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Early Warning and Early Response, by Susanne Schmeidl and Howard Adelman (eds.)
Sharon Rusu
1
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
| Where is the Life we have lost in living? Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? |
| T. S. Eliot The Rock |
If the current humanitarian emergency in the Great Lakes has taught us anything, it is that we do not have an effective international system for intervention in humanitarian emergencies. Following the previous crisis in Rwanda in 1994, lessons learned stressed the need for an early warning system whose warnings would result in the initiation of appropriate responses on behalf of those displaced by conflict and coercion. How do the current policy-oriented approaches in early warning support or hinder the humanitarian community in transcending what has been described as the dilemma of humanitarism in the 90’s? This paper will comment on several current approaches with a view to assessing the role of ReliefWeb, a global information system developed and maintained by UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs as part of its efforts in early warning.
Introduction
The current debate in respect of models and approaches to early warning, conflict management, conflict prevention and resolution is as many-sided as the emergencies against which it attempts to define and evaluate itself. This debate is only part of the complex equation of humanitarianism in the 90s in which the key issues derive from the changing context of humanitarian action. Legal aspects notwithstanding, the major issues today relate to “impartiality, reconciling humanitarianism and human rights, possible prolongation of wars, accountability of humanitarian organizations, humanitarian problems of international economic sanctions, humanitarian assistance and development assistance as rivals, armed protection of humanitarian workers, and legal protection for peacekeeping forces and humanitarian workers”. 2
The situation in Eastern Zaire exemplifies all these key issues. For many relief agencies today, the ethical and political dimensions of the delivery of relief are increasingly problematic. In this regard, the roles and mandates of relief organizations are up for public and private scrutiny. The charges are wide-ranging: some claim that relief is big business without which many relief agencies would lose their growing profit base, while others hold that relief is equally abused by the perpetrators of conflict as well as those unwilling to risk involvement in the sovereign affairs of states where conflicts are raging or waiting to implode. One outcome of this complex situation is that relief agencies are now in a position to make judgements and influence outcomes in ways far beyond their traditional roles. 3
In the face of criticism, many relief agencies have expressed their concern that “humanitarianism is the scapegoat for failed political solutions...particularly so where there is a lack of political will to find solutions on the part of the international community and the governments concerned” 4 The politicization of humanitarian effort is one of the major issues facing the international community today. The dilemma for relief agencies is how to assist those at risk without compounding the crisis and finding themselves scapegoats of conflicting and rival prerogatives.. Commenting on this phenomenon in the case of Somalia, Gérard Prunier makes the point that
| [e]conomic aid should be channelled to criteria of internal performance, with a premium going to those areas where political leaders arrive at some form of agreement, even if very imperfect, and aid should be withheld from fighting areas. By providing help to the refugees at some distance from the disturbed areas, it would be possible to assist those in need, while avoiding a return to the appalling exploitation of the UN by the militias during 1992–1994. 5 |
Unfortunately, we are unable to live and work in retrospect. If this were possible, we might be in different circumstances than those in which we find ourselves in Eastern Zaire. Today, the conflict continues, complicated by shifting alliances, regional culpability and instability. The humanitarian community must balance the delivery of assistance, within zones of conflict, to a mixed group of belligerents and civilians, refugees and IDPs, against the need to reintegrate nearly one million persons in Rwanda while avoiding manipulation by one side or the other. In this regard, history offers little solace as it readily reminds us that this area of Eastern Zaire has had its share of protracted conflicts, with devastating regional implications, that continue to this day.
Early Warning: The Debate
If the current humanitarian emergency in the Great Lakes has taught us anything, it is that we do not have an effective international system for intervention in humanitarian emergencies. Following the previous crisis in Rwanda in 1994, lessons learned exercises stressed the need for an early warning system whose warnings would result in the initiation of appropriate responses on behalf of those displaced by conflict and coercion. 6 Most observers and practitioners even agree on the role of such a system; that it should be designed around objectives which are the result of cooperation and coordinated action among a range of actors. Most also agree that the coordinated short term action strategies that have characterized international intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda are not enough to support the new challenges resulting from ever-increasingly complex emergencies.
