Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey: Chapter 4

1997

4. Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey

The rise and rapid growth of political Islamism remains an enigma. The legacies of two long-standing traditions are still manifest in the field. One is the Orientalist perspective, which maintains that Islam and the West are fundamentally opposed. Its implication is that the recent rise of Islamism is but a continuation of the age-old conflict between the two civilizations. ₁ The other perspective is that of modernization, which contends that Islamic nations will become secular as a result of the modernizing impact of the West. The literature on Islamism in Turkey, in particular, has heretofore been dominated by adherents of modernization theory, who characterize Islamism as a conservative phenomenon and argue that social changes such as industrialization and urbanization will eventually weaken its social bases. ₂

Yet neither theoretical perspective is tenable, considering that the rise of what is called “fundamentalism” is hardly unique to the Islamic world and that Islamism, like other fundamentalisms, is a late-twentieth-century phenomenon. ₃ As the case in point, religion-based politics in Turkey has made a comeback in the most recent phase of the country’s development. This phase, which began in the 1980s, has been characterized by deepened integration with global capitalism, and it accompanied an erosion of confidence in the nation-state. Defying in particular the predictions of modernization theory, Islamism in Turkey has found new social bases among the dispossessed in the rapidly growing urban centers and among middle-class professionals. ₄

Critics of modernization theory point out that modernization has not displaced religion. ₅ That modernization did not displace religion, however, is one thing; that religious politics has been revived in recent years is quite another. The most interesting question remains, what is the specific historical conjuncture in which religion has returned?

Islam versus Political Islamism

Islamism in Turkey, as elsewhere in the region, is a recent and historically distinct phenomenon that arose after a period of dominance of secular nationalism and as a response to its crisis. Thus, even if religion (as “meaning” and “value”) were to be considered inexplicable in terms of sociological models, the return of religion-based politics should still be explainable in terms of social change. Regarding Muslim societies, Bassam Tibi points out that

Islam, in the course of [modernization and Westernization]... was abandoned as a political ideology in many countries in the Middle East. It has not, however, been replaced as a belief system: Islam continues to prevail as a normative system. The renewed role of Islam, since the 1970s, merely refers to the process of political revival of Islam, to its reemergence as a political ideology legitimizing political action. ₆

Thus, we may distinguish between Islam as faith and Islamism as political ideology. The modernization of a number of Middle Eastern countries during the twentieth century led to the displacement of Islamism by secular nationalism and variants of socialism, although Islam always remained as faith. At the end of the same century, Islamist politics is coming back, this time as a postnationalist phenomenon.

This brand of Islamism should be distinguished from Islamic reformism as epitomized by Young Ottoman thought. ₇ During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was undergoing “modernizing reforms,” partly under western European pressure. As the first intelligentsia in Ottoman history, the Young Ottomans contributed to the ideological legitimation of that process. Critical of the “secularism” of the Tanzimat reformers but inspired by the same Western ideas as that group, the Young Ottomans attempted to interpret (and ultimately justify) Ottoman modernization and Westernization in terms of the principles of Islam. ₈ Reformist Islamism was an ideological attempt to reconcile Islamic principles with Westernization. Radical Islamism of the late twentieth century, by contrast, “is a politico-cultural movement that postulates a qualitative contradiction between Western civilization and the religion of Islam.” ₉

In this essay I address the rise of radical Islamism and propose an explanatory framework within which to examine the Turkish experience in terms of social and political change. For this purpose, I make use of a theoretical model that was previously proposed to examine the collapse of democracies in the Third World. Modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s assumed an inherent association between the modernization of society and the growth of democracy. In a pathbreaking critique of this view, Guillermo O’Donnell contended that although democratization was observed in the early stages of Third World development (thus seemingly confirming modernization theory’s predictions), it collapsed in later stages, giving rise to “bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.” ₁₀

A similar observation can be made about the effects of modernization on secularism. Although early stages of modernization resulted in relative secularization, later stages seem to have led to a revival of religious politics. In order to interpret this situation, I argue that Islamism is a product of the frustration of the promises of Westernist modernization and represents a critique of modernism. This argument not only challenges the received wisdom of portraying Islamism as backward-looking premodernism but also explains its rise in terms of social and political change.

