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Final Report With Executive Summary
Carnegie Corporation of New York
1997
3. Operational Prevention
Strategies in the Face of Crisis
Realistic prospects often exist to prevent or curtail violence. In Rwanda, for example, there were at least two opportunities for the international community to exert influence to prevent the disaster. The first came during the months preceding the genocide. As the Arusha Accords were being negotiated, decision makers in the major capitals were warned repeatedly in public and private forums that the Hutu extremists were preparing to unleash a campaign of massive violence against the Tutsi minority. But countries in the region and the wider international community took no action to forestall such preparations. The second opportunity came when the violence began to flare in Kigali. Yet again, the international community failed to respond to calls from the UN secretary-general for the deployment of a military force to stop the bloodshed. 1
In contrast, violence has been averted in several countries because opportunities were seized by the international community. The UN Security Council took the remarkable step in 1992 of deploying the first-ever preventive peacekeeping force in Macedonia to stem spreading violence in the Balkans.
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In Guatemala in 1993, the Organization of American States (OAS) quickly supported institutions of civil society to resist successfully the disruption of constitutional government by President Jorge Serrano.
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The same year, the OAU intervened to protect a fragile democratic process in the Republic of Congo.
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Regrettably, by 1997 the round of violence that began with the Rwandan genocide had spread across central Africa, and a resurgent local conflict in Congo overwhelmed the diplomatic efforts of the OAU and the UN. The fighting in Congo illustrates the recurring nature of the prevention challenge, especially in a region where bullets can still trump ballots and overthrow a fragile democracy.
This chapter discusses operational prevention, that is, strategies and tactics undertaken when violence appears imminent. The responsibility for taking these measures falls both to those closest to an unfolding crisis and also to those more removed. Since the parties in a crisis often cannot find nonviolent solutions on their own, the help of outsiders is, in many instances, necessary. It is of vital importance, however, that the economic, military, or diplomatic action and policies of outsiders avoid exacerbating dangerous situations. Even well-intentioned efforts, if not carefully planned, can have adverse effects.
This chapter lays out a framework for such involvement and discusses the various measures that can be used to avoid imminent violence:
Although this chapter is primarily focused on and will draw on many examples from intrastate disputes, all these measures can be used whether a crisis occurs within a state or between states. In both cases, successful operational prevention involves shared efforts, with the actions and responsibilities of national leaders linked to help as and where needed from other governments, international organizations, and the national and international nongovernmental sector.
Operational prevention relies on early engagement deliberately designed to help create conditions in which responsible leaders can resolve the problems giving rise to a crisis. It involves four key elements that, while not a guarantee of success, certainly increase its prospects: 1) a lead player—an international organization, country, or even prominent individual around which or whom preventive efforts can mobilize; 2) a coherent political-military approach to the engagement designed to arrest the violence, address the humanitarian needs of the situation, and integrate all political and military aspects of the problem; 3) adequate resources to support the preventive engagement; and, particularly applicable to intrastate conflict, 4) a plan for the restoration of host country authority. 5
These elements provide a framework for applying various preventive political, economic, social, and military measures. These steps may not be sufficient, in themselves, to head off violence indefinitely, but they can help open up the political space and time necessary to pursue other means to resolve the dispute. 6 The following discussion explores this framework and many of the measures the Commission believes can be used to prevent the emergence of mass violence.
The Need for Leadership
Governments, international organizations, and even nongovernmental agencies or prominent individuals can provide the necessary leadership around which preventive efforts can mobilize. Effective leadership derives from a special relationship or capacity that makes an organization, a government, or an agency the logical focal point for rallying the help of the international community. To cite but two examples, U.S. leadership in the Gulf War, supported strongly by UN Security Council resolutions, was critical in maintaining unity within a diverse coalition of nations, 7 and in the early 1990s, the UN led an ambitious international peace initiative in Cambodia. 8 In most cases, the active support of the members of the UN Security Council—especially the permanent members—is important to success.
For a number of crisis responses, the absence of international leadership has given them a random quality that inevitably reduces their individual and collective effectiveness. A major evaluation of emergency assistance to Rwanda, for example, concluded that "the Rwanda crisis has been characterized by the lack of a coordinated political strategy within the international community for 'managing' the crisis." 9 Thus, even when much is done to attend to the short-term humanitarian needs generated by conflict, frequently a good deal of "wheel-spinning" occurs; little headway is made in reducing basic tensions or containing the spread of violence. With a leader to help shape a constructive effort and maintain political support, these problems can be avoided.
A Comprehensive Political-Military Response
Preventive responses must seek not only to reduce the potential for violence, but also to create the basic conditions to encourage moderation and make responsible political control possible. In the acute phase of a crisis, assertive efforts may be necessary to deny belligerents weapons and ammunition, and these military steps may very well need to be complemented by economic steps to deny access to the hard currency necessary to procure weapons and pay combatants (steps that themselves demand that outsiders refrain from providing weapons, funds, and other resources to factions in conflict). In addition, humanitarian assistance will usually be needed to help noncombatant victims of the crisis, and such assistance must be carried on in close coordination with the other political, military, and economic programs under way. This is easier said than done, however, as belligerents now frequently try to deny the provision of food and other humanitarian assistance to gain an advantage in the conflict. 10
An integrated response should bring together the efforts of governments, international organizations, NGOs, and private relief agencies. It should also coordinate the efforts of outside parties with those of the responsible leadership on the ground.
Well before civil strife or other sources of crisis yield high levels of violence, they will generate refugees and displaced persons who need emergency humanitarian assistance. A number of states, international agencies, and private sector groups routinely provide for these needs. A serious question surrounds how to provide that assistance in ways that do not exacerbate or prolong the crisis or lead to permanent displacement of large numbers of people. To meet this challenge, humanitarian assistance groups, often led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have begun to expand the boundaries of their operations, both in time and in scope. 11
UNHCR and other relief agencies have become more vocal and active in identifying and addressing dangerous circumstances before they generate large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. 12 In May 1996, for example, in an effort to reduce the potential for massive population movements, UNHCR cosponsored a conference with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to address the problem of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement, and returnees in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The conference sought to devise an integrated strategy that would enable the countries of the CIS to prevent further population displacement, and a major conclusion of this gathering was that the effects of massive population migration reverberate well beyond the locales where the crises occur. Entire regions are affected, and often the entire international community is called upon to help deal with these situations. 13
In part because of the changing nature of post-Cold War crises, UNHCR has broadened its approach to relief, moving well beyond its traditional mandate to provide essential food, medicines, shelter, and refugee protection. It now also emphasizes the importance of rebuilding and strengthening a sense of community through strategies that give priority to more permanent shelter, education, and women's initiatives. 14 Similarly, CARE USA has launched new programs on girls' education, family planning, and microenterprise. 15 Measures such as these can be valuable complements to governmental efforts to find a political solution to a crisis, but they cannot substitute for such efforts.
Resources
As a crisis escalates, and even as efforts begin to help defuse its effects, political rhetoric to mobilize preventive efforts often outpaces the flow of resources, which consists of cash and contributions "in kind" by governments, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and global NGOs such as CARE and Oxfam. 16 Significant resources also come from many smaller humanitarian organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, and other private sector agencies. While these nongovernmental and private sector organizations may not play leading roles in either mobilizing the overall international response to a crisis or in developing the overall plan of engagement, their services and resources are vital to the larger effort and should be systematically integrated into the overall approach. This report takes up the role of these important actors in chapter 5.
Transition to Host Nation Control
The international response to a potentially explosive intrastate situation must, from its outset, plan for the full restoration of authority and responsibility to the leaders of the country in crisis. The participation of community and national leaders in all aspects of the international response helps allay fears regarding the motives of outside parties, and a plan to restore local authority also reassures outsiders that their job will come to an end. While many governments may be willing to help in a crisis, few if any are willing to stay indefinitely. Competing domestic demands and other international concerns drastically restrict even a willing government's ability to engage in a costly international effort over the long term. 
In fact, it is becoming clear that many of the permanent members on the UN Security Council are simply reluctant to become involved at all in situations that appear intractable and by any measure costly.
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Even traditionally active countries have limits. Canada's decision in 1993 to withdraw from UNFICYP—the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus—ended its commitment of nearly 30 years.
The Commission believes that the primary responsibility to avoid the reemergence of violence once peace has been achieved belongs to the people and their legitimate leaders; they must resume complete responsibility for their own affairs at the earliest opportunity. In rebuilding violence-torn societies, women, usually the majority of the surviving population, must be involved in all decision making and implementation.