The question of whether it is simply early warning that is needed or the political will to initiate political action at the highest levels within the UN and among states, is equally relevant here. Despite the work being done in the UN, national governments and at the regional level to develop mechanisms for early warning of conflicts, prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflicts, we still lack real consensus on how to get broader participation in global-scale decision-making. 7 One solution, suggested by Andrew Cottey, relies on the development of “approaches which are less dependent on the short-term attention and narrow interests of particular states and governments”. He further adds that “strengthened international organizations, whose action does not always depend on the active support of governments, are one way forward”. 8
Others would conclude that as a result of recent developments in the UN system and at regional levels “a humanitarian early warning system [for the delivery of emergency aid] is in place, but a conflict management one is not”. 9 And still others would add that “the debate on early warning has not yet moved forward to deal with the issue of the process link between early warning analysis and effective preventive action”. 10 Or that preventive action must be an integral part of early warning, “to address the issue of preventing large-scale conflicts and bloodshed...[by way of] a quick and effective procedure for bringing impending violent situations to the attention of the security council”. 11
How do the current approaches in early warning support or hinder broader participation in humanitarian action, especially conflict prevention and management? This paper comments on some of these issues with a view to setting the context for an assessment of the role of ReliefWeb and early warning. ReliefWeb is a global information system developed and maintained by UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs as part of its efforts in early warning and emergency response.
Early Warning Approaches
As Adam Roberts points out, “an early warning system is only relevant if there is also an early action system.” 12 The problem is that early action is contingent upon transcending the limitations imposed by overlapping UN agency mandates; conflicting agency cultures; political pressures; sovereign interests; the capacity of an already overburdened system to respond and the constraints against early action are but some of the most obvious. From where, one asks, can such action emanate? 13
Albeit not a direct response to the question, one option is to develop approaches that strengthen the international capacity to respond. In this regard, strengthening international organizations and regional organizations is surely relevant, and several recent attempts have already been made within the UN system and new initiatives are in process. The Department of Political Affairs, for example, works closely with UNDHA (the UN agency mandated to provide early warnings to the UN system) in preparing analyses of “hot spots” for the Office of the Secretary-General. In addition, alerts on impending disasters are regularly issued from many other areas within the UN system. International organizations like the ICRC and the IFRC and a number of NGOs including Amnesty International, International Alert in London and the International Crisis Group in Washington also issue regular country reports and alerts.
In Europe, the Office of the High Commissioner for Minorities is mandated to collect information about the situation of national minorities, discuss relevant issues concerning minorities with interested parties and, where appropriate, promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation between them. His mandate includes the issuance of early warnings to the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE. 14 Over time, the High Commissioner has begun to make significant interventions which have had a direct impact on the prevention of potential or escalating ethnic conflicts and encouraged standard-setting in respect of human rights and the protection of minorities.
As part of the development of early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms in Africa, the OAU is developing regional strategies which place emphasis on the importance of empowering NGOs and civil societies in the work of conflict prevention, resolution and peace building. Still, such efforts as those of the OSCE and OAU must be seen against the backdrop of certain realities.
Again, there are limits to such efforts, similar to those posed by efforts over years in the area of preventive diplomacy. Strengthening international organizations alone is not enough. The challenge lies in successfully preventing conflict or its escalation with countries in the throes of economic and political instability, or on the verge of or already engulfed in conflict. One option lies in what Kumar Rupesinghe and John Cockell view as the need to link early warning approaches with options for preventive action. Howard Adelman takes this one step further in suggesting that “early warning [should be] concerned with prevention, mitigation, [and] management of the conflicts that produce...humanitarian emergencies”. 15
Obviously, at the level of the UN having an arrangement in place that would allow for the systematic review by, for example, the Security Council of information provided by a more global effort through the Office of the Secretary-General would go a long way to overcoming some of the shortcomings of the current arrangement. In this regard, a recent initiative, dubbed the “Somovia Formula”, after Ambassador Juan Somovia of Chile, has resulted in a first-ever consultation with NGOs and the Security Council on the current crisis in the Great Lakes. According to Global Policy Forum, the hope is that such an initiative will enable NGOs who are active in conflict areas to regularly brief the Security Council. 16
Another positive option emerged as a result of the “Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, and calls upon the UN Security Council to establish a Humanitarian Sub-Committee ‘to inform fully the Security Council of developments and concerns regarding the humanitarian dimensions of complex emergencies’.” 17
More than part of the answer lies in the mobilization of the ideas and resources of all having an interest—the UN, States, NGOs and international organizations—to engage in a complementarity of planning and implementation of progressive approaches. Such approaches would be based on strengthening policy and practice in early warning, conflict prevention, management and resolution. In this regard, why not have a forum within the UN system for early warning as there is now for peacekeeping and human rights? As G. Ramcharan states:
| One of the problems in the development of an integrated early warning system is that there is still no central forum where the constituency for early warning can marshall its resources and stimulate policies and strategies. In the case of peacekeeping for example, there is the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and the Special Political Committed of the United Nations General Assembly...[for] human rights, there is a Commission on Human Rights, varying human rights organs and the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly. While there are some specialized fora that deal with specific aspects of early warning, there is no general forum where the efforts of member states, non-governmental organizations and the Secretariat can come together in a creative manner for the nurturing of early warning and preventive arrangements...[Additionally], until the Security Council develops some arrangements for reviewing the global situation systematically, and for acting on information presented it by the Secretary-General, the Security Council would really not be in a position to offer much for the time being in the form of early warning and preventive action. 18 |
Interestingly, Ramcharan’s statement predates the now UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs which has the mandate for early warning of complex emergencies. Who should lead on such initiatives is an open question. Despite various attempts within the UN, there is still no single agency or identifiable mechanism for the systematic reporting of alerts to the variety of actors required to mobilize a global response. Further, the nature and extent of the range of approaches just discussed speaks to the lack of a systemic approach and the reluctance of decision makers in relevant fora, including the United Nations, to pay more than lip service to early warning initiatives. 19 Indeed, the reaction on the diplomatic side to the recent consultation of NGOs with the Security Council mentioned earlier was that “no concrete action would be envisaged [on the basis of the NGO recommendations] until France and the United States decide to move.” 20 How, we ask, can this continue in the light of recent and continuing humanitarian emergencies?
The answer, in part, lies in what the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda report identified as a system that does not know what its objectives are. In this regard, a number of contributing factors were identified, including the lack of specialized information units in the field; the need for methods of priorizing by human rights monitors in order to bring significant attention and resources to bear on important cases; the necessity to link early warning with contingency preparedness; and the fact that the UN system effectively lost its capacity to analyse early warning information when it disbanded the Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). Other units tasked to take on the role formerly played by ORCI are too operational in focus to act as the central repository for the kind of “soft intelligence” needed to generate early warning signals for contingency planning in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. Add to all this, the cloak of secrecy and self-interest that continues to permeate national and international fora in respect of humanitarian assistance and response, and you begin to understand why there has been little significant progress in relating early warning to early action. 21
Information and Early Warning
No discussion on early warning approaches from policy and practice through methodologies (historical analysis through quantitative modelling and econometrics) is complete without reference to the central role played by information. This discussion on early warning approaches and the early warning to early action dilemma leads to two suppositions: new, integrated global approaches are required to link early warning with early action; and, no single organization has the capacity or resources to collect, analyse and disseminate the information required to serve this purpose in today’s complex emergencies. To this may be added a third. Information without analysis is, as the popular advertisement goes, “like an orange without sunshine.” Still, analysis alone is not enough. Truly informing the decision making process requires the formulation of strategic options directed at preventive action. Though active intervention is not guaranteed thereafter, the options for it are at least more clearly articulated. This development alone has the potential to encourage standard-setting, transparency, information exchange and, confidence in the sources and analysis of the information. Most importantly, it permits all-important challenge; still a novel idea in most decision making today. 22
Thus, what is needed on the information side, is a network for the collection and exchange of information which is the basis for analysis and the formulation of strategic options. Such a network derives from and is linked to various preventive action mechanisms at the grassroots, regional, national and international levels. 23 Inter-independent networks could provide the base and framework for the provision of a system of alerts linked to the development of strategic policy options for decision makers resulting in a de facto potential for galvanizing response. Recent writing and discussions led by Kumar Rupesinghe, Director, International Alert, have focussed on conflict prevention, intervention and resolution under “multi-track” approaches in which information collection and analysis play an integral role.
To move the analysis forward, a working definition of early warning in the context of an inter-independent network approach is required. And here, early warning may be defined as the ability to collect and analyse information in the interests of providing strategic options for preventive action or, as may be required, informed response. 24
This definition relates directly to the structure and function essential to an effective information system for early warning. Additional features include those elements that today’s information practitioners and networkers regard as standards for efficient information management: standardization of existing networks and exchange mechanisms; reliable, verifiable, and timely analysis of political and domestic situations; major actors and vulnerable groups; use of information technology for rapid dissemination; frequent updates and linkages with field operations; and informed analysis that provides policy options to a wide range of influential decision makers. Obviously, the principles informing such a structure are those related to the production of alerts of the highest quality and verifiability.