The point of departure for this alternative framework is the following observation: the rise of Islamism in Turkey followed a period of state-led developmentalism that resulted in a crisis. A central concept here is “import-substituting industrialization” (ISI), a common model of Third World modernization in the twentieth century. This model is based on the notion that a country can develop by substituting its own manufactures for items it previously imported, with the help of state interventionism. As a first approximation, ISI can be regarded as the Third World variant of the welfare state of the advanced capitalist world. It is an attempt to combine, around a nationalist ideology, the basic principles of the welfare state with an emphasis on rapid industrialization and economic development. The notion of import substitution is an implicit expression of the desire to “catch up.” Thus, if the promise of development that ISI represented has failed—and together with it, faith in modernization—then the crisis of development and the rise of Islamism must be connected.

Nationalist Developmentalism

Nationalist, statist developmentalism in Turkey was identified with “Kemalism.” The trajectory of the Kemalist project was part and parcel of a universal pattern. In many underdeveloped countries, developmentalism started in the 1930s, under conditions of relative isolation from the world economy owing to the Great Depression, and continued after World War II. In the postwar period, productive capital originating in the core economies of global capitalism began to make direct industrial investments in the underdeveloped countries. Thus, Turkey was reintegrated into the networks of global capitalism through the international circulation of productive capital. There began a process of ISI in which technology, capital goods, and inputs were imported and the final product was produced domestically to cater to the protected domestic market. ₁₁

ISI allowed for further industrial development, but on the basis of a specific international division of labor. Turkey produced manufactured goods for its own domestic market, but it depended on imports of capital goods from advanced countries to sustain industrial growth and on world demand for its traditional exports to finance those imports. These two characteristics also brought about the crisis tendencies inherent in ISI. In a situation where sustained industrial development required growing imports while the export base remained stagnant, further industrialization relied on a constantly expanding foreign debt. Under these conditions, ISI necessarily led to a crisis of development. ₁₂

In many Third World countries, the economic structure of ISI also contained political and ideological dimensions. The state was actively engaged in economic development and protected the domestic market both by regulating imports and by expanding the market through redistributionist policies. The developmentalist and protectionist role of the state bolstered the ideology of nationalism, and its role in promoting the welfare of low-income groups fostered an image of “populism.” ₁₃

In its early stages of rapid growth in Turkey, ISI was successful in combining the interests of various classes around the project of inward-oriented national development. In its later stages, the bottlenecks inherent in ISI led to a crisis and the fragmentation of class coalitions. Throughout the 1960s, Turkey was able to sustain high rates of industrial growth and distribute its fruits in a relatively egalitarian fashion. ₁₄ During this period, the ISI model of development allowed for a populist set of class alliances and supported the conditions for a democratic regime. Various segments of society could benefit from the inward-oriented industrial development, and their common interests led them to coalesce around that process. The ideological elements of ISI—that is, nationalism and developmentalism —allowed for popular participation and supported the structures of democratic populism. ₁₅

ISI-based development in Turkey was in crisis by the late 1970s. In 198O Turkey launched a radical shift in developmental trajectory from a statist-nationalist strategy to a market-oriented transnationalist one. This transformation was carried out by a military regime installed later in the same year. The new orientation included the expansion of market forces in the economy as well as the expansion of competitive, individualist ideologies in the cultural realm. Previously, the nation-state had a progressive appearance and often played a politically populist and socially redistributionist role. By contrast, the restructuring in the 1980s entailed an economic model in which benefits accrued to a limited segment of society, a political model that was authoritarian and exclusionary, and an ideological outlook that emphasized competitive individualism. The dominant sentiment was no longer one of trust in, and reliance on, the nation-state. Now the so-called “rising values” included belief in the supremacy of the global market and in the virtues of individual entrepreneurship. The profound restructuring of the Turkish economy, politics, and culture in the 1980s ended the ideological hegemony of nationalist-statist developmentalism. ₁₆

The Crisis of Development and the Rise of Islamism

The dominant ideology in Turkey between the 1930s and 1970s was nationalist-statist developmentalism. But despite the continued predominance of nationalist pretensions in the post–World War II period, actual development took place in the context of full participation in the world economy. Ideology contradicted reality with respect to (1) the nationalist promise versus the deepening integration into, and dependency on, the world economy, and (2) the populist legitimation of the nationalist-statist project versus the class differentiation brought about by the creation of a domestic bourgeoisie and the collaboration of that bourgeoisie with Western interests. The promises of the developmentalist project could not be delivered.

