Occasional Paper #33

Relief and Development:
The Struggle for Synergy

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CONTENTS

The much-maligned relief-to-development "continuum" is second perhaps only to "coordination" as perennial nominee for ho-hum topic of the year among humanitarian agencies. The continuum, it seems, also rivals coordination for the most frequently recurring subject in conferences, aid agency discussions, and journal articles. Like coordination, mere mention of the continuum produces yawns, stifling productive discussion of serious policy issues.

As with coordination, however, understanding the connections between relief and development and the realization of synergy between them is central to effective humanitarian action. However threadbare most discussions of the concept, there is general agreement that unless relief efforts capitalize on inherent development potential, the vulnerability of societies in crisis to emergencies is likely to continue and perhaps deepen. Conversely, there is little doubt that development work, properly understood and managed, represents a solid investment in avoiding future emergencies. The intermediate stages on the would-be continuum between relief and development—whether labeled reconstruction, rehabilitation, or transition—have their own dynamics and connections to activities that are either more short-term or long-term.

In keeping with the purposes of the Humanitarianism & War Project, this monograph approaches the relationships between relief and development less as a matter of theory than as a challenge to effective programming. It examines the origins and evolution of the idea of a continuum, including the now widely acknowledged limitations of the construct. Taking as an objective the need for aid practitioners to capitalize on the development potential in emergency relief situations, it examines recurring obstacles in the struggle to unleash synergy. Rather than proposing an alternative paradigm, it identifies what, in the experience of practitioners, has and has not proved effective in maximizing mutually reinforcing interactions.

The continuum concept, innovative in its own time, has been rejected largely without a concomitant identification of lessons to be learned or institutional changes to be made. At a time of major cutbacks in international assistance and lagging international political will, capturing the potential synergy in aid commitments becomes ever more imperative. Moreover, to the extent that the continuum has become engulfed in overlapping and conflicting mandates among various aid organizations, clearer understanding of synergy may also provide guidance in unsnarling institutional relationships.

This study is one of a set of research activities being conducted during Phase 3 of the Humanitarianism & War Project (1997-1999), the overall theme of which is the dynamics of learning by humanitarian organizations after the Cold War. Since its inception in 1991, the Project has conducted some 15 case studies of individual crises, conducted thousands of interviews with those involved, and examined a number of crosscutting issues, including the humanitarian roles of the military and the media. In the current phase, we are identifying and analyzing innovations in humanitarian practice that seek to respond to the changed international geopolitical situation. The research program of which this monograph is a part is detailed in Appendix 1, which also describes the Project itself and identifies its contributors. A list of publications, many of which can be downloaded in their entirety, can be found at our website (www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/H_W/)

This monograph has been more than three years in the making. It has benefited from wide-ranging conversations with many policymakers, aid managers, and frontline practitioners. It has drawn on a companion study undertaken by Project consultants Joanna Macrae and Mark Bradbury on UNICEF's experience with transition planning in Africa. Joanna Macrae provided useful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript, as did Colin Scott, Peter Uvin, Patricia Weiss-Fagen, Sharon Capeling-Alakija, and Brian Rowe. We thank them for their input.

Some of the findings of the study, which addresses challenges

faced by governmental as well as private agencies, were tested in a meeting at the end of 1998 with major North American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The organizations present included some agencies with either relief or development portfolios and others with multiple mandates covering a full spectrum of activities. There was broad consensus that synergy is more likely to be realized by the latter group, although it was also recognized that better synergy between relief and development is not assured by having more agencies attempting to do everything. Even agencies with a full range of activities experience internal difficulties in overcoming the compartmentalization of relief and development tasks. Participants agreed that in an age of specialization, some specialization of function is desirable, whether within or between aid agencies. That said, building synergy between relief and development does not come easy, either for relief-only or for broader spectrum institutions.

In publishing this study, we take the occasion to express our appreciation to the many persons who have been associated with the research in one form or another. This includes those who have shared their ideas in interviews at headquarters and the field with Ian Smillie as well as those who have read and commented on earlier drafts of the manuscript. We also acknowledge with thanks the assistance in editing and production from Fred Fullerton and George Potter of the Watson Institute. Finally, we express appreciation to Ian Smillie himself, who brings to this review a lifetime of work on development issues and of interactions with private and governmental agencies. A biographical note on the author is included in Appendix I. Appendix II contains some suggestions for further reading.

As we will continue to examine the issues raised in this monograph, we welcome and solicit reactions to it. The topic has numerous implications for how aid agencies understand their tasks, how they relate to other institutions, how they train their staffs, and how they evaluate and learn from their work. A number of these themes are also in the process of being explored in other Project initiatives, particularly studies on coordination and insti-

tution-building that will be completed this year and next.

Larry Minear
Providence
January 1999

Acknowledgments

Many individuals shaped the contours and the details of this monograph. I am particularly grateful, however, to several people who commented on an early draft or who helped point me in the right direction. These include Sharon Capeling-Alakija, Joanna Macrae, Brian Rowe, Colin Scott, Patricia Weiss-Fagen, and Peter Uvin. Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear provided guidance and support; they also poked and prodded and made me think twice about everything I wrote. Brenda Cupper, CARE's Balkans Director, not only provided helpful comments and pointed me in the right direction, she put me in a jeep and sent me there, to Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla and other places where I might get a good view of the struggle for synergy between relief and development.

Ian Smillie
Ottawa
November 1998

Acronyms

ACORD	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
ANC	African National Congress
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee [OECD]
DFID	Department for International Development [UK]
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs [UN]
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EU	European Union
Fad'H	*Forces Armées d'Haiti*
FINNIDA	Finnish International Development Agency
FRETILIN	Front for an Independent East Timor
GDP	gross domestic product
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDB	Inter American Development Bank
IDRC	International Development Research Centre [Canada]
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LRD	Linking Relief and Development
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MSF	*Médecins sans Frontières*
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UN]

OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [U.S.]
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHR	Office of the High Representative [Bosnia]
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives [USAID]
QIP	quick impact project
RS	Republika Srpska
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDDMS	United Nations Development Support and Management Services
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Group [Namibia]
U.S.	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme [UN]

Executive Summary

This occasional paper explores the relationships between emergency and development assistance. These relationships are important because the development community has seen much of its investment eroded or negated in recent years by war and governmental collapse and because relief agencies have recognized the need for sustainable peace if their work is to have long-term significance. Understanding the connections is also important because of evidence that emergency assistance can be inappropriate or even dangerous and that development aid, like emergency assistance itself, has in some cases contributed to fueling and igniting conflict.

From the 1960s into the 1980s, the standard approach to relief and development was a linear one, with both seen as distinct and essentially sequential types of effort. The concept of a "continuum" in which the external response to an emergency moves from relief through reconstruction to development represented a useful conceptual innovation. However, the approach was still based on the notion that at each distinct stage there would be specialized institutions to take and then pass on responsibility for discrete and phased programming. In the early 1990s, the continuum concept gave way to more holistic thinking. As a result, relief and development are no longer viewed as self-contained and mutually exclusive. Linkages can and must be made if reconstruction and development are to be sustainable and recurring relief avoided.

This study highlights three challenges encountered by organizations committed to making effective links between relief and development: *timing, funding* and *understanding*. These are examined through the lens of UNHCR's innovative quick impact projects (QIPs), reconstruction efforts in Haiti, and the return of minority refugees to Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord.

Each case sheds light, with varying emphases, on each of the three challenges. These are the warp of the paper. The weft is a reconsideration of now disparaged historical organizing meta-

phors—the continuum, the merry-go-round, and the conveyer belt. These are resuscitated for their value in describing not so much what should be but what still remains, for better or worse, the basic approach to relief and development.

The first challenge concerns appropriate *timing*—when to engage, when to modify the intervention, and when to withdraw. An essential ingredient of prevention, conflict reduction, and conflict resolution, appropriate timing is also important in terms of knowing if, when, and how to move from basic humanitarian relief to more developmental objectives. Examples of the problem include action too late in Rwanda and perhaps Kenya; departure too soon in Haiti; and transition too fast in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia. Key determinants of timing include political will and financial resources. They can be implicated in hurrying or delaying humanitarian response as well as in rushing the move from relief to development programming. They can be the cause of precipitous agency withdrawal and of the recent obsession with "exit strategies," which may or may not be appropriate to the pace of social and economic change on the ground. Although there are a few cases in which appropriate timing has allowed for improving synergy between relief and development, the study finds that timing remains a fundamental problem on the ground, preventing better cohesion, let alone synergy.

Funding is the second challenge. Emergency funding remains sporadic, arriving in short-term bursts and often after lengthy delays. It can be patchy, and much of it is overtly political. Development assistance too can be patchy, cumbersome, and rigid, often arriving late and without reference to the emergency that it follows. Throughout the 1990s, official development assistance (ODA) declined dramatically, which exacerbated competition and created other obstacles to operationalizing links between emergency and development assistance. Declines in levels of international assistance have made it more difficult to realize potential synergy; experimentation is most difficult when resources are dwindling, donors are taking a closer look at supposedly successful initiatives; and practitioners are on the

defensive. Short on unrestricted private donor funds, many NGOs have in recent years become significant contractors for governments and multilateral agencies, a trend that can mean less independence in where, when, and how an organization runs its programs. The obverse, however, is that governments have become increasingly dependent upon NGOs for the delivery of emergency assistance. Aid agencies are not the only economic actors. Commercial interests can be as potent a determinant of outcomes, although the role of the private sector in emergencies and their aftermath is oddly understudied.

Knowledge and information are related but different; together they characterize the third and most important challenge, *understanding*. Understanding represents the most difficult challenge, a sine qua non for proper timing and a prerequisite for the wise use of whatever funding is available. While both knowledge and information may be in short supply, much greater emphasis has been placed by practitioners on information, especially at either end of the relief-development spectrum, than on knowledge. Inappropriate blueprint-type reconstruction and rehabilitation programs continue to abound, in part because of serious impediments to institutional learning. These impediments include a fear of, and a consequent aversion to, evaluation and an environment in which relief workers suffer from danger, stress, overwork, and burnout. These realities leave institutional memories shallow and provide experienced workers with inadequate time to educate others. Different but equally serious learning impediments pervade the development enterprise. Even where understanding is not in short supply, its application remains heavily influenced by the clearly demarcated institutional borders that exist between relief and development. As a result, the process of lesson-learning, which might enhance the possibility for realizing synergy, too often fails.

The study offers several examples of laudable synergy between relief and development. A word is in order, however, about the subtitle, "The Struggle for Synergy." Over time, thinking about the discrete components of relief and development changed

to a more dynamic notion of a continuum, which has been rejected subsequently as itself too mechanistic and linear. We are still searching for the next image, but there is clear evidence that interactions between emergency aid and development can be improved so that the total effect (that is, the impact on civilian beneficiaries and on the target country) can be greater than the sum of the individual effects.

The study concludes by asking whether the stubbornly resilient chasm between the two can be bridged solely with rather isolated examples of synergy and further exhortations for better understanding and more coordination. It suggests that there may be a fundamental institutional problem that cannot be overcome without much stronger leadership and the demolition of institutional barriers. Virtually all of the various new initiatives to link relief and development are located within an aid superstructure that remains unchanged after a decade and a half of state collapse, horrific warfare, and millions of violent deaths. In practical terms, funding for transitional peace-building efforts was probably less than three percent of all emergency assistance in 1998, and an infinitesimal fraction of overall aid expenditure.

There is an appearance of activity, but the structures of the past—with all of their problems and dysfunctionality—remain firmly in place. For the moment, at least, we are at the beginning and not the end of our struggle for synergy. Oratory thus far outstrips examples of success.

INTRODUCTION

This occasional paper examines the relationship between emergency and development assistance, and the gray area in between. It examines the widespread intellectual and institutional agreement on the potential and the need for synergy, and the real-life dissonance between rhetoric and reality that exists in the field.

The study also examines how and why the concepts and approaches of the so-called continuum and merry-go-round to relief and development programming evolved and then became discredited. It looks at how and why they continue to shape institutional arrangements and response. The study examines the current efforts of some agencies to change the way that they operate as a result of their dominant concepts and approaches.

The paper begins with three case studies in Chapter 1. The first is an innovative attempt, the "quick impact projects" (QIPs) of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to make the transition between relief and development. The second is an examination of two specific types of transitional programming in Haiti during the mid-1990s. The third is a more comprehensive review of the complex issues preventing the return of minority refugees to their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Additional illustrations are drawn from Sierra Leone, Sudan, Mozambique, Bangladesh, and Kenya.

The presentation of the research is organized around three basic themes or "challenges" that face any organization concerned with the transition from emergency relief to longer-term development. These challenges are discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively:

- *the challenge of timing*: The paper reviews the utility of the "early warning" debate; the problem of knowing when and how to intervene; when and how to move from relief to reconstruction and development; and the constraints associated with restricted time horizons and "exit strategies;"

- *the challenge of funding*: The study examines the problem of short-term funding for long-term needs, resource imbalances between countries and sectors, the impact of declining overall aid resources and the concomitant relief-development competition among and within agencies. It also reviews the impact of growing contractual relationships between official development agencies and NGOs; and

- *the challenge of understanding*: The paper examines how international relief and development organizations learn or fail to learn, looking at the role of evaluation, academic inquiry, institutional culture, concepts of "professionalism," and the usefulness of proliferating codes of conduct. It also notes evolving institutional innovations within bilateral and multilateral agencies as a tool for improved understanding and response.

The three challenges represent the warp of the paper. The weft is a reconsideration of now disparaged historical organizing metaphors for linking relief and development: the continuum, the merry-go-round, and the conveyer belt. These are useful in describing not so much what should be, but what often prevails on the ground.

Definitions

The concepts of humanitarian action, transition, reconstruction, development, and the continuum itself have been the subject of countless studies, and their meanings are hotly contested. This is not the place for anything more than a flavor of the debate, and so third-party observations are offered here for three crucial ones—humanitarian action, transition, and reconstruction—to provide a sense of their use in the text.

The term "humanitarian action," as used by the Humanitarianism & War Project, has both narrow and expansive meanings. In a focused sense, it retains its classical reference to "emergency assistance and protection activities, carried out devoid of extrane-

ous agendas—political, religious, or otherwise." However, "humanitarian action encompasses a broader range of longer-term activities that affirm the essential humanity and dignity of humankind," write Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss. "In this larger context, such action includes not only the provision of food and medicine but also the reconstruction of war-torn infrastructure and psychological counseling for rape victims. It includes elements indispensable to keeping life human: for the population of Sarajevo, newspaper and ink for the daily newspaper; for the uprooted people of Afghanistan, assistance in contacting relatives...Connecting and animating all such actions is the essence of humanitarianism."[1]

The concept of "transition" is more self-evident. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defines it as "a rapid change from relief operations to reconstruction and sustainable development operations."[2] However, Joanna Macrae and Mark Bradbury note that the term blurs the issue of when a given transition starts and stops. They ask, "what criteria determine when a country is defined as being 'transitional'? There is evidence from an increasing number of agencies and countries that the shift in aid programming from relief to development is occurring earlier and earlier. That is, situations that effectively still constitute emergencies are being relabeled 'transitional' in order to justify the move into 'development.'"

According to the World Bank, the concept of "reconstruction" has multiple dimensions. It "does not refer only to the reconstruction of 'physical infrastructure,' nor does it necessarily signify a rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework which existed before the onset of conflict," states a framework document from the Bank. "Conflict, if it goes on for a long time, transforms a society, and a return to the past may not be possible or desirable. What is needed is the reconstruction of the *enabling conditions* for a functioning peacetime society."[3]

"Development" is at the center of a varied and much debated constellation of concepts and terminology. Hegel, Darwin, and Marx were early speakers at a podium later occupied by Brandt,

Ward, and Wolfensohn. Economic growth, economic development, social development, human development, integrated development, sustainable development, sustainable human development are terms vying for contention and meaning. For the purposes of this study, "development" connotes more a process than a state of being. It connotes peace, justice, social equity, and an absence of, or at least a declining trend in, ignorance, disease, and poverty.

Why the Link between Relief and Development Is Important

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe burst global floodgates of disaffection, nationalism, and ethnic division. At the same moment in history, and not coincidentally, Western aid donors' interest in development assistance began to wane. Unpopular regimes, cut loose from their patrons' influence, military support, and economic patronage, alternately lost or clung to their moorings in a surge of civil wars and uprisings that gave new meaning to the term "conflict" and new urgency to the search for prevention and solution.

Between 1980 and 1995, more than half of the world's poorest countries experienced conflict. Of these, 30 saw 10 percent of their people dislocated, with 10 of them having more than 40 percent of the population uprooted.[4] In the eight years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, four million people were killed in violent conflicts.[5] In 1998, there were more than two dozen major armed conflicts around the world and perhaps two dozen smaller flash points. Many of these conflicts had persisted for years, with devastating consequences. In 1996, there were 20 million displaced people—half of them in Africa—and there were almost 15 million refugees and asylum seekers.[6] In some countries, an entire generation has grown up in the shadow of war.

Insecurity breeds insecurity. Even in countries where peace has returned, long-term private investment remains insignificant, institutions fragile, trust in government low, and social reintegra-

tion weak. Joblessness among young men socialized in war, especially in countries awash with light weapons, feeds continuing violence, social dislocation, family breakdown, and insecurity.

Understanding the relationship between relief and development is important for several reasons:

- There is growing evidence that development assistance has contributed to fueling and igniting conflict. [7] Aid sustained and nurtured bad governments throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America during the Cold War. In some cases, if not many, inappropriate aid conditionality may have forced an unsustainable pace of change or weakened states to the point where basic social services and the rule of law could no longer be maintained.
- Agencies with primary mandates related to emergency assistance have recognized the need for sustainable peace if their work is to have long-term meaning. The sporadic and protracted nature of many conflicts means that refugees and displaced people are increasingly returning to situations of ongoing uncertainty and insecurity. Effective reintegration then becomes synonymous with "sustainable" return which, according to UNHCR, "implies a situation where—ideally— returnees' physical and material security are assured, and where a constructive relationship between returnees, civil society and the state is consolidated." [8]
- The development assistance community has seen much of its investment eroded or negated by recurring emergencies. At a time of declining ODA, a significant proportion of the funds available has been diverted to relief. It is little consolation that by 1998 there were fewer wars and fewer refugees than four years earlier. The numbers still exceeded those two decades before by several orders of magnitude, and the projected cost of reconstruction—that is, of getting back to the original starting line—was enormous.
- Declining budgets no longer permit development agencies that once avoided emergency situations to ignore the lost

opportunity, the damage to their past investments, or the implications for their future role, should peace return. The World Bank was inactive in 1985 in countries such as Cambodia, Lebanon, Uganda, Angola, and Mozambique; a decade later, it had significant programs in each of these countries. Those programs had to take into account the need for reconstruction and conflict prevention if they were to be sustainable. China and India excluded, 24 percent of 1994 IDA commitments were to countries that had undergone or were emerging from significant periods of intra-state conflict.[9] In these countries and others, "business as usual" was no longer an option.

In cases where a "post-conflict" situation actually prevails, there are still a host of practical problems in making connections between relief and development. Macrae and Bradbury suggest that the term "post-conflict" itself can be misleading because it implies an absolute cessation of violence; because it does not differentiate between regions within a country, some stable and some not; and because it can underestimate structural problems—extreme poverty or authoritarian rule, for example—that must be addressed for peace to become sustainable. The term "post-conflict" is also not very helpful as a planning tool in situations of protracted violence such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Angola, and Sri Lanka.[10]

The relationship between relief and development seems to be so poorly understood on the ground. Making effective links within and among aid agencies carrying out one or another set of activities seems difficult.

A Review of Continuum Thinking

From the 1960s into the 1980s, the standard approach to relief and development was a linear one, with both seen as distinct and essentially sequential types of effort. The concept of a "continuum" in which the external response to an emergency

moves from relief through reconstruction to development represented a useful innovation. However, the approach was still based on the notion that at each distinct stage there would be specialized agencies to take and then pass on responsibility for discrete and phased programming. It is worth noting that initially the continuum idea—often ascribed to, and now rejected by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)[11]—seemed to be a major conceptual breakthrough in post-Cold War thinking.

Following its initial elaboration, the concept was discredited for positing a linear progression from one stage to another. At each of the stages, there were supposedly specialist agencies that would take and then pass on responsibility for those in need of assistance, as though they were on a conveyer belt that would move them from one operation to the next. This approach, in fact, had long been standard practice in the response to natural disasters: emergency, reconstruction, then "back to normal." It was also very much the way that development assistance had been structured because institutions, mandates, and departments were clearly distinguished one from another. Such distinctions are found in most UN agencies; and emergency departments in bilateral agencies and in NGOs like Oxfam, CARE, and Save the Children are similarly compartmentalized.

