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The Americas In Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, by Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger, and contributors
6. From Warmth to Coolness:
The U.S. Congress and the Free Trade Issue in the Americas,
1988–1996
November 20, 1993, was a day of rejoicing for the Clinton administration: By a vote of 61 to 38, the Senate passed bill H.R. 3450 implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), just three days after the House of Representatives endorsed the same proposal (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994: 171). NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994. This historic trade pact, which called for among other things the total elimination of tariffs between the United States, Mexico, and Canada over a fifteen-year period, was an example of a genuine trend toward economic regionalism in the Western Hemisphere. Also representative of this trend was the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed in January 1988. The FTA’s key provisions phased out tariffs between the two nations over a ten-year period.
This chapter seeks to examine and analyze the attitude of the U.S. Congress toward the free trade issue in the Americas during the period between the 1988 debate over FTA and the presidential election of 1996. This was not only a period of rapid economic transformation but also one that seemed to mark an interesting evolution in congressional behavior: Capitol Hill’s initial support for economic regionalism in the Americas, which was obvious in the debates of 1988 and 1993, waned perceptibly between 1994 and 1996, as exemplified by the stalemate on free trade negotiations with Chile. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress, to which the U.S. Constitution ascribed a key role for regulating commerce with foreign nations (Destler 1986: 3), played an influential role in the evolution of regionalism in the Americas—the same Congress that political scientist Jerel Rosati has characterized as “a significant actor in foreign economic policy” (Rosati 1984: 326) 1 and whose involvement in overall foreign policy making has increased since the end of the Vietnam War and the Watergate affair. 2 For example, the successful negotiation of the NAFTA side agreements on labor and the environment was linked to the willingness of the Clinton administration to please many Democratic members of Congress (Wiarda 1994: 133). In fact, the legislative branch has become much more active and visible on trade issues since the 1960s (Destler 1994: 245). Equally illustrative of the substantial increase in the congressional role regarding trade policy was the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, authorizing U.S. participation in the multilateral Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As I. M. Destler has noted: “It was the product primarily of congressional initiative. Not only was its initiation shaped by congressional more than executive priorities, but a considerable portion of its 467 pages addressed issues where members of Congress wanted legislation and the administration (for the most part) did not” (Destler 1994: 228).
More specifically, in this chapter I will attempt to address the following questions: Why is it that the protectionist sentiment so acute on Capitol Hill during the 1980s 3 did not prevail in the debates of 1988 and 1993? Who were the supporters and the opponents of FTA and NAFTA in Congress? Did NAFTA critics deserve the label of “neo-isolationists”? Did the endorsement of regional initiatives such as FTA and NAFTA signal decreased support for multilateralism in the legislative branch? Why did the post-NAFTA period see a strong resurgence in congressional opposition to the idea of economic regionalism in the Americas?
The literature relating to congressional attitudes on this issue is surprisingly limited. For instance, on the Free Trade Agreement of 1988, historians John Thompson and Stephen Randall devoted only a few words to this particular aspect in their 1994 volume on Canadian-U.S. relations (Thompson and Randall 1994: 288). Likewise, Howard Wiarda’s recent article on U.S. domestic politics and NAFTA, although it contains relevant information concerning congressional attitudes in 1993, neglects a rich primary source for determining the views of Capitol Hill politicians on legislation, the Congressional Record (Wiarda 1994: 141–143). As I have already implied, a thorough examination of the U.S. Congress’s stance is therefore highly relevant considering the key role played by domestic actors in the integration process. This is what prompted political scientist Andrew Hurrell to declare that “domestic policy convergence has undoubtedly been an important factor in the resurgence of regionalism” (Hurrell 1995b: 71).
This chapter, which is chronological and topical in its approach, has three sections. In the first section, which deals with the debate of 1988, I present and then analyze the views of FTA supporters and opponents in the legislative branch. I also make some general observations on the congressional vote on the issue. In the second part of this chapter I do roughly the same thing for the 1993 debate on NAFTA. Finally, in the last section I aim primarily to demonstrate that the post-NAFTA period was not an auspicious one for Capitol Hill supporters of economic regionalism in the Americas.
“The Most Ambitious Bilateral Trade Agreement in History”
Hailed by Ronald Reagan as “an historic agreement for both sides” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1990: 4), the January 2, 1988, accord between Canada and the United States generated numerous reactions on Capitol Hill before both houses voted on the issue at the end of the summer. Some of these reactions were frankly harsh, and others were unequivocally approving.
First and foremost, the defenders of the Free Trade Agreement in Congress emphasized the special relationship that existed between the two nations. The views of Oregon senator Bob Packwood were a good illustration of this position. Packwood, a Republican, affirmed that Canada and the United States were “two major industrial countries with an immense border, common interests, common language” (U.S. Senate 1988: 3). According to the senator, a refusal to ratify such a landmark agreement would constitute nothing less than an “absolute crime” (U.S. Senate 1988: 3). His colleague John Chafee of Rhode Island declared that “Canada is our largest export market” (U.S. Senate 1988: 4), and Republican representative Philip Crane of Illinois resorted to citing statistics to make the point: “In 1987... total bilateral trade in goods and services between the United States and Canada exceeded $166 billion, making these two countries the largest trading partners in the world.... The United States purchases 76 percent of Canada’s exported goods, and the United States supplies 68 percent of Canadian imports” (Congressional Record 1988: 21311).
Moreover, several members of Congress asserted that the Free Trade Agreement held out specific economic advantages for their constituencies. For instance, Democratic representative David Skaggs of Colorado emphasized the positive impact the FTA would have on high-tech industries in the Rocky Mountain region: “More than 41,000 Coloradans are employed in the electronic and electric equipment and machinery industries.... In 1986, Colorado companies exported $49 million worth of electronic computers to Canada.... The... liberalization in service and investment industries will translate into many new export opportunities to the state’s technology-based sectors” (U.S. House 1988a: 760). Still others suggested that the agreement of January 1988 would stimulate tourism from Canada (Congressional Record 1988: 24427).
Although the FTA aroused greater political opposition in Canada than in the United States (McGaughey Jr. 1992: 49), several opposing voices were also heard south of the forty-ninth parallel, particularly on Capitol Hill. Indeed, some members of Congress castigated the FTA, which was little known to the U.S. people (Thompson and Randall 1994: 283).