A prominent assertion of Eurocentrism was that only the West was rational and capable of modernity; the Third World, by contrast, was spiritual, traditional, and stagnant. ₁₇ The nationalists’ response to this assertion was to set out to refute the existence of such an essential difference and demonstrate that their own nation was perfectly capable of replicating the Western experience. Nationalism in the Third World expressed its anti-imperialist intentions by adopting Westernization. All those virtues identified by Eurocentrism as markers of Western superiority, such as rationalism, the nation-state, and economic development, were unquestioningly accepted by the nationalists. They could not transcend the Eurocentric problematic because they took Western values and claims as universal truths. ₁₈ Westernization, in this framework, was embraced in the name of “universalism.”

Nationalism was internally contradictory. While seemingly asserting a negation of the Western world, it also aimed to replicate the Western experience of economic and political development. ₁₉ The nationalist desire to emulate the West did not result in a successful replication. This failure laid the groundwork for the emergence of radical Islamism. The Islamist movement now builds on the failure of the internally contradictory promises of nationalism. Islamists condemn nationalism as a project of imitation and accuse the nationalists of aping the West.

Nationalism, as the legitimizing ideology of the modern nation-state, has characteristics originating from modernism—it derives from a belief in human intervention to straighten out worldly matters. Thus, the Islamist critique is particularly effective within the context of the global crisis of modernism and the challenges raised against the universalist mythologies of the West. Although Westernization was previously a more or less unquestioned ideal in the name of universalism, the “condition of postmodernity” has begun to cast doubt on the “universal truths” of modernism. ₂₀ This has created an opportune environment for Islamism to mount an offensive against modernism.

At the global level, the crisis of ideologies based on modernist assumptions has given rise to a proliferation of postmodernist politics of identity. Yet postmodernism, although it is effective as a critique of modernism, does not constitute an alternative social and political project, owing to its inherent cynicism and nihilism. ₂₁ Islamism, however, not only shares many significant themes with the postmodernist critique of modernism but also goes beyond merely pointing out the failures of nationalism and modernism to actually propose an alternative ideology. ₂₂ This, I believe, makes Islamism particularly potent.

The crisis of nationalist-statist developmentalism, too, is part and parcel of a global trend. A growing literature now recognizes that we have entered a period of crisis of the nation-state. ₂₃ Although early in the twentieth century states had begun to regulate national economies and protect the welfare of their citizens, at the end of the same century trends toward “globalization” have undermined the power of individual nation-states. They can no longer independently maintain full employment, sustain economic growth, and preserve reformist welfare policies. ₂₄ In the same vein, “Third World national revolutions as projects of economic and social modernization have proved failures.” ₂₅

Kemalism, as Turkey’s project of nationalist-statist modernization, embraced Western-inspired models of development. In opposition, Islamism advances a wholesale critique of the notion of development. Turkish Islamists regard “developmentalism” as a Western affliction and link it with the fundamental but discredited modernist assumptions about “progress.” ₂₆ Islamists’ views on development are directly germane to their critique of Kemalism. Kemalists define progress and catching up with Western civilization precisely in terms of economic and technological development. Islamists, on the other hand, reject both Western civilization and its local adoption through Kemalism. This rejection can be observed most clearly in the Islamist reversal of Kemalist assumptions regarding development.

The Islamist Critique of Development

In Islamist intellectual discourse, devotion to economic growth and development originates in the post-Enlightenment belief in linear “progress” that was born in Europe and then spread to the rest of the globe. “By the 19th century, the notion of progress had become a new religion in all of Europe,” and “in Turkey, too, ‘progress’ was taken as a given from the beginning.” ₂₇ Islamists point out that this belief in unlimited progress is the most significant component of “modernism,” which they charge with promising paradise on earth and failing to deliver it. ₂₈

Islamist writers criticize Western civilization for its unflinching devotion to economic growth: “Incessant growth, belief in the virtue of growth, embracing growth with absolute conviction have brought the entire world, starting with the Western countries, face to face with a whole host of economic and social problems.” ₂₉ They condemn economic growth as the greatest addiction and as a new idol. ₃₀ They argue that the social consequences of economic growth, where the primary concern is increasing the quantity of goods produced, are one-dimensional societies and one-dimensional humans, consequences that obliterate the mind, the intellect, culture, and creativity. ₃₁