The continuum, linear in concept, was joined by a cyclical metaphor, the merry-go-round. The first overhead in every disaster management training workshop, recalls Hugo Slim, shows the cycle of natural disasters: "Its merry go round phases, from disaster at the top, through rescue and relief to rehabilitation, development and preparedness look increasingly meaningless as a means of analyzing complex emergencies."[12] But not always. There *can* be a cycle in the transition from degenerative change to localized conflict through to outright war and governmental collapse. The return to peace, often uncertain, can prove elusive and result in a further downward spiral of confusion and war. Like the now unloved continuum image, the merry-go-round offered a simple organizing metaphor for chronic emergencies. It failed, however, to provide any understanding of how relief and development

agencies should act or interact as the merry-go-round turned.

Today, the processes of economic and social change, particularly in situations of intermittent or endemic conflict, have come to be viewed as far more dynamic and interactive, circuitous and multidirectional. This conceptual change notwithstanding, much of the language of development still treats the process as a linear sequence in the case of countries, from *least-developed* to *developing* to *developed*; in the case of communities, from *dependency* to *sustainability*; and in the case of agencies, from *relief* to *reconstruction* to *development*. When the linear sequence breaks down, the merry-go-round analogy comes into play.

There can be a continuum from emergency to reconstruction to development. This is more or less what occurred after 1967 in the part of Nigeria known as Biafra, and in Bangladesh after its war of independence from Pakistan. It happened in Vietnam and a number of other wars and complex emergencies. There is, in fact, a logic to continuum thinking, borne out of the experience of conventional wars between states, internal conflicts such as Biafra, and the experience of natural disasters. There is also an understandable human element in the continuum, a natural desire to see the end of a war, to work towards peace, reconstruction and development, to minimize relief and dependency, and to emphasize self-sufficiency and independence. There can also be a political continuum, described in Ball and Halevy's 1996 *Making Peace Work*.[13] They divide the peace process into four linear stages: negotiation, cessation of hostilities, transition, and consolidation.

The fact that most victims of conflict are unlikely to make tidy intellectual and organizational distinctions between emergency and development increases the importance of making effective practical links between the two. For many victims of war, "normal" life was already fraught with risk. Their coping strategies for dealing with the possibility of environmental danger, for example, and its impact on crops and livelihood may not be significantly different from their methods of coping with physical insecurity and violence. Hunger, whether induced by war or by a development failure, is still hunger, and the institutional and technical

differentiations in the donor approach may well be lost upon the population.

This raises the issue of chronic instability, in many countries the norm rather than the exception. In some—Afghanistan, for example—fighting may be a commonplace experience, but for much of the population, the battle is remote, and life's struggles remain as they have been for generations. In such cases, the interactions between relief and development may be even more intimate. Relief workers may require a full arsenal of "development" techniques in order to remain relevant, while development workers may require familiarity with emergency response techniques.

In the search for alternatives to continuum thinking, other expressions have come into vogue. "Linking relief with development" (LRD)[14] is one that enjoys common currency. USAID, for example, has developed principles and operating guidelines on LRD, stressing the need to identify and address the "root causes of disaster vulnerabilities," to build on local capacities, and to support rather than displace indigenous attempts to recover.[15] Another expression gaining currency is "relief-to-development-to-democracy" approach (RDD), which extends the connections.[16]

In the grand tradition of development neologism, a 1995 European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) study suggested that the idea of a "continuum" should perhaps be replaced by "contiguum" to reflect the dynamic aspects of both relief and development.[17] Based on the word "contiguous," this still suggests adjacent rather than integrated approaches. "Transition" has become a common expression, although this term also suggests a linear move from one situation to another. The World Bank's 1997 framework document on reconstruction, for example, refers repeatedly to "post-conflict" situations and "transitions from war to peace," even if the peace it envisages is not a simple return to the status quo ante bellum.

The Bank does not normally work in areas of violent conflict. Hence, the distinction between one "phase" and another is important, as is the identification of "trigger points for moving in and out

of a particular phase,"[18] because the Bank's personnel and resources are present or absent depending upon the characterization. "Moving in and out" misses the reality that development or development-related work can take place *simultaneously* with emergency assistance, in the midst of war, and among refugees. Examples include training in primary health care, education, literacy, or veterinary work; the protection and promotion of human rights; mediation and negotiation; the strengthening of civil society organizations and the promotion of political options. This idea of simultaneity has played a prominent role in thinking about food aid for a decade or more. Discussion of "developmental relief," although often restricted to small-scale examples of what can be done, is not new.[19]

Institutional Attempts at Synergy

During the 1990s, most of the major relief and development agencies rethought their mandates, budgets, and activities. At the outset of the decade, the continuum concept gave way to more holistic thinking. As a result, relief and development are no longer viewed as self-contained and mutually exclusive. Linkages can and must be made if reconstruction and development are to be sustainable, and recurring relief avoided. In 1994, USAID created an Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) as a mechanism for the rapid assessment of, and response to, short-term political and economic needs in the important recovery stage of an emergency. Initiatives have included the demobilization and reintegration of soldiers, work on elections, landmine awareness, reduction of ethnic conflict, and building civil society. In 1995, ECHO published a discussion paper, "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development," aimed at better integration of EU development and emergency efforts. In the same year, UNDP created an Emergency Response Division; starting in 1997, five percent of UNDP's core resources were set aside to build bridges between relief and development activities.

In 1996, the United Kingdom's Department for International

Development (DFID, at the time the Overseas Development Administration, ODA) established a Conflict Policy Unit "to help create the conditions necessary for conflict handling issues to be fully and effectively integrated into ODA policy and practice."[20] Similar units and funds have been created in Canada, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands. In 1997, the World Bank proposed "a new reconstruction framework," which included rethinking the timing and scale of Bank involvement in post-conflict countries and formulating a set of operational recommendations with new guidelines for post-conflict reconstruction activities.

Although their mandates may seem limited and clear, many UN agencies have a range of emergency and post-conflict reconstruction responsibilities. Fourteen claim to have capacities in emergency relief; the same number—though not always the same agencies—work in the areas of protection and assistance to refugees and displaced people; ten have responsibilities for human rights; fourteen in peacebuilding and community development; five in the analysis of post-conflict recovery; twelve in disarmament and demobilization; nine in demining and mine awareness; and four in peacemaking.[21] Bilateral and multilateral agencies are not the only ones affected. Like other multifunctional NGOs, Oxfam believes that a good conflict prevention strategy, like a good development strategy, must target both short- and long-term needs. It must respond at both the micro- and macro-levels and address practical as well as strategic needs if it is to deal with causes as well as effects.[22]

The mantra of linking relief and development, and of the need for coordination between the many actors, perhaps reached its highest visibility in two 1997 documents: the *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* (reprinted in 1998 as *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st*

Century) and the Carnegie Commission's report on *Preventing Deadly Conflict*. These documents and others are examined in the following pages. The first chapter examines how the three fundamental challenges—timing, funding, and understanding—impinge on the effectiveness of international agencies attempting to make real connections for real people between emergency and development assistance.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INNOVATION IN THE FIELD

Genius is one percent inspiration and
ninety-nine percent perspiration.
Thomas Alva Edison, 1932

Intellectual and institutional dissonance in the struggle for synergy between relief and development creates dilemmas for practitioners in the field. This chapter examines these dilemmas in three specific cases. The first is the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an innovative attempt to bridge real-life gaps between emergency and development needs. The second examines specific transitional efforts in Haiti during the mid-1990s. The third is a more detailed look at the problems of timing, funding, and understanding that organizations faced working in the aftermath of the war in Bosnia.

Quick Impact Projects

UNHCR's QIPs are an innovative attempt to bridge the transition between emergency and development programming; they also provide a dramatic illustration of the challenges in doing so effectively. Created to deal with the absence of development agencies in the immediate aftermath of conflict, QIPs essentially aim to solve a timing problem. But in stretching time-constrained emergency budgets into unfamiliar developmental territory, they create another problem. Managed by an emergency organization, many of the projects encountered serious developmental problems—an issue of knowledge and understanding.

For four decades UNHCR programs were firmly based on the idea that the process and the costs associated with the reintegration of returning refugees were the responsibility of others, primarily the government of the home country. By the end of the 1980s, however, it was becoming clear that this idea was, in many cases, unrealistic. Some repatriations are so large and involve

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countries in such dire poverty that reabsorption is impossible without external assistance. In some cases, the local population is as badly off as the returnees, and without a more community-oriented approach, old tensions and conflicts can re-emerge. In addition, the rehabilitation and development requirements of returnees are immediate and may not be met in a timely fashion through the development budgets of other agencies or the longer-term planning of governments. The conveyer belt approach—moving distressed people from one agency to the next—does not work if there is no readily available "next agency."

By the early 1990s, UNHCR recognized that it had a role and responsibility in helping to set the stage for the longer-term rehabilitation of returning refugees and displaced people, and that this would be predicated on the resumption of sustainable development activity. Such activity was most likely to succeed if it was planned and carried out on a community basis rather than specifically targeting returnees, and if it could be dovetailed with the longer-term development programs of governments and other agencies.

QIPs were to kick-start the development process. They were developed in Laos and Uganda and refined in Central America, where UNHCR attempted to link refugee and return-related issues with the regional peace process. As refugees returned to their towns and villages, they found schools and clinics damaged, water systems broken, bridges destroyed. UNHCR encouraged such communities to articulate their needs "and to participate in the implementation of projects, in order to promote local initiatives, thereby strengthening segments of civil society."[1]

Projects included community health centers, schools, repairs to access roads and bridges, and the rehabilitation or digging of wells. A review in Nicaragua found that such efforts, conducted in cooperation with NGOs and other agencies, had provided communities with resources that would otherwise have been unavailable. They had boosted the morale and motivation of returnees, encouraging reconciliation, reintegration, and permanent residence. The projects also had developed local capacities and

revitalized local communities through training and the injection of cash into the local economy through wages and income-generating activities.[2] The QIPs approach was used in the 1990s in Mozambique, Afghanistan, Somalia, Northern Iraq, Tajikistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and elsewhere. By the end of 1994, UNHCR had invested over $10 million in almost 100 small projects in Cambodia alone, mostly through NGOs.

By 1995, however, indications arose suggesting serious and recurring limitations in the approach. A review of the Guatemala program noted that repatriation and reintegration had been difficult and unpredictable, and the situation did not lend itself to the type of boilerplate planning that had been used. The critical issue of land ownership and property title often lagged far behind refugee return, making land-related investment—in the form of house building, seeds, tools, fertilizer, and irrigation—difficult and sometimes impossible.

The pattern was similar for the Cambodian repatriations of 1992 and 1993. There, some 360,000 refugees were moved from the Thai border on the assumption that there would be agricultural land available for each family, primarily in Battambang Province. Where land *was* available, however, much of it was heavily mined. In addition to poor preparation, the land plan collapsed because of the short duration in which repatriation was organized. "I think the time frame was crazy," recalled one UNHCR employee. "When the [Paris] accords were signed, people had to begin moving to be in Cambodia to register for the election. There was no time for further planning."[3]

In Guatemala, institutional structures were weak, with the result that ongoing costs, such as salaries and equipment, associated with projects that built schools or clinics, were often not available. Some of the proposals from the communities, such as telephone lines, "were not always realistic in view of UNHCR's assistance criteria."[4] Many of the projects that did make sense to UNHCR had a longer time frame than the refugee agency, with its one-year budgets, could commit.

In Cambodia, there were additional problems. The effort was

managed by a relatively junior officer and two assistants. As a result, larger and less complex project proposals stood the best chance of approval, and tended to be allocated to the most active and dependable NGOs rather than on the basis of community needs or potential impact.[5] Some partner organizations spoke well of the QIP's effort, while others recognized its inherent limitations. An International Rescue Committee (IRC) official observed that "there was so much confusion going on during the repatriation that I don't believe that any amount of planning for QIPs could have made any difference."[6] Agreeing that good planning was only one part of the issue, a UNHCR staff member argued that QIPs were not meant to be a perfect process. Rather, they were "a means of making repatriation more humane and providing a safety net."[7]

Many of the Cambodian projects were rushed and inappropriate, such as the siting of 250 latrines in one area below the flood plain, causing illness with the onset of the monsoon. Appropriate supervision was impossible, given the paucity of staff resources. A team monitoring projects in Battambang reviewed 20 of them in a day and a half. And an agreement between UNDP and UNHCR about longer-term development follow-up and monitoring, never materialized. In Mozambique the schools, boreholes, and health posts built in 1995 and 1996 with QIP funds were in disrepair within only a year of construction.[8] In a broader sense,

> QIPs became the major focus of [its] repatriation activities at a time when the concept of the "continuum" model was the basis for multilateral discussions. The continuum idea, from emergency relief through rehabilitation and on to development, was intended to ensure a seamless web of activities. In practice, however, the continuum as applied by UNHCR and its partners often resulted in a disjuncture between their respective activities...The "handover" approach was based on the assumption that UNHCR's

initial rehabilitation activities would lay the groundwork for sustainable reconstruction.[9]

UNHCR had extended itself further along the conveyer belt, but it was still a conveyer belt. Sets of actors remain widely separated by mandates, money, and understandings of what was required. The additional problem of time had little to do with local needs and context. In Cambodia, for example, "reintegration was implicitly interpreted to mean whatever could be accomplished with a fixed amount of resources within a predetermined time frame. No clear conceptual framework was used for responding to emerging needs."[10] The reconstruction component of the UN's multifaceted program for Cambodia was, by all accounts, among its weakest.[11]

By 1998, UNHCR recognized that there would have to be much greater cooperation between relief and development agencies on reintegration strategies. It recognized that the QIPs had suffered from a variety of shortcomings. Community needs and participation had not always been given proper weight. Ongoing sustainability had been sacrificed to quick disbursement and to the creation or repair of physical infrastructure, without due regard to recurrent costs. Government departments or international agencies that would inherit these costs had often been left out of the planning, and so the UNHCR projects were left out of *their* planning. Many of the projects were implemented on an ad hoc basis, outside any strategy that might link returnees with longer-term reintegration and development. As a result, much of what had been intended to assist returnees and their communities had become, ironically, a burden.[12]

It is not clear what this evolution and experience implies for the future. In some of their objectives—boosting morale, injecting cash into damaged economies—QIPs undoubtedly succeeded. But in many cases, the challenges of time, money, and understanding frustrated their developmental impact. UNHCR recognizes its own planning and development limitations and acknowledges its incorrect "assumption that its multilateral partners would be

willing and able to build on activities initiated by UNHCR."[13] Among the perceived culprits is United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which in Tajikistan, for example, "did not continue many of the projects that UNHCR had initiated with grass roots community actors."[14]

For its part, UNDP sees the problem as one of "mandate creep," in which emergency organizations "have sometimes moved into quasi-development programs for which they are perhaps technically and organizationally poorly equipped." Yet UNDP concedes that, "the classical development agencies have been slow to respond or even have been reluctant to participate...The mandate creep combined with the incoherence between programs has been manifested in the unedifying spectacle of public squabbling between agencies in the full light of the international community."[15] In an effort to curtail the squabbling, UNHCR and UNDP created a Joint Reintegration Programming Unit in Rwanda, joined later by the World Food Programme (WFP). With a budget of $63.4 million (exclusive of food aid), joint projects in community development, water supply, sanitation and health have been initiated.

With a clear mandate and decades of experience in protection, UNHCR knows that, for refugees, this extends well beyond a bus ticket home. It also accepts the need to "develop a better understanding of its multilateral partners" and believes that it "should be more sensitive to the priorities, agendas, and approaches of development agencies, so as to facilitate activities which are consistent and complementary." Such phrases adorn many strategic planning documents. It remains to be seen whether the lessons identified by UNHCR in development interventions by QIPs, and by those such as UNDP responsible for taking up the ongoing tasks of protection and reintegration, are implemented.

"Mandate creep," a kind of role confusion on the assembly line, would not even be a felt need if those on the line were working to achieve the same overall objectives, plans, and timelines. The following illustrations from Haiti underscore the problem.

Haiti in Transition

Haiti, one of the poorest countries in the world, has been beset by corruption and violence for the better part of the twentieth century. More clearly than most countries, Haiti exemplifies the "merry-go-round" of bad governance, degenerative change, conflict, and external intervention. Recent events also demonstrate the challenges faced by external agencies in attempting to break the cycle. A rush to act (timing) and ill-conceived projects (understanding) were exacerbated in this case by too much, rather than too little, money—or alternatively too much too soon, and too briefly (funding).

With the demise of the Duvalier family regime in 1986, there ensued a five-year struggle for power between the old autocratic elite and those seeking fundamental change. The election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990 looked like the winds of change were at last blowing over Haiti, but a military coup in September 1991 put an apparent end to hopes for democracy and good government. Over the following three years, Haiti was subjected to OAS sanctions, a worldwide fuel and arms embargo, and finally, in July 1994, to a UN Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention. An already low gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 17 percent in 1992-3 and by a further 10 percent in 1994. Agricultural production and exports declined dramatically, and the economic and social infrastructure, such as it was, fell apart. In September 1994, a U.S.-led multinational force restored the Aristide government.[16]

Both immediate and long-term needs were enormous. Productive capacity had been severely damaged, and there was an urgent requirement for tools, seeds, animals, working capital, and infrastructure. In January 1995, Haiti received donor pledges of some $1.2 billion for reconstruction to be disbursed over the following 18 months. This chapter examines two specific donor reconstruction efforts: emergency poverty alleviation projects, and the Demobilization and Reintegration Program of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).

Poverty Alleviation Projects

Within months of the reinstatement of the Aristide government, several major donors had initiated employment programs aimed at rehabilitating or reconstructing basic social and economic infrastructure: roads, irrigation and drainage, schools and health centers, potable water systems, erosion control, and soil conservation projects. With an expenditure of over $100 million, more than one million person-months of work were created for unskilled and low-skilled workers throughout the country between August 1993 and December 1996.[17] Income was earned, hundreds of kilometers of road rehabilitated, hundreds of schools and clinics rebuilt, and thousands of acres of erosion-threatened slopes protected. In this respect, the efforts were generally successful.

Beyond the immediate outputs, however, a 1997 evaluation found that many of the projects had been hastily planned. "As a result, not enough time was dedicated to ensure proper participation and involvement of beneficiary communities and local authorities. There was not enough consideration for post-project operation and maintenance; and in practice those maintenance considerations—if ever planned (in a few best cases)—have not been implemented thoroughly."[18]

The evaluation observed that labor-intensive public works and infrastructure rehabilitation were not only valid, but a high priority. But like UNHCR's QIPs, they lacked the required development perspective and the timeframe needed to do the job properly. As a result, they failed to generate lasting employment that might have occurred through the promotion of small contractors and sustainable community improvement committees.

This is not a new finding. A successful school reconstruction project in postwar Biafra supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) documented the same lessons in community management, local employment creation, and the construction of durable buildings and furniture as far back as 1972.[19] In 1989, Anderson and Woodrow documented many

such examples in their *Rising from the Ashes*.[20] All evaluations and studies of postwar reconstruction concur: projects have to be part of a coherent plan based on a sound knowledge of the people, their culture, and history. Programmers should take the time to do it properly and to ensure that there will be ongoing support if this is required; involve local authorities and communities at all levels of planning and implementation; and do not start, no matter what the pressure, until they are fully on board.

Pressures and the superficial attractiveness of doing something concrete, however, often move in the opposite direction. "It's better to have a working road for four months than not at all," said one aid manager in Haiti.[21] Given the resources available and given the events of the previous ten, if not 100 years, this is an approach that Haiti did not need at the moment of its greatest opportunity for serious progress on the development front.

OTI's Demobilization and Reintegration Program

OTI was created in 1994 as a separate office within USAID's Bureau of Humanitarian Response to reflect the need for a distinct operating unit that could carry out "overt political programs in crisis-prone countries in transition from war to peace. OTI's goal is to enhance development prospects in priority, conflict-prone countries by empowering the citizenry of a country so that they can move towards democratic self-rule."[22]

In its first three years, OTI became operational in Angola, Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda, and initiated activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It funded radio and print media programs, projects run by civic groups aiming to bridge communal divisions, projects promoting human rights and democratic political processes, and projects aimed at training and reintegrating demobilized soldiers. One such project involved the demobilization of the entire Haitian army (*Forces Armées d'Haiti*, or FAd'H) to neutralize the short-term threat posed to peace and to U.S. peacekeepers in Haiti, to minimize further security disruptions, and to lay a foundation for the reintegration of former soldiers into Haitian society.

Some 5,482 former soldiers were processed through a program which provided career counseling, vocational training, stipends, tool kits, and a job referral service. In some respects the program was remarkably successful. Despite difficulties with Haitian government authorities, it was well coordinated, appropriately funded, and sufficiently flexible to deal with unforeseen problems as they arose. Quality training was provided to the 4,867 men who graduated from the training program, most of whom received tool kits, and most of whom took advantage of the job referral service.[23] A second evaluation, conducted several months after the program had concluded, found that the primary objectives had been met. Engaging former soldiers in a training program had helped protect U.S. military forces and had contributed to short-term peace and security. By continuing the program over two years, a longer breathing space had been secured for political, security, and economic transitions to occur. There was only one glitch: "Although the demobilization program gave the former FAd'H some of the skills required for employment, full reintegration is not occurring because of the lack of progress in other areas."[24]

This assessment somewhat understates the problem, however. Of the 4,867 trained, only 304 had found employment, 28 of them as security guards, which was not a job for which training had been provided. The "lack of progress in other areas" that prevented 94 percent of the men from finding jobs included low economic growth—hardly surprising, given Haiti's economic history—and the possibility of social stigma attached to former soldiers. But, the evaluation observed, employment was only "a tertiary objective of the program (and in some ways more a hope than a real goal)."

