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The Americas In Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, by Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger, and contributors
1. Hemispheric Regionalism
in Perspective
Regionalism, as we understand it, is a multidimensional political process of integration occurring between two or more countries in a given geographical region. In the long term, such a process seldom leads to the creation of a new political unit, but it should result in a higher level of cohesion between the countries involved in the process and some form of joint management of regional problems. Regionalism is a social construct devoid of automaticity in the sense that it is a product of human agency, not of some sort of natural evolution. In other words, regionalism is a response to economic, geographic, and other conditions without any deterministic force behind it.
This absence of automaticity means that progress in one area of a regional process of integration will not necessarily entail progress in another area and that progression in a particular dimension may be halted and reversed. All is well and integration can take place when, in a particular regional scheme, major actors share similar perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. However, integration can be halted or reversed when actors have opposing points of view and adopt confrontational policies or behavior. Like any other social and political construct, regionalism is determined by the behavior of the multiple actors involved in the process and by the way regionalism converges with their different interests and strategies. Once launched, regionalism itself becomes part of the strategic environment of these actors, as well as others. This interplay of actors’ strategic behavior and the processes of regionalism is what this book proposes to study.
Having made some conceptual clarifications, we certainly agree with Andrew Hurrell’s comment that the words “region” and “regionalism” are “ambiguous terms” (Hurrell 1995b: 38). That ambiguity, understandable given the complexity of the subject matter, appears in the way various authors over the past forty years have used almost interchangeably the terms “political integration,” “regional integration,” “regionalism,” “regionalization,” “regionness,” and “new regionalism” to identify a phenomenon that may have taken different forms along the years, but that in essence remained the same. This ambiguity also appears in definitions found in the literature throughout the years. 1 This listing of definitions makes two points: (1) it underlines the literature’s difficulty in arriving at conceptual clarity when trying to circumscribe a phenomenon as complex as regionalism; and (2) it shows that, nevertheless, some recurrent themes or characterizations do emerge such as the idea that (i) regionalism is a process; (ii) the phenomenon is multidimensional; and (iii) it is constructed by actors involved in the process, most particularly state actors. Our conceptual definition tries to stay as close as possible to these basic characterizations.
That being said, the phenomenon of regionalism is not something new. Its rediscovery should not conceal the fact that it has been one of the main structuring forces of the international system over the past forty years. Indeed, since the 1950s, the tension between the global and multilateral and the regional levels of governance has always been present, particularly in trade and commerce (Anderson and Blackburst 1993), but also in general economic activity (Oman 1994) and in broader strategic terms. Some scholars even view the region as the most significant future matrix for the regulation of political and economic activity and the central strategic space in the global system (Badie 1995; Laïdi 1994: 217). Although this view may be an exaggeration, the fact remains that regionalism became a significant feature of the international system with the thrust toward European unification in the 1950s. In this introductory chapter, we survey these early manifestations of regionalism in the Americas and elsewhere in order to situate the phenomenon within a historical context. We then review the pertinent theoretical literature addressing regionalism and propose our own actor-focused perspective. Finally, we briefly explain the outline of this book.
Regionalism Since 1945
The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 were fundamental manifestations of strategic regionalism. Although its security aspect was often overlooked later on, one of the main achievements of the ECSC was preventing further European wars between France and Germany (Axline 1995: 2) and transforming a historically confrontational relationship into a cooperative one to create the core area around which European unification could develop. The EEC, for its part, enabled the Western European countries to foster a political space of their own between the all-pervasive superpowers of the Cold War era. Finally, the progressive transformation of the EEC into the European Union resulted in the creation of a new global actor (Piening 1997; Rhodes 1998), confirming the wisdom of David Mitrany’s precepts and reestablishing some of the legitimacy of the neofunctionalist approach to regional integration, at least for the analysis of that particular phenomenon (Mutimer 1989).
