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Early Warning and Early Response, by Susanne Schmeidl and Howard Adelman (eds.)
Major D.M. Last, Ph.D.
The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International
Peacekeeping Training Centre
Fact-finding missions and military observers have been deployed by the United Nations and by regional organizations. They have relied heavily on military personnel, and have often been deployed after it is evident that violent conflict is likely or is in progress. The information they provide, at considerable personal risk, may add little to the international community’s ability to respond to or prevent violent conflict. If they are structured, trained and deployed to address the many dimensions of incipient violence, they can be sued to help galvanize international response. Adding police, judicial, socio-economic political and media analysis elements to observer missions would increase their capacity to observe non-military dimensions of growing conflict. High-level liaison officers from the mission to international bodies might allow the international community to respond more effectively, and lend added credibility to the mission’s activities. In conjunction with international bodies, a mission media cell could help shape the international view of an emerging crisis, to elicit early response. The next generation of observer missions should have multi-functional headquarters with analysis and assessment units, liaison to international bodies, effective team preparation and realistic media strategies.
Introduction
United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) Missions and civilian fact-finding missions have been deployed by the United Nations and by regional organizations for a variety of purposes at various stages in the escalation and de-escalation of tensions. Are they effective components of an early warning system? Can they enhance early warning and response to incipient violent conflict?
This paper begins with some limitations of the current concept of military observer missions. It advocates expanding the concept for the employment of observer missions to make them more effective components in a responsive early warning system, for the detection, prevention and control of violence.
From the starting point of historical and contemporary experience of observer missions, some of their strengths and weaknesses are explored. Assuming that observer missions are to be used to improve our knowledge of potential violence and our ability to respond to it, the paper goes on to examine the types of information required and the ways in which it can be collected. This leads to conclusions about the way multi-functional missions might be structured to collect and analyse information, and the way that information might be moved and used by media strategies and high-level liaison. This is essentially a normative argument, drawing on experience and current practice rather than documentary evidence. The focus is on internal, rather than international conflicts, because of their prevalence.
Fact-finding and Military Observers
More than forty missions since 1947 have included military observers or expert fact-finding teams. Observer missions have typically been composed of military officers, usually unarmed, made up of multi-national teams and deployed for six months to a year at a time. Fact-finding missions have usually been made up of civilian experts who visit an area for no longer than is necessary to answer specific questions within their mandate—a matter of days or weeks. Both military observers and civilian fact-finders have the status of experts on mission. 1 Fact-finding missions have often been sent to areas of rising tension to investigate allegations and provide the necessary background information for diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute. They are a basic tool of preventive diplomacy and routinely employed in the resolution of disputes between states. 2 Observer missions have typically been deployed after a cease-fire . When the cease-fire is unstable, they may find themselves in the midst of a conflict of uncertain duration and intensity. The information individual military observers provide to their headquarters, perhaps at considerable personal risk, often adds little to the international community’s ability to respond to or prevent violent conflict. Understanding some of the ways in fact-finding and military observer missions have been used in the past gives an impression of their utility and limitations.
The United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB)
The first example of UN-sponsored fact-finding was the mission sent to the Balkans in 1947 at the request of the Greek government. Its mandate was to investigate the Greek government’s claim that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were supporting insurgents in Greece. The commission consisted of representatives (most government officials or diplomats) of eleven members of the Security Council. It worked between January and April 1947, visiting the countries in question, and reported that the majority of its members had found some evidence of support for the insurgency, and that Greek territorial claims in Macedonia and Thrace were aggravating the situation. Due to the objections of the USSR, the Security Council was unable to adopt the recommended resolutions, and removed the item from its agenda to allow the General Assembly to deal with the matter. The General Assembly called on all parties for restraint and established the UN Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB). UNSCOB was formed against the opposition of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, and worked without their cooperation. It remained in existence until 1951, submitting regular reports on the growing refugee problems, arms trafficking, and the abduction of children across international frontiers. UNSCOB was ineffective in pursuit of its mandate, largely due to lack of cooperation of the parties. It was disbanded in 1951 and replaced by the UN Peace Observation Commission which maintained a subcommission in the Balkans until 1954 when it too was disbanded. 3
Several factors contributed to the problems of UNSCOB and its successor. It did not have the cooperation of the parties to the conflict, nor the support of a Security Council still paralysed by the Cold War. Both the first mission and UNSCOB consisted of high-level government officials who acted on behalf of their governments, rather than as individuals on mission for the UN. UNSCOB was deployed in a manner which could verify Greece’s accusations, but not its neighbours’ denials. It seldom had a local physical presence on the frontiers or areas in question, relying on the aggrieved party to direct it to evidence. 4
The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
The conflict in Abkhazia began with social unrest and secessionist pressures. Efforts by the government of Georgia to protect a railway and other communications links in the summer of 1992 escalated into armed confrontations, resulting in about 200 deaths in mid-August 1992. A cease-fire was brokered in Moscow on 3 September with a Russian–Abkhaz–Georgian Monitoring and Inspection Commission to oversee its implementation. The agreement included an appeal to the UN and CSCE (now OSCE) to assist in implementation. The situation on the ground remained tense, and fighting resumed in June 1993. In July 1993 the Secretary General recommended an observer mission despite the risks to personnel. An advance team of 9 military observers and 8 civilian support staff arrived on 8 August and began patrols in liaison with the tripartite Georgian–Abkhaz–Russian interim monitoring groups. A joint commission was established on 5 August.
UNOMIG was established by Security Council Resolution 858 (1993) on 24 August. In the early stages of its deployment, the cease-fire broke down under Abkhaz attacks supported from outside Abkhazia. Both patrols and further deployments were suspended. A revised mandate for UNOMIG was considered, while the observers in place remained in Sukhumi. A fact-finding mission to Abkhazia investigated the human rights situation from 22 to 30 October, and noted serious violations by both sides, accompanied by almost complete devastation of large areas and massive displacement of population. UNOMIG’s mandate was extended to January 1994 with its existing strength of four observers. In January, the Secretary General recommended augmentation to 55 observers, and presented two options for an international force—a UN mission of 2,500 troops or a multi-national force acting under UN authority, whose actions would be monitored by UNOMIG. Security Council Resolution 896 (1994) extended the UNOMIG mandate and increased its numbers to 55, but took no action on an international force.
