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The Americas In Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, by Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger, and contributors
12. A Provisional Assessment
In this book we have tried to paint a picture of hemispheric regionalism in the Americas as it now stands. In a sense, continental regionalization has been in the making since the early 1980s, and the decisive thrust came at the end of that decade.
The acute worldwide economic recession of the early 1980s was a significant landmark in the management of contemporary international relations. In addition to fundamentally changing the nature of North-South relations as they had evolved since the mid-1960s, it forced each state, big or small, to reassess its situation and to rethink how it would relate to its external environment in the years to come.
In the case of the United States, the 1980–1982 world economic crisis was an occasion to reflect on its position—in particular its foreign economic policy—in the world economic system. These questions led to a reappraisal of Washington’s traditional support for the multilateral trading system centered on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of which the United States was a leading advocate at the end of World War II. In U.S. political and economic circles, the view of GATT was that it did not serve the country’s interests well and that some other organizational form of external trade policy should be explored. Multilateralism was now challenged by bilateralism, reciprocity, and even regional arrangements as possible alternative frameworks for U.S. trade policy (Destler 1986; W. Cline 1982; Bhagwati and Irwin 1987). This reappraisal led to the signing of free trade agreements with Israel and Canada, allowed for the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and opened the door to an eventual Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
In the case of Latin American and Caribbean countries, the world economic crisis was accompanied by a shattering external debt crisis that brought about a period of intense soul-searching. The effect was as psychological as it was economic for the political and economic elites of the region. Evidently, new attitudes and new ways of doing things would be necessary so that national governments would not completely lose credibility with both the outside world and their own populations. These economic and psychological shocks help explain the embrace of democracy and the adoption of market-oriented economic policies throughout the region during the 1980s. They also explain an apparent new receptivity to some U.S. proposals for increased cooperation.
The second set of intervening factors arose from the strategic changes that occurred in the last years of the 1980s, which are symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The passage from a tight, constraining bipolar international system to a more open but still imprecise world environment had many implications for all the actors involved. Each country had to assess the new situation and determine what course of action was most appropriate for positioning itself advantageously in the new world order.
This was true even for the United States, the only remaining superpower, which had to take advantage of the situation not only to maintain but also to try to increase its global influence. There appeared to be an emergence of commercial and economic blocs in Europe and Asia and therefore a new geoeconomic power configuration different from that of the Cold War period. As a result, the United States had to reevaluate its power base starting with the Americas, its own geographical region. This view was reinforced by the belief within Washington’s decisionmaking apparatus that political and economic changes in Latin America and the Caribbean had created a particular convergence of values offering opportunities that had to be seized.
For the other medium and small countries of the world, like those of the Americas, the need for adaptation was no less evident. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the perception that the emerging world order was being structured around three powerhouses—the United States, European Union, and Japan—in the industrialized world fostered an acute fear of marginalization. There was also fear that the attention and moneys of international lending agencies and private banks would be diverted away from the developing countries to those in Eastern Europe. Fear of exclusion was a powerful incentive for Latin American and Caribbean governments to respond favorably, at least initially, to U.S. overtures concerning hemispheric regionalism.
Consequently, these two sets of events of the early and late 1980s essentially paved the way for U.S. proposals concerning continental integration, and they conditioned the initially positive response given by Latin America and the Caribbean. As shown in Chapter 2, this third attempt at hemispheric regionalism was based on two diplomatic initiatives. President George Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative of June 27, 1990, focused exclusively on the economic dimension of continental integration. Its basic element, as perceived by most observers, was the proposal to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas. The December 1994 Summit of the Americas extended hemispheric regionalism to other dimensions of integration, including political life, security matters, education, health, and the environment. Hemispheric regionalism, as conceived at the Miami summit, therefore implied a diversified process of cooperation and integration in all of the Americas.
As is the case with integration and regionalism everywhere in the world, this kind of process does not evolve and cannot be studied in isolation from its immediate environment. In Chapter 3 we demonstrated that the structural context in which hemispheric regionalism evolves in the Americas does not automatically lead to a deeper and more extensive continental integration, particularly as it relates to the initial conception of the U.S.-sponsored project.
