

## The Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University Working Paper No. 2014-16

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2510357

# Albanian Local Government Finance on the Eve of Territorial Consolidation

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Abstract:

This paper reviews local government finances in Albania on the eve of the government's plan to decrease the number of municipalities from 373 to 61. The paper argues that without changes in the current intergovernmental finance system, territorial consolidation is unlikely to be accompanied by improved service delivery. This is because Albanian local governments are underfunded and receive less revenue than their counterparts in the region measured both as a percentage of total public revenues and of GDP. The current intergovernmental finance regime is also "over-equalizing" and is depriving the country's larger jurisdictions –particularly Tirana— of the resources they need to build network infrastructure. These problems cannot be resolved by the efficiency gains that should come from consolidation. Nor is better property tax collection fix likely to transform the situation. Instead, the national government needs to provide municipalities with new grants and transfers. One possibility here is to introduce income tax sharing, a reform that would also make it possible to anchor the equalization system in an objective measure of relative wealth. Eventually, income tax shares could be transformed into local surcharges.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Albana Dhimitri, Peter Clavelle, Anila Gjika, Besjona Koprencka, Silvana Meko, and Fatlum Nurja for both their research support and their comments on earlier drafts of this report. All errors of fact and interpretation, however remain my own. The research for this paper was carried out under the "Planning and Local Governance Project in Albania" managed by Tetra Tech ARD and funded by United States Agency for International Development.

### **Introduction:**

This paper presents an overview of the evolution and current status of local government finances in Albania today. Its purpose is to give policy-makers a picture of local government finance on the eve of territorial consolidation. The paper makes the following main points:

- Albanian local governments receive substantially less public revenue than their counterparts in all other countries of the region measured as both a share of GDP and of total public revenues.
- Over the last ten years, the financial positon of Albanian local governments has deteriorated.
- The regulatory regime governing local government own-revenues, as well as the size and allocation of Conditional Grants has been extremely unstable, undermining good local budgeting and financial planning while also demotivating revenue mobilization
- The allocation of both Conditional and Unconditional Grants have very strongly favored the smallest but not necessarily the poorest local governments. As a result, the least populous local governments have consistently had higher per capita revenues then their more urban counterparts.
- While Albania has tried to equalize the fiscal resources of poorer jurisdictions, the grant and transfer mechanisms that it is currently using for this purpose are inefficient. They are also directing resources away from the local governments in which the vast majority of the population lives. Of particular note in the respect is Tirana, which is one of the few capital cities in the region that has lower per capita revenues than many other less important jurisdictions in the country.
- The accounting and reporting of local government financial data by both the national government and local governments remains poor, making it difficult to track the evolution of the sector or the effectiveness of the policies governing it.
- The consolidation of 373 local governments into 61 much larger jurisdictions creates a huge opportunity for Albania to improve its system of public administration. But while Territorial consolidation will reduce some administrative costs and at least marginally shift resources to urban jurisdictions, it alone will not solve the financial or administrative problems of local governments.

- For territorial consolidation to fulfill its real promise the national government will need to commit to progressively increasing local government revenues; improving financial reporting systems and practices; and engaging in a sustained and inclusive intergovernmental dialogue.
- There are no magic bullets for improving the financial position of local governments. Improving the collection of the Property Tax is part of the solution, but even doubling the yield of the tax will only increase local government revenues by 4%.
- National policy makers thus need to commit to putting more money into the grant and transfer system, while also making this system more predictable and efficient.
- There are a number of ways this could be done. But probably all should look to define the size of the Unconditional Grant as a percentage of national tax revenues. Similarly, efforts should be made to rationalize the allocation of Conditional Grants while keeping their overall role in the system at a reasonable level.
- National policy makers should also consider introducing Personal Income Tax (PIT) sharing into Albania's intergovernmental finance system. PIT-sharing has become a mainstay of intergovernmental finance in the post-communist world and with territorial consolidation is now technically possible in Albania. PIT-sharing provides local officials with strong financial incentives to promote economic growth; can eventually be transformed into a local tax; and creates an objective anchor for a fair and more efficient equalization system.
- To date, the national government has prevented local governments from borrowing Over time, this policy needs to be changed because without access to debt capital municipalities will not be able to efficiently finance or build much of the urban infrastructure that Albania needs. Liberalizing access to debt however will require time and the development of new regulatory instruments to ensure that municipal borrowing is prudent and permitted only for investment purposes. The national government will also have to restrict its own borrowing because at present the total public debt of Albania as a percentage of GDP (72%)<sup>2</sup> significantly exceeds the limits set by the European Union's Maastricht Treaty (60%).

### **Structure of the Paper**

The paper reviews the history of local government finance in Albania over the last decade. Where possible it compares revenue and expenditure of Albanian local governments with those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> World Bank, Program Document for a First Public Finance Development Loan, May 2014 pg. 8

of their counterparts in other countries of the region. It also examines the distribution of revenues and expenditures across different groups of local governments in order to better understand how the current grant and transfer system is actually working. Finally, it consolidates 2012 revenue data for all 373 existing local governments into the 61 jurisdictions that will be formed next year. This should help policy makers anticipate the revenue and expenditure patterns of Albania's new local governments under the assumption that there are no major changes in the intergovernmental finance system. By the same token, it should also facilitate the planning and simulation of any reforms to the system that are made with the formation of new local governments.

### **Methodological Note:**

Developing a clear and compelling picture of local government finances in Albania is significantly more difficult than it should be. There are many reasons for this. One reason is that local government financial accounting and reporting remains weak. In part, this is because the legal definitions and rules governing local public finance are often unclear and poorly expressed. In part it is because insufficient attention has been paid to training, something that should become more cost effective with territorial consolidation. And in part it is because the Ministry of Finance has repeatedly changed the form in which it makes revenue and expenditure data publically available.

Moreover, and most importantly since 2009 this data has been internally inconsistent with reported revenues exceeding expenditures by significant amounts. The reason for this that transfer payments made to poor households --which go through local governments but are not used by them-- are recorded as revenues but not as expenditures. Unfortunately, however these transfers from the Ministry of Social Welfare cannot simply be subtracted from total local revenues because they include some grants whose end users are local governments. These accounting practices make it difficult to develop a complete and accurate picture of local government finances or their changes over over time. In the following, we have tried to compensate for these weaknesses by taking local government expenditures as a proxy for local government revenues, and by subtracting own-revenues and unconditional transfers from total expenditures to determine the size of conditional grants. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are for local governments only, meaning without the revenues and expenditures are from the 2011 census.

### I. Total Local Government Revenues

Chart I below presents the revenues of local governments in 2012 as a share of GDP and total public revenues for select countries in the region, as well as the average for the EU. These measures are the single-best comparative indicators we have of the relative importance of local

governments in the public administration systems of different countries. To read them correctly it is important to know what public services local governments are responsible for delivering. For example, local governments in Kosovo finance and manage primary schools as well as ambulatory health care, both costly social sector functions. Thus, it is not surprising that local government revenues are substantially higher in Kosovo than in Albania both as a percentage of GDP and total public expenditures.



Chart 1: Local Government Revenue as a Share of GDP and Total Public Revenue: 2012

\*Countries in which local governments are responsible for primary education and in some cases primary health care. See NALAS, <u>Fiscal Decentralization Indicators in South-East Europe</u>, 2012. Albanian data does not include Qarks; Romanian data includes judets.

Nonetheless, the Chart makes clear that local governments play a very small role in the governance structure of Albania: They receive less than half of the share of the national fiscal pie that their counterparts in other countries receive, despite being responsible for the same basic urban services (Turkey, RS, Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia and Serbia). What this means is that while territorial consolidation may improve the efficiency with which local governments use their resources, they will remain underfunded unless a concerted effort is made to slowly increase their revenues.

Worse, the financial situation of Albania local governments has actually deteriorated over the last decade. As can be seen from Chart 2 below, after improving between 2002 and 2009, local government finances have deteriorated over the last five years and are now at levels equal to those at the beginning of the decentralization process. So again, while consolidation may

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of local government expenditures, it will not solve the problem of underfunding.



Chart 2: Local Government Revenues (without Qarks) as a Share of GDP and Total Public Revenues 2002-2013.

### II. The Composition of Local Government Revenues

Charts 3 and 4 (below) present the basic composition of local government revenues between 2002 and 2012 in billions of lek, and as a percentage of total revenue. As can be seen from Chart 3, there has been a fair amount of fluctuation in both total revenues and their composition over the last 10 years. **Own-revenues** increased steadily from 2002 to 2008 and have consistently constituted the single largest source of local government income. In 2008, however, the absolute value of own-revenues began to decline in absolute terms after the national government imposed various restrictions on the tax and few powers of local governments<sup>3</sup>, a policy that continued in 2014 with the transformation of Small Business Tax into the centrally collected Simplified Tax, which though still returned to local governments now has a substantially narrower base.

Between 2007 and 2010, the amount of **Conditional Grants** in the system more than doubled, increasing their share from of total income from about 10% to between 15 and 20%. In 2011, however, the value of Conditional Grants was cut in half, lowering their share in total revenue and compounding a broader decline in local government income from c. 30 to 25 billion lek.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Tony Levitas, *Local Government Taxes, Fees and Charges in Albania: Current and Future Challenges* (Report to the Albanian Associations of Communes, Swedish Association of Local Authorities) September, 2010, pp. 1-31

Finally, the value of the **Unconditional Grant** peaked at 11.7 billion lek in 2009 before declining by about 10% in subsequent years. It still, however, constitutes between 35 and 40% of total local government revenue. Rapidly shifting national government policies with respect to all three broad categories of local government revenue have not helped encourage good local budgeting and in particular have hindered rational investment planning.



Charts 3 & 4: The Basic Composition of Local Government Revenues (without Qarks) in Billions of Lek and as a Percentage of Total Revenue: 2002-2013

Chart 5 below compares the composition of local government revenues in Albania with those of other South-East European countries. Albanian local governments derive a higher share of their (low) revenues from own-sources -50%-- than all other countries in the group except Montenegro. Or put another way, most local governments in the region not only receive a larger share of the total fiscal pie than Albanian ones, but this larger share is coming primarily through greater grants and transfers.

At the same time, only Albania, Kosovo and Bulgaria derive no income from shared Personal Income Tax (PIT). This is significant because PIT-sharing is an important pillar of local government finance throughout post-communist Europe. One reason for this is that it provides local governments with a direct budgetary incentive to encourage job creation and to reign in the gray economy. Another is because PIT per capita is a good indicator of the relative wealth and can thus be used to anchor a transparent, fair, and easy to administer equalization system<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See PLGP White Paper and Tony Levitas, *EURASIA State of Decentralization Background Paper*, Seminar for Dialogue and Capacity building of local and regional authorities in Eurasia in the development and local governance fields, SKL International Tbilisi, Georgia May 2013 pp. 1-30

Territorial consolidation will significantly reduce the technical and political challenges of introducing PIT-sharing into Albania's intergovernmental finance system because all local governments will now have a significant number of residents who pay the tax. Nonetheless, any movement in this direction will have to be preceded by 12 to 18 months of technical preparation, both to analyze the distribution of PIT nationally, and to move the current registration of PIT from the address of employers to the residence of employees.



Chart 5: The Composition of Local Government Revenues in South-East Europe

NALAS, Fiscal Decentralization Indicators in South-East Europe, 2012, Albanian data 2013 without qarks

It is also worth noting that local governments in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Kosovo all derive a very large share of their revenues from Conditional Grants. This is because local governments in these countries are responsible for financing and managing schools, and to ensure that funds intended to support education are actually spent in the sector, the national government provides local governments with these monies through Conditional or Block Grants. Elsewhere in the region, however Conditional Grants usually constitute less than 10% of total revenue, as in Albania today. This however, is unlike in Turkey, FBiH or indeed Albania between 2007 and 2010 when Conditional Grants constituted excessive share of total local government income.