Senator Pete Domenici, a Republican from New Mexico, was among the critics. His fears included concerns over the FTA’s impact on the U.S. uranium industry: “A reading of the agreement would wipe out the Atomic Energy Act provision that requires that America have a viable uranium industry. Under the agreement the case would be mooted” (U.S. House 1988a: 262). As Domenici admitted, he was primarily motivated by a desire to preserve the struggling uranium industry in his own state (Congressional Record 1988: 24406).
For his part, Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, was especially resentful of the FTA’s reaffirmation of the 1965 U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, under which, as he specified, “automotive manufacturers are required to produce at least one car in Canada for every car they sell there, and to maintain at least a 60 percent Canadian content in the cars they build in Canada” (Congressional Record 1988: 24391). Levin deplored the absence of similar protection for U.S. auto production (Congressional Record 1988: 24391).
However, it was the detrimental effects of the Canadian subsidy system that rallied the largest contingent of congressional opponents to the agreement signed by Ronald Reagan and Canadian prime minister Brian Mulrooney. As Republican representative Larry Craig of Idaho explained, the prevalence of this system gave Canadian products “an advantage over the nonsubsidized American products that compete directly with them” (Congressional Record 1988: 21338). Certain members of Congress felt Canadian federal and provincial subsidy practices were particularly harmful to specific U.S. agricultural commodities.
Wheat was a good example. As Senator Kent Conrad, a Democrat from North Dakota, pointed out, the U.S. farm program, which was designed to store surplus grain during bountiful years and sell it to the world in times of shortage, differed drastically from the Canadian farm program:
In contrast to the United States farm program, the Canadian farm program is designed to move Canadian grain to export terminals and to obtain the best possible price for their farmers in the world market. To do this, Canada heavily subsidizes rail transport from the grain producing areas of Canada to port cities. In addition, the Canadian Wheat Board acts as an agent for export sales of all Canadian wheat as well as other products. (Congressional Record 1988: 24388)
In the same vein, Democratic senator George Mitchell of Maine argued that the Free Trade Agreement was unfair for the potato industry in his own state: “Canada now subsidizes its potato industry. The United States does not. This agreement doesn’t change that. Canada has laws which effectively prohibit Maine potatoes from being shipping [sic] into Canada. The United States has no comparable laws. This agreement doesn’t change that” (U.S. Senate 1988: 5).
Interestingly, several FTA supporters openly shared some of their adversaries’ anxieties. Representative Rod Chandler, a Washington Republican who had expressed his excitement about the prospects of creating what he called “the most ambitious bilateral trade agreement in history” (U.S. House 1988b: 117), feared the impact of the FTA on the plywood industry: “Under the agreement, U.S. plywood producers would continue to be denied access to 90 percent of the Canadian market, while Canadian producers would have free access to our market” (U.S. House 1988b: 118). 4
On August 9, 1988, the House of Representatives passed the bill implementing the FTA by a 366 to 40 margin (H.R. 5090); the Senate did the same on September 19 by a vote of 83 to 9 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1989: 228). Such “overwhelming approval by both Houses” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1991: 1232), to use Ronald Reagan’s words, was not really surprising.
In fact, aside from the merits of the agreement itself and the helpful fast-track procedure that accompanied its consideration in Congress, the FTA also received strong backing from some very influential quarters. Business groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the American Business Conference unhesitatingly endorsed the deal (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1989: 223). In addition, the nation’s governors voted 30 to 5 in favor of the FTA as early as late February 1988 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1989: 223). And the Reagan administration spared no effort in promoting the agreement with the backing of organizations like the 500-member American Coalition for Trade Expansion with Canada, a pro-FTA business lobby (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1989: 223). The administration’s “broad-scale educational effort on Capitol Hill” (Aho 1988: 182) certainly helped convince some members of Congress that failure to implement the Free Trade Agreement would have pernicious effects on both nations. John Thompson and Stephen Randall went so far as to declare that “the easy success of the FTA in Congress owed everything to the pressure and support by Reagan and his officials” (Thompson and Randall 1994: 288). Be this as it may, Reagan’s attitude must essentially be viewed within the context of the transformations occurring in the world system during the 1980s: His fears of U.S. decline in the face of resurgent Japan and Europe spurred the president even further in his determination to build bridges with his northern neighbor (Thompson and Randall 1994: 287).
These elements help us understand what led an FTA opponent like New Mexico’s Pete Domenici to predict prior to the Senate vote that “[the Free Trade Agreement] will pass and that it will pass overwhelmingly” (Congressional Record 1988: 24406). In short, the 1988 decrease in protectionist sentiment in the Democrat-controlled 100th Congress appeared unavoidable.
An examination of the 1988 congressional vote on the FTA shows three things. First, the agreement received extensive bipartisan support: of the 83 FTA supporters in the Senate, 43 were Democrats and 40 Republicans (Congressional Record 1988: 24444–24445). Second, many Capitol Hill opponents to the pact were from the states along the Canadian border, a phenomenon linked to expectations that the FTA would have a severe impact in this area. Of the nine FTA dissenters in the Senate, six were from the states of Maine (William Cohen and George Mitchell), Michigan (Carl Levin), North Dakota (Kent Conrad and Quentin Burdick), and Montana (John Melcher) (Congressional Record 1988: 24445). Third, the vote shows that the Western states also accounted for a good number of free trade adversaries: five of the nine opponents in the Senate—namely, Jeff Bingaman (New Mexico), Quentin Burdick (North Dakota), Kent Conrad (North Dakota), Pete Domenici (New Mexico), and John Melcher (Montana)—were from states west of the Mississippi River (Congressional Record 1988: 24445). Naturally, this situation was linked to the fact that some of these states depended heavily on agriculture and that many of their inhabitants believed that the FTA would lead to increased problems with their subsidized Canadian competitors. Indeed, in North Dakota, spokesmen from organizations such as the Wheat Commission and the Barley Council (U.S. House 1988a: 446–449, 481–484) made sure they voiced their “agricultural concerns” in public during the free trade debate.
However, such dissatisfaction was not enough to stop the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, “one of the more enlightened trade initiatives of the postwar period” (Nivola 1990: 253), from taking effect on January 1, 1989, several days after winning approval from the Canadian House of Commons (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1989: 228).
