The Americas In Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, by Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger, and contributors

 

3. The Structural Contexts of Hemispheric Regionalism:
Power, Trade, Political Culture, and Economic Development

Gordon Mace and Louis Bélanger

 

Regional integration, like any other social construct, is a process embedded in and in constant interaction with a specific environment. It evolves in a context defined by events and material realities as well as ideational structures that are preexistent or that develop inside and outside the region. More specifically, the individual and collective actors involved in a regional integration process find themselves already positioned in relation to these events or structures, a situation that both constrains and empowers them when it comes to designing strategies and organizing their behavior so as to orient the integration process.

The original theoretical literature on regional integration paid a good deal of attention to certain sets of circumstances considered important for the success of the integration process. Both the neofunctionalist and pluralist/communications schools identified a number of conditions, including the existence of an external threat (Haas 1961: 376; Haas and Schmitter 1964: 730), unbroken social communication links, and the compatibility of main values held by political elites (Deutsch et al. 1957: 46–57), as well as linkage and coalition formation, unit symmetry, pluralism, and an increase in transactions (Nye 1970: 821). The presence of these and other elements was seen as a prerequisite for launching and achieving the integration process. And logically, the absence of these conditions or contrary sets of circumstances were seen as impediments to the development of integration schemes.

It is impossible to discuss here all the conditions related to the success of the integration process referred to in the theoretical literature—all the more so since some of these conditions have been criticized by scholars (De Vree 1972; Galtung 1968; Hansen 1969; Inglehart 1967; Puchala 1972) and may not apply in every case. Instead, this chapter deals with four structural features that seem to bear heavily on the future of hemispheric integration in the Americas. In one way or another, these elements are all related to what we believe are the most salient prerequisites for integration identified in the theoretical literature. These four structural elements are the distribution of power among the countries of the Americas, the pattern of trade relations in the region, similarities and differences in political culture and, finally, symmetry or asymmetry in levels of economic development.

 

The Distribution of Power

The distribution of power or capabilities among political units participating in an integration process is an important structural condition for the future of any integration scheme. This fact was recognized early on in the theoretical literature with the reference to the presence of “cores of strength,” or core areas having a positive impact on the evolution of the integration process (Deutsch et al. 1957: 38, 72–73).

For Deutsch and his colleagues of the pluralist school, the fact that Germany and France, the two most powerful European countries of their day, saw eye to eye and agreed to act as leaders within the framework of the European Economic Community constituted a significant positive influence for the development of European integration. Similarly, the success of a region-wide integration process in Asia or the Americas today is unthinkable without the active participation of either Japan (and probably China) or the United States. At the same time, difficulties in the process could be expected if the major powers of either region did not share the same vision of integration and adopted opposing strategies. Students of cooperation—realists and liberals alike—also agree that both the relative power of a state vis-à-vis other states and the evolution of its position will affect its interest in cross-border cooperation (Keohane 1993: 282–283; Grieco 1990: 46).

Consequently, the evolution of the hierarchy of power in a given geographical region is a highly salient structural constraint for the evolution of an integration process. The location of each state in the hierarchy will greatly influence its regional strategy and determine, in W. Andrew Axline’s words, who will be the “makers,” who will be the “takers” (Axline 1996: 214), and who will be the cooperators.

In order to examine the particular structural context of hemispheric regionalism in the Americas, we have updated a previous analysis of the hierarchy of power in the Western Hemisphere (Mace, Bélanger, and Thérien 1993). ₁ The procedure for establishing the ranking is quite conventional and in accordance with what is found in the literature (Cline 1980; Doran 1991; W. Ferris 1973; Stoll and Ward 1988; Wallace 1973). It also recognizes the arbitrary nature of any attempt to objectively measure the distribution of power (Doran 1991: 49). We have measured national capabilities using seven indicators regrouped along five dimensions. Size was measured by population and gross domestic product (GDP). Development was measured by GDP per capita. Defense spending was used to measure military strength, and diplomatic missions served as an indicator for political prestige. Finally, trading power was established on the basis of total exports.

On this basis, and in a manner similar to that of Charles F. Doran (1991: 49–54), we have constructed an aggregate index giving equal weight to each indicator. We calculated the index by assigning each country a value for the selected indicators, with each value a function of that country’s relative status compared to the country with the highest score and to which 1,000 points were assigned. Recorded values were then averaged to give us the aggregate index for each country’s capacity. From the index, we established the rank ordering of the countries. The main innovation in relation to our previous analysis was the introduction of a fourth time period (1991–1994) to provide us with a portrait of the situation in the 1990s.

The main findings are as follows. First of all, Figures 3.1a and 3.1b reveal that the distribution of power among the countries of the Americas has remained relatively stable over the past thirty years. There is no major shift on the power scale from one period to the other, although there are some interesting changes. Note, for example, Guatemala’s and Nicaragua’s relative decline in power from the 1960s through the 1990s, the inversion of Chile’s and Peru’s positions, and the trajectory of Argentina, which started off in fourth place in 1966–1969, lost ground in the 1970s and 1980s, and is making a comeback in the 1990s. Table 3.1 also shows that among the largest countries of the region, only Mexico managed to improve its position in relation to the United States from one period to the next. Finally, it is worth pointing out that during the last period, which corresponds with the launch of regional initiatives by the United States, the large Hispanic countries have recovered the economic ground they lost during the 1980s. Canada and Brazil seemed unable to recover at the same rate, despite the fact that the U.S. economy was booming.

Figure 3.1a: Dispersion of Power in the Americas

Figure 3.1b: Enlargement of 0.0 to 1.0

 

