CIAO DATE: 02/2001
March 1997
Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley
Revolutionary changes in global and in European politics have reawakened old fears about Europe's domination by an unpredictable German giant. But these changes have also fueled new hopes for Germany and Europe as models of political pluralism in a more peaceful and prosperous world. In a different era Thomas Mann distinguished between the specter of the "Germanization" of Europe and the vision of a "Europeanization" of Germany. It is a mistake to decide between these two views based on the extrapolation of fears from the past or hopes for the future. It is more useful to treat them as templates that may help us in discerning a more complicated pattern linking Germany and Europe.
Revolutionary changes in global and in European politics have reawakened old fears about Europe's domination by an unpredictable German giant. But these changes have also fueled new hopes for Germany and Europe as models of political pluralism in a more peaceful and prosperous world. In a different era Thomas Mann distinguished between the specter of the "Germanization" of Europe and the vision of a "Europeanization" of Germany. It is a mistake to decide between these two views based on the extrapolation of fears from the past or hopes for the future. It is more useful to treat them as templates that may help us in discerning a more complicated pattern linking Germany and Europe.
German unification and European integration were indelibly linked in 1989-90. Chancellor Kohl's European partners gave their grudging, basic support for German unification in Strasbourg in December 1989. In return Kohl agreed to back President Mitterand's proposal to have the Intergovernmental Conference on the European Monetary Union (EMU) start as early as December 1990 rather than at some later, unspecified date as Germany had preferred earlier. And when it had become clear, by March 1990, that pressure for Germany's early unification was building much quicker than Kohl, Mitterand or most of Europe's leaders had expected, French support for an acceleration Qf the unification process was predicated on a German commitment to a second Intergovernmental Conference on political union which would encompass, besides monetary and economic affairs also foreign and security policy. This deal was approved politically by the European Council meeting in Dublin in April 1990. And it was ratified in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which amalgamated the proposals for economic and political union in Maastricht in December 1991. United Germany thus was to be embedded in an integrating Europe. 1
These diplomatic bargains point to two underlying questions. Why does Germany, the most powerful state in Europe, appear bent on giving up voluntarily its newly won sovereign power? And why have longstanding institutional inefficiencies of the European polity not blocked advances in European integration? The answer this book offers to these two questions has to do with a historically important shift in the institutionalization of power in Germany and Europe, power that conventionally is measured in terms of material resources or bargaining strength.
The Germans have eliminated the concept of "power" from their political vocabulary. They speak the language of "political responsibility" instead. In his analysis of the taming of German power Hans-Peter Schwarz has referred to it as a new forgetfulness of power that has replaced an old obsession with power. 2 Some observers view this rhetorical turn as little more than a cynical ploy in which the old wolf has put on new sheepskin. This book argues instead that it is an indication of a deeper transformation in both the style and substance of German and European politics. The culture of restraint that characterizes German foreign policy and the conscious avoidance of assuming a high profile and seeking a strong leadership role in the European Union emanate from the same institutional source. Jeffrey Anderson dubs this quite appropriately as Germany's "reflexive support for an exaggerated multilateralism." 3
The German approach to power, and the practices which sustain and reformulate it, emphasizes its "soft" elements. 4 Other views interpret German power differently. They stress, for example, power as a form of domination from which actors can escape only by breaking the shackles which tie them down. Or they might stress aspects of contractual bargaining relationships in which the different parties gain, to different degrees, from making deals. Such views underline "hard" elements of power. In reality soft and hard elements always blend. For example, in the summer of 1996, British tabloids stylized an English-German soccer match as a new "war," and they viewed Germany and Britain as the main protagonists in a diplomatic war over "beef derivatives." But at the same time the British and German foreign offices swapped officials as part of ongoing efforts to further European integration through the exploring of practical steps toward an integrated European Embassy. 5
The institutionalization of power, this book argues, is the most distinctive aspect of the relationship between Europe and Germany. Germany's willingness to give the smaller EU members disproportionate power, is puzzling, especially for Anglosaxons, Elizabeth Pond writes. "The efficient Germans reason that it is worth subordinating swift unilateral action today to the cumbersome forging of EU coalitions for the sake of institution-building tomorrow." 6 Only when we move institutional power center stage can we hope to understand why Germany is willing to give up its new sovereign power or why institutional inefficiency has not stopped European integration. Because it takes the hard edges off hard power relations, the institufionalization of power matters. Over time institutions constitute actors rather than merely constraining their preferences. They do so within particular normative contexts (of collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity) or for specific collective identities (as varying constructions of statehood). Norms and identities typically have two effects. They enable actors by constituting them and thus shaping their interests. And they constrain actor preferences.
During the past decades European states, and in particular Germany, have acquired collective identities that are significantly more international than had been true previously. In this situation power is a variable quantity. Parents may act against their individual interests to further the family's interest. What may look irrational for them as individuals can be quite rational from the perspective of the family with which they also identify. Similarly, both the individual member states and the European Union (EU) family can simultaneously gain or lose power. "The terms which captures most accurately the dominant character of the relationship between states and the region," concludes Paul Taylor, "is symbiosis . . . there is no evidence to suggest that common arrangements could not be extended a very long way without necessarily posing any direct challenge to the sovereignty of states. " 7 James Caporaso concurs when he argues that "regional integration is not a zero-sum process . . . Analysts should not have to choose between intergovernmentalism and international forms of political activity. Both logics operate in the European polity. " 8 Nation-states are simultaneously 'throwing out' functions to the supranational level and devolving responsibilities to subnational regions In this view power relations do not add to a fixed quantity that either resides in national states or that gets transferred to a supranational center of decision-making. This makes institutionalized power "soft" compared to other types of power.
Besides the internationalization of state identities the softness of German power in Europe is due also to institutional similarities. In institutional terms the EU and Germany are quite similar. In both polities power is pooled, creating what I call below a European system of associated sovereignty and German semi-sovereignty. In both systems it is possible to exploit superior material resources and advantageous bargaining positions to exercise hard power. But such behavior is the exception not the rule. As Elizabeth Pond argues, German interests are advanced not in balance of power clashes, but in "tedious bureaucratic maneuvering in the confederation-plus of the EU and the confederation-minus of the transatlantic community." 9 Hence, distinctive about Germany is not its unintentional power which, like all larger states, it possesses in good measure, but the fact that its political leaders exercise power only in multilateral, institutionally mediated systems -- in Germany, the EU, the Atlantic Community. and broader international fora -- that soften sovereign power.
This book explores the institutionalization of power relations in two domains. It inquires into the relations between the EU and Germany (primarily discussed in chapters 1-3) on the one hand and the relations of Germany and the EU with some of the European states that surround them in all four directions of the sundial (primarily discussed in chapters 4-8). This introduction focuses primarily on the relations between Germany and Europe; the concluding chapter analyzes the relations between the smaller or more peripheral European states, Germany and the EU. 10 The authors in this book examine both domains to inquire into the institutional practices and state policies that can help explain why a strong Germany is willing to cede its new sovereignty and why the smaller or peripheral states continue to back an integration process despite its numerous institutional inefficiencies. The core argument stresses the effects of institutionalized power relations that take the edges of resource-based power and bargaining relations. Institutionalized power does not only act as an external constraint that helps define actors in defining the interests they seek to pursue. To variable degrees, often affected by the strength of different conceptions of national identity, it also molds the identity of the states themselves and thus the interests thai they hold. In sharp contrast to Britain, this chapter argues, Germany has a remarkably internationalized state identity. This makes Germany an ardent champion of a Europeanization process through which it seeks to promote German state interests.
Several readers of earlier drafts of this manuscript have pointed out that a long list of omissions imposes serious limitations on this book's argument. I agree. Detailed examination of, among others, Switzerland and Austria, Finland and the Baltic states, Slovenia and Croatia, Bulgaria and Rumania, and, importantly, Turkey would have enriched the analysis. Based on my own research on some of these states (for example, Switzerland and Austria) and broad reading on others (for example, Finland and Turkey), I venture the guess that additional cases would have made this a bigger book without changing its central message.
Even more serious, in the view of other colleagues, is the omission of France and Britain. Without denying in any way the importance of the institutional effects of other states, such as Britain's in Scandinavia and Greece or France's in Italy and Spain, this book focuses its attention on the effects Germany and Europe have on the smaller European states. Does the exclusive focus on Germany in Europe not lead to premature conclusions that tend to overestimate the importance of Germany because it underplays the role of Britain and France? Perhaps so. But since a central finding of this book rejects the argument that Europe is increasingly succumbing to German domination or exploitation, as these terms are conventionally understood, the omission of France and Britain tends to increase, not undermine, this book's central argument. 11
Although the authors occasionally include in their analyses a number of other European or international institutions, Europe refers in this book to the European Union and its direct predecessors. The chapters that follow examine this relation from the perspective of both Brussels and Bonn/Berlin as well as from the vantage points of northern, western, southern and central Europe. To which extent are important developments in these states shaped directly by Germany or Europe, or by Germany acting through Europe? What are the political consequences of different forms of influence? And do these forms suggest a clear answer to the question of whether Germany will prevail over Europe or Europe over Germany? The answers that this book offers derive from the premise that we can understand adequately the world of power and interest in Europe only when we see power and interest not simply as attributes of distinctive actors, Germany and Europe, but as aspects of relationships that place Germany in Europe, through institutions that tame power. 12
1. Realism, Liberalism, and Institutionalism: Germany and Europe or Germany in Europe?
European integration during the last forty years has occurred in major cycles. Each cycle created its own climate of Euro-optimism and Euro-skepticism which was reflected on the editorial pages of daily news papers, in the columns of weekly and monthly magazines, and in the world of scholarship. The success of the early years of the European integration movement at the beginning of the 1950s came to an abrupt halt with the defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC) in the French Assembly in 1954. The European Community (EC) in 1957, the Fouchet Plan aiming at the creation of a European union of states that included foreign and security policy (1962) and the timely completion of the customs union was halted abruptly by the crisis of the "empty chair" (1965-66) through which President de Gaulle succeeded in stopping plans for a system of qualified majority voting by the end of the 1960s. Eventually, under the new leadership of President Georges Pompidou and Chancellor Willy Brandt, European integration was launched once more in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But adverse economic developments (including flexible exchange rates, the oil crisis of 1973, and a renationalization of European markets through discriminatory national regulations) stopped the promise of the Werner Plan (1970) of achieving within a decade economic and monetary union. The relaunching of the European project with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985, and with the treaty of Maastricht in 1991 signalled another upswing in response to economic globalization, the ending of the Cold War, and German unification.
Understanding the dynamics of European integration must be informed by this historical evolution. Snapshots of momentary constellations, for example in the distribution of power or the bargaining position of states or societal actors, easily skews perceptions of what is significant and makes us hostage to quickly changing climates of opinion. Historical sociology helps us avoid this trap. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, scholars like Stanley Hoffmann and Karl Deutsch were bears in a bull market of integration studies. 13 Hoffmann argued that the closer the integration process came to the core of national sovereignty, the more difficult integration would become. Early successes in the low politics of commercial policy thus gave an inaccurate picture of the road ahead. Deutsch looked to mass behavior and attitudes and argued that the structural barriers to European integration were very large, as reflected in the measurement of the differential between higher national and lower international growth rates of economic transactions and social communications. Although this book shares with Hoffmann and Deutsch a historical and sociological approach, three decades later its main message is more optimistic.
