CIAO DATE: 07/2010
May 2010
United States Institute of Peace
In August 2009, the Turkish • government announced that it would undertake a major initiative toward Turkey’s Kurdish minority. In addition to being a major development in the long saga of Turkey’s relations with its sizeable Kurdish minority, this initiative, known as the “democratic opening,” is also a testament to the distance the Turkish government has traveled in its policy toward Iraq. • Turkey, which had once spearheaded opposition to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), is implementing a 180-degree turn in its policy toward the KRG. It is developing close economic and political ties with the KRG, and the two are collaborating on a gamut of issues, including efforts to pacify the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). • At the heart of these changes lay a confluence of developments. They include the new geopolitics of the region, the new foreign policy conception of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey’s domestic institutional context, changing perceptions within Turkey of the domestic Kurdish question, and efforts by key individual actors within Turkey. • On the geopolitical level, the announced withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq has helped shift Turkey’s approach to Iraq. Whether it is part and parcel of a conscious strategy by Ankara, Turkey’s ability to influence events on the ground is greatest in northern Iraq. In Baghdad, Turkey has to contend with not just American competition but, far more significantly, the Iranian presence. Ironically, any increase in Turkish influence in the KRG translates into more in Baghdad because of the Kurds’ critical role in Iraq’s capital. • On the foreign policy level, the AKP took advantage of the vacuum created by the war in Iraq and began to fashion itself as a regional power. In a policy that some have come to call “neo-Ottomanism,” Turkey is expanding the contours of its influence in regions that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, including Iraq. On the domestic institutional level, the Turkish military is still decisive • on some matters, but the government has far more say than ever before in questions relating to national security. Indeed, the AKP wishes to resolve the Kurdish issue partly because doing so will curtail the military’s vast prerogatives and in the process protect the party’s own future from “meddlesome generals.” • On the societal level, there is a deep sense of war fatigue in Turkey, especially in the Kurdish southeast. There the pressure is for political activism rather than armed struggle. • On an individual level, key actors within the Turkish military and intelligence community have come to realize that after twenty-five years of fighting, a strategy solely dependent on violence is unlikely to subdue the PKK or resolve Turkey’s Kurdish question. • For all of Turkey’s newfound enthusiasm toward Iraq, the collapse of the Kurdish reform proposals in Turkey could have very serious ramifications for relations between Iraq and Turkey. It would both obviate the PKK’s need to demilitarize itself and, more importantly, lead to increased violence in Turkey’s Kurdish areas, which would complicate Ankara-Erbil relations. • Both Washington and Ankara want to see a transition toward a stable and unified Iraqi political entity that is pluralistic and well on its way to improving the economic lot of its people. • Among the recommendations presented herein, the United States should help keep the Turkish-KRG relationship on track; open a consulate in Erbil; build government capacity in the north; emphasize that it does not wish to leave a PKK presence in the KRG after its departure; be more inclusive of Turkish diplomats in Iraq in this period of transition; and help to improve and develop joint commercial ventures and hydrocarbon routes among Turkey, Iraq, and the KRG.
Resource link: Turkey's New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan [PDF] - 296K