Table 3.1 Aggregate Indx of National Capabilities
1966–1969				1976–1979				1986–1989				1991–1994
Country	Index	Decile		Country	Index	Decile		Country	Index	Decile		Country	Index	Decile
1. United States	1,000.00	10.00		1. United States	1,000.00	10.00		1. United States	1,000.00	10.00		1. United States	1,000.00	10.00
2. Canada	294.31	2.89		2. Canada	342.31	3.23		2. Canada	348.35	3.32		2. Canada	326.01	3.13
3. Brazil	191.97	1.86		3. Brazil	230.35	2.08		3. Brazil	233.71	2.15		3. Brazil	223.15	2.08
4. Argentina	151.19	1.45		4. Mexico	165.94	1.42		4. Mexico	170.99	1.51		4. Mexico	173.69	1.57
5. Mexico	144.88	1.38		5. Argentina	162.62	1.38		5. Venezuela	132.67	1.11		5. Argentina	135.63	1.18
6. Venezuela	131.76	1.25		6. Venezuela	156.45	1.32		6. Argentina	129.55	1.08		6. Venezuela	130.52	1.13
7. Colombia	90.60	0.83		7. Peru	93.78	0.68		7. Colombia	94.02	0.72		7. Colombia	91.51	0.73
8. Chile	88.14	0.81		8. Trinidad and Tobago	93.04	0.67		8. Peru	85.90	0.63		8. Chile	80.54	0.62
9. Uruguay	86.55	0.79		9. Chile	87.75	0.61		9.vChile	79.76	0.57		9. Peru	75.20	0.57
10. Peru	85.00	0.78		10. Colombia	83.62	0.57		10. Trinidad and Tobago	71.81	0.49		10. Ecuador	69.26	0.51
11. Trinidad and Tobago	74.63	0.67		11. Uruguay	81.72	0.55		11. Uruguay	71.08	0.48		11. Trinidad and Tobago	69.19	0.51
12. Guatemala	67.79	0.61		12. Ecuador	79.85	0.53		12. Ecuador	70.84	0.48		12. Uruguay	66.98	0.48
13. Ecuador	67.23	0.60		13. Panama	69.86	0.43		13. Panama	61.15	0.38		13. Panama	57.85	0.39
14. Nicaragua	65.11	0.58		14. Costa Rica	66.84	0.40		14. Nicaragua	57.64	0.34		14. Guatemala	57.78	0.39
15. El Salvador	60.01	0.53		15. Guatemala	66.42	0.39		15. Costa Rica	57.27	0.34		15. Costa Rica	57.33	0.39
16. Panama	58.76	0.51		16. Bolivia	61.99	0.35		16. Guatemala	56.99	0.34		16. Nicaragua	48.95	0.30
17. Bolivia	57.84	0.50		17. Nicaragua	60.63	0.33		17. Bolivia	51.36	0.28		17. Bolivia	48.48	0.29
18. Costa Rica	51.40	0.44		18. El Salvador	57.10	0.30		18. Paraguay	45.08	0.22		18. Paraguay	43.37	0.24
19. Honduras	47.43	0.40		19. Jamaica	46.54	0.19		19. El Salvador	44.27	0.21		19. El Salvador	42.68	0.24
20. Dominican Republic	44.78	0.37		20. Dominican Republic	46.16	0.19		20. Dominican Republic	43.02	0.19		20. Jamaica	41.85	0.23
21. Jamaica	30.57	0.23		21. Paraguay	45.75	0.18		21. Jamaica	41.11	0.18		21. Dominican Republic	39.55	0.20
22. Paraguay	11.90	0.04		22. Honduras	42.92	0.15		22. Honduras	39.70	0.16		22. Honduras	37.85	0.19
23. Guyana	10.66	0.03		23. Haiti	36.75	0.09		23. Haiti	31.09	0.07		23. Haiti	28.51	0.09
24. Haiti	7.74	0.00		24. Guyana	28.14	0.00		24. Guyana	24.02	0.00		24. Guyana	19.58	0.00

 

Another significant finding is that only six countries in the region carry enough weight to have any real potential impact on the future of continental integration. In addition to the United States, these are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela, the only other nations with decile rankings above 1.00. The rest of the countries in the hemisphere are too far back on the power scale to have serious hope for any significant role in the evolution of hemispheric integration. On the strict basis of power distribution, these countries will almost inevitably be the “takers” of the integration process.

A last finding points to the extremely dominant position of the United States in the Americas over the years. Not only is the United States the only remaining superpower in the world system, but it has also maintained the existing power gap between itself and the other countries in the region over a thirty-year period.

What does this mean for the dynamics of hemispheric regionalism? First, U.S. dominance means that hemispheric regionalism makes very little sense without U.S. involvement. Second, it means that the United States is the only country in the region with the capacity to push and mold continental integration the way it wants, provided that it has the political will to do so and the necessary domestic support. Third, no other country can hope to challenge the hegemonic role of the United States on an individual basis. ₂ Although Washington’s leadership appears to have faded somewhat since 1995, all other major countries in the hemisphere except Mexico and Argentina have also lost ground on the power scale in relation to the United States. ₃ This means that the only significant counterweight to U.S. dominance in the framework of continental integration is collective action. And with Canada, Mexico, and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela handicapped by their economic dependence on the United States, the Brazil-Argentina pole offers the only viable alternative.

On the sole basis of distribution of power, the future of hemispheric integration should therefore be highly dependent on the interplay between the United States and the Brazil-Argentina pole, which draws much of its power from a strong Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur). Brazil’s position as the leader of the Southern Cone is less solidly rooted than that of the U.S. because it depends heavily on Mercosur’s good health and on the reaction of its neighbors, particularly Argentina and Chile. ₄

The distribution of power among the countries of the Americas over the last thirty years is therefore an important structural constraint for the future of hemispheric integration. As things now stand, the shape of future continental integration will be determined fundamentally by the basic relationship between the United States and Brazil. And if we look at regionalism as a problem of cooperation, the power structure in the Americas again has implications. The relative position of the United States leads us to expect that cooperation, should it occur, will be hegemonical in form, based on the capacity of the United States to essentially ensure compliance and assume costs. Is the United States ready for this when it is already in a position of unilaterally exercising pressure on every regional power?

This is highly problematic in a context of nonhegemonic global and subregional cooperation. Why would other states accept regional hegemonic rules when, to a large extent, they can achieve similar gains through a combination of nonhegemonic mechanisms of cooperation at the global and subregional levels? Unless there is a significant payoff linked to the regional option, they are unlikely to do so. Inversely, hegemonic cooperation would require that the United States be willing to pay the price for a hegemonic relationship in the region at the very moment it is in the process of disentangling itself from similar relations elsewhere and looking for greater reciprocity.

Major inequalities in the distribution of power can also have positive effects on cooperation. According to neorealist theory, these inequalities reduce state sensitivity to possible inequalities in the distribution of gains produced by cooperation. The theory holds that states in close competition for positions in the hierarchy of power are less likely to cooperate for fear that the benefits of cooperation would be greater for their competitors than for themselves, thereby negatively affecting their power relationship (Grieco 1990). Inversely, states separated by very high gaps of relative capability, which cannot be significantly affected by cooperation payoffs, may satisfy themselves with absolute anticipated gains and simply forget about problems of relative distribution.

Authors theorizing about the importance of relative gains generally limit their comments to relationships with the dominant powers. The focus on dominant powers overshadows competition between second-range states, which can be crucial for regional cooperation.

For instance, sensitivity to expected gains by Latin American competitors may help explain Mexican attitudes toward the expansion of NAFTA and the regionalist agenda in general. Since the 1950s, Mexico has managed to distance itself from Argentina and Venezuela, the two other countries maintaining a decile ranking between 1 and 2 in the hierarchy of power. Mexico seems unwilling to compromise its rising position by sharing the comparative advantage it has gained from NAFTA with others. This question of second-range states’ sensitivity to each other’s gains will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 8.

Looking at the regional distribution of power, therefore, not only allows us to identify the poles likely to structure hemispheric regionalism but also helps us understand how key actors in the process evaluate the benefits of Pan-American cooperation.

 

The Pattern of Trade Relations

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the theoretical literature on regional integration identified an increase in transactions either as a condition for the success of an integration process (Deutsch 1952: 358; Deutsch et al. 1957: 46–57) or as a process mechanism (Nye 1970: 805, 821).

Among these transactions trade occupies an important place, particularly because of its link with another essential condition for the success of integration, namely, the expectation of rewards for the participating units. ₅ Changes in the volume and the pattern of regional trade can therefore constitute another important structural pillar for the future of an integration process.