Why are such standards important? They are essential to accuracy, quick access, timeliness, verifiability, credibility and communication. Without these no system can gain the authority required and confidence of those which it should inform. For those with the experience of meeting the challenges involved in mass relief programmes, the need for standards that ensure the dissemination of accurate information is vital. Having access to information in a standard format plays a major role in the verification of events. Such standards inform and direct information networking, exchange and development thereby acting as the base for early warning structures that support active prevention activities as well as those related to conflict resolution and rehabilitation. 25
Putting such standards into practice has long been the challenge for information networks that cover a wide range of humanitarian assistance and response activities, such as refugee protection, human rights monitoring, relief assistance and development. These networks see clearly the link between early warning and early action in their development of effective information tools and exchange mechanisms. In fact, it was out of a clear desire to mobilize the efforts of all such information gathering activities within the UN, and among NGOs and governments that brought together a group of UN, government, NGO and academics in the autumn of 1994 to look at ways of developing a decentralized, public access, global information management system that met the emergency preparedness and response information needs of the international humanitarian assistance community. In other words, what this group saw as necessary was an information system that would respond to relief in a larger and more comprehensive manner than in the past. After several discussions, the group asked the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs to undertake the development of such a system, and ReliefWeb is the result.
ReliefWeb and Early Warning
ReliefWeb is not in itself an early warning system. Rather, it is a tool to enhance information management and access to reliable information. Its purpose is to strengthen the response capacity of the humanitarian relief community through the timely provision of reliable information on prevention, preparedness and disaster response. Its importance lies in effective information management which features twice daily publishing of reliable information in standard formats. Strongly supportive of the principle of information-sharing, ReliefWeb management actively promotes networking to ensure renewal of its repository of emergency-related information. This repository is continuously updated with systematically transmitted reports from relevant sources. In addition, ReliefWeb offers links to a range of related sources without the user having to leave the site.
As the “newest kid on the block”, it joins other such systems which include: for agriculture, the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food (GIEWS); for atomic radiation, the WMO/IAEA Convention of Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents; for the environment, the UN System-wide Earthwatch; for disasters, HazardNet; for geophysical concerns, the International Tsunami Warning System (ITWS) and the Global Volcanism Network; for health, the Epidemiological Early Warning System (EEWS); for humanitarian problems, the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS); for meteorological issues, the World Weather Watch (WWW) Programme; for refugees and mass population movements, the Global Early Warning System (GEWS) for Displaced Persons and EAWarn, the ethnological monitoring network in the former Soviet Union. There are other initiatives, of course, including many currently on the Internet like UNHCR’s REFWORLD and the databases of the ICRC, IFRC, and WHO as well as countless interest groups who share ideas and information. 26
Given the plethora of other efforts, what need is served by yet another online information system? And how, if it does not issue alerts per se, is ReliefWeb even remotely connected to early warning? To paraphrase two old adages:
| The early bird catches the worm, ...and... The spider which spins its web at night will catch the fly in the morning |
To prevent complex humanitarian emergencies or, if impossible, to respond rapidly, requires a carefully planned and executed global effort. Such efforts comprise many elements not the least of which is a comprehensive capacity in the field of information management and dissemination. No single system can achieve this alone. Again, we return to the notion of the need for an inter-independent network of information resources. The development of such resources ensures that pertinent and corroborated information and analysis are available when required; like the web constructed by the industrious spider.
Here, information systems are called for that support prevention, preparedness and response mechanisms. Information about root causes is critical background for planning preventive actions and for more effective responses if and when movements and displacement occur. In addition, information for the resolution of pre- and post-conflict situations is crucial to addressing long-term solutions and ensuring remedies for the dispossessed. Only information that is reliable and timely will provide the sufficient, solid base for informed decision-making. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of early warning. 27
Advantages of ReliefWeb
ReliefWeb’s policies and practice are based on the principles of reliability, credibility, timeliness, corroboration and challenge. Full source citation is required for all information and analysis hosted by ReliefWeb. This permits the user to judge the reliability of the document and the credibility of the source. ReliefWeb actively recruits information partners and supports information networks and networking practices. This practice builds relationships and supports dialogue between information partners. The result is a rich base for the cross-fertilization of ideas and interactive planning. With its twice daily publishing capacity on the Internet and links to relevant sources from the UN family, NGOs, governments, academic institutions and the media, ReliefWeb serves as central focus for such an information network; a sort of clearinghouse for information on natural disasters and complex emergencies. 28 Its achievements since it was first fully operational in October 1996 include: information exchange agreements with 170 humanitarian agencies; growing multi-lingual capacity; in excess of 20,000 documents in full text; daily updates of current emergencies or natural disasters; access to a central repository of consolidated and organized information from a wide range of sources including geo-referenced maps, graphs of assistance and contributions to appeals; and a developing background section that will soon permit more in-depth research capabilities.
