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The Americas In Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, by Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger, and contributors
9. The Organization of American States and Hemispheric Regionalism
In this chapter we examine the role of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the current resurgence of regionalism in the Western Hemisphere. Although we recognize that the OAS is a multifunctional institution, our analysis focuses on the issue of democracy and human rights. As Heraldo Muñoz explains, “The promotion and preservation of democracy is now the principal issue that defines the public profile of the OAS, in effect, the one that will determine its destiny” (Muñoz 1993a: 70). In sum, what we argue in this chapter is that an examination of OAS activities in recent years, particularly in the area of democracy and human rights, makes possible a deeper understanding of the overall state of inter-American cooperation and a better assessment of the future of hemispheric regionalism.
By virtue of its functions and membership, the OAS is the most important regional organization in the Western Hemisphere. It is the only institution that brings together all the states of the region. In addition, the OAS’s mandate covers political, economic, and social matters. Nevertheless, the explicit link established in this chapter between the study of regionalism and the study of regional organizations is hardly self-evident. In fact, for over a generation the role of regional organizations in the development of regionalism has been the subject of sharp debate. An overview of that debate will make it easier to set the rest of our analysis in its proper context.
The first studies of regionalism and integration placed considerable emphasis on the importance of regional institutions. Drawing on the European experience, many experts and politicians in the 1960s perceived a causal relationship between the vigor of regional organizations and the speed of integration. True to this line of thought, Joseph Nye defined regionalism as “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions” (Nye 1968b: vii). This definition, however, was never unanimously accepted. A number of observers noted, for example, that the plethora of regional organizations founded at the initiative of developing countries had not fostered the rapid growth of regionalism in the Third World. Contending that regional organizations represented only one among several types of instruments for promoting integration, other authors stressed the need to better distinguish the notions of regional cooperation, regional system, regional organization, and regionalism (Haas 1970: 607–610; Hansen 1969: 262–271).
Nearly thirty years later, at a time when references to a “new regionalism” are more and more frequent, the role of regional organizations remains hazy. In defining regionalism as “a state-led or states-led project designed to reorganise a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines,” Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble tend to underestimate the political leadership exercised by regional bodies (Payne and Gamble 1996: 2). Gary Gereffi foregrounds the fact that in East Asia regionalism has been shaped more by the behavior of multinational firms than by the creation of intergovernmental institutions. What characterizes East Asia, in his view, is “a market-induced, rather than policy-induced, form of economic integration” (Gereffi 1995: 138). In comparison with these positions, other analyses assign much more weight to regional organizations. For example, basing his analysis on the assumption that there are “varieties of regionalism,” A. LeRoy Bennett views regional organizations as the institutional engines of regionalism (Bennett 1995: 229–264). Similarly, a recent study by Louise Fawcett notes that the new wave of regionalism has been accompanied by “a proliferation of new regional groupings” and “a revival of older regional bodies” (Fawcett 1995: 9).
Though as yet unresolved, the debate regarding the connection between regional organizations and regionalism has allowed several useful guideposts to emerge. Clearly, the sole existence of regional institutions cannot be seen as a necessary and adequate condition for the development of regionalism. Yet regional organizations can obviously lend stability and predictability to cooperation among states, to the extent that, like all multilateral forums, they accomplish functions of norm creation, socialization, legitimation, and provision of information (Jacobson 1984: 88–90; Archer 1992: 159–177). This, ultimately, is what justifies paying particular attention to bodies like the OAS within a comprehensive study of hemispheric regionalism.
The Miami summit of December 1994 did a great deal to elevate the prestige of the OAS. The Plan of Action put forward there affirms that “the OAS will have a paramount role in following up on the various decisions of this Summit meeting” (Rosenberg and Stein 1995: 26). A watershed event in the modern history of inter-American relations, the meeting in Miami plotted out an ambitious cooperation plan centered on two major objectives: (1) the establishment of a free trade zone in the Americas by 2005 and (2) the strengthening of democracy and human rights in the region. And though the Miami summit ultimately attributed no more than a supporting role to the OAS in the realm of trade liberalization, the organization was identified as the “principal hemispheric body for the defense of democratic values and institutions” (Rosenberg and Stein 1995: 13).
The assignment of such an important political mandate to the OAS is remarkable considering that in the early 1980s the organization appeared to be on its last legs. Historically, inter-American relations had always evolved in an atmosphere of conflict deriving from the asymmetrical distribution of power between the United States and the other countries of the region (Stoetzer 1993). Thus, from a traditional Latin American viewpoint, the OAS was considered a shield against U.S. intervention, whereas in the United States, the organization was perceived as a vehicle for its foreign policy interests. During the Cold War period, this perceptual difference was constantly exacerbated by the U.S. government’s overriding concern with the struggle against communism. Moreover, even though the International Union of American Republics—the OAS’s predecessor founded in 1890—was primarily concerned with commercial matters, the OAS itself has never managed to become a major player in the economic arena. Inter-American cooperation in that field has been continually hampered by notions of development bearing the deep imprint of the North-South divide. Against the background of this less than brilliant past, the rise of hemispheric regionalism in the 1990s allowed the OAS to make an unexpected comeback (Hurrell 1995a; Varas 1992: 52–53).