This section seeks to offer a comprehensive view of the evolution of trade patterns in the Western Hemisphere by presenting a comparative analysis of the periods 1975–1979, 1985–1989, and 1990–1994. By examining the pattern of trade flows during these three periods, we hope to be able to draw conclusions about the structure of regionalism in the Americas in the years to come.

For our calculations, average annual trade between twenty-seven American countries was measured for three periods, 1975–1979, 1985–1989, and 1990–1994. ₆ We chose four-year periods to reduce the volatility of the data, the last four-year period ending with the last year for which data were available at the time of collection. The 1980–1984 period was skipped because of the difficulty of establishing reliable U.S. dollar equivalencies for this period.

The data show that the share of foreign goods exported by all economies in the Americas to other countries within the hemisphere rose from 47.3 percent in 1975–1979 to 48.4 percent in 1985–1989, and to 49.5 percent in 1990–1994, indicating a slight but regular increase in the relative importance of intraregional over extraregional hemispheric trade. It remains to be seen, however, whether these figures provide us with any information about the presence or absence of true regional cohesion. The results could be attributed to a few strong bilateral relationships, which may well prove insignificant in the context of regional reality taken as a whole. In other words, are the Americas an arbitrary creation? Are we speaking of one region or many regions? What is the structure of intraregional trade? These are questions for which answers cannot be obtained by using simple measures.

Correspondence analysis, a technique that offers the advantage of situating each trading partner with respect to every other, is the measurement strategy adopted here to answer these questions (see Figures 3.2–3.4). Often utilized as a preliminary step in classification exercises where data must be regrouped on the basis of a large number of variables, this automatic data assortment technique allows us to represent trade affinities between countries and to assess similarities in their trade profiles. By using a table representing each country as both an exporter and an importer, we projected a three-dimensional cloud of points in which each country’s profile is represented by one point, the location of which is a function of its relative importance for its trading partners. ₇ The distance of each point from the intersection of the two axes is a function of its degree of deviation from what would be considered average trade behavior or structure. The proximity of two points therefore indicates that the two corresponding countries share, either as exporters or importers, a common trade profile or, in other words, that their trade is distributed among regional partners in a similar way. This is a very important point because we are primarily interested in homogeneity of profile instead of strength. Weight is important as well, of course, but principally as it affects the trade patterns of others.

Figure 3.2 Commercial Trade Between American Countries (1975–1979)

Notes: See the chapter Appendix for a key to the abbreviations used in this figure. Axis 1, horizontal: proper value = 0.77; rate (part of total inertia) = 61 percent. Axis 2, vertical: proper value = 0.14; rate = 11 percent.

 

Figure 3.3 Commercial Trade Between American Countries (1985–1989)

Notes: See the chapter Appendix for a key to the abbreviations used in this figure. Axis 1, horizontal: proper value = 0.85; rate (part of total inertia) = 71 percent. Axis 2, vertical: proper value = 0.13; rate = 11 percent.

 

Figure 3.4 Commercial Trade Between American Countries (1990–1994)

Notes: See the chapter Appendix for a key to the abbreviations used in this figure. Axis 1, horizontal: proper value = 0.84; rate (part of total inertia) = 66 percent. Axis 2, vertical: proper value = 0.19; rate = 15 percent.

 

To understand the significance of the position of a single point in the clouds, it is essential to take into account the general pattern of cloud distribution revealed in Figures 3.2–3.4. The general patterns of distribution will help answer the following simple questions: In what respect do clusters form and deviate from the average situation represented by the center of gravity? How do groups of countries with similar trade profiles distinguish themselves from each other?

The displays of cloud point dispersions presented here are divided by two inertia axes crossing the clouds’ center of gravity: axis 1 (horizontal) and axis 2 (vertical). Among several possibilities, these are, respectively, the first and second axes on which the dot clouds are projected with a maximum of dispersion. This analysis compares three data sets, Figure 3.2 representing the 1975–1979 period, Figure 3.3 the 1985–1989 period, and Figure 3.4 the 1990–1994 period. Data used are those of the International Monetary Fund. Our discussion of findings centers on two major subregions: North America and the Southern Cone, which together account for 90 percent of intraregional trade.

General View: The Dominance of the North

A certain number of conclusions can be drawn from preliminary general observation of the figures. First of all, in all cases, axis 1 shows opposition between the United States and Canada, both as suppliers (USAx and CANx) to which are attached their principal clients and as clients (USAm and CANm) with which are associated their main suppliers. ₈ Given the weight of the U.S. economy, the distribution on this axis is essentially a function of the relative power of attraction exercised by the United States in its capacity as the main regional client and supplier in opposition to other regional economic powers. Canada is the most important of these other powers and is the most integrated into the U.S. economy. Because the U.S. situation is unique, other countries will have their positions on axis 1 determined by their proximity to the Canadian situation. This tension is quite apparent in the case of Mexico. Like Canada, Mexico is strongly integrated into the U.S. economy. However, as is also the case with Canada, it does not maintain bilateral ties with other economies strong enough to counterweigh this attraction. Because of this similarity in profile, Mexico is situated in close proximity to Canada in the figures as both an exporter and a supplier.

The figures also show that the power of attraction exercised by the United States is stronger as a client than as a supplier; dots are more closely clustered around USAm than around USAx. More precisely, more countries share similarities of profile with the Canadian position in relation to the United States in their capacity as exporters than in their capacity as importers.

Axis 2 is dominated by the presence of a strong counterweight to the North American center of gravity: the nations of the Southern Cone. The relative cohesion and autonomy of the Southern Cone countries is quite noticeable at the top of the axis. In the middle, between the Southern Cone and the other nations, are most of the Andean countries. At the bottom of the axis stands Central America. Between 1975 and 1979, the region displays a clear profile of cohesion and relative autonomy, particularly with regard to South America. However, South America’s position is more consistent with that of its northern neighbors for the 1985–1989 and 1990–1994 periods.

North America and Its Immediate Zone of Influence

Let us begin by observing the countries that are the most dependent on the United States for their exports, grouped at the right end of axis 1 in Figure 3.2. A cluster of exporting countries that is virtually glued to the U.S. market (USAm) forms the core of this group. More than 85 percent of the regional exports from these nations are directed toward the United States. A second sphere of U.S. influence made up of countries dependent on the U.S. market for more than 70 percent of their regional exports is clearly identifiable for 1975–1979 on the periphery of the core group of suppliers. It includes Surinam, Panama, Jamaica, Belize, and Honduras. However, by 1985–1989 this second circle of influence has largely dissipated to be replaced in the 1990–1994 period by another cluster composed of Venezuela, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Belize, countries that are dependent on the U.S. market for 65 percent to 77 percent of their exports. Guyana and the other Central American countries now form a third cluster.

As we observed previously, the zone of influence of the United States is more diffuse when its exports are considered. During the three periods studied, the United States imported more than it exported in the region. However, the data also indicate that the U.S. position as supplier tended to gain in importance during the last period (from 44 percent to 46 percent of all exports), and its relative position as a buyer declined (from 50 to 46 percent of all imports). Canada’s and Mexico’s alignment with the United States also became stronger.

