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HAITI HELD HOSTAGE:
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE QUEST FOR NATIONHOOD
1986-1996

Robert Maguire (team leader), Edwige Balutansky,
Jacques Fomerand, Larry Minear, William G. O'Neill,
Thomas G. Weiss, and Sarah Zaidi

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The Thomas J. Watson Jr.
Institute for International Studies
Brown University, Box 1970
2 Stimson Avenue
Providence, RI 02912

Telephone: (401) 863-2809
Fax: (401) 863-1270
E-mail: IIS@brown.edu
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/

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"Haitian people, you have just waged an historic battle. As in 1804, when our ancestors defeated the colonial Army to give us independence, today we have defeated the Haitian Army, which had been keeping the country hostage since 1804."

René Garcia Préval
President of Haiti
Inaugural Address
February 7, 1996

FOREWORD

I am pleased to introduce this new study dealing with the response of the international community to the multifaceted dimensions of the Haitian crisis over the past ten years.

In *An Agenda for Peace* and subsequent pronouncements, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has repeatedly emphasized that the maintenance of peace and security rested not only on timely and well-targeted political initiatives but also on an appropriate mix of humanitarian actions and sustained efforts in support of development and human rights. This problematic ranks high in the research concerns of the United Nations University and is an important component of the University's Programme on Peace and Governance. It also provides the central rationale of a UNU Project, "the Foundations of Peace," which seeks to assess the role of international organizations in restoring and maintaining peace and security through a series of case studies with particular focus on development, humanitarian action, and human rights. Since the Humanitarianism and War Project of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University has produced ground-breaking case studies on United Nations-related operations, this convergence of interests made it natural for the United Nations University and the Institute to combine their respective strengths in undertaking this case study on Haiti.

Indeed, the Haiti experience raised a unique blend of questions relating to the role of international organizations that make it a privileged ground for assessing a number of critical policy tenets and assumptions. As a case study, Haiti is particularly revealing not only because of the initial application of economic sanctions and the subsequent use of military force to counteract a military coup but also in the sense that the international community intervened to restore a democratically elected government. In terms of policy relevance and analysis, the Haiti case poses crucial questions on the comparative advantage of resorting to alternative modes of action provided for under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. It also sheds light upon the differential consequences

of unilateral, regional, and universal approaches to conflict management and resolution.

These questions provide the focus of *Haiti Held Hostage*. They are ably explored by a multidisciplinary and international team of distinguished social scientists on the basis, in part, of an extensive and systematic process of on-site interviews with all of the major actors concerned. The study thus generates new data and information that, together with its concrete and practical recommendations, should be of immediate interest to practitioners and scholars as well. It is my hope that it will have a wide readership.

Heitor Gurgulino de Souza
Rector
United Nations University

PREFACE

This is another in a series of case studies conducted by the Humanitarianism and War Project that reviews humanitarian action in conflict settings around the world. This study offers an independent review of responses by the international community to the series of crises in Haiti over the last decade. The purpose of this volume, like that of its predecessors, is to make recommendations to improve the functioning of the major international actors—governments, militaries, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The independence of the project enables us to take a candid and forthright approach.

As with previous studies, the findings and recommendations of the current review are based on first-hand field research. Some two hundred persons involved in various aspects of the Haiti crises were interviewed (some of them more than once) in late 1995 and early 1996 in Haiti, Washington, D.C., New York, and southern Florida. The interviews in Haiti took place in January 1996 after the election of President René Préval but before his inauguration. Ongoing monitoring of events has made it possible for the report to reflect developments through June 1996. A list of those interviewed is contained in Appendix II and a selected bibliography of "Resources for Further Reference" in Appendix I.

The chief architect of the study is Robert Maguire, who has been involved in development matters in Haiti for the past 20 years. Granted leave from the Inter-American Foundation to orchestrate this study, Maguire brought to the undertaking a well-informed historical perspective and a host of contacts that have enriched our research.

The team also included Edwige Balutansky, a Haitian with extensive background in the media; Jacques Fomerand, head of the United Nations University's New York office and well-versed in research methodologies and the United Nations system; William G. O'Neill, an international lawyer with first-hand experience of human rights issues in Haiti and elsewhere; Sarah Zaidi, a social scientist knowledgeable about sanctions issues and community health activities; and the two of us as co-directors of the Humanitarianism and War Project.

Larry Minear took responsibility for integrating comments from other team members on earlier drafts and for finalizing the text. Additional biographical information about the team is found in Appendix III.

In our judgment and experience, a multinational and multidisciplinary team such as this is needed to capture the richness and complexity of the issues, which cut across traditional dichotomies of assistance and protection, humanitarian action and peacekeeping, as well as the traditional demarcations of academic disciplines. Even with inputs from such a team, the challenge of doing justice in a brief volume to the dynamics of the Haiti situation and international responses to it has proved formidable. The result reflects broad consensus among the team, although the precise formulation of every idea may not reflect the views of each member.

From the outset, we identified two major issues as our focus. The first concerns the respective contributions of the major international actors. Who did what best, or at least better? Were sufficient efforts made to optimize the comparative advantages of each actor and the synergies among all? The second concerns the differing impacts of various actions (diplomatic, political, economic, military, and humanitarian) on the welfare of civilians and on indigenous institutions. Which contributions were the most significant and how well did they fit together? To what extent did international actors enhance Haiti's quest for nationhood? By nationhood we mean a people's ongoing effort to shape political, economic, and social institutions that reflect its values and energize and benefit its citizenry.

Given the rapidly changing political landscape and the influence of the past upon the present, we decided to examine each of these issues over the last decade, beginning with the departure of the Duvalier regime in early 1986. In view of the limitations of space, the text offers only enough description of key events to provide the necessary context for assessing the response of the international community. For a more detailed discussion of those events, readers who are not Haiti specialists have a rich array of already published resources to consult, a few of which are listed in Appendix I. Readers familiar with Haiti's past may wish to move directly to Chapters 1 or 2.

In concentrating on the international response in its multiple dimensions over a ten-year period, we believe the study breaks new analytical ground. We expect that it will be of particular utility to policymakers and practitioners in the humanitarian, political, and peacekeeping spheres, as well as to policy analysts and academics. As with our other publications, we also write with the concerned public in mind, upon whose support sustained international action depends.

The case of Haiti represents something of an analytical departure for the Humanitarianism and War Project. Haiti has not been the victim of a civil war but has suffered many of the attributes of strife, such as massive population displacements and human rights abuses, a devastated economy, and a polarized population. Haiti has also been the object of outside responses normally reserved for countries at war, including economic and military sanctions, an invasion of aid agencies, diplomats, conflict resolution experts, and international observers, and hot and cold media coverage. Thus there are useful contrasts and comparisons with other cases studied by the project.

Haiti was in many ways unlike other crises in that the international community sought to free a people held hostage by its own political and military leadership. During the ten-year period, Haiti presented many challenges to which the world responded with the variety of instruments just mentioned. We analyze not only the effectiveness but also the sequencing of these interventions. The study's title highlights the captivity of the Haitian people and the need to judge international responses by their contribution to the quest for nationhood.

In other respects, the Haitian crisis resembles other major emergencies we have reviewed. Like Rwanda's, it highlights the failure of traditional economic development strategies that had infused the country with copious resources over an extended period. As in Somalia, the challenge of nation building beckoned. In Haiti, however, a backlash against the Somalia experience, from which the wrong lessons regarding nation building were learned, limited the range of tasks tackled. As in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, economic sanctions failed to accomplish their political objectives while ravaging the poor,

but with some significant differences. As elsewhere, humanitarian and other international actors became caught up in the conflict and were themselves often held hostage. As in Afghanistan, Cold War chickens came home to roost. As in Liberia and Georgia, regional peacekeeping mechanisms were activated by regional powers and blessed by the UN Security Council, with varying degrees of effectiveness and accountability.

Haiti affords an instructive example of a response by the international community to a very particular set of challenges. Tempting as it may be to view the Haiti experience as non-replicable, however, we believe that it offers an important potential precedent for a future in which constitutional and representative authorities in other regions are likely to be overturned.

This view probably places us in a minority at a time when the support for multilateral approaches to problem solving is falling from fashion. It is a time of waning commitment to the global common good and of growing reluctance to tackle matters that, during the Cold War, had been the jurisdiction of sovereign states. It is a time of backlash against the use of military and even economic coercion and against anything that smacks of "nation-building," even in the poorest and least stable states. Yet precisely now, with gloom and doom overhanging international action, the Haiti experience deserves to be assayed. Future initiatives undertaken at a more propitious moment—and there will surely be some—will benefit.

Whether the Haiti response becomes a precedent depends on whether it serves as a basis for similar interventions elsewhere in the years to come. Less than two years after the restoration of the elected authorities, the longer-term significance of international action cannot be fully assessed. Given Haiti's two-century quest for nationhood, two years is but a fleeting moment. "The U.S. intervention there," writes one analyst, "may well prove to be the most significant foreign policy achievement of the Clinton presidency, and the Haitian spirit that greeted it the signal modern achievement of the Haitian people."[1] However, if positive changes prove short-lived, the judgment of history on the United States and the United Nations will necessarily be harsher.

As with earlier case studies, our report is a vehicle not only for our own analyses but also for the views of those directly involved. In fact, the bulk of this study's material is drawn directly from discussions with participants. We found people very willing to share their views and pass on their prescriptions. It was not unusual for interviews—whether with soldiers, aid practitioners, government officials, politicians, business people, or grassroots groups—to last for hours and to be highly animated, informative, and opinionated. Those interviewed are quoted without attribution to preserve the candor and confidentiality with which views were shared. The authors of the report remain solely responsible for the analysis and conclusions as well as for any errors, omissions, or misstatements.

The published report is itself a vehicle for continuing dialogue on the issues. With that in mind, we are particularly pleased that this English text will be followed by a French and a Creole version, making the product more accessible in Haiti itself. Readers may wish to note that we use names and expressions in Creole, the language spoken by all Haitians. (Thus Port-au-Prince's slum is rendered Cité Soley rather than Cité Soleil.) Following widespread dissemination of the report, the team plans follow-up debriefings in New York, Washington, and Port-au-Prince and perhaps also in Tokyo and Miami. The availability of the English text to users of the World Wide Web at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/H_W/HW_ms.shtml should facilitate distribution further still.

This case study is a joint undertaking between Brown University's Humanitarianism and War Project and the United Nations University. We wish to express our appreciation to the UNU for the collegial collaboration and support that have made this undertaking possible. We also wish to acknowledge our other regular contributors whose names are listed in Appendix III. Without their ongoing support, we would not be in a position to mount such an initiative.

The study also had the benefit of assistance from a variety of individuals. In Haiti, we had help from Ronel Ceran, Fabiola Fouron, and the staff of Haiti Info-Service. We are also grateful for the assistance of the project's staff and of the Watson

Institute, including Fred Fullerton, Amy Langlais, Margareta Levitsky, Sue Miller, Jerry Maldonado, and Nancy Soukup.

As always, we welcome comments and criticisms from our readers. These inform our ongoing monitoring of developments in Haiti and our continuing analysis of conflicts elsewhere.

Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear
Providence, Rhode Island
July 1996


Haiti
Cap Haitien
Gonaives
St Marc
Port-au-Prince
Dominican Republic

Acronyms

AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
AHP	Agence Haitienne de Press [Haiti Press Association]
AIDS	anti-immune deficiency syndrome
APAB	Asesyasyon Peyizan ak Atiza Bonbad [Bombardopolis Peasant and Artisan Association]
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CEBEMO	Organisation Catholique des Pays-Bas pour la Coopération du Développement [Dutch Catholic Organization for Development Cooperation]
CEP	Conseil Electoral Provisoire [Provisional Election Council]
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency [U.S.]
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIVPOL	Civilian Police [UN]
CLED	Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Democratie [Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy]
CNG	Conseil Nationale du Gouvernement [National Governing Council]
CPFO	Centre pour la Promotion des Femmes Ouvrieres [Center for the Promotion of Women Workers]
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs [UN]
DPA	Department of Political Affairs [UN]
DPKO	Department of Peace-keeping Operations [UN]
EC	European Community
EERP	Emergency Economic Recovery Program
EU	European Union
FAd'H	Forces Armees d'Haiti [Haitian Armed Forces]
FAES	Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization [UN]
FRAPH	Front pour l'avancement et le progres d'Haiti [Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress]

HAVA	Haitian Association of Voluntary Associations
HNP	Haitian National Police
IAF	Inter-American Foundation
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program [U.S.]
ICEF	Institute de Consultation, d'Evaluation et de Formation de Personnel [Institute for Consultation, Evaluation, and Training]
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDEA	Institut Diocésain d'Eduation des Adultes
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	international financial institution
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	international nongovernmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPSF	Interim Public Security Force [Haiti]
IRI	International Republican Institute
KONAKOM	Pati Kongrè Nasyonal Mouvman Demkratik yo [National Congress of Democratic Movements]
MICIVIH	Mission Civil Internationale en Haiti [International Civilian Mission in Haiti]
MINUHA	Mission des Nations-Unies en Haiti [United Nations Mission in Haiti]
MNF	multinational force
MODB	Mouvman Oganizasyon Devlopman Belfontenn [Belfontaine Development Movement]
MPM	Mouvman Peyizan Milot [Milot Peasant Movement]
MRE	"Morally Repugnant Elite"
NDI	National Democratic Institute [U.S.]
NED	National Endowment for Democracy [U.S.]
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States

OFM	Organisation Femmes Milot [Milot Women's Organization]
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation [U.S.]
PADF	Pan-American Development Foundation
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organization
PIRED	Project intégré pour le renforcement de la démocratie en Haiti [Project for the Reinforcement of Haitian Democracy]
QIP	Quick-Impact Project
RPL	Rasanbleman Peyizan Laskawobas [Lascahobas Peasant Association]
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General [UN]
STAS	Syndicat des Travailleurs Agricoles de Savanette [Savanette Agricultural Workers Union]
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USAID	United Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme [UN]
WHO	World Health Organization [UN]

INTRODUCTION

PARIAH STATE—HOSTAGE NATION

"Honor. Respect."
Traditional Haitian peasant greeting

In his inaugural speech February 7, 1991, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide told representatives of the international community that Haiti "will be looking forward to a close cooperation of our countries with mutual support and assistance." That cooperation would help the country fulfill its dreams of becoming "a democracy [that] will mean justice and well-being for all."

The challenge faced by Aristide, Haiti, and the outside world was formidable. There was no history of democratic governance. International manipulation of Haiti dated back to the nation's origins in the early nineteenth century. In more recent years, concrete results for the vast majority of Haitians from large per capita aid flows to the hemisphere's poorest country had been conspicuous by their absence.

Against the background of Haitian history reviewed in this opening chapter, the present study examines international involvement in Haiti's recent struggle for change. The focus is on the ten-year period following the collapse on February 7, 1986 of the 29-year Duvalier family dictatorship. The decade is divided into three separate periods, each presenting a different but related set of crises and challenges to the international community.

Chapter 1 examines the immediate post-Duvalier struggle for change up to and including the coup (February 1986-September 1991). Chapter 2 covers the period of military rule and corresponding international response, most notably diplomacy and sanctions (October 1991-September 1994). Chapter 3 covers military intervention, peacekeeping, democratic restoration, and reconstruction (October 1994-January 1996). Chapter 4 offers conclusions and recommendations. An Afterword updates developments through mid-1996, when this study was finalized.

Throughout the decade under review, Haiti has been plagued by political instability, economic and environmental degradation, and violence. Such ills generally characterized the period following the demise of the Duvalier family and culminating in the election of Aristide. The period of the Aristide presidency, lasting only seven months, was itself marked by escalating tensions, culminating in the military coup d'état in September 1991 that sent the president and his associates into exile. Violence and terror were the hallmarks of the period of rule by the de facto authorities that followed. Only since the restoration of Aristide in October 1994 has violence been held in check, although the threat of its resurgence looms over efforts to establish "justice and well-being for all."

Unlike most of the recent crises to which the international community has responded, Haiti's was not one of ethnic rivalry or civil war. It was rather the challenge of what could be considered a type of Caribbean *apartheid* in which a small group, long accustomed to the unbridled exercise of power and backed by the force of arms, stubbornly held hostage a nation insisting on change. Faced with a situation in which a nation was held hostage not by a foreign power but by elements of its own citizenry, international actors adopted a two-track approach. They sought to get the hostage-takers to loosen their grip while at the same working to improve the conditions of the vast majority of Haitians held hostage. International instruments included diplomacy, economic leverage (both in the form of sanctions and of assistance), and military pressure. Efforts to ameliorate the plight of the hostages included emergency assistance and human rights protection.

This study focuses on the nature, sequencing, and effectiveness of the international political, military, and humanitarian actions taken. However, the focus is not intended to minimize the importance of the struggle by Haitians to free themselves. Some fled the country, but many worked for change from within, drawing critical support from various actors beyond their shores. It was these efforts by Haitians themselves throughout the decade that eventually compelled an international military intervention to free a hostage nation from its captors.

The Origins of the Pariah State

Following Haiti's independence in 1804, the former French colony quickly became an international pariah. European colonial powers, joined by the newly-independent United States, officially shunned the black republic, hoping to isolate from their own slave-based economies its "virus" of freedom-from-slavery. Haiti's neighbors replicated the pattern. Under U.S. pressure, the new republics of Latin America excluded Haiti from the hemisphere's first region-wide meeting of independent states, held in Panama in 1826. Haiti took this affront deeply, as it had been the only country to provide the refuge and resources pivotal to Simon Bolivar and his associates in their pursuit of Latin American independence.

Haiti's pariah status continued until 1838, when France grudgingly recognized its sovereignty. Whereas other European powers quickly followed suit, Haiti's hemispheric neighbors continued to isolate it until 1862, when the United States sent an ambassador to Port-au-Prince. Latin American republics slowly followed suit, commencing with Brazil in 1865 and ending with Peru in 1938.

Haiti's recognition came quite literally at a price. Massive cash transfers flowed from its treasury to France following independence as reparations for seizing French assets during the war. Even though by 1838 the young republic had transferred in excess of 30 million francs to Paris, France demanded that indemnities continue, dooming Haiti to prolonged international debtor status from the very beginning of its existence.

The post-independence diplomatic *cordon sanitaire* placed around Haiti did not extend to commercial ties. For the next half century, Britain, France, and the United States jockeyed for advantageous trade relations with what had been the world's richest plantation colony. Although independence struggles had damaged its economy, Haiti still commanded considerable wealth from coffee and other tropical crops and offered a market for manufactured goods. Trading nations sent a mixed message to Haiti's rulers, withholding formal diplomatic recognition while pursuing lucrative mercantile relationships with Haitian counterparts.

Haiti's post-revolutionary leaders responded deftly to such treatment. To deflect the political aversion of others, they became defiant, developing and extolling a strong nationalist pride that emphasized Haiti's uniqueness and its African roots. To embrace economic opportunity, they became accessible and engaging, emphasizing their cosmopolitanism and French culture.

This dichotomous approach toward the outside world was built upon a symbiotic relationship between Haiti's two most powerful groups: its military leaders and merchant elites. In the century following independence, the former, largely of African ancestry, competed for political power. The latter, generally of mixed French-African background and better educated than their political counterparts, controlled commerce, usually holding the balance of power. Thus, Haiti's mercantile elites carved out beneficial alliances with the country's political leaders whom they manipulated in a system that became known as *politique de doublure* (the politics of understudy). From this system emerged a small, urban-based elite that controlled state political and security apparatuses.

The symbiotic relationship developed by Haiti's two most powerful groups was predicated upon exclusion from power of a third group that produced the country's wealth: the vast majority of its population. The Haitian peasantry and small entrepreneurs of the informal economy fell victim to the prevailing system of economic predation and coercive control. The relationships that evolved between producers and the merchants and politicians who took control of their products beyond the farm gate is summed up in a Creole proverb popular among Haiti's poor today: "*bourik travay pou chwal galonnen*" (the mule works to benefit the horse). In the independent state, the foot soldiers of the revolution had become the *moun andeyo* (people on the outside), the pariahs within the pariah.

From Pariah to Hostage

The United States soon became the dominant player in Haiti's trade, despite an embargo levied against the country from 1804-1806 and steadfast abhorrence among U.S. slave-

owners of Haiti and all it stood for. By the end of the century, American merchants were using their relative proximity and hemispheric power to squeeze out most foreign competitors. The American invasion of Haiti in 1915, instigated in part by the threat of German intervention, gave the U.S. unchallenged economic dominance of its Caribbean neighbor. The invasion and the nineteen-year military occupation, during which Washington rewrote Haiti's constitution and chose its leaders, cemented American political dominance.

Between 1915 and 1934, the United States built the institutions and infrastructure needed to quash internal resistance. Disbanding what remained of the Haitian revolutionary army, the U.S. established a new armed force—the *garde d'Haiti*—to combat those resisting American presence and ensure effective occupation of the countryside. Washington provided not only the equipment and the training but also the military doctrine.

Thus Haiti's second army was born; it was a force that would fight the Haitian people and become the target of another military intervention, led by the U.S. itself, 60 years after its American creators had withdrawn. In addition to physical facilities required to support an army, Washington built the roads, bridges, and telecommunication systems required for effective occupation and improved the sanitation and health infrastructure as well. The United States introduced the use of forced labor. The U.S. occupation also shifted geopolitical and sociopolitical balances within the country. Regional political and economic autonomy was weakened in favor of power centralized in Port-au-Prince. The U.S. chose members of the commercial elites to sit in the national palace, excluding Haiti's traditional political players, undoing the system of *doublure,* and strengthening the capital's political class.

This shift in Haiti's balance of power did not fully withstand the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1934. The armed force left behind rapidly reinserted itself into politics. Indeed, by 1950 the Forces Armees d'Haiti (FAd'H) became the unmasked power on the throne when one of its own, Paul Magloire, ascended to the presidency following a military coup d'état. Magloire (1950-1956) immediately reaffirmed the

symbiotic relationship between the army and the urban-based elites, stating, "In this country, there're only two forces that count, the army and the bourgeoisie!"

During the 1950s, the U.S. used military and economic assistance to Haiti as a tool to contain the spread of communism in the hemisphere. Millions of dollars were pledged for such major infrastructure projects as hydroelectricity, irrigation, and roads. A new player, the United Nations, sent cadres of technical specialists to work with Magloire's government. Earmarked for state-sponsored projects and government ministries, little of this largesse reached either Haiti's increasingly impoverished peasantry or its growing number of urban poor, which were excluded from meaningful participation in the state.

A Country of Hostages

François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, succeeding Magloire in 1957, promised a political revolution. Yet that revolution did not alter the relationship between the Haitian state and the majority of its citizens. Instead, it turned Haiti's traditional symbiotic relationships upside down, bringing to power a new political elite: the Duvalierists. Papa Doc's quest to consolidate political and economic power in their hands resulted in violent attacks on the country's commercial and political elites and a new phenomenon: massive exile. In response to the terror, Haiti's elites fled to such cities as New York, Montreal, and Paris.

Duvalier's quest also led him to create an armed militia to offset the power traditionally exercised by the army. The *tonton makout*, a highly politicized paramilitary organization, was an essential element in neutralizing the army and extending his control through a reign of terror that polarized society and occupied the country.

Although Washington endured the excesses of Duvalier's dictatorship (1957-1971) for the same reasons it had ultimately supported Magloire and his associates, its relationship with Papa Doc was equivocal. Duvalier's repression of traditional U.S. partners created special problems for Washington. While a pariah, the dictator was also an ally in containing communism in the

hemisphere, particularly in regards to Fidel Castro's Cuba.

Acutely aware of his leverage, Duvalier was able to exploit Washington's ideology for his own purposes. Duvalier's support came at a price. At the 1962 meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Punta del Este, Uruguay, his government cast a pivotal vote in support of a U.S. initiative to impose sanctions against Cuba. In return, Haiti received $2.8 million to complete construction of the François Duvalier International Airport.

While those fleeing Haiti by plane benefited from the airport, Haiti's poor had little for which to give thanks. Duvalier's armed supporters, ranging from the denim-clad *makout* to the army's khaki-clad *chef seksyon* (section chief), ensured that Haiti's small producers and their families remained hostage to an extractive political and economic system. To act or speak contrary to the "president-for-life" was the ultimate crime in a country where lesser crimes resulted in disappearance and presumed death.

Only one new player on the Haitian landscape—international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs)—tried to reach the poor. An increasing number came to Haiti during Papa Doc's rule, establishing educational, health, nutritional, and religious programs. CARE, for example, arrived in 1959 in response to famine in the northwest and launched its first humanitarian feeding program. Other groups such as Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service established similar activities at about the same time.

For the most part, INGOs were welcomed by the government as long as they did not challenge the status quo. In a state that rendered virtually no services to its citizens, outside groups brought resources that relieved the state of its duty toward its citizens. In subsequent years, aid flows through multilateral and bilateral channels also had the effect of solidifying existing power relationships rather than enhancing the relative power of the poor.

The Phantom State

On becoming president of Haiti after his father's death in 1971, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier pledged to follow his

father's political revolution with an economic one. The young Duvalier's rule would be benevolent, promising change and modernity to improve the lot of its citizens. His pledge won virtually unequivocal support from Washington, multilateral banks, and other governments, which annually pumped tens of millions of dollars into Baby Doc's government throughout the 1970s.[1] Haiti, or more accurately Port-au-Prince, became awash in development projects, development experts, and development offices.

Yet the country remained the poorest in the hemisphere. The main beneficiaries of Jean-Claude's economic revolution were the same Duvalierists who had benefited from his father's political revolution, later to be joined by the country's commercial elites. What observers have dubbed Jean-Claude's "kleptocracy" ended up further concentrating wealth in the hands of a few. By the end of the first decade of his rule, 1 percent of Haiti's population controlled 55 percent of its GNP while 75 percent of all Haitians lived in absolute poverty.

For the vast majority of Haitians, the state remained a phantom that made no positive contribution to their lives. Despite bloated budgets for internationally-financed projects, key state ministries such as agriculture, education, public works, and justice had little, if any, presence in the countryside where most Haitians lived. For most Haitians, the state existed primarily through its mechanisms of predation: the office of taxation (Bureau de Contributions), the army, and the *makouts*. *That* is, the state was both a phantom where government services were concerned and elsewhere a predator.[2]

In response to worsening conditions, numerous Haitians began in the late 1970s to flee the country in crowded wooden sailboats, attempting the treacherous passage to southern Florida and Miami. During the months between January and October 1980, some 13,500 Haitians reached their destination, arriving along with 124,775 Cubans who set out from Mariel Harbor.[3] Washington, anxious to rationalize its Cold War policies, characterized the Marielitos, fleeing a communist regime, as political refugees. Haitians, fleeing a predatory state and the accompanying repression and poverty, were considered economic migrants.