Charts 6 and 7 below show the composition of local government own-revenue between 2002 and 2013 in billion lek and as a percentage of total own-revenue. Unfortunately, there has been a considerable amount of variation in the way the Ministry of Finance has aggregated own revenue data for public presentation, making the analysis of some revenue streams difficult (e.g. Vehicle Tax, Transfer Tax). Also some significant local revenues (e.g. Greenery Fees, Public lighting fees) have never appeared in the data prepared by the Ministry, making it unclear whether codes for these revenues exist, or whether the Ministry has just choosen not include these lines in its reporting.





But what is clear is that the accounting and reporting local government financial data is weak. One reason for this is because the definition of what is a fee, a charge and a tax in Albanian law is very unclear. Indeed, some fees —most notably the **Greenery and Public Lighting fees**—probably should not be allowed at all because there is no way to measure how much of the public good or service being provided is being consumed by individuals or households. Instead, these services should be financed by a general local tax, and more specificly the Property Tax. Similarly, charges for collecting garbage —which at least in theory can be attributed to particular consumers—should be not be bundled together with charges for street cleaning **–the Cleaning Fee--** which (like public lighting) cannot be measured. So, looking ahead policy-makers need to clarify the legal definitions of fees, charges and taxes; better align these definitions with the budgetary codes that local governments are required to use for financial reporting; improve the rulebooks that explain these codes; and train local financial officiers to use them correctly.

Over the last ten years, between 20 and 30% of local government revenue has come from **Non-Tax Revenues**. This category typically includes fines, penalties, interest, revenue from the sale or rental of assets, and carryovers from previous years. In most countries, however the category does not account for so large a share of local revenue. So as with the category "Other" it would be good to know more about what is being included in this category.

As can be seen from the Charts, the **Small Business Tax** has provided with local governments with a substantial if declining amount of revenue of between 4.1 billion lek in 2004 (40% of own-revenue) and 2 billion lek in 2013 (13% of own-revenue). As we have already indicated, in 2014 the base of the tax was narrowed, and the national government recentralized collection,

though 100% of the yield of the new Simplified Tax still goes to local governments. Data for the first seven months of 2014 show an 8% decline over the same period in 2013, adding to the financial difficulties of local governments<sup>5</sup>.

Since 2005, the **Property Tax** (Buildings and Agricultural Land) has produced between 3.2 and 1.6 billion in annual revenue or between 10% and 21% own-revenues. The yield of the tax however has fluctuated quite significantly. For example, between 2009 and 2011, the tax generated around 1.6 billion lek in revenue a year, but climbed to 2.5 billion in 2013 when other revenues fell significantly. Moreover, data from the first 7 months of 2014 show that local governments have already collected about the same amount as they did for all of 2013. In short, it seems fairly clear that local governments are responding to the decline in other revenues by more aggressively collecting the Property Tax<sup>6</sup>. This is a good sign and there is little doubt that looking ahead improving the performance of the Property Tax will remain one of the major challenges facing both local and national officials. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that the larger problem of underfunding can be fixed simply by making the Property Tax more productive. One reason for this is that the Property Tax will have to replace declining income from the small business tax as well as income from fees and charges that should eventually be eliminated (e.g. Public Lighting Fee, Greenery Fee, parts of the Cleaning Fee).

But the real reason for believing that there are limits to how robust a revenue stream the Property Tax can become are suggested by Chart 8 below. The Chart shows the yield of the Property Tax as a percentage of GDP in countries across the region, as well as the average for the EU as a whole. As can be seen from the Chart, while the yield of the Property Tax as a percentage of GDP is very low in Albania, this is not exceptional. Indeed, only in Montenegro and Romania does it approach anything like EU norms (which in turn are low by American or Canadian standards at c. 3% of GDP). More to the point, Kosovo local governments collect property tax revenues equal to only 0.31% of the GDP despite the fact that the international community has invested very heavily in the development of a sophisticated and reasonably complete –though still far from perfect national cadaster. As a result, the national government actually issues tax bills to property owners on the basis of valuation metrics supplied by local governments. Despite this, collection rates remain very low (c. 50% after payments for outstanding debt are accounted for)<sup>7</sup>.

#### Chart 8: The Property Tax as Percentage of GDP in South-East Europe: 2012

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> http://www.financa.gov.al/en/reports/ecomomic-fiscal-program/monthly-reports-and-fiscal-statistics/monthly-fiscal-statistics
 <sup>6</sup> Part of the increase was generated by changes in national government policy that increased minimum square meter charges were doubled for business and second homes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> B. Disha, S. Kurtisi, T. Levitas, "Improving Municipal Own Source Revenue in Kosovo" (USAID/Democratic Effective Municipalities Initiative, January 2012) pp. 1-25.



Data for Albania are for 2013; for the others see NALAS, Fiscal Decentralization Indicators in South-East Europe, 2012

Thus while it should be clear that there is huge opportunity for Albanian local governments to improve the collection of the property tax, it is unreasonable to expect that this can happen overnight, or more importantly that this can alone will solve the larger problem of underfunding local governments.

The **Infrastructure Investment Tax** has also been an important source of local government own-revenue, generating between 1.6 and 3.2 billion lek in annual income and accounting for between 12% and 22% of total local government revenue. The tax is imposed on the value of new construction with the rate limited to 2% in all local governments except Tirana where the limit is 4%. In recent years, a centrally imposed moratorium on the issuing of construction permits by local governments that have failed to pass their urban plans has led to a decline in the yield of this tax, but presumably this will change. Since the basic purpose of this tax is to help local governments build the public infrastructure needed to service new private investment, the tax should be defined as capital revenue and legally earmarked for investment.

In many countries in the region, the equivalent of this tax is called the Land Development Fee (Serbia, Macedonia) or the Utility Construction Fee (Montenegro, Croatia) or simply the Construction Permit Fee (Kosovo). In these countries, the fee is charged on a square meter basis, and local governments are free to set the fee as high as they like. This has made the Fee a very important source of local government revenue throughout the region. But it has also caused many problems, with local governments setting extremely high fees that are thought to discourage new investment. Indeed, concerted efforts are now being made in Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro to eliminate the fee entirely, efforts which if successful will have a profound negative impact on local government finances. In this context, the Albanian solution to this problem –a centrally regulated tax that at once provides local governments with some revenue while preventing the gauging of the business community—seems reasonable. In saying this, however, we do not mean to suggest that there aren't better ways to calculate the base of the tax or ensure that it is imposed fairly.

Finally, a word on local government debt: While in most countries of the region, local government borrowing remains in its infancy, it is only in Albania where national government policy has essentially made it impossible. Over time, this policy needs to be changed because without access to debt capital municipalities will not be able to efficiently finance or build much of the urban infrastructure that Albania needs. Liberalizing access to debt however will require time and the development of new regulatory instruments to ensure that municipal borrowing is prudent and permitted only for investment purposes. The national government will also have to restrict its own borrowing because at present the total public debt of Albania significantly exceeds  $(72\%)^8$  the limits set by the European Union's Maastricht Treaty (60% of GDP).

#### **III.** Local Government Expenditures

Charts 9 and 10 below show the composition of local government expenditures in economic terms in both billion lek and as a share of total expenditures for the years 2002-2012. Unfortunately, until 2009 the publicly available data did not distinguish between wage and non-wage operating expenditures. As can be seen from the Charts, investment spending as a share of total expenditure increased from around 20% to over 30% in 2007.





This coincided with the national government's radical expansion of Conditional Grants, whose value rose from about 2.5 billion lek a year in 2006 to between 4.5 and 5.8 billion a lek year between 2007 and 2010. In 2009, investment peaked both as a share of total expenditure (43%) and in billion lek (13.5) and equaled about 100 million euro.

Since 2010, however Conditional Grants have again fallen to a level similar to 2002-2006. This decline –compounded by the fall in other revenues-- has been accompanied by a drop in both the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> World Bank, Program Document for a First Public Finance Development Loan, May 2014 pg. 8

share of expenditures going to investment and investment spending in lek. In 2011, local governments responded to the fall in their revenues by slashing both investment and other operating expenditures. In 2012, other operating expenditure increased, while investment continued to fall. Wage spending between 2009 and 2012, however remained relatively stable at about 9.4 billion lek. So while the share of investment spending in the budgets of Albanian local governments is not trivial (over 20%), much of this share has been driven by Conditional Grants. Equally importantly, the relatively high –though falling—share is off a very low base. As a result, by 2012 total local government investment amounted to only 50 million euro.

For the years 2002 to 2008 we have data on what this investment spending went for. As can be seen from Chart 11 below, more than two-thirds of it went for transport, meaning road construction.





For the years 2009-2012, we have data on all local government expenditures by function. As can be seen from Chart 12 below, the local governments classify the vast majority of their expenditures under the rubric of General Administration (55-60%). This is followed by Transport, which consists primarily of investments into roads and has fluctuated in line with the total amount of Conditional Grants in the system, most of which have originated with the Ministry of Transport (20-40%). Spending on education constitutes the third largest category of local expenditure (c. 7%) and much of this has probably gone to improve school facilities since local government have no responsibilities for the day-to-day operating costs of schools. These investment efforts however, have been much less strongly supported by Conditional Grants than investment in Roads, because while Conditional Grants from the Ministry of Transport have been equal to between a third and half of all spending on transport, Conditional Grants from the Ministry of Education have been equal to only 10 to 15% of local government spending on schools. Finally, local governments have devoted about 5% of their expenditures to Culture and Sports and about 4% to improving Water Supply. Spending on Health, Housing, Tourism and the general economy remain marginal, though are picture here is not as clear as it should be because of the problems in the way Conditional Grants are reported in the National Data.



Chart 12 Composition of Local Government Expenditure 2009-2012

#### IV. The Distribution of Local Government Revenues and Expenditures

To fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of any intergovernmental finance system it is necessary to look beneath the aggregate revenue and expenditure data and examine how revenues and expenditures are distributed across local governments of different sizes and types. There are many ways to do this. One method is to rank all local governments by the number of their inhabitants and then to divide them into four equal groups or quartiles. This method allows us to examine the relationship between the population of local governments and their revenues. Another method is to rank all local governments by their per capita own-revenues and then to similarly divide them into four quartiles. This method allows us to look at the relationship between the revenue raising ability of local governments and there total budgets. (The two methods would yield identical results if there was a perfect correlation between the population of local governments and their revenue raising capacity).

Tables 1 and 2 below present 2009 financial data in two different ways. Table 1 presents it in quartiles based on the per capita own revenues of local governments while Table 2 organizes the quartiles on the basis of their populations. In both tables the 373 local governments are divided into four quartiles that each contain 93 jurisdictions, with Tirana treated as a separate and special case. In Table 1, the first quartile contains the 93 local governments with lowest per capita own-revenues, the second quartile the 93 local governments with the next highest per capita revenue, and so on. In Table 2, the first quartile contains the 93 local governments with the smallest

number of residents, the second quartile the 93 local governments with the next largest number of residents, and so on.

Table 1 allows us to compare the percentage of the population living in each quartile with its share of each type of revenue. As would be expected, poorer quartiles have a much smaller share of total own-revenue than their share in the total population, and most of the own-revenue in the system is being generated in the richest quartile and, particularly, in Tirana. The allocation of Unconditional Grants however is roughly in line with each quartiles share of the population with the notable exception of Tirana. Despite having 15% of the population the capital only receives 8.3% of the Unconditional Grant<sup>9</sup>. Also surprising is the fact that the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> quartiles receive a higher share of Conditional Grants than their share of the population, while the poorest 1<sup>st</sup> quartile gets substantially less, and the Tirana almost nothing. This is counter intuitive because one might reasonably expect a higher share of Conditional Grants to go to local governments less able to generate own-revenues.