What of the reality that 1,790 men had been trained as auto mechanics, probably doubling or even tripling the number of mechanics in Haiti, or that 602 men were trained in computers for a job market that could realistically employ only a tiny fraction of them? Ironically, while this expensive and rather cruel hoax was being perpetrated on men who had in their previous lives become

hardened and sometimes brutal soldier-policemen, a new national police force was being created. The same evaluation rated the new force as small, ill-equipped, under-trained, badly paid, and comprised of officers who were too young and inexperienced to handle the job they had been given. Thus even the short-term benefits of the demobilization program were overshadowed by the difficulties of creating a viable alternative to the FAd'H. Here the issue was not so much "mandate creep" as "mandate shrinkage"—half-finished components moving too quickly along an understaffed conveyer belt. That crime and violence have continued apace in Haiti, is perhaps, therefore, not surprising. The Haitian merry-go-round continues to turn.

In its "Results Review for 1998 and Resource Request for 1999," OTI notes some of the lessons supposedly learned in its first three years. Exit strategies need to be flexible enough to respond to changes in circumstance, and the two-year time limitation on an OTI country operation may often be unrealistic. The problem of linking real people, who pose real threats, with real opportunities that will keep them out of trouble—that is, the fundamental development challenge—is not mentioned. In short, the Haitian experience confirms the triumph of short-term thinking, short-term mandates, and short-term funding over entrenched, long-term problems and needs.

Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Nothing exemplifies the complexities of the transition from war to peace, or from emergency to development assistance, better than the plight of refugees and displaced people after fighting has ended. Similarly, nothing illustrates the challenges of timing, understanding, and funding better than the situation that prevailed in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina in the two years following the November 1995 Dayton Peace Accord.[25] Bosnia and Herzegovina add a new dimension to the discussion as well: the need for coherence and balance in virtually every aspect of reconstruction and development, including security, justice, and

stability. Accordingly, this section provides greater detail than the previous discussions of QIPs and Haiti's transition problems.

The Importance of "Minority Return"

In the two years after the fighting stopped, fewer than 20 percent of more than two million refugees and displaced people returned home, and only 35,000 of them had gone to areas where they represented an ethnic minority. In December 1997, there were still more than 600,000 Bosnian refugees abroad (some 250,000 in Germany alone) and more than 800,000 Bosnians displaced internally. A closer examination of the returns reveals even more dismal numbers. The Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), which included UNHCR, ECHO, the World Bank, and several other prominent agencies, had adopted a "cluster area" approach in 1997, investing greater amounts of money in five areas from which high numbers of refugees had fled, in an effort to create a "pull effect." During the year, 80,000 refugees and displaced people did return to these areas, but fewer than 5,000 of them were minority returns.[26]

"Minority return" means the return of people to areas in which they had been or would continue to be an ethnic minority. Minority return was crucial. Many of the people displaced by the war were victims of ethnic cleansing. If they did not return to their original homes, not only would the demographic dislocation and the consequent economic costs be enormous, but politically, failure to return would be seen as a de facto endorsement of ethnic cleansing. As the Head of the Department for Refugees and Humanitarian Affairs of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) put it, "In terms of stability, the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina would create a highly volatile situation. Denying the right to return ignores the natural interest of human beings to redress such injustice. The Palestinian and Cypriot examples indicate how perpetuated displacement and denial of return provide fertile ground for conflict to persevere for generations to come."[27]

During the war, an estimated 70 percent of human rights violations were committed by police officers.[28] It was often the police who engaged in forced evictions of minorities, turned a blind eye on looters of minority homes and business, and actively engaged in atrocities. Two years later, many of these same police officers were still in place, working at the behest of local and higher authorities to reinforce the ethnic cleansing that had already taken place. While the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) had the power to decertify police officers and recommend their suspension, no such mechanism existed for the public officials to whom they were responsible. Mechanisms for joint Federation police forces, for cooperation with the legal system, and for the investigation of human rights violations had been created, but progress was slow. Accountability was weak, systems for internal police investigation were nonexistent, and in many cases police simply refused to execute court orders. In some areas, there had to be forceful SFOR intervention to dismantle illegal police checkpoints, remove weapons from police stations, and disarm and demobilize "special police units." The IPTF supplemented the work of SFOR in its watching brief on the police, but at the beginning of 1998, with a few exceptions, the security environment for minority returnees remained tense, if not altogether hostile.

Legal reform, of course, is essential to any serious police reform. Two years after Dayton, the international community was still noting that "there is an urgent need for criminal justice reform in both entities to ensure compliance with the standards set forth in the BiH Constitution, in particular with the European Convention for Human Rights."[29] Laws in the Republika Srpska (RS) were at odds with laws in the Federation, and while some were holdovers from the Yugoslav era, many laws had been passed by fiat during the war in order to accommodate the needs and prejudices of the moment. So inconsistent and complex were the laws and jurisdictions, that the OHR was calling for an "assess-

ment" as late as 1998 in an effort simply to get an understanding of the boundaries and the players. Unlike Haiti, where lack of understanding presented no obstacle to quick action, the members of the international humanitarian system in Bosnia were, after two years, still trying to figure things out as a precursor to meaningful action.

War Crimes

One of the most serious outstanding issues two years after Dayton was the presence of war criminals, indicted and otherwise, often in positions of political influence. This posed a major disincentive to minority return in areas where known murderers walked the streets with impunity. In December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council observed that "until all persons indicted for war crimes are brought before the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), there will be no normalization, no reconciliation, and the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain seriously impaired."[30] A year after Dayton and four years after its establishment, the ICTY—with one trial completed and only seven other indictees in custody—did not look like a success. During the second half of 1997 and early in 1998, things began to improve somewhat, in part because of new American resolve after the appointment of Madeleine Albright as U.S. Secretary of State, and in part because of the May 1997 election of a Labour government in Britain. Several SFOR "snatch" operations resulted in the arrest of a number of indicted politicians, soldiers, and prison camp officers. Much remained to be done, however, with some of the most prominent leaders still at large.

If timing was a problem, so was funding. The tribunal itself was stretched to the limit, with a budget of $67 million in 1998 to handle what promised to be dozens of public and sealed indictments.[31] The International Crisis Group compared the ICTY budget with the cost of the 11-month Nuremberg trial of only 12 Nazi defendants. In today's terms, that much smaller effort cost the equivalent of $2 billion.[32]

Property Rights

Property rights are a complex issue that is pivotal for returning refugees in many postwar situations. They were an issue in Guatemala and Cambodia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, property rights were complicated by the fact that during the communist era much land and housing were "socially owned." Subsequent privatization laws differed between the entities and had been used in some cases to extinguish the rights of minorities and people who had fled during the war. In Sarajevo, for example, where Muslims, Serbs, and Croats had lived peacefully together for centuries, and throughout the war, legislation was passed stipulating that absentee owners had to reclaim their apartments within seven days (or 15 days if they were living abroad). Aimed at minorities, the result, not surprisingly, was a high rate of forfeiture.[33]

Even if the law allowed for an individual to return to the original domicile, getting the incumbent residents out would be no small accomplishment. A minority family attempting to do this in a hostile social and security environment would have a dangerous and almost impossible task. As one report put it, "refugees live in the houses of other refugees, forming endless chains of squatters, at least one of whom is bound to balk at going home."[34]

Moreover, there had been a great urban influx during the war. The demographics of the country had changed, perhaps for good, and this placed an added burden on an already inadequate housing stock. During the war, half of the houses were damaged, ten percent were destroyed, and a further 25 to 30 percent so badly damaged as to be uninhabitable. EU and USAID contracts for such repairs were running in 1997 and 1998 at about $10,000 per dwelling. The European Commission and the World Bank estimated that after twenty months of reconstruction, some 50,000 houses and apartments had been repaired but indicated that the challenge to do much more remained great.[35] In fact, the donor trend was moving away from house reconstruction, leading the OHR to comment that "unless the international community decides to change this trend, the 'race' between minority returnees

and members of the majority community relocating will become a reality in 1998."[36] At $10,000 per house, however, it is no wonder that donors found the cost prohibitive.

Demining

Eighteen months after the war ended, 17,440 mines and "unexploded objects" had been destroyed. Yet more than a million remained untouched in over 30,000 suspected mined areas, seriously disrupting the return of refugees, and resumption of a normal life. Some 50 people a month were being killed or maimed in mine accidents. The OHR observed that the two-year effort had been "marred by sub-optimal delivery and competing programs,"[37] and it looked forward to a new system of coordination that would begin in 1998. It would take almost 30 years at the 1996-7 rate to clear the land mines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a timing problem created by inadequate funding.

Jobs and Social Security

Jobs are essentially a development concern, although the effort to create them, or to build an environment in which they become possible, can begin as soon as reconstruction investments become feasible. In the first two years after the Dayton Peace Accord, donors committed an exceptional $3 billion to a $5.1 billion medium-term Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program. About $1.5 billion of this had been spent by November 1997. The World Bank estimated that economic recovery exceeded 50 percent in 1996, but this was like saying that a two-year-old has aged 100 percent in the past twelve months. In addition, the figures turned out to be an exaggeration. At the beginning of 1998, the numbers for 1996 and 1997 were substantially revised—to 28 percent and 15 percent respectively.[38]

At $1,200 per capita, GDP in the Federation was still less than half its 1990 level and employment was about one third its prewar

level, hardly a magnet for return. In the RS, the situation was even more grim. The GDP per capita was significantly lower, and unemployment much higher. Average wage rates in mid-1997 were $48 per month, and half of the households relied on remittances from abroad.

Some donors had opened lines of credit for medium- and large-scale enterprises. USAID's Business Development Program had made 123 loans by the end of October 1997, with a total value of about $70 million, resulting in an estimated 10,600 jobs, or about $6,600 per job. At that rate, the cost of generating full employment would be about $8 billion. A less expensive alternative was microenterprise, a popular element in donor programs elsewhere. Micro-credit had in fact become, by the end of 1997, one of the most visible donor activities throughout the country. In part, such efforts aimed to boost local economies, but it was also hoped that small loans might have a positive impact on refugee return. Dozens of NGOs had small loan schemes, as did the World Bank, at least four UN agencies, and several bilateral donors. By the end of 1997, 3,500 loans worth an estimated $7 million had been disbursed (out of $31 million firmly committed), creating about 3,700 new jobs and sustaining 3,200 existing jobs. Displaced persons were said to have claimed 70 percent of the loans and returning refugees about 20 percent.[39] Considerably less expensive at about $1,000 per job, these programs tended nevertheless to result in a surfeit of new cafés and hairdressing salons and a paucity of serious evaluation. Even if all the loans were successful and all the jobs sustainable, 6,900 was a very small dent on the half-million target.

In a country emerging from war, programs for the vulnerable—children, mothers, the handicapped, the elderly—are urgently required. In prewar Yugoslavia, social protection programs accounted for more than a quarter of government spending and an estimated eight percent of GDP. Until the economy recovered, however, there was little likelihood of government even beginning to deal with the need, and if donors have their way, there will never be anything resembling the postwar social safety net again.

"Social policy over the next few years will have to focus on the most urgent social priorities," observes the World Bank. "In the medium term, a stronger financial situation will allow for a greater scope of activity—but not a return to the extensive social welfare system that prevailed in the former Yugoslavia, a system that would have been unsustainable even if the war had never occurred."[40] For widows and pensioners, especially those in the RS who had received nothing whatsoever from government for years, this planned triage was a dismal message. As one international aid worker observed, "it seems a shame to have spent so much in keeping the vulnerable alive during the war, only to let them die now before the national social safety net kicks in." For refugees contemplating return, the message was hardly reassuring.

Education

Education should facilitate understanding and reconciliation among ethnic, religious, and cultural groups, while respecting the right of parents to choose the nature of the education their children receive. This was the general practice in Yugoslavian times. The BiH Peace Implementation Council, however, noted in December 1997 that educational policy and programs in both the Federation and RS were not complying with these basic principles.[41]

Discrimination can manifest itself in many ways—ethnic segregation, the language of instruction, the syllabus, and historical and religious teaching methods. Although the Council of Europe, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and a handful of international NGOs were involved in education, their input was limited. By and large, it is easier for donors to focus on buildings than on what takes place inside them. In the education sector, as of August 1997, donors had committed $137 million and disbursed $83 million, mostly for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, and universities.[42]

As with jobs, education is a development issue, which normally is handled by development agencies. In Bosnia, there was no

territorial imperative at work, no conveyer-belt problem. Here the problem was the emphasis on constructing buildings rather than institutions, on physical rather than social infrastructure.

The Media

Peacebuilding involves the reconstitution or creation of an independent media as part of a healthy civil society. However, remedial rather than proactive steps may be necessary in countries like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia where the media was used, and may again be used, to foment ethnic fear and hatred. The Dayton Peace Accord did not refer specifically to the media, and in some places, especially in the RS, television and radio continued to spew the ethnic hatred that had contributed to war in the first place. Donors were not unaware of the power of the media and funded a number of alternative radio and television stations; but these failed to have a major impact. By the middle of 1997, it was clear that Bosnian Serb television (SRT) was actively undermining the peace process and creating fear in the minds of displaced Serbs who might have wished to return home.

After repeated contraventions and warnings, SFOR seized four SRT transmission towers in October 1997 and demanded a restructuring of the station's management. A more proactive approach to news dissemination was taken by SFOR, especially in explaining the arrest of indicted war criminals through live television broadcasts and paid newspaper advertisements. For those concerned about building peace, this was good news. However, it had taken almost two years for the international community to understand the issue (or possibly just the language) well enough to take decisive action.

Civil Society

At the end of 1996, there were several hundred Bosnian associations of one sort or another, about 100 of them working on reconstruction, infrastructure development, human rights, and

women's issues. Most had been established after 1993, and few had a cross-ethnic identity. Many had been formed as conversions of projects established by international NGOs that wanted to "leave something behind," or by the local staff of these organizations trying to strike out on their own. Other organizations had formed spontaneously to deal with particular problems and to take advantage of special funding made available by donors.

As in other countries emerging from communism and command economies, however, there was a major challenge in re-orienting government attitudes towards the nonprofit sector. In addition, there was no legal framework for NGOs. Most were confused by the array of laws and taxes under which they had to register and work. Donors funded some local NGOs with little regard for limited absorptive capacities and even more limited management skills. Organizations less than a year old were charged with managing project portfolios in excess of a million dollars, a supply-driven situation that often represented little more than opportunism by both donors and recipients. One of the most serious problems was shifting donor priorities. Because of a donor move away from emergency and psychosocial work, many NGOs despaired for the people with whom they worked. And because many NGOs and their workers had a social welfare orientation, they were ill-equipped for reconstruction and micro-enterprise development.

Most Bosnian NGOs were forced by donor funding techniques to live with extremely short time horizons. Many could not predict—for themselves, their staff, or their beneficiaries—where funding would come from three months down the road. An impressive array of capacity-building efforts for NGOs nonetheless represented a very small proportion of total funding. And "capacity-building" was often equated simply with "training." There was little coordination between the providers of this training. And for many NGOs the problem was not "how to write a report," but how to write six reports, in English, in six different formats every quarter, or even every month.

Donor naïveté about the NGO reality in Bosnia illustrates the

challenge of understanding. But blatant opportunism was also part of the equation. Many donors and international NGOs characterized their interest in supporting local NGOs as an investment in a strong, pluralist, socially integrated civil society. And yet most donors had essentially sought, and found, cheap service delivery. This was especially true where the return of refugees and displaced people was concerned. Many NGOs had become little more than contractors for food distribution and house reconstruction. In one remarkable harangue, a senior donor representative told a group of NGOs in Banja Luka at the end of 1997 that "you are subject to a paradigm change from emergency aid to socioeconomic rehabilitation on the path to a market economy and European integration," and are thus "working yourself out of business." Precisely two sentences later they were being criticized for the quality of their work, "in particular the sealing of windows and doors and the quality of masonry."   Only a moment before they had been told that they had a major role in "democratization, confidence-building, and the stabilization of vulnerable groups in the war-affected society."[43] This jumble of demands and expectations, not at all atypical of confused donor agency thinking about NGOs, must have appeared staggering to those present.

Rebuilding tolerance and pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps more important than anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia. Without it, the hope of a united Bosnia and Herzegovina will be lost. Democracy is more than the economy, political parties, and elections. Accountability, legitimacy, and competence in public life are key, and these can only be achieved through the active participation of the electorate, buoyed by a strong, plural, associational base. Although there were several new and more constructive initiatives in support of Bosnian civil society through 1997, the domestic NGO community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a key part of this associational base, remained weak, fragmented, and vulnerable to external donors in a hurry. The focus on inexpensive service delivery was at odds with the creation of a strong, pluralist civil society, and the question before donors was not simply one of doing limited good, but of doing harm.

Conclusions

This chapter, and particularly its first and third sections, highlighted the relationship between minority return and the need for coherence and balance in virtually every element of reconstruction and development—a concept that includes security, justice, and stability. For the international actors, the challenges of funding, timing, and understanding creep into virtually every facet of the story. The conventional wisdom that people go home when the fighting ends may never, in fact, have been "standard." But in ethnic wars, the idea clearly has little relevance. For involuntarily displaced people, the transition from war to peace, and from emergency interventions to development, is a prerequisite to return, not something that they can actively initiate themselves.

The distinction between relief and development became blurred in the two years following Dayton, not because of role confusion on the assembly line—as had been the case for QIPs in many countries and for the transition in Haiti. In Bosnia, the conveyer belt essentially stopped moving.

The analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina has suggested that as far as preconditions to sizable return were concerned, outsiders were not doing enough, were not doing as well as they could have, and were not acting quickly enough. In terms of volume, however, the expenditures were not insignificant. SFOR alone probably consumed $5 million a day. Of the $3 billion committed by donors to reconstruction and balance of payments by August 1997, $2.37 billion was in the form of grants. Though only half of what had been committed had been disbursed, the total, $1.55 billion, represented over $77 million a month, not insignificant in a country of fewer than four million people.

An underlying problem in Bosnia—which was perhaps less obvious in the analyses of QIPs and Haiti—was not so much doing enough, or even knowing what to do (as opposed to how to do it), but lack of clarity about what was being done. Humanitarians were primarily concerned about the welfare of refugees and war victims. But by 1998, some Western governments, particularly Germany,

which had hosted so many refugees, seemed preoccupied with simply ending their Bosnian burdens—financial, military, political, and human. Refugees were a symbol of many intractable problems, and "return" was seen to be the solution. Hence, without refugees there would be no crisis. The larger issue—a stable, united Bosnia which would make return and peace both possible and sustainable—seemed to get lost in the rush to satisfy other donor aims. Rebuilding a multiethnic society was clear in the language of Dayton but considerably less so in the programmatic emphases of major donors.

The largest problem for Bosnia and Herzegovina was not money, but time—the time required to rebuild institutions, the rule of law, and good governance. Time will certainly be required to break through the authoritarian and unforgiving nature of the regimes that prevailed in the wake of Yugoslavia's breakup. For western governments and aid agencies keen on quick "exit strategies," time also was in short supply. But time is one thing that refugees and displaced people do not have in abundance.

Despite the grand plans of the OHR, UN agencies, and European governments hosting Bosnian refugees, there were few international NGOs working in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998 that believed large-scale return was likely or even desirable that year. Nor, in fact, did it happen. In its outlook for 1998-99, the *Economist Intelligence Unit* put it this way: "Hostility towards returning refugees is widespread, and confidence among most refugees in their ability to rebuild their lives in areas controlled by other ethnic groups remains low. Even if it were possible for refugees to return, there is in many cases little for them to return to."[44]

The challenges of timing, funding, and understanding are examined in greater detail in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, which draw on the examples from the present chapter and others in order to illustrate conclusions in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2
THE CHALLENGE OF TIMING

Right timing is in all things the most important factor.
Hesiod, 694 B.C.

The first challenge concerns appropriate *timing*—when to engage, when to modify the intervention, and when to withdraw. An essential ingredient of prevention, conflict reduction, and conflict resolution, appropriate timing is also important in terms of knowing if, when, and how to move from basic humanitarian relief to more developmental objectives. Examples of this problem include acting too late in Rwanda and perhaps Kenya; departing too soon in Haiti; and transitioning too fast in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia. Political will and financial resources greatly affect the timing of humanitarian interventions and are often responsible for hurrying/delaying humanitarian action and rushing the move from relief to development programming. They can be the cause of precipitous agency withdrawal and of the recent obsession with "exit strategies," which may or may not be appropriate to the pace of social and economic change on the ground. Although there are a few cases in which appropriate timing has improved synergies between relief and development, timing remains a fundamental problem on the ground, working against cohesion, let alone synergies.