Such integration might have been possible if the evolution of regional integration depended exclusively on the power relationship between the countries involved. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the huge advantage of the United States in terms of power distribution in the Americas has remained almost constant over the past thirty years. And as the example of the German-French axis in Europe has shown, a strong power base can provide considerable leverage for steering an integration process in one direction or another. But power alone is not sufficient; it can be limited by other considerations.
In the Americas, as we have seen in Chapter 3, important political and economic differences exist between the industrialized countries of the North and the Caribbean and South American countries. These differences results in disparate and sometimes opposing views concerning issues of inter-American affairs. This opposition is reinforced by the weight of the historical relationship between the United States and Latin America, which today shapes Latin American attitudes of apprehension and mistrust regarding U.S. intentions in the region. A certain convergence of values may have started to develop in the second half of the 1980s, but a profound and extensive compatibility of values remains a long-term goal.
Opposing views concerning key issues related to the governance of the Americas naturally constitute a significant structural constraint for the progress of continental integration. It is a handicap that is further reinforced, in a sense, by the existence of another particular situation. The large disparity in levels of economic development between the countries of the Americas poses a considerable challenge to the type of economic integration envisaged by the United States and implied, to a certain extent, by the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) model of integration. The apparently dominant vision of an economic integration process wherein all countries are treated on an equal footing without any form of special treatment for the less developed countries of the region may prove unattainable and eventually counterproductive. It is understandable that the region’s larger economies want to move quickly and not be burdened by measures that may not have been completely satisfactory in the past. But there is a very real danger that a “take it or leave it” attitude will bring the governments of the smaller countries to adopt adjustment policies that will place an extremely heavy burden on their own populations. It is not unrealistic to believe that such an outcome could generate Chiapas-type rebellions in many parts of the Americas, thereby creating region-wide instability. That is why the attention given to the situation of the smaller economies both at the San José ministerial and at the Santiago summit must be seen as a positive development.
The most immediately significant structural context for hemispheric regionalism may be that of trade patterns. As the study in Chapter 3 demonstrates, the evolution in the structure of trade in the Americas since the late 1970s reveals a growing concentration of commercial relations around two main centers. In the northern part of the hemisphere, Canada, Mexico, and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean are coalescing around the United States, which acts as the central magnet. A similar situation is developing in South America around the Brazil-Argentina axis, particularly since the creation of Mercosur. It is now possible to foresee that the future evolution of economic integration in the Americas will be determined by the nature of the interrelationship between the NAFTA and Mercosur subregions, given that the two commercial groupings represent 90 percent of intrahemispheric trade.
This is where the comparative analysis of both the NAFTA and Mercosur economic integration models, found in Chapter 4, becomes extremely relevant. Most observations currently emphasize that the nature and scope of the eventual economic integration scheme of the Americas will depend on how the NAFTA and Mercosur frameworks converge. As Ivan Bernier and Martin Roy illustrate, arriving at this convergence will not be easy because NAFTA and Mercosur represent two very different models of economic integration.
Consequently, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the two Summits of the Americas represent significant diplomatic initiatives for launching a complex and diverse continental integration process. Despite an apparently favorable climate for such an endeavor at the start of the 1990s, a careful examination of the realities reveals that the structural context surrounding hemispheric regionalism is not automatically conducive to long-lasting region building in the Americas. All will depend on how the actors cope with the situation. A global assessment of hemispheric regionalism therefore needs to examine actors’ strategies and responses, the focus of the second part of the book.
The Actors’ Perspective
Our decision to use an actors’ perspective in our analysis led us to identify three main categories of actors whose roles can influence the integration process by steering it in one direction or another. These actors are the state, multilateral regional organizations, and civil society. Depending on what perception they have of how the integration process fulfills or opposes their interests, they can either collaborate or try to oppose each other’s strategies in one or all dimensions of the regionalist project. According to the situation, integration can make progress, stagnate, or regress.
The actors involved in the hemispheric regionalism process had different responses to the initial project as presented at the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. As a result, the various actors positioned themselves differently within the dynamics of the integration process.
