Policing Terrorism: Rhetoric and Implementation

OTWIN MARENIN

Policing systems worldwide, in recent years, have attempted to move toward or strengthen existing democratic forms of policing. One can see such developments in efforts within established democracies to advance community control over forms of policing delivered locally; to move formal and informal conceptions of the police role toward a service orientation (rather than focus in a more limited fashion on crime fighting or the control of order as the basic job of the police); to stress prevention rather than after-the-fact reaction to threats, crime, and disorder; to see the goal of policing as providing for the well-being of communities rather than protection of the state and regimes; to entrench at the core of police operational policies and programs attention to the rule of law, human rights, and fair treatment of all the police come into contact with; and to assure oversight and accountability of the police by civic society (both by the acceptance by the police that these are legitimate demands on them to which they need to be responsive and by the enhancement of civic society's capacity to effectively carry out oversight).

In societies in transition, either on the road to development or trying to resurrect minimal capacities for order and state action ("failed states"), both domestic and international actors have been actively seeking to move discredited, ineffective, brutal, and repressive policing systems toward more democratic forms, as part of development assistance programs and the establishment of security sector architectures that protect civic society, individuals, and the state in a balanced way - that is, democratic policing methodologies that lean neither too heavily toward state protection (and potential repression, discrimination, and arbitrary, politically controlled actions) nor toward the protection of rights that renders unattainable the achievement of that minimal social order necessary for people to live their lives with some certainty that their safety and well-being is protected. Democratic forms of policing have become essential goals of development assistance. Democratic forms of political life and societal order are not likely to be stable unless the police behave democratically.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ Caparini and Marenin, 2004; Cawthra and Luckham, 2003; Das and Marenin, 2000; Neild, 2002; Peake, 2004; Perito, 2004.

The threat of terrorism—and the need by societies and states to deal with the fear that terrorist attacks might happen on their soil or against the citizens wherever they are, as well as the objective realities of terrorist actions and plans – has had and will continue to have a harmful effect on the capacity to maintain democratic forms of policing where they exist and will hamper and stifle the movement toward democratic forms of policing in societies seeking that goal.

Engaging the police in antiterrorist work will undermine and distort democratic policing in specific ways:

- It will strengthen the power of the state and its intrusion into and control over the lives of people
- It will lead to police organizational structures that centralize administrative control, bureaucratize role expectations, and enshrine secrecy and stealth as a fundamental operational policy, both within law enforcement and in the police's articulations to other security structures
- It will tilt the balance of order versus rights in favour of order and protection
- It will lead to political manipulation of law enforcement and order maintenance
- It will lessen the capacity of civic society for oversight and insistence on accountability
- It will stop or slow down the movement toward democratic forms of policing in societies undergoing change
- It will enhance the power and autonomy of the police and will tempt them to engage in abuses of their powers and in discrimination against specific social groupings
- It will change the routine operational styles of police work
- It will enmesh the goals, rhetoric, and justifications for actions offered by the police and their leadership in the "securitization discourse" (Loader, 2002).

Before arguing the reasons why these developments are likely and why they will be harmful to the spirit of democratic politics and policing, some basic assumptions that underlie the argument must be stated, and some issues that are not dealt with in this paper must be set aside.

First, the discussion of the effect on the police by their participation in antiterrorist work is discussed in general terms, rather than being based on detailed analyses of how police forces in different states have been drawn into the orbit of antiterror work and how that has changed democratic policing. The argument describes tendencies likely to occur as these can be extracted from the general literatures on policing and terrorism, and are apparent to common sense and based most fundamentally on knowledge of how the police think, what they value, and how they work. The tendencies listed do not have to happen – but they will occur, unless civic society and political and police leaders oppose these tendencies proactively. There is a need to control and prevent terrorist acts, but when doing so, one needs to be aware of what is likely to happen to the values, goals, and operational styles of the police who participate or are drawn into antiterror work unless concerned people make a conscious and persistent effort to prevent the distortion of democratic policing as listed above and as argued below.