Since the mid-1980s U.S. scholars have analyzed the politics of European integration primarily from two perspectives, realism and liberalism, that seek to explain the choices of the actors that have shaped the waxing and waning of the European integration process during the last four decades. Realism and liberalism are not theories but analytical sketches that can be formulated in different ways. 14 Some variants of liberalism, for example, insist on the primacy of social groups in domestic politics and are fundamentally opposed to variants of realism which insist on the primacy of the effects of international anarchy. Stressing the amelioration of anarchy through international institutions, other formulations of liberalism are in some ways closer to international realism than to their liberal cousins emphasizing the primacy of domestic politics. Conversely, traditional realist perspectives which emphasize the power of nationalism in international politics have some affinity with liberal theories that focus on the influence of domestic groups in society. But they differ greatly from variants of liberal analysis that emphasize international institutions. In short, these analytical sketches are not precise. Hence their different formulations can either complement or contradict each other.
Widely known in the 1960s as "intergovernmentalism,"the first perspective is a version of political realism that incorporates both international and domestic levels of analysis. It focuses on the interaction of states in an international system that is constrained by the preferences of actors. 15 This version of realism abandons the idea that international anarchy and calculations of relative gains of governments define the national interest. It emphasizes instead the continuity of diplomatic bargains among governments intent on preserving their sovereignty. Far from denying the importance of European integration, this brand of realism sees in integration an additional arena of competition among self-interested states. European integration was part of a larger diplomatic maneuver that, according to Lord Ismay, speaking of NATO, was designed "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down." Governments are willing to compromise on issues of state sovereignty as long as they see such compromises as serving their interests. In this view European integration does not modify or transform but suffuse international anarchy. 16
German unification and European integration in the early 1990s provide some plausible illustrations for this perspective. The international negotiations that accompanied German unification were dubbed the two-plus-four talks. They involved the two German states as well as the four victorious powers in World War II. In the course of the negotiations, however, these talks rapidly changed to a conversation and bargaining involving the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union and the United States with Britain, France and the GDR of no more than secondary importance. Furthermore, the acceleration of the European integration process, illustrated by the Treaty on European Unity (TEU), signed in Maastricht in 1991, was, among others, also a self-con scious French attempt to harness the enhanced power of a united Germany to an international institution that promised to grant France partial control and thus keep the European power balance from shifting too rapidly against France.
Furthermore, in that process the German Bundesbank and Germany's Constitutional Court have had no trouble to distinguish, when necessary, between their institutional, German and European interests. The Bundesbank has always regarded German interests paramount in the determination of its monetary policy. And in ruling on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht on October 11, 1993, the Court ruled that it, not the European Court of Justice, would determine whether EU institutions were operating within their competence. "It defined the European Union as a Staatenverbund," writes William Paterson, "a type of association of states falling somewhere between a Federation and a Confederation and stressed that member states remained 'Herren der Vertrage' (masters of the treaties). It also argued that any significant steps in further unification needed to be legitimised by the Bundestag." 17
But German unification and European integration also create obvious anomalies for a realist interpretation. For example, there are virtually no traces of Germany's return to realist "normalcy," to the world of balance of power politics in an anarchical international system. Germans shun the concepts and practice of power politics (Machtpolitik) and balancing (Schaukelpolitik). Only in a few restricted intellectual quarters has German unification led to a renewed interest in the theory and practice of political realism. To date this intellectual interest has remained without any apparent wider political resonance in Germany, despite the fact that Germany's leading conservative newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, offers on its editorial page ample space for the airing of realist views. 18 Besides historical, psychological and political reasons for this fact we need to consider also the intellectual shortcomings of realist analyses. For example, proponents of Germany's national interest have failed to derive any concrete strategies from realist maxims that promise new solutions to some of Germany's foreign policy dilemmas. Peter Pulzer's critical review of a modest revival of conservative writings on German foreign policy thus concludes that even contemporary German conservatives do not "advocate a radical departure from institutional anchoring in the West. Least of all do they disavow the ideological and geopolitical experience of the Federal Republic . . . The new calls for national pride have earned only a limited response. " 19
Realist interpretations sometimes fail to acknowledge the importance of the historical experiences of the Federal Republic since 1949. Hence some realists skip across decades or centuries to seek support for propositions that often disregard fundamentally different historical contexts. The waxing and waning of European integration is a process by which states and societies interact over time. This process does not pit unchanging states bent on maximizing fixed objectives, such as security, as some variants of realism have it, or on national interests determined solely in domestic politics as other realists argue. Since historical time is more than the repetition of sameness, we cannot afford to overlook sources of change and innovation.
This realist approach to history is illustrated by John Mearsheimer's bold interpretation of the end of the Cold War. In his pessimistic assessment a new post-Cold War system of European international relations will not emerge for decades; for the Cold War will truly end only once the last American soldier has left Europe. 20 However, in Mearsheimer's argument it is immaterial whether the intervening period is filled with war or peace in Europe. His analysis of history takes snapshots rather than tracing processes; it is restricted to the analysis of comparative statics and neglects the dynamics of change. This is consistent with the realist view that history is sameness, that throughout the ages states have only sought to maximize their security. When this assumption is unwarranted or where the definition of security does not match physical survival, as is true of Europe after the Cold War, political analysis suffers.
Furthermore, an integration process that aims at the pooling of state sovereignty puts into question the very foundation of a realist perspective as Elizabeth Pond has argued. 21 For in its view, locked into a struggle for survival in an anarchic world, states seek to defend their existence to the end. Some realists have attempted to explain European integration through the concept of self-binding, at least for the case of France. But even these analyses remain silent in the face of German policy or let go of neo-realist theory in turning to domestic politics. 22 Why is Germany as Europe's most powerful state so intent on seeking to further integration and relinquish voluntarily its advantage in relative power and bargaining strength?
Known as "neo-functionalism," the second perspective is a version of political liberalism. It draws attention to the context of integration. 23 European welfare states have a profound effect on how actors, such as interest groups and bureaucracies, define their interests and thus shape the course of the European integration process. What matters primarily is not power but interests. Liberal theory thus focuses not only on governments and states but also on the aggregation of interests of private and transnational actors.
Liberals focusing on the primacy of domestic politics see the driving force not in the condition of international anarchy but in the dynamics of interest formation in domestic politics, in the process that translates private interests into public policy. Neo-liberals agree with those realists who insist on the primacy of international anarchy. For them the institutionalization of European integration does not eliminate but civilizes anarchy. Like their domestic analogues, international institutions have this salutary effect through the reduction of uncertainties and the lowering of transaction costs. Because institutions enhance both political predictability and efficiency, they shape the interests of relevant actors in ways that often tend to favor integration. But there is nothing inevitable about this process. The logic of anarchy and exogenous shocks can always override the effects of institutions and lead to a partial or total unravelling of past achievements.
Liberal analysis offers powerful insights into important episodes of German unification and European integradon in the early 1990s. It captures well a deep liberal strain in German foreign policy. 24 But it also explains functional imperatives that are driving European integration. For example, chief executives of large European corporations pushed hard for the initiative to create a single European market by 1992. They saw European integration as a partial solution to overregulated national markets that were threatening corporate competitiveness in the global economy. 25 Pressures for greater efficiency and predictability also came from within the European integration process rather than from global markets without. In his speeches and articles former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, for example, often pointed out that travelling through the twelve member States of the EU in the early 1990s and exchanging a one-hundred Deutschmark bill each time he crossed national borders, would leave him with only 50 Deutschmark at the end of the journey, without having bought a thing. For reasons of efficiency especially large corporations tend to favor the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which many envisage as a step to political union, one of the ambitious legacies of the TEU.
With their insistence on the efficiency-enhancing effects of institutions, however, liberal analyses confront sonie serious empirical and analytical problems. Although European mass publics and elites are frequently at odds on the issue of European integration, neither views the Brussels bureaucracy as increasing some aggregate measure of political or social efficiency. Indeed the process of harmonizing diverging national regulatory regimes throughout the EU is encountering growing opposition, partly because of the lack of efficiency in long-distance governance from Brussels. The evolution of the EU is also a story of the growth of overregulation and institutional inefficiency. But this inefficiency has not stopped integration.
Analytically the focus on the efficiency effects of institutions is also problematic. It is a great weakness of this version of liberalism, and the branch of institutional economics on which it builds, that, to date, it assumes rather than measures the additional information that institutions provide about the preferences of actors and their record of compliance. If the institutional effects of the EU were in fact reducing transaction costs among democratic states in western Europe, rather than increasing them through an oversupply with information, these beneficial effects are likely to be small. West European societies are democratic and open; extensive media coverage and governmental as well as non-governmental bureaucracies provide ample information about the preferences of actors and the compliance records of states with international agreements. In short, the important thing about institutions, at least in this setting, is not that they enhance efficiency but that they offer a normative context which constitutes actors and provides a set of norms in which the reputation of actors acquires meaning and value. 26 Furthermore, a library filled with books dealing with the politics of policy implementation has established that, contra liberal theory's neat separation of private from public actors, the European welfare state is defined by the deep mutual penetration of state and society. This fact creates serious analytical difficulties for variants of liberalism that look to autonomous social groups and the private sector as being primarily responsible for shaping the preferences that determine government policies in the European integration process. 27
For example, empirically the case of German business does not fit liberal expectations. Survey data collected among European business executives indicate that economic and industrial structures shape perceptions of expected gains and losses. Thus, support for the 1992 single market program was strongest among European executives working in export-oriented rather than state-owned sectors. 28 Hence on account of Germany's large export sector, on economic grounds alone German business support for the single markte initiative in Germany should have been particularly strong. But Maria Green Cowles argues that "the handful of German companies that did publicly support the 1992 project did so primarily for non-economic reasons. They did not tout the Single Market program as an important means to liberalize the market. Rather, the firms endorsed the European project on political grounds -- they wanted to assure their industrial colleagues that German companies were 'good Europeans' and committed to further integration." 29
A careful empirical study of the position of a number of German unions on the issue of the European single market also undercuts the expectation of liberal explanations. Andrei Markovits and Alexander Otto report that the position of the German unions was strongly positive, and that member attitudes were not affected by sectoral variation. "We were surprised," they write, "how relatively insignificant sectoral economic expectations and potential changes, which very well might have concrete effects on the unions world of collective bargaining, were in shaping the unions' positions." 30 In a situation of uncertainty ideology shaped position more than concrete economic interests. More generally "the striking aspect of Germany's stance," writes Elizabeth Pond, "is the regularity with which the popular consensus chooses enlightened, long-term self-interest over short-term gain, especially in European Union (EU) matters." 31
Liberalism is attuned to recognize historical processes of change. Social interests evolve in response to domestic or international change, and institutions evolve to facilitate different kinds of political bargains. In the 1950s important segments of German industry were critical of Chancellor Adenauer's policy and not convinced that European economic integration would serve their interests well. Two decades later, in the world of finance, Chancellor Schmidt favored the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) while the German Bundesbank and important elements of German finance did not. Over time German industry and finance redefined what they considered to be in their interests. European governments, including Germany's, subsequently were free to strike new bargains that defined new focal points for compromise in an increasingly dense environment of European institutions.
This dynamic conception of historical change is an improvement over realism's insistence on history as mere repetition. But all variants of liberalism underestimate seriously the effects institutions have on politics. Bargaining theory typically overlooks the central fact a central aspect of all bargaining is about the framework or context in which a particular issue should be seen. A richer conception thus emphasizes not only how institutions facilitate bargains among political actors. It investigates also how institutions affect the c6ntext of bargaining, primarily through the effects they have on the identities of the political actors who make political choices. In the case of Germany, for example, it is plausible to argue that the European option, which in the 1950s had been a clear instrumental calculation of Chancellor Adenauer and the business elite, became for Chancellor Kohl, Adenauer's "grandson," and the German business elite in the 1980s an unquestioned assumption of policy. This is not to argue that German policy reflected idealist motives in the 1980s or 1990s. It did not. It reflected German interests. But those interests, pursued through power and bargaining, were fundamentally shaped by the institutional context of Europe and the Europeanization of the identity of the German state that had taken place in the preceding decades.