Civil society can be viewed as being composed of two nebulae animated by various groups, associations, and, sometimes, individual actors. One nebula is centered on business interests and its main actors are individual companies or business associations in the field of industry (automobiles) or those with a wider, more diversified mandate (chambers of commerce). The other nebula is more loosely organized and more varied. It is more socially oriented and composed of a wide array of associations, social and political movements, and various types of other groups with a wide variety of concerns, ranging from acid rain to human rights to labor conditions. Chapters 10 and 11 examine this category of actors.
Firms and business representatives have always been strategic actors in most integration processes worldwide. The reason for this is simple: Firms usually make investments, produce goods, and sell these goods in national or international markets, thereby providing jobs for the workforce and revenues for governments. In doing so, they also determine whether a particular member country of an integration scheme will register economic gains or losses from its participation in the project. Because deliverance of economic benefits to member countries is one of the first requirements for an integration process to succeed, the attitudes and roles of the business community are important elements to take into consideration.
The business sector in Latin America is not and has never been homogeneous, as Klaus Peter Fischer aptly points out in Chapter 10. His own classification, based on how rents are appropriated, identifies three major categories of business actors: the merchant and traditional exporters, the “new industrialists,” and the subsidiaries of multinational corporations. In Latin America all three categories of business actors appear to be favorable to the contemporary, open market form of integration in the Americas, a form that Fischer calls the integrationist-competitive model, which is exemplified by Mercosur and the proposed FTAA. The only exception is the emerging manufacturing sector, which fears that “open regionalism” will put an end to market segmentation based on rents and might even jeopardize its own existence. This sector of the Latin American business community will not directly oppose integration per se nor the integrationist-competitive model. But it will probably pressure Latin American governments, particularly in the context of the establishment of an eventual FTAA, to adopt measures of limited duration that would enable firms of this sector to be reasonably competitive in a hemisphere-wide market.
It has been shown that in North America the business community was involved in a regionalization process even before the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA. In fact, as Stephen Blank asserts, NAFTA and the FTA were essentially a recognition by national governments that economic integration was occurring in North America. The agreements represented “less an effort to stimulate new trade than to stabilize an emerging environment” (Blank 1993: 1). Furthermore, it appears that in the wake of NAFTA’s implementation, more than half of the large firms in the United States are adopting or considering a North America-as-a-whole strategy and even considering structuring their production network on a continental basis (Blank, Krajewski, and Fry 1993: 10).
Not only does the business community have important stakes in hemispheric regionalism, it is also a central actor in the process. Business sectors are mostly supportive of efforts at continental integration and they have been given an important role to play in the establishment of the FTAA, both by being involved in the process of national consultations and by being active participants in the various working groups. By necessity, the business community will continue to be heavily involved in the development of continental integration in close association with national governments. But opposing points of view and even clashes between U.S. and some Latin American business representatives (in the pharmaceutical industry, for example) reveal that the business community of the Americas is not a homogeneous entity and that even limited accommodation to the business community will sometimes be difficult to achieve.
As for the other part of civil society, André Drainville illustrates clearly in Chapter 11 that social movements are acutely aware of the stakes involved in subcontinental integration projects such as NAFTA or the larger continental project. Their style of bottom-up regionalism aims to put various issues related to sustainable development, human rights, women’s participation in society, health and labor regulations, and so on, on the hemispheric regionalism agenda. Social movements constitute a much looser and more diverse coalition of ecologists, churches, human rights activists, women’s associations, labor unions, and native and peasant movements that are opposed to a corporate type of model of integration led by a government-business alliance. They fear that such a model of integration would benefit mostly large, multinational firms, threaten national sovereignty, and worsen the already difficult living conditions of large, vulnerable sectors of the populations of the Americas.