Timing in "Loud" Emergencies: Warning Does Not Mean Response

At the front end of the timing issue is the concept of "early warning," an idea badly tarnished by the lack of attention given to many urgent warnings in recent years. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests, "Thus far, international efforts to create and use early warnings (especially on long-range issues), have had limited effectiveness. In part this is a

consequence of the inadequate quality, accessibility, and timeliness of the information provided by forecasting and analysis. Clearly the lack of sufficient analytical capacity...creates critical bottlenecks in this regard."[1]

Is it largely a problem of understanding, as the DAC suggests? Many say no, pointing to the emergencies in Haiti and Bosnia. In Rwanda, as well, ample warning existed prior to the onset of genocide. When confronted with a choice of how or whether to intervene, the Security Council pulled back, giving the perpetrators a clear signal that nothing would be done to stop them. Testifying at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1998, General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the small UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda in 1994, said he had asked UN Headquarters for more troops and expanded powers. "We had a time frame of about two weeks, easily, in which we could have deployed the troops," he said. "We could have made it much more difficult for people to kill." He spoke about radio station RTLM, which was broadcasting hate propaganda, and said he had asked the international community to "neutralize" the station. "The RTLM was inciting people to kill, it was explaining how to kill, including whites, including me...When you have an instrument of propaganda inciting people to crimes against humanity, the international community could have targeted it. I had responses that, given the sovereignty of the country involved, we couldn't."[2] Even late warnings went unheeded. Dallaire took pain to apportion blame: "It has always been very easy to accuse the UN of not preventing that genocide," he said. "The UN is not a sovereign country. It's us. It's all of us. If the UN did not intervene, then by extension, it is all of us. We all have a responsibility for the genocide in Rwanda."

During a 1998 visit to Kigali, President Clinton said that "the international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began."[3] Or before, he might have added. Early warnings, late warnings, *all* warnings were essentially ignored for years by most members of the so-called interna-

tional community. It was not a "lack of sufficient analytical capacity," but rather it was an unwillingness by governments and multilateral institutions to shoulder the costs and political difficulties of a vigorous intervention.

In Kenya in the late 1990s, years of political and economic mismanagement had led to a crumbling of civil and political institutions. Land clashes in Western Kenya and the Rift Valley starting in the early 1990s resulted in an estimated 1,500 deaths and more than 300,000 people displaced and dispossessed. Murderous ethnic riots in Mombassa in the summer of 1997 caused an estimated 100,000 people to flee the area.[4] The violent disruption of pro-democracy rallies, arbitrary arrest, torture, and student riots quelled by force of arms had, by 1998, become commonplace. A joint delegation of Amnesty International, Article 19, and Human Rights Watch found worrying new developments in 1998, including the widespread availability of cheap, sophisticated weapons, as well as a new tendency to target women for rape and killing. "Kenya is a powder keg waiting to explode," a spokesperson for the delegation said.[5]

Much has been written in recent years about the need to identify and to distinguish between structural and deep-rooted causes of conflict, and what are called the "proximate" causes that trigger conflict—hence the distinction between poor countries that erupt into violence and those that do not. In the Kenya of 1998, there appeared to be many "causes" to choose from, structural and proximate, with many actors doing their best to spark a conflagration. If there were warnings, where was the response? In the early 1990s, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Paris Club imposed rigorous aid conditionality on Kenya in an effort to end corruption, induce financial reform and probity, and encourage multiparty elections. Ironically, while development assistance was stalled, a humanitarian crisis of minor proportions—a drought in the north—was transformed into one of major proportions, and humanitarian assistance essentially replaced development assistance. Between May 1992 and May 1995, for example, World Food Programme (WFP) commitments alone

were valued at over $121 million. While aid declined by 16 percent between 1991 and 1992, it grew by 24 percent the following year, making 1993 the highest on record for official development assistance (ODA) to Kenya.[6]

Then, as a signal, perhaps, of longer-term donor displeasure, aid to Kenya declined by 33.5 percent between 1993 and 1996, although Kenya was still the eighth largest aid recipient on the continent. Kenya could perhaps take solace in the fact that aid fell by more than 25 percent in ten other African countries, including Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Niger. Botswana, not known for human rights abuse, weak democracy, or ethnic violence, saw its donor income fall by 39 percent.[7] Aid cuts are a blunt weapon that can hurt the poor more than those causing the problem. They are, however, a signal—though in Kenya's case an ambivalent one.

Was a Kenyan "conflagration" predictable? Alexander George and Jane Holl, who have analyzed the gap between warning and response, find much of the reasoning behind claims of "missed opportunities" flawed. They suggest that receptivity to warning by policymakers is conditioned by a number of factors:

- the complexity of world events and the compressed time span in which leaders are expected to respond;
- a propensity to disbelieve or discredit the information on which they are based;
- work overload and disinterest in low-level crises that may not become serious;
- an unwillingness to become involved in issues not of direct national interest;
- a propensity to procrastinate;
- uncertainty about what form of response might ward off the crisis that is being warned of. [8]

There is, of course, the possibility that international action might accomplish nothing, or that it might make matters worse. Chester Crocker, former U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs, observed that "intervention (just like nonintervention) is an inher-

Box 2.1 How Much Time? Innovation In Mozambique
         By Stephen Lubkemann

In Mozambique's Manica Province, Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA) funds an integrated rural health program that is widely regarded as both successful in its own right and as an example of a success in the transition from emergency assistance to development. Success has been attributed in large part to the project's innovative nature. Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the program is its time line. In 1992, FINNIDA made a 17-year commitment to the program, realizing that it would take time to build both the physical and human infrastructure needed for an effective provincial health care system. The time frame has allowed the program to evolve, untying it from unrealistic time-bound benchmarks. Secondly, the program was integrated into the entire health sector and includes public works, primary and curative health care, finance and administration, and human resource development. In order to accomplish this effectively, FINNIDA became the lead health donor agency in the province, acting as coordinator for other external health assistance.

Giving a high level of discretion to project managers on the ground released the project from a "criteria straightjacket" and allowed for the expansion of some components, and the alteration of others. A further innovation was FINNIDA's willingness to rethink issues of financial sustainability when it became obvious that the Ministry of Health would not be able to assume full financial responsibility for the project within the time envisaged. And finally, a private sector firm was contracted to manage the program from the outset, something of a novelty in Mozambique, where NGOs have been favored as executing agencies.

The approach raises questions about the very nature of any donor intervention: Do longer time frames that release both donor and recipient from unrealistic targets and "straightjackets" lead to qualitative improvements in outcome, or do projects simply fill up the time available? Is the relaxation of sustainability targets pragmatic or fatalistic? Is it necessary to take a more holistic approach to sectoral development than the more restricted project approach favored by most donors? Given the positive evaluation findings of the Manica Province Integrated Health Project, a case can perhaps be made for rethinking standard donor practice in these and other areas.

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1 Stephen C. Lubkemann, "Humanitarianism and War Fieldwork Case Study on the Effects of Innovative Practices: The Manica Province Integrated Health Project in Mozambique (1990-1997)," Brown University (draft), April 27, 1998.

ently political action with inescapable political consequences."[9]

Given such views, "doing nothing" may be less a case of "missed opportunity" than of a government acting in what it perceives—however shortsightedly—to be its own best interests. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Rwanda should have received so little real attention, apart from emergency assistance after the fact.

A further example of the problem of timing can be found in Burundi, where, between 1993 and 1996, some 150,000 people were killed. In response to reasonably good media coverage of the massacres and of a coup in July 1996, the then head of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Kofi Annan, attempted to press Western powers to take action. He failed. Nicholas Burns, U.S. State Department spokesman explained the refusal to provide even logistical support this way: "It is not possible for the U.S. to lead everywhere and in every situation...We have led where we think U.S. interests require: in Haiti, and in Bosnia, and we will not hesitate to lead in future situations, where our national interests are directly and in some cases vitally affected."[10] There was nothing new in this. The massacre of 100,000 Hutu in 1972 and another 20,000 in 1988 had also met with muted international response.

Timing in Chronic Emergencies

Other timing factors are at work when agencies attempt to decide whether an emergency has ended, whether to wind down emergency assistance, and whether to place greater emphasis on reconstruction and development. Box 2.2 demonstrates that the answer is by no means straightforward; it also suggests why the clearly demarcated divisions implicit in such categories make so little practical programming sense.

Exit Strategies

In recent years, the term "exit strategy" has loomed large in the

Box 2.2 Is The Emergency Over?
  By Joanna Macrae and Mark Bradbury[1]

At what point and on what basis is an emergency judged to have ended? When does it become legitimate for service provision to be charged for in pursuit of financial sustainability?...

In Uganda, a view that the country is experiencing socioeconomic progress and political stability is contradicted by the fact that almost one third of the population is engulfed in a brutal conflict which has resulted in massive death, destruction and displacement.[2] In Uganda's northern districts, agencies estimate the number of displaced as high as 479,000, with a further 125,000 displaced in the west.[3] Therapeutic feeding centres in Gulu are reported to be receiving as many as 24-30 children per week, with increasing evidence of high levels of malnutrition among adolescents and adults. While UNICEF has taken a lead among UN agencies in responding to the crisis, a reluctance to use the term "emergency," and a concern that any response should be within the parameters of the country programme has, in the view of some field staff, constrained the response...

In Sudan, the normalisation of crisis has been noted in the continuing prevalence of high malnutrition rates. In 1989, nutritional rates of between 10 percent and 20 percent triggered a major relief intervention—Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). The 1996 [UN Consolidated Appeal] for Sudan recorded global malnutrition rates in 1995 ranging from an "acceptable" 13.7 percent to 36 percent in displaced camps around Khartoum, and from 16.1 percent to 30 percent in the transitional zone and government-held areas of Southern Sudan.[4] These levels were not seen to be sufficiently serious to warrant an expansion in the

relief programme; on the contrary, the majority of UN agencies were adopting policies of reducing rations and of arguing that the situation was now moving towards rehabilitation and development.

One is left with two conclusions. First, that the notion of a transition to development does not address the nature of chronic emergencies. In Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia, humanitarian needs and the vulnerability of populations are a consequence of political and economic strategies. Large-scale population displacements in Sudan, northern Uganda and southern Somalia, for example, serve military and economic purposes for powerful groups.

The second is the political acceptance that the emergency is over in Rwanda, and the ease with which the international community has marginalized the problems in northern Uganda. The apparently "acceptable" rates of malnutrition in Sudan, and the acceptance that Somalis will periodically suffer hardships suggests that there has been an accommodation with the permanence of these crises.

1. From Joanna Macrae and Mark Bradbury, *Aid in the Twilight Zone: A Critical Analysis of Humanitarian-Development Aid Linkages in Situations of Chronic Instability, A report for UNICEF* (London: ODI/Brown University Humanitarianism and War Project, February 1998), 41-43.

2. UNICEF Uganda, "UNICEF Support for Districts Affected by Insecurity in Uganda," February, 1997.

3. United Nations Disaster Management Team (Uganda), March 1997.

4. UNDHA, "United Nations Consolidates Inter-Agency Appeal: Sudan," (February 1996).

vernacular of peacekeeping and elsewhere, epitomizing "the new national quest for intervening on the cheap, with the troops home for Christmas—or better yet, Thanksgiving," as one American foreign policy analyst observed.[11] Unknown in foreign and military policy before Somalia, the term and the idea have crept into discussions of humanitarian action and into the lexicon of aid agencies.

OTI is expected to enter and leave a country within two years. An exit strategy is therefore proper if not mandatory before operations begin. In a military situation, perhaps it makes some sense to avoid open-ended commitments. However, fixing a timetable in advance may send a counterproductive message to belligerents that all they have to do is wait or, worse yet, attack outside military forces. Moreover, it suggests that so few interests are at stake that perhaps the effort should not have been under-taken at all. If vital interests are at stake, victory rather than an exit strategy should be the operative term.

For humanitarian organizations dealing increasingly with protracted emergencies and uncertain transitions, exit strategies make even less sense. Calling it "strategic vogue," Gideon Rose writes that "the idea of a formal exit strategy, with its anti-interventionist bias and stress on rigid public planning, is mis-guided in theory and unhelpful in practice. Instead of obsessing about the exit, planners should concentrate on the strategy. The key question is not how we get out, but why we are getting in."[12]

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis points to the necessity of knowing whether and how to respond to humanitarian crises, to temper relief with developmental efforts, and to depart. These are timing issues that are heavily dependent on sound judgments if proper decisions are to be made. But organizations in a hurry, it would seem, have little time, or perhaps little political interest, in learning. Kenya serves as a current surrogate for many historical examples of how outsiders, not knowing when, or how, or

whether to act, often become paralyzed watching once prosperous countries sink into confusion, as though there are no previous examples to draw on for guidance.

The challenge of understanding is elaborated in Chapter 4. Before that, however, Chapter 3 considers the relationship between timing and funding. It should be no surprise that money is regularly a factor in hurrying or delaying humanitarian response, and in inappropriately hastening or stalling the move from relief to development programming. It can be the cause of precipitous agency withdrawal and is the prime motivation behind the growing demand for exit strategies. The time-money nexus was at the root of QIPs' problems, the ill-fated Haitian demobilization project, and is a leitmotif running through Bosnia's post-Dayton reconstruction period.

If the question begins "Why don't they...?" the answer is money.
Robert A. Heinlein

Funding is the second challenge. Emergency funding remains sporadic, arriving in short-term bursts and often after lengthy delays. It can be patchy, and much of it is overtly political. Development assistance too can be patchy, cumbersome, and rigid, often arriving late and without reference to the emergency that it follows. Throughout the 1990s, official development assistance (ODA) declined dramatically, exacerbating competition and creating other obstacles to operationalizing links between emergency and development assistance. Declines in levels of international assistance have made it more difficult to realize potential synergies; experimentation is most difficult when resources are dwindling, donors are taking a closer look at supposedly successful initiatives, and practitioners are on the defensive. Short on unrestricted private donor funds, many NGOs have in recent years become significant contractors for governments and multilateral agencies, a trend that can mean less independence in where, when, and how an organization runs its programs. The obverse, however, is that governments have become increasingly dependent upon NGOs for the delivery of emergency assistance. Aid agencies are not the only economic actors. Commercial interests can be as potent a determinant of outcomes, if not more so, although the role of the private sector in emergencies and their aftermath is oddly understudied.

Overall Aid Trends

Throughout the 1990s, ODA declined dramatically.[1] In 1996, alone, it dropped in ten of twenty-one DAC member countries, including four of the G-7 nations. Although it appears not to have slipped greatly in nominal terms, the $59 billion figure for 1994-

5 represented a 10 percent drop in real terms in a single year, following declines in several years before that. By 1997, the amount was down to $47.6 billion, a weighted average of 0.22 percent of the collective GNP, ODA's lowest level in 45 years. Among the G-7 it was even lower, at only 0.19 percent, weighed down by Italy's dismal 0.11 percent, and the United States' 0.08 percent. By comparison, at the end of World War II, the Marshall Plan consumed two percent of U.S. GDP, about $140 billion in 1997 dollars. Today's American aid program represents less than five percent of that effort.

The declines are even more precipitous when changes in the composition of ODA are taken into consideration. A significant proportion of combined bilateral and multilateral ODA—$5.5 billion in 1996—was allocated to emergency assistance, up by a factor of five in constant dollars in almost as many years. This could be compared with a 13 percent decline in ODA over the same period in constant dollars. An additional four percent of global ODA was allocated from overseas development assistance in 1994 to the upkeep of refugees residing in DAC member countries. This reallocation had the effect of reducing even further the resources available for responding to humanitarian crises.

Several reasons are used normally to explain dwindling aid resources. Some, such as the end of the Cold War and the subsequent rearrangement of geopolitical priorities, are obvious. Other reasons for aid cutbacks are offered so frequently and carelessly that they are becoming received wisdom without serious reflection.

One posits a serious decline in public support for aid, in spite an absence of empirical evidence.[2] Another has to do with the need for fiscal restraint in industrialized countries with high deficits. This flies in the face of the negligible impact of one-tenth of one percent of GNP added to the average Western country deficit. A third suggests that decades of doubt about the effectiveness of aid have at last gained the upper hand, fueled in part by media and fundraising images of helplessness and hopelessness. A fourth rationalization suggests that with the rapid growth of

Table 3.1: Selected Statistics 1985-1997 ($U.S. thousand)
Total DAC Countries (net disbursements, current prices, and exchange rates)

	1985/86	1994	1995	1996	1997
Official Development Assistance	32,296	59,152	58,926	55,438	47,580
ODA as % of GNP	0.33	0.30	0.27	0.25	0.22
Bilateral Emergency Assistance	628	3,468	3,062	2,716	n.a.
Bilateral Emergency Assistance as % of ODA	1.94	5.86	5.20	4.90	n.a.

Source: Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the DAC 1997, (Paris: OECD, 1998). See also "Aid and Private Flows Fell in 1997," OECD News Release, Paris, June 18, 1998

private flows to developing countries, aid may no longer be necessary.[3]

A further explanation for ODA cutbacks is undoubtedly the dramatic increase that has taken place in what is known as "Other Official Flows." Although these may be developmental, the grant element is too small for them to be considered as a part of ODA. Some are provided to countries not eligible for ODA, such as Russia and other so-called transition economies. While ODA is in decline, other official flows do not appear to be, averaging $7.2 billion per annum between 1992 and 1996. Although there is no direct link between them and ODA, a direct connection between the decline in one and the dramatic growth of the other seems plausible.

A connection can also be made between reduced ODA and increased military activities in support of peacekeeping and security. In the mid-1990s, these costs were running about $3 billion annually, but they did not count as aid. Faced with new large expenditures of this type, governments have had to divert money from other priorities, and some of it has undoubtedly come from aid allocations.

Short-Term Funding, Long-Term Needs

One of the greatest problems in making an operational link between emergency and development spending is the nature of budgeting for emergencies. Inevitably emergency funding is sporadic, arriving in short-term bursts, often after lengthy delays. Much of it is political, and the spread is patchy. For instance, UN member states contributed $70 million to Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) at a time of great crisis in Angola, but almost five times that amount to United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia and $2 billion to United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). On average, the fourteen UN consolidated appeals launched in 1994 reached 76 percent of their funding target. The average was 73 percent the following year, and it was 62 percent in 1997.

Within these averages, however, there were major variations. In 1995, 90 percent of the appeal for former Yugoslavia was funded, while appeals for Angola, Sudan, and Iraq achieved only half their targets. Somalia achieved only 30 percent of target at a time when there was possibly more opportunity for reconstruction, and for making good links between relief and development, than at any time in the previous decade. The following year, the Great Lakes regional appeal reached 86 percent of its $564 million target, while the appeals for Angola and Somalia, totaling $302 million, reached on average only 56 percent of target.[4]

The response to specific agencies included in these combined appeals also varied dramatically. In 1995, UNHCR was oversubscribed on its $569 million appeal by $44 million. WFP received 84.8 percent of its requested $926 million in food and nonfood support. UNICEF, however, received only 62 percent of its requested $295 million, and UNDP received less than 11 percent.[5] Because such appeals and the subscriptions to the main budgets of many intergovernmental organizations are decided on an annual basis, the ability to create more than very short-term plans is seriously constrained.

For NGOs, the problem is as severe or worse. Where private donor funding for emergencies is concerned, most NGOs have come to rely heavily on the media as a fundraising aid. When the media "discovered" Biafra, Ethiopia, and Somalia, donations to NGOs grew quickly and dramatically. But some emergencies, like Somalia, are as quickly forgotten by journalists. Private donor funding, and with it the possibility of independent NGO programming, declines as a result. Some emergencies never become major media events—Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are examples. NGOs' ability to respond is limited to whatever unrestricted funding can be raised. The application of such funds to serious but unpublicized relief needs comes undoubtedly at the expense of development programming elsewhere.

In this dilemma, some harsh critics see only opportunism. Alex de Waal, for example, describes NGO fundraising efforts that accompanied the precipitous evacuation of Hutu refugees from

Eastern Zaire in November 1996:

> The humanitarian agencies needed money. In October 1996, there were disasters of various proportions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, Chechnya, Iraqi Kurdistan, Afghanistan and North Korea; a cyclone hit India and an earthquake struck Peru. None of these disasters appeared quite to fit the bill for the humanitarian fund-raisers: the agencies would not have sufficient access or freedom of action, and the visual imagery of the crisis would not be compelling enough. Not having run a successful appeal since the summer of 1994, agencies with large emergency departments (Médecins sans Frontières [MSF], Oxfam, and a host of lesser known ones) were facing a financial squeeze.[6]

Although none of the NGOs had field staff in the immediate vicinity, MSF said that the situation for hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees was desperate. Oxfam and CARE spoke of a million people at risk of dying, and Save the Children (SCF) UK said the incident threatened to become the worst crisis of the century.