No progress was made at further talks in Geneva, and fighting broke out again in February 1994. In April 1994 a Declaration and Quadripartite Agreement were signed in Moscow, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) expressed willingness to send a peacekeeping force, and the Secretary General recommended that UNOMIG’s mandate be extended to monitor its operation. Security Council Resolution 937 (1994) expanded the mandate of UNOMIG to include tasks to: monitor and verify implementation of the Agreement; observe the operation of the CIS force; verify that troops do not remain in or re-enter the security zone; monitor storage areas; monitor withdrawal of Georgian troops; patrol specified areas; and investigate alleged violations of the agreement. The mission was increased to 136 military observers and the mandate extended to January 1995. Differences between the parties remained, and political negotiations continued. 5
Fact-finding, Observer Missions and “Early Warning”
Fact-finding missions have often been composed of experts and senior officials who have had both wide-ranging access to a crisis area, and the skills and background knowledge to identify problems likely to lead to violent conflict. Their mandates have sometimes constrained them in the exercise of these advantages. They have often been limited to flying visits, during which it has not been possible to collect or analyse all the information necessary, nor discern the subtle changes over time which indicate incipient violence. The gradual accumulation of local knowledge is also important for evaluating the risks and benefits of intervention, and the suitability of solutions devised elsewhere. Negotiators outside the region of conflict are often unaware of local conditions, and sensitive only to high-level pressures, not those generated from the grass-roots. They need both the expertise of fact-finding missions and the longevity and perspective of multi-functional observer missions.
It would not be fair to say that UNSCOB, UNOMIG or any of the other fact-finding or military observer missions were ineffective. They did have obvious limitations from which we can learn. They were not able to provide comprehensive and timely information about the evolving threat of violent conflict, nor to get that information in usable form to decision-makers and the international community. UNSCOB needed more balanced distribution and better cooperation by the parties. UNOMIG might have been deployed earlier, with a more diverse make-up and more comprehensive mandate. The fact that it was followed by a human-rights fact-finding mission illustrates the limitations of military observers, particularly in small numbers. The lessons from military observer and fact-finding missions in general can be summarized succinctly: get the mission to where it is needed early; get the mandate right; get the composition of the mission right (more diverse make-up is likely to be better); and prepare it for a complex task. Easier said than done, and previous missions cannot be faulted.
Information Required for Early Warning
With appropriate knowledge about how conflicts escalate and spread, we can link multi-functional observer missions more effectively to other means of early warning. This knowledge begins with the idea of stages in the escalation of a conflict, which is well-established. There is nothing inevitable about the progression of a conflict through stages. Protracted social conflicts like those in Lebanon, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere show repeated crises and remissions, sometimes erupting in war, and sometimes stopping well short of violence. Stages are simply a way of describing the nature and intensity of violence in order to indicate the appropriateness of different responses.
The UN’s programme on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief operations (MCDA Field Manual) lists four stages in the progression of vulnerability to humanitarian disasters. Underlying causes include poverty, limited access to resources, flawed economic system, and ideology. Dynamic pressures compound these underlying factors. They include the lack of institutions, education, training, appropriate skills, investment, markets and press freedom, and macro level forces such as population increase, urbanization, and environmental degradation. The third stage is entered with unsafe conditions and a fragile local economy. Finally, trigger events include war or civil conflict and natural disasters. 6 In a similar vein, Jean-H. Guilmette identifies five stages in the evolution of a conflict, during which different forms of intervention are appropriate. Guilmette suggests that effective development initiatives during malaise, crisis and denied conflict might forestall the violence of “open conflict”. During open conflict and war, diplomatic and military action strives to control and resolve the conflict, while humanitarian aid takes the place of development aid. With settlement comes a period of reconciliation and reconstruction and a return to development activities. 7 From a more sociological perspective, Acheson describes three stages in the breakdown of social order which leads to the threat of genocide. In the first stage, there are isolated individual threats, attacks and prejudice. The second stage is characterized by sporadic, often cyclical outbursts of unplanned violence. Shop-smashing, looting, arson and riots are typical incidents. The third stage is entered with the active participation of the state, the leadership of individual politicians, the use of police, armed forces and possibly the misuse of social welfare records to identify groups. 8
Each of these stages suggests indicators of rising violence, turning points in the early warning process, and increasing risks for the first-hand observers and analysts in-country. What these descriptive schemes do not do, however, is indicate the proximate and underlying causes of escalating violence. It is one thing for observers to describe the shift to increasing violence (assuming they are not caught in its midst and made ineffective, as UNOMIG and other observer missions have been); it is another to identify the probability of increasing violence before it happens, with sufficient certainty to elicit an international response. Observation missions charged with providing early warning therefore need to collect credible information on the proximate and underlying causes of violent conflict, and trace these causes to the changing pattern of violence which they are reporting. This is the first step towards useful early warning from the field.
Identifying the proximate and underlying causes of violent internal conflict yields a checklist of the sort of information early-warning observer missions need to collect. Michael Brown’s comprehensive work lists four sets of relevant factors: structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual. These are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Underlying and Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict 9
| Factors | Underlying Causes | Proximate Causes |
| Structural | weak states intra-state security concerns ethnic geography |
Collapsing states Changing intra-state military balances Changing demographic patterns |
| Political | Discriminatory political institutions Exclusionary national ideologies Inter-group politics Elite politics |
Political transitions Increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies Growing inter-group competitions Intensifying leadership struggles |
| Economic/Social | Economic problems Discriminatory economic systems Economic development and modernization |
Mounting economic problems Growing economic inequities Fast-paced development and modernization |
| Cultural/Perceptual | Patterns of cultural discrimination Problematic group histories |
Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination Ethnic bashing and propagandizing |
Few of these causes fall within the sphere of specifically military competence. Nor can many of them be observed effectively on a short fact-finding visit. Changing ethnic geography in the hinterland, the rise of exclusionary ideology, and perceived economic inequities all characterized the tensions between Muslims and Serbs in northwest Bosnia between November 1990 (the release of the census) and April 1992 (the Referendum result). Speaking in 1996 to Muslims and Serbs in Banja Luka, Prijedor and Sanski Most who lived through these events, it was clear there was no shortage of danger signs. However even by reading specialized news reports and corresponding with friends in Belgrade in 1990 and 1991, I had no indication of the problems on the horizon. This is not to say that these factors cannot be assessed from a distance. It is clear to me, however, that first-hand knowledge at a local level is certain to provide a more comprehensive and accurate picture of risk. The secondary effect of visible international observation might be to reinforce restraint and undermine extremists. There is therefore a need to structure and organize missions inside a country at risk to monitor these factors more effectively. Military observer missions or short-term fact-finding missions alone are inadequate.