Table 1: Wages in Relation to the Cost of Living in Haiti Based on Observations of the Local Economy Measured in US$, 1985-1995



The table is derived from data collected by Father Raf. Maenhout, who monitored the costs of essential items on the markets of Port-au-Prince during the decade.

The first wave of Haitians precipitated two key U.S. policies. First, in an early indication that it had begun to lose faith in the Duvalier government's ability to modernize Haiti's economy, Washington began shifting aid from the state to international NGOs and the Haitian private sector. The goal was to make the country "the Taiwan of the Caribbean," where assembly factories using Haiti's plentiful, cheap labor would mass-produce materials for the U.S. market and create jobs to stem out migration. Funding for NGOs and the private sector expanded as the kleptocratic tendencies of the state grew.[4]

Second, the United States signed an interdiction agreement in 1981 with the Duvalier government. It asserted the right to intercept Haitian boat people on the high seas and return them home, with only a cursory attempt to determine whether they feared persecution upon their return. U.S. resolve stiffened in the mid-1980's with the advent of AIDS, since Haitians were among the groups erroneously held responsible for the genesis and spread of the dreaded disease.

Many ordinary Haitians, distinct politically, economically, and culturally from those who fled Haiti under Papa Doc, succeeded in establishing themselves in North America where they formed the nucleus of Haiti's modern diaspora. Within the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, the diaspora supported and generated support for economic and political reforms in Haiti and in U.S. and Canadian policy toward their homeland.

Jean-Claude Duvalier reestablished the state's traditional relationship with Haiti's elites as part of his strategy of courting continued international support of his "reform" government. His moves pitted his technocrats against his father's "dinosaurs" in a battle for control of the state. Eventually, the young president's alliance with his father's enemies weakened ties with Duvalierism's *authentiques* and seriously undermined his "presidency-for-life."

Also a factor in his demise was the visit in March 1983 of Pope Jean-Paul II, whose message was that "things must change." In fact, things had already begun to change among the country's disenfranchised. Linked largely to work carried out under the auspices of clergy, lay leaders, and indigenous NGOs, Haiti's poor had started organizing themselves into

community self-help groups and peasant associations. The Pope's message buoyed their efforts to improve their social and economic status and gain a political voice. By late 1985, these and the other forces had eroded Jean-Claude's grasp on power.

Immediately following the departure of Jean-Claude, his family, and several associates on February 7, 1986, two Creole slogans articulating contradictory expectations appeared on Haiti's walls. *Chak Kat Ans*, calling for elections every four years and implying participatory democratic governance, received widespread and enthusiastic support, particularly from Haiti's expanding grassroots groups, reform-minded middle class NGOs, and professional associations. *Vive l'Armèe* signaled the reemergence of the army as arbiter of Haitian politics and the reenforcement of traditional relationships between military and other elites. The latter constellation of forces received strong backing both from Duvalierists seeking a return to the status quo and from a bourgeoisie willing to accept cosmetic change.

Conflict in the decade following Jean-Claude's fall has centered around efforts of the supporters of these competing slogans and interests to win the struggle for Haiti's future. Actions by an array of international actors have been critical in expanding, reversing, or containing the opportunities for change following 29 years of Duvalier family dictatorship and over a century of repressed and frustrated stirrings of popularly based change.

This brief review of two centuries of Haitian history provides the context for analyzing international responses to Haiti's crises during the 10 years beginning in 1986. Humanitarian activities came on the heels of earlier efforts to aid the Haitian poor that had produced decidedly mixed results. Based on past experience, the proposition that authentic humanitarian considerations propelled international action resulted in understandable skepticism among ordinary Haitians.

Likewise, efforts to prevent violence and repression followed in the wake of alliances between outsiders and a succession of regimes with little respect for human rights. The embargoes of 1991-1994 were not the first, nor were their

sensitivity to outside commercial interests without precedent. U.S. military forces were returning to confront institutions they had created.

Yet there were also some new elements. Whereas coups had been a regular feature of Haitian life, outside intervention to overturn a coup was out of the ordinary. Doing so was more unusual in that the beneficiaries were democratic processes and the poor who had been marginalized in the past. It was no surprise that the driving outside force was the familiar regional power, yet the multilateral features of the intervention were unexpected.

The following chapters review Haiti's quest for nationhood through a variety of stages during this critical ten-year period. Of particular interest are the political, military, and humanitarian strategies adopted by the international community to free the Haitian people from their hostage status as well as to improve the conditions of those held hostage. The overarching issue concerns how much, in the words of President René Préval that began this study, Haiti has freed itself from its perennial hostage status, and what roles were played by the international community in that process.

Chapter 1

Can the Leopard Change Its Spots?
February 1986-September 1991

"If Haiti isn't a jungle,
why then all these beasts?"
Manno Charlemagne, 1988[1]

With the Duvalier dictatorship over, state and nonstate actors within Haiti intensified their competition to influence the country's future. Three broad groups emerged with widely divergent views. Duvalierism's supporters, reasserting themselves through formal and informal links with the army, sought a reversion to the status quo. The country's commercial, political, and religious elites supported a modicum of change, carefully orchestrated and contained. The vast majority of Haiti's citizenry wanted a radical break from the past and a fundamental reordering of the country's social, economic, and political relationships.

Five-and-a-half years of struggle for power ensued, with the military and elites finding common ground when needed to thwart those seeking fundamental change. During these years, international actors provided essential support to all three groups. Yet that support favored the careful orchestration of change rather than a fundamental revamping of relationships. Indeed, the international community by and large became identified primarily with those groups and institutions uniting to thwart the aspirations of most Haitians.

The first section of this chapter reviews political developments between the departure of the Duvaliers in February 1986 and the election of Aristide in September 1991. The second section analyzes international responses to those developments, with particular attention to its humanitarian elements.

Chapter I: Key Events

February 7, 1986	Jean-Claude Duvalier departs Haiti; provisional government (CNG) takes over
March 29, 1987	Constitution overwhelmingly approved in popular referendum, establishing framework for elections
November 29, 1987	Military sabotages presidential elections; U.S. and others subsequently suspend aid
1988	Three presidents: Manigat, Namphy, Avril; military consolidates power
1988-1989	Aristide emerges as national figure; assassination attempts
March 1990	Avril flees country; provisional goverment established to conduct elections
December 16, 1990	Aristide elected president in internationally monitored elections declared “free and fair”
February 7, 1991	Aristide inaugurated following Duvalierist coup attempt
September 29, 1991	Military coup deposes Aristide

The Struggle Within

Duvalierism without Duvalier

Immediately following Jean-Claude Duvalier's virtually bloodless overthrow, an explosive burst of pent-up energy spread throughout Haiti. Grassroots organizations expanded in number and size, calling for justice, the removal of the *tonton makout* system (*demacoutization*), and decentralization of the state.[2] Many technical and professional associations and other NGOs, particularly those linked with grassroots sectors, responded similarly.

Haiti's long-muzzled press also found its voice. In a country with limited literacy, radio stations broadcasting in Creole were particularly important. One station stood out. Radio Soley, a Catholic institution silenced under Duvalier, was welcomed back on the air as the voice of the people. In its honor, the capital's largest slum, previously named Simone after Papa Doc's wife, became "Cité Soley."

Haiti's economic and political elites, joined by its Catholic bishops, responded cautiously to Duvalier's ouster. Their emphasis on forgiveness appealed to Duvalierists but not to those who had suffered the abuses of dictatorship. For them, reconciliation had to be preceded by justice. The bishops' alliance with other elites opened up a gap between them and the rank-and-file of the church. When the bishops later fired Radio Soley's revered staff and abruptly closed a national church-sponsored literacy program, *Misyon Alfa*, the gap grew to schism proportions, with the population becoming increasingly at odds with the established church and its cautious leadership. The expulsion of Father Aristide from his Salesian order heightened the alienation.

Despite widespread popular desires to uproot (*dechoukè*) all vestiges of Duvalierism, most of the dictators' lieutenants remained in Haiti. Many entrenched themselves in the army and in other state institutions, now overseen by a post-Duvalier provisional National Governing Council (CNG) whose mandate was to lead the country to elections. The CNG, a military government in civilian garb, enjoyed the active support of the United States, which had played a role in its formation. Hai-

tians recall that massacres by the army, the *attaches*, and the *macoutes* in the run-up to the elections of 1987 went virtually unchallenged by the U.S. embassy.

The elections were mandated by the 1987 constitution, a document written by civilians and overwhelmingly approved in a popular referendum in March of that year. Support pledged by CNG leader General Henri Namphy to the constitutionally mandated electoral process gave way to election sabotage in November 1987 when the army realized it could not dictate the outcome. The army's actions ushered in a time of "Duvalierism without Duvalier." Popular euphoria gave way to cynicism.

The "hot summer" of 1987 between the constitutional referendum and the aborted election was punctuated by strikes, demonstrations, and unrest. The former director of an international NGO in Port-au-Prince characterized this as "the key moment in the evolution of current Haitian politics." It brought organizations of civil society seeking a clean break from the past face-to-face with their opponents. Sometimes change-oriented groups prevailed; other times they were defeated, sometimes brutally.[3] The July 1987 massacre in Jean Rabel of several hundred peasants demonstrating for agrarian reform was a stark example of the willingness of those opposing change to resort to violence.

In January 1988, the army selected as president Leslie Manigat, an intellectual who had fled Haiti a generation earlier. When Manigat challenged the military's authority six months later, he was dismissed and Namphy reassumed leadership. In September 1988, General Prosper Avril replaced Namphy when an embarrassed army sent its leader to the Dominican Republic. He had proved closely affiliated with the paramilitaries who had burned the church of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in a Port-au-Prince slum and murdered at least a dozen parishioners.

Following Namphy's departure, the FAd'H nevertheless continued to increase its political power through alliances with the former *makout*. Seeking to lessen its dependence on the country's elites, the army strengthened its economic base through alliances with international networks of drug traffick-

ers and other contraband traders and through control of state-owned enterprises.

By late 1989, the CNG's inability to lead the country to free and fair elections was obvious. Facing increasing unrest in Haiti and mounting pressure from the U.S., Avril fled to Florida in March 1990, leaving the country in the hands of another provisional government, this one headed by Supreme Court Judge Ertha Pascal Trouillot. With international determination keeping the army at least temporarily in line, Trouillot's government managed to orchestrate a process that culminated in elections on December 16, 1990 that were internationally recognized as free and fair.[4]

Lavalas

Although the elites participated from the early stages in the December 1990 elections, it was not until Jean-Bertrand Aristide's last minute presidential candidacy in October that the rest of the population took an active interest. Voter registration offices countrywide were inundated. Three million Haitians registered—the great majority solely to vote for the charismatic priest who had gained a national following both through his involvement with the poor and as a prominent opponent to governmental repression.

Aristide headed a reformist political movement called "Lavalas" (the cleansing flood) and ran on a platform of "transparency, participation, and justice." His objective was to bring citizens "from misery to poverty with dignity." Voters swept him into office with two-thirds of the vote, paying little attention to parliamentary and municipal races, a majority of which were won by candidates affiliated with Haiti's traditional political class. Haiti's elites were distraught with Aristide's victory.

Some opponents tried to keep the newly-elected president from taking office. In early January 1991, an attempted coup d'état was led by Roger Lafontant, a *makout* leader and former Duvalier minister of the interior. He apparently had misread his support from within the army, however, which acted to preserve the election results and enable the president-elect to

take office. Nevertheless, the Duvalierists and their allies had sent a message that they would not accept the outcome of the elections without a fight.

Aristide used his immense popularity to initiate what for Haiti were radical reforms. Vowing to restore to the army its dignity through a "marriage" with the people, he purged its top ranks. Pledging justice for all, he moved to separate the police from the army, as mandated in the 1987 constitution, and abolished the position of section chief, the army-appointed post integral to the FAd'H's continuing control over Haiti. Seeking the participation of all to build a nation, the president invited peasants to the palace and elites to pay taxes. He bestowed on the diaspora the title of the "Tenth Department" (Haiti has nine geopolitical units), calling it "a source of economic richness for us" and inviting Haitians abroad to invest in their country. Moving to reform the phantom state, he closed entire ministries for restructuring, reopening them with greatly reduced staffs and new missions.

For the country's *moun andeyo* and like-minded Haitians, Aristide's seven months in office represented a period of unparalleled hope and flourescence. Haiti's still-expanding civil society grew in influence, spurred by a government that for the first time listened to such voices. Aristide recruited into the government individuals from reform-minded civil society organizations, who brought with them an agenda for change. In this period of relative calm, even the president's detractors credited him with an environment that allowed the return of night life to the capitol.

Early reform efforts by the Aristide government received generally high international marks. Its progress in enhancing revenue while streamlining bureaucracy won pledges in July 1991 of $511 million in grants or loans from the international financial institutions. In September, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a $48 million standby loan.[5] Precipitous declines in human rights violations also won praise. At the same time, there was some impatience with slow movement on internationally-financed development activities, which Aristide sought to allay with the explanation that revenue should be enhanced and corruption attacked before moving ahead with major development schemes.

The forceful push for change further alienated most of those already wary of Aristide. Parliament sought to perpetuate a business-as-usual approach, its opposition culminating in a proposed no-confidence vote in Aristide's hand-picked Prime Minister René Préval, which, if passed, would have ousted him and his cabinet. This move was met with a demonstration by several hundred Aristide backers that intimidated conservative parliamentarians. The demonstration and some intemperate words by the president were used by already fearful elites to underscore their opposition to Aristide and Lavalas.

Long before this episode, those in Haiti vehemently opposed to Aristide engaged in a campaign to "demonize" the priest-turned-politician. Using well-developed political and media connections in Port-au-Prince, Washington, New York, Paris, and Montreal, Aristide's opponents spread alarming stories that dramatized the perceived threats to Haiti, their own well-being, and the interests of international partners. The effectiveness of the campaign was confirmed by one veteran diplomat posted to Haiti in 1994. Having prepared himself by reading everything available from his government and the media about Aristide, he arrived with what he said he soon discovered to be a caricature of the country's president.

Following a series of successfully defused military mutinies, Aristide left Haiti in mid-September to address the UN General Assembly. Alerted on his way home to plausible coup rumors, the president took a confrontational stance, attempting to mobilize his massive popular support against the advantage held by the few with weapons and money. His efforts failed. The violent military-led coup d'état overthrew on September 29, 1991 the government after fewer than eight months of its five year term. Following the murder of hundreds of Lavalas supporters in the immediate aftermath of the coup, survivors fled for cover and abandoned their activities.[6]

International Responses

During the five-and-a-half-years between the departure of the Duvaliers in early 1986 and the coup against Aristide in late 1991, international action was geared primarily toward

promoting modest rather than fundamental change. The international community did not move quickly to encourage and reinforce the outburst of grassroots energy in 1986 or to rally behind the democratically elected president in 1991.

Setting the tone for other less important actors, U.S. government policies and programs worked primarily with and through Haiti's establishment to moderate the pace and influence the direction of change. In a distinct minority were some progressive governments and international NGOs that sought to encourage and strengthen grassroots movements as part of a strategy to transform traditional balances of power and to enhance accountability.

The quest for nationhood during this period centered around efforts to form new political alliances, to moderate the army's influence, and to control economic power. Institution building at the grass roots was a function of the political space available within which communities could organize and mobilize support. Contrasting with efforts in the political sphere, international humanitarian activities had a lower profile and were concentrated in periods of stress when protection of emerging leaders and emergency assistance to embattled communities was required. Strategic planning and action regarding longer-term development was limited.

Responding to Duvalierism without Duvalier

The hallmark of international involvement during these years was a series of efforts to strengthen established political institutions and promote a stable environment conducive to economic development through foreign technical and financial aid. Propelling Washington's concern with Haiti was an interest in stemming migration of Haitian boat people toward its shores. The main vehicles for achieving these objectives were the customary partners—the government and elites.

The U.S. mobilized its own agencies, particularly the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and its leverage in intergovernmental bodies to support its political and economic goals. Other governments and intergovernmental organizations—including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the European Com-

munity (EC), and various UN bodies—tended to focus on humanitarian assistance and economic development aid programs. Some European and North American NGOs worked closely with progressive Haitian NGOs and grassroots organizations. Haiti's neighbor, the Dominican Republic, also played a role, particularly in providing a venue for political asylum and contraband trade.

As soon as the CNG assumed power, it received considerable bilateral and multilateral financial and material support. The United States immediately resumed aid that had been suspended during the final days of Duvalier's government and continued to provide assistance, despite the provisional government's democratic shortcomings, until the November 29, 1987 election massacre. At that point, Washington halted all bilateral assistance except aid to combat drug trafficking.[7] Cessation of aid to the CNG, however, did not weaken its grasp on power since the FAd'H had used the period of strong international backing to consolidate its political and economic power so as to be able to withstand the eventual withdrawal of aid.

The military's behavior in late 1987 seems to have had a sobering effect on bilateral and multilateral donors. Only following the ouster of Avril in late 1989 and the end of overt military rule did multilateral and bilateral aid return to immediate post-Duvalier levels. Indicative of its return was the activation under the Trouillot-led government of the Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale (FAES), a multimillion dollar social and economic assistance fund financed by the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank and managed by the Haitian government.

During the time of Duvalierism without Duvalier, large amounts of governmental and intergovernmental aid continued to flow through international NGOs to their local affiliates. The Haitian private sector and, to a lesser extent, national NGOs and grassroots groups also received support. Donors sought out local collaborators, both as a substitute for inefficient and corrupt government channels and to influence their program priorities.

International agencies had a wide array of NGO partners from which to choose. By the early 1990s, there were as many

as one thousand international and indigenous NGOs active in Haiti.[8] Haitian grassroots groups themselves numbered in the thousands. These organizations carried out a dizzying array of humanitarian assistance and socioeconomic development programs throughout the country, most of them bringing little durable improvement to the lot of ordinary Haitians. Little coordination existed either among or between funders and implementing agencies. The absence of accountable government structures spurred the evolution of what was widely described as a "Republic of NGOs."

Partners could be found to accommodate the objectives of donors to reverse, contain, or expand change. Indeed, the panoply of funders and implementers exhibited the full spectrum of objectives and activities. Persons interviewed for this report agreed with the categorization of bilateral and multilateral donors, international NGOs and their local partners, and Haitian NGOs and grassroots groups into two broad groups.

The first group was composed of organizations directing their efforts toward emergency relief and the provision of goods and services. These organizations met certain pressing needs in times of disaster but stopped short of addressing the root causes of suffering. Also in this category were agencies that actively supported recidivistic forces thwarting legitimate popular aspirations for change.

The organizations in this first category tended to be affiliated with Haiti's economic, political, and religious elites, often employing Haitians from the country's leading families. USAID and various intergovernmental organizations provided them with significant amounts of funding. CARE and an array of major religious organizations and missionary groups carried out their own such programs and funded indigenous partners as well. Broadly speaking, these activities supported the status quo or sought to introduce modest changes in it, although their stated objectives may have been more reform-oriented.

The second category was comprised of organizations whose interventions sought to bring about fundamental social, economic, and political change. Their programs, often mixing human resource development with economic empowerment, embraced more active decision-making roles for participants. The local groups receiving aid tended to be either

Table 2: Cost of Selected Essential Items in Haiti Measured in Haitian Gourdes, 1985-1995



The table is derived from data collected by Father Raf. Maenhout, who monitored the costs of essential items on the markets of Port-au-Prince during the decade.

community-based or linked through professional or technical associations with grassroots membership organizations and entrepreneur groups, the disenfranchised, and the religious rank and file. Funders included progressive religious groups, NGOs such as Oxfam, or autonomous government-supported entities such as the Dutch Catholic Organization for Development (CEBEMO) and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF).

An example of the second category is provided by Oxfam-UK, an international NGO that began work in Haiti in the 1970s. During the Duvalier era, it had worked largely with church groups in training and literacy. In 1986, it took advantage of the political opening to begin work with a newly formed federation of "base groups" in income-generation projects. These activities contrasted with those of NGOs in the first category, which emphasized food-for-work and other assistance programs. Although the payment of people for work on community projects (a particularly common activity in the 1970s) may have provided some additional income and improved family nutrition, food-for-work programs did little to increase the relative economic and political status of the poor.

During the early post-Duvalier period, few Haitian NGOs and grassroots groups were registered with the state. One problem was Haiti's antiquated legal framework, which did not provide a category for registering civil society organization. Moreover, many grassroots groups continued to view the state as both phantom and predator. Without legal status, NGOs and grassroots groups often had difficulty receiving funds from governmental or intergovernmental organizations.

Partnerships involving Haiti's commercial elites in private sector development were an integral element of the international response to post-Duvalier Haiti. In a highly publicized visit to Haiti in 1986, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz stressed the importance of foreign investment in Haiti and of U.S.-Haitian private sector partnerships for job creation. Following Shultz's visit, the United States government's investment insurance arm, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), was authorized to insure U.S. private sector investment in Haiti, an extraordinary move given the still volatile situation.

Despite efforts to strengthen Haiti's private sector, little international investment was forthcoming, particularly outside Port-au-Prince. Haitian private sector investment also remained in the capital, largely in its factory zone. The assembly plant sector was touted as a lead component of job creation and economic stability but addressed only a fraction of the country's job creation needs. As outspoken trade union leaders, workers, and social change activists eroded the stable environment the sector had enjoyed under authoritarian rule, factory owners—some of them Haitian—moved operations to the Dominican Republic and beyond. Investment also was discouraged as a result of the neglect of the country's infrastructure. In the years following Duvalier's ouster, jobs in the assembly plant sector declined from a high of about 60,000 to 39,000 by the time Aristide was inaugurated. Seven thousand additional jobs had been lost by July 1991.[9]

In sum, despite substantial international involvement in the immediate post-Duvalier years, Haiti saw only limited political and economic development. Looking back from 1994, donors concluded that even after many years of large amounts of foreign aid, "international cooperation has had two basic shortcomings: no impact and no sustainability."[10] Most citizens remained mired in absolute poverty and misery, powerless to change their lives. A small group continued to monopolize power, wealth, and access to resources, reinforcing the nation's extreme economic, social, and political polarization. Migration remained an option exercised by thousands seeking a way out of the morass.

Responding to Lavalas

Contrasting with the tendency of most international actors to affiliate with Haiti's establishment, the response to the country's new actors and reformers—whether associated with civil society organizations or, following the 1990 elections, with the state—was generally wary and stand-offish and, on occasion, outright negative. The tone was set early in the period and exemplified by one of the first tangible acts of the U.S. government following Duvalier's ouster.

In March 1986, Washington sent "non-lethal" crowd-control equipment to the Haitian army. American rubber bullets and tear gas symbolized for many Haitians what they could expect as the normal international response to their aspirations for significant change.

International support for democratic political processes throughout this period also was weighted against those who challenged the establishment. Governments and intergovernmental organizations preferred "democracy through elites" to a less predictable but more participatory "grassroots democracy."

Prior to the 1990 elections, Washington funded programs to develop political parties under the auspices of quasi-U.S. government political organizations affiliated with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Such funding benefited Haitian groups considered centrist and supportive of the politics of reconciliation but excluded nascent reformist political groups and movements considered too radical or leftist.

Leading up to those elections was more constructive interaction on the political front between key international actors and Haitian reformers. United States Ambassador Alvin Adams worked with the entire spectrum of groups. At the time, both more and less progressive groups were seeking to ease the army from power and put into place the framework for the elections that took place in December 1990.

Proceeding without interference from the Haitian military and paramilitary, the elections were certified as free and fair by various international observer missions. Such missions provided unchallenged legitimacy to the victors, including Aristide. Ironically, when the excluded reformers succeeded in winning the 1990 election, USAID democratization programs shifted their focus from the government to the forces in opposition to Lavalas. Haitians would later note that many of those enrolled in such programs were identified with the de facto regime that overturned the constitutional authorities.

Aristide's brief tenure before the coup was marked by uneasy relations with most international actors. Washington never trusted him or his government, despite the fact that during his first seven months, migration dropped to a trickle,

human rights violations were significantly reduced, and economic and bureaucratic reforms were initiated. Some other international players, not fully sharing the U.S. uneasiness, nevertheless moderated their embrace of the reform-minded government. Governmental and intergovernmental entities continued long-standing relations with the country's elites and with organizations more comfortable with modest than radical reform.

One regional player, the Dominican Republic, which shares Haiti's island home, reportedly worked actively to destabilize Haiti's fledgling government. The Dominican Republic harbored some of Haitian democracy's worst enemies, including an assortment of disgraced Duvalierists and military officers. It also undermined what little stability the Aristide government had brought to Haiti.

Pressured by Port-au-Prince and others over the treatment of Haitian workers in its sugarcane fields, the Dominican Republic abruptly repatriated thousands of Haitian and Dominican-Haitian agricultural workers in July 1991, dumping them across the border. Even though UN agencies and NGOs assisted with emergency and resettlement programs, the strain on Haiti's economy was enormous. Confirming the destabilizing effect of the Dominican Republic's actions, a senior Aristide official cited this as the time "when the coup really began."

International Involvement and Nationhood

Most international involvement after the ouster of the Duvalier family dictatorship did little to advance the cause of democracy and development in Haiti and its quest for nationhood. Deeply rooted habits of the past kept most international actors in league with their traditional partners and distant from the *moun andeyo* in the struggle for fundamental change. Fueling those tendencies, Cold War ideologies and reflexes were deftly used by Haiti's political leaders and military and economic elites to reinforce their cause and to influence international perception and action.

Although the years 1986-1991 in Haiti coincided with the dramatic changes in and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, the persistence of Cold War paradigms limited support for

genuine political reforms, including those identified by the Aristide electorate and government. Throughout these years, distrust of those working to change the status quo continued to distort American perceptions and limit international action. U.S. aid was steered away from grassroots development activities committed to empowering the ordinary Haitian citizen.

Apart from the lingering Cold War animus, outside actors approached Haiti with agendas that did not well suit the needs of a country finally cut loose from its autocratic past. The heavy emphasis placed by outsiders on reconciliation ignored the aspirations of most Haitians to do away with all vestiges of dictatorial rule. They sought to end impunity for human rights violations, viewing the reconciliation endorsed by the outside world as a continuation of impunity rather than a move toward justice.