This helps expiain why it matters so little to the German government that on an issue of vital importance to its export-oriented trade policy, it is in a minority position in the European Union. Klaus Gunter Deutsch, for example, calculates that the coalition favoring, with Germany, ''open regionalism" controls only 28 votes in the Council of the EU, a clear minority compared to the 48 votes of the coalition backing "closed regionalism" in the EU's common commercial policy. 32 Similarly, the internationalization of Germany's state identity made it quite natural for the German government to insist in the early 1980s that Siemens, one of Germany's industrial giants and one of its largest semiconductor producers, cooperate with a Dutch firm, Phillips, on the submicron circuit technology necessary for the production of advanced memory chips in the government initiated Megaproject. 33 Institutions make certain political realities more or less natural. That is, they endow them, to different degrees, with the quality of being taken for granted. In Bonn and Berlin in the 1990s, it appears, Germany's embeddedness in Europe has acquired this aura.
This is the central insight of a sociologically-inclined analysis that highlights the importance of "thick" identity forming effects of institutions besides the "thin" effects of uncertainty reduction. The first wave of theories of European integration in the 1960s was largely sociological. In mapping the waxing and waning of the social foundations of integration Karl Deutsch and some of his students analyzed mass interactions and elite attitudes. 34 These studies did not seek to replace intergovernmental and neo-functional explanations. They looked instead at the broader social context which framed and influenced the negotiations between governments and the bargaining among interest groups in Brussels and in national capitals. The conclusions of this research pointed in two directions. On the one hand they suggested the growth of a security community, in western Europe and within the North Atlantic area, that made war highly improbable. At the same time the communications theory and behavioralist bent that informed all of Deutsch's work pointed to structural limitations in European integration. In Deutsch's language the integration process favored pluralism and loose organizational coupling in pluralistic security communities over homogeneity and tight coupling in amalgamated security communities. 35
Shorn of behavioralism, the sociological perspective is alive and well in contemporary theories of international relations generally and in the analysis of European integration specifically. In international relations theory, both on questions of national security and political economy, this perspective seeks to link the materialism and rationalism that characterizes mainstream theorizing to processes of communication and social discourse that constitute actors and help define their interests. The analysis of institutional forces has retained an even stronger appeal in the analysis of domestic politics. The "new" institutionalism encompasses a broad array of approaches. Prominent among them is the historical-sociological approach that seeks to understand how institutional norms and identities shape policies and politics. 36 Applied to European integration a variety of formulations have described and explained in different terminology some of the structures and processes that are characterizing the acceleration of European integration since the mid-1980s. Compared to an earlier generation the language of sociological approaches has changed more than its central message.
That message moves to center stage what realist and liberal accounts tend to neglect, a partial pooling of sovereignty into multi-level governance systems that vary by problem area. "Eurospeak" or "Eurobabble" give us a hint of this important shift. It has invented a large number of concepts that describe ad hoc and de jure political solutions to the problems of the EU, among them "subsidiarity," "co-decision,""variable geometry," "opting-out" and "opting-in," "comitologie," and "concentric circles." 37 John Ruggie sees in the EU a novel international form that is not described well in the familiar terms of national, intergovernmental or supranational relations. Because politics no longer starts simply from separate, fixed national viewpoints, Ruggie argues, the give-and-take by which states are defining their "own identity -- and the identities are logically prior to preferences -- increasingly endogenize the existence of the other . . . Within this framework European leaders may be thought of as entrepreneurs of alternative political identities." 38 Viewing the same process from the perspective of Europe, Walter Matfli and Anne-Marie Slaughter argue similarly that "in lieu of standard models of the unitary state, the picture that emerges is one of 'disaggregated sovereignty'." 39
Building on the English school of international society theorizing, Ole Wæver points out that the European polity is emerging in the international scene as both a competitor at the global level and a barrier against a possible remilitarization of intra-European rivalries. This is not a state but a socially-constituted pole that operates as a force in complex, multi-layered European politics. 40 One reason why, in this view, all attempts to integrate Europe as a state are doomed to failure lies in the simple fact that increasing Europeanization generates political opposition rooted in societal insecurities about the future viability of established national and state identities. 41 Hence the integration process is encroaching on national sovereignty without creating a new sovereign unit. And the link between statehood and exclusive territorial control is weakened. From a similar constructivist perspective but with a different twist, Emanuel Adler comes to roughly similar conclusions. Adler is building on the sociological approach of Karl Deutsch and his collaborators. Specifically, he is interested in working on a historically grounded concept of security communities that can be measured not only through the numerous social indicators that Deutsch had ingeniously specified but also through an analysis of changes in discursive practices. 42
Trying to escape the misplaced dichotomy between national and supranational forms of legitimate governance, Philippe Schmitter has tried to typologize territorial and functional elements in the emergence of polities. 43 Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch examine in greater depth the process of governance in the European polity which they conceive of as a multi-level system that responds to conditions of an increasing globalization of problems and a growth in transnational systems of governance. 44 And in their writings on European regionalism Gary Marks and Alberta Sbragia have done much to articulate a similar analytical perspective. 45 In a similar vein Paul Pierson has argued the case for a "historical institutional" rather than an "intergovernmental" perspective on integration even for issues, such as social welfare, where the European polity has relatively small direct, financial effects. European integration unfolds over time during which governments, motivated by short-term bargains, face both the ubiquity of the unintended consequences of their actions as well as the "lock-in" effects of historical trajectories. These make it very costly for national governments to reassert national control. In this historical perspective European integration results in a fragmented, discernibly multi-tiered European polity. 46
Finally, Johan Olsen articulates an institutionalist perspective in arguing that the analytical focus on coalition-building and policy development normally rests on the implicit assumption, appropriate only for stable periods, that "political processes maintain, rather than change, existing actors and institutional and cultural frameworks." 47 But in unstable periods this assumption is problematic, as political conflicts and discourse are trying to fix the boundaries that define a political community as well as the identity of the actors that operate within it. An institutionalist perspective is then necessary to capture these important political processes.
While realist and liberal perspectives capture important elements of the manifold relationships between Germany and Europe they tend to slight unduly the institutionalization of power which take off many of the hard edges in contemporary Europe's international relations. This oversight is not mitigated by the fact that both perspectives are often complementary in their insights. Liberalism's insights can make up for realism's discounting of the importance of domestic politics, transnationai relations and international institutions. Liberalism's neglect of the distributional consequences and power can be complemented by realist accounts. Yet in the analysis of Germany and Europe neither perspective pays sufficient attention to the effects that the internationalization of state identities and institutional similarities have jointly in softening the hard edges of relationships frequently marked by great asymmetries in material power and bargaining positions. That is, they neglect the institutional forces that have transformed a relationship between Germany and Europe to one of Germany in Europe.
2. The Internationalization of Identities: European and German
In the fall of 1989 the voices of leading German, European and U.S. politicians like Helmut Kohl, Oskar Lafontaine, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Mikhail Gorbachev, Francois Mitterrand and James Baker were seeking to articulate new concepts -- such as "unification through association" and a "common European house" -- with which to describe this new political reality in often muffled voices. Willy Brandt, Margaret Thatcher and Henry Kissinger captured these changes with the more familiar political terminology of national unification and national power. Both sets of voices describe important aspects of reality. National power and state interests have not become irrelevant in Europe's new political context. But the Europeanization of that context has itself become very important for how states like Germany conceive of their national interests, and for how they pursue their political strategies. The title of this chapter conveys the central message of this book. In times of revolutionary change, the extension of a partly internationalized German state is in many German and European quarters accepted as a natural response. 48
European Collective Identities. State identities are primarily external; they describe the actions of governments in a society of states. National identities are internal; they describe the processes by which mass publics acquire, modify and forget their collective identities. While national identities in Europe have probably not decreased during the last decades, to date they have not posed an insurmountable barrier to European integration. The permissive consensus among national mass publics is reinforced by the gradual growth of ambiguous and contested collective European identities that are beginning to complement national identities among some social strata. Illustrative examples include cultural policy, language use, currency, citizenship and anthem as ambiguous symbols of collective identity that mirror in the social sphere the intermingling of a "multi-perspectival" polity with "multi-tiered" governance systems through which traditional state identities have been partly internationalized.
The institutional presence of Europe as a set of norms and a source of collective identity has been the subject of explicit political considerations. The Adonnino committee, for example, debated a Europe more accessible for its citizens and in 1985 recommended, among others, the extension of student exchanges and an all-Europe TV channel. 49 The Franco-German bicultural "arte" television channel, with an estimated budget of DM 250 million, has broadcast since 1991. Student exchanges have blossomed. Between 1995 and 1999 the EU is planning to spend about $2.5 billions on all types of programs. Student applications for the largest of these programs increased from 3,000 in 1987-88 to 146,000 in 1994-95. 50 And the trade conflict between Europe and the United States over movies and television programming was resolved only in the last hectic hours of the Uruguay Round. Against the wishes of most national governments and the entertainment and media industry, the European Parliament has since demanded more than non-binding quotas. "Culture is not a commodity," argues Luciana Stellina, the Italian communist chairing the Parliament's culture committee. "What is at stake is the survival of the cultural identity of Europe." 51 And that culture is plural.
In terms of language, for example, Europe is not rationalizing around one standard, as did Spain and France in the 18th and 19th centuries. Contemporary European integration resembles 20th century India instead with its strong preference for retaining national languages and the growing trend towards globalization. 52 David Laitin argues that a 2+/-1 standard language repertoire is consolidating in Europe. English is the lingua franca, state languages tenaciously defend their position in the educational systems of the EU members, and regional languages have made successful incursions into national language regimes. 53 A European living in southern England will be able to function effectively with one (2-1) language; other Europeans will need command of their mother tongue and English; Europeans living in regions with their own distinctive languages, such as Catalonia or Scotland, will speak three (2+1) languages. In their language use Europeans are institutionalizing a stable multiple language regime that they accept as natural and normal. But this regime is not efficient. States will retain separate state languages in a European and global language regime increasingly centered on English. And about one-third of the Commission's staff work in translation and interpretation services. This constitutes about two fifths of the EU's administrative budget, approaching a billion ECU annually. 54
Much debated in the 1990s the EMU also has an important symbolic dimension that touches Europe deeply. 55 As with language the outcome points to multiple collective identities. With German national identity closely linked to the Deutschmark, as is implied in the concept of DM-nationalism, the choice of a name and the look of a future European currency remained contested. While the French favored sticking to the French-sounding Ecu (identical in sound but not in orthography to the ECU, the European Currency Unit) which they had used several centuries ago, Chancellor Kohl objected because this currency sounded in plain German too much like "cow" (or Kuh). For a while there was talk of calling the new currency an EuroFranken or Euro-Franc, a concession to France and with association of a stable currency derived from both German history and present Swiss practice. Britain, however, vetoed the idea, dubbing the franken a Frankenstein.