Early warning missions should also be sensitive to the factors which are linked to severity of a conflict. External affinities which produce apprehension in identity-groups, powerful emotive group juxtapositions and stereotypes, historical experience of ethnic domination, and ethnically based parties are often evident in the most severe cases of inter-ethnic conflict. Competition for power within ethnic groups may also exacerbate friction between ethnic groups, as leaders attempt to mobilize followers or consolidate power. 10 This sort of information might be used to help analyse the information collected on each of the factors Michael Brown identifies. Two examples of the information collection before and after a violent conflict indicate the ways in which an early warning mission might function in practice.
Examples from Bosnia
A mission in Bosnia in 1990–1991, with the approval of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, might have had a regional office in Banja Luka or Biha_ responsible for the north-west. If constituted like the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers deployed later on, it might have provided information of impending violence as early as 1990, 11 and certainly would have yielded a much more accurate picture of events by 1991. Interviews at local level would have revealed that the economic downturn in the late 1980s had led to attempts by several groups, not all ethnically based, to gain control of worker-owned (“dichonic”) factories. Factory committees controlled housing and job allocation, and discrimination on ethnic grounds was evident as early as 1990, although the victims and perpetrators varied from factory to factory. Talking to local politicians and analysing local radio and newspapers would have yielded a clear picture of the formation and expansion of nationalist parties: first Izetbegovi_’s Muslim SDA (though not initially identified as a Muslim party) then the Croatian HDZ and finally the Serb SDS in November 1990. People travelling in the area as early as 1990 might have noted the appearance of nationalist symbols on police uniforms (Lilies for Muslims, and chequered shields for Croats, neither worn by Serbs on the same police force). The Serbian take-over of Radio Prijedor in March 1992 would have been a clear watershed. A police component to the early-warning team might have been able to discern the isolation and expulsion of non-Serbs from the local police forces, culminating in early 1992 as Serbs expelled from Croatian police forces in Sisak and Zagreb came to towns like Prijedor and Nova Gradiöka and were given police jobs there. The municipal defence departments charged with civil defence in cities like Prijedor, Banja Luka and Nova Gradiöka had taken on a more militant character by November 1991, and played an active role in the municipal coups of April–May 1992. Military observers might have noted this changing role, as well as the decreasing control of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the military reaction to defeat in Croatia. 12 Much of this information might have come too late to constitute “early warning” but might still have led to more effective international intervention at an earlier stage in the conflict, using all the means at the disposal of the international community.
Between 1990 and 1992, none of the means of observation was effectively deployed at local level; these warning signs, or cues for action, were not available. Now, in the aftermath of a settlement, such instruments are available. They can be used both to adjust international assistance to settlement and reintegration processes, and warn of impending renewal of violence.
The political and social information network now in Bosnia includes the Office of the High Representative and his regional offices, the UN Civil Affairs officers distributed to regional level, OSCE human rights monitors, and the EC Monitors, who continue to perform both economic and political monitoring and collection tasks. The International Police Task Force monitors police and the judicial system with the help of UN Civil Affairs, and is linked to political pressure through the Office of the High Representative. Military civil affairs, psychological operations, and media (information campaign) elements cooperate closely with the civil components of the mission. Economic analysis and assessment is performed by the International Management Group (IMG), which has local offices in regional centres in Bosnia, and also from a greater distance by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by the International Monetary Fund, both of which deploy field inspection teams periodically, supported by the local offices of the IMG. Military information is provided by the presence of a sophisticated international force with well-staffed headquarters and well-distributed units which have liaison officers down to local battalion level. Joint Military Commissions chaired by officers of the international force (normally held at Brigade level and higher) provide for close coordination between the international force and the parties to the regime. The transparency regime and information measures provided for by Annex 1B of the Dayton accord are supervised by OSCE inspections in which the parties to the agreement participate.
The comprehensive implementation regime now in place in Bosnia is probably too invasive to be considered as a model for an early warning regime. It is unlikely that any sovereign state would consent to such a mission. The contrast between international involvement in 1992 and in 1996 illustrates several aspects of the gap in information collection. We need much more effective collection and analysis of political, social, economic, military, and perceptual information. The situation within Bosnia must also be seen in its proper regional context, and different means for collecting this sort of information should be part of an early warning system.
Collecting Information on the Regional Environment
Any internal conflict can be positively or negatively affected by the involvement of outside players. There are a variety of reasons for international involvement in domestic conflict, stemming from various degrees of altruism and self-interest. Hegemonic ambition, a desire to restore or preserve regional stability, ethnic sympathy with the oppressed, a sense of national or international responsibility, and humanitarian concern are some of the reasons identified by Cooper and Berdal. 13 The European Community, in addition to its network of diplomatic contacts, deployed EC Monitors to countries bordering on the Yugoslav conflict. The further from the centre of the conflict, the more important are high-level contacts with decision-makers, and the less significant local observation will be. An exception to this might be regions of ethnic affiliation and border regions, where significant incidents might translate rapidly into policy changes. 14
Collecting Political and Social Information
The example from Bosnia, and the rapid escalation to violence, illustrates the need to look carefully at accelerators and decelerators of incipient violence. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse describe these in terms of domestic, regional and international implications of domestic social and political conflict. 15 In practical terms, this means that observers must be able to talk to local politicians, understand local politics and social pressures, and have the trust and confidence of a sufficiently broad spectrum of local personalities to collect information about the changing dynamics of domestic tensions at the local level.
In my experience, it is often difficult to interpret the things which you are being told by a local politician; the difficulty increases with translation, lack of familiarity with the local context and the complexity of the problems political leaders are dealing with. After several months in a community, some things which appeared clear are beginning to seem less certain, and much of the information previously gathered begins to take on new meaning as knowledge is gained of personalities, personal backgrounds, and local agendas.