 Table 1: Local Government Revenues by Quartiles based on Per Capita Own-Revenues in

 2009

Quartile by Own Revenue Per Capita	Population	% of population	% of Own Revenue	% of Uncond. Grant	% of Condit. Grant	% of Total Revenue	Own Revenue Per capita	Total Revenue Per Capita	Ratio of total per capita revenues to those of the 4th quartile
1	400,508	14.3%	1.1%	14.5%	8.5%	8.0%	407	6,416	2.3
2	425,750	15.2%	3.3%	16.4%	15.5%	10.5%	1,125	7,898	1.9
3	489,160	17.5%	8.7%	19.6%	24.2%	15.5%	2,555	10,203	1.4
4	1,066,225	38.1%	55.8%	41.1%	49.7%	48.8%	7,507	14,722	1.0
Tirana	418,495	14.9%	31.1%	8.3%	2.0%	17.2%	10,654	13,258	1.1
Total/Avg	2 800 138	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	5 127	11 488	1.3

In these tables we have used the 2011 census data for all calculations, despite the fact that in 2009 revenues were allocated in accordance with the Civil Registry data.

Taken together, these indicators suggest that while there is some equalization going on, almost all of it is coming at the expense of the capital city and that it is not very efficient because the wealthier local governments in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> quartile are getting higher shares of (potentially equalizing) grants than their share in the population. This can be seen in the ratio of total per capita revenues in each group to the per capita revenues of the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile. For starters, the per capita revenues of Tirana are actually lower than the average for all local governments in the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile. This is exceedingly unusual because capital cities are typically among the two or three

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This result seem to be the product of two aspects of the formula for allocating Unconditional grants: First the component formula that allocates 15% of the grant pool on the basis of square kilometers works strongly against Tirana which occupies only 40 square kilometers. And second unlike other densely populated jurisdictions Tirana is not eligible for the 15% of the grant pool that is allocated to local governments that provide urban services.

wealthiest jurisdictions in a country. Also unusual is the relatively low ratio of the per capita revenues of the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile to the 1<sup>st</sup>. Here it is only 2.5 to 1, when it is often over 4 to 1.

Quartile by Population	Population	% of popula tion	% of Own Revenue	% of Uncond. Grant	% of Condit. Grant	% of Total Revenue	Own Revenue Per capita	Uncond. Grant per Capita	Condit. Grant per Capita	Total Revenue Per Capita
1	103,954	3.7%	1.4%	10.3%	8.7%	6.0%	1,877	11,567	5,033	18,477
2	253,599	9.1%	6.1%	16.6%	16.3%	11.7%	3,480	7,629	3,761	14,870
3	468,080	16.7%	8.6%	18.6%	19.6%	15.2%	2,636	4,629	3,179	10,444
4	1,556,010	55.6%	52.8%	46.3%	48.6%	49.9%	4,875	3,473	1,961	10,308
Tirana	418,495	14.9%	31.1%	8.3%	6.8%	17.2%	10,654	2,312	292	13,258
Total/Avg	2,800,138	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	5,127	4,170	577	11,488

Table 2 Local Government Revenues by Quartiles based on Population in 2009

What is driving these results becomes a little more obvious when we look at the composition of local government revenues by quartiles based on population. In Table 2 the first thing that should be noticed is that the distribution of population across quartiles is very different than in the Table 1. For example only 3.7 and 9.1% of the total population live in the two quartiles composed of local governments with smallest populations, as opposed to 14% and 15% of the population when the quartiles are organized on the basis of own-revenues per capita. This means that at least some large jurisdictions generate very little own-revenue. At the same time, we can see that when quartiles are ranked by relative wealth the 14% of the population that lives in the poorest quartile generates only 1.1% of the own revenues in the system (Table 1), but when they are ranked by population, the much smaller 3.7% of the population living in the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile actually generate a higher share of the own-revenue in the system (1.4%) than the 14% of the population living in the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile of local government least able to generate own revenues (1.1%). This in turn suggests that not all small jurisdictions are poor.

Despite this, and as can be seen from the per capita figures in Table 2, a very disproportionate amount of both Conditional and Unconditional Grants are being allocated to the local governments with the smallest populations. So much so, that the average per capita revenues of these jurisdictions now exceeds those of all other groupings. Equally striking is the fact that the average per capita revenues of the largest local governments in the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile –where 56% of the population lives—is now the lowest in the country and the ratio of its revenues to those of all other groupings is less than 1.

In short, while Unconditional and Conditional Grants are clearly being used to "equalize" the finances of local governments, the effective allocation criteria is not relative wealth, but size – with the smallest jurisdictions getting more whether they are rich or poor. This is an inefficient way to use scarce funds. It is also compounding the financial problems of the jurisdictions in the  $4^{th}$  quartile that serve 56% of the total population. Indeed, the anti-urban bias of the

intergovernmental finance system in Albania is striking because most countries in the region have the opposite problem: For example, in Serbia the four largest cities had per capita revenues seven times those of the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile of local governments in 2002. Moreover, even after very significant improvements were made in the equalization system in 2006, the gap between the largest and smallest local governments remained well over 3 to 1, a gap which widened again at the end of the decade<sup>10</sup>. Similarly, in 2010, Skopje had per capita revenues close to three times *the average of all other jurisdictions* in the country, while the per capita revenues of local governments in the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile were five times higher than those of the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile<sup>11</sup>.

Obviously, the point here is not the Albania should try to emulate what is going on in many other countries in the region. Indeed, in some ways Albania should be complimented for its commitment to equalization. Nonetheless, it seems fairly clear that this policy has gone too far in favor of rural jurisdictions and that a more efficient system of equalization should be put in place. We will return to this issue at the later.

For the moment, however, let us look briefly at how the sharp drop in total revenues in the system after 2009 affected the basic distribution revenues across local governments. Here, it is important to note three things. First, between 2009 and 2012 the total amount of Conditional Grants in the system dropped from 5.2 to 2.0 billion lek. Second, the amount of the Unconditional Grant fell from 11.7 to 10.1 over the same period. And third, the Unconditional Grant was allocated in accordance with the 2011 census figures (and not the data from the Civil Registry) for the first time.

Table 3 below is organized like Table 2, meaning around quartiles based on the population of local governments. The last column of the Table shows the percent change in total revenues since 2009. It is the most striking feature of the Table and reflects the overall cuts in the intergovernmental transfer system. But a few other things are worth noting. Now the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile is actually getting close to 25% of Conditional Grants as opposed to only 8% in 2009. This means that while the overall financial position of local governments weakened, the policy of favoring smaller –as opposed to poorer-- jurisdictions actually got stronger: The 1st quartile of local governments received more in Conditional and Unconditional Grants than the 2nd quartile, despite the fact that by 2012 the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile had higher per capita own-revenues than those in the  $2^{nd}$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Tony Levitas, *Reforming Serbia's Intergovernmental Finance System,* Serbia Local Government, in <u>Journal of Public Administration</u> (Volume 28, Spring 2005) pp. 149-178 and Levitas, *The Effects of the Suspension of the Law on Local Government Finance on the Revenue and Expenditure Behavior of Local Governments in Serbia: 2007-2009,* <u>Serbian Quarterly Economic Monitor</u>, Winter 2010) p. 1-28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See Tony Levitas, *Local Government Finances in Macedonia Today: Possible Reforms for Tomorrow,* <u>IDG Working Paper,</u> Urban Institute, May 2010, pp 1-39

Quartile by Population	Population	Area in KM	% of population	% of Own Revenue	% of Uncond. Grant	% of Condit. Grant	% of Total Revenue	Own Revenue Per capita	Total Revenue Per Capita	% change since 2009
1	103,954	9,029	3.7%	1.5%	9.8%	24.8%	5.9%	1,858	13,857	-25%
2	253,599	8,470	9.1%	3.4%	13.2%	21.7%	8.3%	1,796	8,035	-46%
3	468,080	5,901	16.7%	10.4%	18.2%	24.2%	14.3%	2,947	7,492	-28%
4	1,556,010	4,938	55.6%	53.4%	50.3%	28.8%	51.2%	4,536	8,091	-22%
Tirana	418,495	40	14.9%	31.3%	8.5%	0.5%	20.4%	9,872	12,016	-9%
Total/Avg	2,800,138	28,379	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	4,720	8,786	-24%

Table 3 Composition of Local Government Revenue by Quartile based on Population: 2012

Also of note is the fact that total per capita revenues fell less dramatically in the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile and in Tirana than elsewhere. In part this due to the fact own-revenues proved more buoyant than grants and transfers, though here too the national government's effort to constrain local tax powers took its toll. But in part it is due to the fact that the use of the Census Data to allocate the Unconditional Grant produced a shift in resources in favor of larger local governments. Thus, the share of the grant going to the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile increased from 46.3% to 50.3%, while in Tirana it rose from 8.3% to 8.5% (Compare Tables 2 & 3). The reason for this seem to be that the decline in the national population that the 2011 Census revealed (in relationship to the Civil Registry data) was more profound in rural jurisdictions than in urban ones.

Table 4 below looks more closely at the composition of Own Revenues by quartile. As can be seen from the Table, 74% the Property Tax, 90% of the SBT, Infrastructure Tax and Cleaning Fee, and 78% of all Non-Tax Revenue is collected by Tirana and the local governments in the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile. In short, and at the moment, a very high share of all own revenue in the system is currently being collected by the 94 most populous jurisdictions in the country. On the one hand, any fall in revenue that may come with the 2014 reform of the SBT will hit these jurisdictions the hardest. The same will be true of any reform off the Cleaning Fee that makes it impossible for local governments to bundle garbage collection fees with charges for street cleaning, or reforms that force local governments to do away with Public Lighting and Greenery Fees because these revenues are also heavily concentrated in larger jurisdictions and particularly Tirana. At the same time, territorial consolidation will distribute own-revenue raising capacity somewhat more evenly across Albania new local governments (see Table 6 below) simply by reducing their number.

 Table 4 Composition of Own-Revenue by Quartile based on Population: 2012

Quartiles	% of pop.	% of own revenue	% of Property Tax	% of SBT	% of Infrast. Tax	% Cleaning Fee	% of Non- Tax	Own Revenue per capita	Property Tax per capita	SBT Per Capita	Infrast. Tax Per Capita	Cleaning fee per capita	Non Tax Per Capita
1	3.7%	1.5%	2.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.5%	2.2%	1,858	473	89	55	82	551

			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	i i	1	1	1
2	9.1%	3.4%	5.2%	1.6%	1.7%	1.8%	5.7%	1,796	401	142	108	118	585
3	16.7%	10.4%	18.8%	7.2%	8.4%	7.3%	14.8%	2,947	791	346	294	256	827
4	55.6%	53.4%	50.2%	52.1%	76.6%	45.2%	44.7%	4,536	633	752	809	480	749
Tirana	14.9%	31.3%	23.3%	38.7%	13.0%	45.2%	32.6%	9,872	1,093	2,075	512	1,784	2,033
Total/Avg	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	4,720	701	802	587	590	932

Table 5 below shows the composition of local government expenditure by quartile based on population and by basic economic type. The Table is useful primarily because it shows that even in 2012 the relatively high per capita revenues of local governments in the first two quartiles resulted in higher levels of per capita investment than in all other groups, including Tirana. Again, this is unusual and in most countries of the region investment spending by capital cities is typically much higher the virtually everywhere else.

Quartile	% of population	% of wages	% of operating costs	% of investment	% of Total Expend.	Wages per capita	Operating Costs per capita	Investment per capita	Total Expend. Per Capita
1	3.7%	5.5%	4.0%	4.7%	4.7%	4,964	3,588	3,107	11,659
2	9.1%	8.8%	6.4%	11.8%	8.7%	3,261	2,358	3,194	8,813
3	16.7%	15.0%	10.3%	17.0%	13.8%	3,025	2,059	2,493	7,580
4	55.6%	52.4%	56.4%	54.3%	54.4%	3,173	3,391	2,394	8,970
Tirana	14.9%	18.3%	22.9%	12.2%	18.4%	4,110	5,109	1,998	11,252
Total/Avg	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	3,363	3,339	2,450	9,164

 Table 5 Local Government Expenditure by Quartile based on Population in 2012

Per capita expenditures are slightly higher than the revenue figures because of the problem discussed in the methodological note. They are also more correct.