At the December 1995 EU summit meeting in Madrid, the choice was made in favor of the "Euro." The look of the new currency still remains to be decided. The choice of Euro leaves open the possibility of a hyphenated European-national currency as in Euro-Pound, Euro-Franc or Euro-Deutschmark and a look for the currency that will somehow integrate the blue colors of the European flag. The subdivision of the Euro into cents foreshadows such a solution. Countries adopting the common currency will be permitted to put their own designs on one side of the coins. 56 Judging by a number of other institutional practices, such a combination of European and national symbols would be compelling not only for a transitional period but as a long-term solution for a polity in which citizens may retain some aspects of their national currencies in a future EMU. New automobile license plates in Europe are a daily reminder of what an Euro coin might look like. National plates are now adorned with a blue strip on the left-hand side showing both the European emblem, 12 golden stars against a blue background, and the national origin of the car. 57
The new EU passport, issued in identical format and red color, but embossed with the names of the different member states, is another example of the same practice. Arriving at European airports and forming longer and slower queues, travellers who are not citizens of a EU member state quickly notice that European citizenship is in a slow process of definition even though the Europeanization of border controls remains one of the most controversial aspects of the European integration process in the 1990s. 58 Social and economic rights that were once restricted only to national citizens are gradually being extended to immigrants. 59 And movement towards a European citizenship that is partly distinct from national citizenship has become a distinct possibility. 60
The adoption of the finale's "Ode to Joy" of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as Europe's anthem points in the same direction. 61 A well-known publicist for European unity in the interwar period, Count Coudenhove-Kalergie, in 1949 had been one of the first to suggest the Ode to Joy as a possible anthem. Between 1952 and 1964, East and West Germany used the Ode as their joint victory hymn at the Olympic Games. Overcoming a number of potential rivals, the Ode gradually established itself as the most widely accepted European hymn, especially in local communities. Building on many unsolicited, private suggestions, the Council of Europe made its first official plea for an official European anthem in June 1971. The 1971 resolution recommended the tune of the Ode, without the words, as Europe's anthem. 62 Herbert von Karajan was commissioned to make the musical arrangements and provided them in 1972 for orchestra and brass.
In 1986 the European Parliament took "formal note of the current practice concerning the European anthem" in the hope that it and other symbols would "strengthen the concept of European identity." 63 Although the issue of language was not explicitly debated the tune was condemned to be left without words not so much because of the global rather than regional appeal of Schiller's verses, but because of the simple, widely understood, and undebated fact that this was a German-language text. 64 Reflecting on the ambiguities surrounding the adoption of this anthem Clark concludes, "here was truly a bastard-child of the Enlightenment: a song without words; hope without a text . . . at a basic level the Council of Europe acted out of ignorance, was seduced by commercialism, fell prey to an ideology which espoused the superiority of German music, and (unwittingly or not) succumbed to the powerful force exerted by the Beethoven myth itself." 65
The wordlessness of the European anthem speaks volumes about the ambiguities created by the regional, national, European and international admixture of elements that constitute an evolving collective European identity. The weakness of European media, a European public discourse and the European Parliament point to the fact that the European polity is not a democratic state-in-becoming that currently suffers from a democratic deficit. Its system of multi-level governance reflects primarily a transnational growth of public and private bureaucracies. This constrains the growth of a European collective identity and guarantees the persistence of strong national and subnational identities in an integrating Europe. Europe's collective identity has been carried by a permissive consensus among mass publics and by a strong commitment of political and social elites. Just as Beethoven continued to rework the ending to his Ninth, so too are European states continuously reworking a collective identity that now contains more international elements, in particular in Germany, than it has at any time in this century.
Internationalizing German State Identity. Symbols of collective identity contain a variable mixture of national and international elements. In Britain and France, for example, traditional national and state identities are much stronger than in Germany where collective identities have changed many times, including in the most recent past; in the decade preceding unification, for example, in common parlance the Federal Republic was already often equated with Germany. German receptivity for ambiguous identities that incorporate new, internationalized forms is arguably greater than for British or French. Thus Klaus Goetz argues that "the Europeanisation of the German state makes the search for the national, as opposed to the European interest a fruitless task. The national and the European interest have become fused to a degree which makes their separate consideration increasingly impossible." 66 The fact that Germany's Europeenization serves Germany's broad interests, as Simon Bulmer argues in chapter 2 and as Jeffrey Anderson modifies that argument in chapter 3, reinforces the important point that, far from undermining interests, institutions are of critical importance in helping shape the conceptions of interests that inform policy in Germany and elsewhere.
Between 1949 and 1990 Germany's division and European integration were closely connected in a Cold War setting. Within the context of the U.S. security guarantee for West Berlin, the Federal Republic and Europe, West Germany's integration into Europe was, in Germany and in Europe, a calculated reaction to historical memories of the disastrous consequences of Germany's bid for European and global supremacy in the first half of the twentieth century. The gradual fading of these memories and the sudden end of the Cold War posed once again the issue of how a united Germany should relate to Europe. The answer, before and after 1989-90, was the same -- through European integration.
Constitutive politics in the EU, Simon Bulmer argues in chapter 2, mediates German power. Rare in contemporary Europe is what Bulmer calls "deliberative" power, a direct international projection of German interest and power, as for example in the rules for the European Central Bank (ECB). The Bundesbank's high-interest rate policy soon after unification is instead an instance of "unintentional power" that had strong effects on Germany's European neighbors. The economic consequences of German unification thus illustrates how Germany exercises power not so much strategically as by its sheer weight. Finally, what matters most often is Germany's "indirect institutional" power. In shaping the rules of the game Germany tends to mobilize a bias favoring its policy in the long-term. Indirect power eventually translates into regulative power. This is generally evident, Bulmer argues, in the constitutional politics of the EU as well as in some of its specific governance regimes.
Indirect institutional effects derive partly from similarities. For example, multi-tiered governance arrangements are very typical of both the EU and Germany. To be sure the European version of "cooperative federalism" resembles Germany's only superficially. It lacks an accretion of power at the top; the importance of legal institutions in the EU is due to the weakness, not the strength, of the state administration; the EU commands only a very small fraction of the financial resources that are at the disposal of the German government; and the EU's Commission does not have access to a field system of administration. More importantly, enveloped by strong legal institutions both the EU and Germany have many multi-tiered governance arrangements that institutionalize consultative bargaining and consensual decision making procedures between different centers that are jointly involved in deliberation, decision and implementation.
It is noteworthy, Jeffrey Anderson argues in chapter 3, that German political elites embraced the EC initially as a means for reestablishing Germany's national sovereignty. Subsequently, Germany used its sovereign power to project onto its European partners a markedly different, internationalized state identity. The signing of the Maastricht treaty, however, may have been a high-point of Germany's internationalization. This is illustrated by the increasing importance of the Lander for some policy issues and by the limits that the Federal Constitutional Court's 1993 judgement imposed on possible future constitutional reforms of the EU.
Germany's indirect institutional power, Bulmer argues further, is reinforced by the agenda-setting role that it has played in the European Council. The Council provides for-biannual summit meetings of the EU's heads of state. It combines elements of intergovernmentalism (the institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] and of cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs [JHA]) and of supranationalism (the Council of the EU and the Committee of Permanent Representatives).
Chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, as well as Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, have played central roles in the European Council: in the launching of the idea of the EMS during the 1978 Copenhagen summit; in the initial outline of the budget compromise and the Solemn Declaration for the longer-term prospects for European integration at the Stuttgart summit in June 1983; in the relaunching of the EMU at the Hannover summit in June 1988; and in the joint letter that Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Francois Mitterrand sent in April 1990 to the Irish Presidency calling for the convening of an IGC on political union paralleling the proposed EMU. Significantly, Germany started none of these initiatives on its own. Typically it cooperated with France, and occasionally with Italy, and thus avoided, as chapter 3 argues, the temptation of trying to set the European agenda unilaterally. In fact when Germany found itself isolated, as it did unexpectedly in its opposition to the MacSharry proposals for reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1991-92, German officials described the situation as "unacceptable" and made a drastic, last-minute change in policy.
Germany's internationalist orientation is reflected, after the early 1960s, in its consistently strong support of successive enlargements of the EU. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard were still divided over the benefits of a "smaller" Europe, integrated around Germany and France, and of a "larger" Europe more loosely structured to include Britain and most of the other EFTA members. But from then on Germany was a strong supporter of enlargement: British, Danish and Irish accession in the 1970s, the joining of the three Mediterranean states in the 1980s, and the proposed Eastern enlargement of the EU by the end of the 1990s. Put differently, in line with the internationalization of the identity of the German state after World War II, Germany's approach to European institutions since the 1960s has been based on a broad definition of European identity.
Without touching on Germany's underlying strong commitment to multilateralism, and a long-term definition of its political interests, chapter 3 argues, that unification has had noticeable effects on Germany's European policy. 67 Underneath the "soft" power of constitutive politics, in the area of regulative politics newer, "hard" economic interests express serious, internal resource scarcities. They are beginning to supplant older, "hard" political interests that had aimed at the general stabilization of Germany's external environment. This shift has disturbed what Anderson calls a "comfortable equilibrium" that existed between constitutive and regulative politics before 1990. In four case studies (the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), foreign trade, competition and structural funds) Anderson illustrates the full range of Germany's response to changed circumstances. Because they absorb three-quarters of the EU budget, these cases are substantively important. He concludes that since 1992 the German government has tended to look much more closely at the bottom line, paying more attention to who gets what. This is not surprising. Germany is by far the largest net contributor to the EU budget, measured both in absolute and per capita terms. While unification has made Germany drop from the second to the seventh rank in the per capita income of the EU members, its net contribution has increased from 10.5 billion deutschmark in 1987 to 22.0 billion in 1992. It is estimated to rise to 30.0 billion by 1997. A German household with four members annually paid in 1993-94 about 2,000 deutschmarks for the EU, more than the special solidarity tax levied after unification. 68 By 1996 the leaders of all major parties agreed that Germany's financial contribution to the EU amounted to about two-thirds of the net income of the EU, double the relative size of the German GDP in the EU; Germany's annual excess payment of about $9 billion, they agreed, would have to stop. 69
This shift reflects new conditions at home and abroad and increases the weight of short-term interests in German policy. The issue that is likely to reflect this new condition most clearly is the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Germany favors enlargement more strongly than any of the other main powers in the EU. But for enlargement to work, the EU and Germany will have to allocate additional funds. Considering Germany's budgetary and economic difficulties after unification, playing the accustomed role of Europe's paymaster will become increasingly difficult. 70 Enlarging Europe towards the east, and paying off the southern European countries, which worry over a shift in the EU's funding priorities, will seriously test established patterns of conducting political business in Europe. Budgetary conditions thus are likely to dictate the pace and direction of Europe's future enlargement. This change in Germany's traditional stance will rob the European polity of a traditional, important shock absorber.
The evolving relationship that has placed Germany in Europe during the last forty years has been furthered greatly by a transformation of Germany's nationalist and Neo-Nazj right. The dynamics of party competition in the Federal Republic, reinforced by the electoral strategy of the CDU/CSU, led in the 1950s to the gradual absorption of a traditional nationalist protest vote by refugees and former Nazis into a staunchly anti-Communist conservative camp that favored European integration. The revival of a neo-Nazi right in the mid-1960s was no more than a brief interlude. The alarming increase of neo-Nazi social movements, like the skin-heads, with their xenophobic and racist violence directed against foreigners in the l990, had little resonance among the established political parties or major institutions in society. After Chancellor Kohl reacted to these attacks with a thunderous silence, it was countered by a largely spontaneous social movement and an eventual crackdown by the Lander governments.
Finally, it is a happy accident of German history that the party of post-Communism, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), absorbs in the five new German states not only the votes of old Communists but also of most of those who normally would vote for a protest party on the Right. Hence despite extraordinarily high unemployment rates and totally disorienting changes, a nationalist Right has been unable to draw sizeable popular support in the new eastern states of the Federal Republic. History, institutions, strategy and luck all have left Germany with an extreme Right that is weak, if measured by the standards of other European states such as France, Belgium and Italy. This fact has enhanced the trust of other European states in German politics and policies. And it has created space for an expansion of the international elements that have gradually become part of the identity of Germany's state. Hence developments inside Germany and in Europe have run parallel, not just in terms of government policy and transactions in markets, but also in the institutions that constitute the identity of political actors and prescribe norms of conduct that help define their political interests.