To understand regional and international dynamics, the same is true on a higher level. The diplomatic community is probably best placed to do this, with one caveat. National diplomats naturally tend to preserve the confidentiality of their sources and relationships, and reserve the benefits of those relations for their own countries. Consortia of diplomats, like the Z–4 in Zagreb in 1995, may find a common cause, but there is still a need for missions from organizations like the OSCE and the UN, which share information more freely. The changing balance of political interests affects the rational calculation of costs and benefits of war, and this is a calculus in which military analysts should be involved. 16
The OSCE code of conduct forms a basis for expanding the concept of early warning and conflict prevention, by providing a means of measuring deviation from accepted norms. 17 In practice, this means either international observation at local level, or alliances with local groups dedicated to monitoring the standards of free-speech, media access, electoral fairness, human rights, and minority protection which are included in the OSCE code. The dilemma is that local groups may be the target of reprisals and restrictions at precisely the time when their information is most needed for early warning. International observers may be restricted or expelled, but this in itself constitutes a warning signal which might not come with the tightening of access to local groups.
At the regional and international level, the OSCE has five mechanisms which can be related both to collection of political and social information for early warning purposes, and to early response to problem areas. These are: (1) intensive political consultation; (2) implementation debates within the OSCE framework; (3) Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and their continuation through, for example, inspections and verification; (4) the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities; and (5) the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human rights. 18 Because each of these mechanisms creates its own flow of information and contacts, an early warning mechanism needs some access to them. In the case of the ECMM, informal links between the mission headquarters and the Centre for the Prevention of Conflict in Vienna helped in this regard. But the higher level mechanisms also need detailed information about regions of concern. Thus it was that EC monitors were commissioned to provide information on specific political, economic and social questions from time to time. The most useful reports were often those which provided specific examples of a general problem, such as treatment of minorities. 19 The implication is that observers at field level need to be familiar with the mechanisms which might be used to take action. For example, the Vienna Mechanism on Military Developments, the Moscow Mechanism on Human Dimension Developments, and the Berlin Mechanism on Serious Emergency Situations, are not always understood by those who are collecting information from local mayors, chiefs of police and garrison commanders. 20
My own experience with “comprehensive fact-finding missions” is that they have a limited capacity to set up interviews with the right people on short visits into a confused theatre. They must rely on those already in place. Several European delegations had to rely on UNPF to set up meetings and interviews for their visits to Croatia. Since the visitors do not who is there to speak to, and those in place do not know in advance what questions are to be asked, getting the right answers may be a matter of serendipity.
Systematically collecting political and social information, and using it effectively for early warning requires expertise and carefully cultivated contacts at local, national and regional/international level. It also requires understanding at each level of the capabilities and requirements of the “early warning system” at higher and lower levels. This suggests a need for liaison, familiarization visits, and direct communications. Training and preparing teams to work together would also be useful.
Collecting Economic Information
The relative deprivation hypothesis linking economic hardship to violent conflict is widely accepted, though not well-supported with empirical data. 21 It is likely that the impact of macro-economic indicators on inter-ethnic conflict is ambiguous, but probably marginal. 22 Micro-economic indicators and distributional issues are more likely to be related to the sort of inter-communal violence seen in the Balkans and former Soviet Union. The problem for early warning missions is that neither macro- nor micro-economic indicators are likely to be readily available. The figures available at a distance are probably unreliable (as were IMF and world bank figures for Yugoslavia in 1991) . Figures on inter- and intra-ethnic distribution may have surprisingly convoluted implications. Esman describes how Israeli hegemony has benefited the lowest economic class of Palestinians, who have taken menial employment in Israel; landed Palestinian gentry, a traditionally privileged group, have lost status and power; middle classes excluded from the new prosperity have become radicalized. Thus the impact of economic change has varied by socio-economic group, and the resultant impact on the likelihood of violent conflict can only be assessed by understanding the resulting intra-ethnic dynamics. 23 This suggests that collecting and analysing economic information might be better done in-country than at a distance. It is by observing the daily effects of economic inequity, mounting economic problems, development and modernization, and discriminatory economic practices that their implications for violence can be best understood.
If distribution is a key element in early warning, then observers should understand factors affecting distributive politics in ethnically diverse countries. These include ethnic patterns, regime type, and institutional context. Regime strategies for accommodating the economic power of ethnic minorities also need to be assessed. 24 In practice, this means understanding how local authorities respond to shortages, how distribution networks function, and how this affects individuals. Collective response to frustration and inequity may be rioting and violence in some circumstances and meek acceptance in others. This level of detail is difficult to judge from a distance.
Measuring return to normalcy after a conflict is part of the process of providing early warning of impending breakdown. We have good examples of this process from the on-going mission Bosnia. Setting and measuring objectives may include: measuring housing reconstruction in particular areas to assess repatriation and resettlement; examining food security and food prices in particular areas; comparing morbidity and mortality rates to historic examples; and assessing the restoration of markets and economic activity. 25 “Normality indicators”collected by the US Army Civil Affairs Teams in Bosnia in 1996 included such indicators as the price of bread, oranges, and underwear, and the frequency of truck and bus transport on particular routes. Aggregated at regional level, these indicators gave a rough impression of the return to normalcy, measured against events in the country as a whole. Collecting them, however, was time-consuming and manpower intensive.
Collecting Media Information
As with economic factors, the relationship between public information and violence is not precise. Domestic media may have more or less influence in on local actions, depending on the society, its predispositions, and other sources of information. Choices will have to be made about the types of media to monitor, and the effort to devote to each. Domestic media in the local language has the greatest impact on the evolving conflict. Examining the international media’s influence on decision-makers, Nik Gowing has concluded that the CNN factor is only suggestive rather than directive, and is often seen by leaders as trite and crude. 26 The international media, however, might be a useful vehicle to shape international response.
Several types of information about the media are relevant to early warning. The degree of public and special-interest access to the media can be assessed by asking groups that seek access. Impartiality of access may vary from station to station and newspaper to newspaper, or it may be set by national policy. If set by central policies, this may actually help to prevent incitement to violence by keeping fringe groups out of the public media. A second problem is assessing the sort of material which is being broadcast. Sampling is an option, but material on local stations and in local newspapers may be more virulent than the central services which are easily monitored in capital cities. In most countries, translation will be an issue, and the quality and speed of translation will influence the degree to which local media is transparent to observer missions. Contact with independent journalists and international networks might work in low-risk environments, but may no longer be viable as the situation deteriorates. Even the ability of an observer mission to use local help may be undermined by pressure on translators or their families.