The most effective outside contribution to nationhood during the period came in the electoral process of 1990. UN electoral observers were in Haiti several months before the elections; OAS observers also monitored the process. Yet the heavy emphasis on the elections themselves rather than on viable longer-term political processes limited the accomplishment. The departure of observers after the inauguration left the fragile reformist government vulnerable, contributing, many believe, to the coup seven months later. As one international official explained, "Common sense said 'Stay the course,' but there was simply no international mandate to do so." Elections proved a necessary but not a sufficient condition for sustainable democracy.

Likewise, the continuing presence of governmental and intergovernmental organizations in humanitarian and development work made no discernible contribution to economic, much less political, reconstruction. Seeking to cause the Haitian leopard to change its spots, Aristide and his government were backed only by numbers and by constitutional legitimacy. That, in a country where a popular proverb states "Constitutions are paper, bayonets are steel," was not enough.

CHAPTER 2

NO STEEL, NO DEAL: MILITARY RULE
OCTOBER 1991-SEPTEMBER 1994

"I'm standing here in the big road. I ask who else will take a stand?
Everybody runs for cover..."
"Jou Malè" (Day of the Shock), Boukman Eksperyans[1]

As Haiti's first democratically elected president fled to Venezuela on September 30, 1991, a wave of violence and terror swept the country that would continue throughout the three years of military rule. Polarization of political, economic, and social relationships within Haiti characterized the period. The de facto authorities, having toppled the elected government and installed a civilian regime, confronted international actors with major dilemmas.

Actors were required to function in a complex, shifting, and nuanced environment. Dealing with the de facto authorities, whether the military who seized power or their civilian counterparts, raised serious problems of strategy and tactics. Efforts to respond ostensibly followed a two-track approach. Diplomatic actors sought to dislodge the military through political pressure, combined with punitive economic measures and eventually the threat of force. Humanitarian actors sought to assist and protect those held hostage. In reality, both diplomatic and humanitarian action worked to consolidate the control of the illegitimate authorities.

This chapter examines the international response across four periods of de facto rule. The first period, in the immediate aftermath of the coup during the months of October and November 1991, saw the UN Security Council condemn the coup and OAS imposition of sanctions against the new regime. The second, between December 1991 and January 1993, was a time of mixed messages from abroad and of consolidation of the de facto powers' hold. The third, from February 1993 through April 1994, witnessed intense diplomatic activity, including the negotiation and collapse of the Governor's Island agreement. During the fourth period, from April through September 1994, the international community stepped up its

Chapter II: Key Events

October 1991	U.S., OAS, UN condemn the coup; OAS imposes sanctions; Aristide arrives in Washington
November 1991	Mass refugee exodus begins; oil tanker runs OAS embargo; diplomatic efforts fail
May 1992	Executive Order by President Bush halts refugee flow
December 13, 1992	Dante Caputo named UN Special Envoy, with OAS support
January 20, 1993	Clinton inaugurated U.S. president
June 16, 1993	UN Security Council approves worldwide fuel and arms embargo
July 1993-October 1994	Governor's Island Accord signed and subsequently collapses; October 13 UN reimposes embargo lifted in August; MICIVIH evacuated from Haiti October 15
February-April 1994	U.S. policy toughens with appointment of William Gray as new U.S. special envoy
July 1994	MICIVIH expelled from Haiti; UN Security Council Resolution 940 authorizes military intervention
September 19, 1994	Following Carter mission, US-led Multinational Force enters Haiti to remove key Haitian military leaders and restore elected officials

resolve to remove the de facto powers, using a combination of diplomatic pressure and the threat of force.

The lack of prompt and effective diplomatic action to counteract de facto rule made this a time of heightened danger for popular leadership and of enormous hardship and suffering for most ordinary Haitian people. International humanitarian action, confronting the "steel" of military rule, succeeded only to a very limited extent in alleviating that danger and suffering.

Diplomatic Action

October-November 1991. The initial international response to the coup was immediate. Dispatches from Haiti described the flight of its democratically-elected government and massacres led by the military, mostly of poor followers of President Aristide in Port-au-Prince. Reports also detailed a massive exodus of urban slum residents from violence-torn neighborhoods and violence and repression in the hinterlands. "This coup will not stand," U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told an emergency OAS meeting in Washington, the body that would mount early diplomatic efforts to dislodge the de facto authorities.

Dispatching a delegation to Port-au-Prince to negotiate an immediate end of the crisis, the OAS faced the first test of its Santiago Accord. That agreement in June 1991 mandated nonrecognition of a regime that seized power from a democratically elected government and required diplomatic action to restore the constitutional authorities. Ratified only shortly before and unanimously supported, the accord compelled hemispheric actors—many of them relatively young democratic governments with restive militaries of their own—to press to restore Haiti's constitutional authorities, whatever their views of the government and its leader. Having played a role along with the United Nations in the election that brought Aristide to power, the OAS had a special stake. Yet facing intimidation from the military, the delegation retreated to Washington to lead the OAS in condemning the coup and imposing hemispheric trade sanctions.

In addition to supporting OAS diplomatic efforts, the U.S. made clear its own objections. Receiving Haiti's exiled president in Washington, President Bush joined other leaders in condemning Haiti's military rulers. As Bush was announcing a freeze of Haitian government assets in the United States and a ban on payments by American firms to the renegade regime, however, reports began circulating of his administration's less than full confidence in Aristide.

By mid-October 1991, the UN General Assembly had joined the OAS and the U.S. in condemning the coup and denying recognition to the de facto regime. However, viewing the crisis as a domestic matter, the Security Council issued a bland statement rather than passing a resolution. By early November, the U.S. had reinforced the OAS response by putting in place its own economic embargo against Haiti, banning all commercial traffic except that associated with humanitarian aid.

Despite its initial rebuff and inability to prevent the rapid installation by the military of a government, the OAS spearheaded continuing efforts to reverse the coup. A second mission in early November led by Colombian diplomat Augusto Ramirez Ocampo sought out military leaders, politicians, and others who supported the coup. By then, the Haitian armed forces, led by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras, had installed a puppet civilian regime composed largely of Duvalierists. It had also cracked down on the press, closed radio stations, and sponsored demonstrations against Aristide and the OAS embargo that were supported by the country's commercial elites. In response to targeted violence, many representatives of the legitimate government and of popular civil society organizations went into hiding or fled the country. In mid-November, the U.S. Coast Guard repatriated 538 boat-people, the first group intercepted after the coup.

By late November, the scene of OAS negotiations had shifted to Cartagena, Colombia, where a parliamentary delegation of mostly coup supporters met the increasingly peripatetic Aristide. The legislators focused on lifting the embargo; the president concentrated on restoring the government. During the talks, a Colombian oil tanker under Liberian registry ran the embargo, delivering millions of gallons of fuel.

The lack of enforcement against either Haiti or the tanker emboldened the military and those supporting it, ending any chance of rapid OAS resolution of the crisis.

Many of those interviewed for this study viewed the tanker incident as a turning point in OAS-led diplomacy and in the consolidation of military rule. Before the incident and in spite of defiant posturing by coup leaders and supporters, intense international pressure had left them uncertain. But the incident buoyed their resolve. For their part, Aristide supporters, noting that international pressure had recently helped abort a military coup in Russia, were hopeful that such pressure would reinstate the elected government.

The weaknesses of sanctions as a diplomatic instrument also were highlighted in these early months. Aristide supporters called for a total and comprehensive embargo, believing that coup supporters would cave in quickly. The poor had survived for generations under what had amounted to sanctions by a succession of regimes, stated several grassroots leaders. They certainly could have toughed it out, especially if international sanctions succeeded in restoring a government that had given them such hope.

Yet OAS sanctions were porous from the start. Their scope was hemispheric, not international; they were voluntary, not coercive; they were blunt, not targeted. That the first delivery of critically needed fuel in violation of the sanctions was made by a vessel originating in an OAS member state hosting negotiations to resolve the crisis shattered OAS credibility.

OAS diplomacy also was undercut by Washington's mixed messages. One frustrated OAS official faulted Washington for a lack of consistent support of OAS efforts, including sanctions. "The U.S. speaks with many tongues," he commented wryly. The U.S. would have been even less seized with the Haiti crisis in the absence of pressure from the diaspora in the form of street demonstrations against the coup in Miami, Washington, and New York. The Canadian diaspora organized similar events in Montreal.

Diplomacy in the early stages operated on a faulty premise. As one diplomat observed, "We always assumed we were dealing with rational actors in Haiti, even when it should have been clear to us that this was not the case." The determination

to press ahead with diplomatic efforts not backed by the immediate threat of force turned out to be one of several key miscalculations with serious humanitarian and political consequences.

December 1991-January 1993. As violence and terror continued, attention in early 1992 focused on the Washington Accord, an OAS attempt with strong U.S. backing, to negotiate with parliamentarians still in Haiti. The accord, which sought to install a compromise prime minister as a step toward the restoration of the Aristide government, failed when Haitian army leader Raoul Cédras, not present at the negotiations, failed to endorse it. This ended meaningful negotiations during this 14 month period.

Diplomatic efforts were directed toward creating what eventually would become a jointly sponsored OAS / UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). The 1990 elections provided a precedent for on-the-ground OAS and UN observers. President Aristide's post-coup request to the OAS and UN for observer presence—first set at 3,000—elicited a mixed response in Port-au-Prince, where the de facto leaders saw acceptance of the mission as a lever for lifting sanctions but also as an affront to national sovereignty.[2]

During these months, the U.S. also stepped-up engagement with the Haiti crisis, reflecting an upsurge in Haitian refugees fleeing on crowded, rickety boats. The Bush administration's policy of repatriating Haitian refugees drew outraged responses from human rights organizations and others in the U.S., including the Haitian diaspora and members of Congress. Following a lower court order suspending repatriation and forcing the administration to process claims for refugee status, the U.S. Supreme Court in February 1992 reversed the lower court's ruling, opening the way for a resumption of forced repatriation. This decision reinforced Washington's policy of occasional condemnation of military-led violence paired with forcible return of those fleeing it, a contradiction that strengthened the resolve of the military.[3]

American refugee policy also became an issue in the presidential elections in November 1992. Presidential candidate Clinton denounced the executive order issued in late May

by President Bush directing authorities to return, without adequately screening, all of the increasing numbers of boat-people interdicted on the high seas. Clinton promised, if elected, to provide temporary asylum to all Haitians who fled until their elected government was restored. Yet President Clinton announced just before his inauguration that he would maintain the policy of forced repatriation, enlisting President Aristide in a successful appeal to Haitians not to take to the seas.

February 1993-April 1994. Following a Security Council resolution in late 1992 reaffirming support for Aristide, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali named Dante Caputo, a former Argentine foreign minister, as his special envoy for Haiti. On February 1, 1993, Caputo arrived on his first visit to Port-au-Prince. He and the Clinton administration's own envoy, Lawrence Pezzullo, reopened concerted efforts to resolve Haiti's crisis through negotiations. The process of bringing the Haitian army to the negotiating table was largely the result of steps that both fine-tuned and expanded sanctions.

In June, following a series of unproductive visits to Haiti by Caputo and Pezzullo that highlighted the intransigence of the military and the resistance of the elites, Washington announced sanctions directed at 83 people or institutions identified as supporters of the coup and the military regime. In rapid succession, Prime Minister Marc Bazin resigned and General Cédras announced he would attend negotiations only if sanctions were lifted.

In mid-June, the Security Council imposed a worldwide fuel and arms embargo, effective June 23, to be lifted only following military cooperation in negotiations to restore democracy to Haiti. Cédras left Haiti on June 26, leading a delegation to Governor's Island in New York harbor where he agreed on July 3 to a ten-point accord that provided for Aristide's return to Haiti on October 30, a suspension of the embargo following ratification of a new prime minister and his government, and the presence of 1,100 UN supervised police trainers and military personnel to oversee the constitutionally-mandated separation and reform of Haiti's army and police.

On August 27, following ratification of Prime Minister Robert Malval and his cabinet by members of Haiti's barely functioning legislature, UN sanctions were removed and fuel once again was imported freely. Shortly thereafter, advance teams of U.S. and Canadian police and military personnel arrived, along with multilateral missions preparing to restart suspended economic development programs after October 30.

In the period leading up to the Governor's Island negotiations, sanctions became an effective lever for bringing the military to the table because they were worldwide, targeted, and enforced. The terms of their removal became a focal point of discussion. The de facto government's demand that they be lifted prior to the actual return to Haiti of President Aristide prevailed over admonitions of the constitutional government that this be done only once the president had been reinstated. Ultimately, the latter position was vindicated, but only after the premature removal of sanctions had allowed the de facto leaders to replenish stocks and once again defy the international community.

During this third period, discussions surrounding MICIVIH served to bring more attention to ongoing human rights abuse in Haiti. The Security Council decision to send an expert team to Port-au-Prince in February 1993 before the full deployment of MICIVIH was a particularly important step. In addition to paving the way for MICIVIH's expansion, the experts' report underscored the magnitude of the desperate situation in Haiti.[4] Earlier press reports of abuse in Haiti had tended to be overshadowed by the ongoing crusade of Aristide's detractors to shift the focus to alleged human rights abuses during the brief period that the Aristide government had been in office.

Reports issued by MICIVIH detailed an upsurge of repression and deaths during July that continued through August and September, with individuals supporting the democratic government beaten and arrested. Five unarmed civilians in a crowd gathered outside city hall to welcome the restoration of the Mayor of Port-au-Prince were shot dead. Antoine Izméry, a businessman loyal to Aristide, was dragged from a church in broad daylight and murdered in view of MICIVIH observers.

The chief negotiators, Caputo and Pezzullo, discounting MICIVIH reports of growing repression, insisted that "the process was on track."

Such acts paralleled the appearance of a new ally of the military vehemently opposed to the return of Aristide: the Front pour l'avancement et progrès d'Haiti (FRAPH). By early October, its gun-toting members, called "patriots" by General Cédras, had set up roadblocks in the capital and harassed public officials, members of the Malval cabinet, and MICIVIH observers. On October 11, 1993, FRAPH led a noisy dockside demonstration against the arrival of a ship transporting about 200 additional Canadian and U.S. military instructors anchored in the Port-au-Prince harbor. Fearing replication of violence similar to that against U.S. military personnel in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, the U.S. ordered the *U.S.S. Harlan County* to turn around. Not consulted prior to the decision, UN and Canadian officials, including Caputo, were caught completely off guard.

The *Harlan County* incident shattered the Governor's Island Accord. Two days later, the UN voted to reimpose its embargo if Cédras did not step down within 48 hours. On October 14, when Guy Malary, the Malval government's justice minister, was assassinated on a Port-au-Prince street, Canada withdrew its 50 police trainers and France canceled deployment of its personnel. On October 15, the UN ordered the evacuation of all personnel, including MICIVIH and humanitarian agencies. The Security Council reimposed the UN embargo. Five U.S. warships were soon joined by a multinational fleet of a dozen more naval vessels.

Most of the population lived in hiding or in terror as the FAd'H and FRAPH, still buoyed by their *Harlan County* success, led a campaign of violence. Gang rape became a tool of political intimidation. Bodies dumped in the streets often had their faces "erased" by machete swipes. Ordinary Haitians, barred from fleeing their country and helpless before the unrestrained use of power, feared for their lives, particularly at night when shots that rang through the air reaped a harvest displayed in the morning for all to see.

Efforts to restart the diplomatic process following the collapse of the accords were unsuccessful. In fact, they had the

effect of putting the legitimate government on the defensive. Aristide's call for a total blockade of Haiti was widely criticized as recalcitrant and callous. The exiled president's unwillingness to support solutions that compromised the legitimacy of his government led him to be labeled intransigent. Perhaps most damaging to the constitutional government was the late October release of a CIA report impugning Aristide's mental stability. Later discredited, the report reinforced defiance by the de facto regime at a critical moment.[5]

With stocks of fuel and other essentials replenished and the Dominican border still porous, the army and its supporters felt confident that time was on their side. Unilateral U.S. action in late January 1994 to revoke the visas of 500 Haitian military officials, however, underscored the regime's continuing pariah status. More than any previous step, this isolated the coup leaders by cutting off an escape route. Reimposed sanctions reminded the de facto leaders of their illegitimacy. Although at times wavering from its commitment to the Aristide government, the international community did not abandon that commitment, backing up diplomatic efforts with tightened economic coercion to pressure the de facto authorities.

April-September 1994. Following the failure of efforts to persuade the de facto regime to relinquish power, a crescendo of political pressure in the United States and on the United Nations led during a six-month period to more forceful diplomacy and the ultimate exit of General Cédras.

The arrest in mid-April of six U.S. Congressmen protesting Haiti policy who had chained themselves to the White House fence and the well-publicized hunger strike by Randall Robinson, an internationally respected figure in the African-American community, ratcheted up pressure on the administration. The appointment as special advisor on Haiti of a respected former member of Congress, William Gray, signaled new resolve. The clear statement by President Clinton in early May in reference to Haiti's de facto rulers—"It's time for them to go"—heralded more forceful policy, what the U.S. defense secretary would call "coercive diplomacy." Clinton's decision in May to provide Haitian boat people greater opportunity to establish claims for refugee status was also a sign of

change.[6] The shift in Washington's stance paralleled new thinking at the UN and rising international dissatisfaction with existing strategies.

Concurrently, Washington pressed the UN for a complete economic embargo and closure of the Dominican border. It unilaterally suspended air traffic to Haiti and restricted financial transfers to the country, effective June 21, and revoked all nonimmigrant Haitian visas as of June 29. On May 6, the Security Council approved a complete economic embargo, effective May 21, excluding only food, medicine, and cooking oil. American naval vessels headed a reinvigorated multinational fleet stationed off the Haitian coast to enforce the new measures.

Security Council actions were reinforced in turn by additional U.S. measures. These included freezing all Haitian assets and suspending all financial transactions with Haiti (excepting only remittances of up to $50.00 each month sent directly to families). The U.S. suspension of air traffic, eventually followed by all countries, isolated Haiti physically. Pressure grew from the United States and the United Nations on the Dominican government to close its border and conduct active military inspection of all vessels sailing to Haiti.

Cédras scoffed at the Security Council's actions. The regime installed a new puppet civilian government headed by an octogenarian judge and supported an initiative by Clinton's political opponents in Washington to send a fact-finding panel to seek a political accommodation with coup leaders. Continued questioning of Aristide's character deflected attention from ongoing repression. A leaked cable from the U.S. embassy belittled MICIVIH's reports of the deteriorating human rights conditions and questioned the extent of reported violations. In spite of the naval presence and heightened risk of seizure, merchant ships continued to skirt the embargo.[7]

Faced with the failure of existing policy, coercive steps to remove military rule emerged as an option by mid-1994. The expulsion of MICIVIH in July provided a rationale for heightened attention to human rights abuse as an issue compelling rapid resolution of the crisis. Fifteen nations committed troops to a possible peacekeeping force. On July 31, following intense lobbying by the U.S., Security Council Resolution 940 autho-

rized the use of "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military dictatorship." The same day the Dominican Republic agreed to a small contingent of U.S. troops (later joined by some Canadians) to observe compliance with the UN embargo along its border. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations also pledged peacekeeping troops. Throughout this period, a key diplomatic role was played the Friends of Haiti, comprised of the governments of the United States, Canada, France, and Venezuela. (Argentina joined the group in 1995 and Chile in 1996.)

Tough action by the Security Council was not without controversy. The council's Latin American members were divided about its wisdom. There was widespread criticism of gracing a "free-lance" U.S. military initiative with a UN imprimatur. Few countries pledging troops for peacekeeping agreed on an armed invasion. In Washington, the administration faced fierce opposition to military intervention, even from within the Democratic Party. Polls showed only moderate public support. Such division of opinion, including reports of debate within the administration itself, even as Clinton approved a timetable for a military intervention and as troops began to mobilize, buoyed the de facto officials that defiance would ultimately pay off.

News from Haiti included reports of presidential ambitions on the part of General Cédras and of resistance forces being mobilized under FAd'H leadership, along with the usual dispatches of military and paramilitary violence, terror, and murder. Reports dramatized what had ultimately become the debilitating effectiveness of the UN embargo and of U.S. sanctions. Support for the military was rumored to be eroding, leaving the regular army and paramilitary forces increasingly isolated. With no significant new developments on the negotiation front, international attention focused not on whether but on when military intervention would occur and whether the Haitian authorities would cooperate or resist.

On September 15, as a U.S. invasion force made final preparations, President Clinton told Haiti's military leaders to "leave now or we will force you from power....Your time is up." Two days later, he dispatched a mission comprised of former President Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. With U.S. military aircraft already airborne en route to Haiti, Carter announced an agreement. As a result, the intervention on September 19, 1994 was permissive rather than forcible.

Several realities emerged from three years of diplomatic efforts to dislodge the de facto authorities. First, initial efforts by the OAS lacked the scope, authority, and clout of later UN initiatives. Second, economic sanctions were generally porous in their ability to cut off trade, lacking in conviction on the part of those who imposed them, and biting only when tightened late in the day. Third, the military regime responded to the serious application of force: that is, to the dispatch of airborne and naval troops but not to the *U.S.S. Harlan County*. Its philosophy was, as Haitians put it, "No steel, no deal." Finally, U.S. policy, influenced by domestic politics as well as moral concern for Haitian civilians, played a preeminent if ambivalent role in diplomatic efforts.

Humanitarian Action

The international community responded to the Haitian crisis not only through diplomatic efforts to dislodge the de facto authorities but also through humanitarian action to provide assistance and protection to those held hostage. Three years of military rule posed major operational, political, and institutional challenges for humanitarian organizations.

The operational challenge of functioning in Haiti under the de facto regime was self-evident. "Haiti was a sick country before the crisis," recalled one UN aid agency head. "During the coup it became sicker." The massive population displacement occasioned by the actions of Haitian military and paramilitary groups produced a human disaster of the first order. Among the indicators were flight from Port-au-Prince to rural areas and flight from rural towns into the more remote hinterlands. The numbers of boat people also served as a barometer of conditions, with approximately 35,000 interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard between October 1991 and May 1992. The numbers of internally displaced persons during the four periods of military rule were estimated by MICIVIH at about

300,000. Refugees during the same time frame were 60,000-70,000. Thus more than five percent of Haiti's population was uprooted during this phase of the crisis.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, when many international humanitarian personnel and journalists were grounded in the capitol, Haitian NGOs and community organizations became the major information source. Building on existing networks throughout the country, these organizations, some forming a coalition ("plateforme") on human rights, gathered data and disseminated it to organizations outside Haiti. They reported that grassroots activists had been beaten both for their involvement in community activities and because of their perceived status as proxies of international actors seeking to condemn the military's action.

By early 1992, a pattern had emerged. Army-led crackdowns took place against students, grassroots activists, or others protesting military rule or speaking out on behalf of the ousted government. Even during and following the Governor's Island negotiations in mid-1993, MICIVIH reported a dramatic upswing in human rights violations. As one diplomat noted, it was as if the closer a solution to the political stalemate, the more abusive the human rights environment.

Military violence had a debilitating impact, both directly on Haitian grassroots groups and NGOs and indirectly on funders. Community groups were unable to hold meetings or conduct activities. Most city-based NGOs were forced to scale-back operations. Even health care and food aid programs were affected, as restrictions placed on local partners by violence and threats of intimidation kept them from rendering services. Few individuals or organizations active in community work were spared the fallout from the coup. "The violence was so pervasive that even community health care workers became targets of harassment," stressed one program coordinator.[8]

The repression that created such displacement and augmented the need for protection and assistance represented a challenge to humanitarian personnel themselves. In the prevailing environment of random and targeted violence, expatriate personnel feared for their own safety at precisely a time when there was the greatest need for their services.

Responding to the coup, a number of international organizations immediately closed down operations in Port-au-Prince, a decision that some have since reconsidered. Evacuated staff endeavored to maintain contact and keep programs going from locations beyond Haiti. Some aid groups scaled back projects that were supported throughout the country as those efforts and the organizations carrying them out could not continue. Bilateral and multilateral funders such as USAID, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) struggled in the coup environment to maintain existing humanitarian programs.

As the Governor's Island agreement unraveled, the peril to expatriates increased. MICIVIH observers continued operations under more difficult conditions, as they were verbally and sometimes physically challenged by FRAPH personnel. FRAPH street operatives taunted unarmed *blancs* (a shorthand term for foreigners of whatever race) that they would soon meet a fate of the U.S. serviceman whose body was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Over the strong objection of its director, MICIVIH was included in the mid-October 1993 post-*Harlan County* evacuation. As its presence was widely credited with limiting human rights abuse, its withdrawal left Haitians who had collaborated with the mission even more vulnerable and contributed to an environment for unrestrained human rights violations by the army and paramilitary associates.

Relocated to the Dominican Republic, MICIVIH staff remained for three months, experiencing frustration and staff attrition. In late January, the first contingent of 22 UN/OAS observers returned to Port-au-Prince as a result of heavy pressure on military authorities from Washington and New York. Those authorities, who had accorded MICIVIH some respect prior to its evacuation, were now openly derisive of the mission. Faced with the arduous task of recovering its prior operational status and respected stature with Haitians, MICIVIH managed to reclaim lost territory with aggressive reporting about the increased abuse that had occurred in its absence and the ongoing abuse despite its return.

In July 1994, however, MICIVIH was again expelled by the authorities, once again creating a vacuum of official observers

that was partially filled by the international media. Press coverage of bodies being eaten by pigs in the streets of Port-au-Prince and of the assassination in late August of Father Jean Marie Vincent, a close associate of Haiti's exiled president, for example, fueled international alarm. Some Haitians noted that the increase in concern reflected less an upsurge in abuses than a convenient "discovery" of them by world leaders. In any event, as noted earlier, MICIVIH's expulsion became a rallying point for heightened diplomatic and military efforts.