#### V. Simulating the Revenues and Expenditures of Albania's New Local Governments

The consolidation of the 373 local governments into 61 new jurisdictions should make it possible for Albania's to improve its overall system of public sector governance. For the new local governments to fulfill their promise, however, the intergovernmental finance system should be reformed. As we have already indicated, this will require figuring out ways to provide local governments with additional revenue, some of which will have to come from more concerted and coordinated efforts to improve property tax collection, and some of which and some will have to come from increasing grants and/or the introduction of PIT sharing.

It is not our purpose here to elaborate on the development of these new policies or mechanisms. Instead we simply want to briefly review the structural and financial characteristics of the new, consolidated local governments. This can be done by aggregating the distribution of basic revenues, population, and surface area of today's local governments into those of tomorrow. This analysis is also the first step towards being able to simulate the effects of any anticipated reforms on the budgets of local governments. In the following, we look briefly at the structure the new

jurisdictions and then at the composition of their revenues. The appendix presents more detailed information for all new local governments, broken down by the units that have now been consolidated into them.

Table 5 shows the changes in the system when quartiles are organized by the population of local governments. The top half of the Table compares the basic structural characteristics of current and new local government and the bottom half the composition of their basic finances. As can be seen from the Table, territorial consolidation will dramatically increase the average population of all local governments as well as their average area in square kilometers.

Quartile	Total Po	pulation	% of po	pulation	Average p	opulation	n population density		% change
	Current	New	Current	New	Current	New	Current	New	
1	103,954	124,852	3.7%	4.5%	1,118	8,323	12	20	71%
2	253,599	312,269	9.1%	11.2%	2,727	20,818	30	50	66%
3	468,080	467,583	16.7%	16.7%	5,033	31,172	79	76	-4%
4	1,556,010	1,338,012	55.6%	47.8%	16,731	89,201	315	158	-50%
Tirana	418,495	557,422	14.9%	19.9%	418,495	557,422	10,463	502	-95%
Total/Avg	2,800,138	2,800,138	100%	100%	7,507	45,904	99	99	0%
Quartile	% of Own in Sy	Revenue stem	% Uncon in Sy	d. Grants stem	% Condit. Sys	Grants in tem	Total Pe Reve	Total Per Capita Revenue	
	current	new	current	new	current	new	Current	New	
1	1.4%	3.2%	10.3%	9.5%	8.5%	5.9%	13,8	57 11,809	-15%
2	6.1%	11.0%	16.6%	15.4%	15.5%	37.3%	8,0	35 10,929	36%
3	8.6%	8.9%	18.6%	17.9%	24.2%	19.2%	7,4	92 6,919	-8%
4	52.8%	37.5%	46.3%	46.3%	49.7%	35.0%	8,0	91 7,571	-6%
Tirana	31.1%	39.3%	8.3%	10.8%	2.0%	2.6%	12,0	16 11,394	-5%
Total/Avg	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100%	100.0%	100%	8,7	86 8,786	0%

Table 6 Distribution of Population and Area of Current and New Local Governmentsbased on Quartile by Population:

Of particular note here is the radical expansion of the territorial area of Tirana which will increase from 40 square kilometers to over 1000. At the same time, its population will increase by over 30% and as of 2015, 20% of the country's will live in the capital. These changes will be driven by incorporating into Tirana a number of rapidly urbanizing areas like Dajt, Farq and Kashar, as well as some predominantly rural areas like Shengjerg and Peze. Indeed, the incorporation of these more urban jurisdictions into Tirana is primarily responsible for the decline in the share of the population who will now reside in the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile of local governments (from 1.55 to 1.33 million). The territorial expansion of the capital should improve Tirana's ability to manage growth as a metropolitan area. But it will also create demands for investment in new infrastructure. Moreover, and as can be seen from the bottom half of the Table the per capita revenues of Tirana will continue to decline unless changes are introduced into the intergovernmental finance system.

Territorial consolidation will not however, radically change the share of the population living in the 1st quartile of local governments (3.7 to 4.5%), and while the population density of local governments in the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile will increase substantially, it will remain low. Many of these new, but still very rural jurisdictions will have to serve a number of dispersed settlements without necessarily having a strong urban center. This will make their situation somewhat different from most of the other new local governments, most of which will have at least one central aglomeration. As can be seen, from the bottom half of the Table, the total per capita revenues of the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile of local governments will decline by about 15%, though they will still remain higher than all other groups, including Tirana.

The share of the population living in the  $2^{nd}$  quartile will increase from 9.1% to 11.2%. More curiously, this is the only quartile of local governments where consolidation will lead to an increase in per capita revenues. One reason for this is that this quartile contains a fair a number of local governments that have reasonably high own-revenues. Indeed, other than Tirana, it is the only group in which its share of own-revenues is equal to, or greater than its share of the total population (11% and 11%). Another reason for this is that a disproportionate share of conditional grants would go to the  $2^{nd}$  quartile assuming existing allocation patterns continued in the future. Why this is the case is unclear. But what it suggests is that with consolidation the inefficiencies of Albania's equalization system will be concentrated more on the  $2^{nd}$  quartile than on the first.

The average size of the 3<sup>rd</sup> quartile of local governments will increase 6 fold, from about 5000 people to 3000 people. But it will continue to house the same percentage of the total population (c. 17%). Moreover, the population density of the 3<sup>rd</sup> quartile will remain stable, while those of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> quartiles will increase, and those of the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile and Tirana will decrease. This may indicate that the newly elected officials of the local governments in this quartile will face less profound, or at least less novel management challenges. But if so, they will be confronting these challenges with 8% less in per capita revenues.

Finally, the size and composition of the 4<sup>th</sup> quartile of local governments will change significantly with consolidation. The share of the population residing in this quartile will fall from 56% to 48%, while the average size of the local governments in the group will increase from over 16,000 people to close to 90,000. Some local governments in this group will be based around a single large urban center (e.g. Elbasan, Durres, Korce). Here, the challenge will be ensuring that services are provided to the surrounding communities. Others will be composed of a large number of relatively small towns and settlements, and will thus have to invent a new, common identity and administrative structure (e.g Bulquize, Diber). And still others will be dominated by two or three communities of roughly equal size, a distribution that may make overcoming particular interests and vanities more difficult than elsewhere (e.g. Kurbin, Pogradec, Lehze). The per-capita revenues of this quartile will also decline by about 6%. Unfortunately, many of these jurisdictions will still have relatively poor tax bases because the

share of total own-revenues generated by this quartile will fall with consolidation from 52.3% to 37.5%, (despite the fact that they will continue to account for 48% of the population). Indeed, as can be seen from the Appendix, there are quite a large number of 4<sup>th</sup> quartile local governments with extremely low per capita revenues. This also suggests that Albania should be looking to create an equalization system that is based on more objective measurements of relative wealth.

#### VI. Conclusion

The major findings of this analysis are relatively simple and straight forward. The first and most important finding is that the overall financial position of local governments in Albania is very weak and has deteriorated over the last 5 years. Albania is also exceptional in that grants and transfers have been directed very heavily towards sparsely populated, but not necessarily poor local governments at the expense more urban local governments –most strikingly Tirana. Consolidation should reduce the administrative costs associated with having large numbers of very small jurisdictions. But these savings will not solve the problem of underfunding, especially since Albania's new local governments will have to investment considerable resources in developing the administrative and managerial systems needed to provide services to geographically dispersed citizens. Consolidation will also not automatically solve the existing inefficiencies of the grant system.

Unfortunately, there are no magic bullets for fixing these problems. Local governments can and should be expected to improve Property Tax collection. But this will require concerted intergovernmental cooperation and difficult policy choices at both the national and local levels. Equally importantly, it is virtually impossible that better Property Tax collection alone will dramatically improve the overall financial position of local governments: As we have noted, doubling collection will only increase total local government revenues by about 4%. Moreover, some of these potential gains may also be "consumed" by the reform of quasi-fiscal taxes like the Cleaning, Greenery and the Public Lighting fees.

National policy makers thus need to commit to putting more money into grants and transfers, while making this entire intergovernmental finance system more predictable and efficient. There are a number of ways this could be done. But probably all should look to define the size of the Unconditional Grant as percentage of national tax revenues, and to both rationalize the allocation of Conditional Grants and keep their role in the overall system at a reasonable level.

Policy makers should also consider introducing PIT-sharing as the third pillar of Albanian local government finances. PIT-sharing has become a mainstay of intergovernmental finance in the post-communist world for at least three reasons. First, it provides local government officials with strong budgetary incentives to promote economic growth and to work with the national government to reign in the grey economy. Second, PIT per capita is single-best measure of the relative wealth of local governments that will be available to national government policy makers for many years to come. It thus provides the clearest and most transparent base upon which to

ground a fair and efficient equalization system, meaning one that could avoid the distortions that comes from assuming that all small, sparsely populated jurisdictions are poor and all urban jurisdictions are wealthy, assumptions that have implicitly guided Albanian policy for at least the last 5 years. And third, PIT-sharing can eventually be transformed into a true local tax, first by giving local governments the right to impose a small surcharge on the national government's rate, and eventually by dividing rate-setting powers between the national government and local governments.

Finally, it is worth stressing, that while it was difficult to conceive of introducing PIT sharing in a world dominated by tiny local governments, this has fundamentally changed with territorial consolidation. Albania's new, large local governments will ensure that the yield of the tax across the country will be much more uniform, and that there will be almost no local governments that don't have some share of the population paying PIT. By the same token, large local governments make it technically much easier to link the local share of the tax to an employee's place of residence, and not as is the case today, to the address of his or her employer. This does not mean that PIT sharing can be introduced overnight. But it certainly could be put in place by January 1, 2016 if national government policy makers started to conduct the necessary analytical and technical work now.

Ultimately however, the most important condition for reaping the potential gains of territorial consolidation does not lie in the pursuit of one or another particular reform. Instead, it lies in the national government recommitting to decentralization as a political, fiscal, and administrative project. At a minimum, this recommitment will require progressively shifting resources from the national to the local level, improving financial accounting and reporting at all levels of the system, and restarting an inclusive and institutionalized dialogue on intergovernmental policy.