It is no surprise, then, that the United States is the foremost trading partner in the Americas. Its presence structures the web of trade relations in the region.

The Southern Cone

As Figures 3.2–3.4 show, the Southern Cone constitutes the main counterweight to North American trading power in the region. The countries most integrated into this subregion are located at the upper end of axis 2. This pattern clearly reveals the relative weakness of the Southern Cone’s relationship with North America, as well as its remarkable lack of economic ties with Central America and the Caribbean.

Brazil, for which the United States represents a more important economic partner, occupies a median position that varies little from the first to the second period but changes significantly during 1990–1994, when Brazil became more entrenched in the Southern Cone. There is a fundamental shift here: As the proportion of Brazil’s regional exports going to the United States dropped significantly between the second and third periods (from 65.5 percent to 49.2 percent), Brazil became more dependent on its neighbors’ markets. Argentina, for example, which accounted for 6.6 percent of Brazilian regional exports in the second period, received 17 percent of them in 1990–1994.

Modifications in the export profile of Argentina and Chile created a certain disturbance in the group’s trade structure. The position of the two exporters on the left side of axis 1 for 1975–1979 reveals their relative autonomy in relation to the U.S. market and the relative importance of neighboring states as customers. However, the situation changes radically during the 1985–1989 period. Argentina and especially Chile now appear on the right side of axis 1, which means that they are aligning themselves on North American patterns of trade with the United States. The situation changes again in the 1990–1994 period as Argentina moves back to the left side of axis 1, joining Paraguay and Uruguay in a closer relationship with Brazil as importers.

Figure 3.4 is extremely interesting because it reveals that the Southern Cone is developing a distinct regional trading structure. Axis 2, representing the Southern Cone counterweight, shows a significant rise in importance for 1990–1994, jumping to 19 percent in terms of its general dispersion value and lining up more strongly than previously along the dual Brazil-Argentina pole. The Southern Cone’s integration into the region as a whole is relatively weak, especially in the case of the smaller economies (Paraguay, Uruguay) strongly dependent on middle powers such as Brazil and Argentina. The countries of the subregion also maintain relatively strong trade links among themselves. This structure nevertheless underwent significant changes over the three periods under study. Relations between the middle powers and the United States grew closer, and the smaller economies grew more dependent on the middle powers for their regional external trade. However, the positive effects of Mercosur are clearly revealed by the increased clustering of the Southern Cone countries in the 1990–1994 period. In fact, Figure 3.4 is an eloquent illustration of the fact that the Americas of the 1990s are now composed of two main trade subregions.

Trade Patterns and Regionalism

Traditional literature on regional integration, particularly works from the transactionalist school (Deutsch 1954; Deutsch et al. 1957), assumed a close relationship between certain types of transactions, notably trade, and the success or failure of integration schemes. Combined with other indices, variations in the level of regional trade and the distribution of trade flows between neighboring countries were seen as advance indicators of the future state of integration processes. Although the main idea behind such reasoning—that trade influences political cooperation—has inspired important works informed by classical liberal theses, even after the golden age of transactionalism (Polachek 1980), a growing body of literature emerging from public choice and neorealist approaches to international political economy is providing evidence of the opposite—that it is good political relations that have a positive impact on trade (Pollins 1989a, 1989b; Dixon and Moon 1993; Gowa 1994). All these studies converge in one sense by clearly demonstrating that political cooperation and trade are inextricably linked. States are less inclined to abandon political partnership if they expect it to have a negative effect on trade, and states are more inclined to develop trade relations with political allies they can trust.

Our analysis of trade ties in the Americas in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s follows this reasoning. We believe that a structured observation of trade flows over a certain period of time will give us an idea of the strength and geographical configuration of regionalism in a given geographical region. The regional structure of exports and imports becomes the key to determining whether a region is organized around “industrial centers of gravity” (Peschel 1990: 71) or whether it grows out of a logic of “hegemonic power relations” (Fishlow and Haggard 1992: 13). It then permits us to identify the specific economic-political relationships on which regionalism can be built. In this perspective, the results of our factor analysis demonstrate that the countries of the Western Hemisphere possess widely variable leadership capacities in relation to the regional environment.

These capacities point to two possible scenarios—both found in the literature—for the eventual configuration of a regional system in the Americas (Fishlow and Haggard 1992: 26–27). In the first scenario, inspired by the “hub-and-spoke” model, the United States would become the center of a network of bilateral agreements signed by a number of countries in the region. This situation would evolve and eventually give way to the creation of a regional system of the Americas dominated by the hegemonic power of the United States. In contrast, a second scenario, inspired by the “hub-hub” model, suggests that regional transactions would follow another pattern of agglutination around two groups of countries. This would eventually lead to the creation of two regional systems within the Western Hemisphere.

The results of our analysis of trade patterns in the Americas provide evidence that would seem to support the latter scenario, at least regarding trade relations. A comparison of data for the three time periods reveals the increasingly powerful attraction of the U.S. market, as well as the structuring effect of the Brazil-Argentina pole.

The U.S. market has effectively grown in importance, not only for its immediate Canadian and Mexican neighbors but also for many countries in Central America and the Caribbean, and Venezuela as well. Should this trend continue in upcoming years, it could jeopardize the future of the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Central American Common Market, and the so-called Group of Three (Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia). These integration or cooperation schemes could well fall into disarray as more and more of their members became attracted to or even engulfed by a North American regional system.

For the southern half of the hemisphere, the data analysis for the three time periods also reveals the growing importance of Brazil and Argentina as poles of attraction. The trend here is not as clear as it is in the North American case, but in the 1990s the Southern Cone trading zone has become increasingly structured compared with the North American trading system.

The major casualty of this development will probably be the Andean integration scheme. Indeed, the Andean nations seem to be increasingly affected by conflicting centrifugal forces. Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Colombia look northward; Bolivia appears to be increasingly linked to the Southern Cone; and Peru and Ecuador are exporting more to the United States but importing more from the countries of the Southern Cone. For these countries, there is also a political appeal in having stronger links with the Mercosur countries. With Mexico increasingly integrated into the North American environment, the center of Latin American political and diplomatic activity and leadership has shifted more to the Brazil-Argentina axis dominating Mercosur.

Consequently, the slow but progressive emergence of two subregional trading systems in the Americas constitutes a significant structural feature that cannot be ignored in negotiations leading to a free trade area of the Americas. Combined with the trends in the distribution of power discussed previously, the evolution in the pattern of trade relations in the Western Hemisphere suggests that initial U.S. plans to extend the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the rest of the region have little chance of success if they imply some kind of dissolution of the politico-economic alliance represented by Mercosur. And success appears even less likely in light of the recent failures to implement the fast-track procedure in the United States. In the current context, it therefore appears that continental integration is more likely to proceed on the basis of accommodation between the NAFTA and Mercosur economic development models.