Our study emphasizes the problem of democracy and human rights because these issues tend more and more to overshadow other OAS preoccupations. The OAS does, of course, continue to carry out various functions regarding, for instance, trade liberalization, security, and the war on drugs. But in these areas of inter-American cooperation, the OAS’s role remains relatively muted. The negotiations on regional commerce and security have taken place within ad hoc forums known as Trade Ministerial and Defense Ministerial (Inter-American Dialogue 1997a: 22–28). As far as the war on drugs is concerned, it is common knowledge that the U.S. government favors a bilateral rather than a regional approach (Klepak 1996). Consequently, democracy and human rights dominate the OAS agenda as never before.
Democracy and human rights have sometimes been regarded as separate items on the OAS agenda. The approach we have adopted is different, our assumption being that, because they constitute the core of liberal pluralism, democracy and human rights constantly overlap. This is the viewpoint implicit, for example, in the appraisal made by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when he observed that “the protection of [human rights] is closely linked to the process of democracy” (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 3). The same vision also informs the Miami summit’s Plan of Action, according to which “a democracy is judged by the rights enjoyed by its least influential members” (Rosenberg and Stein 1995: 13). In this chapter, the questions of democracy and human rights will be discussed as complementary and indissociable issues of inter-American cooperation.
Our analysis builds on a body of literature that focuses on the OAS’s increasing involvement in the promotion of democracy and human rights (Acevedo 1993; Acevedo and Grossman 1996; Bloomfield 1994; Farer 1993, 1996; Gosselin, Mace, and Bélanger 1995; Padilla 1993; Valenzuela 1997; Villagran de León 1992; Vivanco 1994). Our objective is to determine whether, on the basis of its work in the area of democracy, the OAS is contributing to the construction of hemispheric regionalism either as a forum or as a player. In the first section of the chapter we describe how the OAS has recently made it possible to institutionalize certain regional principles and norms regarding democracy and human rights. In the second section we examine what the OAS is doing in order to put those regional principles and norms into effect. Basing the third section on a critical analysis of the OAS’s role as both forum and player, we assess the extent of inter-American consensus in matters of democracy and human rights. Finally, in the conclusion we locate the OAS’s work on democracy in relation to the overall dynamics of inter-American cooperation.
A Changing Democracy Doctrine
As of the mid-1980s, once the dictatorships had begun to topple in the hemisphere, a new climate of cooperation started to take shape in inter-American relations. The new climate allowed the OAS to refine its definition of democracy and human rights and to undertake a host of new initiatives regarding these matters. A first step was the adoption of the Protocol of Cartagena in 1985. In this charter amendment, the OAS’s commitment toward the promotion and strengthening of representative democracy was articulated more explicitly than ever before, and the need to uphold the sacrosanct principle of nonintervention was reaffirmed. In particular, the Protocol of Cartagena recognized representative democracy as “an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.” It also established a direct link between democracy and human rights by referring to the need to “consolidate, in the framework of democratic institutions, a regime of individual liberties and social justice, based on the respect of human rights” (Organization of American States 1989: 1).
In 1990, as a new member of the OAS, Canada provided the leadership for the creation of a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). Within a few years the UPD became the institutional focal point for most of the OAS’s efforts in the area of democracy. The main purpose of the UPD is to provide advisory services and technical assistance to help OAS members develop democratic institutions and procedures. At the time of its creation, three specific fields of endeavor were identified: electoral processes, legislative processes, and educational programs for promoting democracy. Electoral monitoring soon took precedence over other priorities, but the UPD is now seeking to enlarge its scope by emphasizing the global and integral nature of democracy. Increasingly, the UPD’s discourse stresses the need to consolidate both civic practices and mechanisms of participation in the political process (Organization of American States 1997b: 5). As UPD head Elizabeth Spehar explains, “The premise behind the Unit’s support is the need to develop the democratic political culture of the countries of the hemisphere, as the most fundamental way of ensuring that democracy will thrive and endure in the Americas” (Organization of American States 1996: 5).
In the wake of the establishment of the UPD, the OAS General Assembly in June 1991 took another decisive step regarding representative democracy. In the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System adopted on that occasion, member states reaffirmed their “inescapable commitment” to the defense and promotion of democracy and human rights in the Western Hemisphere (Vaky and Muñoz 1993: 104). The Santiago meeting also led to the adoption of Resolution 1080, which is less rhetorical and contains more operational provisions than the Santiago Commitment. Resolution 1080 requires an immediate meeting of the OAS Permanent Council in the event of a sudden interruption of the democratic process within a member state. The resolution also provides for the convening of an ad hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs or a special session of the General Assembly within a ten-day period in order to determine the measures to be taken. What makes Resolution 1080 innovative is, above all, the mandatory nature of the proposed procedure as well as the involvement of top-level representatives of the member states. Widely recognized as a major breakthrough in inter-American cooperation, Resolution 1080 was not easily adopted. The reservations expressed by Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico bespoke a major divide between noninterventionists and activists (Argentina, Canada, Chile, the United States, and Venezuela were among the latter). Mexico was the last to rally to the final compromise, but it did so with extreme reluctance (Bloomfield 1994).