Yet, the reality suggested that about 600,000 Hutu refugees had simply decided to go home. Or had they? Nicholas Stockton, Oxfam UK's Emergencies Director, believes that the actual numbers were much higher than 600,000, and that as many as 400,000 people—many of them children—were, "in effect, airbrushed from history."[7] And is de Waal's charge of opportunism fair? Certainly it has an element of truth, but there is more to agency responses than ambulance chasing.

NGOs are often criticized for a lack of "professionalism" in emergencies, but in order to build professionalism, an organization must be able to develop and retain good staff. This cannot be done if the agency is on a financial merry-go-round, riding from crisis to "no crisis" and back to crisis again in response to whatever

stories the media deem newsworthy.[8] Most NGOs cannot maintain a stable of experts in anticipation of donor funds that may or may not come or wait for the media to pick up on an emergency in Chechnya or Peru that will give their fundraising effort the requisite boost. Like individuals and governments, NGOs must make choices and set priorities.

It is worth noting, however, that larger NGOs with capacity to work in several places at once *were* active in many of the emergencies that de Waal mentions, even if big fundraising campaigns were not mounted. SCF UK, for example, was involved in each of those emergencies except Chechnya. MSF was involved in all of them.[9]

Competition Versus Coordination

Most NGOs today face problems, sometimes severe, of competition and coordination. And many face a variety of new issues arising from their attractiveness as executing agencies for bilateral and multilateral organizations.

Competition among NGOs, and the clamor for media attention, especially in emergency situations, can be dramatic. As bilateral aid budgets stagnated, growth in the share of emergency relief grew—at least in the first half of the 1990s—encouraging greater competition for resources. Development aid has a much more checkered record than disaster assistance, at least in the eyes of some observers. Disaster funding is easier to obtain, it has a proven track record in saving lives, and, unlike development aid, it is usually not well or closely evaluated. Coming to the rescue of victims is for most donors and the public at large a sufficient justification, whereas more is expected of development cooperation.

Competition has been increased in recent years by the arrival of new players. UNDP and the World Bank, for instance, are, now more actively involved in emergency and reconstruction programming or in policy-related work, raising the stakes appreciably. And organizations that have had a primary development focus, such as

UNICEF, are taking a much more active role in emergency situations.

Competition also grows out of the proliferation of private organizations. In 1980, there were 37 foreign agencies in Thailand's Kao I Dang Cambodian refugee camp, while in camps less accessible to the media, there were few or none. On the Thai-Cambodian border, NGO crowding was even more intense, with 60 active agencies. One ICRC delegate observed that there were more medical teams on the border than in four African countries combined.[10] Fifteen years later, the numbers had increased. At the end of 1996, there were estimated to be between 156 and 240 international NGOs at work in Bosnia.[11] An estimated 100 NGOs worked at one time or another in Zaire's Goma camps. John Seaman, a senior SCF UK official, observed:

> If you stand not far back from a crisis like Rwanda, it is clear that NGOs behave like rabble. In a concentration of NGOs such as Goma, there is such an imperative to establish a trademark and territory, and all technical standards go to the wall. For Save the Children Fund, it is a difficult question of either competing or staying away— in which case we lose out on both media coverage and money.[12]

The rush to act, and to be seen to be acting, weighs heavily against the possibility of thoughtful longer-term reconstruction and development work. It is not surprising that when emergencies and their funding wind down, many NGOs pack their bags and leave. For those that specialize in emergencies, this makes practical sense, but for those with dual mandates, there may be no choice, if money for postemergency rehabilitation and development is not available.

Coordination among agencies has always been an issue in the aid business, one that clearly impedes greater interagency synergy. But coordination within agencies has also been hampered by the

need to compete. A 1998 report for UNICEF suggested that the organization suffered internally from a culture of "reluctant relief."[13] A 1996 study of USAID in the Greater Horn of Africa region examined the constraints inhibiting a smooth transition between relief and development programming. It found that "within USAID's corporate culture, disaster and development experts are philosophically, fiscally and physically divided, with separate offices, programming systems and funding sources. These lead to different values and agendas within country specific contexts."[14] The study found that legislative and regulatory re-quirements were particularly problematic, with a wide range of funding sources, congressional earmarks and prohibitions, and cumbersome procurement regulations which delayed and ob-structed flexibility. Despite reasonably good understanding of the need and potential for making programming connections between relief and development, the organization was seriously con-strained by political, financial, and bureaucratic burdens.

Attention has been given in recent years to the idea of task-sharing, especially in the context of an overstretched UN system that could devolve some of its responsibilities to regional arrange-ments for security functions and to NGOs for the delivery of services.[15] Large NGOs have already become significant contrac-tors for governments and multilateral agencies. In the United States, SCF received 54 percent of its overall 1995 support and revenue from the United States government. For CARE the figure was 62 percent, and for Catholic Relief Services it was 71 percent.[16]

David Korten has coined the term "public service contractor" to describe organizations that "are driven by market consider-ations more than by values, and therefore are more like businesses than voluntary organizations." The nomenclature is often used as a term of disparagement, and many NGOs would argue, justifi-ably, that values play an essential role in motivating staff and supporters. Nonetheless, with more and more NGO resources emanating from contracts with governments and intergovernmen-tal organizations, it is worth examining Korten's outline of the

pressures that drive an NGO towards public service contracts:

- The fatigue of constantly existing at the margin of financial survival and the attraction of donor funding;
- The strain of constantly fighting established interests, values, and practices;
- The difficulty of maintaining value consensus and commitment as the organization grows;
- A sense of moral obligation to provide job security for paid staff;
- The belief that contracting will bring greater funding and make it possible for the organization to do more of those things it feels are truly important; and,
- The pressure from donors to "professionalize." [17]

There is another reason that NGOs have moved in this direction. Contracts for services have become increasingly available. In the emergencies of the 1960s and 1970s, governments worked mainly with governments and multilateral agencies or they managed programs themselves, as did multilateral agencies. But two trends began to intersect in the 1980s. The first was a demonstration by NGOs of new professionalism and capacity. Simultaneously, host governments, to the extent that they could function at all, were increasingly seen to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The second trend that favored NGOs was a rethinking in the North of appropriate roles of government.

A third point worth considering is the cost-effectiveness for NGOs of contracting, as opposed to fundraising. Fundraising and donor follow-up for an emergency may cost as much as 30 cents for each dollar received. The fundraising messages will undoubtedly be emotive, and may counteract earlier efforts to educate donors about Southern development, self-reliance, and dignity. Getting a large contract from UNHCR, WFP, or ECHO will be much less time consuming and therefore less costly than fundraising appeals, and, while it may entail compromises of one sort or

another, it does not require the production and broadcasting of images of helplessness.

Many NGO-watchers nevertheless deplore the contracting trend because it can mean less independence in where, when, and how an organization runs its programs. If contracts are available for Rwanda but not for North Korean famine victims, North Koreans will inevitably get shorter shrift. If there are contracts in Bosnia for micro-enterprise but not for work with trauma victims, as was increasingly the case in 1997 and 1998—trauma victims will always fade from NGO view, regardless of need.

Although there is considerable evidence that growing NGO dependency on government has had a negative impact on NGO advocacy,[18] the central question here concerns the potential for linking relief and development. Does increased NGO dependency on government weaken or enhance this potential? Writing about Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand and Peter Chamberlain demonstrate what can go wrong in a variety of country settings: "Funding requests were often turned down on the basis that they were 'too developmental'; donors' thinking and institutional arrangements are based on linear notions of the 'relief to development continuum.' Experience in Afghanistan exposed the lack of institutional frameworks within which to provide assistance for transitional activities which are neither 'relief' or 'development'."[19]

The problem can be seen as one of supply responding inappropriately to demand. This may, however, be wrong. While the ostensible "demand," or at least the need on the ground may be clear enough, the actual demand is often articulated less by the victims of conflict and their closest mentors than it is by those who provide funding. In some cases it may be the $10 donor who wants to do something *right now* for the victims of a hurricane in Central America that has pushed Sudan out of the headlines. Or it may be a bilateral donor concerned about Rwanda, but not North Korea. Far from being a perversion of the law of supply and demand, these are examples of the law at work. They are, of course, also examples of how agencies have become confused about their "customer"—about whether their purpose is to serve the funder or the victims of an emergency.

Some NGOs will, no doubt, bend with any financial wind, accepting without much question the terms and conditions under which resources are made available. Yet governments, despite their own internal political, financial, and bureaucratic priorities, *can* be moved on key operational issues to accept arguments about priorities from NGOs. In fact, NGOs from Nordic countries argue that few strings are attached to substantial support from their governments. And while the dependency of many NGOs on government may be a fact of life, the reality is that for many of the largest NGOs—including MSF, several members of the Oxfam group, World Vision, and SCF UK—government funding still represents much less than half of their income.

In fact, where emergencies are concerned, the dependency shoe finds itself increasingly on the other foot. For example, French government support for NGOs is tiny—0.65 percent of ODA in 1997—and yet 46 percent of all French emergency assistance was channeled that year through NGOs. In Denmark and New Zealand, the amount of government emergency assistance channeled through NGOs was approximately 37 percent of the total in 1996, and in the U.S. it was over 60 percent.[20] The World Food Programme (WFP) channeled an estimated $580 million through NGOs in 1997, UNHCR, about $300 million—about one-half and one-third of their respective budgets.[21] Approximately half of all ECHO funds in 1995, or about $832 million, were spent through NGOs.[22] In this sense, some governments may need NGOs more than some NGOs require governmental resources. The ability of NGOs to determine the agenda in this new subcontracting situation is worthy of considerable evaluation and reflection.

The Private, For-Profit Sector: Helping or Hindering?

Aid agencies are not the only actors in emergency and transition situations. It is odd, given the voluminous critical investigation of aid agencies, development assistance, and humanitarianism, that very little ink has been devoted to the role of

the private, for-profit sector in complex emergencies and their aftermath. This is especially surprising given the widespread proclivity through the 1990s to hail the private sector as the solution for most ailments. Aid has been implicated in causing economic and political collapse and in delaying its recovery. Although they are members of the private sector, NGOs are categorized as "not-for-profit." As such, they are frequently assailed for opportunism, individualism, amateurism, and lack of transparency. The UN and northern governments and their politicians are regularly held up to scorn for inaction and tightfistedness. But the private, for-profit sector is rarely discussed in the context of complex emergencies, except as something that must be "jump-started" in the reconstruction phase of waning emergencies.[23]

The *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* have considerably more to say about NGOs than about the private sector, devoting only one or two lines to the subject under the general rubric of the need for a stable macroeconomic environment in post-conflict situations. The Carnegie Commission's *Preventing Deadly Conflict* devotes two pages to the subject, suggesting primarily that businesses may be well placed to detect the early warning signs of conflict and could pressure governments to seek an early resolution. The contribution of the private, for-profit sector is seen to be more circumscribed in the acute emergency phase but more fulsome as stability returns, and opportunities for reconstruction and development become more visible.

During a conflict, normal commerce is likely to be disrupted or destroyed, although new opportunities, not to mention opportunism, inevitably arise.[24] The arms trade, for example, is likely to grow and thrive, as are numerous other ways to earn a profit within a war-torn country. Indeed, a growing literature points to the interests of those who benefit from war as a central explanation for the continuation of the civil wars of the 1990s. On the other hand, it is often the private sector that allows a relief effort to function. The Lebanese commercial class in Sierra Leone, for example, is often maligned by Sierra Leoneans, government and aid workers alike. However, journalist Robert Kaplan—often lambasted by

the same people for different reasons—observes that, "Though nobody said it, aid workers and diplomats knew that if all the ten thousand Lebanese workers ever left Sierra Leone, so might they. The Lebanese were a life support system for foreigners, whether it was by arranging truck transport for refugee relief or offering lunch in a Western-style place."[25]

At a higher level of enterprise, "investors" in tropical hardwoods, natural resources, and drugs can play an important role during an emergency by providing or denying foreign exchange, jobs, or political support. Prior to the downfall of Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, for example, America Mineral Fields reportedly supplied Laurent Kabila with his own plane and financial support in return for a one billion dollar mining concession in Shaba Province.[26]

There is another controversial but nonetheless available role for the private sector—the provision of security services, ranging from equipment and training to the use of direct force.[27] The Government of Papua New Guinea hired Sandline International, a "military consultancy firm," to put down a ten-year rebellion in Bougainville. The Government of Sierra Leone used Executive Outcomes and later Sandline to provide logistics and fight rebels in its civil war, with an emphasis on liberating diamond mining areas of the country. Such firms multiplied during the 1990s, gaining clients in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa. Raising serious ethical questions for aid practitioners, they put a business-like face on the mercenary calling, appealing to governments in serious trouble.

A different situation is found in countries without major international commercial interests. The independent government of Eritrea, emerging from 17 years of Ethiopian state-controlled commerce that had been characterized by corruption, paralysis, and black marketeering, was consumed at first by a desire to regulate the business sector. This led to costly and cumbersome licensing arrangements which encouraged rather than detracted from fraud. A new macroeconomic policy in 1994, however, sought to create a more broadly based and supportive environment

for business, explicitly including the informal sector. Through 1995, laws were enacted to dovetail with the new policy—on land ownership, investment policies, licensing arrangements, sales tax, and joint government financing. The result was that in the first half of 1996, 4,163 business licenses were issued, compared with only 850 in 1995.[28]

Somalia offers a different example of private sector recovery when a modest stability is present. In the Northeastern Bari region, the development in 1993 and 1994 of a thriving import-export economy contributed to revival and reconstruction in a setting where formal government structures barely existed. Animal production became the backbone of the new economy—live animals for export, meat, skins, and animal subproducts such as milk and *ghee* for local consumption. The fishing and lobster industries also began to revive, and fledgling companies offered services in telecommunication, airline transportation, and currency exchange. Others offered veterinary services, construction work, and private health care.

In all of these endeavors, however, serious short-term problems soon emerged. Animal husbandry led to a rapid increase in herd size, with environmentally destructive overgrazing. Foreign-owned fishing vessels quickly dominated the fishing grounds, taking "licenses" from prominent locals and dumping their waste along the coast. The biggest import was *quat*, a tobacco-like substance that stimulated people more than the economy. In addition, a lack of regulation and the absence of credit facilities limited the overall commercial value of what was emerging. Looking for ways to reestablish the economy of the region, business leaders in Boosaaso finally formed a Chamber of Commerce in 1996, aimed at restoring financial institutions, diversifying the economy, and defining a secure legal framework for investors.

While perhaps a long way from being a broad-based integrated economy, these developments in Bari were at least as important as the work of external agencies present—including United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Of-

fice for Project Services (UNOPS), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and CARE—in helping to restore infrastructure and incomes to a ravaged economy.

These examples of private, for-profit sector activity demonstrate that:

- commercial interests can be as potent a determinant of outcomes, as the work of international aid agencies;
- the development of, or return to, legitimate private capital for reconstruction can be far greater than anything done through ODA channels. This explains the understandable interest among international financial institutions in achieving macroeconomic stability and conditions conducive to investment;
- "sound" economies and growth curves that do not include widespread sharing, are unlikely to contribute to sustainable peace.

Milton Friedman once wrote that "there is one and only one responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits, so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception and fraud."[29] The problem in emergency and transitional situations—as examples in this chapter have shown—is that the "rules of the game" may well be ignored. In the absence of enforceable laws, rules, and conventions, context and temptation may lead to commercial distortions and entanglements that are not always in the best interests of the population at large.

Conclusions

With aid reductions in the 1990s, there has been increasing competition among all players for "market share." Resource constraints have heightened competition among NGOs for private donor funds and government contracts, sometimes at the expense

of their own priorities and advocacy. The greatest competition may have been, however, between claimants of resources for emergency assistance and for development. Certainly the growth in bilateral emergency spending during the early 1990s far outstripped any growth in development spending. Nonmilitary emergency and refugee relief grew more than 156 percent—from $1 billion to $3 billion—between 1990 and 1996, while ODA as a whole grew less than five percent. Emergency spending may have peaked in 1994, but in 1996 it still represented almost five percent of ODA, up from only two percent in 1990.[30]

For emergency assistance and any ability it might have to contribute to reconstruction, the biggest constraint is the sporadic and short-term nature of donor commitments. Inevitably, most short-term funding deals only with short-term needs. In all of this, as will be seen in Chapter 5, there is almost no explicit funding for reconstruction and transitional activities, exacerbating the gap between emergency and development possibilities, and between the officials and organizations for whom these are competing priorities.

It is important to remember, however, that aid—even if it were doubled or tripled—cannot do everything, and that aid agencies, whatever color their stripes, are not the only players. The private, for-profit sector is seriously under-researched in emergency and transition situations, and it plays an important, if not always positive role, that may help or hinder the work of others.

These various relationships lead to the third and most important challenge, the challenge of understanding.

CHAPTER 4
THE CHALLENGE OF UNDERSTANDING

> Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
> Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?
> T.S. Eliot, *Choruses From "The Rock,"* I [1]

Knowledge and information are related but different; together they characterize the third and most important challenge, *understanding.* Understanding is also the most difficult challenge, an ingredient in proper timing and the wise use of whatever funding is available. While both knowledge and information may be in short supply, much greater emphasis has been placed on information, especially at either end of the relief-development spectrum, than on knowledge. Inappropriate blueprint-type reconstruction and rehabilitation programs continue to abound, in part because of the absence of institutional learning. These impediments include a fear of, and a consequent aversion to, evaluation, and an environment in which relief workers suffer from danger, stress, overwork, and burnout. These realities leave institutional memories shallow and provide experienced workers with inadequate time to educate others. Different but equally serious learning impediments pervade the development side.

Even where understanding is not in short supply, its application remains heavily influenced by the clearly demarcated institutional borders that continue to exist between relief and development. As a result, the process of learning lessons fails to enhance the possibility for realizing synergy.

Knowledge, Information, and Learning

Most discussions about emergency assistance note two factors about recent wars. First, wars now mostly take place within states rather than between states, complicating humanitarian action enormously. Second, they often continue sporadically and at sometimes high intensity for years, as in Angola, Sudan, and Sri

Lanka. These twin realities have major implications for links between relief and development:

- Relief, which has always labored in the shadow of the development enterprise, may come more into its own right with the recognition that emergencies are more than transient, unusual, and passing phenomena.
- Prevention has become demonstrably more visible as a goal, although a continuation of the piecemeal efforts of the past are unlikely to bear much fruit.
- International activities to build stronger civil society institutions, much in vogue since the early 1990s, are likely to continue as part of the enchantment with nonstate actors.
- There are likely to be increasing efforts to rebuild governments. Great care is required in designing such efforts if they are not to conflict with peacebuilding and strengthening civil society.

The requirements of relief and development agencies in situations of protracted conflict, therefore, will continue to change. New knowledge and new skills will be necessary in negotiation, political management, conflict management, and human rights. New skills will also be required in order to work more constructively with international military forces, as well as with local combatants.

As in other sectors, knowledge is essential to the effective and efficient delivery of emergency assistance, to good development, and to the creation of synergies between the two. Knowing what to do, how to do it, when, and whom to do it for and with are essential parts of the puzzle. Thus, relief and development organizations should have a good working knowledge of the local culture, language, and history. They should be aware of socioeconomic disparities and gender-related issues; understand the prevailing political and security environment; and be able to analyze and build upon local strengths and coping mechanisms.

Increasingly, they are also expected to recognize and provide

warnings about accelerating or "triggering" factors. Moreover, they should be able to grasp and deal with ethnic tensions and human rights abuses; and know how to plan, develop, and manage complex programs. They are also expected to approach their work comprehensively and analytically, even if funding for acquiring and maintaining such competence is extremely limited and there is no budget beyond a few months.

Frequently, they are obliged to deal with huge numbers of people in areas where food, water, and basic sanitation are in short supply. They are expected to be able to look at a crowd and distinguish a legitimate refugee from a killer and devise a way of feeding one but not the other. They should have good negotiation skills in order to deal effectively with refugees, traumatized populations, other donors, reporters, local politicians, UN peace-keepers, local armies, bandits, and thugs.

The list lengthens. The more critical an analyst is of what took place in a past emergency, the more numerous the verbs in the final paragraphs fall into the future imperative: *have to, must, should.* Frequently missing, however, is an answer to the essential question, "How?"

Knowledge, information, and learning are not synonymous. Information and data analysis are often major problems in emergency and postemergency situations. But even where information is ample, it is not the same thing as knowledge. Information can *convey* knowledge, but it can also convey confusion, half truths, and even outright lies. Knowledge grows with experience, awareness, and consciousness.

In the light of T. S. Eliot's distinctions at the outset of this chapter, it is worth examining an example from the 1997 *World Disasters Report,* entitled "From Information Management to the 'Knowledge Agency'."[2] The essay deals with new communications technologies and the importance of up-to-date information in helping emergency workers get to the right place with the right help at the right time. It talks about radio, Global Positioning Systems, and INMARSAT Mini M voice/data terminals, referring to these as "knowledge systems" for "knowledge agencies." While

undoubtedly important, these technologies have little to do with knowledge, except as the transitory medium through which information may or may not pass.