 

Still a Political Cultural Divide ₉

Regional integration theory recognizes that integration processes can develop initially to a certain point provided that the participating units receive some economic benefits or at least expect economic benefits to materialize from their participation in the integration scheme. In the long term, however, economic gains are not enough to sustain and deepen the integration process. For this to happen, certain sociocultural conditions are deemed necessary, including compatibility of main values (Deutsch et al. 1957: 46–57; Nye 1970: 821), unbroken social communications links (Deutsch et al. 1957: 46–57), common aspirations and mutual identification (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 26, 39, 98–94), and consensus (Etzioni 1968: 167, 469). Here again, we know that these political links and similarities can be fostered, especially in light of the relative success of European Community expansion.

These and other similar elements mentioned in the literature all fall more or less under the general heading of differences and similarities in political culture. Analysts have used political culture to explain why Latin America followed a path so different from that of the United States and Canada in terms of political institutions. In one of the most fascinating interpretations in the literature, Stanley and Barbara Stein identified the political culture of Britain, Spain, and Portugal at the time of New World colonization as the main explanation for the diverging paths of political and economic development in North and South-Central America during the last three hundred years (Stein and Stein 1970). In essence, the Steins argue that colonial-era Britain was a society in the process of modernization, with an economy that was starting to industrialize, a political system in transformation, and a general openness toward scientific ideas. In contrast, Spain and Portugal were still preindustrial commodity producers characterized by extreme centralization of political authority, tightly closed political systems, excessively rigid social hierarchies, and strict adherence to traditional values enforced by tight Catholic church control. It was this preindustrialized social model with its antiquated political and economic system that was imposed on the Ibero-American colonies and is primarily responsible for Latin America’s evolution since the period of independence. This interpretation is also shared by Abel, Taras, and Cochrane (1991: 27–28).

According to another view of political culture, the Americas are home to three very different types of countries: premodern, modern, and postmodern. According to Robert Cooper (1996), premodern states are countries like Haiti, Surinam, and Paraguay, where the legitimate monopoly on the use of force is still not accepted by all. Modern states, found throughout most of Latin America and the Caribbean, are those still functioning on the basis of a nineteenth-century European system in which belief in state sovereignty remains strong and international relations are governed by the balance of power. Finally, the postmoderns—namely, Canada and the United States—are those states where sovereignty is less important and governments and citizens are more open to intrusions into domestic affairs by global forces and international or regional institutions. Clearly, the integration process in the Americas will have to accommodate these three categories of states.

Numerous commentators from academic and political circles have stated that one of the main explanations for the present-day momentum in favor of regionalism in the Americas is found in the rapid shrinking of those differences in political culture. Sudden democratization during the 1980s in Latin American countries has been seen as both the removal of a major obstacle to political cooperation and a positive movement that should be encouraged and sanctioned through cooperation. The question, then, is how much of the gap in political culture between North America and Latin America has been closed and how solid this progression toward democratization really is.

Howard Wiarda recently noted how great a distance still separates the United States and Canada from Latin American countries in the areas of democracy and human rights despite representative democracy’s strong comeback throughout Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s (Wiarda 1997). Although military regimes were all replaced and regular elections are now held virtually everywhere, problems persist between elections. Pluralism remains limited and corporatism is apparently making a comeback in many countries (Wiarda 1997: 18).

Political reforms, albeit still incomplete, are progressing normally in two important countries, Argentina and Chile, as well as in others, such as Nicaragua and El Salvador. In contrast, the situation in the two principal regional powers appears to be essentially blocked. In Brazil, reforms have been left hanging and have produced chronic failure at the government level. As for Mexico, change appears imperceptible, particularly with regard to the question of free and fair elections and the alternation of power, as the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) rebellion so clearly indicated. Although Brazil, in 1992, and Venezuela, in 1993, were able to replace presidents accused of corruption without placing their democratic regimes in jeopardy, both regimes were shaken by the bids for consolidation of power (autogolpe) undertaken by Presidents Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Jorge Serrano Elías in Guatemala during the same period (1992–1993). Serious problems thus remain within countries of pivotal importance to the regional equilibrium.

An examination of the particular issue of human rights completes this general overview of the evolution of political reforms. A democratic regime does not necessarily guarantee complete respect of human rights, but the human rights situation is a good indicator of democratic health. On the one hand, several countries in the region were obliged to assume the legacy of massive human rights violations attributed to former military regimes in pursuing the transition to democracy. In most instances, to use Manuel Antonio Garreton’s terms (Garreton 1994), a policy of amnesty and impunity prevailed, accompanied by occasional efforts to establish guilt and administer justice for appearance’s sake. This was the case, for example, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

On the other hand, Table 3.2 indicates that whereas the overall human rights situation in Latin America has improved over the longer term (1975–1990), the assessment is much less conclusive in the specific area of civil rights. ₁₀ In the 1990–1993 period, respect for civil rights effectively deteriorated in several important countries, particularly those that face ongoing guerrilla and terrorist activities, such as Colombia and Peru. As for Mexico, where guerrilla activity is recent, it is the lack of progress that stands out. In addition, the civil rights situation also deteriorated or stagnated in several other nations, most notably in Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina.

In sum, the consolidation of democratic regimes generally appears to be an arduous task. Although the situation varies from one country to another, certain states, including Brazil and Mexico, the two most important nations, still face grave problems. Rights violations are of major significance in Mexico and notable in Brazil. Corruption is widespread and institutional reforms unsatisfactory in both countries. The situation prevailing in these two nations exercises an important influence on regional stability.

Table 3.2 Civil and Political Rights in the Americasa
	1980				1985				1990				1993
	PRb		CRc		PR		CR		PR		CR		PR		CR
Argentina	6		5		2		2		1		2		2		3
Bolivia	7		5		2		3		2		3		2		3
Brazil	4		3		3		2		2		3		2		3
Canada	1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
Chile	6		5		6		5		4		3		2(1991)		2(1991)
Colombia	2		3		2		3		3		4		2		4
Costa Rica	1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
Cuba	6		6		6		6		7		7		7		7
Dominican Republic	2		3		1		3		1		3		2		3
Ecuador	2		2		2		3		2		2		2		3
El Salvador	6		4		2		4		3		4		3		3
Guatemala	5		6		4		4		3		3		4		5
Haiti	6		6		7		6		7		5		7		7
Honduras	4		3		2		3		2		3		2		3
Mexico	3		4		4		4		4		3		4		3
Nicaragua	5		5		5		5		5		5		4		3
Panama	4		4		6		3		7		6		4		3
Paraguay	5		5		5		5		4		3		3		3
Peru	2		3		2		3		2		4		6		5
United States	1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
Uruguay	5		5		2		2		1		2		1		2
Venezuela	1		2		1		2		1		3		3		3
Source: Committee on Latin American Studies (1996), Statistical Abstract of Latin America (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California), p. 274
Notes: a. On a scale of 1 to 7, 1 corresponds to a situation where rights are most respected, and 7 to a situation where they are least respected. b. The score for political rights is determined by the degree to which a given country satisfies the following requirements: (1) leaders are chosen in decisions made on the basis of an open voting process; (2) significant opposition is allowed to compete in this process; (3) there are multiple political parties and candidates not selected by the government; (4) polling and counting of votes are conducted without coercion or fraud; (5) a significant share of political power is exercised by elected representatives; (6) all regions, even the most remote, are included in the political process; and (7) the country is free of foreign or military control or influence. Countries assigned a rank of 1 most closely satisfy these requirements and those assigned a rank of 7 most seriously violate them. c. The score for civil rights is determined by the degree of liberty a given country grants its news media and individual citizens, primarily as it applies to political expression. The survey looks at censorship applied to the press or radio. It also assesses the rights granted any individual to openly express ideas and to belong to an organization free of government supervision and the individual’s right to a free trial, that is, the degree to which the judiciary is independent of administrative control. Also important is the number of political prisoners held in a country, the use of torture or brutality, and the degree to which the state security forces respect individual rights. Countries assigned the rank of 1 grant the greatest degree of civil liberties, and those assigned the rank of 7 most seriously violate them.