“One of the Biggest Triumphs of [the Clinton] Presidency”
Although the 1988 debate provoked strong reactions on Capitol Hill, the 1993 debate on the North American Free Trade Agreement was even more emotional. Democrat Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, who was first elected in 1961, claimed that the agreement had “sparked the largest and most comprehensive public debate on international trade that I have witnessed in all my years in the Senate” (Congressional Record 1993: S15536). His words highlight the importance of examining what Democratic representative Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut called “this tumultuous debate” (Congressional Record 1993: H7335)—a debate that clearly reflected Congress’s particular sensitivity on “intermestic” issues. 5
The employment issue was central to the arguments of the congressional supporters of the historic trade agreement signed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico on December 17, 1992. As one senator explained, “At the heart of the debate is whether NAFTA will mean job creation or job loss” (Congressional Record 1993: S16974). Republican representative David Dreier of California was among those who believed that “the job creating aspects of free trade are one of the most important reasons to support NAFTA” (Congressional Record 1993: H4855). Dreier, who was commended by President Clinton for his pro-NAFTA efforts (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1994: 2139), argued that the positive impact of the agreement on employment was easy to understand: “NAFTA will create jobs here because high Mexican barriers to our exports will be reduced (Congressional Record 1993: H4855). Dreier’s optimism was shared by many of his colleagues in the House, including Michigan Republican Peter Hoekstra, who found fault with the job loss argument: “The argument that we will lost [sic] jobs because of NAFTA ignores reality. The ability to move jobs out of the United States exists today. By approving NAFTA, we will reduce the incentive to move jobs to Mexico by lowering and eliminating tariffs on United States goods” (Congressional Record 1993: H9911). For his part, Californian Steve Horn deplored the malevolence of certain NAFTA opponents: “Those who exaggerate potential job losses do not discuss American job gains from NAFTA.... 283 top economists of all political views—including 12 winners of the Nobel Prize in economics—signed a statement supporting NAFTA. They agreed that America will gain many more jobs than we might lose” (Congressional Record 1993: H7343).
According to some Capitol Hill politicians, the agreement was also favorable to agriculture. Senator David Pryor, a Democrat from Arkansas, noted the benefits that NAFTA would bring to the rice farmers of his state. As he explained, “Rice exports to Mexico... are hit by a 20–percent tariff on milled rice and a 10-percent tariff on rough rice. With NAFTA, these tariffs will be phased out over a 10-year period” (Congressional Record 1993: S14584).
Still others stressed that the December 1992 agreement would not be harmful to the U.S. environment. In fact, Senator Max Baucus, a Democrat from Montana who has been described as “one of the leading environmentalists in the whole Congress” (Congressional Record 1993: S12058), agreed that NAFTA was “the greenest trade agreement in history” (U.S. Senate 1993: 1). However, he was also conscious of the gap existing between the United States and its southern neighbor in the area of environmental enforcement (U.S. Senate 1993: 2). For his part, Republican John Chafee asserted that NAFTA contained several provisions on the environment and that it had been endorsed by spokespeople from organizations such as the National Wildlife Federation (Congressional Record 1993: S12058).
Moreover, many members of Congress felt that NAFTA would contribute to reducing illegal immigration from Mexico. Democratic senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey explained his conviction that this would be the case on the grounds that NAFTA would boost the economy south of the Rio Grande (Congressional Record 1993: S12058).
For a good number of Washington-based politicians, NAFTA was good news from a foreign policy standpoint. Republican representative Jim Kolbe of Arizona, for example, viewed NAFTA as a “very important initiative to improve our relationships with Mexico and the rest of Latin America” (Congressional Record 1993: H5445), and Bill Bradley underscored that NAFTA would ensure a secure oil supply for the nation (Congressional Record 1993: S15530). For his part, Democratic senator John Kerry of Massachusetts judged that the creation of such a powerful trading bloc was vital “as we watch China and Asia, the Asian tigers, emerge with even greater power today” (Congressional Record 1993: S16603). According to Democratic representative Mike Kopetski of Oregon, one of these “Asian tigers” was particularly eager to make a move in the event that NAFTA was rejected: “If not this NAFTA, the probability is that Mexico and Japan—Japan, our major competitor—will attempt to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement. If that happens, Japan will use Mexico as an even greater staging area to ship their goods into the United States” (Congressional Record 1993: H8802). Of course, NAFTA, by enhancing U.S. competitiveness, was also perceived by people like Republican representative Ron Packard of California (Congressional Record 1993: H9864) to be an effective means of competing with another strong regional trading bloc, the European Community.
Finally, some members of Congress resorted to the lessons of history to condemn protectionism and promote NAFTA ratification. Republican representative Herbert Bateman of Virginia provided a good example: “For 50 years, American leaders have supported the systemic expansion of global free trade. Within this framework, the United States has prospered enormously. However, the opposite occurred when Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, short-sighted... legislation that raised barriers to trade” (Congressional Record 1993: E2884).
NAFTA opponents on Capitol Hill also resorted to an imposing range of arguments to justify their position. Scholar Howard Wiarda has identified twenty-two different arguments used by NAFTA critics both inside and outside Congress (Wiarda 1994: 135–136). “A product of corporate America” (Congressional Record 1993: S11752), “a destructive agreement” (Congressional Record 1993: H9876), “a jobs program for Mexico” (Congressional Record 1993: S16013)—these were among the strongest denunciations from NAFTA detractors criticizing the deal in Congress.
Not surprisingly, most opponents emphasized that ratification of such a regional initiative would mean job losses for U.S. workers or, as Democratic representative George Miller of California called them, “these people who helped us to win the Cold War” (Congressional Record 1993: H9878). Democratic representative and majority whip David Bonior of Michigan was convinced that job losses were inevitable:
American workers are the best in the world and... they can win in the new global marketplace if... the playing field is fair... ; but NAFTA threatens to... put us at a tremendous disadvantage. Why? Because primarily there is a systematic policy in Mexico to keep wages low.... Even in the highest paying jobs, Mexican workers earn less in a day than American workers earn in an hour.... If... wages are so low, and the Government rolls out the red carpet called NAFTA, the big multinationals would be crazy not to use that red carpet to close up shop here and move south of the border. (Congressional Record 1993: H4670)
In fact, Bonior considered that the huge wage disparities between the two countries would hurt countless people in the United States: “If NAFTA passes, Henry Kissinger will not be put out of work,... Lee Iacocca will not lose his job, but 500,000 Americans will.... There is not a single word [in this agreement]... that says anything or that does anything to raise Mexican wages... or to ensure that Mexican workers earn enough to buy our products” (Congressional Record 1993: H9858). In the same vein, Democratic senator Donald Riegle of Michigan expressed his concern about integration with a nation that “has a Third World economy... in terms of its wage structure” (Congressional Record 1993: S5861), and Democratic representative Marcy Kaptur of Ohio argued that approval of NAFTA would be particularly harmful to women because so many of them worked in the textile industry (Congressional Record 1993: H4674–H4675). For her part, Barbara-Rose Collins, a Democratic representative from Michigan, argued that NAFTA would hurt African Americans: “NAFTA will liberalize access to Mexico manufacturing. This... will cause the number of jobs traditionally held by blue-collar workers... to evaporate. Because minorities are concentrated disproportionately in these jobs, we will see unemployment among minorities shoot up. At 14.6 percent, unemployment among African-Americans is already more than double that of other Americans” (Congressional Record 1993: H8336).