There are non-governmental groups with expertise in monitoring and assessing media. OMRI, the Soros Foundation and Broadcasters Without Borders are examples of organizations which might be able to assist with some aspects of media monitoring, if connected appropriately to an early warning mission. Their main contribution might be in the form of theatre-familiarization and education for the observers, to ensure that the right sorts of information about the media are collected.
Collecting Military Information
While monitoring open media in most societies is uncontroversial, military observers on an early warning mission may have to tread a fine line between information gathering and activities perceived as hostile spying. The risk of collection increases as the risk of violent conflict intensifies, because of the demands of operational security. If “confessional affiliation” is a principle for selecting the observers, then each community might reasonably expect non-affiliated observers to be biased against its interests. 27
The key to monitoring effectively without being accused of spying is liaison. This is well expressed by Colonel Peter Williams, a Chief Military Observer for UNPF, who argues that liaison is one of the essential functions of observation. 28 By maintaining open and honest communications with military units, by building trust and confidence between commanders, and by assuring the prospective parties to a conflict that information revealed to the observer will be treated in confidence, military observers can collect military information effectively. This implies restrictions on the behaviour of observers, such as not carrying marked maps or making notes on patrol. It should not imply any restrictions on their freedom of movement, which should be negotiated at the highest level and exercised vigorously.
The types of information collected by a military observer mission vary, but should include evidence of armed movement, irregular troops, clandestine arming or training, changing intra-state military balances, mobilization of reservists, new restrictions on movement near bases or training areas, para-military activity by the police or plain-clothes units, and so on. All of these might be useful indicators of rising tensions or preparation for armed conflict.
After a conflict, military observers might be deployed to provide early warning of likely breakdown of cease-fire arrangements. Cease-fires are normally stable when one side is completely defeated, when the parties have effective governments which have agreed to the cease-fire and can control all the elements under their authority, and when there are few advantages and some costs to violating the cease-fire. An integrated military approach might include establishing a buffer zone, limiting forces in a particular area, and enforcing or monitoring air exclusion zones. 29 These factors might be used as indicators for a post-conflict early warning regime.
As a situation deteriorates, military observers in particular may find their activities increasingly restricted, increasingly risky, or both. In the case of the restrictions, it may be appropriate to exert political influence at various levels to retain free access to military information. This can be done if there is a close relationship between the officials involved in collecting and analysing political and social information and the military observer mission. In the case of increasing risk, an assessment should be made about the value of the additional information provided by the observer mission. In some cases it might not justify the personal risks taken to collect it. Revision to the posture or mandate of the observers would result. This is not limited to military observers, but in principle should apply to any observer in a potentially dangerous situation. One of the factors which might justify risk is the ability of the mission to mobilize international action in response to an impending crisis. If the information is not going to be acted on, then it makes little sense to expend lives to collect it.
Summary: the Information Requirement
If an early warning mission is to collect information on all the indicators which might be related to the onset of violent conflict, it cannot be limited to a short-term fact-finding mission, nor to a military observer mission. A combination of military, economic, political and media expertise is required. Many of the indicators cannot be collected or assessed effectively at a distance. A mission should expect to remain in-country for some time—certainly long enough to secure the trust and confidence of local leaders, and collect information effectively at first hand. Alliances with local groups, such as human rights groups, might be an alternative, but these may have crippling limitations as tensions increase. Free movement and free communications with local people are essential for collecting all of the sorts of information required. Communications between those collecting information at the lowest and highest levels are also necessary, if the right questions are to be asked.
Establishing an Early Warning Mission
Given the types of expertise required, what would an early warning mission look like? The first concern of an early warning mission is the collection and analysis of information. Beyond that, the mission must be structured to ensure that the information is effectively used. A third consideration is the preventive role which an early warning mission might serve without the addition of any further resources.
The Alternatives
The UN has seven main instruments to influence conflicts. Fact-finding missions, traditional peacekeeping missions (including both forces and observers), multi-functional peacekeeping missions (such as UNTAG in Namibia and UNTAC in Cambodia), and humanitarian assistance. 30 These four instruments are authorized under Chapter Six of the UN Charter and their effective use hinges on the consent of the parties. Sanctions and embargoes, judicial enforcement and military force are imposed on parties to a conflict, and have repercussions for use of the first four instruments. In the past, fact-finding missions have typically made a single report, (often behind closed doors), then dissolved. They have not been well placed to influence decision-making or build a constituency for preventive action. Recent examples include the Special Envoys to Burundi in 1993 and 1995, the Special Mission and Good Offices Missions to Afghanistan in 1994, and a mission to Rwanda in February 1995. 31 Yet Special Envoys and Fact-finding missions have far greater access to decision-makers during the brief span of their reporting period than do observer missions. They are impeded not by their duration, but by their limited ability to collect the sorts of information mentioned above, and their limited ability to get this information to international decision-makers.
Some conclusions about the effective management of multinational military interventions are relevant to multi-functional observation missions. General Andrew Goodpaster concludes that the UN has three basic alternatives for organizing missions: under UN command; under the control of regional organizations, or with ad hoc arrangements. Common doctrine within the framework of a regional organization (perhaps only NATO) affords the greatest coherence to a military mission. Command and control arrangements form the vital link between forming a mission and employing it effectively. Intelligence about the disposition and intent of parties to the conflict must be used to guide the mission, and comprehensive contingency plans should be prepared to respond to sudden changes in the mission’s environment. 32
Adding Dimensions to Observer Missions
The limitations of purely military observer missions have been mentioned. The ECMM represents a different sort of observer mission. EC Monitors lost some credibility early in the Balkan conflict for several reasons. Their “ice-cream man” appearance did not appeal to military men, although many monitors were serving or retired officers. Their unarmed status, armoured vehicles, excellent equipment and satellite communications should have allowed them to continue to operate during the worst of the fighting, but they were pulled back from risky situations early in the conflict. 33 Despite this, the EC Monitoring Mission had many of the characteristics desirable in an early warning mission.