In a reversal of the nationalist emphasis on economic development, the Islamist critique maintains that “in a civilization where reason alone is dominant... it is nearly impossible for technology to be friendly to the environment or to humans,” and thus, “in order to save human beings from captivity to production, we must shift our values from money and things to virtue.” ₃₂ Paralleling the environmentalist critique of materialism, the Islamist perspective emphasizes unity with nature as an antidote to consumerism: “The source of human happiness can be found not in money or the consumption of material objects, but in living in harmony with nature and the universe.” ₃₃ The cause of environmental pollution, in this view, is the irresponsible fixation on production and productivity. ₃₄

Islamists emphasize that the Islamic person does not regard material gratification as the sole aim in life, and they contend that excessive spending would be ended in the Islamic way of life. ₃₅ The policy proposal originating from this perspective is the following: “If our expenditures do not exceed our subsistence needs such as food, clothing and shelter, then we can lead a serene and productive life free of anxiety.” Thus, “the solution is very simple. Just reduce consumption.” ₃₆

All of this represents a complete reversal of the assumptions of nationalist developmentalism, where success in the anti-imperialist struggle was measured in terms of economic growth and industrialization. By contrast, the Islamist position frames the rejection of the West in civilizational terms: “It is no longer indisputable that industrialization should be pursued whatever the cost,” because “the issue for Islamic countries is not industrialization; it is the struggle for [authentic] civilization.” ₃₇ In an implicit critique of Kemalism, the Islamist view contends that “no civilization can be defeated by its own weapons.” ₃₈

This shift in intellectual discourse from developmentalist to “postdevelopmentalist” concerns can be seen perhaps most starkly in the program of the Islamist political party. In its earlier incarnation as Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) in the 1970s, the Islamist party led by Professor Necmettin Erbakan articulated its Islamic themes in accord with the dominant economic and political theme of that era, that is, industrial development. Erbakan’s party championed “heavy industrialization” as the surest route to Turkey’s independence from the West. ₃₉ Twenty years later, in its present reincarnation as Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), also led by Erbakan, the Islamist party no longer emphasizes the need for industrialization but rather focuses on such “postindustrial” themes as protecting the environment, building civil society, and withdrawing the state from all economic activities. ₄₀

A prominent Islamist author who has also acted as an ideologue of Refah expresses the shift from developmental to moral themes by condemning single-minded devotion to economic growth for its destructive effects on the human soul as well as on the natural environment: “Humankind has lost its conscience. A new kind of monster has been created, a monster with no heart, a dried-up brain, and a big stomach.... We have polluted the air... and made a hole in the sky.” ₄₁ The guilty party is self-evident: “That magnificient Western civilization! That West which became wealthy by plundering the historical heritage of humankind.” ₄₂ Although in the past it was embraced uncritically, “everyone can now see that Western civilization is coming to an end. All that rationality, all the technological trinkets and gadgetry could not fulfill the hopes and promises of happiness.” ₄₃ He goes on to explain that despite all efforts to dominate nature by machinery, humankind has been unsuccessful. The solution, therefore, lies in “being at peace with ourselves, with other humans, with nature, and ultimately with God.” ₄₄ He points out that the Islamic solution should be carefully distinguished from the Western one: “The Islamic state does not promise wealth and prosperity to the Muslim community.... [To expect such a thing] would be to mistakenly expect that a goal promised by capitalism could be reached via the Islamic route.” ₄₅

Conclusion

In his examination of Third World historiographies, Gyan Prakash identifies a “postnationalist” literature that is distinctive for its “repudiation of the post-Enlightenment ideology of Reason and Progress” and thus is different “from the anti-Orientalism of nationalism.” ₄₆ This, he argues, constitutes “a challenge to the hegemony of those modernization schemes and ideologies that post-Enlightenment Europe projected as the raison d’etre of history.” The Islamist literature in Turkey is, in this sense, clearly postnationalist, although, paradoxically, it is not “post-Orientalist.” Whereas the nationalists rejected the Eurocentrism of the West by attempting to demonstrate that they, too, were capable of modernization, the Islamists accept the Eurocentric assertion of an essential difference between the West and the East. In its rejection of the West, Islamism reproduces the essentialist assumptions of Orientalism.