The OAS’s commitment to the collective defense of democracy advanced with the adoption of the Protocol of Washington at the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly in December 1992. When this amendment to the OAS charter goes into effect, it will give the organization the authority, provided there is a two-thirds majority, to suspend a member state whose democratic government has been overthrown by force. As of mid-1998, the Protocol of Washington had been ratified by twenty states. Like Resolution 1080, the Protocol of Washington is meant to have a dissuasive effect on any group or faction that may be tempted to disrupt the functioning of democratic institutions in a member state. The Protocol of Washington was another instance of confrontation between activists and noninterventionists in the OAS. Isolated once again, Mexico finally voted against it. In its official statement appended to the protocol, the Mexican government insisted that “Mexico is opposed to the punitive character ascribed to the OAS” and that “it is unacceptable to give to regional organizations supra-national powers and instruments for intervening in the internal affairs of our states” (Organization of American States 1997c: 2)
The OAS doctrine of democracy was extended further with the Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development, adopted at the 1993 OAS General Assembly. This declaration made clear that the OAS’s mission was not “restricted to defending democracy wherever its fundamental values and principles have collapsed” and called for “a continuing effort to prevent and anticipate the very causes of the problems that work against democratic rule” (Vaky and Muñoz 1993: 111). In particular, the Declaration of Managua established a direct link between the development of democracy and the eradication of extreme poverty.
The relationship between democracy and development was readdressed in a more solemn and comprehensive manner at the Miami summit. From its very title, the Declaration of Principles adopted on that occasion linked the issues of democracy, free trade, and sustainable development. Besides the ritualistic commitments to preserve and strengthen democratic systems, the declaration affirmed that “democracy and development reinforce one another” and that “the fruits of democratic stability and economic growth must be accessible to all” (Rosenberg and Stein 1995: 9, 11). Complementing the Declaration of Principles, the Miami Plan of Action drew attention to new problems that could be considered threats to democracy, such as corruption, crime, and terrorism (Rosenberg and Stein 1995: 14–16). In a subsection of the document devoted to human rights, the governments of the hemisphere renewed their commitment to inter-American human rights bodies and furthermore agreed to promote greater coordination in that regard between the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank. The Miami summit thus helped clarify and further legitimize the hemispheric democracy doctrine.
Early in 1995, the new secretary-general of the OAS, César Gaviria, strove to sustain the “spirit of Miami” in a major document titled “A New Vision of the OAS.” This document was submitted as “a navigational chart in the quest for true participatory democracy” (Organization of American States 1995: 5). On a symbolic level, Gaviria’s “New Vision” was a confirmation of the OAS’s repositioning thereafter as an international forum dedicated above all to the promotion and defense of democracy. On a substantive level, the distinguishing feature of this document was its effort to propose a people-centered, as opposed to a state-centered, definition of sovereignty. “An active citizen and a well-organized civil society,” wrote the secretary-general, “are the guarantees of effective exercise of popular sovereignty” (Organization of American States 1995: 9). Built on the concept of equality of all citizens, the approach advocated by Gaviria reinforced the link between the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. Yet on the eve of the year 2000, the realization of a more solid conjunction between these two objectives remains the most difficult challenge facing the OAS.
The foregoing summary of events demonstrates how, for more than a decade, the OAS has been seeking to better define its role in strengthening democracy in the region. In general terms, that role can be analyzed with reference to two horizons: the short term and the long term. In the short term, Resolution 1080 and the Washington protocol are the OAS’s main instruments for responding in a concerted manner to any attempt at interrupting democracy. In the long term, the UPD emerges as the primary tool for the organization’s ability to ensure the growth of democratic institutions in the hemisphere. Overall, the inter-American doctrine of democracy is founded on a set of legal and policy norms that are increasingly consistent.
Such consistency, however, takes on a completely different cast in light of the fact that neither financial nor human resources have kept pace with the broadening of the OAS’s mandate. In 1997, the UPD’s budget was less than U.S.$15 million. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has only thirteen lawyers to monitor human rights in the entire hemisphere. Clearly, a significant gap exists between the organization’s ambitious goals and the paucity of the means at its disposal. And the gap does not seem to be narrowing. At present, only a handful of countries make a significant contribution to the OAS budget. The United States is the one country capable of leading the way toward financial soundness but sees no interest in doing so. The U.S. share of the OAS budget was officially reduced from 66 percent to 59.47 percent in 1990 after Washington unilaterally decided, as it had done at the UN, to pay only a fraction of its assessment (Vaky 1993: 39). In the final analysis, the OAS’s chronic lack of resources betrays a lack of political will among the member states and constitutes the most concrete impediment to the achievement of the organization’s goals with respect to democracy and human rights.