EC Monitors were geographically dispersed in teams with responsibility for defined political boundaries. They had diplomatic status, and represented a range of military and civilian skills and backgrounds. They had a broad mandate to talk to local authorities, police, community leaders, in fact just about anyone within their area. They lived in local communities, paid for good quality translators, and were readily accessible to locals. The willingness of some teams to help individuals opened the door to sources of information and insight at the local level. Teams reported daily via secure satellite links. Their consolidated reports were on desks in the foreign offices of European capitals the following morning. Regional offices provided summaries and assessments based on multiple reports, and the headquarters in Zagreb included a sophisticated analysis and assessment branch with regional and functional experts, considerably larger than the Analysis and Assessment Unit attached to UNPF Headquarters. The mission was responsive to questions asked at higher levels to support the development of plans; monitors received direction to address specific issues (opportunities for micro-investment to employ demobilizing soldiers in May 1996, for example). All of these characteristics make the ECMM a useful model for an early warning mission. But the mission was not without its drawbacks.
Collecting Information
Although a high proportion of EC monitors were serving or retired military officers, their mandate was primarily political and social. As the situation stabilized with the introduction of IFOR, economic information was increasingly important. Many teams were ill-prepared to seek out the types of political, economic and social information which might be required for a typical early warning mission. Teams also had to cover very large areas. Typically, a two-person team covered four or five major municipalities, in an area which might take an entire day to drive across. Five municipal governments, five police forces, perhaps a dozen major economic enterprises and public utilities, minority communities, non-governmental organizations and so on. Given the constraints of travel time and poor telecommunications, collecting detailed information could be a slow process.
With the arrival of the OSCE Human Rights Monitors, Centre for Human Rights, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and UN Civil Affairs, much closer monitoring of the police, judicial and minorities situation became possible. Without the assistance of other organizations, police monitors could not observe the whole judicial process. Police monitors can effectively supervise community policing, investigations, arrest and detention. Human rights and civil affairs monitors were more effective at monitoring the passage of cases through the judicial system and the handling of judicial rulings, such as the right to establish commercial radio stations, complaints about property rights, and so on. These are all valid indicators for an early warning system. The experiences of UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia, and of IFOR and related missions in Bosnia are good guides for the structure of an early warning mission. The system worked best when there was systematic cooperation between all the components of the monitoring organizations at local and at regional level.
In the Bosnian example, information was shared at local level and passed up separate information “stove-pipes” to each of the mission headquarters. The experience of some participants was that information was less effectively shared at higher levels, while others argue that only at higher levels was the information properly fused. The advantage of having numerous separate organizations involved in collecting early warning information is that it spreads the risks for the international community. An entire branch of the system can be deprived of resources or lose the confidence of participants, and other organizations can pick up its functions. The Centre for Human Rights, for example, did not have the resources to execute its mandate at regional level in Bosnia in the Spring of 1996, and the OSCE was able to fill in. 34 The disadvantage is that, taking all components into consideration, the mission may absorb far more resources than necessary, and may expend a lot of unnecessary energy coordinating the activities of its disparate parts.
Analysing Information
Information is not collected for its own sake. There is already a great deal of information available without launching expensive monitoring missions to collect more. Ideally, having observers like the EC Monitors or the OSCE human rights monitors at local level allows the focused collecting of information for specific purposes. The information is analysed, and action taken as a result. One example illustrates how this might work in practice for an early warning mission.
Changing demographic patterns can be a source of conflict. After the Dayton Agreement, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line became a focus for inter-communal tension, as Otis suggests is commonplace in divided societies. 35 As settlement of the final boundary-line approached, tensions increased around the town of Otoka in north-west Bosnia. A physical confrontation between Muslim and Serb crowds occurred on 19 April with little warning, and deaths were narrowly averted. It was clear from the 19 April incident that further mass demonstrations were likely in two volatile corridors in north-west Bosnia: at Otoka and between Prijedor and Sanski Most. 36 A concerted effort was launched to identify the timing and location of the next disturbance, and reduce the risk of violence which might derail the fragile progress towards return of refugees. UNHCR contacts with refugee leaders identified organizers. On about 6 May, British troops on the Federation side of the IEBL received information that the demonstrations were scheduled for 12 May, with the participation of up to eight bus-loads of Bosnian refugees residing in Germany. US Information Teams distributing the Herald of Peace heard of the involvement of a German NGO called “Society for the Preservation of Threatened Peoples”. Its agenda was to expose the continued presence of war criminals in Prijedor and their role in preventing return of refugees. In meetings, Muslim refugee leaders revealed a strategy of highlighting Serb obstruction, by storming the IEBL with large numbers. 37 Civilian Police and EC monitors identified preparations on the Serb side of the IEBL for a violent reception, including piles of rocks along the anticipated route. The local Serb and Muslim radio stations in Prijedor and Sanski Most were used to inflame public sentiment on the issue of return throughout April and May.
Putting this information together from diverse sources, and interpreting it to allow a clear picture of upcoming events was a challenge for all concerned. Authorities on both sides had some interests vested in a confrontation. They were apprehensive, but also reluctant to cooperate in de-escalating tensions because of fear that the other party would thereby gain an advantage. A series of meetings at local and regional level, under the chairmanship of IFOR and UNHCR, were the fora in which the information was first interpreted and then acted upon. In the context of the IFOR mission, the G2 or intelligence cell was the focus for “assembling” a coherent picture of likely events. EC Monitors and particular UNHCR field officers had a clearer idea of likely events, because of their privileged communications with refugees and local authorities.
Although demonstrations occurred on both sides of the IEBL on 12 and 18 May 1996, direct confrontations were avoided. This was achieved through a series of escalating meetings with officials and police on both sides, and with Muslim refugee leaders. After the inflammatory role it played in the 12 May event, pressure was successfully exerted in Europe to prevent the German NGO from participating in the 18 May event. These modest tactical successes illustrate some of the complexity of collecting the right sorts of information to permit short-term action to head off incipient violence. In the larger picture, there are situations which are the aggregate of many small incidents like this, and there are larger events which originate in the strategic designs of the parties to the conflict, or players outside the affected country. One of the most important roles for systematic analysis is to attempt to identify chains of causality, trends and actions which might lead to violence, and which are susceptible to external influence.