Some Capitol Hill politicians also thought that NAFTA would have detrimental effects on agricultural jobs. Democratic representative Patsy Mink of Hawaii was particularly concerned about the impact of NAFTA “sugar provisions” on 17,000 Hawaiian sugar plantation workers. The provisions stipulated that there would be no limit on Mexican sugar exported north of the Rio Grande after fifteen years (Congressional Record 1993: E905–E906).
Naturally, the issue of NAFTA’s environmental impact was raised by many members of Congress. Democratic senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, for instance, stated that although Mexico’s environmental standards were strict on paper, they had a notoriously bad enforcement record. The senator contended that such a situation might have deleterious effects on public health (U.S. Senate 1993: 9). Furthermore, the argument that NAFTA would contribute to reducing illegal immigration from Mexico was also assailed by certain Capitol Hill politicians. Dianne Feinstein, a Democratic senator from California, said that there were no provisions in NAFTA requiring Mexico to control its own borders (Congressional Record 1993: S16067). She also quoted a study by NAFTA supporter Philip Martin of the Institute of International Economics that predicted an increase in illegal immigration into the United States “as the Mexican economy turns to manufacturing and displaces those Mexican agricultural workers whose crops are inefficiently grown” (Congressional Record 1993: S16068).
A number of NAFTA opponents also declared that the “dictatorial” nature of the Mexican political system and the issue of human rights south of the Rio Grande constituted another impediment to NAFTA ratification. In the words of Independent representative Bernard Sanders of Vermont: “The [Institutional Revolutionary Party] has been in complete control of the Government since 1929, never having lost an election. Workers in Mexico today are not allowed to organize free trade unions, state and federal elections are rigged,... and dissidents have been jailed and killed. How do you have a free trade agreement with a country that is not free?” (Congressional Record 1993: E2353).
Although the arguments summarized here were the most prominent in the anti-NAFTA discourse, several other issues were raised by members of Congress, including claims that the agreement would create new bureaucracies 6 and threaten U.S. motorists. 7
In retrospect, however, most NAFTA opponents on Capitol Hill did not deserve the label of “neo-isolationists” since many of them seemed receptive to the free trade idea 8 and privately recognized that more U.S. jobs would be created than lost in the long run (Wiarda 1994: 140). Thus, politicians like Ohio’s Howard Metzenbaum (Congressional Record 1993: S11074) and California’s Dianne Feinstein (Congressional Record 1993: S16068) publicly rejected protectionism and voiced their support of free trade principles. Above all, it is important to remember that several NAFTA opponents, including Michigan’s David Bonior (Congressional Record 1988: 21351) and Donald Riegle (Congressional Record 1988: 24444), voted in favor of the 1988 Free Trade Agreement with Canada. However, the enormous differences between the U.S. and Mexican economies, as well as pressures from interest groups and constituents, prompted many members of Congress to back away from their pro–free trade position.
As mentioned earlier, the bill to implement NAFTA (H.R. 3450) was passed in the Senate by a vote of 61 to 38 on November 20, 1993. Three days earlier, the House had approved the same piece of legislation by a majority of 234 to 200 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994: 171), a vote that David Rosenbaum of the New York Times qualified as “one of the biggest triumphs of [the Clinton] Presidency” (New York Times 1993a). As with the 1988 vote, this congressional endorsement was not altogether surprising, although the prospects of a free trade victory had appeared somewhat doubtful as late as September 1993 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994: 172). Although NAFTA had generated considerable criticism outside Congress (from Ross Perot, Pat Buchanan, organized labor, etc.) (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994: 172), it was supported not only by prominent economists and certain environmental groups but also by two former U.S. presidents, 9 a large majority of governors, 10 numerous newspapers (Congressional Record 1993: S12070), most major business groups, and the greater part of the Hispanic community (Wiarda 1994: 121–123). Support from this last group was by no means trivial; Hispanics are well on their way to becoming the largest minority in the United States by the year 2000 (Wiarda 1994: 123).
Furthermore, the growth of U.S. exports as a result of Mexico’s adhesion to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986 was another reason that several senators and representatives saw NAFTA in an auspicious light; many felt that the 1992 accord would intensify such a trend by eliminating remaining tariff barriers (Congressional Record 1993: H9879). Quite a few legislators were aware that public opinion, in spite of its negative perception of the measure, was not intensely opposed to NAFTA. This sentiment, among other things, was evident in a poll taken just a few days before the congressional vote: “It found that of the respondents who were opposed to NAFTA, a reassuring 75 percent said that how their members of Congress voted on the NAFTA issue would not alone determine whether or not they would vote to reelect their representative or senator” (Rourke, Carter, and Boyer 1996: 396).
Another similarity with 1988 was the bipartisan nature of the NAFTA vote: In the House 102 Democrats and 132 Republicans supported the agreement (New York Times 1993a: A1), whereas 27 Democrats and 34 Republicans did the same in the Senate (New York Times 1993b). Representative Newt Gingrich of Georgia contended that the NAFTA debate was “in the past traditions of historic bipartisanship, the tradition of the... Truman doctrine, and the vote on Desert Storm” (Congressional Record 1993: H9876). However, the Democrats, who controlled the 103rd Congress, were much more divided on the issue than the Republicans. This was especially true in the House, where 156 Democrats voted against NAFTA, compared with only 43 Republicans (New York Times 1993a: A20). These results can be explained by the fact that many Democratic representatives wanted to retain the backing of organized labor, which remained “a potent force at local, state, and regional levels” despite its declining influence in national politics (Wiarda 1994: 132). As for the stronger support NAFTA enjoyed in the Senate, it was due in part to the fact that senators, because of their six-year terms in office, were less susceptible to the pressures that led many representatives to vote against the measure (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994: 179).