OAS Activities
OAS activities are commonly divided into those concerning the defense of democracy and those concerning the promotion of democracy. The attention of diplomats and the media has focused primarily on defense operations because of their immediate political impact. Since 1991 Resolution 1080 has conferred on the OAS unprecedented powers to prevent the overthrow of elected governments. So far, Resolution 1080 has been used on four occasions. In the first three cases, constitutional authority had been aborted outright by a military coup or an executive move to shut down the national legislature. These were the September 1991 military coup in Haiti and the autogolpes (self-coups) of the president of Peru in April 1992 and the president of Guatemala in May 1993. The fourth case, the Paraguayan crisis of April 1996, was different inasmuch as democratic institutions, though seriously threatened, were ultimately maintained.
In each of these four situations, a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council was convened as provided in Resolution 1080. Except in the case of Paraguay, there followed an ad hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs to determine which collective measures would be taken. These diplomatic initiatives made it possible to adopt resolutions condemning the interruption of constitutional rule and to undertake mediation. In the cases of Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay, these actions, in conjunction with international and domestic pressures, helped resolve the crisis rapidly. In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori agreed to a compromise, which, though considered by some a step back for democracy, was deemed satisfactory by the OAS. In Guatemala, President Jorge Serrano Elías, who had dissolved the Congress and the Supreme Court, was soon forced to step down. Finally, in Paraguay, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy emerged victorious from his confrontation with army commander General Limo César Oviedo.
The OAS’s involvement in the Haitian crisis turned out to be more difficult. The overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on September 30, 1991, entailed the first enforcement ever of Resolution 1080. Thus, considering that it was a precedent, the OAS’s response at the time was remarkably swift and resolute. The Permanent Council condemned the coup d’état the very day it took place. In the first days of October, the ad hoc meeting of ministers of foreign affairs decided that the OAS would not recognize the representatives of the new government and that the IACHR would present a report on the human rights situation in the country. The ministers called for the diplomatic isolation of the new regime and asked member states of the OAS to suspend economic relations with Haiti. However, when the de facto Haitian government systematically refused to comply with the demands of the other governments of the hemisphere, the OAS found itself at a loss and was unable to step up its political and economic sanctions. The OAS’s lack of leadership eventually opened the door to a joint intervention by the UN and the United States. Indeed, it was on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of all means necessary that the United States organized the deployment of military forces that allowed President Aristide to return to power in 1994. In short, the Haitian crisis “dramatically reveal[ed] the limits of OAS action” (Acevedo and Grossman 1996: 145).
Overall, recent history testifies to the growth of the OAS’s capacity to defend democracy collectively. Through a series of unprecedented actions, the organization has contributed, albeit in ways that are not easily measured, to the maintenance of the rule of law in the region. Yet the Haitian episode argues against the temptation to overestimate the OAS’s newly acquired influence. The OAS is not in a position, for example, to enforce an embargo, nor can it resort to military force. Furthermore, the OAS’s low profile during Ecuador’s constitutional crisis in February 1997 prompted a number of observers to cast doubts on the level of commitment of governments in the region to a truly credible system for defending democracy (Inter-American Dialogue 1997b: 7).
Regarding the OAS’s role in the broader arena of the promotion of democracy and human rights, once again, the 1990s represent a turning point. Under this head, the OAS’s most important activity consists in supporting and evaluating election processes. As of mid-1998, the UPD has participated in more than thirty-seven electoral observation missions (Organization of American States 1998). Most of the missions were organized to monitor presidential elections, but in some countries the UPD was also invited to support municipal electoral processes. OAS missions cover a broad range of issues, including “the organization and administration of the elections themselves, enforcement of the electoral laws, the registration of parties and candidates, the preparation of the voter rolls, the campaign, and citizen participation” (Organization of American States 1997d: 30). Electoral missions have done much to enhance the OAS’s reputation and credibility in recent years, yet they have been the target of some serious criticism. It has been suggested that “the missions... generally try to settle electoral irregularities privately with the national electoral authorities rather than confront the host government directly” (Inter-American Dialogue 1996: 5). To the extent that the OAS avoids “being politically contentious,” its actual contribution to the democratization of the countries where it intervenes remains moot (Inter-American Dialogue 1996: 5). The question arises whether the organization does not at times serve only to lend international legitimacy to governments wishing to maintain the status quo.