Experiences at regional integration were not limited to the European continent, however. The EEC soon became a model or a goal for other countries, particularly in what was then called the Third World. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 primarily as a response to a perceived communist threat coming from China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Like the EEC, ASEAN was an example of strategic regionalism and resulted in a loose political and economic arrangement whose objective was to develop free trade among member countries, but also to establish a forum for political consultation in the event of a reduced U.S. presence in Asia as a result of the Vietnam War. In Africa, in the meantime, regional integration was also very much on the agenda as one of the instruments to help African countries get a better deal in the anticipated new international economic order. The Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, 2 the East African Common Market, and the West African Economic Community, 3 to name a few, were economically oriented, whereas groupings such as the Community of West Africa’s States 4 had more political objectives in mind.
Apart from Europe, however, the thrust toward regionalism was most profound and diverse in the Americas during the 1960s and 1970s. The push toward integration in the hemisphere was influenced by two contending paradigms. In the first, the main emphasis of Latin American integration went from political unity to economic integration under the influence of what could be called the developmental philosophy of the recently created Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, later to become ECLAC after the inclusion of the Caribbean and better known by its Spanish abbreviation CEPAL). In the second, the Pan-American paradigm sought to revive the “Western Hemisphere idea” leading to continental integration.
The ECLA doctrine was based on the ideas of its first secretary-general and respected Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch. What became known as the Latin American structuralist school of development theory sought to explain underdevelopment in Latin America essentially as the result of an international system composed of a center and a periphery. This underlying international structure was the cause as well as the result of an international division of labor wherein the center produced and exported manufactured goods while the countries of the periphery produced and exported raw materials and commodities. The fact that historically the price of manufactured goods has risen faster than the price of raw materials created a situation of deteriorating terms of trade as the basis of the “unequal exchange” between North and South. Unequal exchange was the main cause of Latin American underdevelopment, a situation that could be overcome only by industrialization based on import substitution. But national markets were too small and the strategy of industrialization by import substitution at the local level had reached its limits. Only regional integration schemes could provide the larger markets and the accompanying economies of scale necessary for industrialization. Industrialization would then take place in an economic environment constrained by state regulation, and when necessary, state intervention would lead to the modernization of Latin American societies and, eventually, their inclusion in the First World (W. Baer 1962; ECLA 1950).
On the basis of these precepts, in the 1950s and early 1960s ECLA became extremely active in supporting efforts at regional integration (Mitchell 1967), most notably in Central America, where such efforts led to the establishment of the Central American Common Market (CACM). ECLA ideas were also influential to a certain extent in the discussions leading to the creation of the Andean Group and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). However, both integration schemes, particularly the Andean Group, went much further than what was presented in the ECLA doctrine (Axline 1979; Fontaine 1977; Mace 1981).
Consequently, by the first half of the 1970s, the Latin American and Caribbean landscape was covered with integration schemes varying in both form and content. In addition to the CACM, the Andean Group, and CARICOM, there was also the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 5 and the Latin American Economic System (SELA). 6 Although SELA was more a forum supporting economic integration than a real integration scheme, LAFTA was an integration process that had little to do with the ECLA doctrine. An extension of a Southern Cone project devised by governments opposed to ECLA’s intervention and supported by the United States, LAFTA was essentially a loose free trade arrangement based on two limited mechanisms: annual negotiated tariff reductions and industrial complementary agreements. The region hosted all three types of integration schemes identified by Lynn K. Mytelka (Mytelka 1979: 10–21) in the developing world: laissez-faire integrative systems (LAFTA), laissez-faire with elements of compensation through planning (CACM and CARICOM), and interventionist integrative systems (the Andean Group).
At the end of the 1970s, however, regional integration in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world was in a state of crisis. A combination of factors contributed to the situation, including specific events related to each integration scheme, for example, Chile’s withdrawal from the Andean Group and the refusal of LAFTA’s larger member countries to adopt compensation mechanisms favorable to the less developed members of the integration process. But without a doubt, what most affected regionalism in the 1970s was the oil crisis of 1973–1974 and the resulting economic stagnation worldwide. This new turn of events had a negative impact on regional integration in developing countries in two major ways. The recession in industrialized countries increased protectionism, making access to their markets more difficult for developing countries. At the same time, the North-South dialogue came to an end, the 1981 Cancún conference being the last of its kind. The oil crisis also created severe budget deficits for most oil-importing developing countries, which in a matter of months had to face huge increases in the price of oil products and derivatives. The resulting fiscal deficits required huge loans from international money markets, directly causing the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Moreover, the economic downturn reinforced inward-looking attitudes and put an end to the spirit of cooperation needed for the give-and-take approach that could ensure the success of regional integration.