These elements form a framework for operational prevention, and within this framework a number of specific measures can be applied. The first critical task in prevention is to determine where and when the most disastrous conflicts and confrontations are likely to occur. The capacity to anticipate and analyze possible conflicts is a prerequisite both for any prudent decision to act and for effective action itself.
Early Warning and Early Response
To repeat, the circumstances that give rise to violent conflict can usually be foreseen. 18 This was certainly true of violence in Bosnia in 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994. Ample warning of the deteriorating circumstances was available in both cases—in the open media and through government intelligence information channels. It is not plausible for governments to claim that there was a lack of timely warning of crises on such a scale as these. This argument is simply unconvincing in an age when major governments operate extensive, sophisticated early warning and intelligence networks worldwide. These governments, as well as the major regional players, often do know about incipient catastrophes, and in most cases they have a sense of what should, and could, be done to reduce the chance of catastrophe.
What Kind of Warning Is Most Useful?
Because dangerous circumstances rarely degenerate without warning into violence, what is needed is not simply more information, but rather the right kind of information and a reliable interpretation of its meaning. Every major government maintains an active watch over the world's "hotspots," and many have developed capabilities to track and predict developing trends (see Box 3.1).
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Yet even practical early warning will not ensure successful preventive action unless there is a fundamental change of attitude by governments and international organizations. A systematic and practical early warning system should be combined with consistently updated contingency plans for preventive action. This would be a radical advance on the present system where, when a trigger event sets off an explosion of violence, it is usually too difficult, too costly, and too late for a rapid and effective response.
Thus, in addition to the relatively easy identification of major hotspots and checklists of problem conditions, policymakers also need specific knowledge of the major elements of destabilization and the way in which they are likely to coalesce to precipitate an outbreak of violence. For effective preventive action, however, an additional step is necessary. Policymakers need to identify the issues, factors, and conditions that will encourage and sustain local solutions, an effort that may very well involve providing support for "responsible" or "moderate" leaders. But two cautions are in order. First, if outsiders back these moderate leaders with too heavy a hand, the solutions arrived at will be seen as illegitimate and not sufficiently "local." Second, "moderate" in these circumstances is often relative and ephemeral. Today's moderate leader could prove to be increasingly extreme as time passes and circumstances change.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these observations. First, during the early stages of a crisis, policymakers should not only be attentive to how circumstances could worsen, but also be alert for opportunities to make constructive use of local issues and processes that could help avoid violence. Second, they should exercise great care as to whom they support and how that support is offered.
Big events are often triggered by small incidents, but seldom by small causes. By 1994 it was well known that Rwanda was one of the poorest countries in Africa and that its economy was heavily dependent on coffee. When the International Coffee Agreement collapsed in 1987 and the price of coffee fell to half its 1980 value, knowledgeable people knew that it would have a particularly damaging effect on what was an already ethnically charged situation. This situation was dramatically polarized by the October 1990 RPF invasion. By the same token, while it was not possible to predict precisely that a plane crash involving the death of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi would precipitate the slaughter of nearly one million people, there were many earlier indications of the likelihood of genocide in Rwanda. Yet in 1994, no effective plan for preventive action was in place for decisive Security Council action.
Many policymakers point to the impossibility of reliably predicting the "trigger" as an important reason for the failure to act. Yet the claim to need advance knowledge of precise "triggers" is undermined by actions that states sometimes take without a trigger. In
1992, the Bush administration mounted a much needed humanitarian operation in Somalia, not in response to any particular event on the ground, but rather in response to an awareness that 1,000 people per day were dying and the increasing public sense within the United States that something needed to be done to deal with the growing number of crises around the world. 19
Who Can Best Provide Useful Early Warning?
Governments, international organizations, NGOs, business enterprises, religious leaders, scientific groups, the media, and even the public at large all have, in their different ways, a capacity for early warning. Governments, of course, have already developed procedures and systems to keep themselves abreast of the essential information necessary to operate in dangerous circumstances. But many of these other groups and agencies also have a capacity to warn.
NGOs, for example, are often the first to be aware of and to act in crisis areas, and they have a wealth of information regarding the conditions and grievances that give rise to violence. (Indeed, the disruption of normal NGO operations is itself an early warning signal that conditions are deteriorating dangerously, a signal that governments often miss.) In Cambodia, for instance, while outside links with leaders were largely nonexistent throughout the 1980s, NGOs maintained a presence in much of the country and provided a rich source of information from which the international community was able to draw.
There are, of course, problems involved when humanitarian and other nongovernmental and private sector groups take on an increased information and early warning role. The information these groups provide is not always accurate or balanced. Many conflicts today occur in relatively remote regions where accurate information about the competing sides and their partisans is hard to come by, which makes it difficult to form a valid picture of the overall situation. Moreover, humanitarian groups, business enterprises, and religious institutions that operate regularly within or near crisis areas develop their own agendas that often do not conform to those of governments, the parties to the dispute, or outsiders. Thus, what might appear to one group as an unambiguous opportunity for action may be seen as the opposite by another. In addition, humanitarian and other groups are understandably reluctant to provide information that can be used to undermine one or another of the parties and generate allegations of spying and heightened dangers for their field staff. 20 Episodes of kidnapped or murdered aid workers send a chilling message that they are no longer immune from the very violence they seek to end.
Governments and international organizations are ultimately best suited to alert the broader international community to a coming crisis and to assess the validity of the information available from other sources. But they seldom do so; there are no mechanisms in place for governments or the decision-making bodies of the major regional organizations to acquire systematically the information that international and national NGOs, religious leaders and institutions, the business community, or other elements of civil society have accumulated from years of involvement. Moreover, few habits and practices have been developed to encourage such an exchange. There are signs that this may be changing, however. In a major report on UN reform issued in July 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized the importance of NGOs and other elements of civil society and acknowledged the essential contribution they make to UN operations. 21
Who Should Be Warned?
While the answer to this question may seem obvious, it poses a legitimate challenge to proponents of early preventive action. Logically, early warning should be given first to those who can take constructive action. This generally means governments and groups likely to be immediately involved in the crisis, governments and leaders nearest to the scene of conflict, the United Nations (particularly the UN Security Council), and regional organizations. Religious organizations may also be warned, particularly of situations in which local religious leaders and institutions could play positive roles or in which they are playing a particularly unhelpful role of exacerbating tensions.
In addition, those who can induce governments, organizations, and agencies to act (e.g., media organizations, business communities, NGOs, concerned publics) should be kept informed. The role of an informed public may be especially important because public expectations can be a significant factor in motivating governments to act. Attentive, expert, and activist communities in many countries often know about problems before they become desperate and can encourage governments to take positive and timely action.
Before even a rudimentary strategy for preventive action can be developed, however, the weak links in the warning-response chain must be strengthened. Four problems in particular are noteworthy. First, the difficulty is not in identifying potential trouble spots, but rather in understanding situations well enough to map their trends and forecast which ones are likely to explode and when. Second is the related problem of unjustified or premature warning which gives rise to a "cry wolf" reaction among policymakers. The fear that actions taken may prove to have been premature or unnecessary may, in many instances, be stronger than the fear that inaction may allow a crisis situation to explode. Third, those in a position to take early action often find themselves overwhelmed by other pressures and crises. Attention to what are considered relatively distant, merely potential problems is considered a luxury they cannot afford. Finally, while decision makers may take a crisis very seriously, a reluctance to act in the face of warning may arise because they are deterred by the prospects of a slippery slope of increasing involvement in the crisis. These problems make the task of formulating a response to a crisis difficult. But they do not relieve governments of the need to respond to the increasing expectations their citizens have that something will be done to deal with the unfolding events.
In sum, it is difficult for major governments to claim that they did not know that violence on the scale of a Rwanda or Bosnia could happen. Similarly, it is implausible for such governments, especially in the larger, more powerful and wealthy states, to claim that nothing could be done to avert such crises. Increasingly, they are being held accountable not only for "What did they know and when did they know it?" but also for "What could they have done and when should they have done it?" To prevent deadly conflict, the problem is less one of early warning than of early action. As a first step, diplomatic engagement can help overcome this problem.
Simply knowing about a developing crisis is not enough. As a minimum step to arrest potential violence and to address humanitarian needs—but without precipitating unwanted and indefinite involvements in remote crises—governments should explore the possibilities of expanded frontline preventive diplomacy by using ambassadors, senior foreign office officials, and personal envoys of the UN secretary-general. 22 When crisis threatens, traditional diplomacy continues, but more urgent efforts are also made—through bilateral, multilateral, and unofficial channels—to pressure, cajole, arbitrate, mediate, or lend "good offices" to encourage dialogue and facilitate a nonviolent resolution of the crisis.