Another major component of OAS activities in favor of democracy and human rights was developed to address the specific needs of countries ravaged by civil war. Assuming as a premise that peace is the first condition for the establishment of democracy, the OAS has been extremely active in what has been termed “post-conflict reconstruction.” Activities of this type have included demining operations, as well as the demobilization of armed groups, the verification of the application of the peace accords, the provision of social services, and the rebuilding of institutions. OAS post-conflict reconstruction work has been most intensive in Nicaragua. There the OAS has been involved in the peace process since 1989 through the International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV), constituted jointly with the UN. According to one expert, “The experience of coordinated United Nations–OAS operations in Nicaragua was not a very positive one” (Baranyi 1995: 351). The CIAV was criticized most notably for having been incapable of preventing renewed outbursts of violence (Millet 1994). As Stephen Baranyi concludes, however, “It is worth noting that it is the OAS which remained in Nicaragua to provide the required longer-term peace-building services and that the OAS appears to be learning the importance of maintaining strict impartiality when dealing with disputants in such conflicts” (Baranyi 1995: 351).
The OAS has furthermore been active in other parts of Central America, although in El Salvador and Guatemala the conflicting parties preferred to call on the UN rather than the OAS. Looking outside Central America, the OAS also assisted the peace process in Surinam, where it was instrumental in the signing and application of the 1992 peace accords. It was assigned responsibility for tasks related to the disarmament of combatants, demining, and the supervision of elections. As shown by the convergence of these various cases, post-conflict reconstruction has now become a key element of the OAS’s approach to democracy.
The OAS also promotes the strengthening of democracy and human rights through a series of training, education, research, and information initiatives. In Nicaragua, for example, the UPD has provided support to establish peace and human rights commissions and has organized workshops for local political officers from conflict zones. In Haiti, it has set up human rights educational programs (Organization of American States 1997d: 26–29). Currently the UPD is trying to act more as the catalyst rather than the chief manager of such undertakings. It increasingly insists on the need for an exchange of experiences among OAS members and for partnerships with other institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank. The UPD’s long-term approach to democracy has generally been viewed favorably. In particular, the UPD has provided expertise that would not otherwise have been available. Yet the work accomplished by this agency has nevertheless given rise to all sorts of questions. For one thing, it has been suggested that “the Unit has not developed an integrated strategy concerning what ‘democracy promotion’ is,” an omission that engenders the risk that projects may be subordinated to political criteria (Inter-American Dialogue 1997a: 14–15). More fundamentally, one may ask how the UPD, with its very limited budget, can hope to make a significant difference for the development of a hemispheric democratic culture.
Finally, the OAS has helped to promote democracy and human rights through initiatives of a normative nature. For example, two such initiatives stem directly from the Miami summit. First, in March 1996, the member states of the OAS signed the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. One of the noteworthy innovations of this convention was a set of measures designed to facilitate interstate cooperation regarding bank secrecy. Second, in April 1996, the OAS made possible the adoption of the Declaration of Lima to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, which defines terrorism as a crime that “impairs the rule of law and democracy.” These new legal instruments do not broaden the judicial functions of the OAS as such. However, they clearly illustrate how the OAS is actively seeking to enlarge and deepen its role in the consolidation of democracy in the region.
Scope and Limits of the New Consensus on Democracy
The OAS’s new commitment to democracy and human rights has substantially raised the credibility of the project of hemispheric regionalism. There is little doubt that regional cooperation is more readily accomplished among states sharing common political values, and the OAS has done much over the past decade to foster the growth of such common values in the Americas. There is now an unprecedented consensus among states regarding the understanding of the rules of governance applicable to either their own jurisdiction or to others in the region. At the same time, the OAS’s goal of bringing about a distinct and truly Pan-American conception of democracy is not yet at hand.
The expansion of the OAS’s ambit and activities in the area of democracy and human rights derives from profound attitudinal changes within the countries of Latin America. The most significant of these changes is that democracy is no longer seen as a strictly domestic issue. As Tom Farer observes, governments in the region are showing a “growing tolerance” toward external action aimed at defending democracy. “Even measures that would once have been widely condemned as impermissible intervention,” he explains, “are acquiring a remarkable aura of legitimacy” (Farer 1996: 4–5). This new interpretation of the notion of sovereignty is all the more consequential in light of how ardently Latin American governments had always defended nonintervention as a fundamental principle of inter-American cooperation. Some countries, such as Mexico and Peru, have sought to downplay the meaning of the new norms adopted by the OAS, and their governments continue to affirm the primacy of national sovereignty. But despite any “jurisprudential controversy” that may arise from the ranking of the principles governing inter-American relations, the sovereignty of the state has clearly lost its former status of inviolable doctrine (Tesón 1996: 33).
The Paraguayan crisis of 1996 offers one of the most telling illustrations of the recent ascendancy of democratic values in the Americas. The involvement of the international community, added to domestic pressures, was decisive for the resolution of the standoff between President Wasmosy, representing constitutional order, and a faction of the military headed by General Oviedo. The OAS was an active player in this international response, but its role was not the most influential. Much more crucial were the actions of the foreign ministers of Brazil and Argentina, who went to Asunción and threatened to exclude Paraguay from the Southern Cone Common Market should that country renege on its democratic commitments. As noted by Richard Feinberg, “It is difficult to overstate the historical significance of this willingness of South America’s largest economies to intervene—boldly and openly—in the domestic affairs of another Latin American state” (Feinberg 1997: 167). Thus, what emerges above all from the Paraguayan episode is the increasing internalization of democratic principles by the political elites of the hemisphere. Ironically, General Oviedo himself is reported to have declared that “with the OAS’s adoption of Resolution 1080 in Santiago, the era of military coups in Latin America had come to an end” (Valenzuela 1997: 54).
