CIAO DATE: 04/2009
February 2009
U.S. Military Academy, Department of Social Science
It is become common to argue that a special relationship exists between the United States and Israel and that this relationship explains unconditional American support for Israeli policies. These arguments generally focus on the period after the 1967 war. This makes examination of the period immediately before this time especially useful for understanding the nature of American relations with Israel. If this period marks the beginning of a special relationship, then there should be initial indicators of that relationship and its impact on the policy making process. In 1967, American policy was initially designed to accomplish the relatively modest goal of preventing an Israeli preemptive attack while building support for a multilateral plan to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba. Yet, the United States ultimately failed to achieve either objective. Given the potential danger of war to American interests, a strategic analysis of this case might predict active and vigorous efforts, using all aspects of American power, to prevent conflict. The puzzle is why this did not occur. By examining a purely systemic explanation for American actions in 1967, this paper will explore the complexities and tensions in the United States-Israel relationship in 1967 and investigate the nature through which domestic politics and decision making factors influence American foreign policy.
Resource link: American Decision Making and the 1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict [PDF] - 146K