An examination of the November 1993 vote also reveals that politicians from the four Mexican border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) tended to be strong NAFTA supporters. New Mexico senators Pete Domenici and Jeff Bingaman, who had both opposed the FTA in 1988, voted in favor of the deal (New York Times 1993b), and no less than twenty-four of the thirty-member Texan delegation in the House of Representatives did the same (New York Times 1993a: A20). 11 In fact, politicians from states west of the Mississippi River, most of them probably reassured by the positive impact of the 1988 Canada-U.S. agreement, seemed receptive to the free trade idea. Only 29 percent of NAFTA opponents in the Senate were from the West, compared with 56 percent of those who had voted against the FTA five years earlier (New York Times 1993b). 12 Also different from 1988 was the strong legislative opposition to NAFTA coming from older industrial states of the Northeast, such as Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. The region accounted for 55 of the votes cast against NAFTA in the House of Representatives, but only 9 of the votes against the FTA. 13
There are a number of reasons for this opposition. On the one hand, siding against organized labor in these and certain other states would have appeared suicidal for a member of Congress seeking reelection—something akin to a political “kiss of death” (Wiarda 1994: 132). Indeed, several Democratic members of Congress from the region were heavily dependent on the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the dominant labor organization, for campaign contributions (Wiarda 1994: 132). On the other hand, the old northeastern “manufacturing belt,” which includes these states, 14 has experienced economic stagnation since the 1960s while the “sunbelt” has grown and prospered. 15 Naturally, the economic situation in the Northeast has had an impact in the area of foreign economic policy. As scholar Peter Trubowitz has pointed out, the growing vulnerability of many key industrial sectors (automobiles, steel, etc.) to global competition in the 1960s and 1970s gradually eroded support for free trade in the manufacturing belt as protectionism grew increasingly attractive (Wiarda 1994: 186). 16 This would certainly explain why the most outspoken critics of NAFTA in Congress—people such as Donald Riegle, David Bonior (who was called “the real leader in the House in opposition to [the agreement]”) (Congressional Record 1993: H6966), and Marcy Kaptur—were from these states.
Although the U.S. Congress supported the free trade agreements of 1988 and 1993, the endorsement of such regional initiatives did not mean that support for multilateralism 17 had declined in the legislative branch. On the contrary, many indicators of congressional attitudes for the years 1988–1993 seem to confirm, as French scholars Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts have argued, that regionalization and globalization are not antinomic notions (Badie and Smouts 1992: 203).
Of course, both FTA and NAFTA stimulated the trend toward regionalism. During the debate of 1993, for instance, several Capitol Hill politicians convinced of the merits of trade liberalization advocated similar initiatives elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. For example, Minnesota senator Dave Durenberger argued that the extension of NAFTA to countries in the Caribbean and in Central and South America was highly desirable (Congressional Record 1993: S16605).
Congress’s commitment to multilateralism, however, remained strong during both the 1988 and 1993 debates. Although agreements like FTA and NAFTA essentially resemble what Badie and Smouts have called “une stratégie de défense contre l’extérieur” (Badie and Smouts 1992: 198), Capitol Hill’s willingness to eliminate obstacles to international trade and build bridges to countries outside the Western Hemisphere had not faded. Oregon representative Bob Smith, for example, viewed the Canada-U.S. rapprochement of 1988 as “a chance for America to begin an agreement which will expand possibly to... Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea” (Congressional Record 1988: 21331). Even more important, several members of Congress expressed considerable interest in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. President Reagan had authorized U.S. participation in these important talks when he signed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act on August 23, 1988 (Destler 1994: 228), and Republican senator James Jeffords of Vermont, for one, maintained that refusal to approve NAFTA would jeopardize the successful completion of the negotiations (Congressional Record 1993: S16013).
Thus, as Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott have affirmed, regional initiatives such as NAFTA must not be regarded “as a shift in U.S. policy away from its central focus on multilateralism” (Hufbauer and Schott 1993: 116).
“We Need a Cooling-off Period”
At first glance, U.S. congressional support for free trade appeared to remain strong during the post-NAFTA period. Congressional endorsement of U.S. participation in GATT at the end of 1994 seemed to exemplify this continued commitment to multilateralism. The vote ratifying “the most ambitious global trade accord reached in four decades” (New York Times 1994c), a 124–nation pact that slashed tariffs by one-third and created a new international body designed to police trade between countries (the World Trade Organization), was unequivocal: The House of Representatives approved the deal by a vote of 288 to 146 (New York Times 1994b) and the Senate by a tally of 76 to 24 (New York Times 1994c). And as had been the case with the previous free trade agreements, congressional support was bipartisan in nature: In the House, for example, 121 Republicans and 167 Democrats voted in favor of GATT (New York Times 1994b).
Congressional supporters of economic regionalism in the Americas were also quick to voice their praises after NAFTA took effect. As early as June 1994, Representatives David Dreier and Jay Dickey (an Arkansas Republican) weighed in with positive assessments of the first six months of NAFTA. Dreier underscored the fact that U.S. exports to Mexico had increased to $11.8 billion between January and March, and Dickey emphasized the various benefits for Arkansas (Congressional Record 1994: H5451–H5452). A few months later, Democratic senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona expressed a similar opinion for his home state: “Almost 1 year after NAFTA went into effect... the facts paint a much different picture than the alarmist concerns raised by some opponents of NAFTA. For example, in... Arizona, it is estimated that our state’s exports to Mexico in the first half of 1994 were up almost 25 percent” (Congressional Record 1994: S14959).
These considerations probably explain why members of Congress such as Representative Doug Bereuter of Nebraska spoke out in 1995 to advocate NAFTA expansion. The Republican expressed his strong support for Chile’s accession to NAFTA in light of its success in economic liberalization (Congressional Record 1995: H10811). In Bereuter’s view, however, the benefits of the 1992 trade pact were not the only factor justifying NAFTA expansion: “The simple truth is that the United States, and the American people, have no good economic choice but to push for expansion of NAFTA gradually... to the entire Western Hemisphere or risk being excluded from a rapidly liberalizing world economy. Economic integration and trade liberalization is occurring in nearly every part of the world including Europe, Asia, and South America” (Congressional Record 1995: H10811).
For his part, Republican senator Richard Lugar of Indiana advocated Trinidad and Tobago’s admission to NAFTA on several grounds: “As one of the most advanced economies in the Caribbean, the island nation has successfully implemented economic reforms that have deregulated industry, lowered tariff barriers.... Trinidad and Tobago and the United States have long enjoyed cordial diplomatic relations as well as strong economic ties arising from the investment of United States companies in the energy sector of [this country]” (Congressional Record 1995: S18921).