Of special importance is the need to strengthen the secretary-general's capacity for preventive diplomacy. It was with this in mind that Norway in 1996 initiated a Fund for Preventive Action to increase the capacity of the secretary-general to act quickly and effectively when early action is required. 23 This report makes a number of recommendations regarding ways to strengthen the Office of the Secretary-General in chapter 6.
Preventive diplomacy must overcome several obstacles. One of the greatest challenges is suspicion of the motives of those who would practice it. Another is the charge that much of this is really little more than traditional diplomacy—statecraft and foreign policy that have long been composed largely of diplomatic and political efforts to forestall undesirable events. A key difference today, however, is that diplomats and politicians need to find ways to cope with crises anywhere in the world and within states as well as between them, not only because these crises are tragic in themselves, but also because they are increasingly costly for neighboring countries and many countries beyond.
Therefore, diplomacy today is tied, perhaps as never before, to a complex web of economic and social relationships that span the globe. The diplomat's job is at once easier and harder. It is easier because states and peoples relate to each other in multiple dimensions at all levels of society, and the welter of contacts may enhance mutual understanding and help establish wider bases for cooperation. The job is harder, in part, because nonstate actors are increasingly important in international relations and often operate beyond diplomats' reach. One result is that it is now effectively impossible to isolate a state from the international system, and this fact makes it easier for targeted states to deflect pressure. Nevertheless, in deteriorating circumstances, a number of diplomatic steps may help manage the crisis successfully and prevent the emergence of violence.
First, states should resist the traditional urge to suspend diplomatic relations as a substitute for action and instead maintain open, high-fidelity lines of communication with leaders and groups in crisis. It may be counterproductive to deny governments an important means of managing a problem precisely at a time when reliable firsthand information is essential.
Second, governments and international organizations must express in a clear and compelling way the interests in jeopardy. This step is essential to help mobilize support for preventive action, and it is especially important should it prove necessary later—as is often the case—to use more assertive measures to draw clear lines against unacceptable behavior.
Decision makers often run into domestic difficulties when they contemplate more assertive measures to deal with a crisis, in large measure because they have not laid the groundwork at home to prepare their parliaments or legislatures and publics for such steps. It is essential to articulate clearly, early, and repeatedly the national interests involved in engaging constructively to prevent a worsening of the crisis. This preparation can include providing information about the developing crisis; offering regular explanations of how national interests are served through preventive engagement; initiating and supporting public dialogue on the broad options available for dealing with the crisis; and developing a decisive strategy to manage the situation.
Third, the crisis should be put on the agenda of the UN Security Council or of the relevant international organization, or both, early enough to permit preventive action. At the same time, a means should be established to track developments in the crisis to provide regular updates. In addition, as mentioned earlier, a mechanism should be established to incorporate information from NGOs and other nongovernmental actors to augment Security Council deliberations on unfolding events. 24 Exposing brewing crises in these ways helps to illustrate the broader context—and perhaps higher stakes—of the crises. It also demonstrates to concerned publics that serious efforts are under way to resolve the problems. 25
Fourth, whatever the case for broadening the multilateral context of an unfolding crisis, governments should be attentive to opportunities to support quiet diplomacy and dialogue with and between moderate leaders in the crisis. Special envoys and representatives of key states or regional organizations, or on behalf of the UN, have time and again demonstrated their value, particularly in the early stages of a crisis. In reviewing the role of "quiet diplomacy" by mediators, one scholar identified the following elements of successful negotiation: 1) sensing when conflicting parties are open to outside engagement; 2) maintaining the confidentiality of negotiations; 3) judiciously using incentives to carry negotiations through stalemates; 4) creating a deadline for agreements; 5) tackling easier issues first—with the momentum created by early agreements easing more difficult negotiations; 6) understanding the honor and symbolism that parties may ascribe to certain issues; and 7) maintaining the trust of all parties through open, honest dialogue. 26
In the fluid circumstances of the post-Cold War era, diplomatic and political strategies to avert a looming crisis demand creative ways of defusing tensions and facilitating mutual accommodation among potential belligerents. These strategies can include a serious discussion of peaceful border adjustments or revisions, new constitutional arrangements, forms of regional or cultural autonomy, or even, in unusual circumstances, partition. Potential solutions may lie in various forms of power sharing—discussed further in the next chapter—to help assure groups that their interests are not at the mercy of a simple majority, however assembled. 27
In Europe, the OSCE has developed "missions of long duration" that have been deployed to some 12 countries. The details of the mandates vary, but these missions emphasize the protection of fundamental human rights through international presence, first-hand information gathering, situation monitoring, and technical advice and assistance to host countries. These missions are usually made up of civilian and military members and have a minimum mandate of six months, although most have lasted much longer. Missions of long duration provide a virtual permanent presence on the ground and as a result are able to provide the Permanent Council, the Chairman-in-Office, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and other OSCE bodies with firsthand accounts of unfolding events. They are frequently led by senior diplomats with extensive regional expertise and practical experience in intercultural communication, negotiation, mediation, and confidence-building measures.
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Official diplomacy can be greatly strengthened by private sector activity. So-called Track Two diplomacy, long an informal staple in international negotiations and used by leaders who wanted to take informal soundings of adversaries' intentions, is increasingly the diplomacy of choice for problems beyond the reach of official efforts.
Indeed, some governments have found NGOs very useful in brokering political agreements and supplementing governmental roles. In the Middle East peace process, for example, a Norwegian research institute with its roots in the trade union movement was critical in breaking the ice and laying the groundwork for the Oslo Agreements in 1993. In Guatemala, Norwegian church organizations were instrumental in facilitating the dialogue between the parties to the conflict. In Tajikistan, a joint U.S.-Russian task force of private citizens with deep experience in conflict mediation and resolution, sponsored by the Kettering Foundation of Dayton, Ohio, had by mid-1997 brought the Tajik factions together nearly 20 times to establish a foundation for formal negotiations. Other groups in the United States and Europe that are engaged in unofficial preventive diplomacy include the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, International Alert, The Carter Center's International Negotiation Network, the International Crisis Group, the Project on Ethnic Relations (see Box 3.2), and the Conflict Management Group. These organizations have played active roles in building relationships between conflicting parties and with interested governments, training in diplomacy and conflict resolution, and providing good offices to parties that are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflict. 29
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Those well-practiced in the art of nongovernmental diplomacy (including Track Two, multitrack, and citizen diplomacy) uniformly point up the value of building trust through long-term commitments to dialogue and intergroup relations and active training programs that make aggressive use of facilitated dialogues, high technology access to ideas and people via the Internet, and cross-cultural or intergroup exchanges. In addition to the substantive progress that these efforts make in bridging the differences that often divide hostile neighbors, they generate impressive lists of "alumni" who carry their experiences back to their communities and influence them in later years when many of them assume positions of leadership. 30
In sum, a wide array of political and diplomatic steps are possible, early, to help defuse an unfolding crisis. Sometimes, however, stronger measures are called for to send a sharper message to leaders that the path they have chosen to pursue their aims is an unacceptable one.
In circumstances of incipient conflict, a number of economic measures are at the disposal of states and international organizations. Beyond sanctions, other tools such as inducements, conditionality, and the dispute resolution mechanisms of international trade organizations may help influence potential belligerents to avoid a violent course.
Sanctions
Sanctions can play an important role in support of preventive diplomacy, notwithstanding the fact that practical questions remain about governments' abilities to use them effectively. Governments use sanctions to serve three broad policy functions: to signal international concern to the offending state (and, by example, to others), to punish a state's behavior, and to serve as an important precursor to stronger actions, including, if necessary, the use of force. Sanctions are often used as a first step and as a means to signal the targeted state that more drastic action could be forthcoming if corrective steps are not taken.