The commonplace expression "lessons learned," which often heads a section at the end of evaluations, evidences a similar confusion in terms. "The concept of 'lessons learned' has become something of a buzzword in post-Cold War parlance," Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear have written. "The rush to create lessons learned units is not to be confused with the learning of lessons. To the extent that many of the so-called lessons remain relegated to file drawers, the idea is a perversion of the concept of learning."[3] In the three cases examined in Chapter 1, knowledge of local people, conditions, and needs was often poor, but in some, basic knowledge of sound generic development practice was also in short supply.

Evaluation and Knowledge

One of the difficulties in learning from emergencies stems from a paucity of formal evaluation processes and the documentation that might ensue. Part of the problem relates to the culture of emergency assistance. Of necessity, much takes place in fast-evolving ad hoc situations. Assessing short- and longer-term impacts in unstable environments is difficult and sometimes impossible.

Even if evaluations occurred more frequently and their results were more widely shared, the process might not help as much as proponents think. Evaluations can be very threatening, especially if failures are put on display. Moreover, evaluations, as was the case in the Haitian demobilization, normally focus on successful *outputs* (for example, well-trained men) rather than the intended *results* (for example, viable employment). Failure is common in all walks of life, but there is oddly little tolerance for it in the relief and development businesses. Failure often results in reduced funding or other forms of disapprobation. For evaluation to be helpful, it should focus more on learning than on verification and control;

and financial backers should be willing to tolerate honest mistakes as long as they are not repeated, and as long as lessons are genuinely learned.

In fact, evaluation may be less important to learning and change than well-paced policy analysis. As Larry Minear has noted:

> Seasoned evaluators, themselves fully committed to having their labors contribute directly to improving the functioning of institutions, caution against attributing too much influence to the evaluation process itself....Working groups or task forces established by individual agencies to deal with specific crises may play more of a role in adapting policies to the changing needs than do evaluations after the fact.[4]

The wide circulation of such publications as African Rights' *Humanitarianism Unbound* and Mary Anderson's *Do No Harm*[5] are aimed at changing the way emergency assistance is planned and delivered. These publications probably have had much greater influence on relief agency thinking than almost any evaluation, including the costly 1996 Rwanda multi-donor study.[6]

Oxfam Great Britain's Emergencies Director Nicholas Stockton holds, however, that the abundance of critical analyses of emergency assistance over the past decade represents a concerted attack that has seriously damaged the credibility and capacities of relief organizations.[7] Driven more by a reformist agenda than by empirical rigor, academic study on humanitarian action, he suggests, has played into the hands of governmental and intergovernmental aid agendas that seek increasingly to avoid political censure and to do less of everything rather than more of the right thing.

While the purpose and impact of such analytical inquiry of relief efforts may be debated, there is no doubt that research and evaluation has been a growth industry in recent years, adding to

an already vast library of development literature. However, there is a very short shelf of material on transition, reconstruction, and potential synergy between relief and development.

Institutional Cultures

Working against both individual and institutional learning, particularly in emergency situations, are institutional cultures and their systems of rewards and punishments. Sue Lautze summarizes the problems:

> Disaster relief has not enjoyed the same career rewards and status as international development. It is difficult to attract qualified professionals to the *profession*. A common expression from the field claims that disasters attract three kinds of people: missionaries, mercenaries and misfits. In addition to having a poor professional reputation, disaster relief work is extremely demanding. Days are long and stressful. Relief workers are expected to be highly mobile. Decisions involving massive resources are made with insufficient information. Field work is dangerous and often emotionally disturbing. Finally, few relief organizations invest adequately in their staff. Staff turnover and "burnout" are relatively high. As a consequence, institutional memories are shallow, leaving the most experienced with the least time to train and educate other staff.[8]

Few practitioners would argue that stress and burnout are not prevalent among relief workers. But is their behavior and the ways in which they learn—that is, their institutional culture—different from the development side of the international aid spectrum? Writing about rural development, Robert Chambers has examined the problems of what he calls "normal professionalism," which he

defines as "the thinking, values, methods and behaviour dominant in a profession or discipline."[9] Such professionalism has built-in stability "from its link with knowledge and power, reverence for established method, capacity to reproduce itself, and defences against threat. It is sustained by the core-periphery structure of knowledge and knowledge generation, by organizational hierarchy, and by rewards and career patterns." Normal professionalism has its strengths, especially in sciences like engineering and medicine.

In his writing about rural development, Chambers finds three major problems. The first is an assumption that if enough expertise is brought to bear, a problem can be solved. The failure of integrated rural development projects in the 1970s demonstrated the fallacy of this approach, as did the vast and seemingly comprehensive donor effort in Bosnia that failed to ensure minority return. For relief practitioners in Uganda, Sri Lanka, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, comprehensive lists of how to prevent or alleviate conflict are not of much use when boy soldiers— teenagers high on drugs, testosterone, and fantasies of violence and power, and led by psychopaths—are attacking the far side of town.

The second weakness of normal professionalism is what Chambers calls "misuse of method"—that is, the exercise of informal power under the guise of technical objectivity. Peter Uvin provides an example from Rwanda. In the face of widespread government-inspired human rights abuse in the early 1990s, the aid community, unable to adapt to local realities, was advancing the notion of greater government ownership and control of aid resources. Uvin cites examples of UNDP, Swiss, and Belgian aid projects all aimed at strengthening government structures:

> Thus, at the same time as Rwanda's farmers were facing crises without precedent, as inequality and corruption reached endemic proportions, as the hopes for the future extinguished, as violence, hatred and human rights abuses became govern-

ment policy, the international community con-
gratulated Rwanda with its improved capacity to
overcome its 'limited absorptive capacity,' to
improve its capacity to design and implement
development projects. In short, to play the aid
game.[10]

The third weakness Chambers sees in normal professionalism
is "the law of prior bias. What comes first stands highest, gets most,
and sets patterns." Things are done in a certain way because that
is the way that they have always been done. Ex-soldiers in Haiti
need jobs, so they get vocational training; this is the way things
have always been done by aid agencies, regardless of context.
Micro-enterprise lending, the flavor of the decade, becomes a
boilerplate solution to poverty, regardless of impact or sustainability.
Hence, Bosnia has a glut of cafés and *friseurs* in a climate where
security, property rights, and war crimes remain largely unsolved.

The same can be said more broadly about the continuum
linking relief and development. At the normative level, there is no
major problem because a holistic, coordinated approach in which
the actors "do no harm" is now generally accepted. At a conceptual
level, few would argue with Chambers' idea that "development is
not a progress in a single direction, but a process of continuous
adaptation, problem-solving and opportunity-exploiting under
pressure. Causality is complex and circular, not simple and lin-
ear."[11] At an empirical level, there is similarly no real problem. It
is generally accepted that conflict is increasingly characterized by
uncertainty, terror, and an absence of rules, and that some low
intensity conflicts will drag on for years, thereby thwarting
attempts at long-term planning. It is known and accepted that
some reconstruction and development can occur during a conflict,
and that the victims of conflict are not without their own
knowledge, as well as underutilized coping strategies and capaci-
ties. The practical examples of building on this knowledge are
small-scale and anecdotal, but they nonetheless illustrate how
some organizations have been able to alter or reverse normal

professionalism, acting as role models for others. Mary Anderson's *Do No Harm* is full of useful examples of this.

It is at this practical level, however, where the potential for a new kind of professionalism begins to break down. Walls have been constructed between organizations and, within some organizations, between relief and development departments. Developmentalist disdain for relief, the institutional culture of emergency assistance, staffing techniques, funding priorities, political myopia, an absence of open and objective evaluations, and limited time frames all conspire to weaken and negate the normative, conceptual, and empirical evidence that things should and can be done differently.

Human resource constraints are part of the problem of understanding, learning, and effective programming. Perhaps the largest impact is felt in the diminishing human capacity to comprehend the scenes of disaster. A 1996 study of USAID programming in the greater Horn of Africa found that:

• generally declining staff levels within the agency meant overburdened staff and time-consuming, labor-intensive reorganization;

• there had been a lack of qualified development staff on site during critical stages of planning for transition from relief to development. This relates in part to slow staff procedures and a general lack of staff interest in working in transition situations because of poor career incentives, long hours, extreme hardship, and sometimes danger;

• the withdrawal of key staff during an emergency can lead to lost opportunities and tunnel vision.[12]

Understanding Local Cultures

In order to function effectively and efficiently, relief and development agencies require a better understanding than they have had in the past of local cultures, political and social dynamics, and history. Although intimate familiarity is never easy, emergen-

Box 4.1: BRAC and the Question of Understanding

BRAC started small, and did not expect to continue beyond its first emergency activities immediately after the devastating 1971 war of liberation. Even the name—Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee—suggested impermanence. Fazle Hasan Abed and his colleagues soon found, however, that rural needs went far beyond simple relief and reconstruction. Poverty, disease, ignorance, and exploitation were endemic throughout the countryside. Eventually the "rehabilitation committee" became a "rural advancement committee," and then just "BRAC," transforming itself into an organization that was to become synonymous with efficiency, effectiveness, and the best meanings that can be attached to the word "development."

Numbers give a sense of the magnitude of BRAC. In 1997, the organization had almost 18,000 staff and more than 33,000 part-time teachers in its village primary schools throughout Bangladesh. There were 1.8 million members in almost 54,000 village organizations, most of them women. Collectively they had saved over one *billion* taka (about $30 million). And in 1996 they borrowed over five billion taka (about $128 million) for productive enterprises, repaying virtually all of it on time. A million women were actively involved in poultry projects. And 25 million mulberry trees had been planted to support a sericulture enterprise which produced 43.5 metric tons of silk between 1992 and 1995, half the entire national production.

Arguably, BRAC's most important investment was in its own learning. During an interview, Deputy Executive Director Salehuddin Ahmed recalled joining BRAC in 1979 after getting a Ph.D. in economics. Sent to a village for nine months, his urban middle class ideas about the poor were dramatically altered. "We were learning new things, but we were also *unlearning* a lot of things...that the poor were lazy, that their I.Q. was low, that they didn't want to educate their children, that we had to do everything. In the evening we used to sit together under a hurricane lamp and talk about what were learning. It was a different kind of research."

At an institutional level, learning began with the early establishment of a Research and Evaluation Division in 1975. Probably the most significant NGO research effort anywhere, it has maintained a high standard and a prolific output of studies and evaluations, many undertaken with prominent international research institutions. The creation of an internal research capacity gave BRAC the capacity to know when it was making a mistake, and the capacity to make informed course corrections.

Learning is also about teaching, and from the beginning BRAC invested a major portion of its budget in training its staff. Human development, management, and skill-related courses—which aim to be learner-centred, life-oriented, and participatory—are now offered at 12 Training Centres across the country and in village settings. A monitoring unit tracks courses for quality. And extension and refresher courses are an important part of the process. In 1997, over 66,000 people went through BRAC training programmes, 25 percent of them villagers and village para-professionals. Remarkably, 60 percent of the trainees were BRAC's own staff, with the balance from other NGOs and government.

Since its wartorn independence, Bangladesh has suffered from drought, severe flooding, and the chronic emergency of extreme poverty. While most of BRAC's work has been developmental, it has played an important role in relief efforts during the emergencies. September 1998 saw the worst flooding in 40 years. At its peak, BRAC had organized dozens of emergency camps throughout the country and was baking and distributing a million loaves of bread a day. Its effectiveness in making appropriate linkages between relief and development, and in transforming itself from a relief agency to one of the world's most effective development organizations, is due in part to its impressive leadership and its integrated approach. But the most significant factor in its success is undoubtedly its ongoing investment in understanding the realities of poverty, rural life, and interventions that can make a difference.

cies make understanding of local situations even more difficult for outsiders. Time is of the essence in saving lives, and expatriate-led teams usually arrive in a hurry, attempting to provide assistance as expeditiously as possible. Knowledge can be built up over time, but when the emergency winds down, so do staffing complements, both expatriate and local. New players and new agencies arrive, and they must often start from scratch. Newcomers may have little appreciation of the trauma that people have suffered. They may have little idea of what "community" meant before the crisis and may not understand what war has done to the social fabric, generational relationships, or the roles of such vulnerable groups as women, children, and the elderly.

Understanding local cultures and issues requires more than good staff, expatriate and local. It requires effective partnerships with local actors—governments, municipalities, traditional leaders, civil society organizations, and NGOs. If these are absent, or weak, or if they become lopsided through a power imbalance, understanding and therefore programming, as in much of the Bosnian example, will suffer.

Safeguards

Closely allied to the problem of understanding is the difficulty of knowing what helps and what hinders useful emergency and development assistance. And yet, such understanding is essential for effective programming for either relief or development, let alone for optimizing any synergy between them. Almost every major emergency has generated a catalogue of errors: outdated drugs, wrong foods, inattention to the special needs of women, and inadvertent assistance to combatants. The protection of affected populations can draw relief agencies into new and dangerous waters where they actually hurt victims.[13] For example, the provision of too much food for too long can create unnecessary dependencies or agricultural market distortions.

Recently, much has been written about counterproductive aid, and many suggestions have been made for addressing this

problem in complex emergencies. One recent and frequently mentioned suggestion, made by Paul Richards, is a call for "smart relief," a kind of "just in time" approach to the provision of equipment and supplies in order to avoid attracting thieves and combatants.[14] Mary Anderson has suggested a "Hippocratic Oath" for aid, a pledge to "do no harm" while also doing good.[15] And in 1994 the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, later joined by dozens of NGOs, drafted a *Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief* that contains several commandments about doing the right thing (for instance, "strive to reduce future vulnerability" and "respect culture and custom") and about avoiding the wrong thing (for instance, not to "act as instruments of government foreign policy" or to "further a particular political or religious standpoint").[16]

Suggestions in codes and innovative project ideas may be helpful, but for relief workers on the ground and for those struggling with a transition situation, they can be annoyingly simplistic. One frequently cited example of "smart relief" is the use of wet feeding as a substitute for the dry rations that can attract fighters. Wet feeding, however, can encourage people to congregate at centers where sanitation and clean water are in short supply. An Oxfam wet feeding center in Liberia was beset by cholera as a result of this problem.[17]

Few relief and development practitioners intend to do harm. The problem is, however, that inadvertent harm can often occur without a robust supply of commodities that are scarce in an emergency or in one that is winding down—namely, historical and cultural understanding, appropriate funding, and a good sense of timing. And programmers must balance the urgent and often contradictory demands of different and influential actors—donors, victims, the media, government, and combatants.

It would be useful to unpack the frequently cited example of the inadvertent harm done by hiring armed guards in Somalia, a practice that encouraged combatants and thugs, and also drained important relief resources away from victims.[18] It was obviously never intended, however, that hiring armed guards would become as problematic as it did. Armed watchmen are commonplace

throughout the world. Although subsequently repudiated by Geneva headquarters, the ICRC's decision to employ armed guards in 1991 was taken after the murder of one international delegate and fourteen local staff, and the wounding of others.[19] The problem was not the initial hiring of armed guards but the subsequent competition among relief agencies for guards, and the increase in the stakes when the military situation went out of control several months later. Armed guards are still required almost everywhere, and no generalization will obviate the need for them. Nor will it warn clearly when the practice is about to become problematic.

The *Disaster Relief Code of Conduct* is little more than a set of vague guidelines, which probably explains why more than 100 NGOs were in a position to support it in the first three years. It has very general exhortations such as "[W]e will place a high priority on the proper coordination of our emergency responses." There is nothing binding, no mechanism for ensuring compliance, no complaints procedure, no board or supervising body—in short, no teeth. While the *Code* is a step in the right direction, its weaknesses are a reflection of agency unwillingness to be held accountable for things over which they have limited control, although the code points toward the desirability of more control and accountability.

Just as doctors without equipment fear later lawsuits from accident victims whom they find by the roadside, aid personnel are reluctant to be held accountable for the humanitarian fallout from tense situations and political and military actions taken by others. That said, better harmony between professional performance and binding codes of conduct could help ensure more effective relief and development, as well as greater synergy between the two.

Attempts to Improve the Knowledge Base

A recent attempt to take the *Code* further is the Sphere Project, launched in 1997 by several humanitarian agencies to compile, "from existing material and current best practices, a set of minimum standards covering essential goods and services, implemen-

tation assistance and stakeholder accountability."[20] Although regarded by some as a breakthrough, the project's first two reports stay safely within the bounds of well-known generalities. For example, the "standard" suggested for water quality is that "drinking water at point of collection [should be] of sufficient quality to be drunk without transmitting water-borne diseases and without causing short term health hazards. Bathing water [should be] free of schistosomiasis."[21] Nonetheless, the final publication will include better norms for project delivery, which could be important if donors use them in the allocation of funds and the evaluation of past disbursements.

While its impact remains to be seen, the Sphere Project is innovative in its partnership, in its use of seconded agency staff, and in its use of electronic communications and the Internet.[22] Other efforts to improve the knowledge base can be found in the growing volume of academic and practical study on emergencies, emergency response, and the connection between relief and development.[23] NGOs themselves are producing case studies and manuals that add elements to an understanding of emergency response. Illustrative examples include *The Oxfam Handbook on Development and Relief, Development in States of War* and CARE Canada's *NGOs in Complex Emergencies Project.*[24]

In 1998, Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) began to develop a new code of conduct governing official British assistance for humanitarian operations, which it planned eventually to take to the EU for broader ratification and dissemination. Although similar to the Red Cross code, it also articulates a new set of ground rules to guide its funding decisions: "We recognize that humanitarian intervention in conflict situations often poses genuine moral dilemmas. We will base our decisions on explicit analyses of the choices open to us and the ethical considerations involved, and communicate our conclusions openly to our partners."[25]

Many agencies in recent years have instituted proactive and responsive projects to examine and act in the largely neglected space between relief and development assistance. In Canada, for

example, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has created a Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program "supporting research, policy development and capacity building as tools to assist countries emerging from violent conflicts to make the difficult transition to peace, reconciliation, social equity and sustainable development." In the U.S., there is a variety of government and independent initiatives. The Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has initiated studies on the links between relief and development. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), itself an innovation of sorts, has produced publicly available evaluations and reports reviewing its work. In 1996, the President's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative produced public recommendations for major changes in the way that relief and development are conceived and administered. Many larger NGOs have undertaken their own internal reviews of transition issues that attempt to draw out the lessons about new demands and their changing roles.

A number of agencies—including the World Bank, UNICEF, UNDP, and UNHCR—have recently undertaken or commissioned internal studies that re-examine the relevance of their mandates in the face of new realities. In 1997, the DAC produced its comprehensive set of *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*, and in the same year, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict produced a compendium on preventing, alleviating, and resolving conflict.[26]

The jury is still out on what impact these initiatives, most dating from the mid-1990s, will have. Alex de Waal, one of the most critical of critics, says that "as critiques of humanitarianism become more common and more accepted, some thoughtful agency staff are becoming more questioning...[however] few if any of the internal critics have succeeded in breaking the code...This cannot be achieved while the language of humanitarianism remains so foggy and oblique."[27] Certainly, as de Waal suggests, there is a higher degree of self-criticism within agencies, and much more external criticism than ever before.

Conclusions

Of the three challenges analyzed in this study, the challenge of understanding is clearly the greatest. Understanding what to do in a complex emergency—relief, development, a mix, nothing—is by no means easy. William Shawcross has observed that "not for nothing do we now have to deal with what are called 'complex emergencies.'"[28]

At this point, it might be useful to think again about the continuum as an organizing metaphor. Clearly there is a continuum in the lives of people—from one day to the next, from one event to the next, from war to peace, from poverty to something better, if they are lucky. This is the natural continuum of time and hope.

In thinking about what might come after a war, they and their benefactors among relief and development agencies have no difficulty in conceptualizing another kind of continuum, an intellectual progression from one step to the next. The problem lies in moving from this intellectual continuum to a concrete situation in the field, where myriad overlapping and sometimes conflicting needs compete for the attention of scores of organizations—all with different agendas, budgets, and time frames, along with different levels of understanding and knowledge. The problem is not continuum *thinking*, it is the absence of mechanisms to build shared knowledge and coordinate appropriately financed activities in a logical progression from emergency to peace and development.

However it is applied, the clear message from the preceding analysis is that knowledge is not the same thing as information. While both may be in short supply, much greater emphasis has been placed on generating raw data about the beginning and end points on the relief-development spectrum, and especially on emergencies. Inappropriate boilerplate interventions continue to abound, in part because of serious impediments to institutional learning. Such impediments reflect inappropriate career incentives and an absence of the accountability that might come from more

and better evaluation. Intellectual inquiry may be changing contemporary institutional frameworks somewhat, although to date the greatest emphasis has been at either end of the relief-development spectrum rather than on any practical synergy in the middle. Even where knowledge and understanding are not in short supply, their application remains heavily influenced by clearly demarcated borders between "relief workers," "relief agencies," and "relief budgets" on the one hand, and their development counterparts on the other.