A second set of challenges was more explicitly political. In the wake of the coup, the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States, addressed by deposed President Aristide in an ad hoc session on October 2, 1991, expressed strong support for the democratic government of Haiti. Committed "to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who hold power illegally," they recommended that all states suspend "their economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and technical cooperation except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes." They resolved to press other regional bodies such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to do likewise.[9] A week later, they urged OAS member states "to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid," with such aid "channeled through international agencies or nongovernmental organizations."[10]

These OAS measures formed the basis for UN actions. Following an appearance by the ousted president before the UN Security Council, the General Assembly passed a resolution on October 11 that, noting the OAS resolutions, expressed strong condemnation of "the attempted illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti." Whereas the resolution did not mention economic or humanitarian assistance, its reference to OAS action made clear that the same ground rules would apply. The resolution noted the need for "an increase in technical, economic and financial cooperation, when constitutional order is restored."[11]

Such actions by regional and multilateral bodies had serious consequences for assistance efforts. For example, UN organizations could not proceed with normal activities, UN officials explained later, in a country whose government has been condemned by member states as illegal and against

Objectivity and the Mainstream U.S. Press

Despite claims of objectivity, the American press tends to reflect U.S. policy. That, at least, is the message from a review of press coverage of three major events.

In September 1991, a bloody military coup ousted democratically-elected President Aristide. He was returned to power by an American-led intervention in September 1994. During those years, neither the main characters in the drama nor the issues at stake changed—but reporting did. Is the fact that the shift paralleled a shift in U.S. policy pure coincidence?

After the coup, the press played down readily documentable human rights violations by the de facto authorities while refering to Aristide as "a radical priest," his supporters as "mobs," and the military leaders as "mature." The U.S. embassy was extremely critical—off the record—of the ousted president and lenient in judging the de facto regime. Support for the coup by the Bush administration, the CIA, and the Pentagon was never revealed in the press though ordinary Haitians were well aware of the fact.

In the well-covered Governor's Island negotiations, the press described Aristide as "intransigent," General Cédras as "open, intelligent." Human rights violations by the military received less attention than the perceived need for a general amnesty, which Aristide rejected. The Clinton administration, eager to solve the boat people issue, settled for cosmetic change. Although Cédras would retire, the army remained in power, with no date set for Aristide's return.

Having no choice by mid-1994 but to intervene, the Clinton administration needed to convince public opinion that the military were evil and Aristide a true and duly elected democrat. The press suddenly recalled that Aristide was "president" rather than priest. The military became "criminals" and "human rights violators." Human rights became a serious issue. The press ultimately confirmed what the vast majority of Haitians had said throughout these three years.

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whom an embargo has been imposed. However, the reductions in nonemergency aid activities created serious hardships, while humanitarian programs, despite their exemption, found it difficult to function within the specified parameters.

The IAF, a U.S. government agency working with grassroots groups, was forced to cut off all support to its grantees. Washington permitted it to resume operations only after a full year of military rule. Recognizing the rationale behind the suspension of many such activities, many Haitian NGO and grassroots leaders nevertheless believed that the immediate and complete withdrawal of support isolated them at a time of maximum peril, weakening their ability to resist the coup and making them even more vulnerable to the prevailing terror.

Humanitarian actors faced the challenge of functioning in a setting in which the internationally recognized government was sequestered outside the country while illegitimate authorities controlled the territory and levers of political and military power. Conducting residual humanitarian activities required contact with the authorities, if for no other reason than to receive their tacit consent. For its part, however, the de facto regime approached international organizations with an eye on asserting authority and maximizing the association in order to foster its own legitimacy.

For outside agencies, renting office or warehouse space that did not benefit the illegitimate government and its supporters was impossible. The only office space and housing open to MICIVIH, for example, was owned by government officials or associated "Morally Repugnant Elites" (many Haitians used the shorthand, "MREs").[12] The presence in Washington of the democratically elected president and ministers-in-exile represented another set of players, viewpoints, and accountabilities to be reckoned with.

Aid activities by Haitian NGOs that continued during the coup period were suspect among those whose own work was subjected to attack. Conservative church groups and NGOs linked with the country's elites comprised most of the entities able to function. Several high profile programs linked to international and Haitian NGOs viewed as sympathetic to the regime enjoyed outside support. The mere fact that such

groups could function heightened the stop-gap nature of their work, increasing their attractiveness to some funders and their budgets. Together with the ban on development assistance, the emphasis on relief tasks by groups approved by the government forced a significant shift away from sustainable development activities.

International NGOs such as Oxfam, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and CEBEMO, whose earlier efforts had fostered reform-oriented economic development with progressive Haitian partners, shifted to address needs of coup victims, particularly the internally displaced. They established emergency funds to provide food and shelter for community development activists fleeing violence and intimidation and to assist those who had been tortured. Oxfam-US rallied support for the efforts of a grassroots organization in Haiti's Central Plateau to assist those who had fallen victim to what local organizers described as the most ferocious and bloody dictatorship in its history.

The effectiveness of international efforts was constantly questioned by supporters of the ousted government. Many doubted that international programs reached the most vulnerable. Those associated with the constitutional government never went so far as to urge the cut-off of funding for humanitarian activities altogether, but they did monitor the situation closely for abuse by the de facto regime.

A third set of challenges was linked specifically to the issue of economic sanctions. The sanctions proved a liability to the poor, a boon to the de facto authorities and their supporters, and a hardship to humanitarian organizations.

The effects of sanctions on the poor and on those with limited means at their disposal were immediate, ongoing, and predictable. The prices of basic imported necessities, particularly food, skyrocketed as suggested by Table 2 in Chapter 1. Many people were already bearing the extra burdens of displacement and shouldering bribes, fines, and fees extracted by the de facto authorities. Virtually an entire population became bankrupt as small entrepreneurs and farmers sold tools, livestock, and land to provide for immediate needs. Middle class producers, characterized by one Haitian as "businessmen who wanted to play by the rules," also were severely decapitalized.

The damage began in October 1991 with the implementation of sanctions, however porous in nature. As much as possible, Haiti's poor adapted, long accustomed to being preyed upon by their own rulers. Most tightened their belts; many found new ways to eke out an existence, some relying on remittances from relatives and friends overseas. When the sanctions were lifted in August 1993, the poor did not benefit from the reprieve. When they were reimposed in October 1993, Haiti's ordinary citizens continued to feel their brunt.

Lacking the resources of the military and elites to stockpile necessities, the poor were directly affected when street prices soared. Importers of banned commodities set high prices and smugglers commanded exorbitant prices for goods (particularly fuel) carried over the Dominican border. Haitians dependent on public transportation were hard hit when the costs of public taxis and buses experienced a many-fold increase. Table 1 in the Introduction highlights the decreased value of wages during the period of de facto rule.

Despite the hardship, most Haitians initially welcomed sanctions as an expression of international solidarity with the Haitian people and the ousted Aristide government and as an expression of censure of the de facto authorities. In the words of a Haitian NGO leader, "Sanctions that had the blessing and support of the international community at least represented something." Also contributing to continued support was the fear that lifting sanctions would imply acquiescence in military rule.

Over time, as sanctions proved ineffectual and the plight of the poor worsened, their attitude changed from one of welcome to acceptance and, finally, to outright opposition.[13] Had the measures accomplished their objectives with dispatch or been adapted over time, they would probably have retained the support of the poor. By the time that governments took steps to make them more effective, most Haitians considered them a cruel hoax.

By contrast, sanctions worked largely to the benefit of the military regime and its backers. Coup leaders and their supporters found ample ways of accessing essential supplies and commodities. Indeed, they used sanctions to enrich themselves and consolidate their hold on economic as well as

political power—primarily by controlling contraband and the importation of items allowed under the embargo, particularly food staples such as rice. There was great irony in the fact that, at least at the outset, those who profited from the sanctions urged their lifting while those who suffered from them encouraged their tightening, at least at the outset.

Year in and year out, sanctions were more damaging to humanitarian organizations than to the regime against which they were invoked. Those agencies, like independent entrepreneurs and the poor, were pinched by high prices and scarce supplies. Shortages of essential items, most notably of fuel, began almost at once to cramp aid operations. The agencies responded by forming a committee to pool information about needs. When a humanitarian fuel exemption was later put into place, the group sought to distribute limited resources to maximum effect.[14]

PAHO coordinated the receipt and distribution of "humanitarian gas." Special arrangements for humanitarian fuel facilitated the work of aid organizations, which between January and mid-September 1994 received 1.2 million gallons of diesel fuel and some 206,000 gallons of gasoline.[15] In a more general sense, the sanctions raised difficult issues regarding what items would be exempted, how customs procedures would be handled, and what strategy would be used by humanitarian agencies to deal with the authorities.

The fuel embargo also posed dilemmas for governments, whose embassies did not qualify under humanitarian guidelines. Several purchased supplies from military-sanctioned black market traders. U.S. officials defended their violation of the embargo as having enabled them to continue humanitarian activities and, by keeping the USAID mission open, to lay the groundwork for the prompt off-loading of the first fuel tanker as soon as the sanctions were lifted.[16]

Considering themselves more bound by the rules, humanitarian organizations lacked the maneuverability of the de facto authorities and governments. Indeed, their every move was subject to scrutiny. The de facto regime, the constitutional government, and Haitians themselves asked, in essence, "Whose side are you on?" For humanitarian actors who saw themselves allied with the victims but not with one side or the

other in the political struggle, the dilemmas were excruciating. While operating under the sanctions tied their hands, violating them carried political messages as well. Unlike situations of outright civil war in which their task was to help victims caught in the middle, their clientele in this case was by definition on one side.

A fourth challenge involved broader institutional issues. Functioning in a sanctions environment highlighted the absence of relevant policy in many organizations and a lack of expertise in implementing the strategies adopted. Their difficulties were complicated by the lack of clarity of expectations for humanitarian activities on the part of those imposing sanctions.

In keeping with pronouncements by the OAS, the UN General Assembly, and the Security Council, UN organizations limited direct contact with de facto officials to avoid conveying even the slightest legitimacy. But how were agencies to carry out humanitarian mandates, which charge them with assisting persons irrespective of the causes of their suffering or the nature of the government involved? Intergovernmental organizations require the consent of the authorities; even NGOs less mindful of the constraints of sovereignty could not long function if the authorities did not approve of their activities.

Some within the UN system favored the provision of a full range of humanitarian assistance, broadly defined, reasoning that not to do so would penalize the poor for a coup that had already victimized them. Others held that any humanitarian assistance would be construed as endorsement of the illegitimate authorities. Differences existed not only among the UN's humanitarian agencies but also between them and the UN's political apparatus.

Similar tensions existed within the OAS, which was involved both in political efforts to end the crisis and humanitarian programs to assist its victims. An effort by the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in late 1992 to issue a consolidated appeal for Haiti was delayed as a result.[17] OAS officials who originally insisted on limiting aid to humanitarian assistance "stricto sensu" (for example, vaccines) as distinct from "enlarged humanitarian assistance programs"

(that is, refrigerators for vaccines) eventually agreed to requesting funds for activities "directly associated with basic human needs."

The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) resident representative in Haiti, whose tasks included the coordination of UN activities, took a restrictive approach that some UN colleagues viewed as highly detrimental to their ability to carry out their programmatic mandates. In January 1994, he issued a circular requiring that UN staff work no more than three days a week in an effort to reduce the perceived level of support for the de facto authorities. Contacts with the authorities were to be kept to an absolute minimum; correspondence was to be addressed generically (for example, to the Minister of Health) rather than to a specific official of the de facto regime.

Others saw the need to provide as comprehensive assistance as possible to Haitians in their hour of great need. UNICEF, which routinely deals with all parties in civil wars, did not view its assistance to women and children as conveying recognition of the political authorities. The UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) successfully stretched the definition of basic humanitarian needs to include family planning and reproductive activities and managed to get contraceptives included on PAHO's list of essential drugs. UNFPA officials argued successfully that in a society in which sexual violence against women was rampant, particularly during the de facto rule, women's health issues that otherwise might be considered "developmental" were clearly "humanitarian" in nature.

The ability of the UN system to function in this particular setting was complicated by several other factors. Strong-willed personalities heading UN agencies in Haiti had firm opinions about the crisis. Their approach to their organizational mandates, often informed by only minimal guidance from agency headquarters, was perceived as influenced by their personal political views. Rapid personnel turnover complicated the picture further. UNDP, for example, had four resident representatives during the period of de facto rule.

In some instances, UN officials proceeded with considerable political naiveté. The head of one agency, much to the consternation of his colleagues and to the frustration of his

successor, accepted an award from the de facto government just prior to his departure. There was also little accountability to agency headquarters and little overall coordination exercised by DHA, to whom UNDP resident representatives in their capacity as DHA humanitarian coordinators reported.

The Haitian crisis showed UN humanitarian agencies in their most uncoordinated and least effective light. The differences could hardly have been more fundamental, the tensions more dysfunctional. Little common ground existed between those who believed that UN aid personnel should have no contact with the authorities and those who believed that if they were to have no contact, UN aid organizations should not be in Haiti at all. Differences among the agencies were compounded by a perceived insensitivity to humanitarian concerns on the part of those managing the political and diplomatic aspects of UN presence. Neither the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) nor his aides took much interest in the dilemmas of humanitarian agencies.

Beyond conflicting interpretations of humanitarian mandates and rapid personnel turnover was the problem of the heavy reliance on local staff. In the highly politicized circumstances of military rule, Haitians employed by humanitarian organizations, and by diplomatic missions as well, had their own strongly held views. One long-term employee of an aid organization who was himself ostracized by his colleagues for his support of the constitutional government estimated that about 90 percent of all Haitians working for international organizations supported the coup. An exact percentage is hard to establish, but evidence suggests that agency interpretations of events in Haiti and agency partnerships strengthened or forged during the de facto period were influenced by well-positioned, veteran Haitian staff who were mostly members of the elite and coup sympathizers. Certainly the coup event itself removed the possibility of any middle ground, forcing Haitians to choose between two sets of competing political authorities.

The period of de facto rule highlighted the inability of the UN system and of many NGOs to protect and assist civilians within a nation held hostage. An illustration of some of the operational, political, and institutional challenges confronted

by the international humanitarian response to the Haiti crisis is provided by a Harvard University study of the impact of sanctions.

In 1993, UNICEF commissioned a study by a Harvard University team on the impact of economic sanctions on Haitian civilians. The study reported a dramatic increase in the number of child deaths in Haiti—about one thousand excess child deaths per month—as a result of the economic sanctions. The findings were based on research carried out at a Save the Children program in the Maissade area of northwestern Haiti. The region had experienced one of the worst measles epidemics that had begun in June 1991, peaked in 1992, and continued into 1993, largely attributable to historically low levels of vaccination.[18]

Despite some thoughtful recommendations—for example, creating a "humanitarian corridor" to ensure provision of assistance to those in need—the report unleashed a firestorm of methodological and political criticism. Some questioned the extrapolation of mortality data, in particular deaths associated with measles, from one Haitian region to draw broader countrywide conclusions. Others held that while measles were indeed "the major health problem during the embargo period," such epidemics were common in Haiti and could not with certainty be directly linked to the impacts of sanctions. In fact, critics noted that an essential drugs program mounted by PAHO and NGOs during the de facto period appeared actually to have improved the health status of Haitians during those years.

Beyond questions about the study's approach were its perceived political agenda and demonstrable political impacts. Issued at a time of resurgent FRAPH-led violence and while the Governor's Island agreement was rapidly unraveling in mid-October 1993, it fueled the already intense political debate and heightened existing tensions among aid organizations. It was seen by some as corroborating criticism of Aristide, who had called for a reinstatement of the blockade.

De facto authorities and others critical of the embargo cited the report in attacking the sanctions and the organizations supporting them. Its conclusions buttressed their view that the embargo, a humanitarian disaster of the first order,

Lavi Chè under Military Rule

Lavi Chè—or, translated from the Creole, "the cost of basic necessities is exhorbitant"—became a common complaint during the period of military rule, when economic and social indicators deteriorated sharply. Even before the coup, three quarters of the population already lived in conditions of abject poverty, lacking ready access to safe drinking water, adequate medical care, or sufficient food. During the the coup period and with the imposition of economic sanctions, the peasants, comprising 70 percent of the population and relying largely on subsistence agriculture, experienced great difficulty in farming due to the violent nature of military rule and the lack of available and affordable inputs.

In cities and towns, the employment situation deteriorated as well. An estimated 143,000 jobs were lost in the private sector (this figures includes the jobs lost in the assembly sector, cited elsewhere). For reasons of personal safety, migration from urban areas into the countryside as well as to other countries increased, with internal migration taxing the resources of an already burdened rural sector. Throughout the country, food and fuel were prohibitively expensive as a result of the steep depreciation of the gourde. As data is fragmentary, there was an apparent deterioration in the nutritional status of children in the north and northwest, reflecting not only economic problems exacerbated by the sanctions but also a continuing drought.

In the absence of significant improvement following the restoration of the constitutional government, *Lavi Chè* has remained a rallying cry for the dispossessed.

Sara Zaidi

should be lifted. In contrast, supporters of the elected authorities faulted the study for considering health effects without addressing the fundamental cause of Haiti's humanitarian suffering: military rule. In their view, the political crisis and its attendant repression, not the economic sanctions, were the real problem.

The report's findings and the responses to it dramatized how much it was not possible to isolate a humanitarian issue such as health care—in fact, even research about health care—from the surrounding political environment. The activities of international agencies, and their own apparent naiveté about how findings would be read, became major issues in the conflict.

Diplomacy, Humanitarian Action, and Nationhood

Of the three periods examined in this study, the period of de facto rule proved to be the most difficult for the international community. Diplomatic and humanitarian efforts alike were vitiated by the unwillingness to confront the overall international strategy of the de facto authorities.

The relationships between diplomacy and humanitarian action were both positive and negative. On the positive side, the presence of international humanitarian personnel made a significant contribution to efforts to resolve the Haitian crisis. They provided the diplomatic community with information about the changing nature of the situation and conveyed a sense of international solidarity. The expulsion of MICIVIH in 1994 accelerated international action, which led to the exit of the military leadership.

On the negative side, frictions and tensions between the political and humanitarian perspectives reduced the possibilities of mutually reinforcing activities. Humanitarian action suffered from the lack of success of diplomatic efforts in dislodging the de facto rulers or, at a minimum, in creating the necessary space for aid activities. In retrospect, the international community made a major miscalculation in failing to heed the counsel of one highly placed Haitian, who sentiments were typical of many others: "If you think you can negotiate with these guys, you are kidding yourself. You have a bunch

of people whose only syntax in dealing with all domestic actors is violence. Why would anybody expect them to understand any other language in their dialogue with foreigners?"

Functioning in an environment of ineffective diplomacy, humanitarian organizations had the worst of both worlds. Their programs were curtailed by association with an overall strategy that failed to accomplish its stated political objectives. At the same time, many Haitians viewed the aid groups' accomplishments as a palliative that did not address the fundamental cause of their suffering and deteriorating conditions.

In a larger sense, many in Haiti questioned how much international humanitarian responses were indeed "humanitarian." Emergency assistance and protection efforts were welcome and necessary, but "the most effective humanitarian aid program," commented a number of those interviewed, "would have been to get the military out of the country." From this perspective, a serious and timely embargo, firmly imposed, tightly enforced, and backed up by credible military force, as it finally was, would have been the most humanitarian approach.

Although ordinary Haitians might still have suffered, the end result would in all probability have entailed less suffering. Had diplomatic efforts, including the embargo, mounted in October 1991 been as effective as they had become by mid-1994, untold suffering could likely have been avoided. Had the military intervention of September 1994 occurred earlier, the same logic might well apply.

Like the coup and the period of military rule that followed, diplomatic efforts to dislodge the de facto regime, including economic sanctions, and humanitarian efforts to assist and protect the Haitian people had generally negative implications for Haiti's ongoing quest for nationhood. That quest continued through these years more as a result of the resilience of the Haitian people than of the effective response of the international community.

In fact, although outside efforts played an essential and welcomed role in reinstating the elected authorities, outside actors allied themselves mostly with Haitian elites, continuing Haiti's history of external and internal manipulation. Mixed

signals conveyed about democracy and governance, including treatment received by the elected president himself, left many Haitians jaded. Was the international community indeed committed and able, in the circumstances, to nurture a sense of nationhood?

CHAPTER 3

LIFE BEGINS AGAIN
SEPTEMBER 1994-FEBRUARY 1996

"Our misery is over. Our misery is ended. Our misery is ended."
Zanj yo Tounen (The Spirits are Back),
Boukman Eksperyans[1]

On the morning of September 19, 1994, the first soldiers of the UN-authorized and US-led Multinational Force (MNF) landed in Haiti. The mission of Operation Uphold Democracy, which would quickly grow to 21,000 troops, was to ensure the departure of the military regime, restore to office Haiti's elected authorities, and establish a secure and stable environment in which the people of Haiti could begin to rebuild their country.

Once the MNF had achieved its goals, international military presence was entrusted to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Its purpose was to maintain the peaceful environment established by the MNF and ensure the success of the original intervention following the withdrawal of the remaining MNF elements at the end of February 1996. On March 31, 1995, the transition from the MNF to UNMIH took place. The mandate of UNMIH itself was extended to February 29, 1996 and subsequently to June 30, 1996.

MNF and UNMIH military personnel worked in tandem with other actors, both international and Haitian, to repair the damage of three years of de facto rule and to address major challenges in areas of security, political process, and economic recovery. As of early 1996, when the study team visited Haiti, the major international contribution during this time lay in security and political processes. Progress on the economic front was more embryonic and halting. Time would tell how durable those changes would prove.

Chapter III: Key Events

September 1994	MNF establishes presence, begins demobilizing Haitian armed forces
October 1994	Coup leaders leave Haiti; Aristide returns; UN sanctions lifted; delegations visit Haiti to activate EERP; new government formed, led by Prime Minister Smarck Michel
January-February 1995	Aristide dismantles Haitian armed forces; police academy opens
March 31, 1995	President Clinton visits Haiti to preside over hand-off from MNF to UN peacekeeping operation
June-September 1995	Internationally monitored municipal and parliamentary elections
October 1995	Prime Minister Michel resigns over slow progress on privatization; various donors suspend aid
November 1995	Parliamentarian Feuille assassinated, precipitating weapons raids, calls for disarmament, and spontaneous roadblocks
December 17, 1995	René Préval elected president to succeed Aristide
February 7, 1996	Préval inaugurated in Haiti's first-ever democratic transfer of power, pledges progress on privatization and agriculture; UNMIH mandate extended through June 1996

The Challenges

Security

The MNF troops landing in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, part of the "permissive intervention" arranged under the Carter agreement, were to cooperate closely with the FAd'H during a transitional period of political leadership. As ordinary Haitians came out in droves to welcome them as liberators, the Haitian military and its supporters watched warily. There was no violent resistance to the deployment.

Fears by Haiti's elites that mobs of unruly Aristide supporters would exact revenge did not materialize. Despite some looting of warehouses in downtown Port-au-Prince owned by soldiers and coup supporters, most Haitians reacted peacefully to their restored freedom and celebrated their new-found security. The scenes of Haitians welcoming U.S. soldiers recalled newsreels of Allied troops liberating Europe in 1945. Few others than the Haitian military itself and the direct benefactors of military rule resented their presence or advent. Many harbored hopes that they would launch a process of "nation building," transforming Haiti as they knew it. Even the more realistic had high expectations of tangible improvements.

Within days of deployment, the relationship between the foreign troops and ordinary Haitians blossomed. American soldiers performed acts of kindness and won wide respect. At the same time, the relations between the MNF and Haitian military counterparts deteriorated precipitously. In Cap Haitien, U.S. troops killed ten members of the FAd'H after an incident involving taunts and intimidation outside a Cap Haitian police station. A demonstration followed in support of the U.S. troops by "tens of thousands of Haitian citizens...chanting, cheering and waving."[2] In Port-au-Prince, the FAd'H continued its abuse of Haitian citizens, in one instance beating to death a street vendor as U.S. troops watched. "We came here to restore democracy," lamented one soldier, "and they've got us out walking around with murderers."[3]

Amid press reports of such incidents, pressure mounted for the MNF to become more assertive. In response, U.S.

Special Forces fanned out into the countryside to relieve Haitian troops of command. In the cities, the MNF confined the FAd'H to barracks and, in rapid succession, destroyed its Heavy Weapons Unit and disarmed soldiers in uniform. Pressure was also placed on the FAd'H's disillusioned leadership to step down. On October 4, one coup leader, former Police Chief Michel François, left Haiti for the Dominican Republic. On October 8 and 10, the other two coup leaders, Generals Biamby and Cédras, resigned and departed for Panama on October 12, leaving behind an effectively leaderless and demoralized Haitian army.

On October 15 under MNF escort, President Aristide returned to a tumultuous welcome. He publicly thanked those who had played pivotal roles in the events culminating in his return, many of whom had traveled to Port-au-Prince for that day. He reserved his greatest praise, however, for the unflagging persistence of Haiti's people. Repeating a phrase that had become his mantra, Aristide once again called for Haitians, including the military, to eschew violence, vengeance, and impunity and to embrace reconciliation, justice, and peace. He did not offer the thoroughly discredited army a marriage with the Haitian people, as he had done in his inaugural address in February 1991. He moved to reduce its role little by little until by June 1995, according to one senior military advisor, all that was left of the FAd'H was a fifty-member presidential band.[4]

Even before the formal demobilization of the FAd'H, two major issues emerged: the rehabilitation of its approximately 6,500 soldiers and the disarmament of soldiers and paramilitary group members. Popular sentiment appeared to be that demobilized soldiers, once stripped of their weapons, would pose no threat to society. Indeed, some grassroots leaders expressed interest in having weaponless former soldiers join them in internationally-financed soil conservation and reforestation programs as a means of demonstrating their good faith in rebuilding what they had destroyed.

In January 1995, a USAID-funded and International Organization for Migration (IOM)-administered program set about demobilization and rehabilitation tasks, providing former FAd'H soldiers with tools, job counseling, and referrals. By early 1996, some 5,300 former soldiers had been enrolled. The

program, however, did not include opportunities for former soldiers to work alongside farmers, nor did it link them with ongoing NGO-sponsored rehabilitation and development efforts.

Nor did MNF intervention result in the disarmament urged by many Haitians. Many observers believed that the MNF had latitude to undertake such an initiative under the terms of Security Council Resolution 940, but U.S. forces declined to engage in house-to-house weapons searches. Instead, protection of U.S. forces themselves was a priority to avoid a Somali-like confrontation. In fact, the situations were dissimilar. The U.S. military had far more information on its Haitian counterparts than on the feuding warlords in Mogadishu, and the atmosphere in Haiti itself was less tumultuous.