There is no doubt that the OAS considers the electoral process the single most important institutional component of a democratic system. Hence, the charter highlights the notion of representative democracy, a notion defined in the Santiago Commitment as the “expression of the legitimate and free manifestation of the will of the people” (Organization of American States 1991). The new inter-American consensus nevertheless encompasses the idea that the requirements of democratic government go much beyond the mere holding of elections. Gradually, a more substantive understanding of democracy has gained authority within the OAS’s discourse. First, it is acknowledged as never before that a democracy cannot enjoy full legitimacy if it does not include an independent legislative body, an effective judiciary, a transparent public administration, a dynamic party system, and the decentralization of state powers in favor of local jurisdictions. Second, the governments of Latin America now agree that democracy requires close civilian supervision of the armed forces. In this regard, the launching of programs to educate civilian leaders on security issues and military officials on the workings of democracy is a promising initiative (Inter-American Dialogue 1997a: 24). Finally, a new consensus has been achieved on the notion that democracy is linked to the economic environment. The United States now admits that extreme poverty undermines democracy, whereas Latin America has come to recognize that trade liberalization promotes democracy. On the whole, then, there has been an ideological convergence among governments in the hemisphere regarding some basic elements that should define a democratic culture.
Furthermore, the OAS has fostered a strengthening of regional common values through its efforts on human rights issues. It has long been recognized that the OAS has established the “second-best regional regime for human rights,” after the European Union (Forsythe 1991: 87). In the 1990s the OAS has succeeded in further broadening the inter-American human rights regime. For the first time, the IACHR was invited to observe the human rights situation in Brazil (1995) and Mexico (1996). More fundamentally, the OAS has paid increasing attention to all forms of discrimination—social, sexual, ethnic, and racial. Given the position of women in traditional Latin American societies, the adoption of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women in 1994 represents a major symbolic victory in the struggle for equal rights.
Current discussions within the IACHR aimed at advancing the rights of indigenous peoples, the disabled, and migrants are another indication of the new conception of justice that is gaining momentum throughout the Americas. Historically, it is the most mature democracies that have paid the greatest attention to the rights of vulnerable groups. Seen in that light, the OAS’s recent work on human rights issues certainly helps consolidate the democratic commitment of the governments of the hemisphere. From a broader perspective, this work provides another example of how the political values of the various countries of the region are evolving through the setting of ever more ambitious shared objectives.
The new inter-American consensus on democracy and human rights issues was made possible by a unique combination of domestic and international factors. On the domestic level, every country in the hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba, is currently ruled by an elected government. Since 1980, Haiti has been the only country to experience the overthrow of a democratic government; even so, President Aristide was eventually reinstated (Inter-American Dialogue 1997b: 7). This wave of democratization has resulted largely from the exhaustion of the authoritarian regimes long considered typical of Latin America. The “lost decade” of the 1980s irrevocably sapped the legitimacy of the military governments that held power in a number of countries. Thereafter, “the economic failure of most of [the] dictatorships, their militarizing self-serving policies and the human rights horrors they had perpetrated could no longer be ignored” (Brachet-Marquez 1997: 19). Such economic and political conditions were conducive to the growth of a strong pro-democracy movement throughout the region. Once elected, the democratic governments felt it was in their interests to obtain international protection; by ensuring the maintenance of democracy in nearby states, they would be ensuring the maintenance of democracy within their own borders.
The democratization of Latin America has also been aided by a favorable international environment. To quote Mihaly Simai, the post–Cold War era is characterized “by an unprecedented spread of universal suffrage and by greater pluralism... than the world has ever seen” (Simai 1994: 346). In 1994, 114 countries could be considered democratic, a twofold increase over the previous ten years (Diamond 1995: 9). A major effect of the end of the Cold War was the resolution of the civil wars in Central America, which paved the way toward national reconciliation in this subregion. More generally, the end of the Cold War provided spectacular confirmation that the political choices made by the countries of Latin America as of the early 1980s coincided with major historical trends. With the fall of socialism, no credible alternative to the democratic model was left standing. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali has noted, “People in nations around the world have become more insistent in their demands for democracy” (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 5). Latin America has been particularly affected by this global movement.
But although there has been remarkable progress in recent years, the inter-American consensus on democratic values remains fragile (Thérien, Fortmann, and Gosselin 1996: 228–229; Wiarda 1997, 15–22). First, it may be extravagant to describe the Americas as a “community of democratic societies,” as was done at the Miami summit (Rosenberg and Stein 1995: 9). The term “community” implies a certain homogeneity, whereas, in fact, the political regimes of the various countries of the hemisphere are highly disparate. To gauge this diversity properly, Larry Diamond proposes a distinction between “democracies” and “semi-democracies.” In his estimation, in 1994 only nine of the twenty-two Latin American countries “stood within the conceptual threshold of democracy” (Diamond 1996: 61). Hence, the notion of a community of democracies is mistaken inasmuch as a number of governments are unable to enforce the rule of law or uphold civil liberties effectively.