## Appendix: Composition of Basic Revenues of New Local Governments in Ranked in Order of their Per Capita Own Revenues using 2012 revenue data

New LG	Population	Area in KM	Uncond. Grant Per Capitat	Condit. Grant Per Capita	Own Rev. per Capita	Property Tax Per Capita	SBT Per Capita	Total Rev (w/o Soc. Sec Grants) Per capita
klos	13,249	302	3,097	45	192	30	0	3,334
KLOS	7,873	144	1,922	33	134	17	0	2,089
SUÇ	2,716	63	3,986	123	340	76	0	4,450
XIBER	2,660	95	5,669	0	212	19	0	5,881
has	16,790	400	5,102	1,347	699	66	0	7,148
FAJZA	3,491	73	3,979	5,680	48	0	0	9,707
GJINAJ	1,106	83	8,842	859	304	0	0	10,006
GOLAJ	6,187	170	4,459	110	484	38	0	5,053
KRUME	6,006	74	5,730	193	1,370	146	0	7,293
pustec	3,290	199	5,624	329	828	207	75	6,781
LIQENAS	3,290	199	5,624	329	828	207	75	6,781
memaliaj	10,657	372	7,292	90	1,055	234	141	8,437
BUZ	737	85	12,943	0	330	217	0	13,272
FSHAT MEMALIAJ	1,606	60	6,179	266	1,099	431	55	7,544
KRAHES	2,554	66	5,155	0	922	90	96	6,078
LUFTINJE	1,734	100	9,602	0	419	270	0	10,021
MEMALIAJ	2,647	1	8,162	84	1,740	216	377	9,986
QESARAT	1,379	60	4,947	224	1,125	270	126	6,296
diber	61,619	940	4,635	118	1,126	89	253	5,880
ARRAS	3,055	74	4,977	469	226	61	0	5,672
FUSHE CIDHEN	2,909	18	3,845	80	141	103	0	4,066
FUSHE MUHURR	2,780	77	4,279	0	337	12	0	4,617
KALA E DODES	2,252	76	5,414	119	27	0	0	5,560
KASTRIOT	6,200	57	3,098	10	341	36	8	3,449
LURE	1,096	134	11,162	1,198	696	100	0	13,056
LUZNI	2,433	48	4,586	444	80	64	0	5,111
MAQELLARE	10,662	76	2,505	22	361	26	232	2,888
MELAN	3,649	74	4,176	205	733	148	46	5,114
PESHKOPI	13,251	5	6,651	41	4,188	193	964	10,880
QENDER TOMIN	7,590	41	3,010	51	156	86	11	3,217
SELISHTE	1,605	87	7,532	193	124	0	0	7,848
SLLOVE	2,405	87	5,249	47	118	43	15	5,415
ZALL DARDHE	1,051	35	7,389	196	244	39	34	7,829
ZALL REC	681	50	10,444	544	419	419	0	11,407

tropoje	20,517	1,060	6,963	3,738	1,206	77	322	11,907
BAJRAM CURRI	5,340	3	6,237	1,052	3,553	215	1,190	10,843
BUJAN	2,550	110	5,256	36	50	0	0	5,342
ВҮТҮС	1,563	161	9,102	33	107	0	0	9,242
FIERZE	1,607	78	7,488	192	835	271	88	8,515
LEKBIBAJ	1,207	175	13,076	4,221	1,488	0	0	18,785
LLUGAJ	1,787	70	5,932	35,757	42	0	0	41,731
MARGEGAJ	2,346	259	7,964	465	632	0	0	9,062
TROPOJE	4,117	205	6,030	129	189	0	27	6,348
kukes	47,985	944	5,434	330	1,236	143	29	6,999
ARREN	462	59	13,049	0	36	0	0	13,085
BICAJ	5,631	79	3,792	0	86	0	0	3,879
BUSHTRICE	1,486	40	5,514	139	222	0	0	5,874
GRYKE CAJE	1,440	90	8,984	3,025	38	0	0	12,048
KALIS	827	30	8,871	10,153	75	0	0	19,099
KOLSH	1,250	44	5,277	0	1,385	0	0	6,662
KUKES	16,719	14	5,830	26	2,788	400	83	8,644
MALZI	3,072	188	6,318	319	265	0	0	6,901
SHISHTAVEC	3,835	61	4,387	34	54	27	0	4,475
SHTIQEN	3,438	35	3,603	67	502	7	0	4,173
SURROJ	1,099	67	8,468	0	316	0	0	8,785
TERTHORE	2,959	66	4,072	70	2,225	0	0	6,367
TOPOJAN	1,753	76	6,644	147	22	0	0	6,812
UJEMISHT	1,797	54	5,169	186	57	0	0	5,412
ZAPOD	2,217	42	4,477	128	79	9	0	4,684
belsh	19,503	196	4,216	137	1,277	368	323	5,631
BELSH	8,781	59	4,571	111	1,991	465	676	6,673
FIERZ	2,065	40	4,028	125	1,165	517	6	5,318
GREKAN	3,138	36	4,334	181	372	129	93	4,887
KAJAN	3,925	46	3,474	98	812	329	16	4,385
RRASE	1,594	15	4,105	307	418	204	0	4,830
maliq	41,757	656	3,730	61	1,313	488	199	5,104
GORE	1,565	157	9,368	0	1,269	299	304	10,637
LIBONIK	8,922	87	2,919	49	1,456	768	86	4,424
MALIQ	4,290	32	5,402	18	2,426	704	438	7,845
MOGLICE	951	179	13,651	460	1,597	132	21	15,709
PIRG	7,652	56	2,559	27	751	215	171	3,337
POJAN	10,864	71	2,959	55	1,594	596	326	4,607
VRESHTAS	7,513	73	3,618	106	646	241	43	4,370
kurbin	46,291	267	4,175	595	1,416	187	273	6,186
FUSHE KUQE	5,460	63	3,056	1,898	695	68	110	5,649
LAÇ	17,086	23	4,985	140	1,998	222	353	7,124
MAMURRAS	15,284	56	4,233	53	1,319	216	363	5,605

MILOT	8,461	125	3,155	1,651	883	141	56	5,688
malesi e madhe	30,823	949	4,916	95	1,450	175	117	6,460
GRUEMIRE	8,890	104	3,434	32	301	75	110	3,766
KASTRAT	6,883	144	3,535	94	1,198	351	59	4,828
KELMEND	3,056	376	8,624	93	1,451	100	16	10,168
KOPLIK	3,734	13	8,397	117	3,819	347	482	12,332
QENDER	4,740	49	3,401	267	455	70	52	4,122
SHKREL	3,520	262	6,486	0	3,667	110	38	10,154
puke	11,069	506	8,918	756	1,478	276	249	11,152
GJEGJAN	2,846	150	7,213	1,113	754	127	95	9,080
PUKE	3,607	21	9,575	104	2,945	316	666	12,624
QELEZ	1,761	86	6,573	2,471	288	225	11	9,331
QERRET	1,498	154	12,490	0	1,988	714	42	14,477
RRAPE	1,357	96	9,850	345	80	67	0	10,275
peqin	26,136	198	3,382	193	1,491	280	311	5,066
GJOÇAJ	5,207	38	2,687	72	845	341	38	3,604
KARINE	1,350	28	4,285	343	1,579	352	161	6,208
PAJOVE	6,626	61	2,913	62	1,079	95	247	4,054
PEQIN	6,353	4	3,858	0	3,062	347	870	6,920
PERPARIM	3,423	46	4,188	787	964	268	48	5,939
SHEZE	3,177	22	3,294	350	798	416	118	4,442
bulqize	31,210	680	5,320	396	1,494	38	206	7,209
BULQIZE	8,177	41	6,393	59	3,119	3	678	9,572
FUSHE BULQIZE	3,342	77	3,762	0	486	0	9	4,248
GJORICE	4,214	31	3,749	370	258	57	66	4,377
MARTANESH	1,836	160	9,399	2,886	4,315	13	168	16,601
OSTREN	3,034	115	5,151	183	426	80	12	5,761
SHUPENZE	5,503	81	3,979	664	503	6	22	5,146
TREBISHT/Klenje	993	51	7,692	519	1,995	272	96	10,206
ZERQAN	4,111	123	5,587	69	1,079	88	3	6,735
prrenjas	24,906	323	3,639	4,859	1,562	113	477	10,059
QUKES	8,211	127	3,689	25	863	112	105	4,577
RRAJCE	8,421	62	2,855	14,177	1,096	177	117	18,128
STRAVAJ	2,427	122	5,490	297	402	38	86	6,188
PRRENJAS	5,847	13	3,929	119	3,696	54	1,681	7,744
librazhd	31,892	793	4,019	103	1,644	146	520	5,765
HOTOLISHT	5,706	175	4,243	45	263	71	61	4,552
LIBRAZHD	6,937	2	3,097	93	5,758	390	2,069	8,948
LUNIK	2,621	103	5,726	108	479	122	9	6,313
ORENJE	3,883	102	4,965	0	416	52	0	5,382
POLIS	3,385	91	3,222	243	852	131	362	4,318
QENDER	8,551	198	3,048	30	503	56	74	3,581
STEBLEVE	809	123	13,861	1,241	1,133	118	29	16,235

mat	30,969	548	6,308	96	1,648	161	327	8,053
BAZ	2,228	60	6,043	79	195	41	33	6,316
BURREL	10,862	14	5,929	47	3,056	218	641	9,033
DERJAN	1,102	43	8,506	0	67	10	0	8,573
GURRE	3,369	55	3,682	69	30	4	0	3,781
комы	4,283	83	10,047	138	2,408	114	612	12,593
LIS	3,824	69	3,762	54	748	255	100	4,565
MACUKULL	1,565	85	10,399	313	798	65	0	11,509
RUKAJ	2,507	36	5,316	82	111	28	0	5,509
ULEZ	1,229	103	7,082	461	2,057	710	57	9,600
libohove	3,667	238	8,788	711	1,677	547	179	11,176
LIBOHOVE	1,992	21	6,195	0	1,385	283	264	7,580
	1 264	73	8 245	0	1 772	921	103	10.017
	411	143	23 028	6 340	2 799	679	0	32 166
fushe arrez	7.405	536	10.393	1.070	1.784	564	164	13.248
BLERIM	913	111	13 659		90	42	25	13 749
FIFR7F	1,302	119	9,750	2.047	382	0	0	12,179
FUSHE ARRES	2,513	23	8.020	182	3.577	1,464	456	11,779
IBALLE	1 129	123	14 741	0	318	106	0	15 059
OAFE MALI	1.548	160	9.691	3.101	2.122	221	32	14.914
devoll	26.716	454	4.275	397	1.944	430	390	6.615
BILISHT BASHKI	6.250	12	4.263	107	3.854	290	1.175	8.225
носіянт	4,461	87	3.865	104	1.015	546	94	4,984
MIRAS	6.577	169	5.142	111	1.018	394	229	6.271
PROGER	3,988	91	4,450	2,136	1,971	493	59	8,558
QENDER BILISHT	5,440	96	3,449	40	1,608	493	171	5,097
cerrik	27,445	190	4,026	111	1,994	517	334	6,131
CERRIK	6,695	11	7,020	146	3,485	447	833	10,651
GOSTIME	8,116	50	3,094	0	1,860	591	197	4,954
KLOS	3,262	26	2,887	177	330	155	0	3,394
MOLLAS	5,530	60	2,879	130	2,028	738	236	5,037
SHALES	3,842	43	3,399	201	1,042	468	180	4,642
tepelene	8,949	431	6,854	574	2,007	462	313	9,435
KURVELESH	705	113	16,534	0	1,746	323	206	18,281
LOPES	723	84	9,215	6,634	1,268	938	25	17,117
QENDER	3,179	232	4,457	32	1,717	646	167	6,206
TEPELENE	4,342	2	6,645	55	2,385	269	485	9,084
gramsh	24,231	737	6,122	296	2,070	230	592	8,488
GRAMSH	8,440	2	6,263	70	4,428	295	1,660	10,761
KODOVJAT	2,355	83	5,574	131	1,840	253	53	7,546
KUKUR	2,560	89	5,844	0	295	91	15	6,138
KUSHOVE	659	54	8,925	1,516	754	142	0	11,195
LENIE	779	101	9,033	0	1,175	411	0	10,207