 

On the regional level, the failure of OAS attempts to restore democracy in Haiti has revealed how difficult it will be to establish a hemispheric regime for democracy in the face of strongly opposing points of view.

The areas of civil rights, human rights, and democratization are only three examples of how culture and history have nurtured conflicting ideas and fundamental differences. These differences are structural realities that will influence continental integration.

 

Worlds Apart: Levels of Economic Development

Scholars studying regional integration schemes involving developing countries quickly became aware of the significant structural constraints created by uneven levels of economic development among participating countries (Axline 1977; Mytelka 1979: 10–15). In almost all cases, the establishment and eventual success of these integration processes required the adoption of compensatory or redistributive measures in support of their less developed members. Such measures were often an important condition for the inclusion of these countries at the start of the integration process; even the European Community had to address the problem. In the rare cases where the larger and more developed countries refused or were reluctant to establish measures in support of less developed members—as in the Latin American Free Trade Association, for example—integration schemes faltered after only a few years of existence.

In the Americas, economic development has been extremely diverse. When GDP per capita is used as a measure of economic development (see Table 3.6 in the chapter Appendix), there are significant variations among the twenty-four countries for which information was available. Alongside countries such as the United States and Canada, which have a GDP per capita of over $14,000, are a good number of countries whose GDP per capita is less than $2,000. Furthermore, although the GDP per capita of many countries did grow over the time period studied, in the 1990s most lost ground in relation to the United States. In fact, only Canada improved its position significantly in relation to the United States, with a gain of more than 1.00 (from 6.6 in 1966–1969 to 7.7 in 1991–1994).

Given the huge disparities in economic development levels throughout the Americas, this means that it is almost impossible to envisage the establishment of an integration process that does not include some form of special treatment for the less developed countries of the region. In particular, an early U.S. idea of extending NAFTA to the rest of the hemisphere appears extremely unrealistic, because only a few countries of the region are able to comply with such a model of economic integration.

In fact, strict application of a rigorous free trade agreement to the whole hemisphere would seriously harm Caribbean and Central American countries as well as certain South American countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru, which would require important structural adjustment in order to comply with such a treaty. The problem of taking account of the differences in level of development has already emerged as a major challenge during the prenegotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Although NAFTA’s and Mercosur’s larger countries recognize the need to take appropriate measures in order to facilitate small economies’ integration to the future zone, they rejected a proposal by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean to create a Regional Integration Fund to finance programs of adjustment, saying that existing institutions should be able to support transition costs (“Caricom” 1997). However, they ultimately accepted the idea of accommodating small economies by agreeing to consider “on a case by case basis” “measures such as technical assistance in specific areas and longer periods for implementing the obligations” (San José 1998).

Of course, the need to accommodate smaller economies will be the subject of hard negotiations, and it shows the immediate relevance of the disparities in levels of development to the development of hemispheric regionalism. It is a key structural constraint that will have to be addressed if integration is to involve countries other than the NAFTA and Mercosur member states.

 

Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined four main areas of structural constraint and opportunity that will necessarily influence the evolution of continental integration in the Americas. Distribution of power and patterns of trade relations over the past thirty years constitute structural realities pointing to two possible scenarios for the future of hemispheric integration. In the first case, integration would proceed along an integration framework based on NAFTA and the U.S. agenda for inter-American affairs, with the United States as the major center of gravity. In the second, hemispheric integration would develop on the basis of two core areas—the U.S.-NAFTA subregion and the Brazil-Mercosur subregion—and proceed more slowly because of the need to accommodate the interests of both areas. If only the first two structural constraints are considered, then the current situation favors the second scenario: Washington’s bargaining position has been weakened by the administration’s incapacity to secure fast-track authority and the concurrent strengthening of the Mercosur subregion. But we must always keep in mind that this particular situation can change rapidly and again modify the dynamics of integration in the Americas.

When the two other structural parameters—political culture and levels of development—are taken into consideration, however, the situation becomes much more complex and leaves the very future of hemispheric integration open to question. Differences and disparities are so important that it is difficult to imagine the success of a hemisphere-wide integration scheme based essentially on North American views or even negotiated by the major countries of the region without concern for the smaller ones. It seems clear that the only way for hemispheric integration to succeed is through practicality, open-mindedness, and genuine compromise. That means compromise by the United States and Canada with regard to the interests and points of view of the rest of the region, as well as compromise by larger, more developed countries regarding the situation of their smaller, less developed counterparts.

This may seem a Herculean task, but as the forty-year European integration process reminds us, regional integration is a long-term enterprise. The window of opportunity for hemispheric integration opened at the end of the 1980s was only a starting point. A learning process is now in progress and its ultimate results will depend a great deal on the attitudes and the behavior of the actors setting the stage for continental integration in the Americas.

 

Appendix

Abbreviations used in Figures 3.1–3.4
Argentina	Arg
Bahamas	Bah
Belize	Bel
Bolivia	Bol
Brazil	Bra
Canada	Can
Chile	Chi
Colombia	Col
Costa Rica	Cos
Dominican Republic	Rep
Ecuador	Ecu
El Salvador	Sal
Guatemala	Gua
Guyana	Guy
Haiti	Hai
Honduras	Hon
Jamaïca	Jam
Mexico	Mex
Nicaragua	Nic
Panama	Pan
Paraguay	Par
Peru	Per
Surinam	Sur
Trinidad and Tobago	Tri
United States	USA
Uruguay	Uru
Venezuela	Ven

 