Until now, these groups have been more effective in national settings, where they have managed to build large coalitions and influence public opinion, as was the case in Canada on the FTA issue and in the United States and Canada on the NAFTA issue. But coalition building on a continental basis has been more difficult to achieve, although progress is slowly being made. Among the reasons that social movements have had difficulties organizing on a continental scale may be the fact that issues related to hemispheric governance may still appear abstract for grassroots organizations working at a local level. Differences in cultural background and levels of economic development may also play a role. But progress is being made as input from social movements is sought in national consultations. More important, social movements have tried to structure regional actions by holding a parallel summit in Miami and parallel forums like the one held in Belo Horizonte in May 1997. Three hundred representatives from various nongovernmental organizations, associations, and grassroots movements met in Belo Horizonte, at the same time that a hemispheric trade ministerial was being held, to discuss democratic participation and social and economic rights. They also demanded that civil society be given a seat at the discussion table at the Summit of the Americas in Santiago. Institutional participation of civil society did not materialize at the Santiago summit, but there was a positive outcome in this sense. Following developments at the San José ministerial, the participating governments decided in Santiago to establish the Consultative Committee on Civil Society. Although the impact of such a committee is still unclear, the Plan of Action of the Santiago summit sends a clear message that civil society will be welcome as a participant in the shaping of the regional agenda.
The business community has already taken an active role in the early stages of continental integration, though other components of civil society have remained on the fringes. It is clear, however, that if hemispheric regionalism is to develop and deepen, space must be made and channels put in place to allow the active participation of all sectors of civil society. These channels are what link the integration process to the national and local levels, whose support and follow-up are so essential to the long-term success of a regionalist project. Hemispheric regionalism will need to set up a framework, most likely within the Organization of American States (OAS), similar to those established by the European Union or the former Andean Group. This framework will provide firms, groups, and associations an opportunity to meet regularly to discuss problems and propose measures that hemispheric governments and regional organizations will need to take into account.
The second category of actors is the multilateral regional organizations, the most important of which is the OAS in the context of hemispheric regionalism. As described in Chapter 2, the OAS experienced an uphill struggle after losing most of its influence in inter-American affairs by the mid-1980s. Latin American political elites saw the organization as a U.S. invention and not the most appropriate institution to manage hemispheric affairs.
However, beginning in the early 1990s, the OAS’s situation improved somewhat on account of the arrival of new members such as Canada. The image of the organization, with its traditional U.S.–Latin American focus, started to change. As Guy Gosselin and Jean-Philippe Thérien show, a new dynamic emerged wherein the OAS began to actively promote democracy in the Americas, even though the OAS has been less successful in preserving existing democratic regimes. Enduring Latin American mistrust of U.S. motives and intentions has made it difficult for the OAS to intervene in difficult political situations, as exemplified by the case of Haiti.
All in all, OAS pro-democracy measures implemented through its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy or other channels have had a positive impact in promoting a convergence of values that is essential to region-building efforts. But a lot more will have to be done if the OAS is to contribute effectively as a forum and as an active participant in the construction of hemispheric regionalism. It remains to be seen whether the organization will succeed in other areas of hemispheric cooperation, particularly in relation to the specific mandates given to the OAS in the Miami Plan of Action. Will the OAS be given enough resources and acquire sufficient legitimacy to do more than fulfil the mandates it is assigned? Will it reach the point where it is proposing measures to national governments and devising policies? It is still too early to judge the performance of the “new” OAS with regard to its contribution to hemispheric regionalism. The organization was neither an initiator nor a major actor in the first phase of continental integration, but if it can standardize democratic conduct in the region, it could play a positive role in sustaining and deepening the hemispheric regionalist project.
National governments, strategic participants in the first phase of current efforts to structure hemispheric regionalism, are the third category of actors. Historical evidence from integration experiences elsewhere in the world indicates that their role is a common one. Indeed, region building at an institutional level is difficult to imagine without the input and participation of national governments.
In the Americas of the 1990s, hemispheric regionalism would have been unimaginable without the initial push from the United States in its capacity as regional hegemon. Impressed by political and economic changes in Latin America and the Caribbean throughout the 1980s, the U.S. administration felt that values in the region had converged, creating opportunities that were not to be missed. This belief moved President Bush to propose the June 1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which was followed by the signing of NAFTA in 1992. Both events created the momentum that led to the December 1994 Summit of the Americas.