In addition, the newness of the inter-American consensus on democracy makes it all the more tenuous. However avant-garde Resolution 1080 may be, it goes back to only 1991; it is therefore too soon to draw conclusions about the depth of the attitudinal changes associated with the resolution. At this juncture, there is no assurance that democracy in Latin America is irreversible. The lukewarm endorsement of democratic ideals by such countries as Mexico, Peru, and Colombia is one reason for caution. A second is that in several polities the military continues to play a leading role. The two attempted coups that in recent years shook an apparently well-established democracy like Venezuela are enough to give pause. To a large extent, the speed and magnitude of political change in Latin America during the 1990s explain why the roots of democracy there remain as shallow as they do (Brachet-Marquez 1997: 46).
In addition, the scope of the inter-American consensus on democracy is limited. For example, the OAS doctrine concerning the collective defense of democracy excludes the creation of instruments such as early-warning systems, mandatory sanctions whenever a government is toppled, or the establishment of peacekeeping forces. Moreover, the road toward the attainment of democracy remains unclear. Secretary-General Gaviria has chosen to obscure this problem further by affirming that although democracy is a common objective for governments in the region, not every country is obliged to apply “the same model” (Organization of American States 1995: 9). Such ambiguous diplomatic language has the advantage of leaving the door open to a multiplicity of traditions and experiences; it is thus perfectly consistent with the demand-driven, noncoercive approach preferred by the OAS. Its ambivalence, however, testifies to the inability of governments in the hemisphere to articulate the contents of their democratic aspirations.
Thus far, the OAS has had far more success producing agreements on abstract and long-term goals than promoting specific legislative initiatives in favor of land reforms, tax reforms, or reforms in education systems. As noted earlier, the positions of the United States and Latin America have of late undergone a remarkable rapprochement regarding the links between democracy and development. Yet major differences persist. A huge gap still separates the United States and the countries of Latin America over their respective interpretations of the assignment of responsibilities in the struggle against poverty. Simply put, the United States sees poverty as a domestic issue, whereas Latin Americans argue that it is a transnational problem. In a broader perspective, a number of Latin American observers remain suspicious of the fact that U.S. support for democratization is closely tied to Washington’s bias in favor of market liberalization (Payne 1996: 112–113). They stress that the benefits that were to be derived from Latin America’s recent economic reforms are still hard to discern (Inter-American Dialogue 1997b: 11–12). All in all, the economic parameters that ought to provide the framework for the OAS’s democratic project clearly remain an ongoing source of tension in hemispheric relations.
As for the defense of human rights, again, the confluence of values among the countries of the hemisphere has limits that should not be underestimated. First, the inter-American human rights regime is a two-tiered system because barely half of the governments of the region have accepted the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction. Nonparticipants include the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Mexico; thus it is apparent that only small and medium-size countries are fully integrated into this regional regime. Second, there is a persistent controversy over the management principles of the system. For example, certain IACHR and Inter-American Court nominations over the years suggest that some OAS members prefer a system subordinated to political aims rather than to criteria of professional competency.
Moreover, the very nature of the roles played by the commission and the court remains contentious. The debates are crystallizing in an environment radically different from the one that prevailed until the early 1990s. As the commission’s latest annual report points out, “Paradoxically, the new situation in the Hemisphere [has]... generated more cases for the Commission because in democratic systems individuals actively seek to assert their rights.” The report adds that “cases [have] grown legally more complex to reflect a shift from violations of basic rights to disputes over more complex legal interpretations typical of increasingly open societies” (Organization of American States 1997e: 805). Irritated by this new trend, some governments, in an attempt to weaken the commission, have tried to restrict its functions to promotion and education. Drawing on their newly acquired democratic legitimacy, they argue that with the disappearance of authoritarian regimes the commission has lost much of its raison d’être. Though still marginal, this point of view does betoken the shortcomings of the convergence of values regarding human rights in the Americas.
As Richard Feinberg has stressed, with the end of the 1980s “the hemisphere’s intellectual climate changed dramatically” (Feinberg 1997: 34). The countries of the region are more united than ever in their conception of democracy and human rights, and this new context has largely contributed to the dynamics of hemispheric cooperation. Not only is a freer politics increasingly considered ethically superior, but it is also seen as the most appropriate road to economic growth. Undeniably, among the intertwined domestic and international factors that have made possible this conceptual transformation, the multilateral initiatives of the OAS have played a considerable part. But it would be easy—and tempting—to overestimate the OAS’s accomplishments as well as the true state of the inter-American consensus on democracy. To borrow Howard Wiarda’s image, “The glass of democracy in Latin America is still only half full” (Wiarda 1997: 15). Because of this situation, the political values that might compose the cement for hemispheric regionalism remain an important subject of debate.