Second, the rhetoric of fighting terror can be quite democratic. Goals, plans, and policies will be stated with a proper concern for rights and the liberties of individuals, and only some minimal intrusions on privacy and deviations from the rule of law (and these reluctantly engaged in) that are necessary for national security and the protection of state and society are envisioned and will be sanctioned by the state and the police. But rhetoric is not reality, nor are abstractly stated goals and assurances self-enacting. Given how all governmental policies tend to be implemented and knowing how people and organizations that do participate in antiterror work will use their newly given authority and justifications, it will not be surprising to find that what will actually be done is not quite what the rhetoric states or the policy envisions. Once the human element is introduced into how policies will be carried out, there will be distortions of the formally stated goals and practices, for the people and the organizations will have their own interpretations of what they are expected and allowed to do in order to be effective; they will interpret directives in light of their own experiences, interests, and values. And one can assume, again based on the experience of police reforms in any society, that both administrators and workers (those doing the antiterrorist activity whatever these may be – intelligence collection, interrogations, the shadowing of likely suspects) will see the rhetoric as a guidelines and authorizations targeted for public consumption by different domestic and international audiences, while the police know that they will be judged on how effectively they achieve their antiterrorist goals. The police will see a lot of discretion and leeway in how they do their work and they will use that discretion to shape the manner in which policies are implemented.

This argument – that the human element will distort policy design and implementation – applies to political leaders. They will be or may be sincerely committed to suppressing terrorist threats, but they will not be unmindful of the political implications for their public careers of how they deal with and are seen to deal with terrorist threats. Notions of national security, conceptions of who is a terrorist, what terrorist acts are, or what the rule of law requires are flexible concepts that can be given substantive content in various ways. Fears can be manipulated, information selectively interpreted, and actions announced that deal with terror but are also useful to shore up the credibility of those in power and undermine the claims of competitors.

In short, among police, intelligence, and security workers, operational policies on the ground (or "at the coal face," as the British police would say) will incorporate formal and informal goals and styles, and political leaders will see and use antiterrorist rhetoric for both public protection and personal and organizational advantage. Thus, the argument is not based on what is formally stated as the goals and policies for fighting or dealing with terror threats, but on what the people who will plan and carry out the work of antiterrorism are most likely to do. What happens will reflect the perceptions and values of the police, as seen through their eyes, as well as what civic society and the state expects them to do.

A third basic assumption deals with how terrorism is conceived as a threat and what, therefore, is the best and most effective way of dealing with it. The distinction here is between fighting a war against terrorism or seeing terrorism as a policing problem, different in some aspects from the work police normally do, but nonetheless essentially a question of investigating and substantiating that individuals or groups are likely to commit or have committed a crime. The war metaphor as the context for antiterrorist policing provides a fundamentally different set of justifications for how to do policing (or how to engage the normal police in antiterrorist work) than does the notion that terrorists are a specific type of criminal. The distortions of democratic policing listed above are much more likely to happen and be more massive and intensive in a political milieu that stresses the war metaphor. Put differently, the distortions will vary from state to state, depending on how the political, intelligence, and security leadership talks about terrorism.

Fourth, without going into any details about the values and elements of democratic policing – for there exists a large literature on this topic¹⁸⁶ and such notions have become enshrined in domestic reforms and innovations, international conventions, and the criteria for police assistance programs and peacebuilding efforts – one only asserts that democratic policing norms as defined in these documents and embodied in practice are the standard against which likely distortions will be judged.

Bracketed out, there are three issues: the question of what terrorism is, antiterror policies conceived as warfare, and normative evaluations of the effects of antiterror work on the police, society, and the state.

Definitions of terrorism, what terrorist attacks are, and who is a terrorist are notoriously ambiguous and relativistic. The same acts could

¹⁸⁶ e.g., Bayley, 2001; Independent Commission..., 1999; O'Rawe and Moore, 1997; OSCE, 2002; UN, 1994, 1997.

be characterized as terrorism, legitimate self-defence, or revolutionary reactions to repression based on the ideological standpoints, value judgments, and objective conditions of participants in the discourse. There will always be unavoidable political judgments that influence the labelling of violent acts, even when people condemning terrorism are on the same ideological side, an argument not to be disputed here. First, it is a fact that governments will label certain acts and groups as terrorist, respond to those acts and threats, and seek to enlist the support and cooperation of others in that effort. The effects of perceiving and dealing with threats from terror (however defined) on normal or conventional policing will be assessed.

The second issue not dealt with is antiterrorist operations conducted as war against suspect governments and states. There will be issues of how to deal with suspected and committed terrorist actions in those conditions, but the police, such as they exist, will be largely irrelevant.