Internationalization of European State Identities. The Europeanization of state identities extends well beyond Germany. The European model that helped shape Germany after 1945, at various times and in various places, has been important also for other states that have had to make a transition from authoritarian to democratic government. For these European states a return to "Europe" seems more natural, for example, than for the United States which was reattached to Europe in the late 1940s through the deliberate ideological construction of a "North Atlantic" region. Numerous examples illustrate this point.
After the colonels had relinquished power in 1974, for example, beyond all reasons of national security and normal politics Greece was helped in its rejoining of Europe by the fact that it was widely viewed as the foundational civilization of Europe. In this historical construction it mattered little that for centuries Greece had been part of the Ottoman Empire and that the structure of the Greek state was not well suited to the European integration process. 71 Similarly, during their transition from autocracy to democracy in the 1970s Portugal and, in particular, Spain, deemphasized their traditional Iberian-latin American identity and, for domestic and international reasons, highlighted their European role instead. 72 And after the revolution of 1989-90. the central European democracies are looking to "Europe" more than to any other model for their domestic politics and international relations. This is true not only in terms of general ideological orientation but, specifically, for human rights and political citizenship, which are more strongly institutionalized at the regional level in Europe than in any other world region. Toward these efforts at political reform and reorientation among the southern and central-eastern European states German policy has been highly sympathetic. For after 1945, this was precisely the European path that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his successors had charted for the Federal Republic.
European collective identities are also defined negatively. To be European means in southern France and Spain not to be from North Africa and in eastern Germany not to be from central-eastern Europe. European identity, that is, has a good dose of xenophobia built into it. Turkey, for example, is arguably less "European" than Greece in its geography, history and current political practices. Hence it has faced a much more difficult time to negotiate terms by which it too could be part of the European integration process. For beyond the history of great power diplomacy, by which the western expansion of the Ottoman Empire was eventually contained by the European powers, there remains the fact that Europe's collective, Christian identity is intimately bound up with Turkey as something alien to Europe. 73
Russia occupies an even more important position for post-Cold War Europe. Will Russia stretch from Vladivostok to San Francisco, from the Urals to the Atlantic, or only to the near abroad? Since Russian identities remain still tied primarily to an empire lost, rather than a state gained, Europeans are watching Russian domestic politics carefully. An international or European Russia would diminish and a nationalist Russia would increase the external pressure for a further development of a collective European identity, especially in central Europe. 74 The political conflicts about how Russia should relate to Europe will have profound influence on the depth of collective European identity.
"Europe" stands not only for formal, human and democratic rights or the discomfort or fear of other countries that do not institutionalize these rights fully. It also expresses a substantive commitment to human welfare in capitalist markets. For this the Germans have coined the term "social market economy." It was first articulated by the Freiburg school of economics and implemented in the 1950s, most importantly with the indexation of social security payments 1957, thus eliminating the structural poverty that afflicted the old in earlier German welfare regimes. Since then the institutions of the welfare state have had a phenomenal success throughout Europe.
At no place has the power of this state identity been more evident than in Germany. The unification process illustrates that collective assertion has given way to individual entitlement. Sensing this momentous change Chancellor Kohl did not promise the Germans what the economic expertise of the Bundesbank was telling him: blood, sweat and tears. Instead he promised the German voters business as usual: national unification without individual sacrifice. Combined with a by now firmly anchored welfare state identity, this nationalism of individual entitlement typifies not only Germany but all west European states.
The process of a Europeanization of state identity has been considerably weaker in France and Britain than in Germany. Prime Minister Thatcher's persistent and public and President Mitterand's wavering and covert opposition to Germany unification in 1989-90 are a reflection of this important fact. But it was France, rather than Germany or the smaller European democracies, that accelerated the European integration process in the 1980s. Once it had recognized that national strategies were becoming too costly, France turned toward Europe as the most promising way for defending a now redefined, more international identity. Put bluntly France was prepared to sacrifice a measure of control in Paris in expectation of gaining new instruments of control in Brussel. France thus has begun to follow what had become Germany's postwar foreign policy strategy: seeking to regain national sovereignty through international integration. The end of the Cold War and German unification reinforced Germany's traditional and France's newly found stance. Hence the SEA, the TEU and moves towards the creation of an EMU were carried by a strong French-German consensus on the advantages which derive from a more international definition of state identities and interests. 75
In contrast to France Britain's relation to Europe has been more distant. The traditional identity of being a global power and a victor in World War II has made it harder to accept Britain's descent to the position of an important medium-sized state in Europe. The special partnership with the United States retains a strong hold over British policy, reflected in an adamant opposition to have the EU develop a common security and foreign policy. The Europeanization of British identity is undercut also by the traditional British role of playing off one European state against another from a position of splendid isolation. And British politicians are deeply committed to maintaining national sovereignty and to protect Parliament's power as the guarantor of British democracy. Furthermore, many of Britain's economic interests remain global as in direct foreign investments and financial services, are totally separate from the EU as in oil which the EIJ imports and Britain exports, or are a source of profound financial and political irritation as in agriculture. For numerous reasons then Britain's relation to Europe has remained awkward. 76 In short, France sought to strengthen existing state identities within a supranational framework. The United Kingdom's half-hearted commitment to Europe stems form the fact that Europe substitutes for the diminution of a global rather than the enhancement of a national role.
By contrast, Germany and some of the smaller European states have embraced Europe as a means of strengthening and projecting existing state identities. "Hence for many states," Brigid Laffan argues, "there has been a high degree of compatibility between the national project and European integration." 77 This difference in orientation is both reflected in and reinforced by an internationalization of Germany's position in European and Atlantic institutions that is more far-reaching than France's or Britain's. France has become a strong supporter of European integration while taking a cautious attitude towards NATO and the role of the United States in European defense matters. Britain is deeply divided over the issue of European integration but remains an avid supporter of NATO. In contrast to both Britain and France, Germany's position has been to further political integration in Europe, specifically by enhancing the power of the European Parliament and an extension of the principle of qualified majority voting. And Germany has not lacked in its fervor for NATO. The first survey of the German elite taken since the end of the Cold War showed, as Ronald Asmus writes, that "today's German leaders are overwhelmingly pro-European Union and pro-NATO; strongly favor enlargement to Eastern Europe, are sober about Russia's future, and are increasingly willing to deploy the Bundeswehr under a NATO flag in 'out of area' missions to defend common Western interests. 78
German political controversies concern which international context to choose, the United Nations for peace-keeping operations, as the center-left prefers, or NATO for peace-enforcement, as the center-right maintains. The fact that the context for military action must be international is, however, beyond dispute in Germany. This is true neither of the unabashedly realist approach with which Britain seeks to defend its national sovereignty against an encroaching European Union nor of the instrumental-institutionalist one with which France seeks to defend national interests with supranational instruments. Only Germany is a strong supporter of both the EU and NATO and appears ready to push ahead with a deepening institutionalization of Europe. Germany, writes Elizabeth Pond, "is thoroughly European in a way that none of its allies yet is. Germany is increasingly comfortable with its role as a medium-sized power. It no longer aspires either to be a big, cuddly Switzerland abstaining from Europe, or any more global reach. It has found its niche." 79
An institutional perspective that places Germany in Europe does not have to neglect the effects of power and interest. It broadens our vistas to encompass institutional effects that shape identities and thus help define actor interests that inform the exercise of materialist power and efforts to coordinate conflicting objectives. Such a perspective highlights how institutions connect national and international levels and thus avoids reifying analytical distinctions. It does not negate the importance of power but inquires into the meaning of power. It does not disregard actors but inquires into the political processes that define their identities and thus condition political choices. It does not overlook interests but examines how they are defined. And it draws our attention to the importance of both historical time and the possibility of change.
3. Institutional Similarities: Europe's Associated Sovereignty and Germany's Semisovereignty
The hard edges of power in the relations between Germany and Europe are also softened by the overlap of competencies that characterize the institutionalization of power relations within each. Although distinctive, the institutional practices that mark the European polity resemble Germany's on this score. The system of governance in the European polity is based on what one might call "associated sovereignty," pooled competencies in overlapping domains of power and interest, which is characteristic also of Germany's "semisovereign" state. 80
The overlapping of competencies and powers that mark different European governance systems resembles the politics of some of the smaller European states and Germany more than those of France or Britain. In some instances, for example the strong political role of the judiciary, this is the result of German and European developments that have happened to run parallel. In other instances, as in the blueprints for an independent European Central Bank (ECB) committed to the goal of price stability, the assertion of German power was crucial. And there are numerous instances of institutions that fall between sheer coincidence and strategic calculations backed by power. More than thirty Euroregions, for example, express a political commitment to the principle of subsidiarity and the strength of local and regional interests. The formal institutions of the EU -- the Council of the EU (formerly the Council of Ministers), the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice -- are hybrids that share powers with national governments and with each other. 81
As representative of the national governments the EU's general and twenty-two specialized councils deal, respectively, with foreign policy and a variety of specialized issues. 82 The Council of Ministers is assisted by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The councils have many executive prerogatives, but they are also the most important legislative body of the EU. In the execution of policy the councils are linked closely to nafional bureaucracies. They are arenas for the creation of trans governmental coalitions. And since the vast majority of the issues is technical, the councils also provide access to the committees of the European Parliament and interest groups operating at national and, increasingly, at European levels. Furthermore, the Council of the EU is involved in policy implementation through "management" committees on which some of its members sit and which operate by weighted voting. Operating mostly by consensus, the councils are shrouded by a secrecy in their proceedings that reinforces the democratic deficit which characterizes the EU institutions at large. In their political practice they illustrate how in the EU power is combined across different levels of governance and among different centers of power.
With its 20 members meeting as a cabinet, the Commission acts in concertation with the Council of the EU. 83 It supervises the 13,000 civil servants who work in Brussels. But it also initiates most important legislation. Issued largely by the Commission in the form of regulations and decisions, the total legislative output of the EC more than doubled between 1970 and 1987, from 3,209 to 8,471. 84 And it supervises the implementation of member states without acting as an enforcement agency. 85 The Commissioners are appointed by their national governments. The Commission relies often on the expertise of national bureaucracies, both in the development of new policies and in the implementation of existing ones. And because it seeks also to lessen its dependence on national governments, it is also a voracious consumer of information provided by non-governmental sources. Thus the institutional practices of the Commission reflect a merging of legislative and executive as well as supranational and national power.
After the mid-1980s Jacques Delors was at the helm of the European Commission, arguably its most important President since 1957. The Delors strategy was more than simply to succeed at its first major task, the ratification of the SEA. The Delors team's approach, in the words of Francois Lamoreux, was a 'Russian doll' strategy. "You take the first doll apart and then, inside is another one, which leads you to another and so on . . . until it is too late to turn back." 86 Delors' ambition extended beyond the liberalization embodied in the SEA. He was interested in advancing the institutionalization of the European polity along several dimensions. German unification presented both a great challenge and an opportunity. Delors welcomed unification without any hesitation, and he worked hard and successfully at facilitating the early integration of the five new Länder into the EC. "The wisdom of Delors's course on Germany," writes George Ross, "seemed self-evident. A Germany anchored at the center of the EC was the sine qua non of the Community's future." 87
The members of the European Parliament, elected directly since 1979, caucus along ideological rather than national lines. 88 But Parliament's power has remained largely advisory. It can delay actions, and it has the right to impeach members of the Commission. But its power is restricted to the approval of only noncompulsory spending items which amount to only about two-fifths of the European budget. It is excluded from exercising any significant budgetary control over the largest item, agriculture. The absence of a European public and media, of strong transnational links between parties, and of important issues to be decided in European electoral politics, explain why elections to the European Parliament are often plebiscites on unrelated national issues rather than focusing on the substance of the European polity.