In fact, sanctions regimes have been in virtually constant use in recent years, suggesting that governments view this measure as an effective means of influence. The fact that many states seem to place great store by them sharply contrasts with the general view that sanctions are cumbersome, costly, slow to produce results, a cynical gesture (to deflect pressure for stronger measures), or completely ineffective, and that sanctions also tend to penalize innocents as much as or more than culpable leaders. These difficulties are real. If sanctions are to prove more useful in preventing mass violence, their deterrent value must be strengthened. 31
States can improve their ability to use sanctions by developing national infrastructure and procedures to ensure that sanctions take effect quickly and by facilitating improved international coordination. Few countries have the necessary laws and administrative arrangements in place to impose sanctions in a timely and effective manner. Many valuable lessons in this regard were learned during the establishment of the elaborate network of sanctions assistance monitoring teams (SAMs) surrounding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia beginning in 1993. These procedures should be standardized and made available to other states, with small amounts of UN technical assistance, so that sanctions regimes can be rapidly deployed as part of a broader strategy to help prevent and resolve future conflicts. 32
The application of economic sanctions requires detailed planning, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. As sanctions regimes become increasingly complex technically, juridically, and administratively, few governments have developed corresponding legal and administrative infrastructures to guarantee the effectiveness of the process by which sanctions are imposed and monitored. Sanctions regimes require the involvement of agencies throughout government—including those responsible for foreign affairs, economic policies, legal issues, and military strategy.
A step toward building national capacities for sanctions would be to survey national structures and develop a database of operating practices and procedures. Various models of national sanctions legislation and structures could be identified, so that when a new regime is mandated by the Security Council, it can be implemented quickly. Standard guidelines for creating and maintaining national monitoring and enforcement measures might also be devised. As with the case of SAMs in the former Yugoslavia, the UN and concerned governments have demonstrated that they can cooperate to develop the necessary local infrastructure to implement effective sanctions. 33
Sanctions should be part of a broader influence strategy that puts maximum political and economic pressure as precisely as possible on the offending parties—preferably regimes or specific leaders, rather than whole populations. Sanctions regimes, if they are focused on commodities exclusively, must be swiftly and comprehensively imposed to be most effective. Graduated, piecemeal approaches are unlikely to work. 34 Sanctions regimes should be supported, where necessary, with the forceful measures suitable to ensure compliance and demonstrate resolve. Diplomatic and other political communications should be clear on the behavior necessary for sanctions to be lifted and, where possible, accompanied by an incentive package to comply. Public information outlets at home and abroad should convey these same messages.
Such a comprehensive view of sanctions means identifying in each case the measures and approaches most likely to affect the leaders and decision makers who are being targeted. Greater international cooperation will be required to achieve these aims and minimize loopholes. Sustained and skillful efforts are needed to produce the diplomatic consensus required to ensure both the legitimacy and effectiveness of sanctions.
Sanctions are sometimes imposed for lack of better alternatives and without much expectation of effectiveness. Indeed, sanctions often seem to exact a price from the target state—usually at the expense of the most vulnerable sectors of the population—without effecting a change in the target government's behavior. The Commission believes that sanctions would be more effective if outside governments communicated more explicitly to the target state's leaders the future consequences of their actions. To do this, detailed knowledge of a potential target state and its economy is necessary.
International corporations often have an extremely good understanding of what economic levers can influence governments. As foreign direct investment and international trade have expanded in recent years, the international business community has become increasingly knowledgeable about the conditions that could lead to international pressure to use sanctions, the likely impact of sanctions, and ways to make them more effective. 35 Unfortunately, consultation between policymakers and international business leaders has been limited. While, in part, this can be attributed to a divergence of interests over the use of economic sanctions, much of it can also be ascribed to weak channels of communication. Recent steps to improve cooperation include discussion of a possible UN international business advisory group on sanctions and several private sector initiatives aimed at minimizing economic disruption caused by sanctions. 36
States that impose sanctions should also take steps in accordance with Article 50 of the UN Charter to reduce unwanted or undesirable effects and minimize the privation and suffering of innocent civilians and the economic losses often suffered by neighboring countries. 37 One way, as noted above, is to impose commodities sanctions regimes swiftly and comprehensively in order to achieve maximum effect and thereby help reduce the time such regimes must be in place.
The UN is indispensable to mandating and implementing sanctions, but the Commission also recognizes the potential preventive value of informal measures undertaken by neighboring states or other regional arrangements. Such informal moves can often be implemented quickly, sending a clear signal that unacceptable behavior has generated this response.
But even sharper measures are possible. "Targeted" sanctions offer a way to focus the penalty more directly on those most responsible for the crisis. Such "targeted" sanctions include freezing leaders' personal assets, or denying them access to hard currency. In this regard, financial information can be shared among cooperating nations to identify and restrict the cash flows of leaders who threaten to use violence. While these leaders may still be able to hide assets, they would have great difficulty using them without being detected. Restricting their access to hard currency can limit their ability to keep arms and ammunition flowing and can also jeopardize their hold on power.
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The Commission recognizes that targeted sanctions are extremely intrusive and set a stark precedent for dealing with ruthless behavior. Such sanctions therefore must be subjected to strict scrutiny and fully vetted by international deliberative bodies to establish a legal justification and basis for their imposition before they are used.
Although the Commission sees much promise in the use of economic sanctions as a tool for preventing violence, it recognizes that sanctions mandated by the UN since 1990 have lasted longer, and been less effective and more costly than their proponents had originally hoped. Obviously, much needs to be done to improve them. To begin, sanctions must be considered in the context of a broader influence strategy. Such a strategy would take account of the target state's vulnerabilities and the role of neighboring states and regional arrangements. It would require developing a legal justification and a framework for imposing sanctions and monitoring their implementation. It would also require specifying the steps by the target state that would avoid sanctions or cause them to be lifted.
Inducements
Although there has been much research on the use of economic sanctions in international relations, there has been far less work on the role of political or economic inducements—the use of "carrots" instead of or in addition to "sticks"—to influence other leaders and states. 39 Yet in practice, inducements are very often an integral part of diplomacy. They could have greater preventive potential if they were better understood. 40
Essentially, the inducement process involves the granting of a political or economic benefit in exchange for a specified policy adjustment. Inducement policies strive to make cooperation and conciliation more appealing than aggression and hostility. Examples of inducements include: favorable trade terms, tariff reductions, direct purchases, subsidies for exports or imports, economic and military aid, favorable taxation, granting access to advanced technology, military cooperation, and the many benefits that accrue to members in good standing in international organizations. Often policymakers juggle a variety of political, military, and economic elements as part of an overall package of inducements.
A study sponsored by the Commission concludes that inducements are most effective when used early and that they are especially influential when used against the backdrop of sanctions—where benefits of cooperation can be weighed against stark punishments for pursuing a course of violent action. 41 The proportion of these positive and negative approaches to be applied in a particular situation depends on the nature of the problem and the objectives being served. While inducement strategies are preferable for laying a groundwork for peace and cooperation and preventing the initial outbreak of violence, coercive measures may be more appropriate and effective when unacceptable behavior is clearly indicated. Here too, however, careful consideration of the political and economic needs of the target state can assist the international community in devising a balance between positive and negative approaches (see Box 3.3).
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While inducements are not appropriate in every setting and may be considered appeasement if employed in the face of overt military aggression, they can have significant advantages over punitive approaches. Conciliatory gestures frequently lead to cooperative responses, while threats often initiate spirals of hostility and defiance. 42 If such lessons are applied to preventive action and new ways are created to use inducements judiciously, chances can be improved that a violent outbreak might be averted.
Conditionality
One particularly potent inducement for effective preventive action may be "conditionality," or the forging of links between responsible, nonviolent behavior and the promise of greater reward through growing integration into the community of market democracies. Increasingly, through bilateral programs and through pressure on the international financial institutions, states are attaching good governance conditions to the development assistance provided to emerging economies. In several countries, for example, Malawi and Kenya, bilateral and international financial aid was suspended for a time in an effort to promote democratization. 43 Associating assistance with responsible governance in this way may give the international community a powerful source of leverage with those who persistently use violent means to pursue their aims, provided that such policies are applied with consistency in similar situations.
States that attach conditions to their aid are not themselves above scrutiny, however. The potential leverage of conditionality is diminished when donor states demand higher standards of behavior than they themselves are prepared to observe. No longer can established, wealthy states simply dictate behavior to the less powerful. Consistent standards must be devised that apply to all states equitably. Perhaps nowhere is this kind of reciprocal accountability in greater evidence than on questions related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination. So-called threshold states are unwilling to sign up to rules and regimes for managing the problem of nuclear proliferation until they are satisfied that future arrangements will apply with equal force and effect to the existing nuclear states.
