |
|---|---|---|
| Background: During 1990s economic slowdown and reduced import capacity result in large drawn of food stocks to almost zero. | ||
| Aug/Sept 95 | Extensive floods destroy hundreds of thousands of hectares of crop land in addition to agricultural structures. GIEWS intensifies its monitoring of the situation. consequent lack of foreign exchange and large internation UN interagency mission with FAO participation mounted to Korea DPR |
Emergency Operation (EMOP) jointly approved by FAO & WFP for 8.8 million dollars for food and vegetable oil for 500,000 worst affected people for 3 months. |
| Oct/Nov 95 | GIEWS through its periodic publication Food Crops and Shortages warns of a tight food situation developing. | In the absence of response by donors, WFP provides 5000 tons of rice from own resources. WFP establish office in Pyongyang |
| Dec 95/Jan 96 | AO WFP Crop Assessment Mission to Korea DPR — findings highlight serious food supply difficulties, exacerbated by floods and economic difficulties. Special Alert issued by GIEWS 24 December advocating urgent international emergency and programme food assistance. |
Country receives additional Programme food assistance through bilateral channels, though overall pace of assistance still inadequate. |
| Feb/March 96 | GIEWS makes statement to the US Congressional House Committee on International Relations (Sub-Committee on Asia) on the Food and Agricultural situation in Korea DPR. | During the course of the hearing, indication given that the US had pledged $ 2 million assistance on the basis of the FAO assessment. |
| May/June 96 | In view of deteriorating food situation, FAO/WFP fields Assessment Mission to Korea DPR — Special Alert issued May 1996 warning that pace of emergency assistance had been very slow and that nutritional standards were falling fast. | Launch in June 1996 of UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Flood Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Korea DPR., including 70 000 tons in food assistance and agricultural rehabilitation package. |
| July/Aug 96 | Re-occurrence of floods affects some 300,000 hectares in key agricultural areas in the south FAO/WFP Damage Assessment Mission evaluates 1996 flood damage. GIEWS Special Report issued Sept 1996. |
Extensive international media interest and coverage |
| Nov 96/Jan 97 | FAO/WFP mission to evaluate 1996 Floods and overall food supply situation. Special Report issued Dec 1996 – | Second, emergency Appeal for 100 000 tons of food assistance jointly approved by FAO and WFP. |
| FAO WFP Briefing on the food situation in Korea DPR at a donor meeting held at FAO Headquarters and appeal for the supply of seed and fertilizers. | ||
Results
In responding to the emergency situation in Korea DPR, GIEWS filled an important information gap in alerting the world of the agricultural and overall food situation in the country, especially as very little was known hitherto. As GIEWS assessments have been recognised as being objective and impartial in alerting the international community of the gravity of the food situation there has been considerable response. This includes, 70,000 tons in emergency food assistance and 400,000 tons in programme food assistance since the first alert in 1995. In addition the country has already received donor pledges to cover approximately 43 percent of the second emergency appeal issued in February 1997 for 100,000 tons. Donor have also pledged resources for 5,500 tons of barley seed, 2,000 tons of fertilizer and $107,000 for the purchase of pesticides for the introduction of a double crop of barely to promote greater food security.
4. Conclusion
Through technological break-through this century, the world can now potentially produce enough food to feed its population. Unfortunately, this has not happened, indicating that supply alone is not a sufficient measure to eradicate acute food shortages and the curse of famine. Added to this are periodic occurrences of calamities either man-made or natural that can take affected countries from relative calm and stability into catastrophe. In addressing these issues, there is, therefore, a moral and humanitarian obligation to reduce human suffering. In doing so there need to be two vital ingredients, early information that brings the nature and gravity of the problem to the attention of the world and effective action that mobilises collective resources to reduce suffering.
GIEWS has endeavoured for over twenty years to address the vital early warning ingredient to alert the international community to impending food crisis. The System’s strong conviction is that in providing early warning information, the international community has a rational basis on which to act on time. Added to this, is the System’s reputation for being independent and objective. However, even though GIEWS is continuously striving to improve the speed, quality and overall effectiveness of information delivery, the System in itself cannot guarantee that timely and adequate response will ensue to avert severe food shortages or famine. This responsibility, has a much wider dimension, but as shown in the paper, early warning information has undoubtedly a crucial role to play in avoiding major food crises.
Endotes
Note 1: Includes all food deficit countries with per caput income below the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance (i.e. U.S.$1,395 in 1994), which in accordance with the guidelines and criteria agreed to by the CFA should be given priority in the allocations of food aid. Back.
Note 2: World Food Summit: Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, 13-17 November 1996, Rome, Italy. Back.
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