The cooperation and assent procedures, introduced by the SEA, have, however, enhanced considerably the power of the European Parliament. 89 The result has been an intensification of bargaining prior to the introduction of EU Council or Commission proposals and thus a partial merging of legislative and executive powers. In the eyes of the German government, not of the French or British, these reforms fall far short of remedying the democratic deficit of the EU. It appears plausible to assume that any future evolution of the powers of the European Parliament will derive largely from the forging of stronger links between it and national legislatures. Parliamentary practice thus brings together legislative and executive powers and, more weakly, national and supranational elements of power.
The European Court is marked by judicial activism. 90 The Court's judicial identity shields it from political interference as it pursues its objectives. In contrast, at the national level courts and executives contest explicitly over the institutional prerogative to define the balance of power among government institutions and the pace, scope and manner of an integrating European polity. 91 The Commission's right to sue member states (Article 169), the right of member states to sue each other (Article 170), and the Court's right to review the legality of all actions taken by the EU Council and the Commission (Article 173) aim at securing compliance with the obligations of the Treaty of Rome. But it is the prime task of tne Court to enforce a uniform interpretation and application of European law (Article 177) throughout the EU. Furthermore, as part of its evolving practices, the Court monitors national laws for possible incompatibilities with the Treaty. In this task the Court decides cases in which individual citizens sue national legislatures and executives. Finally, as specified in Article 177, the Court also rules on general issues involving the validity of Community law. It is an indication of how strongly supranational and national levels of governments are linked that the Court does not decide these issues directly. Rather it issues "preliminary rulings" and thus seeks to guide lower, national courts in their judgments. 92 There is ground for reasonable disagreement on whether the Court's decentralized method of enforcement is a source of weakness, strength, or both. But it is evident that the Court's activism relies heavily on an admixture of supranational and national powers.
A substantial overlap of powers is characteristic also of the three main pillars of Germany's semi-sovereign state: federalism, parapublic institutions and coalition governments. 93 These pillars pool the competencies of different actors in a broad array of different institutions. First, in a strong federal system the dispersal of power is reflected in the overlapping competencies of state and federal authorities, in the structure of the German bureaucracy, in the financing of different levels of government, and in a regional diversity that has been reinforced by German unification. Secondly, a similar system exists also in Germany's parapublic institutions, which can be found in most major arenas of public policy. These institutions express in their political practice something akin to the doctrine of subsidiarity at the European level, which seeks to concentrate decision-making power in the hands of those most qualified, not necessarily those most affected, to deal with specific issues. Finally, at both federal and state levels Germany's state pools the powers of different coalition governments. The logic of coalition government is reflected also in the relation between Bundesrat and Bundestag. Political parties are themselves often statist in outlook, illustrated, for example, in their dependence on public funds. In Germany there is no clear concentration of power. Rather, political bargaining takes place in a system that fuses executive and legislative functions in the process of policy formulation and federal, state and local centers of power in the process of policy implementation.
Remarkably, the process of unification has done little to change these basic features of Germany's political institutions. 94 At the time of unification many observers and activists, inside and outside of Germany worried about the possibility that the "Berlin republic' would differ as much from the "Bonn republic," as "Bonn" had differed from "Weimar." Even those who avoided apocalyptic messages were united in the belief that the increasing heterogeneity in Germany's federal system would make a greater centralization of power inevitable. But the record of the first five years after unification did not support those views. Consensual governance sustained by the same overlapping pillars of power has remained the dominant trait of German politics after unification. Neo-corporatist tendencies, for example were illustrated by the "Solidarity Pact" and the way unions proposed a "Job Alliance." In Germany's federal system the individual states have become no less important. Distrustful of a central government that pushed the mounting costs of unification increasingly also on their shoulders, the states have forged alliances across all partisan and denominational cleavages. And they have fought successfully for stronger rights of co-determination in the affairs of the European Union. And Germany's tradition of loyal opposition has been continued by a SPD which has been meek, even by German standards, while facing a government that has enjoyed oniy a four-seat majority in the Bundestag since the 1994 election. While the SPD moves gingerly to explore the possibilities of alliances at the state level with the post-Communist PDS, the CDU is eyeing with growing interest a Green Party that is rapidly transforming itself from a single-issue social movement party to the third force in the party system. With or without the FDP, the German party system is likely to continue the practice of coalition government and loyal opposition.
The different institutions of the EU and different national systems of governance are linked in transnational policy networks that vary according to the particular issue at hand. 95 These networks are the frameworks in which the concertation and synchronization of European and national policy processes occurs. They are marked by an admixture of "hard" and "soft" regulatory styles that Adrienne Heritier calls a "policy patchwork." 96 The passing of time has altered some political practices and not modified others. In the early 1960s European interest groups were relatively unimportant. In fact they were no more than liaison groups with the secretarial function of coordinating the view of different national groups. 97 But it was clear even in the early days of the EC that an accretion of power towards Brussels would change the nature of lobbying. Research on interest group politics and the process of policy implementation illustrates this point. In the 1990s more than 90 regional and local governments, representing more than half of the EU's population, have opened offices in Brussels. 98 The accretion of power in Brussels has created an important new arena for lobbying even though it is still quite unstable, remarkably open, and at times highly unpredictable. 99 The industrial employer organizations, food and agriculture, commerce and the professions account for the vast majority of EU associations. They are exceptionally well placed for influencing the consultative bodies of the EU whose number doubled in the 1980s to about 1,200. 100 The expansion in the scope of EU policies and the expanded role of the European Parliament have increased the intensity of lobbying at the European level. Europe's emerging system of interest group representation tends towards pluralism. It contrasts with neo-corporatist arrangements and stable policy communities at the national level. Business, not labor, has become the international actor per excellence. 101
Change has been less noticeable in the area of social movement politics. National social movements are dealing primarily with national not European institutions. Sidney Tarrow argues that ordinary Europeans and their domestic groups do not react directly to European level decisions. Grass-roots collective action remains primarily focused on national structures of political opportunity. While interest groups have to some extent shifted from national to European targets, with the exception of the environment, most other social movements have not. "The EU," writes Sidney Tarrow, "has not yet become a fulcrum for movement organisations as the national state did before it." 102 The absence of this shift, as Tarrow notes, is not surprising. The EU's emphasis on regulatory policy making leaves so many competencies and venues for national governments and bureaucracies, especially in the process of national implementation of EU directives, that movement organizations seek access where they feel they will have the biggest impact. When Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold published in 1970 a volume that took stock of both the theory and practice of European integ ration, they referred to Europe as a "would-be polity." 103 In the 1990s most students of European integration write about the European polity as an institutional fact that is internationalizing, not replacing, the identity of European states in transnational governance systems.
The system of associated sovereignty in the European polity and Germany's semi-sovereign state are both distinguished by overlapping competencies, not by their concentration or division. This is not to argue, however, that the growing links between associated sovereignty and semi-sovereignty were part of an overarching plan to bring about a domination of Europe by Germany. German institutional practices have evolved from a relatively coherent political vision expressed in the Basic Law. European institutional practices have evolved as the result of often contradictory ideological and state perspectives. In the waxing and waning of deregulation and reregulation of national and European politics, complex political bargains between nafional governments and Brussels have created numerous opportunities for political creativity in the implementation of partial plans. Despite their differences in historical origin. the similarity in institutions and practices (such as multi-level governance systems, subsidiarity. an activist court, and an autonomous central bank modelled after the Bundesbank) creates a European milieu in which German political actors easily can feel at home. 104 This provides a strong anchor for Germany in Europe. Internationalization creates national, regional and local countercurrents, but because of a structural congruence in how power is exercised, Europe's institutional setting is remarkably familiar and natural for Germany. In brief, two historical processes, German democratization and European integration, came to be linked thus making it possible for German and European political elites to reinforce and exploit an institutional flt that initially had emerged fortuitously. Historical accident and human agency interacted in the creation of the institutional congruence of Germany and Europe.
Other political systems mesh less well with the European polity. The U.S. system ot government, for example, has no more than a surface similarity with Europe's associated sovereignty and Germany's semi-sovereignty. It is true that the separation of power between different branches of the U.S. government and its layer-cake federal system divides and diffuses power; it offers interested actors, groups and institutions sharing power numerous veto points to shape the formulation and implementation of policy, backed by a U.S. version of the practice, not the ideology, of subsidiarity. But in contrast to the EU, the U.S. has in the Presidency a strong center of power that accentuates political fissures. And in contrast to Germany, the U.S. lacks a system of political parties as the central political institution, linked into a marble-cake system of federalism, that brings all the affected actors together in problem-focused negotiating arenas. In short, the division and diffusion of power in the U.S. political system reflects institutional practices that differ greatly from the partial pooling of sovereignty in the European polity and in Germany.
In contrast to the U.S., British and French politics concentrate rather than divide power. Britain is organized around a system of Parliamentary government and a strong two-party system. The British system of winner-take-all elections creates decisive majorities that provide the basis for strong leadership. A "neutral" civil service, the absence of a written constitution and of judicial review, and a society with a relatively decentralized system of interest groups support the concentration of power in the majority party in Parliament and in the hands of the Prime Minister. French politics revolves around a system of Presidential rule and a powerful state bureaucracy. Parliament is relatively uninvolved in policy making. The courts and the National Bank occupy subordinate, though important, positions. And interest groups are relatively decentralized and marginal.
Britain's late entry in 1973, policy clashes on agriculture and budgetary contributions, and persistent political divisions between and within the political parties, and the strong tradition of Parliamentary government, chapter 2 argues, has made for an uncomfortable fit in terms of policy, politics and institutions which accounts for its position as a relative outlier in the European integration process. On questions of investment and finance, Britain's economic interests have remained closely tied to the global economy. Conversely, on questions of agriculture and its disproportionately large contribution to the EU budget, Britain had compelling national concerns. Beyond economic matters, in its identity British officials have tended to view Europe as a poor second cousin to the global empire they were relinquishing. Britain's traditional role had been to balance the affairs in Europe, not to get engaged in Europe. And Britain's "special relationship" with the United States valued U.S. entanglement in European affairs more than the growth of an autonomous center of power in Europe. Most importantly, strong conflicts within and between its major political parties, reinforced by the adversarial style of the House of Commons, mobilized strong opposition against foreign attempts to encroach on the polifical prerogatives of the oldest Parliament in the world that had never seen its power checked either by a written Constitution or the opinions passed down by a Constitutional Court. Britain's troubled relationship with Europe thus results fr6m numerous sources.
Like Britain, France retains a clear state and national identity. But in its policies, politics and institutions, compared to Britain, France has been more European. Seeking to regain some of the national sovereignty it gave up at the supranational level France's commitment to the European project is based on relatively clear calculations of long-term interest rather than a partial merging of identities as in Germany. Key bargains between France and Germany on important political initiatives have defined the structure of opportunities and constraints for others as France has benefitted with Germany from exercising is coalitional power. Furthermore. the institutionalization of Franco-German relations in the Elys$eacute;e treaty have begun to embed this coalitional power in a new social reality that is marked by a growth in social interactions. Since its creation in 1964 the German-French Youth Association, for example, has sponsored under its various programs six-weeks visits of about 4.6 million French and German participants in the neighboring country. At the level of elites, Franco-German consultations have intensified even more dramatically. During the 1980s, for example, Bjorn Sverdrup estimates that President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl met about six to eight times a year on a bilateral basis; if one includes their meetings in multilateral fora, they met about once a month during a period of a dozen years. 105 Compared to Britain, interests and institutions have brought France much closer to Germany and Europe.