PISHAJ	4,906	104	3.681	73	813	283	30	4.567
POROCAN	1,269	82	7,661	110	524	76	0	8,294
SKENDERBEGAS	1,239	78	8,332	0	884	86	24	9,215
SULT	631	63	10,683	7,560	246	91	0	18,490
TUNJE	1,393	80	6,911	0	280	140	0	7,191
mirdite	22,103	881	8,028	3,009	2,285	65	351	13,322
FANE	2,977	201	7,299	19,855	718	16	34	27,872
KAÇINAR	1,016	86	12,076	299	554	76	79	12,930
KTHELLE	2,209	106	5,900	0	96	24	12	5,996
OROSH	1,899	131	8,452	228	5,575	37	676	14,254
RRESHEN	8,803	160	7,216	736	3,075	101	626	11,026
RUBIK	4,454	119	8,832	0	2,189	35	171	11,022
SELITE	745	78	15,449	242	246	197	0	15,937
skrapar	11,397	859	8,812	181	2,300	1,053	175	11,293
BOGOVE	1,098	65	10,188	0	9,630	6,655	775	19,819
CEPAN	740	90	13,043	556	1,938	825	0	15,537
CUKALAT	3,045	31	3,759	425	736	301	278	4,919
GJERBES	813	153	12,445	0	3,167	149	35	15,612
LESHNJE	496	85	14,857	187	2,024	494	7	17,068
РОТОМ	897	124	10,254	0	1,071	204	28	11,326
QENDER	2,545	108	8,184	24	1,720	850	82	9,929
VENDRESHE	984	63	8,148	152	1,528	242	30	9,828
ZHEPE	779	138	16,198	66	1,980	273	0	18,244
divjake	34,254	316	3,285	69	2,349	751	391	5,702
DIVJAKE	8,445	89	4,496	24	4,954	1,027	878	9,474
GRABIAN	3,638	38	3,483	269	1,565	689	123	5,317
GRADISHTE	7,521	58	2,586	34	1,680	737	269	4,300
RREMAS	4,449	82	3,178	104	2,018	888	127	5,300
TERBUF	10,201	49	2,773	43	1,109	495	287	3,926
selenice	16,396	561	6,828	1,780	2,350	1,175	110	10,958
ARMEN	2,965	64	6,907	396	2,472	1,074	0	9,775
BRATAJ	2,849	147	7,133	72	866	585	44	8,072
КОТЕ	3,516	145	4,218	42	3,204	1,461	317	7,464
SELENICE	2,235	15	9,461	99	3,565	2,670	141	13,125
SEVASTER	1,720	88	8,973	15,895	1,986	962	39	26,854
VLLAHINE	3,111	101	6,344	31	1,958	534	61	8,333
kelcyre	6,113	305	7,878	252	2,568	709	477	10,697
BALLABAN	1,047	89	10,847	0	2,208	608	169	13,055
DISHNICE	1,159	82	10,959	1,142	1,430	525	48	13,531
KELCYRE	2,651	58	4,929	37	3,741	1,035	922	8,708
SUKE	1,256	76	8,783	94	1,439	277	190	10,317
vau i dejes	30,438	478	4,062	382	2,578	408	112	7,022
BUSHAT	14,149	101	2,935	38	3,467	607	124	6,439

HAJMEL	4,430	37	2,860	152	698	95	84	3,711
SHLLAK	671	63	15,639	1,197	3,215	0	0	20,052
TEMAL	1,562	113	6,909	5,326	2,792	472	0	15,027
VAU I DEJES	8,117	90	4,519	89	2,254	294	154	6,862
VIG MNELE	1,509	73	7,605	382	992	183	18	8,979
polican	10,953	269	6,546	114	2,622	1,259	571	9,282
POLIÇAN	4,318	12	7,967	57	3,519	1,356	1,060	11,544
TERPAN	1,716	168	8,879	165	1,157	867	74	10,201
VERTOP	4,919	89	4,484	147	2,345	1,311	315	6,976
kruje	59,814	336	3,142	1,501	2,715	549	247	7,358
BUBQ	5,951	49	2,709	14,239	1,067	340	61	18,015
CUDHI	1,812	81	7,500	1,009	324	133	0	8,833
FUSHE KRUJE	18,477	45	3,496	25	4,741	632	367	8,261
KODER THUMANE	12,335	69	2,704	48	1,311	204	76	4,064
KRUJE	11,721	50	3,445	112	3,357	1,151	429	6,914
NIKEL	9,518	42	2,088	89	1,299	302	174	3,476
shkoder	135,612	896	4,054	94	2,865	396	416	7,013
ANA E MALIT	3,858	47	2,931	400	1,172	25	109	4,504
BERDICE	5,773	33	2,977	113	1,455	211	113	4,545
DAJC	3,885	37	4,300	131	2,020	1,037	72	6,451
GURI I ZI	8,085	75	2,770	76	740	72	60	3,586
POSTRIBE	7,069	122	4,708	31	628	93	0	5,367
PULT	1,529	132	9,498	0	538	0	0	10,036
RRETHINAT	21,199	44	2,020	362	756	147	63	3,137
SHALE	1,804	219	9,712	49	1,287	101	0	11,047
SHKODER	77,075	31	4,523	7	3,610	404	558	8,141
SHOSH	304	65	31,175	1,796	2,159	0	0	35,130
VELIPOJE	5,031	90	3,170	64	11,771	2,527	2,025	15,005
pogradec	61,530	592	3,508	168	2,865	328	765	6,541
BUCIMAS	15,687	48	1,963	125	1,688	304	213	3,775
CERRAVE	7,009	77	3,774	80	1,031	146	237	4,884
DARDHAS	2,182	83	6,139	234	602	111	82	6,974
HUDENISHT	5,990	75	2,331	64	2,480	157	287	4,875
POGRADEC	20,848	2	3,789	98	5,830	559	1,916	9,717
PROPTISHT	4,785	75	4,500	419	572	150	20	5,490
TRABINJE	2,481	111	6,129	122	463	190	15	6,715
VELCAN	2,548	120	6,094	1,014	384	133	29	7,492
ura vajgurore	28,301	127	3,963	109	2,872	573	646	6,944
COROVODE	4,051	2	10,394	109	5,514	400	1,425	16,018
KUTALLI	9,643	44	2,591	104	1,340	331	198	4,035
POSHNJE	7,375	38	2,498	129	2,094	854	445	4,722
URA VAJGURORE	7,232	43	3,684	96	4,228	706	1,011	8,008
kucove	31,262	160	4,020	431	2,901	531	827	7,352

KOZARE	5,622	43	2,632	1,511	2,037	741	449	6,180
KUCOVE	12,654	3	5,852	57	4,704	383	1,369	10,613
LUMAS	3,981	76	3,452	136	2,150	853	387	5,738
lushnje	83,659	373	3,074	105	3,094	672	709	6,274
ALLKAJ	4,319	24	2,749	101	2,191	529	402	5,041
BALLAGAT	2,461	26	3,184	94	1,211	304	73	4,489
BUBULLIME	5,548	36	2,352	74	3,504	1,566	438	5,931
DUSHK	7,872	43	2,499	610	1,659	573	435	4,768
FIERSHEGAN	7,023	37	2,437	44	1,418	166	547	3,899
GOLEM	5,243	31	2,827	88	2,198	1,158	553	5,113
HYZGJOKAJ	2,603	22	2,801	168	727	287	51	3,697
KARBUNARE	4,193	33	2,543	98	600	227	60	3,241
KOLONJE	5,728	36	2,545	108	3,372	632	553	6,026
KRUTJE	7,564	43	2,457	34	2,237	962	63	4,729
LUSHNJE	31,105	41	3,912	14	4,880	649	1,311	8,806
PERONDI	9,005	38	2,565	413	1,238	465	495	4,216
rrogozhine	22,148	224	3,777	313	3,154	837	461	7,244
GOSE	4,120	48	3,722	50	1,937	1,134	179	5,709
KRYEVIDH	4,662	65	3,473	31	4,374	1,859	590	7,878
LEKAJ	5,126	58	3,362	121	1,098	212	547	4,580
RROGOZHINE	7,049	13	4,070	757	2,383	473	548	7,211
SINABALLAT	1 191	40	F 210	540	46.007	65.4	10	
011110712210	1,151	40	5,210	519	16,007	654	49	21,736
kolonje	11,070	<b>862</b>	9,909	335	3,235	549	49 <b>751</b>	13,479
kolonje BARMASH	<b>11,070</b> 480	<b>862</b>	<b>9,909</b> 16,490	<b>335</b>	3,235 2,292	<b>54</b> <b>549</b> 353	49 751 42	13,479 18,782
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM	<b>11,070</b> 480 355	<b>862</b> 116 103	<b>9,909</b> 16,490 24,587	335 0 1,451	<b>3,235</b> 2,292 506	549 353 271	49 751 42 0	13,479 18,782 26,543
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE	11,070 480 355 3,746	<b>862</b> 116 103 3	5,210           9,909           16,490           24,587           8,660	335 0 1,451 281	3,235 2,292 506 3,888	549 353 271 526	49 751 42 0 1,719	21,736 13,479 18,782 26,543 12,829
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK	11,070 480 355 3,746 416	862 116 103 3 238	9,909 16,490 24,587 8,660 19,285	335 0 1,451 281 1,176	3,235 2,292 506 3,888 9,125	554 549 353 271 526 799	49 751 42 0 1,719 109	21,736 13,479 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK	1,194 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525	40 862 116 103 3 238 1	3,210 9,909 16,490 24,587 8,660 19,285 8,123	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135	3,235 2,292 506 3,888 9,125 4,298	554 549 353 271 526 799 458	49 <b>751</b> 42 0 1,719 109 827	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556
kolonje       BARMASH       CLIRIM       ERSEKE       KOMUNA       LESKOVIK       LESKOVIK       MOLLAS	1,191 <b>11,070</b> 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165	9,909 16,490 24,587 8,660 19,285 8,123 8,536	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0	3,235 2,292 506 3,888 9,125 4,298 2,338	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485	49 <b>751</b> 42 0 1,719 109 827 151	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE	1,194 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91	3,210           9,909           16,490           24,587           8,660           19,285           8,123           8,536           24,379	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346	16,007           3,235           2,292           506           3,888           9,125           4,298           2,338           2,877	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753	49 <b>751</b> 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602
kolonje         BARMASH         CLIRIM         ERSEKE         KOMUNA         LESKOVIK         LESKOVIK         MOLLAS         NOVOSELE         QENDER ERSEKE	1,194 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145	3,210           9,909           16,490           24,587           8,660           19,285           8,123           8,536           24,379           6,946	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96	16,007           3,235           2,292           506           3,888           9,125           4,298           2,338           2,877           1,887	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753 675	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE elbasan	1,194 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714	40         862         116         103         3         238         1         165         91         145         872	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 <b>106</b>	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753 675 586	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89 <b>592</b>	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b>
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE elbasan BRADASHESH	1,194 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 <b>106</b> 11	3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361         8,135	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753 675 586 2,721	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89 592 341	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE Elbasan BRADASHESH ELBASAN	1,070 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700 78,703	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56 22	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 11 45	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361         8,135         4,130	654           549           353           271           526           799           458           485           753           675           586           2,721           414	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89 592 341 889	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE elbasan BRADASHESH ELBASAN FUNAR	1,194 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700 78,703 2,122	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56 22 77	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 111 45 388	3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361         8,135         4,130         317	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753 675 586 2,721 414 97	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89 592 341 889 141	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE Elbasan BRADASHESH ELBASAN FUNAR GJEGJAN	11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700 78,703 2,122 5,126	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56 22 77 28	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643         2,938	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 111 45 388 77	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361         8,135         4,130         317         1,506	654           549           353           271           526           799           458           485           753           675           586           2,721           414           97           726	49           751           42           0           1,719           109           827           151           225           89           592           341           889           141           160	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349 4,522
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE elbasan BRADASHESH ELBASAN FUNAR GJEGJAN GJINAR	11,070         480         355         3,746         416         1,525         1,520         355         2,673         141,714         10,700         78,703         2,122         5,126         3,478	40         862         116         103         3         238         1         165         91         145         872         56         22         77         28         89	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643         2,938         5,533	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 111 45 388 777 111	16,007           3,235           2,292           506           3,888           9,125           4,298           2,338           2,338           2,338           2,338           2,338           2,338           2,338           2,338           2,338           2,337           1,887           3,361           8,135           4,130           317           1,506           1,132	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753 675 586 2,721 414 97 726 293	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89 592 341 889 141 160 130	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349 4,522 6,777
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE elbasan BRADASHESH ELBASAN FUNAR GJEGJAN GJINAR GJINAR	11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700 78,703 2,122 5,126 3,478 2,192	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56 22 77 28 89 57	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643         2,938         5,533         4,857	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 111 45 388 777 1111 153	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361         8,135         4,130         317         1,506         1,132         201	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753 675 586 2,721 414 97 726 293 55	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89 592 341 889 141 160 130 0	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349 4,522 6,777 5,211
kolonje BARMASH CLIRIM ERSEKE KOMUNA LESKOVIK LESKOVIK MOLLAS NOVOSELE QENDER ERSEKE Elbasan BRADASHESH ELBASAN FUNAR GJEGJAN GJINAR GRACEN LABINOT FUSHE	11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700 78,703 2,122 5,126 3,478 2,192 7,058	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56 22 77 28 89 57 49	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643         2,938         5,533         4,857         1,752	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 106 111 45 388 777 111 153 398	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         3,361         8,135         4,130         317         1,506         1,132         201         1,271	554 549 353 271 526 799 458 485 753 675 586 2,721 414 97 726 293 55 476	49 751 42 0 1,719 109 827 151 225 89 592 341 889 141 160 130 0 0 354	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349 4,522 6,777 5,211 3,421
kolonje         BARMASH         CLIRIM         ERSEKE         KOMUNA         LESKOVIK         MOLLAS         NOVOSELE         QENDER ERSEKE         elbasan         BRADASHESH         ELBASAN         FUNAR         GJEGJAN         GJINAR         GRACEN         LABINOT FUSHE	11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700 78,703 2,122 5,126 3,478 2,192 7,058 5,291	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56 22 77 28 89 57 28 89 57 49 106	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643         2,938         5,533         4,857         1,752         3,741	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 106 111 45 388 777 1111 153 398 112	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361         8,135         4,130         317         1,506         1,132         201         1,271         368	654           549           353           271           526           799           458           485           753           675           586           2,721           414           97           726           293           55           476           166	49           751           42           0           1,719           109           827           151           225           89           592           341           889           141           160           130           0           354           36	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349 4,522 6,777 5,211 3,421 4,221
kolonje         BARMASH         CLIRIM         ERSEKE         KOMUNA         LESKOVIK         LESKOVIK         MOLLAS         NOVOSELE         QENDER ERSEKE         elbasan         BRADASHESH         ELBASAN         FUNAR         GJEGJAN         GJINAR         GRACEN         LABINOT FUSHE         LABINOT MAL         PAPER	1,070 11,070 480 355 3,746 416 1,525 1,520 355 2,673 141,714 10,700 78,703 2,122 5,126 3,478 2,192 7,058 5,291 6,348	40         862         116         103         3         238         1         165         91         145         872         56         22         77         28         89         57         49         106         102	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643         2,938         5,533         4,857         1,752         3,741         2,932	335 0 1,451 281 1,176 135 0 3,346 96 106 106 111 45 388 77 111 153 398 112 0	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         2,338         3,361         8,135         4,130         317         1,506         1,132         201         1,271         368         1,961	654           549           353           271           526           799           458           485           753           675           586           2,721           414           97           726           293           55           476           780	49           751           42           0           1,719           109           827           151           225           89           592           341           889           141           160           130           0           354           36           166	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349 4,522 6,777 5,211 3,421 4,221 4,893
kolonje         BARMASH         CLIRIM         ERSEKE         KOMUNA         LESKOVIK         MOLLAS         NOVOSELE         QENDER ERSEKE         elbasan         BRADASHESH         ELBASAN         FUNAR         GJEGJAN         GJINAR         GRACEN         LABINOT FUSHE         LABINOT MAL         PAPER         SHIRGJAN	11,070         480         355         3,746         416         1,525         1,520         355         2,673         141,714         10,700         78,703         2,122         5,126         3,478         2,192         7,058         5,291         6,348         7,307	40 862 116 103 3 238 1 165 91 145 872 56 22 77 28 89 57 28 89 57 49 106 102 22	3,210         9,909         16,490         24,587         8,660         19,285         8,123         8,536         24,379         6,946         3,553         2,321         3,966         5,643         2,938         5,533         4,857         1,752         3,741         2,932         2,407	319         335         0         1,451         281         1,176         135         0         3,346         96         106         11         45         388         777         111         153         398         112         0         130	16,007         3,235         2,292         506         3,888         9,125         4,298         2,338         2,338         2,877         1,887         3,361         8,135         4,130         317         1,506         1,132         201         1,271         368         1,961         1,656	654           549           353           271           526           799           458           485           753           675           586           2,721           414           97           726           293           55           476           166           780           447	49           751           42           0           1,719           109           827           151           225           89           592           341           889           141           160           130           0           354           36           166           368	21,736 <b>13,479</b> 18,782 26,543 12,829 29,586 12,556 10,874 30,602 8,929 <b>7,021</b> 10,466 8,140 6,349 4,522 6,777 5,211 3,421 4,221 4,893 4,193