Hemispheric regionalism, the other integration paradigm in the Americas, was reactivated in 1948 at the Bogotá conference. With the signing of the charter establishing the Organization of American States (OAS), the new inter-American system experienced a promising debut. It was hoped that the OAS, with its network of specialized conferences and agencies, later complemented by the Inter-American Development Bank, would become the main diplomatic forum for inter-American affairs as well as the major regional institution for cooperation in areas such as health, education, and culture. In matters of security, the contours of a regional system were established with the signing in 1947 of the Rio Treaty, providing for collective defense against aggression either from outside or from within the region. The major drawback, however, concerned economic affairs; the failure to ratify the economic agreement signed at the Bogotá conference brought the dream of a free trade area in the Americas to a standstill.
But on balance, there might have been enough support for continental integration in the early 1950s if U.S. attention had not been concentrated in other regions of the world and if positive gestures had been made, such as the adoption of an aid package similar to the Marshall Plan. Such aid was what Latin American governments were hoping for, but it never materialized. On the contrary, when U.S. attention was diverted back to the Americas, it resulted essentially in unilateral interventions or ill-fated policies such as the 1954 Guatemalan episode, the Bay of Pigs episode and the embargo against Cuba, and the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. Even the 1961 Alliance for Progress failed to repair the damage, and by the mid-1960s, hemispheric regionalism had become an agonizing process.
For the Johnson administration, the Meeting of American Chiefs of State at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967 was supposed to encourage Latin American integration, revitalize the Alliance for Progress, and improve inter-American relations generally (Connell-Smith 1974: 248). Instead, it proved to be the last meeting of its kind for many years to come. As it turned out, a combination of factors pushed inter-American relations into a period of decline lasting almost twenty years. The war in Vietnam had the effect of diverting U.S. attention away from Latin America for several years. Subsequently, the U.S. government and its Latin American counterparts had very divergent views on issues such as control over natural resources, treatment of foreign investments, the external debt, and the crisis in Central America, to name but a few.
Consequently, both paths toward regionalism (the Latin American and the Pan-American) had come to a dead end by the early 1980s. As was the case with regionalism elsewhere in the Third World, Latin American and Caribbean integration schemes had become empty shells, barely surviving. Hemispheric regionalism, for its part, was almost nonexistent, as Latin American governments had lost all faith in the OAS. How is it, then, that at the end of that same decade, regionalism had made a stunning comeback not only in the Americas but in Europe and Asia as well, again becoming a central feature of contemporary international relations?
Of course, this evolution cannot be explained by any single factor, and in the Americas the combinations of factors vary from country to country. 7 However, three elements seem to have played a central role in the analysis put forward by decisionmakers throughout the region. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the implosion of the Soviet Union meant an important victory for the Western-based model of democracy and economic development. These events also confirmed the status of the United States as the only remaining superpower. The modernization of the former Eastern bloc countries also meant that Latin America as a whole would have to compete with Eastern Europe for development funds. A second reason had to do with the perception that the world economy was in the process of being reorganized around three major economic blocs: Western Europe, North America, and Asia (Belous and Hartley 1990; Brand 1992; Buelens 1992). Latin America could not afford to be excluded from the principal axes of economic transactions. Finally, the effects of the external debt crisis on the psyche of Latin American elites must not be underestimated. The results of the crisis led to an important change in their values and perceptions with regard to the traditional economic development model, the role of the state in the economy, political behavior, and the nature of their relationship with the United States (ECLAC 1992, 1994).