Economic Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Every major international trade organization has mechanisms to help broker disputes that may arise among members, and members commit themselves to pursue their grievances through these organizational processes and to be bound by their findings. The dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is typical: following the identification of a grievance, a panel of experts may be assembled to rule on the merits. If found in violation, an offending party is required to bring its policies or practices into compliance within a reasonable period of time or face a damage judgment. If corrective action is not taken, the aggrieved party may retaliate by raising duties. Decisions may be appealed, and uncorrected behavior can lead to more serious measures, such as sanctions or expulsion from the organization. 44
Other organizations, arrangements, and agreements, such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), and the Bank for International Settlements, all have dispute resolution mechanisms that may be activated to reduce points of friction among members. Because these mechanisms are designed to work between governments, however, they are less suitable for brokering internal economic disputes, and governments do not appear uniformly eager to invite outside engagement on such matters. Nevertheless, some similar mechanisms may be adaptable for use by governments in their internal affairs, and they remain in any case important tools to help manage disputes between states. Given the great significance of economic issues in an increasingly interdependent world, the lessons learned from these mechanisms for nonviolent dispute resolution deserve closer attention (see Box 3.4).
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Notwithstanding the utility of the foregoing diplomatic and economic measures to help prevent the outbreak of mass violence, some circumstances may demand more assertive steps to limit the possibility for violence.
Basic Principles
The threat or use of forceful measures might seem at odds with the Commission's focus on prevention of deadly conflict. But situations will arise where diplomatic responses, even when supplemented by strong economic measures, are insufficient to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of major violence. The question is when, where, and how should individual nations and global and regional organizations be willing to apply forceful measures to curb incipient violence and prevent potentially much larger destruction of life and property. The Commission believes that there are three broad principles that should govern any such decision.
First, any threat or use of force must be governed by universally accepted principles, as the UN Charter requires. Decisions to use force must not be arbitrary or operate as the coercive and selectively used weapon of the strong against the weak.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter enables the Security Council to authorize any measures, including armed force—by individual states or organized groups of states—which it deems necessary to "maintain or restore international peace and security." The classic use of this peace enforcement process is in response to cross-border aggression, as in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. With the post-Cold War shift in preoccupation from international conflicts to those within state boundaries, there has been a greater willingness to apply the concept of "threat to international security" more liberally, and to see a number of internal conflicts as having this character.
Some have gone further, arguing that the UN's basic responsibility is to protect human security when it has been imperiled on a vast scale, and that this—together with the obligation of member states through the UN Charter and other instruments to protect basic human rights—may be a sufficient foundation in certain cases for forceful measures. 45 While it cannot be said that this approach has had much overt acceptance, it has been an important tacit rationale for enforcement operations in support of humanitarian objectives (as in Somalia in 1993), and it has given some encouragement to those inclined to take a broad view of what constitutes an "international" security problem.
Chapter VI of the Charter, relating to the settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, "or other peaceful means," has been the banner under which a number of military and police deployments have in fact occurred in the past. These deployments have been more for the now-traditional peacekeeping functions of monitoring, supervising, and verifying cease-fires and related agreements (as, for example, in Cyprus since 1964) than for applying force to prevent additional outbreaks of violence. It has always been accepted that a mission mandated under Chapter VI could apply force in self-defense, perhaps now extended to include "in defense of the mission," but that is as far as the authority reaches.
There is a conceptual "gray zone" between Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter in which the UN has increasingly found itself operating—the so-called "Chapter VI and a half" situation, in which the Security Council has been unwilling to give a full Chapter VII enforcement mandate (or to make available the resources to enable it to be carried out effectively), but at the same time has given military and police peacekeeping personnel tasks that require threats of force or, in extreme situations, the use of force.
Multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations—that involve not only monitoring and supervising, but also active support of humanitarian objectives and maintenance of law and order—are not new (having begun in the Congo in the early 1960s), but they have become more common since the end of the Cold War. The record of such ambiguously mandated operations has been mixed: successful enough in Cambodia and Mozambique (mainly because the enforcement role was not fully tested), but unable to prevent massacres from 1994 to 1997 in Rwanda and Zaire, as well as in 1995 in Srebrenica, Bosnia.
The message from all this is clear enough. If the UN contemplates missions in situations where the threat or use of force may be required to avert major violence, it must determine from the outset its source of authority in the Charter, specifically mandate the mission accordingly, and provide the resources needed to do the job effectively. It cannot be left for later discussion or to the commander in the field to decide whether there is some acceptable principle, in international law and practice, on which to rely when applying force: that responsibility has to be borne by the Security Council.
Second, the threat or use of force should not be regarded only as a last resort in desperate circumstances. Governments must be attentive to opportunities when demonstrations of resolve can establish clear limits to unacceptable behavior. Familiar examples of such uses of force include the deployment of military forces to areas of potential conflict and the mobilization of forces to heightened states of readiness. 46
Many thoughtful observers view the use of force only as a last resort. They believe that using forceful measures where necessary to back up diplomatic and economic steps comes dangerously close to starting down the slippery slope of entanglement, or that such steps amount to unacceptable intervention. But the Commission believes that there are acceptable ways to take firm measures early enough to prevent or limit violent conflict. To be sure, taking such steps as deploying warships or conducting fly-overs in a show of force requires a careful consideration of next steps if the measures do not have the intended effect. While this is also true of other means of influence, it is an especially important factor to consider when contemplating threats or use of force. Therefore, the use of such measures must be carefully integrated with other policy instruments, calibrated to the interests engaged, and supported by consistent political and diplomatic signals to underscore the seriousness of purpose. The aim is to use threats or actual use of force judiciously to set clear and convincing limits on unacceptable behavior.
Third, states—particularly the major powers—must accept that the threat or use of force, if it does become necessary, must be part of an integrated, ideally multilateral strategy, and used in conjunction with political and economic instruments. 47 The use of force must also be guided by prudence and responsibility. One way to achieve these aims is to institutionalize the emerging view that when employing force for preventive purposes, states should only do so with a UN Security Council resolution specifying a clear mandate that details the arrangements under which force will be used and the institutions that will be involved in the action. Consultation with other multilateral institutions or regional organizations is essential to establish the legitimacy of such a force. The effectiveness of the deployed force will depend, in part, on the perception of its legitimacy and integrity in discharging its mandate—a perception that itself will require greater confidence in the organization and, in particular, the representativeness of the Security Council (which is in much need of reform—an issue taken up in greater detail in chapter 6).
The Commission does not mean to suggest that there are no circumstances under which the unilateral use of force might be contemplated. Indeed, the Charter authorizes unilateral force in certain circumstances. For the kinds of preventive action contemplated here, however, a multilateral response should be the norm, as envisaged in the UN Charter, and a norm that should apply to large as well as small states.
There are three distinct kinds of operations where the use of force and forces—that is, military or police personnel—may have an important role in preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict: postconflict peacekeeping, preventive deployments, and "fire brigade" deployments. Only the third of these involves personnel on the ground having the mandate or capacity to apply forceful measures (other than in self-defense)—but the credibility of all three as preventive strategies depends on the perception that if peace breaks down, forceful measures to restore it may well be forthcoming.
Peacekeeping and Maintaining Civil Order
In the aftermath of cease-fires and more substantial peace settlements, traditional lightly armed peacekeeping missions can help monitor and restrain tense situations. The UN has deployed many missions of this type, including its very first peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization set up in Palestine in 1948, and troops deployed under UN auspices in Cyprus in 1963. Their primary role has been to monitor, supervise, and verify cease-fires and settlement terms.
Though mentioned nowhere in the UN Charter, peacekeeping missions have become an integral aspect of the organization's effort to maintain peace and security. These operations have been most effective when deployed in very specific circumstances where the parties to a conflict are separated along clearly demarcated boundaries and when they agree to a cease-fire and the presence of the outside forces. These missions serve several purposes, including to signal the interest and engagement of the international community, to observe and monitor relations between antagonistic parties, and to act as a deterrent against renewed fighting.
More recent UN peacekeeping operations have been multifunctional in character, with tasks extending beyond basic monitoring and supervision to involvement in maintaining law and order, infrastructure rebuilding, and assisting to reestablish effective governance. Examples of successful "expanded" peacekeeping missions include those deployed in Namibia and Cambodia. In Namibia the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), in addition to its core peacekeeping mission, negotiated the repeal of discriminatory laws, the granting of amnesty for exiles, and the release of prisoners and detainees, in addition to registering voters for elections and supervising those elections. Likewise, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) administered elections, a land-mine clearing program, and the rehabilitation of the civil administration. 48
Experience in a number of UN missions—Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, Western Sahara, and elsewhere—reflects the particular need to plan carefully and execute responsibly law-and-order operations to establish and maintain legitimate civil control. An international policing force can monitor situations of potential unrest, provide security for humanitarian operations, establish a presence through patrols and precincts to help keep tensions in check, retrain or replace problematic elements within the host country's own police force, and restrain gang or other organized criminal activities until local authorities can resume complete control. 49 Strengthening local policing capacities through international, regional, or ad hoc arrangements may reduce the necessity for military interventions. Technological innovations that permit law enforcement and military forces to use less-than-lethal means for keeping order may increase the effectiveness of their operations. 50
Policing cannot by itself ensure civil control. Good police practices are not a substitute for political systems providing alternative outlets for grievances. Success depends on the degree to which policing practices are supported (and regulated) by legitimate governmental, judicial, and penal systems underwritten by the rule of law.