TREGAN	3,036	57	3,081	0	2,916	553	405	5,997
ZAVALINE	1,622	101	6,852	2,907	754	277	20	10,513
lezhe	65,633	505	3,264	1,060	3,460	325	415	7,783
BALLDREN	6,142	70	3,286	72	3,258	238	63	6,615
BLINISHT	3,361	49	3,164	18,518	1,724	351	70	23,406
DAJÇ	3,834	39	3,434	54	1,309	367	75	4,796
KALLMET	4,118	44	3,264	44	2,579	391	59	5,887
KOLÇ	4,228	34	3,076	244	1,330	56	34	4,649
LEZHE	15,510	5	4,221	43	6,440	441	1,173	10,704
SHENGJIN	8,091	44	2,343	38	7,306	622	470	9,687
SHENKOLL	13,102	54	2,193	49	966	136	223	3,208
UNGREJ	1,587	120	8,534	2,268	525	124	11	11,327
ZEJMEN	5,660	46	3,018	45	1,327	284	172	4,390
kamez	104,190	37	2,677	82	3,552	449	470	6,311
KAMEZ	66,841	25	3,064	123	4,545	594	615	7,732
PASKUQAN	37,349	12	1,984	9	1,776	190	211	3,769
permet	10,614	607	7,395	224	3,577	426	277	11,197
CARCOVE	918	154	14,194	236	2,464	567	95	16,894
FRASHER	387	137	26,065	492	2,263	0	30	28,820
PERMET	5,945	2	4,871	23	4,296	366	455	9,191
PETRAN	1,622	152	7,891	1,021	3,323	432	54	12,235
berat	60,031	382	4,269	121	3,578	590	915	7,968
BERAT	36,496	19	4,702	16	4,689	559	1,256	9,408
OTLLAK	9,218	53	2,878	45	2,307	552	523	5,230
ROSHNIK	2,513	79	6,084	230	2,239	941	87	8,552
SINJE	3,351	139	5,723	26	844	582	78	6,594
VELABISHT	8,453	93	2,801	662	1,645	669	450	5,109
delvine	7,598	186	6,513	73	3,582	651	471	10,168
DELVINE	5,754	54	6,962	18	4,033	767	622	11,013
VERGO	1,844	132	5,112	243	2,176	289	0	7,531
konispol	8,245	193	4,588	78	3,653	996	254	8,319
KONISPOL	2,123	45	5,417	170	6,916	855	438	12,502
MARKAT	1,859	90	6,428	97	393	65	11	6,918
XARE	4,263	58	3,373	24	3,450	1,473	268	6,847
mallakaster	27,062	334	4,182	1,516	4,048	397	430	9,746
ARANITAS	2,714	51	3,640	4	2,834	689	164	6,478
BALLSH	7,657	2	3,650	71	6,252	249	1,125	9,972
FRATAR	3,221	48	3,979	80	2,075	419	264	6,134
GRESHICE	1,152	18	4,800	2,669	1,354	49	9	8,823
HEKAL	2,623	55	5,433	98	3,688	393	87	9,219
KUTE	1,977	56	5,354	0	1,304	1,019	35	6,658
NGRAÇAN	588	8	7,316	62,265	653	225	0	70,233
QENDER	6,253	61	3,052	45	5,205	316	228	8,303

SELITE	877	34	10,013	0	621	456	0	10,633
fier	120,655	621	3,238	87	4,360	1,057	778	7,685
CAKRAN	11,722	96	3,514	78	630	460	72	4,222
DERMENAS	7,788	64	3,118	43	1,014	275	143	4,176
FIER	55,845	13	3,011	31	6,346	485	1,490	9,389
FRAKULL	6,820	43	2,894	76	1,242	155	34	4,212
LEVAN	8,159	111	4,039	88	2,256	1,260	248	6,383
LIBOFSHE	6,149	87	3,256	54	4,062	2,319	187	7,372
MBROSTAR	7,460	42	2,556	45	6,808	5,210	85	9,409
PORTEZ	8,259	47	2,530	369	2,881	1,886	122	5,780
QENDER	4,207	29	7,057	404	4,720	1,754	621	12,181
TOPOJE	4,246	90	3,456	188	2,380	1,294	231	6,024
ANTIGONE	998	40	5,799	206	3,471	695	143	9,476
CEPO	1,727	117	9,730	0	2,880	251	238	12,611
livadhja	10,529	467	8,329	848	4,918	1,524	220	14,096
ALIKO	3,849	63	4,630	87	5,083	1,072	36	9,800
DHIVER	1,396	92	13,064	6,131	4,106	935	278	23,302
FINIQ	1,333	23	11,901	0	6,980	1,972	754	18,880
LIVADHJA	1,165	172	17,212	31	6,587	3,600	401	23,830
MESOPOTAN	2,786	116	5,644	0	3,413	1,363	113	9,058
korce	75,994	808	3,845	51	5,012	839	1,297	8,908
DRENOVE	5,581	97	4,734	78	2,565	1,020	160	7,377
KORÇE	51,152	14	3,351	6	6,456	929	1,829	9,813
LEKAS	392	103	22,571	0	2,831	360	0	25,402
MOLLAJ	3,438	57	4,033	225	3,218	777	356	7,476
QENDER	9,022	74	2,852	179	1,112	186	249	4,143
VITHKUQ	1,519	250	9,587	186	625	69	149	10,399
VOSKOP	3,832	72	4,817	128	2,336	1,380	66	7,281
VOSKOPOJE	1,058	141	12,169	0	4,018	631	123	16,188
shijak	27,861	92	2,852	92	5,041	589	534	7,985
GJEPALAJ	3,449	33	3,529	261	1,361	668	44	5,152
MAMINAS	4,463	28	2,764	133	2,413	953	304	5,310
SHIJAK	7,568	5	3,848	92	2,415	225	1,049	6,354
XHAFZOTAJ	12,381	27	2,086	30	8,619	659	438	10,735
kavaje	40,094	199	3,638	1,383	5,139	880	1,197	10,160
GOLEM	6,994	55	3,585	48	11,462	1,770	1,028	15,095
HELMES	3,139	70	3,045	164	1,536	724	236	4,745
KAVAJE	20,192	8	3,679	33	4,622	298	1,761	8,334
LUZ I VOGEL	4,735	25	3,730	0	3,276	1,779	528	7,006
SYNEJ	5,034	41	3,829	10,715	2,425	1,233	397	16,968
vlore	104,827	619	3,887	52	5,739	589	1,023	9,678
NOVOSELE	8,209	138	3,886	21	2,195	673	418	6,102
ORIKUM	5,503	336	5,847	51	7,409	1,174	1,462	13,307