These factors are at the root of the significant reemergence of basic patterns of regionalism in the Americas, the subregional Latin American and Caribbean integration schemes, and the U.S.-led thrust at continental integration. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the adoption of new forms of regional integration throughout the subregion, starting in the second half of the 1980s, can be explained by the combination of fundamental attitudinal changes resulting from the debt crisis and the perception of an emerging world order dominated by three blocs of mostly industrialized countries, which generated an acute fear of marginalization. The Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), the Group of Three (Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela), the Andean Community (reformed Andean Group), and, moving in the same direction, the CACM and CARICOM now represent what Klaus Peter Fischer has called in Chapter 10 the “integrationist/competitive” model of integration. Supported by liberal democracy and market economics, this new form of integration favors elements such as financial liberalization, limited protection for local industries, and a weak presence of the state in the economy, among other things. It is what ECLAC has called “open regionalism” and it represents a fundamental shift in the way Latin America and the Caribbean address regionalism.
In the case of U.S.-led hemispheric regionalism, this third attempt at continental integration was launched by Washington as one of the measures to strengthen the United States’ global influence in the context of the new post–Cold War international order. It was also a response to a very strong belief in Washington’s administrative branch that the changes in political behavior and economic policies throughout Latin America during the 1980s created a historic moment of a convergence of values and a window of opportunity that had to be seized. With the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the background, the building blocks of continental integration were the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, announced by President George Bush on June 27, 1990, and the Summit of the Americas, attended by thirty-four countries of the hemisphere in Miami in December 1994. The documents produced in the context of these two major diplomatic initiatives trace the contours of a hemisphere-wide integration process whose highlight is the proposal to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). But as we will see in Chapter 2, what is involved in the so-called Miami process goes beyond free trade; it is really a multidimensional integration process involving issues in many areas of hemispheric cooperation.
This book is essentially a study of the contours of hemispheric regionalism as it shapes the future of the Americas. The literature on the subject has been growing steadily over the past few years (Grugel 1996; Hurrell 1995a; Mace and Thérien 1996b; Muñoz and Rosenberg 1993; Nishijima and Smith 1996; Payne 1996; P. Smith 1993a; Weintraub 1994a). However, a considerable portion of this literature has focused on trade and the FTAA, whereas other contributions deal with specific issues without attempting a general examination of the whole process. This book is an attempt to assess the hemispheric integration project by trying to understand its specific nature, by locating it in its immediate environment, and by examining the strategies of the actors involved in the process.
Analyzing Hemispheric Regionalism
How should one analyze contemporary regionalism as applied to the Americas? The first wave of theoretical studies on regional integration was centered more or less on three analytical frameworks that were strongly influenced by the European unification process. The neofunctionalist school (Haas 1958, 1964; Haas and Schmitter 1964; Nye 1968a, 1970) basically understood integration as a process leading to the formation of a new political unit superseding the nation-states participating in it. The creation of a new political unit resulted from a shift in loyalties and expectations from the national to the supranational level, along a continuum from economic to political integration through a movement of spillover. Analytically, the research strategy involved examining and measuring background conditions and process mechanisms in order to explain the evolution of integration and to arrive at projections concerning the future state of the integration process.
The transactionalist/communications approach (Deutsch 1954, 1964; Deutsch et al. 1957; W. Fischer 1969; Puchala 1970) constructed a logic of integration that in essence was not very different from that of the neofunctionalist school. Integration was conceived as a process leading to the establishment of a security community, be it pluralistic or amalgamated. Provided that certain essential background conditions are present, takeoff can occur and integration will move forward on the basis of shared values and transactions among the communities being integrated. In this conception, increased transactions and growing value compatibility reinforce each other, contributing to the development of mutual trust, which generates support for economic integration, which in turn builds support for political integration. The research strategy of this approach consists of measuring flows of transactions and value compatibility in order to arrive at conclusions on the evolution of the integration process. Compared with the other theoretical perspectives, the transactionalist/communications approach places less emphasis on institutions and on the political aspects of the integration process.