The adjustments that British and French political elites must make to the organization of power in the European polity are arguably greater than is true for German elites. For Britain what matters is will not institutions; realism or intergovernmentalism captures much of this approach to Europe. France takes an instrumental approach to Europe that stresses a combination of short- and long-term French interests. Furthermore, in contrast to the EU and Germany, both Britain and France exercise independent military power in world politics. This makes them players on important issues in world politics where neither the EU nor Germany are present. Neither the British nor the French political system thus is fully compatible with Germany's institutional approach to Europe that emphasizes long-term interests rooted in a Europeanization of state identity, and that is grounded in a system of diffused power characteristic of both the systems of associated sovereignty characteristic of the European polity and Germany's semi-sovereignty.
In sharp contrast to Britain and France, several of the small European states, like the EU and Germany, diffuse power and thus operate quite easily in a system of associated sovereignty. The legitimacy of corporatist bargains tends to matter in these small states more than the efficacy of popular participation in politics, which remains restricted to regular electoral certification of the major political parties. 106 Analogously, the legitimacy of the European polity rests substantially on voluntary compliance and the effectiveness of the policy machinery rather than authoritative, central control and public participation in the policy process. Indeed Paul Taylor argues convincingly that the consociational arrangements in some of the smaller European democracies, rather than intergovernmental bargains or functional pressures, describe most accurately the European integration process. 107 In both systems of power individual parts enjoy considerable autonomy which compromises the sovereign control of the center within the consociation; political consensus supports common arrangements that aim at increasing the welfare of both parts and collectivity; the parts are represented by the principle of proportionality; and government is dominated by a cartel of elites that operates by the principle of consensus, a voids majoritarian decision-making and seeks to protect the autonomy of the parts.
Furthermore, the German Rechtsstaat tradition after 1945 and the importance of legal norms in the process of European integration match well with the preferences of small states for legal rather than political ways of organizing international affairs. 108 In comparative perspective Germany resembles the institutional practices of its smaller European neighbors more closely than does any of the other larger European states. 109 It is therefore not surprising to find an affinity between the institutional practices of associated sovereignty and semi-sovereignty on the one hand and of democratic corporatism on the other. Furthermore a weakening of the corporatist arrangements in some of the smaller states in northern and western Europe has tended to increase further the institutional similarity with Germany which has never featured fully developed corporatist arrangements. 110
Semi-sovereignty and associated sovereignty are systems of power that are closely linked. Looking at it from the perspective of important political institutions in Germany, specifically the government, the ministerial bureaucracy, the Bundestag, the Länder, the Bundesrat and the courts, Dietrich Rometsch concludes that "an increasing 'Europeanization' . . . a fusion of national and European institutions can be observed clearly in the German case." 111 The evolution of institutional practices of associated- and semi-sovereignty in Europe and Germany are mutually supportive. But they are also the product of material power, strategic bargaining and historical accident. Whatever the precise mechanisms that have shaped this evolution, it is an important consequence that, from the perspective of Bonn and Berlin, the European political milieu is largely taken for granted. Politicians deviating from a strong European policy tend to do poorly at the polls. 112
The meshing of Europe's system of associated sovereignty and Germany's semi-sovereignty is not well analyzed in terms of universal categories that describe the relationship among actors whose identities are fixed. And the relations between Germany and Europe cannot simply be interpreted as a contest over the maximization of relative power or a bargaining process aiming at the coordination of conflicting policies. Such views conceal what is distinctive about Germany in Europe. The concepts of associated and semi-sovereignty alert us to a structural congruence in the arrangement of power at different levels of governance as well to a partial pooling of German sovereignty in a European polity that has emerged from the different states that constitute it. Coexisting with these states, that polity to some extent modifies the identities of states, the interests they hold and the policies that they pursue.
4. Conclusion and Preview
Regional integration is nothing new either for Germany or Europe. History is replete with examples of a variety of leagues, commonwealths, pacts, associations and councils. German unity in the 19th century emerged from one such construction, the Zollverein, which in 1834 brought under one roof a variety of smaller customs and commercial unions. Subsequently German states formed a tax and a monetary union. But German unity in 1871 came only after three bloody wars in less than a decade. This mixture of voluntarism and violence marked to different degrees also subsequent European experiences with regional integration. At the end of the 19th century, for example, numerous proposals advocated schemes of regional economic integration at the European level quite similar to some of the proposals made after World War II. By contrast the New Order that Germany sought to impose on Europe in the 1930s and 1940s used the old instruments of economic coercion, exploitation, occupation and war. Compared to this historical record the degree of institutionalization that places united Germany in an integrating Europe is quite remarkable.
A comparison with integration processes in other regions reinforces this point. In terms of geography and politics Germany, China and the United States are central to the developments of all of the various subregions in Europe, Asia and North America. 113 They are more important than France, Britain or Italy; Japan, India, Indonesia or Russia; and Canada or Mexico. Asian integration occurs through markets and informal corporate, ethnic and familial networks. The elites of many of Asia's developmental states remain deeply suspicious of relinquishing sovereignty to an international bureaucracy not easily held accountable. Market integration in the Americas follows a shallow path seeking to create little more than a free trade zone. In both regions political attempts to further integration have accelerated only in the 1990s.
Compared to Asia and North America, the formal institutionalization of the relations between different states is Europe's most defining characteristic. 114 At its inception, in the 1950s, political elites favoring European integration aimed at internationalizing the core of Germany's military-industrial complex and of the German army through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Defense Community (EDC). After the political defeat of the EDC in the French Assembly in 1954, the European Economic Community (EEC) became an important political instrument to stop a backsliding into the traditional pattern of European state-to-state diplomacy. Put differently, in its moment of defeat the political architects of European integration aimed at a customs union and a denser set of institutions than did North America when its moment of creating a regional free trade zone arrived more than three decades later. And unlike Asia the EEC institutionalized from the very beginning the pooling of sovereignty in some policy sectors (foreign trade, agriculture and transportation) rather than relying on informal integration through markets. Although political leadership and grand bargains mattered intermittently, in subsequent decades the European integration process was full of unintended consequences that strengthened further a high degree of formal institutionalization. Accompanied and interrupted by multiple political crises, over successive decades the growth of European institutions has continued to shape state identities and norms of conduct and thus has influenced the conceptions of the national interest that political elites seek to further.
This book investigates the institutionalized taming of Germany's power in Europe through a set of empirical case studies that seek to uncover different patterns of influence linking Germany with the EU on the one hand and Germany, the EU and a number of smaller European states on the other. Instead of projections of past experiences onto the future, this volume develops its insights based on specific institutional and policy episodes in different European states. Specifically, in chapters 2-3 this volume presents an analysis of the interaction between Germany and the EU, viewed from the vantage points of both Bonn/Berlin and Brussels. And chapters 4-7 offer twenty-four case studies of how European and German influences manifest themselves in different institutions and policy sectors in ten states clustered around Germany in all directions of the sun dial. 115
The book focuses on countries that have been core members of the EU since the 1950s (Netherlands and Belgium), countries that joined in the 1980s and 1990s (Greece, Spain and Sweden), countries that are hoping for membership in the coming years (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic), and countries that decided not to join but adjust unilaterally (Norway). The specific country case studies include economic-regulatory issues that have been central to the European integration process. But they include also social, cultural and security affairs where EU effects are weaker compared to either broader European, transatlantic or global effects on the one hand or national or sub-national effects on the other. In brief, in the absence of established facts on which we might rest our judgements about Germany's effects in Europe, this book has to include a broad range of political institutions and policy issues.
The next two chapters analyze Germany in Europe from the perspective of Brussels (chapter 2) and Bonn/Berlin (chapter 3). They show how the political norms that have evolved in the European polity are creating a milieu in which Germany exercises indirect, institutional rather than direct, deliberative power. Furthermore, in the aftermath of unification the growing economic constraints that Germany is experiencing favor a new set of harder economic interests that are looking more for short-term tangible returns rather than subsidizing unconditionally an open-ended political process that benefits Germany in the long-term.
Chapters 4-7 focus on different patterns of European and German influences on the institutions and policies of some of the states on the northern, western, southern and eastern periphery of Europe. Specifically these chapters point to variability within each of the four subregions by offering a comparative analysis of the Netherlands and Belgium (chapter 4), Spain and Greece (chapter 5), Sweden and Norway (chapter 6), and Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic (chapter 7). These chapters illustrate the different ways in which European and German effects are jointly shaping some of the institutions and policies in these ten states.
The concluding chapter 8 draws together some of the main findings of the case studies. Considering the great diversity in institutional arrangements and national policies in a region with strong international effects, it argues that: (1) international effects are pervasive but not overly constraining; (2) varying by policy sector, the soft European and German institutional effects can be parallel, countercurrent, mutually reinforcing, and independent; and (3) neither the political ambitions expressed in the Maastricht treaty nor a unified Germany exercising hegemonic leadership are likely to forge, either singly or in combination, these diverse national states into one European polity or proto-state anytime soon. Europe, Germany and the smaller European states are likely to continue instead to link national and regional politics through pervasive domestic, regional and international institutional links.
political norms that have evolved in the European polity are Our initial question -- will Germany dominate Europe or Europe Germany? -- does not point simply to converging or cross-cutting political processes that one can analyze solely in terms of material or bargaining power. The domination of one state by another and the coordination of conflicting objectives of different governments occur frequently in the European polity. But they acquire a different meaning in different historical and institutional contexts. And that context has changed greatly since 1945 as the identity of the German state has been internationalized. This historical development is distinctive and noteworthy viewed both from the perspective of modern German history and contemporary European affairs. By themselves analyses that focus on the importance of material or bargaining power fail to recognize how institutions have softened the effects of German power in Europe. Far from denying the existence of German power this book points to important changes that have affected how German power in Europe is exercised. In brief, this book argues that we need to think not of Germany and Europe but of Germany in Europe. Since the European polity offers a familiar political stage, it is highly improbable that German political elites will any time soon turn their back on European institutions that have served so well the interests that motivate German policies at home and abroad. Germany in Europe is a political fact that is defining the international and national politics of the new Europe.
Note *: For critical comments and suggestions on earlier drafts I would like to thank David Cameron, James Caporaso, Nikiforos Diamandouros, Barry Eichengreen, Peter Gourevitch, Joseph Grieco, Helga Haftendorn, Peter Hall, Gunther Hellmann, Stanley Hoffmann, Mary F. Katzenstein, Robert 0. Keohane, Beate Kohler-Koch, Stephen Krasner, Michael Kreile, David Laitin, Andrei Markovits, Gary Marks, Stefan Leibfried, Harald Müller, Henry Nau, Elizabeth Pond, Simon Reich, Judith Reppy, John Ruggie, Gian Enrico Rusconi, Wayne Sandholtz, Fritz Scharpf, Gebhard Schweigler, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Wolfgang Streeck, Bengt Sundelius, Michael Zürn; participants at seminars discussing drafts at the University of Bremen, Darmstadt, Geneva, Göttingen, Manchester, Mannheim, the European University Institute at Florence, the Humboldt University Berlin, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; the project participants; and two anonymous readers for Cornell University Press. Back.
Note 1: .Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Stephen F. Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). Wolfgang Schäuble, Der Vertrag: Wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991). Horst Teltschik, 329 Tag: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991). Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995). For the prior history see Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993) and Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). Back.
Note 2: Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Gezahmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbessenheit zur Mach tvergessenheit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985). Back.
Note 3: Jeffrey J. Anderson, chapter 3, manuscript p.8. Back.
Note 4: For the concept of "soft power" see also Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). Back.