Conclusion
Inter-American relations have undergone a substantial transformation in the 1990s. Although the depth of this transformation should not be exaggerated, hemispheric regionalism has benefited from an exceptional political thrust owing to the 1994 Miami summit. This context of renewal explains why the OAS currently enjoys an unprecedented legitimacy. As we suggest in this chapter, the resurgence of the OAS has been evident primarily in the areas of democracy and human rights. In most other fields of inter-American cooperation, particularly economic and security issues, the OAS has played a distinctly less consequential role.
In the economic arena, it is true that in recent years the OAS has attended to matters of commerce and integration as never before. Soon after the launching of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative by U.S. president George Bush in 1990, the OAS established a working group to handle this project; then, in 1993, a Special Committee on Trade was created to promote dialogue on hemispheric trade liberalization. Yet it became clear through these developments that the OAS was not likely to serve as anything more than a forum for discussion and the exchange of information. That status was confirmed when the Miami summit set up the so-called Trade Ministerial, a political process basically independent of the OAS, to steer the negotiations on the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas. The OAS’s functions in relation to this project are restricted essentially to technical support. Hence, the duties of the OAS Trade Unit, which was created in 1995, are centered on the preparation of specialized studies and the coordination of ministerial meetings (Inter-American Dialogue 1997a: 27–28). With regard to development financing, the OAS’s contribution also appears to be slim. The OAS’s resources are simply too modest in comparison with those available to other aid agencies, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank.
With respect to security, there are a number of reasons that its priority on the OAS agenda has been on the decline. First, with the end of the Cold War, the relative weight of security matters has decreased in the Americas, as it has elsewhere around the world. Instead, attention has been focused on the new threats to security, such as drugs and migration. But on these issues the OAS remains sharply divided; moreover, it does not command any real authority to resolve these problems. Regarding more traditional armed conflicts, the end of the East-West confrontation has allowed the OAS to be more active, but it has also brought to light some of the organization’s limitations. In many conflicts—for example, those in El Salvador and Haiti—the OAS has been obliged to yield political leadership of the peacekeeping operations to the United States or the UN. Furthermore, the OAS has been marginalized in terms of regional negotiation structures. The Committee on Hemispheric Security, established in 1992 within the OAS, was bypassed via the Defense Ministerial set up by the U.S. government’s initiative soon after the Miami summit. Finally, a number of the security problems that recently arose in the hemisphere were related to domestic rather than international conflicts. Because the solutions they required were far more political than military, these conflicts helped cast a new light on security issues and heightened the importance of the OAS’s concern for democratization.
This, then, is the backdrop against which democracy and human rights have today become the OAS’s top priority. Concurrently, these are the areas where the OAS has best succeeded in affirming its relevance and authority. Admittedly, the OAS cannot be considered as the main determinant of the advancement of the region toward democracy. Nevertheless, the organization has made a noticeable contribution to this advancement by combining its initiatives with those of many other political forces. The OAS has been influential as both a forum, through the progressive broadening of the organization’s mandate regarding democracy, and as a player, through the application of a series of concrete measures designed to defend and promote the rule of law in the region. As Andrew Hurrell has suggested, the strengthening of the OAS’s role in the fields of democracy and human rights testifies to an unprecedented “ideological convergence” in the hemisphere (Hurrell 1995a: 273). This convergence has made it possible to lend a far more cooperative impetus to inter-American relations. By the same token, it has generated a political climate favorable to the development of hemispheric regionalism. Yet the progress achieved in recent years should not obscure the magnitude of the challenges that remain.
Some of those challenges are related to conjuncture; others are structural in nature. Since the Miami summit, hemispheric regionalism has lost the momentum of the early 1990s. Because this negative trend seems largely due to Washington’s foreign policy choices (Inter-American Dialogue 1997b: 4), Latin American governments will no doubt be increasingly wary of accepting any measure, whether it concerns democracy, human rights, or any other issue, that might be interpreted as a concession to the United States. From a structural perspective, the overall dynamics of inter-American relations continues to be encumbered by the weight of past conflicts. As argued by Feinberg, “Mistrust of the United States still pervades many sectors of Latin American societies, including parts of the foreign policy establishments and bureaucracies” (Feinberg 1997: 38). The United States, for its part, often sees Latin America as a group of underdeveloped countries “roughly fifty years behind Canada and the United States in terms of the prosperity of its citizens and the solidity of its democratic institutions” (Harrison 1997: 18). Rooted in the wide gap that characterizes the distribution of wealth in the Americas, this atmosphere of mutual suspicion constitutes a powerful brake on any new cooperation initiatives. In the end, it is clear that the OAS is now in a better position to make a significant contribution to the growth of hemispheric regionalism. Unfortunately, this unique situation does not in itself guarantee the success of the organization’s future undertakings.
Endnote
*: The authors would like to thank research assistant Joël Monfils for his excellent work in collecting and organizing data. Back.
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