From G7 to G8: The Role Of The Summit

From G7 To G8:
Evolution, Role and Documentation of a Unique Institution

Peter I. Hajnal

April 1998

The Role Of The Summit

Perhaps the central role of the G7, according to Kirton, is "to create consensus among its members, at the highest political level, on the major global issues of the moment. It does so ... through the G7 's deliberative function of forcing the leaders to get acquainted, listen and learn about one another's national constraints, priorities and goals ... [leading] to effective ongoing relationships ... [;] the directional function of setting the agenda [and] defining the priorities ... [and] the decisional function of reaching concrete agreements on specific subjects ... ₅₅ Merlini, in contrast, holds that "[t]he summit is not a decision-making forum ... . [It] does not play; it conducts the orchestra, interpreting the score, assigning the instruments and giving the starting note. " ₅₆

Joe Clark, a prominent former summit participant (first as prime minister and later as external affairs minister of Canada) remarks that

summits are extremely constructive. They focus the attention of governments and leaders and often allow breakthroughs that would not occur in the more cumbersome traditional system. Precisely because heads of government are so busy now, they can become locked into patterns of dealing only with the most urgent issues and the most familiar allies. Summits free leaders of those patterns and allow both a wider experience of international issues and a real opportunity for initiative and cooperation. They rescue multilateralism from its inherent bureaucracy and caution. ₅₇

A study by the Atlantic Council highlights the G7 function "to link together political, economic and security issues which might otherwise be dealt with in highly compartmentalized contexts, without any overall strategy or set of objectives. " ₅₈₅ Hisashi Owada distinguishes three major purposes of the summit: "[p]olicy convergence through the process of an exchange of views and discussion ...; [p]olicy cooperation through the process of agreeing to a common strategy ...; [and p]olicy coordination through the process of concerted action undertaken ... . ₅₉₅

Kirton's endorses the G7 with special enthusiasm:

the G7 possesses a decisive advantage over the competing United Nations-Bretton Woods system .... [Its] ability to effectively deliberate, set policy directions for the global community, and reach and respect ambitious, timely and well tailored agreements rests on four fundamental features: concerted power ... [,] restricted participation, common purpose, and political control by democratically and popularly elected leaders. ₆₀

In a similar vein, Wendy Dobson observes that

Summit participants are quick to note two enduring values of Summits that are next to impossible to quantify. First, there is great value in leaders meeting for the purpose of getting to know one another and one another's views on current issues ... . Second, the complexity and range of issues with which leaders must deal is such that Summits provide opportunities to identify issues where cooperative action might be possible, delegate authority to analyze and respond, and provide for accountability by the delegates. In effect, Summits are less and less forums for initiatives, and more and more forums for issue identification and delegation. ₆₁

There is an additional perspective on the dynamics of the G7. The four European members--France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy--interact regularly within the EU, just as Canada and the U.S. have interacted continuously, even before the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and then the North American Free Trade Agreement. In some ways, therefore, the G7 is a forum for what is often a three-way dialogue among North America, Europe, and Japan. In fact, Bergsten and Henning--writing about the G7 finance ministers' group rather than the larger G7--express the view that "the G-7 should streamline its own membership by becoming a G-3 as soon as the progression of monetary union in Europe permits that region to be represented by a single spokesperson on macroeconomic policy. " ₆₂ Kirton echoes that possibility: "Institutionally, the prospect of EMU as an accomplished reality, with a European Central Bank, suggests the G7 may be replaced by a G3, with Canada and perhaps Britain excluded. " ₆₃ It should be added, however, that evolution along such lines is more likely to occur in the finance ministers' forum described below, rather than in the G7/G8 as a whole.

Notes:

Note 55: Kirton, "The Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, the G7 and the Halifax Summit," 66. Back.

Note 56: Merlini, "The G-7 and the Need for Reform," 22. Back.

Note 57: Joe Clark, "The PM [Prime Minister] and the SSEA �Secretary of State for External Affairs] : Comment 2," International Journal 50, No. 1 (Winter 1994/1995) , 215. Back.

Note 58: Summit Meetings and Collective Leadership in the 1980's, Charles Robinson and William C. Turner, co-chairmen; Harald B. Malmgren, rapporteur (Atlantic Council of the United States Policy Papers; Washington, D.C.: Working Group on Political Affairs, Atlantic Council of the United States, 1980), 38-39. Cited in Stefano Silvestri, "Between Globalism and Regionalism: The Role and Composition of the G-7," in The Future of the G-7 Summits, 28-29. Back.

Note 59: Hisashi Owada, "A Japanese Perspective on the Role and Future of the G-7," in The Future of the G-7 Summits, 96. Back.

Note 60: John J. Kirton, "Economic Cooperation: Summitry, Institutions, and Structural Change." Back.

Note 61: Wendy Dobson, "Summitry and the International Monetary System: The Past as Prologue," Canadian Foreign Policy 3, No. (Spring 1995): 6. Back.

Note 62: Bergsten and Henning, Global Economic Leadership and the Group of Seven, 139-40. Back.

Note 63: John J. Kirton, "Economic Cooperation: Summitry, Institutions, and Structural Change." Back.