To achieve limited disarmament, the MNF instituted a weapons buy-back program, acted upon tips, and set up roadblocks to search for weapons. The force's only casualty occurred at a shoot-out at one of its roadblocks. Such efforts generated thousands of weapons, but widespread concerns continued that hidden arms would be used following the UN's departure. Those who defended the limited approach pointed out that it avoided needless confrontation and was realistic since Haiti's porous border with the Dominican Republic made even total disarmament only temporary. They viewed deinstitutionalization of the military as the best assurance that Haiti's improved security environment would be sustained, regardless of the continued presence of weapons.

Concern about the continuing presence of weapons in the hands of coup supporters was palpable. In November 1995, following the murder of a pro-democracy parliamentarian, President Aristide again pressed for aggressive disarmament. His call precipitated a rash of impromptu roadblocks by Haitian citizen groups. UNMIH, lacking a clear mandate to do so, did not respond. Some local civic leaders interviewed in January 1996 reported threats of violence from paramilitary elements; some elected officials were apprehensive as well.

Concerns also were voiced about relationships between U.S. troops, particularly Special Forces Units, and Haitian paramilitary personnel. On October 3, 1994, the MNF made a

highly publicized raid on FRAPH headquarters in Port-au-Prince, complete with arrests. Yet the next day the U.S. provided FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant a forum for a press conference at which he urged reconciliation. The controversy was heightened with the revelation that the U.S. had confiscated thousands of pages of FRAPH documents and was negotiating their return to the Haitian government.[5]

Indeed, a recurring issue agenda throughout the restoration period was Washington's political agenda. "In the months after the United States invasion of Haiti, American officers repeatedly told their troops that the country's most dreaded paramilitary group was actually a legitimate opposition political party," concluded one investigative reporter. "'They're no different from Democrats or Republicans,' soldiers in Haiti dutifully echoed when asked about their instructions." While Special Forces sought out and reassured FRAPH elements, American intelligence agencies had determined a full year before the invasion that FRAPH was paramilitary rather than political in nature.[6]

Equally critical to improved security was the status of Haiti's police. Because Haiti had never had an independent police force—its police were members of the FAd'H and hence soldiers—there was no credible institution from which to build a new professional and independent force. Joint patrols with Haitian personnel were envisaged by U.S. military planners as soon as MNF troops had secured their positions. However, reacting to the recent debacle in Somalia, the U.S. military, according to one officer, vowed that its soldiers would not become "rent-a-cops."

The shoot-out in late September 1994 at a Cap Haitien police station compelled the MNF to move with dispatch on the policing front. It also was forced to abandon its joint patrol concept since, in the wake of the incident, the FAd'H simply had ceased to exist throughout the northern part of Haiti, to the delight of the citizenry and the consternation of the MNF. In the absence of Haitian forces, MNF personnel were called upon for routine policing.

As a quick-fix, the MNF moved to create an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), composed primarily of FAd'H personnel screened to exclude its most abusive members. IPSF enroll-

ees were given a week's training in police professionalism and human rights by the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) and redeployed to Haiti's major cities.

Unenthusiastic, like most others, about the prospect of having former members of the military back on the streets, the Aristide government insisted that 1,000 Haitian boat people who had received three weeks of police training in Guantanamo be given similar training and incorporated into the interim force. Upon their arrival back home, the Guantanamo trainees were accorded heroes' welcomes. In assuming IPSF duties, however, neither the local police recruits nor the refugees were professionals in any meaningful sense of the term.

An initial team of 900 international police monitors attached to the MNF oversaw the IPSF, which was responsible for public security while a new national police force was being formed. Transforming the home of the Haitian army's Heavy Weapons Unit into a police academy, ICITAP inaugurated in January 1995 a four-month course for the first group of 300 police. By February 1996, 5,200 new police had been trained and deployed, gradually replacing members of the interim force. To reach the desired numbers, several groups of Haitian National Police (HNP) cadets were housed in a U.S. military facility in Missouri during part of their training. Decommissioned IPSF were offered the opportunity to join other demobilized soldiers in the skills training and job placement program. The entire process was coordinated by ICITAP, with the involvement of French, Canadian, and other trainers.

While Haitians supported the idea of a new police force, concerns over its leadership, experience, and professionalism were acute. As late as January 1996, some areas of the country had yet to receive their complements. Some HNP contingents that had been dispatched were showing little willingness to report to mayors and other civilian authorities. Many observers felt that the training received had been inadequate, particularly for sensitive tasks such as crowd control and the use of force.

Responding to mounting pressure for more effective police presence, President Aristide in early December 1995 offered 1,400 IPSF—800 from Guantanamo and 600 former

FAd'H—positions in either the HNP or other state security forces. By the time President Préval was inaugurated in February, the sensitive issue of the use of former soldiers in the new police force had become moot. The new HNP head had agreed to admit only 100 former FAd'H members who had served in the IPSF.

Political Process

As its name suggests, a fundamental objective of Operation Uphold Democracy was to restore and safeguard Haiti's nascent democratic political process. Renewal of that process through elections was viewed as a major goal of the outside military intervention and as an indicator of its success.

By February 1995, the terms in office of all the members of Haiti's Chamber of Deputies, mayoral councils, and communal section councils, as well as of two-thirds of the parliament's senators, would expire. Elections were urgently needed to ensure continuity, to meet constitutionally-mandated timetables, and to enable ordinary citizens to select new leaders for the period after military rule. The five-year term of Haiti's president, constitutionally prohibited from succeeding himself, would end on February 7, 1996. Elections for a successor to Jean-Bertrand Aristide himself were required in late 1995.

The most basic step was to restore to office already elected authorities. Various international actors helped in that effort. Shortly after the arrival of the MNF, UN and U.S. diplomats facilitated the return to Haiti of many parliamentarians, mostly from exile in North America. In Haiti, the MNF made sure that they, and municipal leaders throughout the country, could physically reclaim their elected offices, some of which had been occupied by protégés of Haiti's military rulers.

Following the return of the constitutional president, a new prime minister had to be named and then, along with his government, ratified by parliament. Aristide nominated a businessman, Smarck Michel, who had previously served briefly as his commerce minister. Michel and his cabinet, which included new as well as familiar faces, was ratified by the reconstituted parliament.

The electoral process itself also had to be put into place. This involved a variety of measures, from naming a presidentially appointed Provisional Election Council (CEP), establishing candidacy eligibility requirements, and registering voters to identifying voting sites, printing election ballots, and arranging election finance. Further, international observers had to be enlisted and accommodated. Institutions playing a role included the UN Electoral Assistance Unit, the newly-formed OAS Democracy Unit, and such USAID-funded organizations as the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI).

National elections for 2,192 municipal and legislative posts were held beginning in June 1995, with re-runs and run-offs in July and September. Observer delegations followed each closely. Working through its Democracy Unit, the OAS fielded a team of several hundred observers that included personnel from MICIVIH, which had reestablished itself in Haiti shortly after the arrival of the MNF.

The other two lead delegations, both from the United States, were split along partisan political lines. One was led by officials of the Clinton administration, the other organized by IRI. Smaller delegations from religious and advocacy groups also participated. Despite some disagreement among the teams, observers generally agreed that the elections represented a major achievement and were a "free, fair, and flawed" exercise.

They were flawed because of rampant disorganization, omission of names from the ballots, poor poll worker training, and CEP oversight that failed to inspire confidence. Many of the small or traditional parties boycotted the election, although their chances of doing well were slim. Problems notwithstanding, there was little evidence of fraud or manipulation and the results were resounding.[7]

With very few incumbents returned to office, Haiti's traditional political class suffered a devastating rebuff. Most of those elected to municipal and parliamentary offices in 1995, expressing some affiliation with Aristide's Lavalas movement, represented a new generation of leaders, political out-

siders who now moved to the inside. Many had been community activists. Their overriding concerns were government accountability, especially to those left out in the past, local development, and the decentralization of the state.[8] A top priority was to pass legislation creating new constitutionally mandated bodies for local and regional governance. These bodies were called territorial assemblies, with authority to generate and spend revenue locally, and were widely viewed as central to Haiti's democracy.

Following the municipal and parliamentary elections, attention turned to the presidential contest. Aristide had pledged to step down at the end of his term. As December drew near, however, there was mounting popular sentiment—which he did not discourage—that he stay on for three more years to make up for time spent in exile following the coup. Under strong pressure from the U.S., he stuck to his pledge.

From a field of 14 candidates, René Garcia Préval, Aristide's first prime minister and close associate, swept into office with 87.9 percent of the vote. OAS and U.S. observers declared the election free and fair, although voter turnout was only about 30 percent. In Haiti's first-ever peaceful transition from one elected president to another, Aristide bestowed on his successor the presidential sash at an inauguration ceremony on February 7, 1996, ten years to the day after the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship.

The elections attracted great international attention and represented a major international contribution. Beyond them, however, were other necessary fundamental challenges. Foremost was the need to achieve greater parity among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Governance in Haiti traditionally had been the exclusive domain of the executive branch, aligned with an all-powerful military that ran roughshod over a subservient legislature and judiciary. Local officials were little more than figureheads; soldiers and section chiefs wielded the real power.

With the military gone, section chiefs eliminated, and more representative local officials in office, the challenge, according to one legislator, was to transform a "presidential political culture" into "a democratic political culture" based upon a system of functioning checks and balances. Complicat-

ing the challenge were Haiti's limited human resources in the form of experienced leaders, managers, and technicians. Many trained personnel who had fled the coup were reluctant to recommit themselves to public service.

Moreover, during three years of brutal rule, the de facto regime had emptied the national treasury and looted the infrastructure. Telephones, typewriters, desks, and even lighting fixtures and toilets had been stolen from public buildings by the military and its supporters. A single telephone existed for the entire parliament. Upon his return to the National Palace, the president slept on a cot supplied by the MNF.

At the same time, tremendous international pressure was exerted on the government, especially on the executive branch and the ministries, to address the entire range of reconstruction needs. Yet even the traditionally all-powerful executive was paralyzed. "In Haiti," commented an official in January 1996 who was central to the rebuilding process, "everything is broken, and everyone is now looking to the state to fix it all at once. We can't do everything; indeed, we can only do a few things. There are very few competent people in government. Once you get past the minister and his personal associates, most of the civil service is still composed of people there since the time of Duvalier or of military rule."

Municipal and parliamentary elections represented a solid start at strengthening local governance. However, reinforcing a traditionally weak judiciary was even more difficult. Yet a viable and independent judiciary was central to the rule of law, an end to impunity, and a sustainable democracy. "Haiti has to make a transition from the rule of men to the rule of law," noted an observer, "if its democracy will survive."

The judiciary also required strengthening at the local level, as an incident in January 1996 demonstrated. Following the reinstatement of Aristide, land disputes that pitted land-hungry peasants against landowners became increasingly common. In one such dispute in the Milot area of northern Haiti, a group of squatters seized a rich stand of timber from its absentee landowner, whose family had owned the land since the early 1800s.

Faulting President Aristide, whom they viewed as having blessed such lawless acts, the owner and his backers sought

redress through the traditional use of power and intimidation rather than by approaching newly elected local officials—strangers to them—to seek mediation. Eventually, the fledgling National Agrarian Reform Institute was forced to mediate the dispute in the absence of other legal or political mechanisms.[2]

A just and accountable system of law and order also would mean a transformation of the existing system of courts and prisons at all levels. The physical and human infrastructure alike was woefully inadequate. This became apparent from the beginning of the international intervention, when suspected criminals handed over to MNF forces were soon back on the street due to the inability of the judicial system to investigate and hear cases or of the penal system to hold prisoners. A number of spectacular jail breaks early on, some from facilities under MNF supervision, shattered confidence that fundamental changes would be made. Subsequently, rising incidents of criminal violence and the appearance of organized gangs undermined Haitians' faith in the future.

Juxtaposed against overwhelming need, progress as of January 1996 was minimal. A judicial training academy had been established and international training and reform programs instituted, but international officials conceded that the pace was far too slow. They expressed concern about a loss of momentum with the anticipated reduction of international presence, activities, and resources. The absence of judicial proceedings for criminal acts committed during or after military rule had frustrated the population. In the absence of meaningful reform, they might believe that they had no choice other than to take justice into their own hands.

Two other democratic institutions—a free press and a flourishing civil society—confronted new challenges following the restoration of the constitutional authorities. Haiti prides itself on a vibrant press. Its radio stations play a central role in a country with 80 percent illiteracy. Outlets run the gamut: from far-right, old line Duvalierists, to moderate and left-wing viewpoints. All face intense economic pressures. Some stations have modern equipment and teams of correspondents, others are shoe-string operations.

More worrying still, few Haitian journalists, whether radio, television, or print, have professional training. Nor are there agreed upon standards of ethics. In a society where word travels fast, the media sometimes fuel rumors rather than tracking them down. Investigative reporting is rare, with journalists, perhaps as a legacy of years of repression and terror, reluctant to challenge government or powerful interests.

During the restoration period, local civil society, including grassroots groups and NGOs, confronted the challenge not only of rebuilding and reasserting capacity to implement programs but also of forging new relationships with the state. During the latter part of the post-Duvalier period and throughout de facto rule, many groups had kept their distance from the state.

With the reinstatement of constitutional government and the election of new officials, a "reforming state" sought to shoulder new responsibilities—for example, in the delivery of health care and education and in literacy and the provision of technical assistance to small farmers. NGOs that had viewed the state as phantom or pariah now began to see it as potential partner. The environment was akin to that in 1986 after the departure of the Duvaliers and in 1991 in the initial Aristide presidency.

Humanitarian agencies welcomed the advent of a state more oriented toward ordinary citizens, but there were many uncertainties. "Haiti hasn't yet decided what a government is," one seasoned observer noted. "The state is as confused as is the international community about what its relationship with popular organizations should be." The situation was complicated because each of the major actors—the state, popular organizations, and the international community—was diffused and unorganized. Uncertainty was compounded by the new government's inability to deliver on its promises and by the continuing lack of status in Haitian law for private organizations. The following section identifies specific problems in the area of economic reconstruction.

Having been severely decapitalized of productive capacities during military rule, many Haitians desperately required access to resources. Tools and animals had to be recovered, seeds and other agricultural inputs acquired, and stocks replenished. Affected were not only poor farmers and market women but also middle class entrepreneurs as well.

One entrepreneur in the export sector had reduced her staff from 200 in the Duvalier days to 10 during the time of de facto rule. "I cannot and will not go further in[to] debt to revitalize my business," she said with evident frustration, "and there seems to be no source of finance at favorable terms available to help me." The ultimate revitalization of the economy, however, would depend on entrepreneurs such as herself.

Even before the MNF intervention, international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor governments met with officials of the Aristide regime to establish an economic recovery strategy. In August 1994, a social and economic recovery program presented by the Haitian government and based on economic stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization, and decentralization was adopted as the framework for an Emergency Economic Recovery Program (EERP) following the removal of the military.[10]

In January 1995, 19 multinational institutions and 14 governments pledged $1.2 billion in support of Haiti's recovery over an 18-month period. Pledges included support for balance of payments, energy, infrastructure, governance, and humanitarian aid in addition to troop costs. Also in January, the government signed a privatization agreement with the World Bank. During the previous month, $83 million in past debts to the IFIs had been cleared, allowing for quick disbursement of resources.

A weak economy prior to the coup had been further devastated during military rule and accompanying sanctions. With Aristide's return, the economy required strengthening to combat the effects of inflation, price gouging by smugglers, and depleted inventories. Also needed was massive new investment from both local and international sources. Consistent with its pre-coup policy, the Aristide government sought

investment from the diaspora as a cornerstone of economic recovery. The government reiterated its earlier pledge to bring Haiti "from misery to poverty with dignity."

First, sanctions had to be removed. Learning a lesson from the Governor's Island experience, the UN waited to do so until the day following Aristide's return to Port-au-Prince. With the constitutional government restored, sanctions and the FAd'H gone, foreign troops present, high-profile visits of donors taking place, and news of pledges for reconstruction in the air, expectations for a rapid, tangible, and sustained economic take-off were high.

Reflecting the prevailing optimism and much to Washington's relief, migration from Haiti also had ceased. Indeed, within months of the intervention, Haitians remaining at Guantanamo had return home, most of them voluntarily. Practically destitute, they joined the millions of Haitians seeking a brighter future. "For us," one grassroots leader recalled, "this represented a period of great hope when life started again."

In rapid succession, other steps to economic recovery were taken. Within a month, the Aristide government established a joint public-private sector Presidential Commission on Economic Growth and Modernization to promote and guide investment. The president invited to the palace stalwarts of Haiti's private sector, including the so-called MREs who had supported the de facto regime, urging them to become full partners in reconstruction. Diaspora delegations visiting the palace heard the same message.

In early 1995, tariffs were slashed, an IMF standby agreement signed, and Prime Minister Michel traveled to Washington to promote his government's economic program. In describing its features, he used the term "the democratization of public assets" rather than the more internationally in-vogue "privatization," a term unpopular with most Haitians. At issue was the divestment into private hands of nine state enterprises, most of which, like a sugar and a flour mill, an edible oils factory, and a cement plant, were either not in operation or were mismanaged. Other enterprises on the divestment list included the telephone and electric companies and the airport and port authorities.

Privatization was a central but controversial element in a more comprehensive IMF structural adjustment program. For Aristide and his supporters, divestment of state enterprises was problematic well beyond the usual sensitivities of appearing to cave in to international pressure. True, the enterprises generally were inefficient and had never served the Haitian people. But large segments of the newly empowered population wanted such entities to serve them, not foreigners or discredited elites. They wanted to make the state accountable, not to give away its assets.

Quite apart from the fact that aid disbursements required progress in privatization, the government recognized the need to deal with inefficient state enterprises. A government proposal in August 1994 to exclude elites from ownership of state enterprises had been rejected by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the arm of the World Bank overseeing the economic restructuring.

With anti-privatization sentiment on the upswing, including street demonstrations led primarily by state enterprise trade unions, Prime Minister Michel came under increasing pressure over his support for divestment. Michel resigned in October 1995, receiving less-than-forthright backing from President Aristide, who had become highly equivocal on the issue. His replacement, Foreign Minister Claudette Werleigh, avoided the subject, speaking instead of budgetary deficits. Such shortfalls were a very real possibility since USAID had already suspended disbursement of $4.6 million earmarked for energy support payments and other donors had conditioned disbursements of as much as $110 million on progress in privatization.

Aristide's equivocation puzzled many observers since it protected Duvalierists and military-appointed workers with sinecures in state enterprises. Some suspected that he had learned a lesson from his earlier attempt to streamline the civil service, which had created a pool of disenchanted people who became coup supporters. In any event, the issue of the divestment of state enterprises, together with the need once again to reform the civil service (swollen further under military rule), drew a cautious response from the Aristide government that alienated international supporters and some sectors of the Lavalas movement itself.

One Haitian observer contrasted Aristide's timid response in 1994 with his bolder strategies to reform the state and enhance revenue following his election in 1991. "In 1994, when the reinstated government had the international community firmly on its side, it could have made bold moves to make the MREs pay taxes, winnow the ranks of the civil service, and enact the economic reforms it tried in 1991." As a result of the go-slow approach, he observed, the MREs in early 1996 still were not paying taxes, the government was desperately short of revenue, and the civil service remained bloated with coup supporters. Conversely, the observer mused, "Had Aristide acted as cautiously in 1991 as in 1995, there probably would never have been a coup!"

Aristide left the issue of the democratization of public assets and the associated suspension of international aid to his successor. Before the end of his first month in office, President Préval had pledged to make privatization a top priority, a commitment confirmed by Prime Minister Rosny Smarth. Smarth, however, distinguished between state enterprises that engage in production and those that render services, implying a willingness to divest the state of the former while retaining the latter. With the threat of renewed street demonstrations in the air, the new government appeared to be seeking a compromise acceptable both at home and abroad.

Although macroeconomic matters dominated discussions between the restored government and international funders, issues that touched the population most directly were the presence and programs of a new player, foreign troops, which picked up some of the traditional aid tasks. Many Haitians, particularly at the grass roots, had high expectations that troops who had freed them from hostage to the FAd'H would follow up with programs to provide jobs and improve infrastructure. "After the soldiers came and got rid of the *makouts*," recalled one grassroots leader, "we expected to see tractors and engineers." Nation building by the U.S. military occupation during the years 1915-1934 provided ample precedent.

Such dramatic action was not forthcoming, however. The MNF was limited by directives against nation building and "mission creep," constrained by the prevailing perception of Somalia as nation building gone awry, and saddled with a

preordained exit date. As for UN troops, Security Council Resolution 940 made no mention of civic action activities, reflecting, UN officials explained, a division between developing countries, which favored them, and developed countries, which opposed them.

Against this backdrop, the number of such activities was surprising. One high-profile example was the construction by American military engineers of a bridge at Jacmel in southeastern Haiti, using funds from the IDB and donor governments. Dedicated with great fanfare by President Aristide in December 1995, the bridge was considered one of the military's major contributions to reconstruction. In reality, its utility was limited by the need for another bridge farther along the road that was never built and by the punishment it took from large military vehicles. The MNF also mobilized relief operations in the wake of tropical storm Gordon in November 1994.

Some UNMIH troops scattered across the country in mostly remote areas also worked with local populations in civic education and infrastructural improvement, whether as part of their assigned duties or on their own time. By the end of 1995, they had participated in about a thousand small projects, including repairing schools and churches, vaccinating children, fixing roads, and removing burned vehicles and garbage." U.S. Special Forces units also wrote proposals that were presented to the IOM, which made small grants for community level projects assisted by the military.

The absence of a formal civic action mandate gave way to "operational necessity" in the field. Military officers found that their troops benefited directly from such measures well beyond their public relations value. Major General Joseph W. Kinzer, the U.S. soldier who served as both commander of U.S. forces in Haiti and UNMIH forces, brought transformers from Puerto Rico to light the Port-au-Prince streets, making the capital safer for his troops as well as for the citizenry. The Pakistani commander of UNMIH forces in Cap Haitien had the same rationale for civic action initiatives there. Under the rubric of "force protection," nation building activities were carried out, enhancing security for civilians as well as serving military purposes.[12]

Hostage to Buzzwords

Three terms in the military lexicon became household words during the acrimonious debate about Presidential Decision Directive 25, issued in May 1994, which now circumscribe U.S. support for international military operations. Largely reflecting the Somalia debacle, these buzzwords are highly charged but conceptually vacuous, vitiating sensible policy debate about Haiti and elsewhere.

Exit Strategy: The obligatory departure of American soldiers from Haiti by March 1996 echoed the new mantra. The timetable was established arbitrarily to satisfy U.S. domestic politics, not to reflect local realities. Such an approach translates into Creole—and incidentally into Serbo-Croatian as well—as an absence of vision and concrete objectives. Why even begin in Haiti with a departure schedule fixed unrealistically in advance and without a commitment to leave behind sustainable institutions?

Mission Creep: Modifying mandates is prohibited. However, the visceral rejection of task expansion runs counter to common sense and the flexibility required in all military and civilian operations. The prohibition prevents creative and sensible adaptations in the field without reverting to the Security Council or other appropriate political authority. Normally, we would condemn such dysfunctional micromanagement and those who failed to adapt to changing circumstances. Why not here?

Nation Building: The "N" word is anathema. The mantra is "vote and forget." Haiti thus resembles Cambodia, Mozambique, and Angola. The post-Cold War panacea for countries torn apart by civil strife or war consists essentially of elections, although only a generation-long investment in justice will ever break Haiti's cycles of violence. Why such myopia when unbuilt nations are likely to require subsequent intervention?

Thomas G. Weiss

Traditional aid agencies were divided on strategies during the restoration period. Some, sensing an "open moment" provided by the change in political leadership, placed a premium on quick impact projects (QIPs) to make a palpable difference in the quality of life of ordinary Haitians. USAID gave priority to such efforts, funding groups such as the IOM, the Pan-American Development Fund (PADF), and CARE. The intention was to meet urgent needs while putting people to work and giving them some economic resources.

By November 1995, IOM had provided small grants to 1,923 microprojects as part of a Communal Governance Program in support of community groups in such sectors as reforestation, potable water and sanitation, and literacy. PADF and CARE used food as payment for labor provided on community works projects such as drainage ditch and road repair and latrine construction.

Aid organizations involved in these projects acknowledged their limitations. Many of the activities, they conceded, were neither sustainable nor genuinely participatory. Some of the community groups were artificial constructs designed solely to receive funds. Some activities even had been demonstrably counterproductive, as described in the accompanying box. Problems notwithstanding, one project manager stated, "It's better to have a working road for four months than not at all." Even if the community proved unwilling or unable to sustain projects initiated with outside assistance, the reasoning went, the outside world will have made a good-faith effort to help.

Aid personnel operating from a different paradigm took a more cautious approach. Acknowledging the need for visible change, they felt that reconstruction aid could be a vehicle for breaking the long-established cycle of dependency—but only if it represented a departure from previous assistance. The innovative element, they reasoned, involved the empowerment of grassroots organizations, which food-for-work activities and QIPs rarely did.

Those committed to participatory and sustainable development took a dim view of enlisting the military in economic reconstruction. "The destruction of the Haitian armed forces was the largest possible contribution that the international

Development Disconnect

The sign at the village entrance proudly proclaimed, “Job Creation Project: Ditch Drainage.” The fine print indicated a two-month project funded by key bilateral and multilateral donors and implemented by major U.S. NGOs. Since the project’s inception in mid-1995, some jobs had indeed been created. Villagers had been paid to shovel silt out of a drainage ditch parallel to the road along which most homes were located.

Yet newly elected officials and civic activists were critical of the efforts. Silt shoveled into villagers’ yards blocked rainfall run-off, resulting in mud mounds and mosquito infestation. “Outsiders, not the peasants movement, decided this project,” explained one leader. “People worked on it out of desperation.” “What we really need is reinvestment in agricultural production, educational materials, and teacher training,” observed another, “and a way to get fruit rotting in the hillsides to market.”

To date, locally identified priorities and long-term needs remain unaddressed by quick-fix foreign aid. Out of frustration, organized small farmers in the community have invaded idle lands, manifesting their desire to augment their productive resource base.

Robert Maguire

community made or could have made," observed one Haitian official. "We could have asked the Army Corps of Engineers to take over the Ministry of Public Works. While that might have solved our problems in ninety days, it would have meant the severe emasculation of national sovereignty."[13] It also might have delayed the assumption of control over the future by Haitian civilians, inside government and out.