Table 3.3 Military Expenditures (1988 U.S.$ millions)
		Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile
Country		1966–1969			1976–1979			1986–1989			1991–1994a
Argentina		3,777	0.15		5,520	0.28		3,096	0.10		2,070	0.09
Bolivia		74	0.00		199	0.01		171	0.00		232	0.01
Brazil		3,647	0.14		4,818	0.25		4,034	0.13		1,803	0.08
Canada		5,911	0.23		7,033	0.36		9,756	0.33		8,788	0.37
Chile		231	0.01		1,074	0.05		1,470	0.05		1,639	0.07
Colombia		542	0.02		431	0.02		855	0.03		1,455	0.06
Costa Rica		14	0.00		23	0.00		23	0.00		19	0.00
Dominican Republic		19	0.00		23	0.00		51	0.00		35	0.00
Ecuador		52	0.00		139	0.01		174	0.01		189	0.01
El Salvador		94	0.00		164	0.01		198	0.01		97	0.00
Guatemala		42	0.00		101	0.00		199	0.01		115	0.00
Guyana		9	0.00		39	0.00		32	0.00		73	0.00
Haiti		27	0.00		21	0.00		28	0.00		89	0.00
Honduras		18	0.00		43	0.00		235	0.01		69	0.00
Jamaica		22	0.00		54	0.00		26	0.00		89	0.00
Mexico		531	0.02		982	0.05		782	0.03		468	0.02
Nicaragua		52	0.00		138	0.01		351	0.01		38	0.00
Panama		17	0.00		40	0.00		104	0.00		69	0.00
Paraguay		29	0.00		68	0.00		65	0.00		115	0.00
Peru		187	0.01		490	0.02		620	0.02		334	0.01
Trinidad and Tobago		68	0.00		136	0.01		144	0.00		132	0.00
United States		258,649	10.00		195,651	10.00		297,739	10.00		235,252	10.00
Uruguay		125	0.00		203	0.01		167	0.00		123	0.00
Venezuela		856	0.03		1,471	0.07		1,244	0.04		1,508	0.06
Source: Compiled by authors from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) and International Institute of Strategic Studies (1995: 267). Note: a. Period data for Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago are from the IISS. Data for Nicaragua are in 1993 dollars rather than 1988 dollars like all the others.

 

Table 3.4 Exports (U.S.$ millions)
		Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile
Country		1966–1969			1976–1979			1986–1989			1991–1994
Argentina		1,510	0.44		6,028	0.42		7,977	0.27		13,109	0.28
Bolivia		160	0.04		672	0.04		658	0.02		844	0.01
Brazil		1,897	0.55		12,486	0.88		28,768	0.99		37,995	0.82
Canada		11,754	3.48		47,615	3.38		106,225	3.68		140,406	3.04
Chile		945	0.27		2,608	0.17		6,145	0.21		10,094	0.21
Colombia		546	0.15		2,759	0.18		5,224	0.17		7,667	0.16
Costa Rica		162	0.04		819	0.05		1,218	0.04		2,390	0.05
Dominican Republic		160	0.04		762	0.04		814	0.02		619	0.01
Ecuador		215	0.05		1,465	0.09		2,179	0.07		3,226	0.07
El Salvador		203	0.05		941	0.05		623	0.02		802	0.01
Guatemala		225	0.06		1,075	0.06		1,100	0.03		1,402	0.03
Guyana		114	0.02		278	0.01		228	0.00		380	0.00
Haiti		40	0.00		177	0.00		187	0.00		176	0.00
Honduras		184	0.04		571	0.03		857	0.02		1,076	0.02
Jamaica		237	0.06		730	0.04		784	0.02		1,412	0.03
Mexico		1,262	0.36		5,543	0.38		20,097	0.69		39,545	0.85
Nicaragua		154	0.03		627	0.03		278	0.00		274	0.00
Panama		91	0.02		362	0.01		313	0.00		559	0.01
Paraguay		49	0.00		255	0.01		541	0.01		763	0.01
Peru		817	0.23		1,946	0.13		2,830	0.09		3,696	0.08
Trinidad and Tobago		450	0.12		2,247	0.15		1,443	0.04		1,910	0.04
United States		33,684	10.00		140,423	10.00		288,449	10.00		461,715	10.00
Uruguay		181	0.04		656	0.03		1,317	0.04		1,695	0.03
Venezuela		2,833	0.83		10,224	0.72		30,264	1.04		16,677	0.36
Source: Compiled by authors from International Monetary Fund (1995a).

 

Table 3.5 GDP (1985 U.S.$ billions)
		Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile
Country		1966–1969			1976–1979			1986–1989			1991–1994
Argentina		53	0.20		69	0.20		69	0.16		109	0.23
Bolivia		4	0.01		7	0.02		7	0.01		8	0.01
Brazil		80	0.31		179	0.53		248	0.57		256	0.54
Canada		177	0.69		316	0.94		385	0.88		408	0.86
Chile		12	0.04		13	0.04		19	0.04		26	0.05
Colombia		16	0.06		27	0.08		39	0.09		47	0.10
Costa Rica		2	0.01		4	0.01		4	0.01		6	0.01
Dominican Republic		2	0.01		4	0.01		5	0.01		5	0.01
Ecuador		5	0.02		13	0.04		17	0.04		19	0.04
El Salvador		4	0.01		7	0.02		6	0.01		7	0.01
Guatemala		6	0.02		11	0.03		12	0.03		14	0.03
Guyana		0	0.00		1	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00
Haiti		1	0.00		2	0.00		2	0.00		2	0.00
Honduras		2	0.01		3	0.01		4	0.01		5	0.01
Jamaica		2	0.01		2	0.00		2	0.00		2	0.00
Mexico		73	0.28		135	0.40		175	0.40		209	0.44
Nicaragua		4	0.01		5	0.01		4	0.01		4	0.01
Panama		2	0.01		3	0.01		5	0.01		6	0.01
Paraguay		2	0.00		3	0.01		5	0.01		6	0.01
Peru		11	0.04		16	0.05		19	0.04		16	0.03
Trinidad and Tobago		5	0.02		7	0.02		7	0.01		7	0.01
United States		2,571	10.00		3,354	10.00		4,356	10.00		4,743	10.00
Uruguay		4	0.01		5	0.01		6	0.01		6	0.01
Venezuela		37	0.14		62	0.18		66	0.15		80	0.17
Source: Compiled by authors from International Monetary Fund (1990, 1995c).

 

Table 3.6 GDP per Capita (1985 U.S.$ thousands)
		Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile
Country		1966–1969			1976–1979			1986–1989			1991–1994
Argentina		2,312	1.59		2,540	1.46		2,205	1.07		3,241	1.64
Bolivia		915	0.48		1,368	0.67		951	0.35		972	0.40
Brazil		924	0.49		1,602	0.83		1,736	0.80		1,607	0.74
Canada		8,601	6.60		12,161	7.98		14,960	8.35		14,206	7.66
Chile		1,341	0.82		1,257	0.59		1,482	0.66		1,875	0.89
Colombia		819	0.40		1,111	0.50		1,300	0.55		1,394	0.63
Costa Rica		1,174	0.69		1,683	0.88		1,564	0.70		1,860	0.88
Dominican Republic		469	0.12		728	0.24		729	0.23		707	0.25
Ecuador		993	0.54		1,661	0.87		1,648	0.75		1,763	0.83
El Salvador		1,316	0.80		1,556	0.80		1,168	0.48		1,268	0.56
Guatemala		1,244	0.74		1,636	0.85		1,383	0.60		1,439	0.65
Guyana		715	0.32		749	0.25		573	0.14		587	0.18
Haiti		313	0.00		380	0.00		332	0.00		250	0.00
Honduras		814	0.40		869	0.33		817	0.28		843	0.33
Jamaica		1,025	0.57		1,034	0.44		926	0.34		1,040	0.43
Mexico		1,576	1.01		2,089	1.16		2,130	1.03		2,335	1.14
Nicaragua		2,052	1.38		2,166	1.21		1,110	0.44		848	0.33
Panama		1,564	1.00		1,908	1.04		2,068	0.99		2,222	1.08
Paraguay		752	0.35		1,071	0.47		1,234	0.51		1,300	0.58
Peru		869	0.44		999	0.42		884	0.32		724	0.26
Trinidad and Tobago		4,497	3.33		6,558	4.19		5,372	2.88		5,327	2.79
United States		12,872	10.00		15,138	10.00		17,848	10.00		18,470	10.00
Uruguay		1,510	0.95		1,853	1.00		1,926	0.91		2,009	0.97
Venezuela		3,855	2.82		4,495	2.79		3,592	1.86		3,916	2.01
Source: Compiled by authors from International Monetary Fund (1990, 1995c).