Third, it is not questioned whether these tendencies, if they happen, are a good or bad thing. Some regimes and members of civic institutions, and most police and security workers, will consider the trade-off of rights for protection against terror a legitimate risk and sacrifice (or deny that there will be trade-offs at all), while other will see aspects of antiterror work as fundamentally undemocratic and subversive of basic democratic and human rights (such as expectations of privacy or fair and equal treatment under the law).

Democracy is a balancing act among competing but equally legitimate values. Valuing tradeoffs is a political question that societies will have to decide for themselves. It is a political question, since different groups and individuals will have different normative ranking schemes and priorities, and how to judge the effects of antiterrorism work on "the democratic balance" will fluctuate over time.

There is also no real method for valuing tradeoffs since the losses to democratic politics (which I think the tendencies discussed embody) are quickly visible, while the gains are hard to detect or measure. Governments and security agencies will announce that so many attempts by terrorists have been prevented by good intelligence, police work, and international cooperation (but no details can be released to the public since that would reveal means and methods). One has to take such announcement on trust that what agencies and leaders say is true rather than as self-serving attempts to justify their work and show successes. That trust is often in short supply, since enough evidence exists that such claims have been manipulated or fabricated in the past.

Values, Goals, and Operational Styles

In contrast are the values, goals, and operational styles of normal and democratic policing with antiterror work to support the argument that involving the police in antiterror work will lead to distortions of democratic policing. The model of community-oriented or community-based policing (COP) is used as representative of democratic policing,¹⁸⁷ and goals and policies of state security agencies as representative of antiterror work (which is not war).

Relations with the Public and Local Communities

A fundamental objective of COP and democratic policing is working with people – that is, being partners with communities and establishing the necessary trust and confidence to allow the police and the public to engage in reciprocal support and cooperation. To achieve this, the police have to be transparent, accessible, willing to listen to people's demands and complaints, and accept their communities as legitimate voices in the development and execution of operational policies.

Gaining trust requires having had successful experiences (that is, having worked together with mutual respect and cooperation) in the past; a belief that the police treat people in the community fairly and equitable, that is, without discrimination, stereotyping, or disdain; the understanding that the police limit the exercise of their powers by acknowledging the legitimacy of legal constraints and that they deal with complaints in an open and visible manner that actually holds officers responsible and accountable. The public, in turn, trusts the police, since their interactions and encounters with the police have been courteous, polite, and professional, and have led to effective order, crime, and safety conditions.

Security agencies have, of necessity, a completely different style of interacting with the public. Their work is not transparent; they are not accessible, except if the public wishes or is expected to provide information on suspected individuals or groups (that is, become informants for the government, its eyes and ears at the local and intimate level); they do not routinely and visible interact with the public (they are not out in the open); their work is shrouded in secrecy; and the effectiveness of their work cannot be assessed realistically, since many successes are events that did not happen.

¹⁸⁷ e.g., SEESAC, 2003.

Intelligence

The police collect intelligence and so do security agencies, but the type of information sought and the manner in which it is gathered differ profoundly.

The police collect information relevant to their normal order maintenance, crime control, and service work. They seek specific information on specified individuals or groups that can be linked to legal allegations of misconduct (done or planned). Information that cannot be shown directly relevant to the cases they are working on (such as political leanings, food preferences, reading habits, and so forth) is suspect and should not be collected at all. In COP, especially in problem-solving activities, information that is relevant is more broadly defined, since it is not tied to casework but to dealing with a problem that is perceived by the community and the police as broadly defined.

But in neither situation – casework or problem solving – are the police allowed to go beyond what the law authorizes. Their intelligence collection is constrained, in democratic systems, by the rights possessed by the public both in substance (what they can collect) and in manner (how they can collect). The police will be interested in many kinds of information (and they often will illegally collect that information or know of it) but they also know that they cannot use it without repercussions for their work and the trust they have gained from their community.

Security agencies also are interested in information converted to intelligence, but they are much less constrained by law (or they are, but in ways either unknown to the public or in a way that makes it hard to assess whether the security agents have abided by the constraints placed on their powers). They collect information that may or may not be useful in the future (not just legally relevant data), on all aspects of the lives of suspect individuals and groups, often by surreptitious means that would be illegal or extralegal if the police employed them. They also pay differential attention to and collect information on particular groups and ignore others – that is, they engage in forms of categoric, racial, or cultural profiling, often based on stereotypes – even if most members of those groups are not likely to be suspected of or involved in terrorist acts.