The UN system, which had found the challenges associated with the de facto authorities so perplexing and divisive, was better able to cope with the more traditional setting of post-conflict reconstruction. With the constitutional government once again in power, UN humanitarian organizations had a single set of interlocutors, and a more human needs-oriented set at that. Issues that had been mostly political and ideological gave way to more operational and programmatic concerns. An interagency coordination mechanism managed by UNDP brought UN and international partner organizations together on a regular basis. As in other country settings, however, individual UN organizations praised the arrangements more because they were given a broad operational latitude rather than because of any meaningful impact on coordination.

Earlier frictions between the human needs and political sides of the United Nations were eased with the establishment of system-wide coordination authority. The responsibilities of the UN resident coordinator, whose duties included those of the UNDP resident representative and the UN humanitarian coordinator, were an integral part of the peacekeeping operation by virtue of the resident coordinator's duties as deputy special representative of the UN secretary-general. Unique in the history of UN peacekeeping activities, these arrangements represented a change from the standard approach in which humanitarian and development activities proceed separately from peacekeeping efforts.

The synergistic potential among activities in the humanitarian, reconstruction, development, and security spheres was enhanced. Regular meetings of senior UN peacekeeping staff benefited from the presence of a ranking official who could draw linkages with the ongoing work of other UN organizations. The designation of a senior UN development official as

second in the command structure of the UN peacekeeping operation, empowered to act on behalf of the SRSG, also meant that the UN force commander occasionally took orders from him.[14] The innovative organizational chart had features that might bear replication in other peacekeeping missions, but observers cautioned that the same arrangements might not succeed outside Haiti, and perhaps might not have succeeded even in Haiti during the de facto period. Personalities also played a role.

Resources committed by the international community through multilateral and bilateral channels for emergency, reconstruction, and development purposes during the restoration period were substantial. As of August 1995, pledges for the period from October 1994 through the end of the century stood at $1.7 billion. About one third had been utilized by the end of 1995; additional pledges were also received from September 1995 onward. The magnitude vastly exceeded the investment made by Haiti itself in "infrastructure, machinery and equipment," reported the secretary-general, and underscored "the critical need for an improved absorption capacity."[15]

Despite the scale of funds available, one recurring criticism from many locals and some expatriates was the prevailing lack of consultation with ordinary Haitians. The donor community, a long-term Haiti watcher observed, "has not invited the participation of Haitian civil society." The observation was confirmed by several international NGOs and by the youth leaders of Milot, who, along with their families, had experienced the full range of political repression and economic marginalization. In interviews, they offered insightful commentary about the decade under review, sharing their dreams for their nation. They recommended that "The United Nations put its head together with our government so that we as youth can live in peace and build our country." Yet they and other such groups had not been sought out by international actors and remained untouched by international resources.

Looming ominously over international aid efforts was the continuing erosion in the standard of living. Within a year of the intervention, *Lavi Chè* had become a major political issue. An ever-growing number of Haitians expressed the frustra-

tion that, restoration of constitutional government and international largesse notwithstanding, economic conditions were not improving. Table 1 in the Introduction indicates that by December 1995, the value of wages had returned to levels preceding the de facto years. However, Table 2 in Chapter 1 notes that selected health, energy, and particularly food items remained roughly at or above comparable costs in earlier years.

Some criticism was directed toward foreign military forces, whose personnel and vehicles were in great evidence. "We knew our own military wouldn't help us," observed one Haitian, "but we thought real armies did that sort of thing." Disappointment with the military, however, was part of a larger perception that, in spite of massive amounts pledged for reconstruction, quick disbursement strategies of funders, and the presence of many aid agencies, average Haitians had seen few changes for the better in their lives since September 1994.

Most of the those interviewed in early 1996, whether in the slums of Port-au-Prince or in the towns and rural areas of northeastern and northern Haiti, the Artibonite, and the Central Plateau, confirmed little or no direct impact from the array of aid programs mounted following the coup. Many complained that the aid received was not what they needed as it was too short-term or because it addressed alien priorities. As some aid officials rejected the criticism, others conceded its validity.

Restoration and Nationhood

Faced with the crisis in its restoration phase, the international community responded better than in the immediate post-Duvalier period a decade earlier, and with far greater effectiveness than during the de facto years. Its most significant contributions during the ten-year period under review came in this period: restoring the elected president, dislodging the Haitian military regime, and helping disband the Haitian army. As a result of MNF and UNMIH interventions, Haitians were able to go about their daily lives with a greater sense of security. A recurring theme of interviews was that "If the international military hadn't come, we wouldn't even be able

to meet with you, much less to carry out our community organizing activities." By all reports and personal testimony, human rights abuses fell dramatically.

The period also witnessed substantial gains in the area of political processes. The establishment of an electoral process, the election of new national and municipal leadership, the peaceful transition from the first elected president to a successor, and, in a broader sense, the infusion of new energy, leadership, and accountability all represented major advances. Economic gains were more superficial, but included a decreased need for emergency assistance to combat hunger and disease and a framework laid for reconstruction activities.

Yet serious problems remained. Despite major strides in the demobilization and social reintegration of members of the Haitian armed forces, many paramilitary personnel and substantial quantities of weapons remained in circulation, testing the resources of the embryonic police, judicial, and prison systems. While civil society was reawakening, its relationship with the state remained in flux. Many economic gains had been short-lived and superficial. New structures to replace aid dependency and patronage with empowerment and self-reliance had yet to be put into place. Political and social cleavages remained deep and reconciliation distant.

The very success of the military intervention, paradoxically, had raised an even more difficult set of issues. "What in the old days would have constituted emasculation—that is, the landing of foreign troops," noted one senior Haitian government official, "has left domestic policy makers with wide latitude. Whether the right decisions were taken is a separate issue."

Only time would tell whether the outside world, in partnership with Haitians, had taken full advantage of the space created by the successful intervention. As of mid-1996, the jury was still out. To be sure, a constitutional government had replaced an illegitimate one; a phantom and predatory state had given way to a more present and accountable one. Yet the process of assisting the reinstated government to consolidate the gains and nurture a new sense of state responsibility and of nationhood was dragging. Moreover, international staying power was showing signs of weakening. As noted in the

Afterword, UN peacekeeping activities were extended initially beyond February 29, 1996 and then beyond June 30, 1996—only at the eleventh hour and at levels short of those requested by Haiti's government and endorsed by those nations most closely involved.

In sum, progress to date had been real but remained fragile. For growing numbers of Haitians, *Lavi Chè* had called into question whether the international intervention would indeed sustain the "success story" status it currently enjoyed. Already, some Haitians had begun to question the value of elections and democracy if neither improved economic conditions. Security and political gains were thus in danger of being outweighed by other failures. Those associated with the UN peacekeeping operation were seeing as the major challenge in Haiti that of "being remembered for more than just its Humvees."[16]

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"...one ignores Haitian history
at a terrible peril to contemporary policy making."
Anthony P. Maingot[1]

The experience from the years 1986-1996 is rich and diverse. From the foregoing review of international involvement in Haiti, major findings and recommendations emerge. Grouped under 11 thematic headings, each has implications for international actors. In each instance, findings are stated first, followed by 31 recommendations.

Evolving Local Challenges, Shifting International Responses

The three periods in the decade beginning in 1986 presented the international community with different challenges of varying degrees of difficulty. During the post-Duvalier opening, the long pent-up flourishing of civil society offered a brief opportunity for nurturing and reinforcement, before the window closed with the violence that aborted the 1987 elections and installed another repressive regime. During the period of military rule from 1991-1994, the challenge was to dislodge the de facto regime while assisting and protecting those it imperiled. Finally, from September 1994, the restoration of the constitutional authorities brought another opening for the political, economic, and social reconstruction of a more democratic, just, and accountable nation.

In assessing the responses to these three sets of challenges, the analysis found that during the period of de facto rule, when it was most sorely tested, the international community demonstrated its lowest levels of effectiveness and resourcefulness. A strategy based on half-hearted efforts to persuade or cajole a regime whose leaders established and maintained themselves through the use of force made for ineffective diplomacy and hamstrung humanitarian action at precisely the time when the stakes were highest.

During the restoration period, outside actors, presented with more traditional challenges, were at their most effective. Using military muscle, they dismantled the de facto regime, restored the constitutional authorities, and helped establish basic security and electoral processes. Yet a politically-driven time frame predicated upon rapid change and quick fixes ran against the grain of Haitian history. The fast-paced approach also undercut laborious efforts to put into place more self-reliant, participatory, and sustainable institutions.

During the immediate post-Duvalier years, international interventions moved slowly to grasp a little-understood challenge. Diplomatic pressure was successful in sustaining new political processes in the wake of the departure of the Duvaliers. Economic assistance, taking a business-as-usual approach, failed to address the structural inequalities of wealth and poverty, power and powerlessness—instead reinforcing them. By 1990, however, international support for democracy and momentous changes in world politics associated with the end of the Cold War helped foster a climate in which Haitians felt empowered to institute political changes and elect a change-oriented president.

The experience of the decade demonstrates that based on an astute assessment of the changing political landscape, effective international responses require a coordinated mix of interventions—diplomatic, humanitarian, and, on occasion, perhaps military as well. In all three periods, effective linkages among diplomacy, force, and humanitarian action were conspicuous by their relative absence.

Recommendations:

- Effective international action requires coordinated strategic planning that takes into account the political lay of the land and the likely impact of outside intervention.

- Effective responses require international actors to speak with a clear and consistent voice. Uncertainty, equivocation, and dissent is likely to be viewed as indicative of a lack of resolve that only encourages resistance.

Legitimacy and Power

The recurring theme of Haiti's history throughout the last ten years has been the quest for nationhood. Particularly following the 1991 coup but also before and after the period of de facto rule, the pivotal issue in achieving self-determination was that of power versus legitimacy. In the end, legitimacy maintained the upper hand, largely because it had been bestowed on the Aristide government by the majority of the Haitian people in free and fair elections organized by the UN and the OAS. The presence of outside electoral observers at Haiti's 1990 elections—from governments, the UN, the OAS, and numerous NGOs—was of paramount importance in confirming the willingness of the same international community to act vigorously to restore the deposed government.

The Aristide government's legitimacy gave it the moral high ground during negotiations to remove the de facto regime. Even legitimacy, however, did not offer complete protection against international diplomatic pressures to compromise on matters of principle, as the Governor's Island dynamics demonstrated. Despite ambivalence and even contempt for the Aristide government in some international quarters, the legitimacy of the constitutional authorities proved the determining factor in retaining substantial outside support and eventually triggering concerted and effective international action.

Ultimately, it was the government's constitutional mandate that enabled—or, more precisely, compelled—international actors to restore the duly elected authorities. For their part, international actors ultimately rose to the challenge. The issue transcended the personal opinions held by a particular head of state or foreign minister regarding President Aristide himself. In the grudging words of one diplomat, "He may be an s.o.b., but he's our s.o.b." Or, as one commentator put it, "For the first time, the United States turned against the sort of military strongmen too long excused as a bulwark against Cold War communism and intervened to restore a democratically elected leftist it didn't even like."[2]

Throughout the entire decade, however, international actors allowed voices supportive of broad-based democratic

The United Nations in Haiti

The UN intervention in Haiti constitutes an example of "second generation peacekeeping." In contrast to operations of an older vintage that sought primarily to mothball interstate conflicts, this new breed of operations involves a complex array of consensual arrangements designed to achieve political settlements to intrastate as well as interstate conflicts.

The UN Mission in Haiti was given four basic and interrelated objectives by the Security Council. First, it was to maintain a "secure and stable environment." Second, it was to assist the government in "the professionalization of its armed forces and the creation of a separate police force." Third, it was to help "the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections." Finally, it was to "improve the functioning of [Haiti's] justice system," including the training and fielding of a new police force.

In addition, the UN intervention took on peculiar and distinctive features because of its regional and coercive nature. Shortly after the coup that overthrew President Aristide in September 1991, the Organization of American States called for his restoration and imposed a general trade embargo. In June 1993, the Security Council endorsed a more stringent oil and arms embargo. In July 1994, it authorized a multinational military operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The OAS has continued to be involved in Haiti jointly with the UN within the framework of MICIVIH, whose original purposes of human rights monitoring and promotion and institution building of police, prisons, and justice systems were expanded to include electoral matters.

A final singular and novel characteristic of the UN operation has been the appointment for the first time of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General who also acts as the Representative of the UN Development Programme and is responsible, in that capacity, for coordinating all UN development agencies and programs.

Jacques Fomerand

change to be drowned out by shrilly voiced, well-financed and well-connected, and narrowly framed expressions of Haitian national interests. The broad Haitian majority, however, saw itself vindicated by the eventual outcomes of international intervention.

Recommendations:

- In rallying behind constitutional authorities in countries challenged by forces without political legitimacy, the international community should take full advantage of resources at its disposal—including appropriate coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The nurturing of democracy in a country without democratic traditions should be expected to require particular resourcefulness.

- The international community should find ways and means of listening more attentively to, and supporting the legitimate aspirations of, disenfranchised populations in their efforts to nurture broad-based democratic change. For example, instead of focusing on those in the capital, outside actors should make more energetic efforts to engage sectors that are at greatest risk during periods of authoritarianism or military rule, especially in rural areas.

The Roles of Regional and Global Institutions

International responses to Haiti's crisis were shaped in part by dynamic interplay between the OAS and the UN. Reflecting the movement toward democratization throughout the hemisphere, the OAS had adopted the Santiago Accord in June 1991 just before Haiti's military coup. The accord underscored the fact that illegitimate military rule would no longer be tolerated.

The OAS accordingly responded swiftly—but ultimately ineffectively—to the first subsequent example of a democratic crisis within a member state. Its role, particularly following the 1991 coup and in juxtaposition with UN involvement, continues to be the subject of heated debate. Recent OAS response to events in a potential military coup in Paraguay suggests that

the regional organization is prepared to build on the Haiti experience.[3]

Perceptions that the OAS bureaucracy was out of its depth once the Haitian crisis went beyond hemispheric proportions have some merit. However, the performance of a regional intergovernmental organization, like a universal one, is also a function of the political support received from member governments. It is also true that OAS presence in Haiti throughout the crisis was key in helping to maintain international focus and resolve. "Without the OAS," commented a senior OAS official in a view confirmed by others less personally involved, "the UN would have forgotten Haiti."

Haitians seeking change found OAS persistence indispensable. It conveyed solidarity with democratic forces and processes and brought Haiti more firmly into the region's fold of nations. Action by the OAS to honor the Santiago Accord pledge to respond to coups against democratic governments in the hemisphere, in the words of one of those involved, "circumscribed U.S. action." Hemispheric involvement also undercut traditional strategies by Haiti's elites to resist international pressures. OAS contributions were not only political and diplomatic but also programmatic, particularly in the areas of human rights and humanitarian assistance.

The extent to which OAS collaboration with the UN influenced the world organization's approach merits deeper reflection, as does the historic import of the UN's response to the assertion of sovereignty by a rogue element of a nation's own people. The UN Security Council authorized intervention in the affairs of a member state to restore democracy even though the word "democracy" does not appear in the UN Charter.

Recommendations:

- Regional institutions may bring to a crisis response essential elements of leadership and familiarity with political context. They also have pivotal roles to play in activating institutions with a more global mandate and authority. Their involvement should be encouraged, especially in situations involving domestic political disputes with region-wide and global implications.

- A clearer division of labor between regional and global institutions is needed as well as standard operating and managerial procedures to orchestrate cooperation between them in joint ventures. In anticipation of the complementary roles that regional and UN institutions may play, memoranda of understanding should be negotiated, detailing respective responsibilities. More prompt reinforcement of regional initiatives by the UN system may also be essential to their efficacy.

Bilateral Interests and Multilateral Processes

International responses to Haiti's crises were shaped by domestic political factors in powerful states. Had Haiti not been located within sailing distance of the U.S., General Cédras and his regime might still be occupying Haiti's National Palace, maintaining the status quo and enjoying the support, however reluctant, of governments and intergovernmental organizations. There is some truth in the observation of a senior Haitian government official that "Nobody really cares about Haiti except as it impacts on southern Florida."

Haiti's geographic proximity to the United States also transformed its internal crisis into a major domestic policy issue. The large Haitian diaspora (some estimates are as high as one million) worked effectively to make the connection. Washington was more important in shaping the world's response than any other government or intergovernmental institution acting in its own right, including the OAS and the United Nations itself. In this instance, it exercised its leadership in support of international decisions.

Reflecting public as well as Haitian diaspora opinion, the U.S. resolve to confront this highly-charged issue worked to offset domestic political tendencies toward accommodation with the Haitian military and traditional elites. Washington's resolve was fueled by resolute positions against the coup by the Haitians, who refused to capitulate. Also playing key roles were the Friends of Haiti and the democratic governments of CARICOM.

The leadership role played by Canada, too, reflected geographical and political considerations. On a per capita basis,

Ottawa was probably the largest contributor of resources and personnel to UN operations in Haiti and without doubt picked up the slack when U.S. involvement waned. Yet throughout the decade and particularly during the past five years, a distinct point-counterpoint emerged in the policies of the two North American neighbors. Canadian policy was more fulsome in rallying around Aristide early on and more proactive in supporting early military intervention. The specific impact by the Haitian diaspora in Montreal on Canadian policy is noted in the Afterword.

The geography of the crisis brought into prominence actors in the U.S., Canada, and the Caribbean who informed and influenced domestic and thereby international action. Members of the diaspora joined with non-Haitian lawyers, human rights advocates, political leaders, and social justice advocates to provide resources, information, and moral support to people in Haiti, particularly during the period of military rule. The exiled Aristide government, which quickly relocated to Washington in 1991 following the coup d'état and carried out its own public relations efforts, helped maintain and strengthen international resolve when it wavered.

As military interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia suggest, the perception that a government's interests are threatened may spur the exercise of leadership, even within a multilateral framework. In the Haiti crisis, U.S. resolve to confront the issues of democracy-under-attack and immigration heightened its leadership profile and its willingness to interact with others to address the problem. UN presence and processes, particularly during the time of UNMIH, exercised a useful brake on traditionally strong U.S. influence over Haiti.

Offsetting the value of U.S. leadership, however, was its distorting influence on the timing and contours of the international (rather than the humanitarian) effort. Many of those interviewed criticized the UN for allowing itself to be used as a "blue fig leaf" to advance U.S. foreign policy interests to the clear detriment of multilateral values and processes. As the "subcontracting" of operational responsibilities by the Security Council becomes more commonplace to ease the pressures

on United Nations itself, the protection of the world body from bilateral manipulation becomes a serious policy concern.

Recommendations:

- The interests of one or more major powers in promoting international action, fueled by domestic political considerations and perceived national interests, should be acknowledged and welcomed to the extent that they converge with the interests of the larger community of states. However, safeguards should be introduced to maximize multilateral action and accountability. Such measures might include deployment of more diverse contingents of international observers, fuller access by the media, and more frequent and detailed reporting to the Security Council.

- In conflict settings dominated by one or more major powers, steps should be taken by humanitarian actors in particular to safeguard the continuity and independence of their activities. Such measures would include working to ensure that activities by multilateral organizations receive funding from more than a single donor government and that the resources provided to NGOs likewise come from a variety of national sources.

Synchronizing International Involvement

A recurring tension in responding to the Haiti crises concerned the pace at which the international community moved on various fronts. Short-term political objectives repeatedly clashed with the goals of longer-term social and economic reform.

Prior to 1991, the prevailing aid paradigms were linked to short-term foreign policy objectives; lacking the dimension of popular participation, they proved unsustainable. Despite more than $1 billion in multilateral and bilateral aid funneled into Haiti in the 1980s, the gap widened between the vast majority of Haitians and the wealthy and powerful few. Dur-

ing periods of military rule following 1986, aid programs were constrained by shifting directives, lack of coordination, rapid staff turn-over, and tensions among agencies. Affiliation with local partners perceived as coup sympathizers also undermined effectiveness.

Following the intervention in 1994, aid tied to consolidating its short-term success failed to respond to the longer-term challenge posed by Haitians decapitalized during military rule and in need of assistance to become productive again. Rarely during the decade were international resources allied with internal forces promoting durable change.

The clash of timetables was highlighted in the tensions between security and justice. Since September 1994 in particular, the pace of outside involvement has been set by international political leaders, military planners, and peacekeepers. Anxious to avoid "mission creep" and to honor agreed "exit strategies," military planners moved quickly. Perhaps the most striking illustration involved the demobilization of the Haitian army and the creation of a new security force. Yet the hastily trained Haitian National Police sometimes resorted to deadly force too quickly and were not trained in modern techniques to control crowds or investigate crimes. The result has been a lack of legitimacy and credibility of the new force that has undermined security and placed at risk the very success of the multilateral intervention.

The forced pace and priority for moving quickly in the security arena has not been matched by equal attention or urgency accorded areas of slower change such as judicial and penal reform and amnesty. Those engaged in human rights and reconstruction have proceeded with more deliberate speed and with more attention to sustainability. Infrastructural rehabilitation and economic development have been shortchanged.

Tensions between timetables also were illuminated by debates on Haiti's ability to make use of outside resources. Here the desire of international actors to move quickly in overcoming limitations of absorptive capacity clashed with the interest of local actors in making changes in national policies and procedures before receiving infusions of outside aid. Already facing daunting development challenges prior to the three years of military rule, Haiti was a country whose

overall devastation compared to Japan and Germany following World War II—but without their highly educated work forces, ability to attract substantial outside aid, or massive presence of outside troops.

Responding to political pressure and underestimating the obstacles, IFIs mobilized expatriates to accelerate disbursements. Delegation after delegation descended upon Haiti, which overwhelmed the slender local human resources and local initiatives already mounted. Exacerbating matters was the presence of a freshly liberated population with high expectations that the newly accountable Haitian state and its international partners would address their urgent needs overnight.

Haiti's condition begged for evenly paced and multisectoral assistance in nurturing nations. Although aid officials mounted field missions, filed reports, and pledged massive amounts of aid, few durable new investments materialized and fewer still benefited the poor majority. Many of those interviewed, while grateful for assistance from outside military forces in dislodging de facto rule, were extremely critical of the lack of assistance in addressing chronic poverty.

Recommendations:

- In establishing timetables, the international community should address the tensions between fast-paced, time-limited activities and the need for ongoing support for the slower processes required to make progress in economic and social development. Interventions without a commitment to longer-term sustainability will lack the necessary impact and should perhaps not even be mounted. Investments in durable economic and social change should be viewed as an indispensable means of consolidating short-term gains in the political and security arenas.

- Whereas urgent humanitarian needs merit response, aid organizations and donor governments should emphasize projects that assist people to gain access to resources for productive, sustainable investment. The mix of humanitarian and development assistance as well as the nature of longer-term aid also require rethinking. Donor interest in

absorption of assistance should not upstage the desire of a recipient government to control its own destiny.

- Planners should recognize that nation-nurturing can enhance security, create goodwill, defuse tension, and increase absorptive capacity to utilize aid more quickly and effectively. Military and civilian personnel tasked with nurturing a sense of nationhood should receive the requisite orientation and training.

Developing a Humanitarian Strategy

To one degree or another, in each of the three periods, those engaged in assistance and protection lacked a concerted strategy to exploit and widen the space available for humanitarian action. In 1986, they failed to nurture the fledgling institutions of civil society. Following restoration of the constitutional authorities in 1994, the rapid infusion of outside resources—characterized by those involved as a "dollar drop"—was geared more toward implementing QIPs than strengthening local institutional capacity.

The lack of a concerted strategy was most evident and most damaging during military rule. Humanitarian organizations were ill-equipped to manage activities in an environment that provided negligible space for assistance and protection at precisely the time when such activities were most necessary. Some groups found this disarray inconsequential, but the study concluded that in the absence of a concerted strategy, political authorities took advantage of divisions among humanitarian actors, creating discord among donors and exploiting the situation to strengthen their own positions.

Recommendations:

- To date, there has been little reflection on the performance of humanitarian organizations active in Haiti, whether civilian or military, public or private. However, they should devote more time and staff resources to reviewing the strategies chosen and assessing the effectiveness of their activities during and preceding the decade under review.

The patent failure of development strategies involving massive infusion of resources over decades should lead to appropriate course-corrections.

- Humanitarian organizations should clarify their policies for situations in which de facto authorities have supplanted democratically elected ones. They should underscore the right of civilians to humanitarian assistance and the right of impartial organizations to have access to them, without conferring legitimacy on the authorities involved. They should also define the essential programmatic elements involved in humanitarian action and take steps to avoid the damaging personnel turnover that characterized the Haiti response.

Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions were not effective in dislodging the de facto authorities. The initial economic embargo imposed by the OAS was binding only on its members, some of whom violated it blatantly and with impunity. Subsequent U.S. and UN sanctions also fell short of their stated political objectives, even when the sanctions were tightened up over time. Washington's weakening of its own embargo to import fuel into Haiti and accommodate U.S. manufacturing interests undermined the sanctions strategy. Only in 1994, as sanctions became better targeted and more biting, were they taken seriously by the political authorities in Haiti. Even then, however, it was the threat of military force rather than any pain of enforced scarcity that led the regime to step down.

If sanctions were politically ineffective, their impacts on the humanitarian status of the poor were devastating. They caused dwindling availability of basic necessities and rising prices of imported items, although the impact on health was not as disastrous as believed by some analysts at the time. Sanctions hamstrung humanitarian activities, interrupted aid supply lines, reduced programs, and introduced tensions into relationships with the authorities and among aid groups. At the same time, many members of the elite, who had their own resources and channels outside and inside the country, ben-

efited from scarcities and parallel markets. Some even reaped windfall profits. The embargo on fuel accelerated environmental degradation of the countryside as people were forced to harvest even more scarce wood to produce charcoal for domestic fuel.

Yet sanctions had two positive impacts: stigmatizing the de facto regime and conveying solidarity with its opponents. Sending and receiving such messages, however, did not obscure a fundamental anomaly. The poor, who were most hurt by the measures, urged tough sanctions from the start—in fact, more sweeping and binding than governments were prepared to impose. Meanwhile, de facto officials and Haitian elites, well insulated from the full force of sanctions, urged their removal, pleading humanitarian help.

The use of economic sanctions followed the sequence enshrined in the UN Charter. Initial efforts were geared to persuade in an effort to avoid the use of military force. When persuasion and economic pressure failed, military force was invoked. Yet the anticipated consequences did not materialize. During the three-year sanctions period, the international community failed to achieve the desired political changes, instead wreaking disproportionate—some critics would say unconscionable—human consequences. The evolution in attitude of the Haitian poor toward the sanctions from positive to negative has been noted.