Linking Information to Action
Alexander George and June Holl make the case that marshalling timely and effective responses to warning of violent conflict requires an integrated strategy that develops potential responses with anticipated warnings. “The need to do so will only increase as publics grow increasingly expectant that their governments will do something to deal with the crises that they surely see coming.” 38
Drawing an analogy from perception experiments, George and Holl list the three factors likely to influence ability to distinguish a warning in a stream of other information. These are: the strength of the signal relative to the strength of confusing or distracting background stimuli; the expectations of observers evaluating signals; and the costs and rewards associated with recognizing and correctly appraising the signal. 39 If the analogy is correct, then early warning missions might be more effective if they can achieve two things. First, they might attempt to screen out confusing signals and shape information available to the public and to decision makers. Without accurate analysis, there is a risk that attempting to screen and shape information will add to confusion or result in erroneous actions. Second, they need access to decision-makers or their advisors who have expectations and interests about potential conflicts. Early warning missions might therefore be concerned with two sorts of information or messages: comparatively simple public messages conveyed through the international media; and sophisticated private messages and information conveyed to key decision-makers and their advisors.
Direct personal liaison by trusted colleagues is the most effective way of passing relevant information between large and complex organizations. There are many examples. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) had an ambassador to UNPF in Zagreb. Starting in 1993 NATO attached high-ranking liaison officers to UNPROFOR in Zagreb and Sarajevo. Ambassador Holbrook placed a liaison officer in UNPF headquarters in Zagreb in October 1995 to help coordinate his initiatives with UN actions, and to keep him informed of developments. Choosing the right people for these posts, and ensuring that the “target” organization has sufficient confidence in the contact to use the information and advice is essential if an early warning mission is to use this vehicle to influence decision-makers or their advisors. Since key high-level people are not always available, the calibre of representation might be increased with the urgency of the situation.
Gowing’s conclusions about the fickle nature of the international media have been mentioned. International mass media, however, remain the most effective way of reaching large audiences with a simple message. The practice of joint, multi-agency press conferences (“speaking with one voice”) in Sarajevo prevents discord or contradiction in the mission from becoming the story. An early warning mission needs to have an accurate assessment of current media presence and media coverage (host-nation, regional, and international) and should be prepared to adjust its information strategy to use available information effectively. IFOR, for example, ran an information campaign on at least three different levels. The affected population was one target audience. Local media were a related target audience. International audiences were reached through both the international media and coordinated press releases from contributing nations’ national media outlets. Readily available video imagery, satellite hook-ups and secure transport help to attract the international media, but they are not natural allies.
If early warning missions are appropriately structured, they may go a long way towards overcoming the natural inertia of the international system in responding to incipient violent conflict. The most important barrier is decision-makers, who might be reached directly or through liaison with their advisors. A second vehicle is the pressure of public opinion, mobilized through the international media, guided by a careful information programme. Our experience in Bosnia should lead us to be cautious about both. The parties to the conflict will have their own interests at stake, and will use the same means to influence their international environment. The international community was often unable to match the sophistication or the resources deployed by Miloöevi_, Izetbegovi_ and Tudjman to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad.
In the effort to instigate action, participants in a mission should also beware the hubris of assuming that they know what is best. There seems to be a natural tension between headquarters at different levels— “those who think they know what is going on are annoying to those of us who do”. What is perceived by a lower (or higher) headquarters as inertia may be a different perception of the costs and benefits of action.
Early Warning Mission as Precursor to Action
The Balkan experience, though not an early warning mission, has been used to provide examples of ways in which one might function. This may extend to taking direct action within the scope of the mission to help forestall violence or mitigate its impact. Providing warning, taking direct action, and acting as a vanguard may be related functions which an early warning mission should be prepared to undertake as the situation changes.
Direct action might take a number of forms. Economic action might include identifying development opportunities, assisting worthwhile causes to secure international funding, helping to prepare proposals, and acting as project officers for programmes run by development agencies. This sort of activity is likely to increase the stature of the mission and the cooperation of local authorities, making it easier to gain access and information. Direct action on political and social matters is more likely to be perceived as meddling in internal affairs, particularly once officials have become involved in discrimination or oppression. Observing at a distance without offering any hope of assistance, however, may make information collection difficult. People will be reluctant to expose themselves to official retribution for the benefit of “voyeuristic” observers who report to some distant centre, with no evidence of any action or result. 40 There is even scope for direct military and police action in the early warning stages. Sending each faction’s officers out of country for training and professional development, holding seminars and workshops in-country, and building professional relationships would all be useful steps on which to build later. In each case, one of the functions of the early warning mission is to bring greater resources from outside the mission to bear at an early stage and in places where they will have a positive impact. This argues for a mission with many organizational links.
Should it be necessary to escalate from an early warning mission to one which deploys more resources, a carefully used early warning mission might help in the smooth deployment and efficient start-up of a larger and more complex mission. In military terms, observers can function as liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties. 41 The same functions are required for political, economic and social aspects of a mission. One of the most important functions is simply preserving and transferring information. Many wheels were reinvented by IFOR, the High Representative’s Office, and UNMIBH, having been lost without a trace in the ashes of UNPF and UNPROFOR.
Conclusion: Observer Missions and Effective Early Warning
There are three steps to using observer missions to provide effective early warning. The first is to get the missions into the right place at the right time, with appropriate mandates and freedom of action. The second is to ensure that they are appropriately structured and prepared to detect vital signs, interpret them correctly, and communicate that information. The third is to ensure that they are linked into the international community in such a way as to maximize the impact of the warning they can provide. This might include a media strategy, liaison to international and regional organizations, and personal links to key decision-makers.
Neither short-lived fact-finding mission nor traditional military observer missions can be expected to provide early warning linked to effective action. Multi-functional observer missions might.
Endotes
Note 1: International Peace Academy, The Peacekeepers’ Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 361. Back.
Note 2: Office of Legal Affairs, Codification Division, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States, (New York: United Nations, 1992), multiple entries deal with different applications of fact-finding by the various bodies charged with the resolution of disputes. Back.
Note 3: Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, Bjørn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future, A Study Sponsored by the International Peace Academy with the Support of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, (London: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 143–145. Back.
Note 4: Rikhye, Harbottle and Egge, pp. 144, 147. Back.
Note 5: United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation in Georgia, Reference Paper, April 1995. Back.
Note 6: United Nations, The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief Operations: MCDA Field Manual, Draft Version 3, November 16, 1995, pp. 1–2 to 1–8. Back.
Note 7: Jean-H. Guilmette, “Beyond Emergency Assistance: Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Decision-Making,” A discussion paper, July 1995 (CIDA/ACDI), pp. 18–19. Back.