Given these problems, it is no wonder that forging effective links between emergency and development assistance has proven so difficult, and no wonder that the conveyer-belt and the merry-go-round images seem so apt. There is not enough time or money to learn; not enough learning or money to act; not enough money or understanding to stay the course.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

This is no way to run a planet.
Gus Speth, UNDP Administrator, 1998[1]

This study has focused on the relationship between emergency and development needs, on the potential for creating greater synergy between the two processes, and on the nature and organization of the international response. Greater synergy *is* possible, desirable, and necessary, during an emergency and in the transition out of an emergency. The transition, in fact, could be seen as a move from crisis to non-crisis, rather than from relief to development.

Such a refinement notwithstanding, the challenges of reconstruction and rehabilitation are vast: psychosocial, economic, institutional, agricultural, environmental, military, and the physical infrastructure. Creating carefully nuanced approaches appropriate to the time and place is easier said than done. Drawing on previous lessons from UNHCR's QIPs, transition projects in Haiti, the panoply of problems in post-Dayton Bosnia, and other examples, this final chapter offers some basic conclusions about the issues of timing, funding, and understanding. First, however, the vexing and recurring question of institutional mandates is addressed.

Institutional Mandates

At a broad level, *development* agencies have an interest in better links between emergency assistance and their own work for two reasons. The first is to ensure that foundations are laid as soon as possible for an effective transition out of the crisis. The second is to ensure that as much as possible has been done to prevent further erosion of developmental investments and a recurrence of violence. *Relief* organizations, conversely, have an interest in seeing their beneficiaries move toward sustainable peace.

There are two additional reasons for making effective links between relief and development, perhaps more important than ever before. First, complex emergencies are lengthening. Too often the conveyer belt—from emergency to reconstruction to development—breaks down in the emergency phase and never gets started again. Or it becomes a merry-go-round, circling from emergency inputs to development and back again to crisis. Standard short-term relief programs are no longer adequate or appropriate to the task. Second, new, vicious, and widespread warfare has demonstrated that development assistance as practiced in the past has been inadequate, both to the tasks of alleviating poverty and to the prevention of deadly conflict. The public expectation of both prevention and cure by those requesting funds is understandably high. But securing adequate funding for both emergency and development assistance at a time of general and growing reluctance among governmental donors depends on convincing both the public and policymakers that lessons are being learned and applied and that "business as usual" is a thing of the past. Mats Karlsson, Swedish State Secretary for Development Cooperation, observes:

> The gap between relief, rehabilitation and development is not only a result of stereotypical administrative or budgetary structures. More important is the policy that guides the manner in which existing resources are used. A clear policy can do with a great number of budgetary and management set ups; a weak policy easily becomes the prey of bureaucratic rules and procedures.[2]

A fundamental question emerges from this research: Do agencies with capacities in both relief and development have a comparative advantage in maximizing synergies between relief and development? The simple and obvious answer is "yes," but simple answers can be misleading.

Organizations with both relief and development capacities, such as CARE, World Vision, Oxfam, and Save the Children, have in-house experience that can build knowledge, allow for flexible approaches and nuanced understandings of timing, and allocate donor income to suit the emergency and developmental needs of their beneficiaries. ACORD, for example, has been able to adjust its development programming to meet emergency requirements time and again in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, shifting the emphasis when conditions have demanded. Save the Children UK believes that its "long-term perspective means that it responds best [to an emergency] where it already has a presence and a history...This allowed for a thoughtful and strategic response in Somalia in 1992. By the same token, SCF finds it more difficult to respond rapidly to emergencies in new countries. SCF was slower in responding to the situation in Rwanda, for example, than were many other organizations."[3]

Agencies with dual mandates may have a comparative advantage, even in countries where they have no presence at the outset of a crisis. Oxfam's dual mandate has allowed it to move quickly into emergencies where it had no previous geographic presence and to make emergency investments with long-lasting development benefits. In the post-war Bangladesh of the 1970s, it provided food, shelter, and health care to tens of thousands of returning refugees. This was, and remains, the core of its emergency approach worldwide, not unlike a dozen other relief agencies.

But Oxfam also invested immediately in basic infrastructure, building bridges and providing the ferries necessary to get people, food, and commerce moving as quickly as possible. Some of those ferries were still providing useful service 25 years later. Seeing that there were local capacities for the delivery of relief, Oxfam also invested in fledgling Bangladeshi organizations, a programming novelty in 1971. One of modern Bangladesh's foremost health organizations, *Gonoshathaya Kendra,* received sustaining grants from Oxfam during this period for its emergency clinics. As argued earlier, BRAC is one of the world's largest and most effective

NGOs. It received its first external grant from Oxfam during this initial emergency period as well.

During the same period in Bangladesh, CARE was able to turn a vast emergency shelter project into a self-help rural housing program that formed the basis for cooperative societies and revolving loan funds. The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) converted a basic feeding program into a long-range nutrition project, which helped to revolutionize the country's production and consumption of vitamin-rich winter vegetables.

These options were available to organizations with dual mandates and with a perspective that looked beyond the immediacy of the emergency. Such options were not available then or now to agencies with a primary focus on emergency relief, nor would they have been available to organizations with a strong post-conflict developmental mind set. MSF and UNHCR, for example, would not have had the time, mandate, or expertise to turn a feeding program into a long-term seeds project. Even if they had started such a project, incoming development agencies would likely have shown little interest in becoming custodians of a secondhand project initiated and then handed over by a departing relief agency. In Bangladesh, the dual mandate, combined with a good understanding and a keen sense of timing, gave organizations the edge to realize synergies.

In Bangladesh, however, funding also played a key role, and funding may be an extremely limiting factor in any generalizations about dual-mandate organizations. The major relief/development agencies in postwar Bangladesh were recipients of huge amounts of unrestricted private donor funds, enough to allocate and reallocate to efforts where the need seemed greatest—short or long term, emergency or developmental. The same has been true for agencies in such other large-scale, well-publicized emergencies as Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Bosnia. But where emergencies have been less well-publicized and where unrestricted private donor money has been more limited—Angola, Haiti, and Sierra Leone come to mind—opportunities for synergies narrow.

Timing

Getting the timing right—knowing when to intervene, when to modify the intervention, and when to withdraw—is essential to prevention, conflict resolution, reconstruction, and development. It is also important in knowing if, when, and how to move from basic relief to activities with developmental objectives. The study has suggested that the greatest problem for Bosnia, for example, was not money but understanding and time—the time required to rebuild institutions, the rule of law, and good governance; the time required to break through the authoritarian and unforgiving nature of the regimes that followed Yugoslavia's breakup. But time is one thing that involuntarily displaced people do not have. With a few exceptions, such as the FINNIDA example in Mozambique, most aid agencies do not have much time either.

Without money, of course, timing is irrelevant. Money is a key factor in most timing decisions—in hurrying or delaying humanitarian response, and in inappropriately hastening the move from relief to development programming. It can be the cause of precipitous agency withdrawal, and it is the prime motivation behind the growing demand for unrealistic exit strategies. The time-money nexus was at the root of many of the problems with QIPs and the ill-fated Haitian demobilization projects, while Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and a dozen others are case studies in bad donor timing. Time and knowledge are also intimately connected because organizations in a hurry have little time to learn. Not knowing when to act, outsiders become paralyzed, as though there are no previous examples to draw on for inspiration.

Funding

With dramatic aid reductions, there has been increasing competition for market share. The greater struggle, however, may have been between those seeking resources for emergency assistance and those seeking resources for development. For emergency assistance and its ability to contribute to reconstruction, the

biggest constraint is the sporadic and short-term nature of donor commitments. Inevitably, short-term funding will deal primarily with short-term needs, exacerbating the gap between emergency and development assistance and between the workers and organizations for whom they are competing priorities.

Where NGOs are concerned, the bulk of the funding is provided to a relatively small number of actors, many of whom were in the country before the emergency, and most of whom remain afterwards. The funding is mostly provided by bilateral and multilateral agencies whose presence also transcends the emergency. As one NGO manager put it during a discussion of this draft, "They know us. We and they were there before the emergency and we will all be there afterwards. Why does funding suddenly become compressed into such rigid, short-term packages?"

Reconstruction and rehabilitation lie in between relief and development—underfunded, understudied, and under-reported, suffering from unclear definition and from uncertain aims and objectives. Moving from relief to development, or realizing synergy between them, takes time and requires adequate funding and an understanding of local people, conditions, and the techniques of rehabilitation. There are few dedicated budget lines for reconstruction or rehabilitation within UN or bilateral agencies. Even where there is a budget line, as with the newly established EU provision for reconstruction, the mechanism usually operates more like a relief than a development effort, tending to be event-specific, with short timelines, constant fluctuations, and a heavy proportion of the allocations made through NGOs.

The World Bank notes a key problem relating to postwar reconstruction: "The international community is often ill-equipped to respond quickly on the ground. Pledges are made rapidly, but commitment takes longer, and there is a considerable lag before actual disbursement takes place. Sustainable transitions out of conflict take several years, while there is a tendency for donors to disengage, once the conflict has receded from public attention."[4] Donors can also be monumentally inflexible, bureaucratic, and

inconsistent. The demands on recipients and host organizations can be heavy, and they usually differ, often markedly, from one donor to the next. Far from building capacity, the collective donor approach may well weaken or at least dilute it.

In discussions among practitioners, the constraints working against synergy that are now frequently cited concern the sources of funding. Thus, NGOs often fault OFDA and ECHO for failing to allow relief activities to be approached more from a developmental perspective. The proscription against using government funds in politically unpopular countries is sometimes said to impede activities in settings that may be ripe for synergy. NGOs routinely cite the imperative of not violating the intended use of funds raised from the general public as a constraint against applying "emergency" funds to obvious reconstruction and development needs.

Some international funding has shifted during the past decade from development to relief, as relief operations themselves have grown in magnitude and complexity. In this process, NGOs have become more dependent on governmental sources of funds, with a relatively small number managing an increasing share of resources. Even the largest NGOs, dual mandate or otherwise, have been obliged to use funds received from the general public to leverage financial resources available from bilateral and multilateral donors. In doing so, they have become dependent on, and their work has become significantly influenced by, donor institutions providing such funds. Thus, the emergency and development mandates and priorities of OFDA, ECHO, UNICEF, and WFP, along with their framing of issues and their perspectives on timing, have played themselves out in the priorities and programs of NGOs.

Understanding

The Bosnia chapter showed the relationship between minority return and the need for understanding, coherence, and balance in virtually every element of reconstruction and development—

including security, justice, and stability. For international actors, problems of funding, timing, and understanding infuse virtually every aspect of the Bosnia story. They suggest that "development" as traditionally practiced within the international aid system should also change. It should be curative as well as preventive; strengthen rather than weaken local capacities, both governmental and private; be based on shared vision and understanding; and not reflect strategies established in donor headquarters but by local needs and priorities.

As argued above, knowledge is not the same as information. While both may be short supply, much greater emphasis has been placed on the latter, which has consequently led to formulaic applications of irrelevant data to new situations. Inappropriate management, career incentives, weak accountability, and a lack of meaningful evaluation all work to impede institutional learning. Even where knowledge and understanding exist, their application remains heavily influenced by clearly demarcated borders between relief and development workers, their budgets, and their agencies. Given these problems, it is hardly surprising that synergy between relief and development has proven elusive.

Recommendations and Their Limitations

This study has attempted to demonstrate that the challenges of funding, timing, and understanding present enormous hurdles to "getting it right." There are now several lengthy menus available on what should be considered and what should be done: the OECD *Guidelines* and the Carnegie Commission's *Preventing Deadly Conflict* are recent examples, as are *Do No Harm* or the Red Cross *Code of Conduct*. Practitioners, however, look for immediate guidance. A newly posted field manager—ignorant of local conditions, equipped with an inadequate three-month budget, and trying to make urgent plans for thousands of returning refugees—will find too little in these documents that is immediately useful upon his or her arrival in a war zone.

Making practical and effective links between relief and development is essential. The need to assist people in immediate distress

notwithstanding, an individual's long-term welfare is most likely to be secure if it is taken into consideration at the outset of contact with external agencies. For the victims of war, tomorrow is not always another day. If planning for the future is ignored by those with the capacity to do so, there may not actually be another day.

Relief in its purest form addresses symptoms rather than causes. Once the purpose of an outside effort extends beyond the immediate care of victims, development considerations should kick in. With every physical object constructed or reconstructed, there should be accompanying institutional support. In other words, local institutions should be found, strengthened, or created to maintain the reconstructed road, clinic, or revolving loan fund. Such institutions could be a government body, an NGO, a mothers' group, or a civil society effort that cuts across factions by working on human rights, open media, or educational reform.

Education, in fact, provides an example of the disconnect between investments in infrastructure and people. The biggest problem with education in Angolan schools—or those in Cambodia, California, or Denmark for that matter—is rarely the school building, no matter what condition it is in, but what goes on inside the building. Building *social* infrastructure rather than *physical* infrastructure is, and always has been, the most difficult challenge of development. Having focused too much on the physical in countries on their way down, donors can no longer afford to ignore the social in countries on their way back up. As with so many of the previous cases analyzed, this is not an issue of timing or funding but of understanding.

Lists of recommendations, usually in the imperative voice, conclude most studies. We will resist that temptation, however, and instead consider whether progress is being made after a decade of such lists.

Certainly there is evidence of progress in understanding and realizing synergy along the continuum. There is also more attention to the issues than ever before, as well as interesting and important new "transition" initiatives in the major multilateral and bilateral agencies, demonstrating concern for more holistic ap-

proaches. However, all is not well. The world has entered a period of profound change in the nature of war and peace, and yet coordination and coherence, both within and among agencies, on the connections between relief and development remain serious problems.

Reconstruction remains something of a "missing middle," lost in a gray area between relief and development, inadequately planned, poorly documented, and imperfectly implemented. Funding has more often than not been limited, rigid, and late. Reconstruction has focused heavily on physical infrastructure and the formal economy and only recently on the social sector and environmental issues. The informal economy, local capacities, and psychological trauma have received less attention, while politics and security issues have been relegated to the bottom of the agenda.

Imagine an assembly line in an automobile factory. Imagine people along the conveyer belt making carburetors—perhaps excellent carburetors—without knowing much about the engine to which they will be attached. Imagine hundreds of engines backed up, waiting for automobile bodies that might or might not be produced, depending on levels of interest in the sheet metal department. Imagine the body shop producing only right-side fenders and no doors because the design for the left-side fenders and doors has not been completed or somebody else was supposed to make them and did not. Imagine that budgeting for the end product has been organized around the individual components, that wax paper has been supplied for windows because there was not enough money for glass. Imagine a factory producing vehicles for a market, road conditions, and drivers that it barely understands.

There should be no argument, certainly not at the dawn of the 21st century, about overlapping opportunities and needs for both emergency and development assistance or about the urgent need for one to inform the other. In this respect, the old debate about a continuum was largely one of semantics, obscuring the larger issue of how emergency and development assistance are actually

organized. That they are or can be compatible is by now a given. The problem is one of institutional mandates and personalities, which, dictated in part by funding, define the limits of outsiders' understanding and their approach to timing. In short, institutional changes have not kept pace with conceptual ones.

The image of the conveyer belt, in spite of its limitations, is not a bad one. Agencies with different mandates locate themselves along an assembly line, performing different functions—security, food, water, immunization, schooling, assistance for returning refugees, credit, job training, seeds, and extension services. It is not unusual or wrong for services during an emergency to be provided by different agencies—one drilling bore holes, another handling food, a third organizing a school for children when the time is right. Similarly, in the post-emergency phase, public health may be organized by a UN agency, credit facilities by an NGO, and education by a host government. Consistent with the concept of overlapping emergency and development opportunities and needs, there may well be different actors working at any given point on the assembly line. While the agencies stay in their position, their beneficiaries move on. However, like the imaginary vehicle factory in which nothing is coordinated and individual departments design and produce components at will, the result—if not altogether chaotic—is certainly less than optimal.

If the challenges of funding, timing, and understanding were met and if the emergency itself were not chronic, would the result be a smoother, more appropriate conveyer belt? The answer, no doubt, is "yes." But as with our imaginary vehicle plant, it would probably not be enough. A larger question emerges: How would this more appropriate arrangement come about? One option is for all agencies to become "dual mandate" organizations, like CARE, Oxfam, and World Vision. This suggests, however, that everyone should be able to do everything, which is impossible. Certainly the answer is not for the carburetor department to start making engine parts, or for the paint shop to produce the last three bits of the drive train.

This leads to a more fundamental question: Can the existing chasm between relief and development be bridged simply with more of the now standard exhortations for better coordination?[5] The present study suggests that there are fundamental institutional problems that cannot be overcome without much stronger leadership, and without the demolition of existing structural, financial, and cultural barriers. Most new initiatives to link relief and development are located comfortably within an aid superstructure that has remained fundamentally unchanged after a decade and a half of state collapse, horrific warfare, and millions of violent deaths. Funding for creative transitional peace-building efforts, including those by OTI and other bilateral operations, was probably less than three percent of all emergency assistance in 1998, a tiny fraction of overall aid expenditure.

In short, the structures of the past—with all of their problems and dysfunctions—remain firmly in place.

Introduction

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4. Steven Holtzman, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Washington (Washington, DC: World Bank, Social Policy and Resettlement Division, 1997), 3.

5. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York; Carnegie Corporation, New York, 1997), 3.

6. These figures are taken from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *World Disasters Report 1997* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 127-134.

7. See, for example, Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid* (Cambridge, Mass.: Local Capacities for Peace, 1996), and *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999 forthcoming). See also Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), and Michael Maren*, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity* (New York: Free Press, 1997).

8. UNHCR, "Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace," Geneva, September 19, 1997.

9. World Bank, *World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), 8.

10. Joanna Macrae and Mark Bradbury, *Aid in the Twilight Zone: A Critical Analysis of Humanitarian-Development Aid Linkages in Situations of Chronic Instability: A Report for UNICEF* (London: ODI/Brown University Humanitarianism and War Project, February 1998), 6.

11. Tracking the paternity of the continuum concept is no easy matter. It is often ascribed to UNDP. Whatever its origins, a UNDP official recently observed that "the continuum doesn't live here any more."

12. Hugo Slim, "The Continuing Metamorphosis of the New Humanitarian Practitioner: Some New Colours for an Endangered Chameleon," *Disasters* 19, no. 2 (1995): 121.

13. Nicole Ball and T. Halevy, *Making Peace Work: The Role of the*

International Development Community (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1996).

14. Emerging perhaps from a 1994 IDS conference, the concept sometimes is referred to as "linking relief-rehabilitation and development" (LRRD).

15. USAID, "Linking Relief and Development in the Greater Horn of Africa: USAID Constraints and Recommendations," The President's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, Washington (May 1996).

16. See, for example, Cindy Collins, "Critiques of Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Action," a paper prepared for OCHA (April 1998).

17. ECHO, "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development," Brussels (1995).

18. World Bank, *World Bank Involvement*, 19.

19. See, for example, Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow, *Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster* (Boulder: Westview, 1989).

20. ODA, "Conflict Reduction British Co-operation," London (June 1997): 7.

21. United Nations Office in Vienna, *Survey of the United Nations System's Capabilities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Vienna: United Nations, April 1996), following p. viii (unnumbered).

22. Chris Roche, "Learning from Oxfam's Experience about How to Help Prevent or Resolve Conflicts," (Oxford: Oxfam, 1998).

Chapter 1

1. The evolution of QIPs is outlined in "Post-Conflict Recovery: UNHCR's Capacities and Perspectives," Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies, UNDDMS/UNIDO, Colloquium at Stadtschlaining (June 1995): especially at p. 143. See also A. Bonifacio, "A Primer on Quick Impact Projects," UNHCR, Managua (1992); "Quick Impact Projects," PTSS Discussion Paper No. 8, UNHCR, Geneva (1993) and "Preliminary Guidelines, Preparation and Design of Quick Impact projects," PTSS Discussion Paper No. 10, UNHCR, Geneva (1994).

2. "Post-Conflict Recovery," 147.

3. Interview with Norah Niland, former UNHCR employee, Phnom Penh, June 5, 1995, in Archie Law, A Hollow Success: The Repatriation and Reintegration of Cambodian Refugees (Melbourne: World Vision Australia, December 1995), 60.

4. UNDDMS/UNIDO document, 47.

5. UNHCR, "Review of the Cambodian Repatriation Operation, September 1993," in Law, A Hollow Success, 67.

6. Interview with Michael Calabria, Regional Coordinator of IRC, Phnom Penh, June 21, 1995, quoted in ibid., p. 65.

7. Interview with Robyn Groves, UNHCR, Sydney, Australia, May 11,1995, quoted in ibid., p. 65.

8. Stephen Lubkemann, "Humanitarianism and War Fieldwork Case Study on the Effects of Innovative Practices: 'The Manica Province Integrated Health Project in Mozambique (1990-1997),'" Providence, Brown University, draft, April 1998.