ReliefWeb offers links to other sites on the Internet. These linkages are increasingly not just simply to the central menu of another site, but deep inside the site. Effectively, they link document to relevant document, thereby opening the way to enhanced research potential. Also, linking concept and analysis allows for all-important comparison and contrast. Soon ReliefWeb will host the alerts and reports that will issue from a new initiative in early warning known as Forum on Early Warning and Emergency Response (FEWER). This initiative will act as the conduit through which the field research efforts of its member organizations are made available. In contrast to other efforts, FEWER reports will feature policy options for preventive action.
Limitations
As stated earlier, ReliefWeb is not in itself an early warning system or a solution to information needs for early warning. Rather, it is part of a rapidly growing toolbox of systems and approaches that, if appropriately nurtured and networked, should yield us an encyclopaedic base of knowledge for planning and response. But is this not the problem? In “lessons learned” exercises following recent crises, the lament has been either, “there is too much information available” or, “the important documents providing situation updates are not available when needed”. Still others believe that the fault is not so much at the level of information management, but in the lack of an “analytical framework” that would provide decision makers with interpretations of events and issues, thereby enhancing reflection on policy options. 29 The answer, in short, is there are no perfect systems.
That ReliefWeb is a nexus to publicly accessible sources where discrete information and analysis needs are increasingly met, is itself so compelling a notion that is not easily discounted. ReliefWeb apart, to do early warning requires access to an integrated network of well-managed resources for which there is wide and transparent access. Making information publicly available and holding agencies accountable for the information they provide, as ReliefWeb does, collapses the phenomenon of sole sources and reliance on secret or secured “intelligence” networks of the past. Such efforts can provide impetus for the highest political levels to take appropriate early action in the prevention and mitigation of disasters. It was as a result of the explosive growth of the Internet and the subsequent recognition of the limitations of single system approaches that ReliefWeb and other online initiatives were born. All this, despite the fact that the UN, major agencies and governments will continue to maintain and develop their own internal systems. Again, no single system can provide the information required to galvanize global effort to combat today’s emergencies. But it is in all our best interests to recognize and work collectively to transcend current limitations.
Another of ReliefWeb’s limitations lies in its lack of direct linkages to field operations. Internet connectivity is increasingly becoming available in regions where operational linkages are essential, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Azerbaijan, to name a few. The reality is it will be sometime before such links are operational (including technology and costs) in ways that will allow locals and field operations full access to the World Wide Web. The issue too has an ethical dimension. Many feel that the Internet is a Northern and Western construct that is simply being imposed, without dialogue and agreement, on the South. The question is, what options are available to ensure the development of effective interim systems while allowing for dialogue concerning future directions? The answer lies in using what is available. In Africa, where access to Internet is limited, information is exchanged and disseminated by e-mail networks like FIDONET, MANGO and PADISNET. Moreover, field operations are recognizing the need to make use of HF radio protocols for cheap and efficient communications. Harnessing these existing links is one way to address both equity and connectivity issues. Connectivity is a functional problem. The substantive challenge lies in collecting the information and establishing analytical capacity for rendering it useful. In this regard, active encouragement of the growth and development of information capacity at the regional level is essential. This can be partly achieved through promoting and resourcing regional institutions in information management techniques and new technologies in support of their work in conflict prevention, monitoring, developing civil societies and reconciliation.
Some Preliminary Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to review early warning approaches in the context of current events in humanitarian emergencies to evaluate the role of ReliefWeb. Clearly, the review of efforts to date concurs with the view that a functioning early warning system requires an early action capability. Relative to such capacity, new and integrated global approaches are required to link warning and action. When alarms are sounded, designated actors, inter alia governments and the UN system, must move quickly to respond in an agreed and coordinated manner. Further, no single organization has the capacity or resources to support the information requirements of the humanitarian community in early warning, prevention, preparedness and response. To mobilize relevant sectors at the international level requires the capacity to formulate strategic options directed at preventive action.