Protracting the crisis with flawed efforts to dislodge the de facto authorities was in no one's interest, except those supporting military rule. Time was on their side: each passing day meant one less day in Aristide's five-year presidency. Sanctions proved largely a cosmetic, "feel-good" measure that ultimately required back-up by military force. The blunt weapon of sanctions might have been avoided by the earlier and surgical use of military force, more familiar in the lexicon of the military regime.

In such a scenario, admittedly speculative but urged by many observers who now consider themselves vindicated by events, the international community would have retained credit for its major achievement—replacing the de facto regime with the constitutional authorities—while foreshortening suffering and reducing the reconstruction challenge. As

many Haitians believe, swift and effective military action might have been the most humanitarian approach.

Recommendations:

- Given the wide-ranging, largely negative consequences of economic sanctions in this instance, their use should be reconsidered. Without a reasonable chance of success and when the damage to vulnerable populations is likely to be disproportionate, sanctions should not be imposed. When sanctions are imposed, impact and effectiveness should be regularly assessed. Open-ended applications, especially in poor countries such as Haiti, should not be countenanced.

- Inasmuch as the humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions profoundly complicate the tasks of humanitarian organizations that are themselves hobbled by such measures, the international community should commit itself in advance to alleviating their immediate consequences and offsetting longer-term economic impacts. Otherwise, the primary casualty of the sanctions becomes the welfare of civilians rather than the policies of the targeted authorities.

- Based on the experience in Haiti and elsewhere, individual humanitarian organizations should clarify their operative policies and procedures. Guidelines should be developed and included in training programs on how to function in a sanctions environment. Personnel trained in these special challenges should be deployed to assist. In addition to clarifying the policies of individual agencies, greater communication and coordination among agencies are also needed.

- The Haitian experience is but the latest illustration of the need for a new international mindset and policy framework that gives higher priority to prevention. Expanded research and advocacy efforts should be pursued to make a more compelling case for expenditures that are cost-

effective in the long run, however cost-intensive in the short term.

- Additional research should review the use of sanctions in Haiti and other recent conflicts, developing criteria to guide decisionmaking in the application and monitoring of sanctions regimes. Costs and benefits of various strategies should be examined, including both the early initiation of comprehensive measures and the more graduated approach, using steps such as denying visas, air travel, and business loans, and freezing bank accounts. Since reluctance to use force widened the suffering and frustrated attaining political and diplomatic objectives, consideration should be given to the circumstances that might warrant the earlier application of multilaterally sanctioned military force.

The Mix of Actors in a Permissive Intervention

Following the Carter Agreement, U.S. plans for an armed invasion and the forced demobilization of the FAd'H were radically altered. At its peak, the MNF had about 20,000 soldiers in Haiti. The UN peacekeeping mission consisted of 6,000 soldiers, of whom about 2,500 were American and 900 were international police monitors, along with a small cadre of humanitarian and development agency representatives.

Once the FAd'H was dismantled, the security vacuum that arose was quickly filled in the cities by FAd'H personnel recycled as interim police, with oversight provided by international police monitors. In the countryside, U.S. Special Forces filled the vacuum. Later, the newly and minimally trained and equipped Haitian National Police gradually took over from the interim police. Throughout the period, foreign troops, first in the MNF and then in UNMIH, initially backed-up the IPSF and later the HNP. After the rapid demobilization of the FAd'H, questions arose as to the appropriateness of an early mix in which military personnel were the dominant security element.

The experience highlighted the need to pay much greater attention to the role of international civilian police (CIVPOL)

in peacekeeping operations. In the Haiti case, oversight of police functions rapidly became more important than military tasks. Yet little attention was devoted to ensuring that the modest complement of CIVPOL personnel was adequately trained and deployed for its delicate role. This gap exacerbated the totally inadequate penal and judiciary systems, which themselves should have been the object of greater outside efforts.

In retrospect, was the permissive intervention the best approach? Many of those interviewed for the study observed that the ground rules negotiated by the Carter delegation altered the dynamics of the relationships between outside military forces and the acknowledged outlaws. Rather than asserting international authority and values, the critics hold, the delegation ensured the de facto authorities safe passage out of the country, reinforcing impunity and depriving Haitians of the opportunity to try those responsible for the coup in a court of law.

Equally damaging, it is argued, the delegation's approach required the MNF upon its arrival in Haiti to negotiate with the illegitimate authorities. Observers also question whether one major justification for the permissive approach—the avoidance of bloodshed against the intervenors and the Haitian opponents of the de facto regime—would have been borne out by subsequent events. In short, there are grounds for questioning whether the least coercive approach may have been the wisest.

Recommendations:

- Creation and maintenance of a more professional CIVPOL that would become more involved in the training, mentoring, and evaluation of newly trained local counterparts should be explored. A small UN rapid reaction corps of police with training in human rights, relevant language skills, and policing in a peacekeeping environment might serve as part of an expanded international civilian capacity to intervene in weak or collapsed states. This would probably be more feasible and cheaper than a standing military force. Consideration also should be given to

alternative incentive schemes to attract retired police officers for fixed periods into such field operations.

- The timetable employed by governments in authorizing UN operations should be tailored to the needs and realistic possibilities in particular countries. Recruiting and training a police force from scratch and getting the Haitian judicial and penal system to approach acceptable standards would have required four years rather than four months. Realistic calculations of need, not best-case scenarios reflecting domestic constraints in personnel-providing countries, should help prepare for future operations.

- Although the use of force counters the natural and understandable proclivity in humanitarian and diplomatic communities to seek compromise, the pros and cons of permissive interventions should be reviewed in light of the compromised position in which outside enforcers find themselves.

International Presence

International personnel served as an expression of solidarity throughout Haiti's crises. Particularly during military rule but also during the preceding and following periods, the presence of expatriates was important. Apart from the resources provided, their physical presence and "eyes-and-ears" function speeded the return of Haiti's democratically elected government. Whether associated with the UN, the OAS, donor governments, foreign military forces, or NGOs, they personified an international stake in the outcome of the crisis.

Protection efforts by MICIVIH even before the onset of MNF and UNMIH proved essential to the reduction of human rights abuses. This was the case despite the fact that the presence of MICIVIH was twice interrupted. Moreover, the increase in abuses during the absence of monitors underscored the importance of their presence.

As an element in a preventive strategy, a clearer understanding of what happened in Haiti in September and October 1991—more specifically, an authoritative accounting of the extent of human rights violations by the Haitian military—might have led to a swifter and more resolute international response to the ouster of the legitimate authorities. International human rights personnel on hand before the coup also might have exercised deterrent value. Following the signing of the Governor's Island Agreement, important information shared by MICIVIH was either ignored or discounted.

Recommendations:

- Although they cannot halt all abuse, international personnel can make a substantial difference in situations of civil strife. As a demonstrated deterrent to violence, human rights and humanitarian personnel should be withdrawn only in the most perilous situations, if at all.

- As a preventive measure, international human rights monitors should be introduced at the earliest possible moment into situations involving actual or potential violence, fragile democratic transitions, and post-authoritarian environments. Diplomats, military officials, and others associated with peacekeeping operations should also view human rights conditions as barometers for gauging the seriousness of the parties.

- Human rights missions should give priority to reinforcing the work of local human rights NGOs. By definition temporary, outside missions should not replace or preempt the work of local groups. When possible, human rights field missions also should seek to strengthen governmental institutions responsible for protecting rights, especially the legal, police, and penal systems.

- In light of the UN's comparative advantage in civil administration, the UN should be prepared to assume such tasks for specified periods in extremely weak or failed states.

The U.S. Legal Profession and the Crisis

The flood of refugees from Haiti energized hundreds of U.S. lawyers and law students to fight the Bush/Clinton policy on forced repatriation and to represent Haitian asylum seekers who made it to the United States.

Professors and students at Yale Law School, legal specialists from NGOs, and pro bono lawyers at several large law firms filed lawsuits in federal courts challenging the policy of returning to Haiti all asylum-seekers after a cursory interview to determine whether they had a well-founded fear of persecution. Experts in immigration and refugee law were recruited to write amicus briefs at every level of the case, including the U.S. Supreme Court.

Law students from universities such as Case Western, Michigan, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Boston University, and Yale had a different type of Florida spring vacation in 1992, 1993, and 1994. They drove to Miami, slept four or five to a room, and spent their days, often into the nights, interviewing Haitian asylum applicants. The work was exhausting but exhilarating. The students' immigration law clinics took over some of the cases and more students were later mobilized to prepare asylum applications and seek information on the human rights situation in Haiti. Many of the students, now practicing lawyers, consider working on the Haitian cases their most rewarding law school experience.

Thanks to this activity, unprecedented in the history of the U.S. legal profession, the Haitian refugee crisis may have helped train the next generation of human rights and refugee lawyers while reinvigorating their elders.

William G. O'Neill

International Engagement in Local Processes

Haiti was the first international intervention ever mounted in a country held hostage by a military junta that had seized control from democratically-elected authorities. Unlike other recent interventions, the situation involved not an overt civil war but a fundamental challenge to democracy and human rights. Over time, the reality of an intervention in support of a democracy may prove a more significant precedent than enforcement actions to ensure humanitarian access to victims. In the Haiti crisis, countries of the hemisphere and ultimately the world rallied behind the democratically elected authorities who embodied the nation's sovereignty.

International intervention involved several special factors. One was the political importance of the situation to a major power. Another was the need to ensure the durability of the results of elections promoted and monitored by the international community in the first place. What is the utility of verifying that elections are free and fair if their results can be overturned without challenge? A third factor was advocacy by the Haitian diaspora for the constitutional authorities.

A fourth factor that propelled local political processes into the international arena was the affront to international values of egregious violations of human rights. It was doubly offensive for a state that abused its own citizens to claim "sovereignty." Imposing economic sanctions on Haiti, noted a recent UN report, "required the conversion of an internal threat to democracy into an international threat of peace and security."[4] The same observation could be made for the military intervention as well.

The international response to the Haiti crisis suggests that massive human right violations can trigger a duty to act, an obligation that is not mooted by the assertion of sovereignty by the regime in power. Sovereignty is no longer an acceptable justification for ignoring what transpires within a state's border. This is the case despite some of the special circumstances that elevated the visibility of the Haiti abuses on the international agenda.

Haiti also represented a special situation in that throughout the decade the relationship between the state and civil

society was changing. In the period preceding 1986 and during the early post-Duvalier era and the de facto years, the state abdicated responsibility for meeting the needs of its citizens. Many private humanitarian and development organizations kept their distance from the state, whether as phantom or predator. In the periods of 1986-1987, 1991, and again following the restoration of constitutional government in 1994, the state itself was more inclined, although not fully able, to address such needs.[5] As of 1996, not only the appropriate roles for the organizations of civil society but even their legal status in Haitian law still need clarification.

There are implications not only for indigenous organizations but also for their outside partners. International NGOs had been so dominant for years that, as noted earlier, observers spoke of the Republic of Haiti as "the Republic of NGOs." With the advent of a more responsive state, the activities of outside donor organizations, whose resources would still be needed to facilitate the process of social reconstruction, would nevertheless presumably play less central and free-standing roles.

Recommendations:

- Reflecting upon the Haiti experience, the international community should examine under what circumstances threats to democracy in individual countries should be understood to exercise an automatic claim on international action, whether diplomatic, humanitarian, or military. Automatic action may be unrealistic, but a threshold might be identified that would require Security Council review.[6]

- The operative understanding of sovereignty should be broadened to include an obligation upon those who claim sovereign status to protect the human rights and advance the human welfare of their people.

- Haitian NGOs and other fledging members of civil society should react to the challenge of finding ways of cooperating with legitimate government authorities oriented to-

ward enhanced general welfare. After decades of distancing themselves from unrepresentative and unresponsive officials, Haitian civil society should fashion new working relationships with government. International partners should seek additional ways to strengthen both public and private institutions in weak states.

Institutional Issues

From the Haiti experience have emerged a number of institutional lessons for future crises. In the area of UN system-wide coordination, arrangements were generally unsatisfactory during the first two periods of the crisis. However, in the third period, the designation of the UNDP resident coordinator as the deputy special representative of the SRSG helped develop more effective and concerted interaction among persons with peacekeeping and with humanitarian and reconstruction responsibilities.

The experience also demonstrated inadequacies in the preparation of international personnel. True in the post-Duvalier and restoration periods, this was particularly noticeable during the time of de facto rule. Moreover, the rapid rotation and "burnout" of personnel led to a lack of continuity of staff, which undercut the development of consistent approaches to the authorities. Problems created by economic sanctions further complicated performance. Although the use of local personnel as a general principle is laudable, international organizations in Haiti failed to take into account how much Haitian staff were compromised by their support for or sympathy with the illegitimate regime.

Recommendations:

- The Haiti "model" of institutional arrangements during the restoration period, when the UNDP resident coordinator and DHA humanitarian coordinator served as deputy SRSG, should be considered for other such settings.

- International staff in such settings should receive far more intensive and extensive training, preferably in advance of

taking up their assignments, than was provided in Haiti's crises. In addition to fuller preparation in their own individual functional areas such as humanitarian assistance, human rights, and peacekeeping, personnel should become knowledgeable about the concerns and cultures of other areas. Fuller understanding of the country's historical, social, economic, and political context is also essential.[7]

- In highly politicized settings where extraordinary measures such as economic sanctions have been imposed, consideration should be given to removing existing international personnel and inserting specially trained international teams for the duration of the crisis. Such an approach would come at the expense of familiarity with the local context, but it would free organizations whose impartiality and effectiveness may be impaired by existing relationships and would recognize the special skills needed to respond effectively. International organizations should also be more circumspect about reliance upon local personnel.

AFTERWORD

Developments during the period between January 1996, when most of the interviews for this study were conducted, and the completion of this report five months later confirm trends identified earlier.

First, the pivotal importance of security to the success of the panoply of international responses and to the evolution of Haitian nationhood has been confirmed. If the single most important international contributions during the decade were dislodging the de facto rulers, reinstating the elected authorities, and disbanding the army, the challenge remains to consolidate and extend civil peace and devolve responsibility more fully to reconfigured Haitian institutions.

Progress has clearly been made in law, order, justice, and accountability. The ninth and final class of Haitian National Police graduated in mid-February, bringing the new HNP ranks to about 5,200. Yet while international aid continues, "the young HNP was not currently in a position to maintain a secure and stable environment on its own."[1] Seven Haitian police officers were killed from March to June in suspicious circumstances in separate instances. The training of new judicial personnel continues, although Haitian prisons still suffer from overcrowding and courts still have sizable backlogs.

Haiti remains without an army, but concern continues that individuals formerly affiliated with the armed forces or paramilitaries will become more active once UNMIH withdraws. A rash of incidents accompanied the phasing out of U.S. troops in March 1996. A significant signal against those who might wish to engage in recidivistic violence was conveyed, however, with the arrest and deportation from the Dominican Republic to Honduras of two leading Haitian terrorists, accused of plotting against the Préval government.

Actions in late May to reign in potential rogue elements in Haiti's new security agencies and to move against those involved in a number of flagrant crimes underscored the Préval government's determination to confront destabilizing elements. However, "deep apprehension persists that persons associated with the de facto regime, many of them disgruntled and marginalized, could foment unrest by capitalizing on

public frustration."[2] Reflecting concerns about a "disturbing level of political violence," the U.S. reintroduced in late July a contingent of combat troops to protect American military engineers working on civic action projects.[3]

Second, taking advantage of the generally stable security climate, the new government has begun to confront nettlesome economic issues. In IMF negotiations it committed itself to partial privatization of state enterprises through capitalization, a strategy that seeks private investment in the enterprises while maintaining some state involvement. If ratified by the parliament, the arrangements will unblock approximately $120 million in aid and provide a renewable source of revenue for decentralized governmental bodies.[4] The latter is a key concern of newly elected municipal and parliamentary officials who have been reordering national spending priorities and creating regional bodies to consolidate the decentralization of governance.

The Préval government also has given priority to expanding Haiti's productive capacity, particularly in agriculture. At the same time, it has cautioned the population that it cannot undertake programs to meet all the country's needs at once and has urged donors to recognize that standard adjustment formulas may not address Haiti's particular needs and comparative advantages.

With the economic situation yet to show significant improvement, the new government is clearly working against the clock. In fact, analysts have cautioned that "Paradoxically, the reforms, although essential for sustainable growth and for the release of most long-term international assistance, could nevertheless exacerbate economic distress in the short run."[5] Citing a growing clamor for social services and other basic infrastructure, the UN secretary-general in June reported that "these unmet demands and heightened expectations, generated by the installation of a democratically elected government, have led to frequent demonstrations in the capital and throughout the country." In recent months, "the potential for violence has increased."[6] *Lavi chè* remains a ticking time bomb.

In the context of widespread concern about the quality of life of ordinary citizens, aid activities have come under new scrutiny. The disparity between the massive resources pro-

Foreign Aid at What Price?

The contrast between the cost of foreign aid and the local procurement of goods and services is striking. The mayor of Milot, interviewed by the research team in January 1996, was receiving 12,000 gourdes ($800) monthly from the government in Port-au-Prince to pay the salaries of public officials and the costs of schools and other services for 40,000 persons in and around the northern town of Milot.

The same amount buys a single day of a World Bank or USAID consultant's time, including local expenses, travel, and translation services. A privately run clinic in a slum in the capital visited by the team uses about $800 for two-to-three days of operating costs. Last year, the clinic's staff of 24 treated and dispensed medicines to 30,000 people, most of them paying a fee for the services. A 3-day training seminar on "The World Economy in Transition" for 35 persons from grassroots groups around the country run by an international NGO cost about $800, including participant travel, room and board, and most of the cost of the trainers.

Larry Minear

vided and a lack of durable results has drawn sharp attack, as has the prevalent quick-fix approach. In April, the president and prime minister were reported to be "unimpressed by aid donors' emphasis on humanitarian assistance rather than productive investments."[7] Such sentiments recall earlier questions about whether the results of humanitarian aid were as constructive as assumed.

While continuing to welcome outside assistance, most Haitians would concur with their leaders that such aid should more fully serve locally established priorities and be managed by Haitian institutions themselves. "Important and useful as international assistance may be," noted the UN secretary-general, "it is ultimately the Haitians themselves, and they alone, who are in charge of their present and responsible for their future."[8]

Third, events in recent months have demonstrated again the intersections between politics and international action, particularly with regard to the future of UNMIH. The Security Council extended on February 29, 1996 UNMIH's mandate for an additional four months through June 30. Canada played a critical role, stepping forward to pick up some of the slack created by the handover from the U.S. to UNMIH on February 29. Ottawa agreed to supply the UNMIH force commander, replacing the American whose term had expired, and to deploy over 100 key support and headquarters personnel.

Upon taking office in February 1996, President Préval had requested a six-month extension of the mission, primarily to buy time to professionalize Haiti's new police force. Haiti's international friends and the secretary-general supported the request, but the Security Council did not. Reflecting reservations primarily of the Chinese, the Council extended the mandate for only four months, reducing UNMIH ranks from a high of 6,017 troops as of April 10, 1995 to an approved strength of 1,200 troops.[9] UNMIH's mission was narrowed to "assist the democratic government of Haiti...in fulfilling its responsibilities," specifically in maintaining a secure and stable environment and professionalizing the Haitian police force.[10]

On June 28, days before UNMIH's four-month authorization was to expire, the Security Council reviewed President Préval's request for a six-month extension. Noting that the

extension through June had been viewed as UNMIH's final period, the secretary-general recommended that UNMIH be terminated and a new UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) established. Continued UN presence, he reasoned, is "central...to the success of Haitians' efforts to build a better future."[11]

The council then authorized the creation of UNSMIH, although for five rather than six months. Its military contingent is initially to contain 600 troops, down from 1,200 in the final period of UNMIH, and 300 CIVPOL. An additional 700 troops, most of them Canadian, would also be provided, although their formal connection with UNSMIH was still under negotiation as of early July. Continuing UNMIH's mission, UNSMIH is "to assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment..." The council also confirmed the role of the SRSG in "the coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation."[12] The second of these three goals received new prominence.

Diplomats were relieved that UNMIH will continue, but they "expressed concern that the rapidly shrinking force will leave Haiti unprepared to keep order on its own. What started as a 20,000-troop U.S. force has become merely a representative mission."[13]

Noteworthy in the four-month extension of UNMIH and the establishment for five months of UNSMIH has been the stepped-up role played by the Canadian government. Ottawa's conviction that more troops were needed than the Security Council was prepared to provide has led Canada to station soldiers in Haiti who, although not formally a part of the authorized UN peacekeeping presence, are to be fully integrated into the UN operation. As analysts have pointed out, "The Canadian government has not only taken on a major responsibility in Haiti, they have done so largely at their own expense."[14] Canada also will provide a contingent of 100 French-speaking police as part of the 300-strong CIVPOL unit.

Canada also has committed $3 million for two new aid projects in Haiti. The government seemed intent on demonstrating to Quebec the positive role of a united Canada in a

francophone foreign-policy setting. A more specific rationale was the importance to the ruling party of a seat in the House of Commons in the Papineau-St. Michel district of Montreal, home to about a fifth of the city's 60,000 Haitians. Reporting on the visit to the area at the time of the elections in March 1996 by President Préval on his first post-inaugural trip to North America, news accounts noted that "the welfare of Haiti has assumed an overarching importance in Canadian foreign policy."[15]

The lower profile of Washington has not meant cessation of U.S. involvement altogether. The United States announced reductions in levels of support for Haiti from a high of $1 billion for troops and $325 million in economic aid in 1994 to an estimated $100 million total in 1996. However, under a bilateral agreement, the U.S. provided the Préval government with 300 military personnel, mostly civil engineers, engaged largely in road and bridge improvement projects in and around Port-au-Prince. "Operation Fairwinds" may eventually involve 500 troops.

Haiti also found its way into the partisan politics of the 1996 presidential campaign. "To add to its problems," reports one news analysis, "Haiti—touted by the Clinton administration as a foreign policy success—has become a hostage to U.S. election-year politics." Republicans have criticized expenditures to support the Haiti intervention, placing conditions on aid, delaying funds designated for police training and humanitarian programs, and threatening to hold up other support to the Préval government. Meanwhile, the administration under pressure "retreats by slowing the flow of aid."[16]

Finally, tensions between the agendas and timetables of humanitarian and development actors on the one hand, and political and military actors on the other, have again been illuminated. The tumult and the shouting associated with international military intervention have given way to the more complex task of nurturing a more democratic and accountable nation. With the emergency banked and the threat of immediate emigration reduced, the second-echelon status of human needs has been reconfirmed. "Much remains to be done," the UN secretary-general has noted, "before it can be said that democratic rule is secure in Haiti and its people have

embarked irreversibly on the road to peace, tolerance and prosperity."[17]

As of mid-1996, therefore, the outcomes of international responses to the Haiti crises, no less than international staying power, remain very much in question. Positive synergies between political and humanitarian actions may change to negative ones if the levels and durability of international presence and resources continue to flag. Currently billed as a "success story" among international interventions, Haiti may not long remain so. Viewed in the context of two centuries of Haitian experience, a decade of international engagement at varying levels of intensity and with varying objectives and strategies is anything but a guarantee that Haiti's quest for nationhood will achieve fruition.

ENDNOTES

Preface

[1]Ken Ringle, "Aristide: Delusions of Candor," *Washington Post*, July 2, 1996, D4.

Introduction

[1]The Haitian government's economic plan for 1976-1981, for example, included assistance from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and other lenders in the amount of $800 million. See "Haiti: Against the Wind," *NACLA Report on the Americas* XII, no. 6 (November / December 1979), 50.

[2]For a table showing the cost of living in the Duvalier period as contrasted to the later periods reviewed in this study, see page 9.

[3]"Cuban Haitian Entrants," *Migration Today* VIII, no. 5 (1981), 24.

[4]The "disappearance" of a $20 million International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to the Haitian government in late 1980 led to increased use of NGOs by donor governments. See *Latin American Regional Reports*, June 11, 1982, 8.

Chapter 1

[1]Manno Charlemagne, a popular composer and musician, was elected mayor of Port-au-Prince in 1995.

[2]The surge of organizing energy was particularly noteworthy among peasants and women's organizations. One analyst speaks of a "fervor of organization" as women in Port-au-Prince and the countryside "joined forces to press for their rights which had been systematically denied over the course of three decades." Olga Benoit, "Women's Popular Organizations," in *Roots*, "Report on Haitian Women," 1, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 27.

[3]A prime example of a successful mobilization was the *Rache Manyok* (Rip Out the Cassava) movement. Civil society organizations nationwide mobilized to close down the country until the army desisted from installing a hand-picked electoral committee to run the November 1987 elections.

[4]For a description of events during these years, see Robert Maguire, "The Peasantry and Political Change in Haiti," *Caribbean Affairs* 4, no. 2 (April-June 1991), 1-18.

[5]See Center for International Policy, "Mobilizing Resources for Development: A Retrospect on President Aristide's Economic Strat-

egy for Haiti and His Administration's Record with Aid Donors," *International Policy Report* (May 1992), 1, 5.

[6]Some human rights organizations place the figure of those killed as high as 3,000.

[7]One element of U.S. bilateral assistance rarely affected during this period was aid to the FAd'H to combat drug trafficking through Haiti—even while a prominent Haitian army leader, Col. Jean-Claude Paul, was indicted in the U.S. for involvement with international cartels. Soon after his indictment, Paul mysteriously died. Other events subsequently confirmed high levels of U.S. aid to the FAd'H to combat drug trafficking.

[8]Inter-American Development Bank, *Haiti Country Programming Paper* (Washington, D.C.: IDB, June 1992).

[9]Steve Coupeau, "Labor Relations in Haiti under the Aristide Government," unpublished report, Empire State College / State University of New York, May 1992, 37.

[10]*Emergency Economic Recovery Program: Report of the Joint Assessment Mission, Nov. 7-20, 1994* (Washington, D.C.: IADB, 1994): 79; quoted in Oxfam US, *Rebuilding Haiti: Views from the Grassrooots on Haiti's Reconstruction Needs* (Boston: Oxfam US, May 1995): 2.

Chapter 2

[1]Boukman Eksperyans is a popular music group in Haiti. The three members of the group credited for the writing of the song from which the quotation is taken are Theodore Beaubrun, Jr., Daniel Beaubrun, and Marjorie Beaubrun. The album from which the song comes is "Libete: Pren Pou Pren!" (Freedom: Let's Take It!)