Interestingly, 1995 even saw the introduction of several bills promoting economic regionalism in the Western Hemisphere. For instance, bill H.R. 465 introduced by Democratic representative Sam Gibbons of Florida aimed to authorize “entry into free-trade agreements between the United States and certain Caribbean Basin countries” (Congressional Record 1995: H229).
Despite these free trade bills and strong statements by certain members of Congress about NAFTA’s alleged benefits, the 1994–1996 period was not auspicious for Capitol Hill supporters of economic regionalism in the Americas. Their efforts to pass new legislation were unsuccessful and they obtained little congressional support for either the December 1994 Summit of the Americas held in Miami or its follow-up meetings in Denver (June 1995) and Cartagena (March 1996). The Miami summit, which brought together delegates from over thirty countries in the Western Hemisphere to discuss plans to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005 (New York Times 1994d) generated virtually no positive reactions in Congress: Only Representatives Philip Crane and Bill Richardson, a Democrat from New Mexico, seemed to allude to it (Congressional Record 1995: E97, E118).
Above all, the post-NAFTA period saw a strong resurgence in opposition to the idea of economic regionalism in the Americas. There are three main reasons for this situation.
First, several Capitol Hill politicians felt that NAFTA had had a detrimental effect on the United States. Representative James Traficant of Ohio was one of the most virulent critics in this regard. As early as June 1994, the Democrat ironically commented that “after only 6 months of NAFTA..., trade is literally jumping across the border. That is the good news. Now, the bad news: Mexican trade is booming. Mexican imports have increased 10 percent.... NAFTA is working all right. It is working for Mexico” (Congressional Record 1994: H4296). Traficant, who was easily reelected in November 1994, 18 saw this worrying trend continue throughout 1995: “America has lost 250,000 jobs in 1995 alone. Lockheed laid off 15,000;... AT&T, 8500; Boeing, 12,000;... General Motors, 5000; Kodak, 4000” (Congressional Record 1995: H14026). The layoffs at the Boeing Seattle plant led the Ohio representative to chide his congressional colleagues: “The biggest export for NAFTA has been American jobs. Shame, Congress. Shame for turning your back on the American workers. What will be left? A couple more McDonald’s jobs” (Congressional Record 1995: H13941).
Not surprisingly, many members of Congress who were on record for their previous opposition to free trade shared Traficant’s views. Representative Marcy Kaptur, for instance, proclaimed that “it is time to cancel NAFTA” (Congressional Record 1995: H8667), and Senator Byron Dorgan called the trade agreement “a lemon” and “a total disaster for our nation” (Congressional Record 1995: S17183). In April 1996 Democratic representative William Lipinski of Illinois reminded the House that polls were indicating that “55 percent of the [U.S.] people believed that NAFTA is causing jobs to go to foreign countries” (Congressional Record 1996: H3806). Some legislators even introduced bills to pull the United States out of NAFTA–bills such as H.R. 499, presented in 1995 by a delegation of representative led by Oregonian Peter DeFazio (Congressional Record 1995: H241), and S. 1417, initiated the same year by North Dakotan Byron Dorgan and several cosponsors (Congressional Record 1995: S17183).
Second, widespread concern in Congress over the Mexican peso crisis of December 1994 was hardly conducive to stimulating regionalism in the Americas, as political scientist Sidney Weintraub has pointed out: “The Mexican financial crisis is... affecting the potential expansion of free trade elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere” (Weintraub 1996: 235). Naturally, certain NAFTA opponents were quick to capitalize on the 35 percent devaluation of the peso (New York Times 1995a), which was called “a major embarrassment for supporters of NAFTA” by the Chicago Tribune (1995a). According to Marcy Kaptur, the effects of the Mexican financial crisis were obvious: “It will be cheaper for [Mexicans] to send more into our marketplace and it will be much harder for the United States to send goods down there because our goods will become more expensive in their market” (Congressional Record 1995: H211). Representative William Lipinski, convinced by the general dissatisfaction of public opinion regarding the December 1992 agreement, felt much the same: “Under NAFTA the peso’s value has dropped fantastically. This represents a dramatic wage cut for Mexican workers. Consequently United States exports to Mexico will slow while Mexico’s exports to the United States will rise, wiping out what little trade advantage we had” (Congressional Record 1995: H387). In short, the peso crisis, which U.S. immigration authorities feared could provoke a flood of illegal immigrants across the border (New York Times 1995a), was a key element in explaining NAFTA’s decreasing appeal.
Third, many members of the 104th Congress (1995–1996) were first elected in 1990 or later, after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, more than half of the members of the House and 29 of the 100 members of the more stable Senate were first elected after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Los Angeles Times 1995a). This change in composition helps explain the rise of a certain isolationist mood on Capitol Hill. In the post–Cold War world, many of Congress’s new Democratic and Republican members tended to believe “that solving the United States’ domestic problems [was] the top priority and that the nation should spend less money and energy on foreign policy” (Los Angeles Times 1995a). Consequently, a good number of parliamentarians were less supportive of free trade. A Los Angeles Times article of February 1995 went so far as to suggest that “even without Mexico’s recent financial problems, NAFTA might have a tough time winning approval if it came back to Congress for a vote today” (Los Angeles Times 1995a). Indeed, of the 102 pro-NAFTA Democrats in the House in 1993, only 68 were still in office two years later (Los Angeles Times 1995a). 19
Although none of the bills to revoke NAFTA were successful, the Mexican peso crisis and perceptions that NAFTA results were inconclusive fueled a wave of congressional coolness with regard to regionalism in the Americas, best exemplified by Capitol Hill’s attitude toward Chile. In 1994 President Bill Clinton invited Chile to join NAFTA. However, in the fall of 1995, the Republican-controlled Congress, to the great disappointment of the business community (Los Angeles Times 1995b), refused to renew President Clinton’s fast-track authority (Chicago Tribune 1995c) to speed Chile’s admission. Republican senator Robert Dole of Kansas was one of those who saw no urgency in concluding a free trade agreement with Chile. At the beginning of November 1995, he justified his position: “I believe it would be a mistake to extend new fast-track authority at this time. There are a number of good reasons, but in my view first and most important is President Clinton’s complete failure to explain to the American people why we need yet another trade agreement at this time” (Congressional Record 1995: S16695). Dole added: “The fact is we recently concluded two major trade agreements, GATT and NAFTA. I believe it only makes good common sense to step back a little and assess the results.... We need a cooling-off period, a time to digest the results. We need to focus on our domestic house, on the actions we can take here at home that will improve our global competitiveness” (Congressional Record 1995: S16695).