And security agencies, especially if fighting a war on terror, may use means for extracting information from suspects or even innocents (since it will not be known until the interrogations have been conducted who is who) that may come close to or do violate both domestic law and international conventions that seek to protect individuals against abuse by security agents. If the police engaged in such methods they would be quickly condemned and held accountable (in clear cases of violations); if security agents abuse suspects, their acts are much less likely to be made public or condemned, since they are perceived as doing this to protect societies against dangerous and damaging threats and acts to public well-being and a sense of security.

Prevention and Preemption

The police seek to solve cases and prevent disorder and crime. Security agencies also have these goals but, in addition, seek to preempt terrorist acts. The differences in goals leads to profoundly different views of what work needs to be done.

The police solve or prevent crime and disorder through evidence that can be connected to tangible conduct. Persons and groups of interest to the police must have engaged in activities that have a direct and provable link to acts legally defined as crimes. In democracies, thoughts and speech do not constitute such evidence; these are protected as rights people are entitled to, and governments and security agencies, even though they may find such speech and thoughts offensive or dangerous, cannot allege or prosecute these as criminal conduct unless speech and thoughts lead, have led to, or will incite others to actions that constitute crimes.

Security agencies, in contrast, pay attention to thoughts, speech, and legal conduct (as well as to criminal acts) that indicate that individuals or groups might be engaged in planning terrorist acts. The goal is preempting even the planning of acts or support for them by speech, material support, or services, because if agencies wait until clear evidence of likely actions has been collected, it may be too late. In preemption, all information on suspected groups and categories of people, no matter how collected, is valuable, relevant, and utilizable. Security agencies are interested in collecting, combining, and analyzing what used to be called, if the police collected that information, "political dossiers" – that is, all acts and thoughts, whether legal or not, that might indicate a pattern of predispositions, values, ideologies, and conduct that could pose a threat to the order of society and the stability of the state.

The ultimate goal is integrated databases, incorporating in close to real time information which can be instantly accessed, combining all known data on individuals into electronic dossiers. No distinction can and will be made between information of a personal nature and information that can indicate criminal or terrorist intentions and acts. All data matters, and only after acts have been preempted and prevented, arrests made, or individuals convicted will one know what was relevant information and what was not. The goal is a government in which the lives of people are an open book. Harnessing or drawing the police into antiterror work will lead to policing goals, values, and operational policies that move normal police work in the direction of intelligence and state security work.

Strengthening the Power of the State

Antiterror work is state-centred and tied to notions of national security and interests, rather than to local order and safety. Control, influence, and oversight of the police will tend to shift toward the national level, and local control and the legitimacy (and capacity) for local oversight will decline. There are a couple of aspects to this.

In states with decentralized policing systems, such as the United States or Switzerland or, to a lesser degree, the Netherlands, the capacity and authority to make decisions about collecting intelligence and by what means, or what events and people to keep track of, shifts toward the national level, in effect seeking to harness the local police to priorities in work and operational practices set by the state.

In the more centralized policing systems typical of continental Europe, the EEC, and transitional states, antiterror work will have a less pronounced effect on local control, which is not a common characteristic in the first place, but it will tend to bureaucratize or "intelligencize" police work at the local levels. That is, the collection of intelligence on terror suspects and categories will assume a greater priority than conventional police, including COP.

The second and obvious issue is that engaging the police in antiterror work will undermine COP – most specifically, the commitment to work with the community to establish trust and abiding by legal constraint on surveillance of suspects. For example, in the United States, a number of local police departments have refused to collect information demanded by the state (through the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, such as listing activities at mosques or interviewing Muslims who have travelled to specified countries), on the grounds that this would both destroy the trust departments have worked hard to establish between themselves and minority communities and would also require the police to collect information that has no direct legal (rather than a security) justification.

Centralized Administration Within Police Agencies

Many departments in the United States that are sufficiently large have also developed new antiterror units within themselves, which compete quite well in the struggle for resources, glamour, and rewards against other units, and may lead to a subtle but important shift in the thinking and cultures of the police, elevating the operational methods and priorities of intelligence work over normal police work, which lacks the excitement and recognition of conducting a successful antiterror operation. The police, as do members of other occupations, value aspects of their work differentially (for example, investigative work tends to have a higher status than patrolling, and crime fighting is more professionally challenging, rewarding, and interesting than service work) and will use available opportunities to move the work toward those areas and stress effectiveness as the success criterion. This is true everywhere, as in many EEC states, where efforts to strengthen local control, a service orientation, and adherence to rights has been undermined by the police, who used the growing threats of organized crime to continue to focus on crime fighting. Antiterror work merely gives them more opportunities to make that argument.