Islamism stems from the failure of the nationalist promises of Westernist modernization. Going beyond all those currents that share the theme of “global modernity”—that is, according to Gyan Prakash, modernization, nationalism, and Marxism—Islamism reasserts the specificity and distinctiveness of Islamic culture. Within the national developmentalist ideology, liberation from imperialist oppression and assertion of national identity were defined primarily within the framework of economic growth and industrialization. Throughout the nationalist period in Turkey, the 1930s through the 1970s, rejecting industrialization would have been considered equivalent to treason. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Islamist challenge to the notion of industrialization implies a reversal of the assumptions of national developmentalism. In the Islamist view, the unquestioning acceptance of industrialization is equivalent to submission to imperialism.

Kemalism in Turkey was a paradigmatic model of Third World nationalism in that it perceived and defined Westernization as the attainment of “universal” civilization. The essence of the Kemalist project was the attempt to defeat Western imperialism by adopting Westernization. ₄₇ By contrast, in its plea for authenticity, Islamism accepts the essential opposition between Islam and the West but rejects the Western assertion of superiority. It rejects the nationalist assumptions and asserts the superiority of the spiritual values of Islam over the material wealth of the West.

Endnotes

Note 1: See, for example, Michael Youssef, Revolt against Modernity: Muslim Zealots and the West, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985; Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Back.

Note 2: See, for example, Binnaz Toprak, “The Religious Right,” in Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak, eds., Turkey in Transition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, 218–35; and several chapters in Richard Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern Turkey, London: I. B. Tauris, 1991 (with the notable exception of the chapter by Serif Mardin). Back.

Note 3: For a comparative assessment of fundamentalisms, see Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991. On fundamentalism as a late-twentieth-century phenomenon, see Nikki R. Keddie, “The Revolt of Islam and Its Roots,” in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth P. Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, New York: HarperCollins, 1991, 292–308. Back.

Note 4: Mehmet Ali Soydan, ed., Türkiye’nin Refah Gerçegi, Erzurum: Birey Yayincilik, 1994. See also Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1991. Back.

Note 5: Mary Douglas, “The Effects of Modernization on Religious Change,” Daedalus, vol. 111, no. 1, 1982, 1–20; Robert Wuthnow, “Understanding Religion and Politics,” Daedalus, vol. 120, no. 3, 1991, 1–19. Back.

Note 6: Bassam Tibi, “The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political and Social Development of the Middle East,” Middle East Journal, vol. 37, no. 1, 1983, 3–13 Back.

Note 7: Youssef Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990; Keddie, “The Revolt of Islam.” Back.

Note 8: Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962. Back.

Note 9: Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, 120. Back.

Note 10: Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California–Berkeley, Politics of Modernization Series, 1973. Back.

Note 11: Çaglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, London: Verso, 1987. Back.

Note 12: For the comparable Latin American experience, see the classic work by Albert O. Hirschman, “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 82, 1968, 1–32. Back.

Note 13: Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1979. Back.

Note 14: Korkut Boratav, Türkiye Iktisat Tarihi, 1908–1985, Istanbul: Gerçek Yayinlari, 1988. Back.

Note 15: Haldun Gülalp, “Patterns of Capital Accumulation and State-Society Relations in Turkey,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 15, no. 3, 1985, 329–48. Back.

Note 16: Çaglar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkinmaciligin Iflasi, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1993. Back.

Note 17: Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989. Back.

Note 18: yan Prakash, “Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 32, no. 2, 1990, 383–408. Back.

Note 19: Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? London: Zed Press, 1986. Back.

Note 20: David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989; Bryan S. Turner, ed., Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity, London: Sage Publications, 1990; Pauline Marie Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992. Back.

Note 21: Stanley Aronowitz, “Postmodernism and Politics,” in Stanley Aronowitz, The Politics of Identity, New York: Routledge, 1992, 253–71. See also Robert J. Antonio, “Postmodern Storytelling versus Pragmatic Truth-Seeking: The Discursive Bases of Social Theory,” Sociological Theory, vol. 9, no. 2, 1991, 154–63 Back.

Note 22: Haldun Gülalp, “Islamism and Postmodernism,” Contention, vol. 4, no. 2, 1995, 59–73. Back.