In Chapter 5, Louis Bélanger shows that hemispheric regionalism is one option in current U.S. foreign policy, where there is a lack of effective policy building. As a world power with an enormous domestic market, the United States has many points of interests and a wide range of choices with respect to its position in the world system. In matters of trade, security, and other areas of international relations, the United States can choose among multilateral, bilateral, or regional options and even combine these options on occasion. Hemispheric regionalism is clearly a regional option. However, it is an option that is not firmly entrenched and has not translated into a planned course of action with a well-constructed policy. This point is extremely difficult for non-American observers to understand. After all, hemispheric regionalism should benefit all the countries of the Americas but especially the United States. Large U.S. firms would be the first to profit from an open regional market. Moreover, as the regional hegemon, the U.S. would extend its power base, thereby increasing its global influence.
How can such apparently irrational behavior be explained? The lack of a clearly defined policy regarding the future of hemispheric regionalism—ironically, a lack most apparent since the Miami summit—may be explained by the fact that U.S. policymakers understand that a commitment to a multidimensional process such as hemispheric regionalism will entail specific obligations. The United States, perhaps even more so than other large countries, does not want to be constrained by an international structure, such as an integration scheme, if it is not absolutely necessary or if it thinks it can reap the rewards without incurring the obligations. Another reason may be that there is no strong domestic constituency to support hemispheric regionalism in the United States. Finally, in Chapter 6, Bernard Lemelin’s examination of congressional conduct identifies increasing protectionist sentiment and growing antiregionalism in Congress since 1994 as a result of the Mexican peso crisis and negative perceptions of the effects of NAFTA on the U.S. labor market.
Although the United States took a somewhat erratic wait-and-see attitude toward hemispheric regionalism, Brazil, another major player, had a well-focused policy. Brazilian governments have always sought to block any U.S.-sponsored form of hemispheric regionalism exclusively designed to suit U.S. interests. As Maria Regina Soares de Lima’s analysis in Chapter 7 illustrates, Brazil’s strategy has been to patiently construct an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored project of continental integration. Because the Brazilian government could not single-handedly counteract U.S. initiatives in favor of hemispheric regionalism, it had to build a coalition and a larger power base. This first meant a rapprochement with Argentina and then, more important, the creation of Mercosur. As Bernier and Roy discuss in Chapter 4, Mercosur is a Brazilian-led effort intended to offer an alternative integration model for the construction of hemispheric regionalism. Mercosur’s success is therefore of utmost importance for Brazilian foreign policy in the hemisphere because its smooth operation will keep the Brazil-Argentina axis healthy and attract neighbors such as Chile, Bolivia, and Peru.
The future of hemispheric regionalism may well be influenced by Brazil-U.S. relations, but that does not mean that other countries of the region, particularly those we have called the middle states, will not have a role to play. In Chapter 8 we examine the role of three middle states—Argentina, Canada, and Mexico—and reveal a few surprises in their performance in relation to the hemispheric regionalist project.
Despite its economic dependence on the United States, Mexico previously managed to pursue an active foreign policy that was in line with Third World concerns and often in opposition to U.S. positions, particularly in inter-American affairs (in its policy toward Cuba, for example). But Mexico has adopted a relatively low profile on hemispheric regionalism and has even developed a critical approach toward certain hemispheric initiatives, particularly in the areas of cooperative security and the promotion of democracy. Mexico’s traditional mistrust toward U.S. policies in the Americas may partially explain this approach. However, the principal reason for this wait-and-see attitude is that Mexico wants to maintain its status as the sole Latin American country with preferential access to the U.S. market. As a NAFTA member, Mexico finds itself in the enviable position of being the obligatory economic bridge between Latin America and the United States. The success of hemispheric regionalism, and particularly the FTAA, could undermine Mexico’s current position, because with that success, Mexico would become a player among others.