 

Table 3.7 Population (in millions)
		Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile
Country		1966–1969			1976–1979			1986–1989			1991–1994
Argentina		23	1.12		27	1.19		31	1.26		34	1.28
Bolivia		4	0.19		5	0.20		7	0.25		8	0.27
Brazil		86	4.31		112	5.02		143	5.85		156	6.08
Canada		21	1.00		23	1.02		26	1.03		29	1.09
Chile		9	0.42		11	0.45		13	0.49		14	0.50
Colombia		19	0.93		25	1.08		30	1.22		34	1.28
Costa Rica		2	0.05		2	0.06		3	0.08		3	0.08
Dominican Republic		4	0.16		5	0.19		7	0.25		7	0.26
Ecuador		5	0.24		8	0.31		10	0.38		11	0.39
El Salvador		3	0.13		4	0.16		5	0.18		5	0.18
Guatemala		5	0.21		6	0.26		9	0.32		10	0.35
Guyana		1	0.00		1	0.00		1	0.00		1	0.00
Haiti		4	0.17		5	0.18		6	0.22		7	0.24
Honduras		2	0.08		3	0.12		5	0.16		6	0.18
Jamaica		2	0.06		2	0.06		2	0.06		2	0.06
Mexico		47	2.30		65	2.90		82	3.34		90	3.50
Nicaragua		2	0.05		2	0.07		4	0.11		4	0.13
Panama		1	0.03		2	0.04		2	0.06		3	0.07
Paraguay		2	0.07		3	0.09		4	0.13		5	0.14
Peru		13	0.59		16	0.70		21	0.83		23	0.85
Trinidad and Tobago		1	0.02		1	0.01		1	0.02		1	0.02
United States		200	10.00		221	10.00		244	10.00		257	10.00
Uruguay		3	0.10		3	0.09		3	0.09		3	0.09
Venezuela		9	0.44		14	0.59		19	0.73		20	0.77
Source: Compiled by authors from International Monetary Fund (1995b).

 

Table 3.8 Diplomatic Missions
		Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile			Average  Decile
Country		1966–1969			1976–1979			1986–1989			1991–1994
Argentina		62	5.07		76	5.48		70	4.08		72	3.99
Bolivia		29	2.05		32	1.65		33	1.28		33	1.33
Brazil		63	5.21		78	5.61		82	4.94		80	4.55
Canada		64	5.30		87	6.39		98	6.15		104	6.17
Chile		40	3.11		47	2.96		47	2.30		47	2.32
Colombia		42	3.24		50	3.17		50	2.57		50	2.49
Costa Rica		24	1.60		35	1.91		36	1.47		36	1.57
Dominican Republic		24	1.64		26	1.09		28	0.87		27	0.94
Ecuador		34	2.51		41	2.43		42	1.92		43	2.01
El Salvador		27	1.92		27	1.22		26	0.75		26	0.89
Guatemala		32	2.37		32	1.65		33	1.28		36	1.55
Guyana		6	0.00		15	0.13		16	0.00		13	0.00
Haiti		n.a.	–		22	0.78		21	0.38		21	0.53
Honduras		24	1.60		23	0.87		25	0.68		25	0.82
Jamaica		10	0.37		25	1.04		27	0.83		29	1.09
Mexico		52	4.16		62	4.22		68	3.92		69	3.82
Nicaragua		25	1.74		26	1.13		40	1.77		37	1.62
Panama		26	1.78		36	2.00		36	1.47		34	1.45
Paraguay		n.a.	–		24	0.96		27	0.83		27	0.95
Peru		41	3.15		52	3.35		54	2.87		50	2.50
Trinidad and Tobago		9	0.27		13	0.00		18	0.11		19	0.37
United States		116	10.00		128	10.00		149	10.00		160	10.00
Uruguay		44	3.47		45	2.74		45	2.15		44	2.11
Venezuela		40	3.06		62	4.22		69	4.00		69	3.82
Source: Compiled by authors from The Europa World Yearbook (1966–1995).

 

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Endnotes

Note 1: Space restrictions preclude an extensive discussion of the methodological prerequisites underlying the construction of the indexes and the resulting analysis. For a more elaborate explanation, please see the original article (Mace, Bélanger, and Thérien 1993). Back.

Note 2: Not even Brazil. See remarks in this sense by Maria Regina Soares de Lima in Chapter 7. Back.

Note 3: From the 1980s to the 1990s, Brazil’s overall decline relative to the United States was caused by a weakening of its position in terms of exports, GDP per capita, military spending, and the presence of diplomatic missions. With the exception of military spending, these same indicators explain Venezuela’s relative decline in the 1990s as compared with the 1970s, whereas Canada’s decline from the 1980s to the 1990s is mainly attributable to a relative loss in terms of GDP per capita, GDP, and exports. Back.

Note 4: This is why Chile was asked to coordinate its position with Mercosur members in the talks on Pan-American free trade held at the Mercosur presidential meeting in mid-December 1997 (Economist 1997: 33), a request to which it agreed. Back.

Note 5: “By economic ties, we mean primarily close relations of trade permitting large-scale division of labor and almost always giving rise to vested interests” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 29). Back.

Note 6: Some countries have been excluded because of insufficient data. We have attempted to control this factor in our analysis by comparing the totals in our tables with the data on total regional trade available from IMF yearbooks. Back.

Note 7: In general and statistical terms, we attempt to group points representative of features in mutual proximity in order to delimit some areas of the factorial space where individuals will be of similar profile. Data will then be composed of the totality of points representing individual descriptive characters (in the statistical sense) defined by their factorial coordinates and their weight (or frequency of appearance).... It is important to note that the number of classes to be defined is not fixed a priori, nor is it a matter of chance. It is the structure of the data that helps to determine it. (Bordet and Kokosowski 1982: 198) (our translation). For a more detailed account of the calculus required for this type of analysis that is accessible to the layman, see F. Benzécri (1986). For a comprehensive account in English, see J.-P. Benzécri (1992). Back.

Note 8: Such a configuration on the first axis, a result provoked by the unit with the greatest weight, is inevitable in the case of tables with a null diagonal (Gmardellis 1986: 287). Back.

Note 9: The expression “cultural divide” is borrowed from Lawrence Harrison (Harrison 1997: 5). Back.

Note 10: Data for this section are drawn for the most part from Freedom House (1991); Human Rights Watch (1994); Observatoire de l’information (1989); Reporters sans frontières (1994). Back.

 

The Americas In Transition: The Contours of Regionalism