The police will not be shy about making that argument, or using the justification of antiterror work to appeal for new legal authority and financial resources to pursue cases that before they had trouble investigating, or to manipulate data to show how effective they are in dealing with terror.¹⁸⁸ For example, in the United States, the legal powers granted the government under the Patriot Act and the Department of Homeland Security have been used to investigate local corruption cases which have no discernible connection to terror. Local departments have reported vast increases in criminal cases labelled "terror-related crimes" – cases that before used to be classified under other criminal designations. The police are not stupid. They know where the money, attention, and rewards are.

Unbalanced Rights and Safety

Antiterror provides a justification, often propagated by security agencies, that the need to protect society, the state, and the nation requires a (one hopes temporary) shift by police and security agencies away from the importance attached to the rights of the public and suspects. There is nothing wrong or illegitimate, for example, about finding information on what books people read, what Web sites they look at, what organizations they belong to, how they have voted, what food they order when they fly, or what religious institutions they attend, if the goal sought is security against terror.

The idea that a bright line should separate what is public and what is private, a fundamental distinction in democratic legal systems – and

¹⁸⁸ e.g., Law Enforcement News, 2004; Police Chief, 2004.

that the state and its agencies can only invade private spaces on clear and specified legal or judicially sanctioned grounds – becomes blurred and its legitimacy weakened by antiterror work; and control over deciding when the line should be crossed by the state shifts to executive or quasiexecutive agencies and away from the courts and legislative oversight.

Political Manipulation of Law and Its Enforcement

Antiterror work has great legitimacy. It is, by the experiences of the past few years and by the horrific consequences to the lives of innocent people, a frightening assault on people's sense of security. Being unpredictable, and knowing that many targets exist that are vulnerable and hard to defend, terrorism creates and seeks to create a pervasive climate of fear and uncertainty. This fear and the legitimacy of fighting the source of that fear tempt many political and police leaders into overreaction and manipulation. In the long run, this will make people more uncertain, even if manipulation leads to short-run political gains. For example, the colour-coded terror alerts in the United States may reflect changes in the objective risks of terror attacks, but, as the threat level has been raised and lowered and colours for the day changed and little has happened, with no concrete guidelines having been provided on what to do when threat levels oscillate, some people have concluded that these announcements could be politically inspired manipulations or reflect organizational competition among the various security agencies at the federal level rather than real changes in threats. In practice, the colour scheme has done nothing, as far as one can tell, to either make the public feel more secure or provide concrete guidance to the public and local and state security providers on what to do. Most police agencies have begun to ignore these changes in threat levels, since no specific information about time, place, type of threat, or groups involved has been given out.

Lessened Accountability and Oversight

Antiterror work, with its focus on preemption and its extensive, integrated, and secret data collection, has an obvious effect on accountability and oversight by the political actors, legal and judicial agencies, or the public. To increase transparency, it is argued, would undermine the antiterror effort. To the degree that the police become involved in antiterror work, that same argument will be made and sustained. The police, no more than any other occupation, do not like people standing over their shoulders and examining their work. They will now have one more, and very legitimate-sounding reason, to reject transparency. Accountability will shift from structures and political agencies having the authority for oversight to the language of trust: "You can trust us. We are not doing anything which is illegal or violates your rights, and if we do (or are forced to do) it is for your own protection and good."

Effective accountability over the police has been one of the most difficult tasks to accomplish, even in democratic systems. The justification and cloak of antiterror work makes this task devilishly more difficult. This is probably one of the more harmful consequences for democratic reforms of the police, especially in transitional societies that are trying to move away from the history of state security agencies controlled by state and party, with unchecked powers to engage in surveillance and detentions of "suspects."