"Thin Blue Line" Preventive Deployments
Until recently, peacekeeping operations—both traditional and expanded—were only used in the aftermath of conflict to help reconcile the parties and to prevent the recurrence of fighting. A new concept has now emerged with the deployment in late 1992 of a small force of troops and civilian monitors to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the objective, so far successful, of preventing the spread of hostilities from other areas of the former Yugoslavia (see Box 3.5). The essence of the strategy is a preventive military rather than diplomatic response involving the positioning of troops and related personnel on one or both sides of a border between parties in dispute to prevent escalation into armed conflict. While this is only a "thin blue line" of forces, as with classic peacekeeping, the deterrent lies in the fact that the Security Council has expressed its interest in the situation, all the relevant parties are under close international scrutiny, and there is at least an implication of willingness to take action if there is any resort to violence. 51 The success to date of the deployment in Macedonia may suggest that this measure could prove a particularly effective preventive device. One potential disadvantage, as the experience in Cyprus illustrates, is that sometimes the international community must be prepared to stay for an extended, perhaps even indefinite, period of time.
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"Fire Brigade" Deployments
Much debate has swirled around the idea of establishing a rapid reaction capability within the UN or through other regional arrangements to give the international community a means to respond quickly to an emerging crisis. Many political difficulties attach to such a capability, however, and governments have in large measure proved unwilling to take the steps necessary to establish such a force. 52
As discussed in the prologue to this report, the Commission supports the establishment of a rapid reaction force, the core of which would be made up of 5,000 to 10,000 troops from members of the Security Council. The force would also need a robust planning staff, a standing operational headquarters, training facilities, and compatible equipment.
The Commission offers two arguments for such a capability: first, the record of international crises points out the need in certain cases to respond rapidly and with force; and second, the operational integrity of such a force requires that it not be assembled in pieces or in haste. A standing force may well be a necessity for effective prevention.
Currently, the UN Security Council is ill-equipped to implement quick decisions to establish a military presence on the ground in a crisis. The political machinery and the logistical and financial structure necessary to make things happen within days does not exist. Transportation, communications, and supply functions are contracted out through a competitive, laborious, and time-consuming system. Crisis military staffing is ad hoc and drawn from standing organizations within the UN. While the UN has a military staff of about 145 officers, it is neither permitted to field a force without Security Council authorization, nor is it capable of doing so.
This lack of capacity creates genuine operational hazards. Because of the uncertainties in war and other conflict situations, military commanders desire as much clarity as possible in defining their operations. This clarity includes confirming the legitimacy of the chain of command and mobilizing adequate resources and troop strength to carry out the mission. In complex international operations, the military mission can easily be jeopardized by unclear mandates or a confused chain of command. Obviously, all uncertainty cannot be eliminated, but considerable improvements can certainly be achieved in multinational operations. The chain of command must be clear, unified, and legitimate. The existence of a standing rapid reaction capability would help ensure that these requirements are fulfilled.
In an enlarged Security Council, member states should be prepared to accept as the price of being on the Council the obligation to contribute to the deployment of a well-trained and well-equipped rapid reaction force for short-term missions. Of course, smaller countries would not be expected to make the same contribution as larger countries, and any country on the Security Council would be able to choose, for national reasons, not to deploy their forces in any particular mission. Countries not on the Security Council who wish to contribute to the rapid reaction force would be welcome to do so. The interest shown in the concept of such a force by Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and other countries is a sign that the political will exists.
It seems clear that because of its unparalleled capabilities in certain areas, the United States should be called upon to bear a large, perhaps primary, responsibility for the logistical, communications, and intelligence support, including heavy lift aircraft able to fly the force within days anywhere in the world for UN missions. This would mean that the United States would not always be expected to contribute ground troops, although at times that too may be necessary.
The Security Council should immediately establish a working group to develop the operational requirements for such a capability and make recommendations for Council decision regarding the guidelines for raising and funding such a force. The force would be under the authority of the Security Council and its deployment subject to a veto by any of the permanent members. 53
In the end, of course, the use of such a capability may mean that other efforts to forestall violence have not been effective. The foregoing discussion has illuminated measures that can help defuse a crisis that has reached an acute phase. But the question remains: What can be done to prevent crises from getting to that point to begin with? In other words, what conditions inhibit the rise of violence and how can these conditions be established and maintained? We take up these questions in our discussion of structural prevention in chapter 4.
Notes
Note 1: For an assessment of missed opportunities in Rwanda, see Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones, "Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act, or Failure of Actions Taken?," in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce Jentleson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming). Major General Romeo Dallaire stated that with a force of 5,000 trained troops and an appropriate mandate he could have prevented thousands of deaths. "Rwanda: UN Commander Says More Troops May Have Saved Lives," Inter Press Service, September 7, 1994, p. 2. Back.
Note 2: United Nations Security Council Resolution 795 (1992), adopted on December 11, 1992. Back.
Note 3: Almost immediately following Serrano's suspension of the constitution, judiciary, and legislature, a broad-based civilian movement began to mobilize. Three major democratic institutions—the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Court of Constitutionality, and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman—refused to accept the self-coup (autogolpe) and actively defied Serrano. Most of the military would not support Serrano's actions, and the media was vocal in its denunciations. Members of civil society united under the Instancia Nacional de Consenso—a representative forum which was instrumental in reversing the coup after only two weeks. Internationally, the Organization of American States offered its support to the opposition, and dispatched fact-finding missions to investigate the situation. Secretary-General João Baena Soares met with representatives of civil society—including business, religious, and human rights leaders—and warned of severe international repercussions. For more information, see Francisco Villagrán de León, "Thwarting the Guatemalan Coup," Journal of Democracy 4, No. 4, October 1993, pp. 117-124; Rachel M. McCleary, "Guatemala's Postwar Prospects," Journal of Democracy 8, No. 2, April 1997, pp. 129-143; "OAS Starts Probe of Guatemala Leader's Use of Emergency Rule," Chicago Tribune, May 31, 1993, p.7; Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 77-78. Back.
Note 4: Following Congo's first-ever democratic elections in 1992, tensions simmered between supporters of President Pascal Lissouba and opposition groups. Local conflict resolution initiatives failed to secure a peaceful settlement. After legislative elections in early 1993, violent acts increased and threatened to escalate into open conflict. At this critical juncture, Congolese defense minister General Raymond Damase N'Gollo, acting as mediator on behalf of the Congolese government, issued an appeal for international assistance. With the leadership of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the government of France, an international committee was appointed to oversee new elections, and an international arbitration jury was formed to examine possible election fraud. Completion of these measures restored stability to the situation and allowed the Republic of Congo's democratic transition to move forward. See I. William Zartman and Katharina R. Vogeli, "Preventing Coup and Collapse: Delivering Competition out of Monopoly in Congo," in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce Jentleson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming). Back.
Note 5: A slightly different version of this four-part framework was originally developed by Douglas E. Lute in "Improving National Capacities for Response to Complex Emergencies," a paper prepared for the conference, "Humanitarian Response and Preventing Deadly Conflict," cosponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Switzerland, February 16-17, 1997. Recent evaluations of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) have highlighted these factors in accounting for the relative success of the operation to date. See, for example, United States Army War College, Success in Peacekeeping, United Nations Mission in Haiti: The Military Perspective (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996); Margaret Daly Hays and Gary F. Weatley, eds., Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, February 1996). Back.
Note 6: The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) has been marked by a high level of cooperation between the United States, which provided the bulk of the initial troops for the operation, and UN officials. Additionally, a great deal of attention has been paid to working with the Haitian legislature and security forces to promote democratic practices. See Margaret Daly Hays and Gary F. Weatley, eds., Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, February 1996). Back.
Note 7: For one diplomat's reflections on the process of assembling the coalition and holding it together, see James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), especially pp. 275-299, 308-320, 370-378, 396-406. Back.