Note 23: For a critical review of this literature, see Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, “Globalization and the Future of the Nation-State,” Economy and Society, vol. 24, no. 3, 1995, 408–42. Back.

Note 24: Hirst and Thompson, “Globalization,” 413–15. Back.

Note 25: Hirst and Thompson, “Globalization,” 421. Back.

Note 26: For a parallel phenomenon in Iran, see Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Iran’s Turn to Islam: From Modernism to a Moral Order,” Middle East Journal, vol. 41, no. 2, 1987, 202–17. According to Najmabadi, for Iranian Islamists, “‘development,’ ‘modernity,’ ‘modernization,’ and ‘catching up with the West’ are all concerns of the past; the search for a singular ‘moral order’ is the order of the day” (217). Back.

Note 27: Ismet Özel, “Kalkinma? Ilerleme? Varolma?” in Ahmet Tabakoglu and Ismail Kurt, eds., Iktisadi Kalkinma ve Islam, Istanbul: Islami Ilimler Arastirma Vakfi Yayinlari, 1987, 232. See also Ahmet Tabakoglu, “Islam Iktisadi Açisindan ‘Kalkinma,’” in Tabakoglu and Kurt, Iktisadi Kalkinma ve Islam, 241–43. Back.

Note 28: li Bulaç, Din ve Modernizm, Istanbul: Endülüs Yayinlari, 1991, 27; Ismet Özel, Üç Mesele: Teknik, Medeniyet ve Yabancilasma, Istanbul: Çidam Yayinlari, 1992, 151ff. Back.

Note 29: Ersin Gündogan, Teknolojinin Ötesi, Istanbul: Iz Yayincilik, 1991, 125 Back.

Note 30: Tabakoglu, “Islam Iktisadi,” 244. Back.

Note 31: Besir Hamitogullari, “Iktisadi Vahsi Büyümenin Bunalimlari ve Islam Kalkinma Modelinin Vaadettikleri,” in Tabakoglu and Kurt, Iktisadi Kalkinma ve Islam, 10–12. Back.

Note 32: Gündogan, Teknolojinin, 16–17, 20. Back.

Note 33: Gündogan, Teknolojinin, 25–26. Back.

Note 34: Gündogan, Teknolojinin, 48. Back.

Note 35: Hamitogullari, “Iktisadi Vahsi Büyümenin,” 33. Back.

Note 36: Gündogan, Teknolojinin, 154, 158. See also Tabakoglu, “Islam Iktisadi,” 247–48. Back.

Note 37: Gündogan, Teknolojinin, 23, 31. Back.

Note 38: Gündogan, Teknolojinin, 31. Back.

Note 39: See Türker Alkan, “The National Salvation Party in Turkey,” in Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, eds., Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984, 79–102; Binnaz Toprak, “Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State: The National Salvation Party in Turkey,” in Said Amir Arjomand, ed., From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984, 119–33; Ali Yasar Saribay, Türkiye’de Modernlesme, Din ve Parti Politikasi: MSP Örnek Olayi, Istanbul: Alan Yayinlari. Back.

Note 40: On the politics of Refah, see Rusen Çakir, Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1994; Serdar Sen, Refah Partisi’nin Teori ve Pratigi, Istanbul: Sarmal Yayinlari, 1995; and Soydan, Türkiye’nin Refah Gerçegi. For a brief analysis of Refah’s platform, see Haldun Gülalp, “Islamist Party Poised for National Power in Turkey,” Middle East Report, vol. 25, no. 3–4, 1995. Back.

Note 41: Abdurrahman Dilipak, Savas, Baris, Iktidar, Istanbul: Isaret/Fersat Yayinlari, 1991, 12. Back.

Note 42: Dilipak, Savas, Baris, Iktidar, 13. Back.

Note 43: Dilipak, Savas, Baris, Iktidar, 39. Back.

Note 44: Dilipak, Savas, Baris, Iktidar, 15. Back.

Note 45: Dilipak, Savas, Baris, Iktidar, 20. Back.

Note 46: Prakash, “Writing Post-Orientalist Histories,” 404. Back.

Note 47: Enver Ziya Karal, “The Principles of Kemalism,” in Ergun Özbudun and Ali Kazancigil, eds., Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981, 11–36. Back.