The third theoretical framework, particularly attuned to the realities of the European integration process, could be called the decisionmaking perspective (Lindberg 1963, 1967, 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In a way, it is an expanded adaptation of David Easton’s input-output model for the analysis of regional integration. Integration is conceived as a process in which actors of national systems are progressively led to redirect their demands and support to a higher-level political system that will transform these demands into decisions whose binding character is accepted by the communities participating in the process. The ultimate test for regional integration therefore consists in its collective decisionmaking capacity, that is, its ability to process more and more decisions. The research strategy is centered on the analysis of the collective decisionmaking apparatus in relation to which three groups of properties (level, animators, consequences) are measured and conclusions are drawn concerning the progress of integration or lack thereof.
By the early 1970s, these first attempts at theory building in the field of regional integration were rejected by those who had originally proposed the theoretical constructs (Haas 1975b) 8 as well as by the larger scientific community. First, these original theoretical perspectives were believed to be inadequate for the study of regionalism mainly because the dependent variable had never been adequately conceptualized. Second, the assumption of automaticity in the continuum from economic to political integration was also proved false by the observation of the actual functioning of regional integration schemes. Third, a close examination of the analytical frameworks and their empirical applications revealed problems associated with conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement (De Vree 1972; Pentland 1973). Finally, the fact that these theoretical constructs did not easily adapt to the realities of regionalism outside Europe, particularly in the Third World, also constituted a major handicap.
The more recent literature on regionalism contrasts dramatically with earlier writings on regional integration. In general, it appears less preoccupied with problems related to conceptualization, theory formation, and the empirical investigation of regionalism.
There are, however, some exceptions in which analysts have tried to provide insights for a theoretical understanding of regionalism. Björn Hettne, for one, has tried to construct a structural explanation of what he calls the “new regionalism” (Hettne 1994). Essentially, he seeks to understand the relationship between regionalism and world order and, more precisely, how the world order is being shaped by a process of regionalization. To understand this relationship, he starts by identifying two processes or levels of regionalism: macroregionalism (transnational or supranational) and microregionalism (subnational). There are three types of macroregionalism: trading blocs, power blocs, and “transnational formations,” the last being a process of regional integration and the new regionalism on which Hettne focuses. Regionalism or regional integration is therefore viewed as a process with a variety of dimensions, “the most important being culture, security, economic policies, development, and political regime” (Hettne 1994: 8). Finally, regionalism is animated by a dynamics whose central element is the “dialectical relationship between the two logics, the forces of market expansion and the need for political control” (Hettne 1994: 3).
Little more is said on how to carry out a structured observation of the dynamics of regionalism. It is also unclear how dynamics relate to the dimensions identified or, for that matter, how dynamics of the new regionalism differ from the dynamics of, let’s say, trading blocs. But Hettne’s theoretical reflections do constitute an interesting starting point for a structural analysis of contemporary regionalism, particularly as it relates to hegemony and world order.
In the same line of thought, but focused more specifically on the relationship between regionalism and globalization, James Mittelman proposes analytical parameters for the understanding of regionalism and eventually for the comparison of regionalist experiences (Mittelman 1996b). These parameters are the pattern of production and how it is related to the international division of labor; the way neoliberalism is ingrained in a particular regional context; the configuration of power relations; the social-cultural networks being developed in the regional framework; and the actors, institutions, and the nature of global governance involved in an integration process.
These variables cover many aspects of the dynamics of regionalism. They lay the foundation for the comparative analysis of regionalism and for the examination of how regionalism both participates in and is influenced by globalization. However, Mittelman’s analytical categories appear more useful for telling us where to look than how to observe. More theoretical refinements are needed to determine how each analytical category is related to regionalism. For instance, how are power relations connected to regionalism? What should we analyze and how? What does a particular configuration of power relations mean for the evolution of regionalism? In order for the analytical framework to be used to provide explanations, such questions need to be answered.