9. UNHCR, "Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace," (September 19, 1997).

10. UNHCR, Review of UNHCR's Phase Out Strategies: Case Studies in Selected Countries of Origin, Inspection and Evaluation Service, February 1997, quoted in UNHCR, "Reintegration."

11. See Jarat Chopra, United Nations Authority in Cambodia, Occasional Paper #15 (Providence: Watson Institute, 1994).

12. Discussions with UNHCR Reintegration and Self-Reliance Unit, Geneva, Jan. 29, 1998.

13. UNHCR, "Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace," (September 19, 1997): 7.

14. Ibid., 8.

15. UNDP, "Linking Relief to Development," UNDP Rwanda (June 1998): 7.

16. For a detailed discussion of the transition, see Robert Maguire, Edwige Balutansky, Jacques Fomerand. Larry Minear, William G. O'Neill, Thomas G. Weiss, and S. Zaidi, *Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood 1986 to 1996*, Occasional Paper #23 (Providence: Watson Institute, 1996).

17. L. M. G. Carlier, "Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of Donor-Financed Emergency Poverty Alleviation Projects in Haiti," in *Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction*, Vol. II (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 1998): 7-8.

18. Ibid., 9.

19. Ian Smillie, *The Land of Lost Content* (Toronto: Deneau, 1985), 81-87.

20. Anderson and Woodrow, *Beyond the Ashes*.

21. Maguire et al, *Haiti*, 78.

22. USAID information sheet on OTI, undated.

23. Sally Patterson, *A Report on a Survey of the Former FAd'H in Haiti*

(Washington, DC: Winner, Wagner and Francis, September 1996).

24. Dworkin *et al*, *Haiti*, p. 50.

25. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement led to the creation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a federal arrangement with two "entities"—the Republika Srpska (RS) with a largely Serbian population, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprised largely of Muslims (or "Bosniacs") and Croats. A 34,000 member Stabilization Force (SFOR) made up of troops mainly from NATO countries succeeded the International Force (IFOR). The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was charged with monitoring and managing implementation of the Dayton Accord.

26. Office of the High Representative, "Priorities and Objectives of the Human Rights Task Force for 1998," Sarajevo (December 2, 1997).

27. Andreas Herdina, "The NGO Role in Promoting Civil Society and Facilitating Return," Banja Luka, ECRE/ICVA Reference Group Meeting, November 8-9, 1997.

28. Office of the High Representative, "Outlook for 1998; Resources, Repatriation and Minority Return," Sarajevo, RRTF (December 1997).

29. Office of the High Representative, "Priorities and Objectives of the Human Rights Task Force for 1998."

30. Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self Sustaining Structures" (December 10, 1997): 8.

31. As of March 1998, 24 suspects were being held at the Scheveningen prison near The Hague. Two had been convicted, and 51 others were under public indictment and several more were under "sealed" or secret indictment.

32. International Crisis Group, "A Review of the Dayton Peace Agreement's Implementation," Sarajevo (November 18, 1997).

33. ICG, "Rebuilding a Multi-Ethnic Sarajevo: The Need for Minority Returns," Sarajevo, February 3, 1998. International pressure forced the drafting of new laws to ensure greater fairness, but as of January 31, 1998, these had not been adopted.

34. "Brotherhood and Disunity: A Survey of the Balkans," *The Economist* (January 24, 1998): 8-9.

35. Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self Sustaining Structures," (December 10, 1997): 5.

36. Office of the High Representative, "Outlook for 1998; Resources, Repatriation and Minority Return."

37. Ibid., 24.

38. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia*, "1st Quarter 1998," (London, 1998).

39. European Commission and the World Bank, "BiH: Implementation of the Priority Reconstruction Program; Status Report to the Donor Community," Sarajevo (November 1997): 6.

40. World Bank, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Recovery to Sustainable Growth* (Washington, DC, 1997), 75.

41. Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self Sustaining Structures," (December 10, 1997): 7.

42. European Commission and the World Bank, *BiH*, 5.

43. These comments are all drawn from three consecutive paragraphs in an address by an OHR official to NGOs in Banja Luka, "The NGO Role," 6.

44. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia*, "1st Quarter 1998," 6.

Chapter 2

1. OECD, *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* (Paris: OECD, 1997), 16.

2. "UN Ignored My Pleas: Dallaire," *Globe and Mail* (February 26, 1998): 1.

3. "Horror Tales Upset Clinton," *Globe and Mail* (March 26, 1998): 1.

4. "Violence at the Coast," *Kenya Witness* (October-November 1997): 2.

5. "Kenya: Urgent Need for Action on Human Rights," Amnesty International, Article 19 and Human Rights Watch (April 8, 1998).

6. The story of the "concocted" drought is told in Neil Middleton and Phil O'Keefe, *Disaster and Development* (London: Pluto, 1998). Aid statistics for Kenya are adapted from *Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the DAC* (Paris: OECD, 1993 and 1997).

7. OECD, *Development Co-operation 1997: Efforts and Policies of the Development Assistance Committee* (Paris: OECD, 1998).

8. Alexander George and Jane Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, May 1997).

9. Quoted by Amir Pasic and Thomas G. Weiss, "Humanitarian Recognition in the Former Yugoslavia," *Security Studies 7*, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 198.

10. Quoted by Nik Gowing, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention* (New York: Carnegie commission of Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).

11. Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 1 (January/February 1998): 57

12. Ibid.

Chapter 3

1. Statistics in this paragraph and the next are drawn from *Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1996 and 1997* (Paris: OECD, 1997 and 1998).

2. See, for example, Colm Foy and Henny Helmich, eds., *Public Support for International Development* (Paris: OECD, 1996), and Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich, eds., Public Attitudes and International Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 1998).

3. These arguments have been refuted in many places, including Robert Cassen, *Does Aid Work?* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), Paul Mosley, *Overseas Aid: Its Defence and Reform* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987), various UNDP Human Development Reports, and World Bank World Development Reports, both published annually by Oxford Univ. Press. In 1996, over 72 percent of private commercial flows went to 12 countries, including China, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and Hungary. Low income countries received very little. A more detailed discussion is available in Ian Smillie, "The Overloaded Rickshaw" (London: IIED, 1998).

4. Figures derived from UNDHA, "Summary of Requirements and Contributions," Database-Summary 1995 and 1996.

5. Ibid.

6. Alex De Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (London and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1997), 204-205.

7. Nicholas Stockton, "Rwanda: Rights and Racism," (Oxford: Oxfam, December 1996).

8. There is a growing literature on this subject. The Humanitarianism and War Project has produced two relevant volumes: Colin Scott, Larry Minear, and Thomas G. Weiss, *The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996); and Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., *From Massacres To Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1996).

9. MSF and SCF information drawn from MSF Activity Report July 1996-June 1997 and SCF UK Annual Report 1996/97.

10. William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy.* (London: Deutsch, 1984), 243.

11. Ian Smillie, "Civil Society or Service Provision? NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina," (Ottawa: CARE Canada, November 1996).

12. Quoted in de Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 196.

13. Macrae and Bradbury, *Aid in the Twilight Zone.*

14. The President's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, "Linking Relief and Development in the Greater Horn of Africa: USAID Constraints and Recommendations," (May 1996): ii.

15. See, for example, Thomas. G. Weiss, ed., *Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

16. USAID, Report of the American Voluntary Agencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and Development Registered with USAID (Washington, DC: Bureau for Humanitarian Response, 1997).

17. David Korten, *Getting to the 21st Century* (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian, 1990), 102-103.

18. This issue was raised in connection with U.S. private voluntary agencies as far back as 1973, in "Problems of Voluntary Agencies in Africa," Polit-Econ Services, for USAID, 18. It is discussed extensively in John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations (London: Earthscan, 1991); Ian Smillie, *The Alms Bazaar* (London: IT Publications, 1995); and Mark Robinson, "Privatising the Voluntary Sector: NGOs as Public Service Contractors," in David Hulme and Michael Edwards, eds., *NGOs States and Donors* (London: Macmillan, 1997).

19. Jonathan Goodhand, with Peter Chamberlain, "Dancing with the Prince: NGOs' Survival Strategies in the Afghan Conflict," in *Development in States of War* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1996), 48.

20. Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich, eds., Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships for International Development (London: Earthscan, 1999 forthcoming).

21. WFP: correspondence between CARE Canada and WFP, December 1997; UNHCR: "Information Note," Funding and Donor Relations Service, February, 1997.

22. Smillie and Helmich, Stakeholders.

23. "Jump-starting the economy" is almost as common an expression as "strengthening civil society." For example, the *DAC Guidelines on*

Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation observe that "The need to preserve peace and stability, rehabilitate essential infrastructure, reform public institutions, jump-start the economy, and create employment opportunities places heavy demands on budgetary resources," p. 53. The World Bank's first priority in integrated packages of reconstruction assistance is to "jump-start the economy through investment in key productive sectors." *Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, iii.

24. See Francois Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, *Economie des Guerres Civiles* (Paris: Hachette, 1996); David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 320 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998).

25. Robert Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth* (New York, Random House, 1996), 68.

26. Michael Oliver, "Privatizing Canadian Peacekeeping," draft paper dated 1998. The deal was repudiated when Laurent Kabila came to power.

27. David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi Paper 316 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998).

28. "Governance," Wartorn Societies Project, Final National Workshop, Asmara, December 1996.

29. Milton Friedman, "Social Purpose of Business is to Increase its Profits," New York Times Magazine (September 13, 1970).

30. OECD, *Development Assistance: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee 1994 and 1997* (Paris: OECD, 1995 and 1998).

Chapter 4

1. *Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), 202.

2. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "From Information Management to the 'Knowledge Agency'," *World Disasters Report 1997* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 35.

3. Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, "The Dynamics of Learning by Humanitarian Institutions after the Cold War: An Evolving Introduction to the Issues," Providence, Brown University Humanitarianism and War Project (December 1997).

4. Larry Minear, "Some Thoughts on Institutional Learning and Change," Providence, Brown University Humanitarianism and War

project (March 12, 1997).

5. Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Humanitarianism Unbound: Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies*, Discussion Paper 5 (London: African Rights, 1994), and Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999 forthcoming).

6. Joint Evaluation on Emergency Assistance in Rwanda, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: Strandberg Grafisk, 1996).

7. Nicholas Stockton, "Non-governmental Organisations and Forced Migration," Speaking Notes for the Conference on Forced Migration, Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford, March 25, 1998.

8. Sue Lautze, *Lives versus Livelihoods: How to Foster Self-Sufficiency and Productivity of Disaster Victims* (Washington, DC: OFDA, March 1996), 14.

9. Robert Chambers, *Challenging the Professions: Frontiers for Rural Development* (London: IT Publications, 1993), 3.

10. Peter Uvin, *Aid and Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian, 1998), 89. The quotations within this excerpt are from the World Bank, *Rwanda Public Expenditure Program. An Instrument of Economic Strategy*, Vol. 1 (Washington, 1989).

11. Chambers, *Challenging*, 10.

12. "Linking Relief and Development in the Greater Horn of Africa: USAID Constraints and Recommendations," The President's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (May 1996): 25-26.

13. These issues figure prominently in two forthcoming occasional papers from the Humanitarianism and War Project that are tentatively titled: Larry Minear, Mark Frohardt, William G. O'Neill, and Diane Paul, *Protecting Human Rights in Complex Emergencies* (Providence: Watson Institute, 1999 forthcoming); and S. Neil MacFarlane, *Managing the Conflict Connections* (Providence: Watson Institute, 1999 forthcoming).

14. Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), p. xxviii.

15. Anderson, *Do No Harm*.

16. "Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief," off-print, 6-7.

17. See Steve Collins, "The Risks of Wet Feeding Programmes," *Field Exchange*, Issue 3 (January 1998): 4-5.

18. Much disparaged, this practice has now been engraved on stone tablets as one of many things that must not be done. See for example, DAC *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* (Paris: OECD,

1997), 34: "Payments for 'protection services' cannot be justified as they provide an incentive to factions to maintain insecurity and ransom humanitarian aid."

19. Alex de Waal, "Dangerous Precedents? Famine Relief in Somalia 1991-93," in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, eds., *War and Hunger* (London: Zed Books, 1994), 145.

20. The Sphere Project, "Progress Report Number 1," Geneva, 1998.

21. The Sphere Project, "Progress Report Number 2," Geneva, 1998.

22. For instance, the text of the Sphere document is available at www.ifrc.org/pubs/sphere/sphrnws2.htm4.

23. A second volume by Ian Smillie will be published as an occasional paper by the Humanitarianism and War Project late in 1999, tentatively titled *Strengthening Local Capacities* (Providence: Watson Institute, 1999 forthcoming).

24. *The Oxfam Handbook on Development and Relief* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1995), *Development in States of War* (Oxford: Oxfam, 1996), and Michael Bryans, Bruce Jones, and Janice Gross Stein, "Mean Times: Adapting the Humanitarian Imperative for the 21st Century," (Ottawa: Care Canada, November 1998).

25. Clare Short, "Principles for a New Humanitarianism," DFID, April 7, 1998.

26. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998).

27. de Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 145.

28. William Shawcross, "Threats to Humanitarian Action: Problems and Failures," *Report on the Wolfsberg Humanitarian Forum, 8-10 June 1997* (Geneva: ICRC, 1997), 2.

Chapter 5

1. James Gustave Speth, "Relief and Development: Twin Foundations for Sustainable Recovery and Peace Building," Statement at ECOSOC, UNDP (July 15, 1998).

2. Mats Karlsson, "Relief and Development—A False Dichotomy?" *The Challenge of Peace*, Wartorn Societies Project, vol. 5 (July 1997): 5.

3. Neil MacDonald, "SCF in Emergencies," internal planning paper of Save the Children Fund, London, (1996).

4. World Bank, "A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-

Conflict Reconstruction," (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997): 7.

5. Marc Sommers will elaborate these themes in a forthcoming publication by the Humanitarianism & War Project tentatively titled, *The Challenge of Coordination: The Cases of Sierra Leone and Tanzania* (Providence: Watson Institute, 1999 forthcoming)

Ian Smillie has 30 years of experience in the field of international development as a programmer, evaluator, and writer. He has managed large development enterprises in Canada, Africa, and Asia, was a founder of the Canadian nongovernmental development organization, Inter Pares, and was director of one of Canada's largest NGOs, CUSO. As consultant to a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental organizations for the past 15 years, he has been involved in a range of development initiatives in South Asia and Africa. He has written extensively on various aspects of development. His most recent publications include *The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire; Non Profit Organizations and International Development* (London: IT Publications, 1995) and *Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships for International Development* (London: Earthscan, 1999), co-edited with Henny Helmich.

The Humanitarianism & War Project

The Humanitarianism & War Project is an independent policy research initiative underwritten by some 50 UN organizations, governments, NGOs, and foundations. Since its inception in 1991, it has conducted thousands of interviews in complex emergencies around the world, producing an array of case studies, handbooks and training materials, books, articles, and op-eds for a diverse audience of humanitarian practitioners, policy analysts, academics, and the general public.

The project is currently examining the process of institutional learning and change among humanitarian organizations in the post-Cold War period. Recognizing that humanitarian agencies nowadays are not only in greater demand but are also experiencing greater difficulty in carrying out their tasks, the project is highlighting the innovative practices devised by individual agencies to address specific challenges.

Current research builds on case studies conducted to date, both geographical (the Persian Gulf, Central America and the Caribbean, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes Region, and the Caucasus) and thematic (the interface between humanitarian action and peacekeeping and the roles of the media and the military in the humanitarian sphere). It focuses on three clusters, each containing two issues and several challenges:

Cluster A: Humanitarian Interactions

Issue 1: Orchestrating Emergency Action
- challenges of coordination
- challenges of security
- challenges of professionalism

Issue 2: Safeguarding Human Rights in Complex Emergencies
- challenges of belligerence and criminality within assisted populations
- challenges of imperiled populations
- challenges of gender abuse and bias

Cluster B: Humanitarian Politics

Issue 3. Defining Involvement and Protecting Space
- challenges of engagement and disengagement
- challenges of proportionality
- challenges of advocacy

Issue 4: Managing Conflict Connections
- challenges of not fueling war
- challenges of easing tensions

Cluster C: Humanitarian Impacts

Issue 5: Capitalizing on Development Potential
- challenges of understanding

- challenges of timing
- challenges of funding

Issue 6: Strengthening Local Capacity
- challenges of institution building
- challenges of identity
- challenges of accountability

This research is tailored to the expressed needs of humanitarian organizations, which constitute the primary constituency of the project, generating materials designed for reflection and training purposes. Findings and recommendations are also being followed with interest to the project's other main constituencies, policymakers and academics.

The project is part of Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies, which was established in 1986 to facilitate analysis of global problems and to develop initiatives to address them. Additional information about the institute and the project may be found on the Internet at www.brown.edu/Departments/ Watson_Institute.

Project donors include the governments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Intergovernmental organizations that have contributed to the project are the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), International Organization for Migration, OECD Development Centre, UNDHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNITAR, UN Special Emergency Program for the Horn of Africa, UN Staff College, UN University, UN Volunteers, WFP, and WHO. NGO contributors are the American Red Cross, CARE-US, Catholic Relief Services, Danish Refugee Council, Fourth Freedom Forum, International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Orthodox Christian Charities, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran World Federation, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee (U.S.), Mennonite Central Committee (Canada), Mercy Corps Interna-

APPENDIX II
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

The following is a selection of publications that aid practitioners may find helpful for further reading and reflection.

Anderson, Mary B., *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999 forthcoming), an expansion of *Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid* (Cambridge, Mass.: Collaborative for Development Action, 1996).

_____, and Peter J. Woodrow, *Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

Buchanan-Smith, Margaret and Simon Maxwell, "Linking Relief and Development: An Introduction and Overview," *IDS Bulletin* 24, no. 4 (1994), 2-16.

Ball, Nicole and T. Halevy, *Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community* (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1996).

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997).

Development Assistance Committee, *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997).

_____, *Development Co-operation 1997: Efforts and Policies of the Development Assistance Committee* (Paris: Organisation for Co-operation and Development, 1998).

De Waal, Alex, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry*

in Africa (London and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1997).

Duffield, Mark, "Complex emergencies and the crisis of developmentalism," *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1997), 37-45.

_____, *Aid Policy and Post-Moder Conflict: A Critical Review*, Occasional Paper 19 (Birmingham, UK: School of Public Policy, 1998).

de Goor, Luc van, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Paul Sciarone, *Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States* (London: Macmillan, 1996).

Government of the Netherlands, *Humanitarian Aid: Between Conflict and Development* (The Hague: Ministry of Development Cooperation, 1993).

Keen, David, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 320 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998).

Kuhne, Winrich, ed. *Winning the Peace: Concept and Lessons Learned of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, 1997).

_____, *The Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Planning Coordination and Funding in the Twilight Zone* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, 1996).

Kumar, Krishna, ed., *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).

Lake, Anthony et al., *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1990).

Lautze, Sue and John Hammock, *Coping with Crisis, Coping with Aid: Capacity Building, Coping Mechanisms and Dependency, Linking Relief and Development* (New York: DHA, December 1996).

Macrae, Joanna, and Mark Bradbury, "Aid in the Twilight Zone: A Critical Analysis of Humanitarian-Development Aid Linkages in Situations of Chronic Instability: A Report for UNICEF" (London: Overseas Development Institute/Humanitarianism and War Project, 1998).

Overseas Development Administration, *Conflict Reduction Through the Aid Programme* (London: Overseas Development Administration, 1997).

Pugh, Michael, "Peacebuilding as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research," *Contemporary Security Policy* XVI, no. 3 (1996), 320-346.

Rose, Gideon, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 1 (January/February 1998), 56-67.

Slim, Hugo, "The Continuing Metamorphosis of the New Humanitarian Practitioner: Some New Colours for an Endangered Chameleon," *Disasters*, vol. 19, no. 2 (1995), 111-126.

Stiefel, Matthias, *Rebuilding After War: A Summary Report of the War-Torn Societies Project* (Geneva: UNRISD, 1999 forthcoming)

_____, *UNDP in Conflicts and Disasters: An Overview Report of the "Continuum Project"* (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, May 1994).

United Nations, "Survey of the United Nations System's Capabilities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction" (Vienna: United Nations, 1996).

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and UN Development Programme, "Building Bridges between Relief and Development: Final Report of a UNDP-DHA Workshop in Turin, April 12-17, 1997 (New York: UNDHA and UNDP, 1997).

UN Development Programme, *Building Bridges between Relief and Development* (New York: UN Development Programme, 1996).

_____, *UNDP Continuum Project: Objectives, Approach, Method and Organization* (New York, UN Development Programme, 1993).

_____, *Position Paper of the Working Group on Operational Aspects of the Relief to Development Continuum* (New York: UNDP, 1994).

_____, *Linking Relief to Development* (New York: UNDP, June 1998)

UN Economic and Social Council, Task Force Sub-Working Group on Local Capacities/Relief and Development, *Relief with Development: Challenges for Humanitarian Assistance* (New York: United Nations, 1997).

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