This fight over fast-track authority—essentially a struggle to determine which branch of the U.S. government controlled the trade agenda (Global and Mail 1995: B1) 20 —meant that the issue of NAFTA expansion was delayed until after the 1996 U.S. presidential election (Chicago Tribune 1995b). Commenting on this stalemate in free trade negotiations with Chile, managing director of the Council of the Americas G. Philip Hughes declared that “the momentum of the Miami Summit of the Americas is being lost” (Wall Street Journal 1995).
In addition to the issue of Chile’s integration into NAFTA, the Cuban problem eloquently highlighted the difficulties surrounding the creation of a hemispheric free trade zone. In fact, the controversial Helms-Burton law signed by President Clinton in March 1996, which sought to discourage foreign investment in Cuba and to tighten the U.S. embargo on the Caribbean island (Washington Post 1996), aroused tremendous hostility in the Americas. Approved overwhelmingly by the U.S. Congress after a February 1996 incident in which Cuban air force pilots shot down two small civilian aircraft owned by Cuban exile groups (New York Times 1996c), the legislation met with fierce opposition from NAFTA partners. Canada, which has extensive trade links with Cuba, announced in March that it had lodged a protest with the Clinton administration over the law’s potential violation of NAFTA provisions (New York Times 1996b). 21 Mexico showed similar misgivings and asked to join Canadian-U.S. talks on the issue (New York Times 1996b).
Even more important, the Helms-Burton measure, formally known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (New York Times 1996a), gave rise to recriminations elsewhere in the hemisphere. Leaders of the Caribbean community voiced their opposition to the extraterritorial provisions of the law at a meeting in Grenada in March 1996 (Los Angeles Times 1996), and in a display of near unanimity, members of the Organization of American States passed a resolution in June 1996 rebuking the United States for this extension of the economic embargo against Cuba (New York Times 1996c). The resolution was directed against “all laws that ‘obstruct international trade and investment’ or ‘the free movement of persons’”(New York Times 1996c). 22
On the whole, the momentum toward NAFTA expansion appeared somewhat diminished on the eve of the U.S. presidential election of 1996.
Conclusion
The attitude of the U.S. Congress on hemispheric free trade, which has received scant attention from scholars, was ambivalent during the period 1988–1996. Prior to 1994, members of Congress, most of whom also seemed committed to multilateralism, tended to endorse regionalism in the Americas enthusiastically, as their bipartisan vote in favor of the 1988 Free Trade Agreement with Canada clearly demonstrated. Basically, this accord must be viewed in light of the special relationship between the two neighbors and the transformations taking place in the world system during the 1980s. Although congressional support for the North American Free Trade Agreement was less extensive in 1993—especially in the House, where several Democratic representatives from the older industrial states of the Northeast feared job losses for U.S. workers—the passage of this accord was not surprising. In fact, NAFTA was backed by many prominent and influential groups in U.S. society, as numerous Republican and Democratic members of Congress were well aware.
The congressional attitude toward free trade was less supportive during the post-NAFTA years. Indeed, in spite of some promising signs, the 1994–1996 period was not particularly favorable for the promotion of regionalism in the Western Hemisphere. The Miami summit and its follow-up meetings in Denver and Cartagena provoked little openly positive reaction in the legislative branch, and anti-NAFTA speeches, largely fueled by the Mexican peso crisis of December 1994, were frequent on Capitol Hill. Undoubtedly, Congress’s refusal to renew President Clinton’s fast-track authority concerning Chile is the best illustration of the wave of coolness observed during these years. This refusal also exemplifies the key role of Congress in the evolution of regionalism in the Americas.
In spite of the uncertainties of this period and the detrimental effects of the Helms-Burton law, I nonetheless believe that the momentum generated by the Miami summit is not seriously threatened for the future, at least as far as the United States and its legislative branch are concerned. In fact, the trend toward regionalism in the Western Hemisphere could even get a boost from the United States.
On the one hand, President Clinton has continued to announce his willingness to expand NAFTA in the near future. The president, who once stated that “the most powerful country in the world cannot escape the global economy” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1995b: 2160), repeated that “we must include more nations in our partnership” during a visit to Mexico in May 1997 (New York Times 1997). It also seems likely that both the business community and the influential newspapers (e.g., the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Boston Globe, and Los Angeles Times) that warmly endorsed the December 1992 trade agreement (Congressional Record 1995: H4411) will remain committed to the ultimate goal of the Miami summit inasmuch as most economists have argued that NAFTA had little or nothing to do with the Mexican peso crisis (New York Times 1995c). Needless to say, Congress, whose composition is subject to change, will take note of this argument, as well as the fact that protectionist interest groups are not alone in pressing for governmental action: liberal trade groups, including producers of high-technology products like semiconductors, telecommunications, and machine tools, are increasingly active in the political arena (Destler 1986: 159). Congress will also take note of the fact that certain Latin American countries have begun talks with the European Union regarding the formation of a joint free trade area (Stern and Paretzky 1996: 221) and that allies such as Mexico and Canada already have free trade deals with Chile (Stern and Paretzky 1996: 216; Global and Mail 1996).
On the other hand, considerations of U.S. presidential politics are less important now that President Clinton is serving his second term in office, an element that will certainly help the hemispheric free trade agenda over the next few years. Indeed, we must not overlook the fact that Congress’s refusal to grant fast-track authority to President Clinton in 1995 concerning Chile was also related to a Republican strategy to deny the chief executive a “trade victory” on the eve of an election (Wall Street Journal 1995).
In short, I tend to agree with Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole’s comment of November 1993 that “the battle for free trade... does not end with the passage of the North American Free-Trade Agreement. It is just the beginning” (Congressional Record 1993: S16703). Nevertheless, recent developments, such as the Clinton administration’s withdrawal in November 1997 of a fast-track bill from a scheduled vote that augured its defeat and the defeat of fast-track trade legislation in the House of Representatives in September 1998 (“Barshefsky Foresees” 1998; “Few Trade Bills” 1998), suggest that some pitfalls are still ahead on the road to greater economic regionalism in the Western Hemisphere.
Endnotes
*: I would like to thank Isabelle Poulin, Alexandre Hébert, Annie Laliberté, and my colleagues Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger, and Donald Fyson, from Laval University, for their invaluable help in preparing this chapter. Back.
Note 1: Interestingly enough, political scientist Ralph Carter has revealed that the U.S. Congress “plays an active role in 73 percent of the significant post–cold war trade cases and gets part of all of its desires reflected in 84 percent of the policy outputs” (Carter 1996: 15–16). Back.