The development of information systems to support early warning, prevention, preparedness and rapid response requires an integrated approach that supports coordinated information networks. To ensure the systematic and rapid exchange of information between networks, standard formats and shared policy and practice approaches are requisite. How to achieve this in the context of diverse and competitive agency cultures is a major challenge.
Though not an early warning system, ReliefWeb is an integral part of new information approaches for early warning. Its clearinghouse role is vital to the growth of responsive networking. Its twice daily publishing capacity, public access to updates on ongoing emergencies and alerts to “hot spots”; as well as its requirement of full source citation for all its documents, make it a reliable foundation for the daily work both for desk officers and the more discrete needs of the academic. Though it does not in itself offer an analytic framework for the interpretation of situations and events, it does offer a point of departure for comparison with other points of view and linkages to the analysis of field-based networks like IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Network) in the Great Lakes. In this regard, ReliefWeb should be viewed as a central node in a growing network of information systems. Within this context, there is a great need to encourage the development of an inter-independent capacity within this network of systems. Such a network would then have the capacity to provide a solid information base that would allow for the cross-fertilization of knowledge and the exchange of information so vital to the evolution of early warning policy and practice.
Another challenge lies in galvanizing cooperation in the UN system. What is needed here is cooperation to support a forum for the exchange of early warning expertise and practice from various fora in both early warning and conflict prevention areas. At the same time, study and support of efforts that consolidate “lessons learned” from past endeavour are integral to the pursuit of new approaches to complex problems. Multi-track approaches to conflict prevention, intervention, reconciliation and rehabilitation are also required to ensure that regional bodies are appropriately resourced and sustained in ways consonant with good governance and solutions.
No single system is capable of achieving an information capacity of the magnitude required to support early warning efforts and the attendant needs that characterize the scope of today’s humanitarian concerns. In the end, the problem is a human one. It is about people; about contributing in positive ways to the conditions that will permit every woman, man and child to live their lives in dignity and security. Unless we start now to forge a common purpose, we cannot begin to set the stage for the prevention of complex emergencies. Without cooperation and coordination of effort across the spectrum of potential responses, we will lose the moment and early warning will not be necessary.
Endotes
Note 1: Sharon Rusu currently works for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. When she first wrote this chapter she was Head, Information Services and Dissemination Section, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva. The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by the United Nations. Back.
Note 2: A. Roberts, “Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and impartiality in a policy vacuum”, Adelphi Paper 305, Oxford University Press, 1996, 51. Roberts examines “key issues” in relation to one of his central arguments that “... The adoption by states and international bodies of the banner of humanitarian action was associated with a policy vacuum, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda being the prime examples... Faced with complex conflicts... (h)umanitarian action may continue, sadly, to be a substitute for long-term policies and difficult strategic decisions.”(80) Back.
Note 3: A. de Waal, Humanitarianism Unbound, as quoted in “Understanding the Great Lakes Crisis”, a report on the conference convened by ACTIONAID in Nairobi, Kenya, 1996. Back.
Note 4: ACTIONAID, “Understanding the Great Lakes Crisis”, a report on the International Conference convened by ACTIONAID, Nairobi, December 1996, 31. Back.
Note 5: G. Prunier, “Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal (1990–1995)”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol 15, No.1, Oxford University Press, 1996, 85. Back.
Note 6: H. Adelman, and A. Suhrke, “Early Warning and Conflict Management”, Study 2, International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen, 1996, 80. Adelman and Suhrke posit that early warning was less critical in Rwanda than the willingness to respond. The failure to respond adequately, however, was influenced by poor and unsystematized systems for the collection and analysis of available data that resulted in a failure to translate what was available into effective and strategic plans for action.“Information and analysis [are] critical, the authors argue, not only in anticipating a crisis, but in determining the appropriate response in a particular situation”. Back.
Note 7: P. Brecke, “What Stirs Concern is What Might Need to be Done,” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, Supplement 2, October, 1995, 321–3. Back.
Note 8: A. Cottey, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention,” Refuge, Vol. 15, No. 4, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Toronto, 1995, 12. Back.
Note 9: H. Adelman, “Difficulties in Early Warning Networking and Conflict Management”, Revised version of a paper prepared for the Symposium on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, Clingendael, The Netherlands, November, 1996, 56. Back.