Canada, for its part, took on a more positive role when it entered the inter-American scene faithful to its reputation as an intermediary and honest broker. Canada’s economic dependency on the United States, like Mexico’s, has limited its room to maneuver. Nonetheless, the Canadian government has managed to play a role by developing an interventionist policy that proposes middle-ground positions supporting region building. By applying its traditional middle-power diplomacy to the Americas, Canada seeks to contribute to the emergence of a regional multilateral order. This is the only way to dilute the restrictive bilateral relationship with the United States that the Canadian government agreed to when it signed NAFTA and the FTA.
Argentina is a less predictable and more interesting case study despite its similarities with Canada. Although Argentina had a more limited tradition of middle-power diplomacy at the start of the 1990s, the arrival of the new Menem government in 1990 led to a foreign policy realignment that has brought the country closer to the United States. Like Canada, Argentina also redirected its diplomatic efforts by becoming more interventionist and more supportive of initiatives to develop hemispheric regionalism. At the time, of course, Argentina had high hopes of becoming a NAFTA member itself. Like Canada in its relationship with the United States, the Argentine government was strongly attracted to hemispheric regionalism as a means to reduce the weight of its bilateral relationship with Brazil. But Mercosur’s success, the U.S. administration’s failure to obtain fast-track authority, and Chile’s and Bolivia’s decisions to seek a closer partnership with Mercosur have complicated the situation for Argentina. The Argentine government must now reevaluate its position as it becomes more difficult to resist the Mercosur bloc. With a presidential election looming, Argentina’s strategy in relation to hemispheric regionalism will unquestionably be the most interesting to watch among the middle states of the Americas.
The Dyamics of Hemispheric Regionalism
We have circumscribed the continental integration project, situated it within its immediate structural environment, and analyzed the conduct of actors involved in the integration process. Now how can we evaluate the current dynamics of hemispheric regionalism? Regardless of the optimism surrounding the Miami summit, things are not proceeding as well as expected. But is there enough evidence to conclude, as some have done (i.e., refusal by the U.S. Congress to adopt fast-track legislation), that hemispheric regionalism is at a standstill and that this third attempt at continental integration will be as unsuccessful as the efforts of 1889 and 1948?
It is essential when answering these questions to remember that integration is a long-term process with ups and downs that require frequent adjustment from the actors involved. In the case of hemispheric regionalism, the early years were characterized by the momentum that began with the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and led to the Miami summit. This momentum was made possible by the presence of certain perceptions and beliefs, such as the acute perception throughout the region that the reorganization of the industrialized world into economic blocs, particularly in Europe, would result in the marginalization of other parts of the world, including the Latin American and Caribbean subregions. At a time when the United States was reevaluating its foreign policy options, the administration’s belief that values had converged to a point that made the option of hemispheric regionalism conceivable was also an important factor.
A combination of events and perceptions at the end of the 1980s therefore prompted the U.S. government to propose a plan for the reorganization of inter-American affairs in an effort to strengthen continental integration. At issue was a political and economic development model that would bring political and economic conduct in the Americas in line with the U.S. vision of liberal democracy and market economics. Also at issue was U.S. leadership in the hemisphere and its global influence in the new world order.
It appears, however, that the early momentum of the regionalist project has been lost and that hemispheric regionalism is now in jeopardy. What has happened to explain this turn of events? Has hemispheric regionalism really ended? Our contention is that initial U.S. designs for continental integration are in difficulty and may have reached a dead end. Furthermore, hemispheric regionalism, as distinguished from the U.S. model, which is only one interpretation of continental integration, has essentially entered a new phase. This new phase is an attempt to redefine the contours of hemispheric regionalism in the face of the change in regional dynamics that occurred almost immediately after the Miami summit.
Ironically, it is the United States—the country that would apparently gain the most from the regionalist project—that is at the root of the changing dynamic. In the wake of the first Summit of the Americas, congressional representatives were influenced by new protectionist-minded members, the Mexican peso crisis, and the view that NAFTA was having negative effects on the U.S. economy and the labor market. They began to perceive NAFTA-style integration arrangements as detrimental to the U.S. workforce and economy. Even though experts had different opinions about the precise impact of both NAFTA and the peso crisis on the U.S. economy, Congress had become skeptical about the benefits of extending NAFTA to the rest of the hemisphere. This situation, aggravated by what appeared to be a weaker commitment to hemispheric regionalism on the part of the Clinton administration, led directly to the fast-track authority episode. This major policy fiasco in turn resulted in a significant loss of U.S. credibility concerning its ability to provide the necessary leadership to move continental integration forward.