[2]See "The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti: Report of the [UN] Secretary-General to the General Assembly," Report A / 47 / 908, March 24, 1993.

[3]The Bush administration addressed the contradiction by authorizing the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to open an asylum-screening program in Haiti. However, few of those who were willing to risk declaring themselves in Haiti before their enemies were accorded refugee status and safe passage out of the country.

[4]See Yvon LeBot, Michael Czerny, and Ian Martin, "Report to the Secretary-General of the UN by the Group of Human Rights Experts on the Needs and Operational Plan of the UN Component of the International Civilian Mission to Monitor Respect for Human Rights in Haiti," February 1993.

[5]A variety of evidence suggests an active covert role by U.S. intelligence and defense agencies during the crisis. Many of those interviewed for this study stated their view that throughout the

period of military rule, U.S. officials were much closer to Cédras and the military than to Aristide.

[6]The new plan, under which refugees picked up at sea would be screened for asylum as they were intercepted or in a safe haven established outside the U.S., resulted in a new wave of boat people. Facing a flood of more than 15,000 refugees in the first five days of July alone, the U.S. again altered its policy, announcing that no boat people would be allowed to settle on U.S. soil, effectively shutting down the renewed flow.

[7]See Douglas Farah, "U.S. Fills Up in Haiti with Smuggled Gas," *Washington Post*, April 19, 1994, A1, 12.

[8]For a further description of the situation, see America's Watch, *Silencing a People* (New York: America's Watch, 1993).

[9]MRE/RES.1/91, "Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti," October 2, 1991 (reprinted as UN Security Council Document S/23131, October 9, 1991), paragraphs 5, 6, and 8.

[10]MRE/RES.2/91, "Support to Democracy in Haiti," October 8, 1991 (reprinted as UN Security Council Document S/23131, October 9, 1991), Section I, paragraph 4.

[11]General Assembly Resolution 46/7, October 11, 1991, paragraph 5.

[12]Similar difficulties in a different institutional and political setting confronted NGOs using USAID funds in Azerbaijan. See S. Neil MacFarlane and Larry Minear, *Humanitarian Action and Politics: The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh* Occasional Paper #25 (Providence, R.I.: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, forthcoming).

[13]This progression is described in Claudette Antoine Werleigh, "The Use of Sanctions in Haiti: Assessing the Economic Realities," in David Cortright and George A. Lopez (eds.), *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995): 162.

[14]As part of embargo-tightening action taken on June 16, 1993, the Security Council in Resolution 841 approved "on a case-by-case basis under a no-objection procedure, the importation, in non-commercial quantities and only in barrels or bottles, of petroleum or petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking, for verified essential humanitarian needs, subject to acceptable arrangements for effective monitoring of delivery and use," paragraph 8.

[15]UN Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti: A Reference Paper* (New York: UNDPI, 1995): 18.

[16]See Farah, "U.S. Fills Up in Haiti with Smuggled Gas."

[17]One of the tasks of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, established in early 1992 following the Iraq crisis, was to ensure better coordination of humanitarian activities. For major crises, it issued appeals for resources that analyzed the extent of the

needs and placed within a single rubric the askings of individual UN agencies.

[18]Harvard Center for Population Studies, *Sanctions in Haiti: Crisis in Humanitarian Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Program on Humanitarian Security Working Paper Series, November 1993).

Chapter 3

[1]This quotation is taken from the same collection of songs referenced at the beginning of Chapter 2. Its authors are Theodore, Daniel, Majorie Beaubrun and F. Alexis.

[2]Cited in Bill Galuber, "Haitians Welcome Firefight," *Baltimore Sun*, September 26, 1994.

[3]Cited in "Building a Trusted Police Force in Haiti Challenges U.S. Trainers," Tod Robberson, *Washington Post*, November 2, 1994.

[4] See Susan Benesch, "Haitian army trades truncheons for trumpets," *Miami Herald*, June 12, 1995. A poll of Haitians conducted between March 17 and 24, 1995 by Borge and Associates under the auspices of the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress found that 62 percent of Haitians supported the total elimination of the army, 16 percent wanted it professionalized and retained. Former President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica urged Haiti to follow Costa Rica's example and do away permanently with its armed forces.

[5]See Larry Rohter, "Cables Show U.S. Deception on Haitian Violence," *New York Times*, February 6, 1996, A8.

[6]Bob Shacochis, "Our Hidden Haitian Problem," *Washington Post*, Outlook Section, March 31, 1996, C1-2.

[7] In Resolution 49/27 of December 5, 1994, the UN General Assembly commended the electoral preparatory process "as a further stage in the strengthening of democracy in Haiti" and urged the international community to step up its efforts "to strengthen Haitian institutions responsible for dispensing justice and guaranteeing democracy, respect for human rights, political stability and economic development" (paragraphs 4, 7).

[8]For additional detail, see Robert Maguire, "Bootstrap Politics: Elections and Haiti's New Public Officials," Hopkins-Georgetown Haiti Project, Briefing Paper Number 2, February 1996.

[9]As of April 1996, a solution was reported still to be "distant." Sony Estéus, "Konfli tè nan Milo: solisyon an lwen toujou." *Aksyon*, Senkyem ane No. 46, April 1996, 5.

[10]Republique d'Haiti, "Strategie de Reconstruction Sociale et Economique," August 22, 1994.

[11] For an analysis of the global trend toward increased involvement by international military forces in the human needs sphere, see

Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996).

[12]A decision by the UN secretary-general in the spring of 1995 to promote closer collaboration between peacekeeping and development personnel in Haiti was welcomed by the Security Council, which expressed its hope that the change would "improve the effectiveness of international support for rebuilding Haiti's economy." Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, S/1995/614, July 24, 1995, paragraph 40.

[13]For a review of the pro's and con's of civic action activities, see Joy Olson, *U.S. Military Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs and Their Application in Central America* (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: Interhemispheric Resource Center, 1995). The article notes that such programs can "undermine the U.S. foreign policy objectives of democratization and sustainable development in Central America, just when the region has begun to emerge from years of civil conflict" (p. 12). U.S. Department of Defense figures place the costs of humanitarian and civic action projects by the U.S. military in Haiti during the year beginning October 1, 1994 at $656,000. Such activities cost $299,000 during the year beginning October 1, 1992—that is, during the de facto regime.

[14]Senior U.S. military officials were in general comfortable with this procedure, pointing out that reporting to civilian superiors replicates the existing situation in the United States.

[15]"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti," S/1996/112, February 14, 1996, paragraph 24.

[16]The acronym HMMWV stands for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, the wide-bodied, all-terrain vehicles used by MNF and UNMIH forces.

Chapter 4

[1]Anthony P. Maingot in *The United States and the Caribbean*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), 204.

[2]Ken Ringle, "Aristide: Delusions of Candor," *Washington Post*, July 2, 1996, D4.

[3]The Paraguayan army commander "capitulated in the face of a swift, massive show of diplomatic clout by the Organization of American States, the Clinton administration, and the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, which joined forces to back the elected president." Thomas W. Lippman, "Joint Effort Helps Head Off Coup Threat in Paraguay" *Washington Post,* April 26, 1996, A30.

[4]United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "The Impact of UN Sanctions on Humanitarian Activities," Report on a Study

Commissioned by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs by Claudia von Braunmuhl and Manfred Kulessa (Berlin: Gesellschaft für Communication Management, December 1995), 7.

[5]For a description of a similar process in Nicaragua , particularly in the wake of the electoral loss in 1990 of the Sandinista government with whom many NGOs had collaborated, see Cristina Eguizábal, David Lewis, Larry Minear, Peter Sollis, and Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Challenges in Central America: Learning the Lessons of Recent Armed Conflicts* Occasional Paper 14 (Providence, R.I.: Watson Institute, 1993).

[6]An earlier study recommended a mechanism that would bring crises of stated proportions to the attention of the Security Council, "despite the reluctance of the UN Secretariat or particular member states to act. See Tabyiegen Agnes Aboum, et al., *A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Report to the Aid Agencies* (Providence, R.I.: Watson Institute, 1990), 43.

[7]Intersectoral training along these lines is one of the principal objectives of the UN Staff College being established in Turin, Italy. It is also a recommendation of a number of other studies, including one by Karen Kenny, "Towards effective training for internaitonal human rights field tasks" (Dublin: International Human Right Trust, 1996).

Afterword

[1]This sentiment, expressed by Haiti's Secretary of State for Public Security, was echoed by the secretary-general. See *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti*, S1996/416, paragraph 31.

[2]*Ibid*., paragraph 7.

[3]Reuters, "US troops go to Haiti to ward off violence," August 2, 1996, dateline Washington, in *The Boston Globe*, August 3, 1996, A9.

[4]See "Haiti: Le dollar tombe de son piedestal: Chute de 20%," [an interview with President Preval], *Haiti en Marche*, X, no. 20 (June 26-July 2, 1996), 1, 6.

[5]Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Sustaining Success in Haiti," *Strategic Forum* [Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University] no. 79 (June 1996), 3.

[6]*Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti*, S/1996/416, June 5, 1996, paragraph 6.

[7]The views of President René Préval and Prime Minister Rosny Smarth are quoted in *Caribbean and Central America Reports*, Latin American Newsletters (London: April 4, 1996), 6.

[8]*Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti*, S/1996/112, February 14, 1996, paragraph 60.

[9]The last U.S. troops left the country April 17, 1996.

[10]The Chinese were expressing displeasure with earlier remarks by Aristide supportive of Taiwan and by its attendance at President Préval's inauguration.

[11]UN Security Council Resolution 1048, February 29, 1996.

[12]Report of the Secretary-General, S/1996/416, paragraph 38.

[13]Security Council Resolution 478 (S/1996/478), June 27, 1996, paragraph 2.

[14]Catherine Toups, "China accepts new formula to retain U.N. force in Haiti," *The Washington Times*, June 28, 1996.

[15]Oakley and Dziedzic, "Sustaining Success in Haiti," 4. A similar situation existed in Rwanda, where the Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) commanded some Canadian troops who were part of UNAMIR and others who were not.

[16]Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Haitians at Center of Montreal Election," *New York Times*, March 25, 1996, A8.

[17]Phil Gunson, "Haiti becomes hostage to US election politics," *The Guardian* Foreign Page, June 4, 1996, 12.

[18]Report of the Secretary-General, S/1996/112, paragraph 58.

APPENDIX I
RESOURCES FOR FURTHER REFERENCE

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APPENDIX II
PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Haitian Authorities

Guy Alexandre	Ambassador of Haiti to the Dominican Republic
Bernhard Ethéart	Director, National Agrarian Reform Institute (INARA)
Jean Casimir	Ambassador of Haiti to the US and the OAS
Moise Jean-Charles	Mayor of Milot
Leslie Delatour	Governor, Central Bank of Haiti
Louis Estiverne	Member, Chamber of Deputies
Myrtha Gilbert	Director General, Ministry of Feminine Conditions and Women's Rights
Leo Guillame	Mayor of Mirebalais
Thérése Guilloteau	Minister, Ministry of Feminine Conditions and Women's Rights
Jean-Claude Icart	Verité et Justice
Raymond Lafontant	Executive Director, Presidential Commission for Economic Growth and Modernization
Paul Latortue	Executive Director, Central Implementation Unit, Office of the Prime Minister
Sabine Manigat	Assistant Director, National Agrarian Reform Institute
Jean Molière	Former Minister of Health, Current Minister of the Interior
Margaret Ellen Roggensack	Counsel to the Government of Haiti
Jean-Robert Sabalat	Senator and President of the Foreign Affairs Commission
Suzanne Seitz	Ministry of Tourism
Leslie Voltaire	Chief of Staff, President Aristide and Special Advisor to President Preval
Claudette Werleigh	Prime Minister
Georges E. Werleigh	Economic Consultant, Office of the Prime Minister

Intergovernmental Organizations

James E. Baker	Director, Regional Monitoring Division, DHA
Mahaman Balla	Country Director,WFP
Michael Barton	Public Affairs Officer, IOM
Antonio J. Benitez	Public Health Administration Specialist, PAHO/WHO
Lloyd Best	Former Deputy UNDP Resident Coordinator and Special Advisor to the Resident Representative
Lakhdar Brahimi	Special Representative of the Secretary General, MINUHA
Grégoire de Brancovan	Senior Humanitarian Officer, DHA
Marcel Campbell	UN Civpol, Cap Haitien
Alejandra Cedeno-Ulloa	Liaison Officer, UNHCR
Sofia Clark	Coordinator, MICIVIH, Saint Marc
Régis Couder	Coordinator, Microproject, European Union
Lucca Dall'Oglio	Chief of Mission, IOM
Christina Davis	Former Peace Corps Volunteers-MICIVIH
Marie-Andrée Diouf	PAHO/WHO Representative in Haiti
Arnaud Dupuy	Program Officer, UNDP
Pierre Douyon	Program Officer, UNDP
Mark Ellis	MICIVIH, Gonaïves
Elizabeth Gibbons	Country Representative, UNICEF
Indiana Gonzalez	Project Director, UNDP
Vladimir Grachev	Senior Political Affairs Officer, Europe and Latin America Division, DPKO
Colin Granderson	Executive Director, MICIVIH
Reinhart Helmke	Former UNDP Resident Representative
Susan and Pierre Joanis	ICITAP Instructors, Police Academy
Dushyant Joshi	Program Officer, UNV
Kaz Kuroda	Program Officer, UNDHA
Cecily Lawrence-Cilla	MICIVIH, Gonaïves
Loren Miller	MICIVIH, Cap Haitien
Michael Moller	Senior Political Adviser, Office of the Director-General, United Nations, Geneva

Christian Ossa	Deputy SRSG, UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative and DHA Emergency Coordinator
Michel Pelletier	Acting Director, Europe and Latin America Division, DPKO
Donna Plotkin	MICIVIH, Gonaïves
Bruce Reid	UN Volunteer, UNMIH
Tom Reiss	Former Peace Corps Volunteers-MICIVIH
Jean Marc Ruiz	Economic Counselor, European Union
Arthur Small	MICIVIH, Gonaïves
Heidi Swindells	Director, UN Fund for Population Activities, Port-au-Prince
Hannah Taylor	Charge de liaison, MICIVIH, Saint Marc
T. Anderson White	Natural Resources Economist, The World Bank
Jacques Wiame	Consultant to FAO

Governments

Major Dean Bland	Assistant Army Attache, US Embassy
Major Jack Cheasty	U.S. Army/UNMIH
Sarah C. Clark	Deputy Director, USAID
Larry Crandall	USAID Director, Port-au-Prince
Ambassador James F. Dobbins	Special Representative for Haiti, U.S. State Department
Francis Miles Filleul	Ambassador of Canada
Michael T. Harvey	Food for Peace Officer, USAID
John P. Hogan	Assistant Director, International Operations, U.S. Peace Corps
Herve Ladsous	Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the UN
Lt. Col. Steven Lovasch	Defense and Military Attache, U.S. Embassy
Col. David L. Patton	Commander, U.S. Support Group Haiti
Jean Sebastien Roy	USAID
Stanley Schrager	Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Information Service
Lt. Col. Christopher Short	U.S. Special Forces

Captain Al Stahl	Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Special Forces
William Lacy Swing	U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
Anne Tremblay	Program Officer, CIDA
Gabriel Verret	Economist, USAID, Port-au-Prince

Nongovernmental Organizations

Ernst Abraham	Executive Secretary, Christian Service of Haiti
Roxanne Auguste	Clinic Director, Carrefour Feuilles, Kafou Fey, Port-au-Prince
Antoine Augustin	Executive Director, CityMed of Haiti
Philippe Bécoulet	President, HAVA
Suzy Castor	Co-Director, Centre de Recherche et de Formation Economique
Simolus Clerard	Member of the Executive Committee, APAB
Steve Coupeau	Planning and Development Consultant
Noriac Dathis	Agronomist, ICEF
Lionel Delatour	Executiv Director, CLED
Josué Domond	General Coordinator, RPL
Rolande Dorancy	Former Director, Haitian Refugee Center, Miami
Giselle Fleurant	Director, Comité Artisanal Haitien
Christine Folletti	Delegate ICRC
Gérard Francois	Assistant Secretary, Center for Development Research and Action
Alexis Gardella	Consultant, International Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture
Andrée Gilbert	Chargee de Programme, OXFAM-Quebec and U.S.
Leigh Heart	Deputy Director, CARE
Pastor Jacob and staff	Haitian Neighbor Service, St. Marc
Pierre Jolissaint	Coordinator, MODB
Yvon Joseph	Holy Cross Priest and Founder of IDEA
Pierre Lespérance	Director, Haiti Office, National Council for Haitian Rights
Ira Lowenthal	Director, PIRED
Rachel Neild	Washington Office on Latin America
Raphael Pierre-Yves	OXFAM-United Kingdom and Northern Ireland

Edouard Paultre	Secretary-General, Protestant Federation of Haiti
Franziska Aebi Raymakers	Delegate ICRC
Venel Remareais	Executive Director, AHP
Daniel Roussière	Executive Director, Commission deJustice & Paix, Gonaïves
Clérard Simoles	Executive Committee, APAB
Exempt Valbrun	Mayor of Bombardopolis; Executive Committee, APAB
Eric Swedberg	Save the Children-U.S.
Kely Tabuteau	Administrator, USAID-funded Justice Project, Checchi Associates
Staff	Eye Care Clinic, Mirebalais
Members	CPFO, Port-au-Prince
Members	OFM
Members	Milot Peasant Movement
Members	Youth Leaders of Milot
Members	Syndicat des Travailleurs Agricoles de Savanette

Others

Adler Aristilde	Radio Journalist, Gonaïves
Fred Béliard	Owner, Hotel Imperiale and Partner, Ciment du Nord
Jean-Maurice Buteau	President, JMB Export
Dan Coughlin	Journalist, Interpress Service
Bernard Diederich	Author and Senior Correspondent,Time magazine
Elsie Ethéart	Co-Editor in Chief, *Haiti en Marche*
Yvan François	Episcopal Priest
Micha Gaillard	Spokesperson for KONAKOM, Port-au—Prince, Haiti
Kathie Klarreich	Journalist
Hervé Labarbe	Contractor, Economat de l'Armée de la France / UNMIH
Roland Lamy	Pastor, Our Lady of Divine Mercy Catholic Church, Ft.Lauderdale
Henri Lecomte	Businessman, Cap Haitien
Georges B. Sassine	President, GilAnex Manufacture S.A.
Ginette Taggart	Owner, Les Atelier Taggart, Cap Haitien
Richard Widmaier	Owner / Director, Radio Metropole
Raoul Vizamar	Civil Engineer, Episcopal Church

Members	Youth Group, Our Lady of Divine Mercy Catholic Church
Staff	Various health care and other localcommunity organizations
Group	Women and young Boys from the town of Mirebalais
Group	Rice Cultivators from the Artibonite Valley

APPENDIX III
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATIONS AND AUTHORS

About the Humanitarianism and War Project

Day in and day out, from Burundi to Chechnya, Liberia to Afghanistan, civil strife inflicts widespread human suffering. Even where bloodshed has abated, for example in the former Yugoslavia and Mozambique, tensions and the awesome task of rebuilding war-torn countries remain.

How can the international community better protect those caught in national and regional conflicts? How can it more effectively assist nations to turn the corner on violence and become productive societies? Can aid become an effective force for the resolution of conflicts? Must humanitarian action, as in the past, await the request of warring parties and elicit their consent? With the ebbing of East-West tensions, can humane values form the new cornerstone of international relations?

These are questions being addressed by the Humanitarianism and War Project, an initiative by an independent team of researchers based at Brown University and drawing on the expertise of scholars and practitioners from around the world to assist the international community chart its course in the post-Cold War era. The co-directors of the project are Thomas G. Weiss, Associate Director of the Watson Institute and Executive Director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System; and Larry Minear, Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute and the project's principal researcher.

During the first phase (1991-1993), the project was co-sponsored by the Refugee Policy Group (Washington, D.C.), with support provided by two dozen practitioner organizations and foundations. These included four governments (Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, and France); six intergovernmental organizations (UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNDP, DHA / UNDRO, and the UN Special Program for the Horn of Africa); ten nongovernmental organizations (Catholic Relief Services, Danish Refugee Council, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development [Canada], International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies, Lutheran World Federation, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam-UK, and Save the Children Fund-UK); and three foundations (Pew Charitable Trusts, Rockefeller Foundation, and Arias Foundation).

The second phase (1994-1996) of activities has drawn financial support from: four governments (Australia, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States); eight intergovernmental organizations (UNICEF, UNDP, UN Volunteers, United Nations University, International Organization for Migration, OECD Development Centre, European Commission Humanitarian Office, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs); seventeen nongovernmental organizations (American Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, Danish Refugee Council, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Orthodox Christian Charities, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran World Federation, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Nordic Red Cross Societies [Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian, Swedish], Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children-US, World Vision, and Trócaire); and three foundations (Pew Charitable Trusts, McKnight Foundation, and U.S. Institute of Peace).

The project has conducted field research in the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central America, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, and in the northern and southern Caucasus (more specifically, the conflicts involving Georgia, Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh). Findings and recommendations have been published in a series of case studies. In addition to journal articles and op-eds, the project has also published five books: *The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action* (1996); *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community* (1995); *Humanitarian Politics* (1995); *Humanitarian Action in Times of War: A Handbook for Practitioners* (1993) (also available in Spanish and French); and two volumes of collected essays by practitioners, *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises* (1996); and *Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War* (1993). The project has also prepared a training module that is currently in use by UN organizations.

More information about the project, along with a number of its publications, is available on the Internet at: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/H_W/H_W_ms.shtml

About the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies

Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies was established in 1986 to promote the work of students, faculty, visiting scholars, and policy practitioners who are committed to analyzing global problems and developing initiatives that address them. The Watson Institute promotes research, teaching, and public education on international affairs, an area of inquiry that encompasses inter-state relations; transnational, regional and global phenomena; and cross-national, comparative studies.

The Watson Institute supports and coordinates the activities of scholars and practitioners with interdisciplinary approaches to contemporary global problems. Most are social scientists working on political, economic, social or cultural issues, along with scholars from the humanities and the natural sciences whose perspectives contribute directly to the understanding of these issues. The Watson Institute's affiliated centers and programs currently engage in a broad range of activities, from improving the teaching of international studies to contributing to research and public education about international security, the comparative study of development, health, hunger, the United Nations, U.S. foreign policy, and issues arising within Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union.

For more information, contact Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Box 1970, 2 Stimson Ave., Providence, RI, 02912-1970. Phone: 401-863-2809. Fax: 401-863-1270. World Wide Web: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/

About the United Nations University

The United Nations University is an international academic organization which engages in research, postgraduate training, and the dissemination of knowledge on pressing global problems of human survival, development, and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies. The University is a voluntary funded autonomous organ of the UN General Assembly with academic freedom guaranteed by its Charter. The Charter of the University was adopted by the Assembly in December 1973. The University commenced operations from its Tokyo headquarters in 1975.

The UNU works closely with the United Nations Secretariat, UNESCO, and other UN organizations, acting as a link with the world's academic community. Its activities are carried out through a network of research and training centers and programs in both developed and developing countries. A variety of other institutions are formally associated with the University because of their academic excellence in research or training. The UNU also cooperates with other institutions and individuals on specific projects. The Academic Division at the UNU headquarters is the hub and coordination point of this world-wide system.

Since its establishment, the University has been following a multithematic and multidisciplinary orientation, ensuring a broad range of viewpoints. The current work is carried out within four program areas each of which relates to an area of major global concern: development, the environment, peace and governance, and science and technology.

For additional information, please contact: Public Affairs Section, The United Nations University, 53-7-, Jingumae 5-chome. Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150. Japan. E-mail: mbox@hq.unu.edu. Internet: http://www.unu.edu.

About the Authors

Edwige Balutansky is founder and coordinator of Info-Services, an organization created in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 1994 and supported by the UNDP to provide professional services to Haitian and international journalists and other media representatives. Previously she worked as a Reuters correspondent in Haiti and for several Haitian NGOs, including Haiti Solidarite Internationale, of which she is a founding member. She was also chief editor of the journal *Pensamiento Propio* in Nicaragua.

Jacques Fomerand has headed the United Nations University's Office in North America since April 1992. He has taught at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Aix-en-Provence (France), the City and Queens Colleges of the City University of New York, the School of Advanced International Studies, and Long Island University. At the UN from 1977-1992, Mr. Fomerand followed economic and social questions in the Office of the Under-Secretary General of the former Department for International Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA). His latest publications deal primarily with the functioning of the UN. He is currently preparing a book on U.S. development cooperation policies at the UN.

Robert Maguire is the representative for Haiti of the Inter-American Foundation, responsible for a program of grants in support of Haitian grassroots development efforts. He is also the Haiti Program Coordinator of the Georgetown University Caribbean Project and Chair of the Advanced Area Studies Seminar on Haiti at the U.S. State Department's Foreign Service Institute. In 1994-1995 he was a Visiting Scholar at Johns Hopkins University. He served previously as Peace Corps Volunteer in Dominica, West Indies. His publications on Haiti have addressed rural and grassroots development, civil society organizations, civil-military relations, migration, political development, and human social and economic relationships.

Larry Minear is co-director (along with Thomas G. Weiss) and principal researcher of the Humanitarianism and War

Project at Brown University. He has worked on humanitarian and development issues since 1972, serving as staff to two NGOs (Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief) and consultant to NGOs, governments, and UN agencies. He has conducted research in many humanitarian emergencies and has written extensively for specialized and general audiences. His most recent co-authored book assesses the roles of the military as a humanitarian actor with particular reference to the Rwanda crisis.

William G. O'Neill is a lawyer specializing in international human rights law. He is a consultant to several groups, including the National Coalition for Haitian Rights. He is the former Deputy Director of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and served as Director of the Legal Department of the OAS / UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti and as Legal Consultant to the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda. He teaches a course on human rights in peacekeeping operations at the Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and has written extensively on human rights and international relations.

Thomas G. Weiss is associate director of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and executive director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System. He has held senior posts at the United Nations and the International Peace Academy and has written or edited over twenty books on development, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and international organizations.

Sarah Zaidi is science director and one of the founders of the Center for Economic and Social Rights in New York. A former MacArthur Fellow and Population Council Fellow at the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, she has conducted research in the areas of child mortality and nutritional status, sanctions, environmental health, and population dynamics. Her articles have appeared in such journals as *Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Medicine and Global Survival, The New England Journal of Medicine, Lancet,* and *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.*