Working from another angle and recognizing, as does Peter Robson (1993: 330), that theoretical and conceptual work on regionalism since the late 1980s “has been relatively modest,” Andrew Hurrell attempts an examination of how sets of international relations (IR) theories could be used to explain the dynamics of regionalism (Hurrell 1995b). He starts by looking at systemic theories that offer an outside-in perspective for the study of regionalism. Included here are what Hurrell calls structural theories, which he divides into two sets: neorealism, with its significant variant hegemony, and the approaches related to structural interdependence and globalization. These systemic or structural theories are said to have an outside-in perspective because they seek essentially to analyze and understand regionalism in relation to the broader international system. Theories of hegemony, for example, may help explain how regionalism can act as a response to a perceived threat from a hegemonic power or as an attempt to restrict the power of a hegemony through the creation of regional institutions. They could also be useful in analyzing situations in which a hegemony is pushing regionalism as a way to enhance its global influence. Approaches to globalization may help explain better the interrelations between the regional and global spaces. However, as Hurrell himself emphasizes, the link between regionalism and globalization is often quite complex and ambiguous (Hurrell 1995b: 55).
The second cluster of theories identified by Hurrell are those that concentrate on the link between regionalism and interdependence at the regional level. Included here are neofunctionalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. This set of theories is different from the previous set in that it focuses essentially on the regional construct itself. Neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism could be used to examine the way states and regional institutions move toward interdependence by fostering and developing regional cohesion. Hurrell admits, however, that the relevance of neofunctionalism to the analysis of regionalism outside Europe is not clear (Hurrell 1995b: 60). He maintains that, for its part, constructivism could be useful in examining how regional identity and community building are developed.
Finally, domestic-level theories form a third group of theoretical frameworks that can provide tools for the analysis of domestic attributes or characteristics. According to Hurrell, theories dealing with state coherence, types of political regimes and democratization, and convergence in relation to domestic policy preferences could all provide interesting insights to the analysis of regionalism at the level of national or domestic policies and strategies.
Hurrell’s presentation is certainly interesting and thought provoking. The problem, however, is that apart from neofunctionalism, which may not apply to regionalism outside Europe, none of these theoretical frameworks have been constructed for the analysis of regionalism or regional integration. It would be a demanding enterprise to make these frameworks operational, thus facilitating the systematic analysis of regional integration processes and generating significant findings. Another problem is the difficulty of approaching a relatively specific subject matter (regionalism) from such a vast array of theoretical angles.
This general and brief examination of the theoretical literature on regionalism and regional integration points to two basic conclusions. First, in the case of the first wave of theoretical frameworks proposed for the study of regional integration, the literature contains many basic concepts, central ideas, and insights that are fundamental to the explanation of regionalism today. However, as analytical models per se, early theoretical proposals have proved problematic in terms of both operationalization and measurement. Furthermore, the usefulness of these models for the analysis of regional experiences outside Europe remains unclear.
Second, the contemporary literature on regionalism, as noted by Hurrell and others, remains relatively weak on the conceptual and theoretical levels. The rare attempts at theory building do point in some interesting directions, but it is clear that they need further conceptual refinements. The work of Hettne and Mittelman has demonstrated that the literature emphasizes a structural explanation of regionalism by seeking essentially to understand it in relation to larger structures or phenomena such as world order or globalization. This theoretical perspective is in line with current trends in IR studies that seek to move away from statist or national-level explanations, focusing instead on transnational or subnational forces (Badie and Smouts 1992; Keohane and Nye 1971; Risse-Kapen 1995; Taylor 1984) and larger structures such as world systems, regimes, production systems, hegemony, interdependence, and globalization (Chase-Dunn 1989; Cox 1987; Gill and Law 1988; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977; Krasner 1983a; Mittelman 1996a; Rittberger 1993; Rosenau 1990; Rupert 1995; Wallerstein 1974). Still, the structural explanation, however necessary for the understanding of human activity and international events, is by itself incomplete as an explanatory construction.
An Actor’s Perspective
The outside-in or top-down perspective implicit in the structural explanation must be complemented by an inside-out or bottom-up perspective that focuses attention on how international phenomena are dependent on the way they are used by actors. An analysis based on an actor’s perspective is therefore an appropriate complement. Since the advent of behaviorism, the social sciences, and IR studies in particular, have increasingly focused on actors. This focus has always been one of two basic approaches to the study of international relations used to construct explanations (Hollis and Smith 1992: 1–12). It is still central to the discipline in regard to theory building, as evidenced by discussions on the agent-structure problem (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993; Carlsnaes 1992; Wendt 1987).