Note 2: As Jerel Rosati has noted:
Virtually every president has faced major foreign policy setbacks because of the reassertion of Congress.... Nixon had Watergate; the Nixon-Ford détente policies toward the Soviet Union were thwarted by congressional concern about Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union and a covert war in Angola; Carter could not get Senate approval for the second round of... [SALT II]; and Reagan could not escape the stigma of the Iran-Contra affair. Despite his ultimate triumph in the Persian Gulf War, President George Bush faced a considerable challenge to his policies within Congress before he took the country to war with Iraq in January 1991. (Rosati 1997: 308–309)Back.
Note 3: For instance, 300 protectionist bills were introduced in Congress in 1985 alone (Aho 1988: 181). In fact, several factors can explain the general protectionist sentiment in the 1980s, which was already perceptible during the 1970s. According to I. M. Destler:
Back.The 1970s and 1980s brought far-reaching changes to the world economy. U.S. firms and workers became much more exposed to foreign competition in both home and overseas markets. The relative position of the United States declined, as European rivals were joined by Asian ones.... The rules of the international trading regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade... , grew less effective. The advanced industrial economies, buffeted by two “oil shocks,” entered a period of stagflation, combining rapid price increases with sluggish growth. (Destler 1986: 37)
Interestingly enough, this period differed drastically from the climate of trade liberalization that characterized the two decades after World War II. Destler, incidentally, has noted that such a postwar regime of freer trade, which had strong domestic support, can be attributed to factors such as the Cold War imperative and the United States’ economic predominance (Destler 1986: 4–6).
Note 4: For his part, Democratic representative Jim Moody of Wisconsin regretted that the January 1988 accord excluded cultural industries (U.S. House 1988a: 705). Back.
Note 5: Essentially, the term “intermestic policy” is used to designate policy “with both important foreign and domestic ramifications” (Rourke, Carter, and Boyer 1996: 268). Back.
Note 6: Republican senator Ted Stevens of Alaska pointed out that the most important of these bureaucracies, the North American Free Trade Commission, will have twenty-four subbureaucracies (Congressional Record 1993: S16352). Back.
Note 7: Donald Riegle declared that
NAFTA, if it passes, will allow Mexican drivers to pick up a load at a Mexican factory and drive directly to their destination anywhere in the United States or Canada.... However, there are fundamental differences in the way Mexico regulates trucks and truck drivers and the way the United States regulates them.... Mexico doesn’t require its trucks to have front brakes. Without them, trucks cannot stop as fast.... Mexican drivers can legally drive as long as they want.... By contrast, U.S. drivers can only drive up to 10 hours a day, greatly reducing the possibility of fatigue. (Congressional Record 1993: S10934)Back.
Note 8: Incidentally, the “neo-isolationism” whose resurgence was linked in part to the end of the Cold War and the neglect of urgent domestic problems in the 1980s largely took the form of an anti-UN campaign (Schlesinger Jr. 1996: 157–160). Back.
Note 9: For example, David Dreier declared that “Ronald Reagan recently wrote an editorial in the Wall Street Journal in strong support of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and former President Nixon, who is recognized as a paramount expert in international policy, has strongly supported [NAFTA]” (Congressional Record 1993: H6973). Back.
Note 10: Republican representative Joel Hefley of Colorado reported that no less than forty-two of fifty state governors supported NAFTA in mid-November 1993 (Congressional Record 1993: H9863). Back.
Note 11: As for the California and Arizona delegations, the vote in favor of NAFTA was respectively 31–21 and 6–0 (New York Times 1993a: A20). Back.
Note 12: Five of the 9 (56 percent) Senate opponents to the 1988 agreement were from this region, along with 11 of the 38 (29 percent) senators who had voted against NAFTA. Back.
Note 13: The 55 opponents included 10 representatives from Ohio, 10 from Michigan, 14 from Pennsylvania, and 21 from New York (New York Times 1993a: A20). Back.
Note 14: Scholar Peter Trubowitz has defined the “manufacturing belt” as the region comprising New England as well as the Middle Atlantic and Great Lakes regions (Trubowitz 1992: 174). Back.
Note 15: According to Trubowitz, the manufacturing belt’s declining competitiveness, a reflection of the increasing mobility of capital and the spread of technology within the United States, is partly tied to the rise of Western Europe and Japan as industrial rivals (Trubowitz 1992: 184). Back.
Note 16: Conversely, the free trade idea seems to have rallied more supporters in the sunbelt since the 1960s. During the NAFTA debate, incidentally, “sunbelt senators” such as Harlan Mathews (Tennessee) and David Pryor (Arkansas) contended that many companies in their respective states supported the deal (Congressional Record 1993: S12059–S12060, S14584). Back.
Note 17: In essence, this concept, which is frequently opposed to bilateralism, “means a recognition that major world-wide problems... cannot be handled by individual countries making their own policies, but must be dealt with by co-ordinated efforts and policies developed collectively by many nations” (D. Robertson 1993: 327). Back.
Note 18: He obtained 77 percent of the vote in his district (New York Times 1994a: B19). Back.
Note 19: Pro-NAFTA Democratic representatives such as Dan Rostenkowski (Illinois), Peter Hoagland (Nebraska), David Price (North Carolina), and Maria Cantwell (Washington) were all defeated in the midterm elections of November 1994 (New York Times 1994a: B18–B19). Back.
Note 20: As journalist Drew Fagan explained, this political scrap revealed the different conceptions prevailing at the White House and on Capitol Hill: “The Clinton administration insists that the fast-track bill should be written broadly enough to include NAFTA labour and environmental side deals that all three NAFTA members want expanded to Chile.... However, Republican members of the House of Representatives are using the fast-track debate to press their philosophy that the side deals should not be part of the trade negotiations” (Global and Mail 1995). Back.
Note 21: Canadian officials were particularly upset that the measure sponsored by Republican senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Republican representative Dan Burton of Indiana attempted to extend U.S. law to other jurisdictions where it “could interfere with companies engaged in legitimate business” (New York Times 1996b). In fact, the Helms-Burton law, among other things, “allows American citizens to sue foreigners and foreign companies that ‘act to manage, lease, possess, use or hold an interest in’ property confiscated by the Cuban Government from people who are now American citizens” (New York Times 1996b). Back.
Note 22: It is worth noting that the Helms-Burton act permits the United States “to bar entry to... foreign executives whose companies do business in Cuba” (New York Times 1996b). Back.
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