CIAO DATE: 08/03

Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?

Frank G. Wisner II, Nicholas Platt, Marshall M. Bouton, Dennis Kux, and Mahnaz Ispahani

June 2003

Council on Foreign Relations

Executive Summary

Nineteen months after the defeat of the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies, Afghanistan remains a long way from achieving the U.S. goal of a stable self-governing state that no longer serves as a haven for terrorists. Indeed, failure to stem deteriorating security conditions and to spur economic reconstruction could lead to a reversion to warlord dominated anarchy and mark a major defeat for the U.S. war on terrorism. To prevent this from happening, the Task Force recommends that the United States strengthen the hand of President Hamid Karzai and intensify support for security, diplomatic, and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Although Karzai is trying to assert his authority outside Kabul, he lacks the means to compel compliance by recalcitrant warlords and regional leaders who control most of the countryside. Current policy for the 9,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan rules out support for Karzai against the regional warlords and also active participation in the planned effort to demobilize the 100,000-strong militias. In the Afghan setting, where the United States has the primary military power, this approach is mistaken and leaves a dangerous security void outside Kabul, where the 4,800-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) maintains the peace. (The United States has been unwilling until now to support deployment of ISAF elsewhere.) The U.S.-sponsored effort to develop the Afghan national army (ANA) is proceeding at a painfully slow pace and the projected strength of 9,000 men a year from now is grossly inadequate to provide the Afghan government a meaningful security capability. This is also true for the training of a national police force for which the Germans have taken lead responsibility.

The United States should be exerting greater pressure on neighboring countries to support Afghanistan's stability and not to undercut the Karzai government through backing of regional warlords or failure to curb pro-Taliban elements. Breaking the well ingrained habit of external meddling in Afghanistan is difficult but should have a high U.S. policy priority. To create an additional barrier, the Task Force also believes that the United States should undertake a major diplomatic initiative to obtain a high-level international agreement against outside interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs.

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