Note 8: John M. Sanderson, "The Humanitarian Response in Cambodia: The Imperative for a Strategic Alliance," in After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance, eds. Jim Whitman and David Pocock, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 179-193; Jimmy Carter, "Get Tough on Rights," New York Times, September 21, 1993, p. A21; Anthony Lewis, "At Home Abroad; Fragments of Hope," New York Times, July 30, 1993, p. A27; Paul Lewis, "United Nations Is Finding its Plate Increasingly Full but its Cupboard Is Bare," New York Times, September 27, 1993, p. A8; Elizabeth Becker, "A U.N. Success Story," New York Times, April 28, 1995, p. A33. Back.
Note 9: John Eriksson et al., Synthesis Report, in The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, ed. David Millwood (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 30. Back.
Note 10: For example, Serbian troops blocked humanitarian convoys delivering food, clothing, medical supplies, and winter materials to refugees in Bosnia's war-torn cities. Even after pledges to allow aid convoys through, the Serbs bombed roads traveled by the relief convoys and highjacked UN trucks to prevent the delivery of such relief supplies. Barbara Crossette, "After Weeks of Seeming Inaction, U.S. Decides To Punish Belgrade," New York Times, May 23, 1992, p.1; "Serbs Again Block Supplies in Bosnia," New York Times, December 8, 1993, p. A6; Stephen Kinzer, "Yugoslavs Celebrate Sports Victory with a Political Echo," New York Times, July 4, 1995, p. 5. Back.
Note 11: See John Stremlau, People in Peril: Human Rights, Humanitarian Relief, and Preventing Deadly Conflict (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming). Back.
Note 12: Sadako Ogata, "World Order, Internal Conflict and Refugees," address at Harvard University, October 28, 1996. Back.
Note 13: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Organization for Migration, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report of the Regional Conference to Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary Displacement and Returnees in the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Relevant Neighboring States, Geneva, May 30-31, 1996, CIS/CONF/1996/6, July 4, 1996. Back.
Note 14: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World's Refugees 1995: In Search of Solutions (New York: Oxford University, 1995), pp. 48, 172-184. This shift has generated some concern that UNHCR has made this move at the expense of fulfilling its protection mission. This issue is elaborated on in chapter 6. Back.
Note 15: CARE, 1996 CARE International Report (Brussels: CARE International, 1996). Back.
Note 16: "Donor fatigue" is frequently mentioned by those who fear that badly needed foreign assistance will not be available as an instrument of preventive action. In fact, official development assistance from OECD countries has remained fairly constant, fluctuating between $55 and $60 billion during the 1990s. Meanwhile, resource flows from the private sector have grown substantially, almost tripling between 1986 and 1994, from $37 to $105 billion. Of growing concern, however, is the need to divert scarce foreign assistance resources from long-term development work to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of complex emergencies. For example, two years of emergency work in Rwanda cost the United States $750 million, a sum that is equal to the entire USAID African Development Fund for all of sub-Saharan Africa. See Healing the Wounds: Refugees, Reconstruction and Reconciliation, Report of the Second Conference Sponsored by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Peace Academy, June 30-July 1, 1996, p. 49. For a more general discussion, see Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1995); United States Mission to the United Nations, Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996 (United States Mission to the United Nations, ECOSOC Division, 1996), pp. 22-24; James H. Michel, Development Co-operation, Development Assistance Committee 1995 Report, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996, pp. 8-9. Back.
Note 17: In the United States this reluctance found its way into official policy guidelines with the release of the Clinton administration's Presidential Decision Directive 25 in 1994. Drawing from the U.S. experience in Somalia, the directive outlined the stringent conditions under which U.S. troops would be engaged overseas, chief among them being the need for a clear end-state and "exit strategy." The White House, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," Presidential Decision Directive 25 (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994). Back.
Note 18: This section draws on a paper prepared for the Commission by Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities In Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, May 27, 1997). Back.
Note 19: The Bush administration's decision to commit U.S. troops was considered the logical extension of previous policy. As the leading contributor to Operation Provide Hope, the U.S. was concerned that its efforts would be wasted unless provisions were made for the secure distribution of humanitarian assistance. As conditions deteriorated, both the UN and the Bush administration concluded that "only a U.S.-led coalition could move quickly and efficiently enough to make a rapid impact on the humanitarian catastrophe." See Herman J. Cohen, "Intervention in Somalia," The Diplomatic Record 1992-1993 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 59-67; George Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992-1993, Book I - January 1 to July 31, 1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). Back.
Note 20: The risk of retribution may be particularly high for indigenous NGOs, although international NGOs, to the extent that their in-country presence relies upon permission from host governments or ruling factions, also put their operations at risk. See Robert I. Rotberg, "Conclusions: NGOs, Early Warning, Early Action, and Preventive Diplomacy," in Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press; Cambridge, MA: The World Peace Foundation, 1996), pp. 263-268. Back.
Note 21: Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1997), para. 207-216. Back.
Note 22: This discussion draws on lessons learned from three cases of successful post-Cold War preventive diplomacy: the Baltic States, Congo, and Macedonia. These cases were examined during the conference, "Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World," cosponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, April 23, 1996. Back.
Note 23: See Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, September 1997). Back.
Note 24: Annan, op. cit., Renewing the United Nations, para. 60, 111. Back.
Note 25: In addition, world leaders now have many different forums in which to discuss emerging crises and the means at their disposal to manage these crises. The schedule of high-level international meetings also introduces the important element of continuity to crisis management. The following organizations, for instance, will hold cabinet- or head-of-state-level meetings in 1997-98 (meetings held annually unless otherwise noted):
Arab League
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
The Commonwealth
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Community for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
European Council (twice annually)
La Francophonie
Group of Eight (G-8) (Members meet as G-7 for certain macroeconomic regulatory issues)
Group of 77
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Nordic Council
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Organization of American States (OAS)
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
United Nations General Assembly
United States-European Union (EU) (twice annually)
Western European Union (WEU)
World Trade Organization (WTO) (ministerial-level meeting every two years) Back.
Note 26: Ruth Wedgwood, "Macedonia: A Victory for Quiet Diplomacy," The Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1995, p. 19. For another example of quiet diplomacy, see Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 429. Back.
Note 27: Two major schools of power sharing have developed: the "consociational" approach, of which Arend Lijphart is the leading proponent, and the "integrative" approach advanced by Donald Horowitz. The consociational approach focuses on accommodation through achievement of elite agreements. Integrative power-sharing arrangements attempt to defuse tensions by providing incentives for moderate behavior among ethnic group leaders and by enhancing minority influence in the decision-making process. For an overview of these two schools and a discussion of the applicability of power sharing to the resolution of ethnic conflicts, see Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996). See also Donald Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," Journal of Democracy 1, No. 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 73-79; Donald Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph Montville. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 451-475; Donald Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," Journal of Democracy 4, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 18-38; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 16-20, 55-60, 142-146; Arend Lijphart, "Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing Systems," in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlichka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 275-287. Back.
Note 28: Diana Chigas, with Elizabeth McClintock and Christophe Kamp, "Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation," in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 25-97; Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vade Mecum: An Introduction to the OSCE (Berne: OSCE, May 1996). Back.
Note 29: For definitions and examples of Track Two diplomacy and multitrack diplomacy, as well as a discussion of relationships in a multitrack system, see James Notter and John McDonald, "Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies For Peace," American Perspectives on Conflict Resolution, Electronic Journals of the U.S. Information Agency, Volume 1, No. 19, December 1996, http://www.usia.gov/journals/journals.htm, updated December 1996; James Notter and Louise Diamond, Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1996), pp. 1-17; Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 37-51; Kumar Rupesinghe, "Multi-Track Diplomacy and the Sustainable Route to Conflict Resolution," Cultural Survival Quarterly (Fall 1995), pp. 13-18. Back.
Note 30: The National Research Council's Committee on International Conflict Resolution is conducting substantial research aimed at identifying and examining the major techniques and concepts involved in conflict resolution. Track Two research currently under way focuses primarily on interactive/problem-solving techniques. Numerous papers are being prepared for the committee, which plans to make these papers available during 1998. Back.
Note 31: In the former Yugoslavia, for example, sanctions had very little effect until they were significantly strengthened in April 1993 and successfully forced President Slobodan Milosevic, for the first time, to accept the Vance/Owen peace plan. See David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), pp. 134-135. Back.
Note 32: A study by the Commission has suggested that to improve the UN's ability to maintain sanctions, the UN Collective Measures Committee should be revived and its mandate expanded to include possible inducements. A reconstituted Collective Measures Committee might initially address a five-point agenda: 1) improvements within the UN Secretariat to facilitate the imposition, implementation, and suspension of a sanctions regime; 2) recommendations for national capacity building to impose, monitor, and enforce sanctions; 3) ways to improve cooperation with nonstate parties; 4) combining sanctions with other preventive measures; and 5) the value of financial sanctions. See John Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, November 1996), pp. 57-67. Back.