This negative turn of events in the United States gave other actors involved in the regionalist project more political leeway. The most significant input came from Brazil. Bolstered by the success and geographical extension of Mercosur, Brazil led the movement to try to redefine and redirect the continental integration process. Rather than reject hemispheric regionalism per se, countries such as Brazil question the form that integration will take. Issues include the choice of topics in discussions leading to the FTAA, their order of priority, the timetable to be adopted, and larger questions such as the role of the state in the economy. In addition, many of the region’s smaller countries are afraid that the extension of a NAFTA-style model throughout the entire hemisphere will place an unbearable burden on them by imposing adjustment measures unacceptable to local populations.
Now that there is more political space to move about in, many civil society actors have the opportunity to voice their concerns, propose alternative measures, and insist on participation in discussions to establish the parameters of an eventual integration scheme. The Miami experience has opened the door to civil society interventions, a development worth considering in the current process of redefining hemispheric regionalism.
The second Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998, left many options open in terms of redefining continental integration. Given the state of domestic affairs in the United States, it was difficult to imagine beforehand that the summit would result in major engagements on the part of the participating governments in relation to hemispheric regionalism. On the contrary, one would have expected immobilism or even a step back on the road toward integration.
But the worst fears did not materialize and the Santiago summit did achieve some successes. The most notable success was the decision to launch FTAA negotiations formally and to adopt a timetable and select the countries presiding over the various stages of the negotiations. The objective is to conclude the FTAA negotiations no later than 2005, with tangible progress made toward this goal by 2000. This decision was a compromise between the North Americans, who want to be able to sign interim agreements before all measures are agreed upon, and Brazilian-led Latin Americans, who insisted on negotiating on the basis of the single undertaking principle. By introducing education as a central theme of hemispheric regionalism, the Santiago Plan of Action also draws attention to other dimensions of integration, namely, the social and cultural aspect so important for the long-term success of the regional project. The importance given to civil society actors by the Santiago summit is also a positive development in the sense that it indicates a recognition of the significance of such actors for the legitimacy of the whole process. Finally, the attention given to the problem of the smaller economies as they try to become part of the integration process could be an important step forward if it is translated into concrete mechanisms enabling these countries to join the process without unbearable adjustment costs.
For the rest, the Santiago Plan of Action is essentially a follow-up of the measures included in the Miami Plan of Action. How the actors involved in the process will be able to translate these measures into specific realizations will depend on the outcome of the new dynamics at work in the integration process since 1995.
It is still too early to predict what this process of redefinition will mean for the future of hemispheric regionalism. But it is quite clear that the domestic situation in the United States since the mid-1990s has had a significant impact on the dynamics of continental integration. It has made room for other actors and created opportunities for them to redefine the agenda for hemispheric regionalism. It is evident that the outcome of the current redefinition phase will be influenced by the relationship between the United States and the Brazil-led coalition. Compromises must be made that are acceptable to both the United States and its neighbors; this is particularly true for the United States. If eventual compromises do not appear to take U.S. interests sufficiently into consideration, then Washington will be reluctant to get involved, and hemispheric regionalism will have little meaning in the absence of the regional hegemon. Finally, it is obvious that regional organizations such as the OAS, middle states such as Argentina and Canada, business community representatives, and the broader civil society have a crucial role to play in proposing compromises and solutions capable of generating large support.
Hemispheric regionalism is a complex, long-term process of which this book can offer nothing more than a provisional assessment. The current move toward continental integration—made possible by the particular configuration of the world order in the 1980s—is part of a larger historical process in the Americas that is still unfolding. As with all social and political constructs, hemispheric regionalism is influenced by the perceptions, values and behavior of the actors involved in its construction. Scholars must try to fully understand these elements if we are to more adequately assess a phenomenon that has begun to modify the landscape of the Americas in a profound way.
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