Slow Movement Toward Democratic Forms of Policing in States and Societies Undergoing Changes

The arguments on how democratic policing will be affected in democracies also apply to societies undergoing change. Progress in developing democratic policing systems in countries having little tradition of democratic policing has been slow, and has been as much a process of two steps forward and one step back as one of steady and incremental progress. Much of the unevenness of progress can be tied to security conditions faced by these countries, most commonly an explosion of domestic and transnational organized crime, which have led to demands for effective police responses but have limited progress toward the rights side of police reforms. And in countries in which COP has been the model that is seen as the preferred goal, the threat of terror has tended to override the "softer" side of police work enshrined in COP.

Enhanced Power and Autonomy of the Police

In the same way that the threat of terror stresses the need by civic society to trust its leaders, antiterror work emphasizes the expert capacity of the police, their professional acumen, and their skills in detecting and dealing with threats from terror. Professionalism has been used by the police to assert the need for and legitimacy of autonomy and discretion. As professionals, they should be left to apply their skills and good values to most effectively deal with threats, rather than be overseen continually and interfered with by public "misjudgements" and ill-founded complaints of both their intentions and their work. Antiterror gives them another lever for asserting autonomy, especially when combined with the operational need for secrecy.

Changing the Operational Style of Democratic Policing

Police are notorious simplifiers of the world they work in. The tend to categorize events and people by often crude indicators of likely criminal intents, actions, or dangerousness, and will treat individuals on the basis of group categories they have been placed into. Racial profiling in the United States or the attention paid by the police to the Roma in many EEC states, which makes practical sense to most police, are well-known examples that have been rightly condemned as a practice offensive to the spirit of democratic policing. The police simplify their world since their time, attention, and resources are limited, and they need clues on how to most effectively allocate their work. Categorical placements of individuals do that. The police do not pay attention to everything, but to those aspects of their working world they believe indicate danger, criminality, or a propensity for deviance.

The harmful effects of antiterror work are that it strengthens the predisposition of the police to direct their gaze toward certain groups and individuals and not to others, on the basis of categorical placements and expectations, rather than by objective indicators.

Strengthening the Securitization Discourse

The way in which people talk about security – what it means and how it can be achieved – will have an effect on the types and priorities of security policies pursued by the state. A war metaphor will lead to different perceptions of the justice and legitimacy of security policies and how people are treated than will a "we are dealing with crime" metaphor. Security is a fundamental value and need for societies, but security can be tied to different notions of what type of security matters and when societies and people are secure enough. As Cawthra and Luckham (2003: 310) note, security reform "requires a new conceptual understanding of security based on human security imperatives rather than security of the rule of a regime, cabal, or individual." The rhetoric of antiterror devalues the conceptualization of security as human security. In terms of sector reform, which already focuses mostly on the military and border control agencies, policing will be seen as less relevant (unless tied to antiterror work). The thrust of the reform of policing means that an emphasis on service and responsiveness to community will be relegated to secondary status.

The securitization notion (Loader, 2002) argues that rise of transnational threats, especially in Europe, as it has moved toward the integration of new members into the European Union, has altered the way people conceive of and talk about security and what threatens it. Such democratic values as the tolerance of diversity, openness of governance, and adherence to the rule of law have been weakened as states and societies have reinterpreted and redefined who and what is a threat. The climate of discourse has hardened into certainties that appeal to less democratic and often reactionary political values and practices. Civic life has coarsened. The trust and respect underlying democratic life and sensibilities have given way to a distrust of the stranger and of cultural diversity. The police will be drawn into and may actively support the reproduction of that discourse – and it will channel their gaze and work in specific directions. Their mandate will shift and the relative priorities for attention and work will be reorganized to reflect the stress on security from terror.

Concluding Thoughts

None of the tendencies discussed are inevitable. Yet the degree to which they will happen will depend on the efforts made by civic society and progressive political and police leaders to set in motion processes and create organizational structures that will lessen the probabilities that these tendencies will reach fruition. For the tendencies to happen, all that is necessary is for people who are concerned about the threats to democratic policing (and democratic life) to do nothing.

Terrorism is a serious threat and must be confronted. Yet three implications on how to prevent the tendencies from becoming reality are obvious:

- The police should be organizationally separated from antiterror work. Let the police be the police and let them perform normal policing and let other agencies perform the antiterror work. The police cannot do both community or democratic policing and antiterror work effectively and fairly.
- The meaning of security in security architecture reform needs to encompass human as well as state security. The discourse of security has to be complex, inclusive, and diverse.
- The capacity and legitimacy for civic oversight of the police and antiterror agencies has to be strengthened even more than has been done so far.