In this book we propose a study of regionalism and an examination of hemispheric regionalism based on an actor’s perspective. We identify three main categories of actors—states, regional organizations, and civil society actors—and try to analyze their strategies, policies, and behavior. Our decision to focus on actors to observe and study hemispheric regionalism is based on the belief that it is not possible to understand regionalism (or any other international phenomenon, for that matter) if we do not start by examining the actions of the actors involved in the process and their motivations or calculus. It is the actors who, by their respective appropriation of regionalism, essentially determine the evolution of the integration process. It is only when we have an understanding of this perspective that we can carry out a broader examination of how regionalism is related to larger phenomena. In other words, we think that the best way of analyzing how regionalism interacts with other structuring features of the world system is to look at how actors use these different realities simultaneously.
Naturally, our first category of actors is states. Nation-states have always been recognized as the central political actors of regional integration processes in first-generation analytical models on integration, particularly the neofunctionalist school and Leon Lindberg’s model. This category also features prominently in the most recent definitions of regionalism, which is still considered essentially a states-led project. Normally, the literature refers to state actors in general without introducing distinctions between categories of states.
We feel that the state actor in an integration process must be conceptualized differently, more precisely. Depending on their size, weight, and capacity, states behave differently and do not have the same impact on the evolution of the integration process. As W. Andrew Axline has pointed out, there are at least two categories of states in a regionalist project: the large states (the “makers”) and the small states (the “takers”). In general, the small states, precisely because of their limited resources, cannot hope to have a significant impact on the integration process, and their options are limited. Sometimes their only choice is whether or not to participate in the process, as illustrated by the case of Paraguay and Uruguay in the Mercosur project. Although the analysis of the strategies of small states in relation to hemispheric regionalism is far from uninteresting, space limits have precluded us from examining their behavior in this book.
Our focus is on large states, particularly the United States and Brazil, whose strategies and actions reflect the power relationship in the context of continental integration. As an American and world hegemony, the United States is central to the success or failure of hemispheric regionalism, so much so that we felt it necessary to dedicate two chapters of the book to the United States. Chapter 5 focuses on Washington’s foreign policy toward the Americas, and Chapter 6 examines the role of Congress, which is significant in the formulation of foreign policy, particularly foreign economic policy (Brewer and Teitelbaum 1997: 115–137; Mastanduno et al. 1988). The role of Brazil is examined in Chapter 7.
But large and small states are not the only categories of state actors, either in general or in the specific context of inter-American affairs. There are medium-sized states whose power base and diplomatic skills give them greater room to maneuver than smaller states may have. These states are an interesting study because the options available to them are more diverse and because they have the potential, individually or collectively, to influence regional outcomes. Chapter 8 takes a closer look at these states through a comparative analysis of Argentina, Canada, and Mexico.
Alongside the nation-states is a second category of actors: regional institutions. They are at the heart of Lindberg’s model as applied to the European integration process in which both the Commission of the European Communities and the European Parliament are strategic in policy formulation and as a regional decisionmaking apparatus. But policy formulation and decisionmaking are carried out by regional organizations only in the more structured or advanced integration processes such as the European Union or the former Andean Group. In most regionalist projects, regional institutions essentially play two roles. They serve as a forum wherein issues are raised and discussed by states in order to arrive at a consensus on which collective action can develop. Regional institutions can also intervene as active participants in their own right when proposing courses of action, defining norms, or implementing collective decisions. In both instances, their role is complex because they are often subjected to opposing points of view and divergent demands. How they cope with the situation may significantly influence the evolution of the integration process, because whether or not support is given to other categories of actors may determine specific outcomes and, more generally, the regional project itself. An examination of the role of regional institutions is therefore an important part of the study of regionalism. In the context of hemispheric regionalism, the Organization of American States is a central regional institution and the subject of Chapter 9.