Note 33: Stremlau, Sharpening International Sanctions, p. 29. Back.
Note 34: Swift, decisive imposition of sanctions was one of five conditions identified by Hufbauer and Elliott as contributing to their effectiveness. Other conditions identified are: a relatively modest goal; a target state much smaller than the country imposing sanctions, and also economically weak and unstable; friendly relations between the sanctioned state and the sanctioning state prior to the imposition of sanctions; and low costs for the sanctioning state. See Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Hufbauer, "'New' Approaches to Economic Sanctions," in U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World, eds. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), pp. 132-157. Back.
Note 35: Stremlau, op. cit., Sharpening International Sanctions, p. 61. Back.
Note 36: For example, USA*Engage, a coalition representing over 600 American businesses, agricultural groups, and trade associations, seeks to advance public and private sector involvement in world affairs by attempting to educate policymakers on the impact of unilateral sanctions in terms of: 1) costs to the U.S. economy, 2) the damage to security, commercial, and human rights objectives, 3) the adverse impact on U.S. ties with its closest allies, and 4) the damage to U.S. global competitiveness and investment policy. Interested readers can get more information on USA*Engage from their website: http://usaengage.org. See also Richard Lawrence, "U.S. Sanctions Spur Outcry; Corporate America Presses Case against Increasing Curbs on Other Nations," Journal of Commerce, May 21, 1997, p. 41D. Back.
Note 37: For a discussion of the impact of sanctions on civilian populations, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, "The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions," in Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 274-315. Also see Bryan Hehir, The Uses of Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 1996). Hehir, in considering the moral dilemma posed by sanctions that will harm innocent civilians, suggests implementation of a "principle of consent," i.e., the support of people who will be directly affected. Hehir highlights South Africa as just such a case. Damrosch, while supporting a similar concept of internal expressions of support for sanctions, also illuminates two further complications: 1) cases where an indigenous nongovernmental leadership cannot be identified or, if it exists, is unable to voice its opinion because of government oppression; and 2) cases where the leadership targeted for punishment enjoys broad popular support. Back.
Note 38: The feasibility and effectiveness of targeted financial sanctions is discussed in Stremlau, op. cit., Sharpening International Sanctions; Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Hufbauer, op. cit., "'New' Approaches to Economic Sanctions," pp. 133-157; Elizabeth S. Rogers, Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict, Discussion Paper, 90-02 (Harvard University: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1996). Back.
Note 39: This section draws heavily on a Commission-sponsored study headed by David Cortright. See David Cortright, ed., The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). Back.
Note 40: Until very recently, the lone exception was the much quoted 1971 article by David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics 24, No. 1 (October 1971). Although this remains an under-researched topic, three recent studies are William J. Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Eileen M. Crumm, "The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics," Journal of Peace Research 32, No. 3 (1995), pp. 313- 330; Cortright, op. cit., The Price of Peace. Back.
Note 41: Cortright, op. cit., The Price of Peace. Back.
Note 42: William Gamson and André Modigliani, Untangling the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1971); Martin Patchen, Resolving Disputes Between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 262. Back.
Note 43: On November 26, 1991, the World Bank announced in Paris that a Consultative Group of Donors for Kenya would withhold new loans for at least six months. On May 14, 1992, the World Bank announced on behalf of the Paris Consultative Group of Aid Donors for Malawi that it would not approve $74 million in new loans. The World Bank press statement on behalf of the Consultative Group on Malawi expressed "deep disappointment at the [Malawian] Government's lack of responsiveness to [governance] concerns and what they perceive as its continued poor record in ensuring basic respect for human rights, release or trial of detainees, better conditions in the prisons, respect for the rule of law, and independent judiciary, public sector accountability and transparency, freedom of speech, and open public participation and debate on policy options and freedoms of association." A similar statement was released on Kenya. See David Gillies, "Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank's Policy Frontiers," in The World Bank: Lending on a Global Scale, eds. J.M. Griesgraber and B.G. Gunter (London: Pluto Press, 1996), pp. 101-141, especially pp.123-126; John Stremlau and Francisco Sagasti, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming). Back.
Note 44: "Charter of the World Trade Organization. Annex 2: Understanding On Rules And Procedures Governing The Settlement Of Disputes," January 1, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 1143-1153, 1224-1247. Back.
Note 45: See, for example, Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 9-10. Back.
Note 46: Three recent examples of this type of action include: 1) the establishment by the United Nations Security Council of no-fly zones over Bosnia in October 1992 to protect civilians from strafing by Serbian aircraft; 2) the dispatching of over 20,000 troops, an aircraft carrier, and maritime prepositioning ships to the Persian Gulf in October 1994 by President Clinton to discourage Iraqi troops from re-invading Kuwait; and 3) the placement of the USS Independence battle group and the USS Nimitz off the shores of Taiwan in March 1996 to dissuade the Chinese military from further intimidation of Taiwan. See Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Backs a Ban on Combat Flights in Bosnia Airspace," New York Times, October 2, 1992, p. A2; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. May Seek the Use of Force to Stop Serbs' Flights Over Bosnia," New York Times, December 4, 1992, p. A1; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Sends Force as Iraqi Soldiers Threaten Kuwait," New York Times, October 8, 1994, p. 1; Patrick E. Tyler, "China Warns U.S. To Keep Away From Taiwan Strait," New York Times, March 18, 1996, p. A3; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Off Taiwan, U.S. Sailors Are Unworried," New York Times, March 19, 1996, p. A3. Back.
Note 47: The conflict in the Gulf in 1990-1991 offers a clear example of how such an approach can work. See Department of Public Information, United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996). To support its examination of the role of force in preventing deadly conflict, the Commission sponsored two studies on the subject: Andrew J. Goodpaster, When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington, DC, July 1996; Daniel J. Kaufman, The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict, unpublished report, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington, DC, 1996. The Kaufman paper is an outgrowth of Senior Conference XXXII, "The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict," cosponsored by the Commission and the United States Military Academy at West Point, June 8-10, 1995. Back.
Note 48: United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd ed. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 224-227, 476-478. Back.
Note 49: Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Policing the New World Disorder," Strategic Forum, No. 84 (October 1996), p. 4. Back.
Note 50: One development which may reduce the reluctance to use ground forces is the potential use of nonlethal technologies and weapons. Nonlethal weapons are means to control or coerce people, disable equipment or otherwise impede aggressive action while minimizing death and unnecessary destruction. These technologies may be antipersonnel, antimateriel, or involve electronic and information warfare. The deployment of nonlethal or less-than-lethal techniques and technologies would allow peacekeepers additional options between using deadly force in self-defense or in defense of the mission or remaining exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. The use of nonlethal technologies is not without its problems, however. Principal concerns surround their actual safety and effectiveness. See Anthony Fainberg and Alan Shaw, Nonlethal Technologies and the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, forthcoming). Back.
Note 51: See Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993), pp. 81-85. Back.
Note 52: The notion of "fire brigade" or rapid reaction capabilities within the UN has come under careful consideration in recent years. Among the earliest supporters of the concept was Brian Urquhart, who has written extensively on the subject. See, for example, Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Police the World?," New York Review of Books, May 12, 1994, pp. 29-33; Brian Urquhart, "If the United Nations Is for Real, Give It a Police Force," International Herald Tribune, May 23, 1994, p. 4; Brian Urquhart, "Peace-Keeping Saves Lives," Washington Post, February 16, 1995; Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force," New York Review of Books, June 10, 1993, p. 3; and Brian Urquhart, "Whose Fight Is It?" New York Times, May 22, 1994. For reactions to Urquhart's proposal, see Lee Hamilton, Gareth Evans, Lord Carver, and Stanley Hoffman, "A UN Volunteer Military Force—Four Views," New York Review of Books, June 24, 1993, p. 58; Robert Oakley, McGeorge Bundy, Sadruddin Aga Khan, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Marion Dönhoff, "A UN Volunteer Force: The Prospects," New York Review of Books, July 15, 1993, pp. 52-56. The governments of Canada and Denmark also conducted studies on the topic; see Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, Report of the Government of Canada, September 1995; and Dick A. Leurdijk, "The Netherlands Non-paper. A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study. Revised version, April 1995," in A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 1995), pp. 73-92. See also Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1996). Back.
Note 53: Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, Report of the Government of Canada, September 1995; Leurdijk, op. cit., A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response, p. 77. Back.
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