SHUSHICE         3,981         40         4,562         70         2,805         984         95         7,436           VLORE         79,513         27         3,637         50         6,449         482         1,199         10,136           durres         175,110         338         3,351         156         5,792         871         1,080         9,299           DURRES         113,249         38         3,450         5         7,394         1,026         1,464         10,849           ISHEM         5,001         91         4,099         211         2,486         610         272         6,796           KATUND I RI         10,161         54         3,150         2,205         1,388         596         210         6,743           MANEZ         6,652         43         4,514         244         4,553         194         332         9,312           RASHBULL         24,081         59         1,819         15         3,924         881         457         5,758           SUKTH         15,966         53         4,372         77         1,599         302         417         6,049           gjirokaster         28,673	QENDER	7,621	78	4,722	105	2,474	990	0	7,300
VLORE79,513273,637506,4494821,19910,136durres175,1103383,3511565,7928711,0809,299DURRES113,249383,45057,3941,0261,46410,849ISHEM5,001914,0992112,4866102726,796KATUND I RI10,161543,1502,2051,3885962106,743MANEZ6,652434,5142444,5531943329,312RASHBULL24,081591,819153,9248814575,758SUKTH15,966534,372771,5993024176,049gjirokaster28,6734784,984306,0017451,01511,015GJIROKASTER19,836303,94047,5228611,41011,466LAZARAT2,801424,004551,621166895,680LUNXHERI1,941736,53803,2731,113949,810ODRIE4333614,6996541,059504016,412	SHUSHICE	3,981	40	4,562	70	2,805	984	95	7,436
durres175,1103383,3511565,7928711,0809,299DURRES113,249383,45057,3941,0261,46410,849ISHEM5,001914,0992112,4866102726,796KATUND I RI10,161543,1502,2051,3885962106,743MANEZ6,652434,5142444,5531943329,312RASHBULL24,081591,819153,9248814575,758SUKTH15,966534,372771,5993024176,049gjirokaster28,6734784,984306,0017451,01511,015GJIROKASTER19,836303,94047,5228611,41011,466LAZARAT2,801424,004551,621166895,680LUNXHERI1,941736,53803,2731,113949,810ODRIE4333614,6996541,059504016,412	VLORE	79,513	27	3,637	50	6,449	482	1,199	10,136
DURRES113,249383,45057,3941,0261,46410,849ISHEM5,001914,0992112,4866102726,796KATUND I RI10,161543,1502,2051,3885962106,743MANEZ6,652434,5142444,5531943329,312RASHBULL24,081591,819153,9248814575,758SUKTH15,966534,372771,5993024176,049gjirokaster28,6734784,984306,0017451,01511,015GJIROKASTER19,836303,94047,5228611,41011,466LAZARAT2,801424,004551,621166895,680LUNXHERI1,941736,53803,2731,113949,810ODRIE4333614,6996541,059504016,412	durres	175,110	338	3,351	156	5,792	871	1,080	9,299
ISHEM5,001914,0992112,4866102726,796KATUND I RI10,161543,1502,2051,3885962106,743MANEZ6,652434,5142444,5531943329,312RASHBULL24,081591,819153,9248814575,758SUKTH15,966534,372771,5993024176,049gjirokaster28,6734784,984306,0017451,01511,015GJIROKASTER19,836303,94047,5228611,41011,466LAZARAT2,801424,004551,621166895,680LUNXHERI1,941736,53803,2731,113949,810ODRIE4333614,6996541,059504016,412	DURRES	113,249	38	3,450	5	7,394	1,026	1,464	10,849
KATUND I RI10,161543,1502,2051,3885962106,743MANEZ6,652434,5142444,5531943329,312RASHBULL24,081591,819153,9248814575,758SUKTH15,966534,372771,5993024176,049gjirokaster28,6734784,984306,0017451,01511,015GJIROKASTER19,836303,94047,5228611,41011,466LAZARAT2,801424,004551,621166895,680LUNXHERI1,941736,53803,2731,113949,810ODRIE4333614,6996541,059504016,412	ISHEM	5,001	91	4,099	211	2,486	610	272	6,796
MANEZ         6,652         43         4,514         244         4,553         194         332         9,312           RASHBULL         24,081         59         1,819         15         3,924         881         457         5,758           SUKTH         15,966         53         4,372         77         1,599         302         417         6,049           gjirokaster         28,673         478         4,984         30         6,001         745         1,015         11,015           GJIROKASTER         19,836         30         3,940         4         7,522         861         1,410         11,466           LAZARAT         2,801         42         4,004         55         1,621         166         89         5,680           LUNXHERI         1,941         73         6,538         0         3,273         1,113         94         9,810           ODRIE         433         36         14,699         654         1,059         504         0         16,412	KATUND I RI	10,161	54	3,150	2,205	1,388	596	210	6,743
RASHBULL         24,081         59         1,819         15         3,924         881         457         5,758           SUKTH         15,966         53         4,372         77         1,599         302         417         6,049           gjirokaster         28,673         478         4,984         30         6,001         745         1,015         11,015           GJIROKASTER         19,836         30         3,940         4         7,522         861         1,410         11,466           LAZARAT         2,801         42         4,004         55         1,621         166         89         5,680           LUNXHERI         1,941         73         6,538         0         3,273         1,113         94         9,810           ODRIE         433         36         14,699         654         1,059         504         0         16,412	MANEZ	6,652	43	4,514	244	4,553	194	332	9,312
SUKTH         15,966         53         4,372         77         1,599         302         417         6,049           gjirokaster         28,673         478         4,984         30         6,001         745         1,015         11,015           GJIROKASTER         19,836         30         3,940         4         7,522         861         1,410         11,466           LAZARAT         2,801         42         4,004         55         1,621         166         89         5,680           LUNXHERI         1,941         73         6,538         0         3,273         1,113         94         9,810           ODRIE         433         36         14,699         654         1,059         504         0         16,412	RASHBULL	24,081	59	1,819	15	3,924	881	457	5,758
gjirokaster28,6734784,984306,0017451,01511,015GJIROKASTER19,836303,94047,5228611,41011,466LAZARAT2,801424,004551,621166895,680LUNXHERI1,941736,53803,2731,113949,810ODRIE4333614,6996541,059504016,412	SUKTH	15,966	53	4,372	77	1,599	302	417	6,049
GJIROKASTER19,836303,94047,5228611,41011,466LAZARAT2,801424,004551,621166895,680LUNXHERI1,941736,53803,2731,113949,810ODRIE4333614,6996541,059504016,412	gjirokaster	28,673	478	4,984	30	6,001	745	1,015	11,015
LAZARAT         2,801         42         4,004         55         1,621         166         89         5,680           LUNXHERI         1,941         73         6,538         0         3,273         1,113         94         9,810           ODRIE         433         36         14,699         654         1,059         504         0         16,412	GJIROKASTER	19,836	30	3,940	4	7,522	861	1,410	11,466
LUNXHERI         1,941         73         6,538         0         3,273         1,113         94         9,810           ODRIE         433         36         14,699         654         1,059         504         0         16,412	LAZARAT	2,801	42	4,004	55	1,621	166	89	5,680
ODRIE         433         36         14,699         654         1,059         504         0         16,412	LUNXHERI	1,941	73	6,538	0	3,273	1,113	94	9,810
	ODRIE	433	36	14,699	654	1,059	504	0	16,412
PICAR 937 140 12,693 137 3,275 354 147 16,105	PICAR	937	140	12,693	137	3,275	354	147	16,105
patos 22,959 77 4,480 57 6,208 3,490 535 10,745	patos	22,959	77	4,480	57	6,208	3,490	535	10,745
PATOS 15,397 28 5,216 20 4,276 1,487 722 9,512	PATOS	15,397	28	5,216	20	4,276	1,487	722	9,512
RUZHDIE 2,326 25 3,186 255 277 157 0 3,718	RUZHDIE	2,326	25	3,186	255	277	157	0	3,718
ZHARREZ         5,236         23         2,888         79         14,522         10,859         223         17,489	ZHARREZ	5,236	23	2,888	79	14,522	10,859	223	17,489
QENDER PISKOVE         1,742         161         7,813         103         2,240         643         29         10,156	QENDER PISKOVE	1,742	161	7,813	103	2,240	643	29	10,156
roskovec 21,742 118 3,114 68 8,163 3,109 227 11,345	roskovec	21,742	118	3,114	68	8,163	3,109	227	11,345
KUMAN         5,611         32         3,080         96         23,718         9,261         68         26,894	KUMAN	5,611	32	3,080	96	23,718	9,261	68	26,894
KURJAN 3,618 38 3,228 149 1,617 997 106 4,995	KURJAN	3,618	38	3,228	149	1,617	997	106	4,995
ROSKOVEC         4,975         14         4,269         28         6,577         1,991         820         10,874	ROSKOVEC	4,975	14	4,269	28	6,577	1,991	820	10,874
STRUM 7,538 33 2,321 34 774 280 12 3,129	STRUM	7,538	33	2,321	34	774	280	12	3,129
tirane 557,422 1,110 2,037 43 9,314 1,050 1,657 11,394	tirane	557,422	1,110	2,037	43	9,314	1,050	1,657	11,394
BALDUSHK 4,576 113 2,867 107 774 204 278 3,748	BALDUSHK	4,576	113	2,867	107	774	204	278	3,748
BERZHITE 4,973 72 3,548 146 2,643 293 659 6,337	BERZHITE	4,973	72	3,548	146	2,643	293	659	6,337
DAJT 20,139 95 1,392 46 8,319 224 348 9,758	DAJT	20,139	95	1,392	46	8,319	224	348	9,758
FARK         22,633         28         850         72         13,558         497         224         14,479	FARK	22,633	28	850	72	13,558	497	224	14,479
KASHAR         43,353         39         781         39         10,476         1,928         564         11,296	KASHAR	43,353	39	781	39	10,476	1,928	564	11,296
KRRABE         2,343         19         4,606         3,146         1,269         456         220         9,020	KRRABE	2,343	19	4,606	3,146	1,269	456	220	9,020
NDROQ 5,035 63 3,428 268 1,327 289 372 5,022	NDROQ	5,035	63	3,428	268	1,327	289	372	5,022
PETRELE         5,542         67         2,225         70         7,651         726         403         9,945	PETRELE	5,542	67	2,225	70	7,651	726	403	9,945
PEZE         6,272         108         2,724         156         2,227         394         390         5,107	PEZE	6,272	108	2,724	156	2,227	394	390	5,107
SHENGJERGJ         2,186         206         7,569         302         4,280         257         297         12,151	SHENGJERGJ	2,186	206	7,569	302	4,280	257	297	12,151
TIRANE         418,495         40         2,132         11         9,872         1,093         2,075         12,016	TIRANE	418,495	40	2,132	11	9,872	1,093	2,075	12,016
VAQARR         9,106         46         1,721         211         3,073         1,653         534         5,005	VAQARR	9,106	46	1,721	211	3,073	1,653	534	5,005
ZALL BASTAR         3,380         154         6,526         261         249         81         0         7,035	ZALL BASTAR	3,380	154	6,526	261	249	81	0	7,035
ZALL HERR         9,389         58         2,063         22         1,162         135         189         3,247	ZALL HERR	9,389	58	2,063	22	1,162	135	189	3,247
dropull 3,503 466 13,909 1,823 9,818 3,741 519 25,550	dropull	3,503	466	13,909	1,823	9,818	3,741	519	25,550
DROPULL I         POSHTEM         2,100         111         8,480         184         8,427         3,236         451         17.091	DROPULL I POSHTEM	2.100	111	8.480	184	8.427	3.236	451	17.091

DROPULL I								
SIPERM	971	175	20,385	0	13,893	5,884	850	34,278
POGON	432	180	25,746	13,889	7,421	1,374	103	47,056
vore	25,511	83	2,879	36	10,241	1,803	559	13,157
BERXULLE	9,883	16	1,765	50	1,987	266	249	3,801
PREZE	4,727	29	2,422	22	18,646	1,211	226	21,090
VORE	10,901	38	4,088	31	14,080	3,454	985	18,198
himare	7,818	567	9,476	194	10,892	944	756	20,562
HIMARE	2,822	151	12,277	246	16,461	1,590	1,721	28,984
LUKOVE	2,916	162	6,635	145	11,724	498	360	18,504
VRANISHT	2,080	254	9,657	191	2,171	692	0	12,019
sarande	20,227	64	5,700	23	17,108	948	1,778	22,831
KSAMIL	2,994	28	7,183	81	8,017	624	601	15,281
SARANDE	17,233	36	5,443	13	18,688	1,004	1,983	24,143
Grand Total	2,800,138	28,379	3,741	325	4,720	701	802	8,786