Note 10: J. Cockell, “Draft Early Warning Analysis Framework”, Peacebuilding and Democratic Division, Globlal Issues Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada, August, 1996, 1. Back.
Note 11: K. Rupesinghe and Michiko Kuroda, eds., “Introduction”, Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1992. Rupesinghe views preventive action as integral to early warning and links the two with preventive diplomacy. He further takes the view that preventive action needs to be based on “comprehensive contingency plans for entire regions of conflict” and that regional bodies “may prove better equipped [than States or the UN] to deal with [the prevention of conflicts] at an early stage”(xvii). Back.
Note 12: Roberts, above note 2, 77. Roberts posits that early warning is “a key element in any organisation’s response to challenges. . . [especially when] it can assist efforts to prevent crises, for example through diplomatic initiatives. . .However, early warning also has a role in the prompt and efficient delivery of humanitarian relief. Furthermore, an efficient system of warning has a crucial role to play in the perceived fairness of any system of relief”. Back.
Note 13: G. Ramcharan, “Early Warning in the United Nations Grand Strategy”, Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, Kuroda and Rupesinghe, eds., St Martin’s Press, New York, 1992, 188. Back.
Note 14: G. Gilbert, “Prevention: The Best Early Warning”, International Journal of Refugee Law, No 9 (forthcoming in 1997). Gilbert offers an examination of the early warning and conflict prevention aspects of the mandate of the High Commissioner for Minorities and linkages with early warning and prevention mechanisms elsewhere. Back.
Note 15: Adelman, above note 8, 3. Back.
Note 16: J. Paul, “Historic Security Council Consultation with Humanitarian NGOs”, Global Policy Forum, (WWW.globalpolicy.org) 12 February 1997. Back.
Note 17: Roberts, above note 2, 61. Back.
Note 18: G. Ramcharan, above note 13, 188. Back.
Note 19: S. Rusu, “Early Warning: Much Ado About Nothing”? Refuge, Vol.15, No. 4, Refugee Studies Centre, York University, Toronto, 1996, 9. Back.
Note 20: Paul, above note 16. Back.
Note 21: D. Millwood, ed., “The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience,” Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Standberg Grafisk, Odense, 1995. Back.
Note 22: S. Rusu, “The Role of The Collector in Early Warning”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Special Issue — September, 1990, Oxford University Press, 69. Back.
Note 23: Adelman, above note 9, 49. The author argues that the development of a systematic approach to networking for the exchange of information central to an early warning alert system is perhaps more important than attempts to derive an authoritative base of information from any single set of indicators or signals. Back.
Note 24: Adelman, above note 9, 54. In a lengthy endnote, the author explores various definitions of early warning from the “most simplistic” through detection, information sharing, situation monitoring and communication of an alert; analysis and communication, to the view of K. Rupesinghe that “preventive action is an integral part of early warning” and, finally, to the view of G. Ramcharan, “who continues to distinguish early warning from preventive diplomacy”. The author’s view is that “information sharing, analysis, and developing strategic options are the three necessary ingredients and that early warning is neither a mechanical alarm system on the analog of a smoke detection system for fires, nor at the other extreme, does it entail the response itself.” For further definitions of early warning as it relates to the development of indicators and timely responses regarding movements of persons, Cf L.Gordenker (1992, Kuroda and Rupesinghe, eds., 2) and J. Dedring (1992, Ibid., 200). Back.
Note 25: S. Rusu, above note 19, 69. Back.
Note 26: S. Rusu, “Migration and Refugees: Who’s Afraid of Information? The Challenge of the Nineties”, paper prepared for the ‘Conference on Immigration and the European Union: Building on a Comprehensive Approach’, organized by the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM) with the support of the European Commission, Athens, 26–29 June 1994, 13. Back.
Note 27: S. Rusu, above note 26, 1. Back.
Note 28: D. King, “ReliefWeb A New Information Management Tool for the International Humanitarian Community”, article for a Workshop on Risk Assessment and Early Warning, University of Maryland, November, 1996, 4. King, currently ReliefWeb Information Manager, UNDHA, New York reviews the functionality and capacity of ReliefWeb as an information management tool for risk assessment and early warning. Back.
Note 29: T. Gurr, “An Early Warning System for the United Nations: Internet or Not? A Conceptual Framework for Screening and Interpreting Information is Required”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, Supplement 2, October, 1995, 318–319. Back.
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