The third important category of actors in the context of regionalism is what is now called civil society. This term refers to the myriad of subnational actors who, from corporate businesses to labor unions to women’s associations, form an extremely diverse collectivity. Quite different in nature, organization, and objectives, these actors can influence the evolution of the integration process as they support or oppose the ideas, proposals, and actions of the other two categories of actors. They do so by acting individually or collectively and by selecting channels of intervention in national settings or at the regional level. For example, they may include an Argentinian business firm that pressures its government to approve or oppose a specific proposal related to continental free trade or a loose regional grouping of aboriginal associations supporting or opposing OAS behavior in the area of human rights or health programs.
Among the many subnational actors involved in hemispheric regionalism, the decision to focus on Latin American businesses in Chapter 10 and new social movements in Chapter 11 seemed particularly appropriate in the sense that both subjects are on opposite ends of a continuum: Business is among the oldest and best-organized subnational actors in the context of integration in the Americas, whereas new social movements represent a more recent and, up to now, less structured type of interlocutor.
The first part of this book traces the contours of hemispheric regionalism as it is currently unfolding and situates the project in its immediate environment, in a sense, the situation within which actors must operate. After a presentation of the nature and scope of existing initiatives of hemispheric regionalism in Chapter 2, the focus of Chapter 3 turns toward the structural contexts conditioning the integration process. Then Chapter 4 presents a comparative analysis of integration models as represented by NAFTA and Mercosur. This is a logical end point for the first part of the book, since our observations lead us to the conclusion that hemispheric regionalism, in its current form, rests on two nuclei: NAFTA and Mercosur. Whether they come together or move apart will determine the future of continental integration.
In the second part of the book, attention is drawn to the strategies and actions of our three categories of actors. On the basis of the analyses conducted on our selection of actors, we draw conclusions regarding the current state of hemispheric regionalism and its prospects for the near future.
Endnotes
Note 1: A sample would include the following:
The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end-result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones. (Haas 1958: 16)
By integration we mean the attainment within a territory of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “a long time,” dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its populations. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5)
Political integration will be defined as a process, but without reference to an end point. In specific terms, political integration is (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center. (Lindberg 1963: 6)
I will use “regionalism”... to mean a set of policies by one or more states designed to promote the emergence of a cohesive regional unit, which dominates the pattern of relations between the states of that region and the rest of the world, and which forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues. (Hurrell 1992: 123)
There are four levels of political integration.... Institutional integration occurs when states agree to engage in collective decision-making and develop institutions which formulate and implement the required rules and regulations.... Policy integration concerns the transfer of policy to a higher level of government onto a jointly-managed or coordinated level of policymaking and implementation.... Attitudinal integration assesses public support for integration at the state level.... Security integration is evident when there is a commitment and expectation among states of nonviolent relations. (Rogers 1995: 17–18)
The new regionalism can be defined as a multidimensional process of regional integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects. It is a package rather than a single policy. Whether concerned with economics or foreign policy. (Hettne 1994: 11)
Formally speaking, we define economic integration as a series of voluntary decisions by previously sovereign states to remove barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital, or persons.... Integration is not the same as intergovernmental cooperation.... Integration entails the creation of a new entity... that provides a recognized framework for accommodation among member states on issues relating to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital, or persons.... Intergovernmental cooperation, on the other hand, results from ad hoc bargaining between sovereign states; it does not necessarily occur within a framework of long-term expectations, convergent interests, and shared benefits. (P. Smith 1993b: 4–5)
The authors of this book... adopt an approach which... conceives of regionalism as a state-led or states-led project designed to reorganise a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines. (Payne and Gamble 1996: 2)Back.
Note 2: Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale. Back.
Note 3: Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Back.
Note 4: Communauté des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Back.
Note 5: Modified in 1980 to become the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración. Back.
Note 6: Sistema Económico Latinoamericano. Back.
Note 7: For an overview of these factors as they relate to the major American countries, see the contributions in Mace and Thérien (1996b). Back.
Note 8: See also the Fall 1970 special issue of International Organization, considered by many as the testament of this special group of dynamic and dedicated regional integration scholars who then moved on to other fields of inquiry. Back.
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