Note 8: Donald Acheson, “Preventing Genocide: Episodes must be Exposed, Documented and Published,” British Medical Journal, Vol 313, 7 December 1996. Other descriptions of the process are found in Cynthia Brown and Farhad Karim (editors) Playing the Communal Card: Communal Violence and Human Rights, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995) and Edward L. Nyankauzi, Genocide: Rwanda and Burundi, (New York: AAIC International, 1994). Back.
Note 9: Michael E. Brown, “the Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Michael E. Brown, editor (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 577. Back.
Note 10: Donald L. Horowitz, “Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management,” in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, edited by Joseph V. Montville, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 455–6. Back.
Note 11: The stories collected by Zdenko Leöi_ (editor) Children of Atlantis: Voiced from the Former Yugoslavia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995) include several which reflect the sudden turn to ethnic identity and militant support for ethnic parties after the summer of 1990. Back.
Note 12: Interviews conducted in Prijedor, Banja Luka, Sanski Most, and Novi Grad from January to July 1996. Back.
Note 13: Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, “Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Michael E. Brown, Editor, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 197–198. Back.
Note 14: Discussions with European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) analysts and Head of Analysis and Assessment Unit in Zagreb, Croatia, November 1995. Back.
Note 15: Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 91–92. Back.
Note 16: Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Michael E. Brown, Editor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103–121. Back.
Note 17: Michael R. Lucal, “The OSCE Code of Conduct and Its Relevance in contemporary Europe,” Aussenpolitick 111/96, pp. 223–235. Back.
Note 18: Dr. Wilhelm Höynck, “CSCE Capabilities for Contributing to conflict Prevention and Crisis Management,”Speech at the NATO Seminar on Crisis Management, Brussels, 7 March 1994, in From CSCE to OSCE: Statements and Speeches of Dr. Wilhelm Höynck, Secretary General of the OSCE, 1993–1996 (Vienna: Secretariat of the OSCE, 1996), pp. 102–104. Back.
Note 19: Discussions with EC Monitors in Mission Headquarters, Zagreb in August 1995, and in Team Bravo headquarters in Banja Luka in April–May 1996. Back.
Note 20: Höynck, pp. 104–106. “One of the operational advantages of the mechanisms is comprehensive, impartial, on-the-spot fact-finding. This leads relatively easily to concrete recommendations for specific CSCE involvement, including the application of other CSCE instruments. The fact-finding mission to Kosovo in 1992, undertaken in the context of the unusual-military-activities mechanism, prepared the ground for a further CSCE involvement, which resulted in the decision to establish CSCE missions of long-duration in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak.” (p. 106). Back.
Note 21: Stephen G. Brush, “Dynamics of theory change in the social sciences: Relative deprivation and collective violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40:4 (December 1996), pp. 523–545. Back.
Note 22: Milton J. Esman, “Economic Performance and Ethnic Conflict,” in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, edited by Joseph V. Montville, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 481–489. Back.
Note 23: Esman, pp. 485–486. Back.
Note 24: Peter Lewis, “Ethnic Accommodation, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: the Cases of Indonesia and Nigeria,” Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996, p. 25. Back.
Note 25: Andrew S. Natsios, “Commander’s Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies,” Parameters, XXVI:2 (Summer 1996), pp. 61–62. Back.
Note 26: Nik Gowing, “Media Coverage: Help or hindrance for conflict prevention?” A Diagnostic paper for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Unpublished draft, 3 November 1996. Back.
Note 27: Confessional affiliation was devised for UNPROFOR to balance Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim contingents. In reality, the policy never did more than provoke the mistrust of non-affiliated groups. Back.
Note 28: Colonel P.G. Williams, OBE, “Liaison — A Capability Gap in Current Peacekeeping Doctrine: A Lesson Learned from Operation in the Former Yugoslavia,” unpublished paper. Williams lists twelve components or characteristics of a monitoring and liaison mission. Back.
Note 29: E.D. Doyle, “Verification in the Sinai — An Integrated Approach,” International Peacekeeping, Volume 1, Number 3, (Winter 1994), pp. 336–348. Back.
Note 30: Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “The United Nations and Internal Conflict,” in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Michael E. Brown, editor (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 489–90. Back.
Note 31: de Jonge Oudraat, pp. 528–531. Back.
Note 32: Andrew J. Goodpaster, “When Diplomacy is not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions,” A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, July 1996. Back.
Note 33: UNHCR, UNMO, and UNPROFOR staff who served in Serb-held areas in 1993 and 1994 were not impressed by the caution displayed by ECMM. Some who returned with IFOR in 1996 were unjustifiably reluctant to take the monitors seriously, and lost access to a valuable resource. Back.
Note 34: In some cases, human rights observers from the Centre for Human Rights transferred to the UN Civil Affairs at local level, and none of the local expertise was lost. Back.
Note 35: Pauletta Otis, “Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict,” Paper presented at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 28–31 August, 1996. Back.
Note 36: This reflects a Canadian perspective. The British Multi-National Division South West was concerned about IEBL crossings at Klju_, Mrkoni_ Grad and other sites as well as Otoka and Sanski Most. In the other divisional areas, there were similar flash-points. What follows is a simplified description of a complex sequence of events; others in possession of different information would perceive it differently. It is provided here as an illustration, not a historic picture of events. Back.
Note 37: Meetings with Adem äahinovi_ at Otoka on 20 April 1996, and with Sead _irkin in Sanski Most, 27 May 1996, and near Koprivna on 28 May 1996. In reality, individual traffic across the IEBL continued during this period. Back.
Note 38: Alexander George and June Holl, “The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy,” Paper presented to the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Association of Political Scientists, to be published by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1996, p. 36. Back.
Note 39: George and Holl, p. 7. Back.
Note 40: his was the feeling some minorities expressed about the Centre for Human Rights observers in north-west Bosnia in spring 1996, after they repeatedly emphasized that they could only report but could take no action. The OSCE Human Rights monitors, taking a more assertive approach with local authorities, received more reports because there was some hope that something would come of the information, and it was worth the risk. Back.
Note 41: “Cooperation between Units and Observers,” News From The Front! (The Centre for Army Lessons Learned, September/October 1994), pp. 1–2,5,7. Also published in Peacekeeping and International Relations. Back.
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