Note 5: Nora Boustany, "European Envoys Breach Some Old Embassy Walls," International Herald Tribune (July 6-7, 1996): 1. Back.
Note 6: Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1996): 30. Back.
Note 7: Paul Taylor, "The European Community and the State: Assumptions, Theories and Propositions," Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 125. Back.
Note 8: James A. Caporaso, "The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?" Journal of Common Market Studies 34,1 (March 1996): 46-47. Back.
Note 9: Pond, "Germany as a Regional Power, p.36. Back.
Note 10: Some of these states, like the Netherlands, are small, not peripheral. Others, like Poland, are peripheral, not small. For simplicity's sake, this chapter refers to all of them as "small." Back.
Note 11: This volume seeks to advance a sociological-institutional argument that bridges domestic and international levels of analysis and that differs from rationalist (realist and liberal) perspectives. With the inclusion of France and Britain, the book's 28 illustrative case studies, reported in chapters 3-7, would have increased three-fold. This would have far exceeded the project's limited financial resources and research capacities. Most of the existing academic and policy literatures dealing with Germany's influence in Europe are speculative and based on anecdotal evidence. The case studies which this book reports provide an empirical base that, despite its unavoidable inadequacy, permit a preliminary exploration and testing of a particular analytical stance. Should this approach merit future work, researchers with hopefully larger and better data sets are likely to replicate, extend, reformulate or reject the line of argument and evidence that this book offers. Back.
Note 12: See also Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs, 71, 2 (Spring 1992): 114-30. Back.
Note 13: Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus 95,3 (Summer 1996): 862-915. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1964). Back.
Note 14: For a fuller development of this point see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1996). Theoretically sophisticated reviews of different analytical perspectives on European integration include: James A. Caporaso and John T.S. Keeler, "The European Union and Regional Integration Theory," in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds., The State of the European Community, volume 3, Building a European Polity? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp.29-62; Alec Stone, "What Is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in International Relations Theory," The Review of Politics 56, 3 (Summer 1994): 441-74; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies 34,1 (March 1996): 53-80. Back.
Note 15: Stanley Hoffmann, The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe 1964-1994 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). Alan S. Milward with the assistance of George Brennan and Federico Romero, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies 31, 4 (December 1993): 473-524. For a critical discussion see Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis, "An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism," International Organization 50, 2 (Spring, 1996): 269-99. Back.
Note 16: Intergovernmentalism differs from another variant of realism that self-consciously neglects the role of domestic and transnational politics in favor of the putatively strong effects of anarchy on state behavior even in peaceful environments. Back.
Note 17: William E. Paterson, "Beyond Bipolarity: German Foreign Policy in a Post Cold War World," in Developments in German Politics 2 (London: Macmillan, 1996), p.15 manuscript. For a scathing review of the Court's conservative, central European conceptions of ethnos and demos and its understanding of the requirements of democratic legitimacy in pre- and post-Maastricht Europe see Joseph H.H. Weiler, The State "über alles": Demos. Telos and the German Maastricht Decision EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/19 (Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (Fl), European University, 1995). See also Juliane Kokott, The European Court and National Courts Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context: Report on Germany EUI Working Paper RSC No.95/25 (Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (Fl), European University, 1995). Back.
Note 18: See John Ely's extremely critical essay, "The Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung and Contemporary National Conservatism," German Politics and Society 13,2 (Summer 1995) (issue 35): 81-121. Back.
Note 19: Peter Pulzer, "Nation State and National Sovereignty," Bulletin, 17 (London, German Historical Institute, 1995): 9, 13. See also the theoretically sophisticated and comprehensive survey of recent German writings on foreign policy in Gunther Hellmann's, "Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany," Mershon International Studies Review 40 (1996): 1-39 and a series of articles published between April 18 and August 4,1994 under the heading "What's right" in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Back.
Note 20: Mearsheimer's original article and some of the debate it elicited are contained in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995). See also John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49 with a set of rejoinders in the summer 1995 issue of the same journal. Back.
Note 21: See Pond's exchange with Kenneth Waltz, "International Politics Viewed from the Ground," International Security 19,1 (Summer 1994): 195-99, and Elizabeth Pond and David The 'German Question' and other German Questions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). Back.
Note 22: See especially Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding The Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory, " in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.338, note 14, and Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union, and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21 (January 1995): 21-40. Back.
Note 23: David Mutimer, "1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism Reconsidered," Journal of European Integration 13, 1 (Fall 1989): 75-101. Back.
Note 24: Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," Foreign Affairs 69, 1 (Winter 1990/91): 91-106. James Sperling, "German Security Policy after the Cold War: The Strategy of a Civilian Power in an Uncivil World," Arms Control 12, 3 (December 1991): 77-98. Back.
Note 25: Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," World Politics 42, 1 (October 1989): 95-128. Maria Green Cowles, "Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: The European Round Table and EC 1992," Journal of Common Market Studies 33, 4 (December 1995): 501-26. Back.
Note 26: The point is developed at greater length in Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, Norms and National Security See also the trenchant critique in Wayne Sandholtz, "Rules, Reasons and International Institutions," paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 15-21 April 1996, pp.2-12. Back.
Note 27: These generic problems are addressed in a compelling manner by Reiiate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf, "Der Ansatz des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus," in Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf, eds., Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und Politische Steuerung (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), pp.39-72. Back.
Note 28: Neil Fligstein and Peter Brantley, "The 1992 Single Market Program and the Interests of Business," Working Paper 1.27, University of California, Center for German and European Studies, December 1994. Back.
Note 29: Maria Green Cowles, "German Big Business and Brussels: Learning to Play the European Game," Seminar Paper No. 15, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (November 1995), pp.1-2. Michael G. Huelshoff shares this view in arguing that "German support for 1992 is based mostly on ideological grounds rather than on German interests." See his "German Business and the 1992 Project," in Carl F. Lankowski, ed., Germany and the European Community: Beyond Hegemony and Containment? (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p.23. Back.
Note 30: Andrei S.Markovits and Alexander Otto, "German Labor and Europe '92," Comparative Politics 24, 2 (January 1992): 169. Back.
Note 31: Pond, "Germany as a Regional Power," p. 30. Back.
Note 32: Klaus Gunter Deutsch, "The Politics of Freer Trade in the European Community, 1985-93," Ph.d. dissertation, Free University Berlin, June 1995, p.150. Back.
Note 33: J. Nicholas Ziegler, Creating Industrial Capabilities: France. Germany. and the Politics of Technological Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chapter 5. Back.
Note 34: Karl W. Deutsch et al. France. Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967). Hayward Alker, Jr. and Donald Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area, 1928-1963," in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 287-316. Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally,1967). Back.
Note 35: Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Back.
Note 36: Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/5 (Cologne, Max-Planck Institute, 1996). James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: The Free Press, 1995). Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). George M. Thomas et al., Institutional Structure: Constituting State. Society. and the Individual (Newbury Park, Ca: Sage, 1987). Back.
Note 37: See Philippe Schmitter, "Speculation about Alternative Futures for the European Polity and their Implications for European Public Policy," paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on Quo Vadis Europa 2000, Center for European and Russian Studies, UCLA, Los Angeles, March 16-19, 1995, pp.6-7. Back.
Note 38: John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization 47, 1 (Winter 1993): 172. Back.
Note 39: Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Constructing the European Community Legal System from the Ground Up:The Role of Individual Litigants and National Courts," unpublished paper, Columbia University and Harvard Law School, 1996, p.3. Back.
Note 40: Ole Wæver, "Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security," paper prepared for delivery at the 36th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, February 21-25, 1995. With specific reference to Germany and France see Ole Wæver, "With Herder and Habermas: Europeanization in the Light of German Concepts of State and Nation," Working Papers 16/1990, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen. Back.
Note 41: Ole Wæver et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). Back.
Note 42: Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community," in Beverly Crawford, ed., The Future of European Security (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, IAS, 1992), pp.287-325. Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism and Ideas in World Politics," unpublished manuscript, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 1995. Back.
Note 43: I am basing this presentation on the most recent iteration of a set of ideas that Schmitter has developed in a series of papers dating back at least to 1990. See, most recently, his "If the Nation-State Were to Wither Away in Europe, What Might Replace It?" (unpublished paper, 1996). Schmitter distinguishes territorial constituencies (that are variable or fixed, tangential or contiguous, egalitarian or hierarchical, differentiated or identical, reversible or irreversible) and functional ones (that are variable or fixed, dispersed or cumulative, shared or separate, overlapping or coincident). Based on these distinctions Schmitter delineates four different types of polities. He gives them the names condominio, consortio, conferderatio and stato or federatio. Back.
Note 44: Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohier-Koch, "The Transformation of Governance in the European Union," Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Working Paper No. 11, 1995. Back.
Note 45: Gary Marks, "Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the European Community," in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda Rosenthal, eds., The State of the European Community (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp.391-410. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Birth of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration," unpublished paper. Alberta M. Sbragia, "Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison," in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed. Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1992), pp.257-91; and Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Governance in the European Union (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1996). Back.
Note 46: Paul Pierson, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,"Comparative Political Studies 29,2 (April 1996): 123-63. Back.
Note 47: Johan P. Olsen, Europeanization and Nation-State Dynamics ARENA Working Paper No. 9 (March 1995), p.2. See also James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "Institutional Perspectives on Governance," Arena reprint 94/2, Oslo, 1994. Back.
Note 48: In a flood of publications on this topic see, for example, Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, "Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?" International Affairs 72,1 (January 1996): 9-32. Commission of the European Communities, "The European Community and German Unification," Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/90. Michael Kreile, "Will Germany Assume A Leadership Role in the European Union,?" American Foreign Policy Interests 17, 5 (October 1995): 11-21. Carl Lankowski, Germany and the European Community: Beyond Hegemony and Containment? (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). Michael G. Huelshoff, Andrei S. Markovits, and Simon Reich, eds., From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics after Unification (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993). Jeffrey J. Anderson and John B. Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe,"in Robert 0. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-91 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 23-62. Lily Gardner Feldman, "Germany and the EC: Realism and Responsibility," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 531 (January 1994): 25-43. Back.
Note 49: See Europa-Archiv 22 (1985): D606-21. Eurolotto and a Europe-day have not yet been adopted. Back.
Note 50: Andrei S. Markovits and Carolyn Hofig, "Germany as a Bridge: German Foreign Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe," paper prepared as part of the seminar series of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies on 'Germany's Role in Shaping of the New Europe: Architect, Model, Bridge,' Washington D.C. January 9, 1996, pp.30-34. Back.
Note 51: The Herald Tribune (February 15,1996): 1. Back.
Note 52: See the compelling argument that David Laitin develops in his paper "The Cultural Identities of a European State," paper prepared for delivery at a conference on "European Identity and its Intellectual Roots," Harvard University, May 1993, revised July 22,1994. Back.
Note 53: Eighty-seven percent of the EC citizens reported in 1987 knowing English, compared to 69 percent for French and 57 percent for German, as reported in Eurobarometer, No. 28 (December 1987) and quoted in Laitin, "Cultural Identities," p.9. Back.
Note 54: Laitin, "Cultural Identities," pp.16-17. Laltin reports data from Florian Coulmas, ed., A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects and Quandaries (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), pp.22-26. Caporaso, "European Union and Forms of State," p.39. Back.
Note 55: Der Spiegel 23,1995, p. 102. Nathaniel C. Nash, "What Fits in Europe's Wallets?" New York Times (July 11,1995): Dl, D5. Frankfurter Aligemeine Zeitung (October 30,1995): 13. Back.
Note 56: International Herald Tribune (April 15, 1996): 13. Süddeutsche Zeitung (December 16/17, 1995): 19. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (January 3, 1996): 11. The issue can get very complicated in specific cases. Because of its ancient Greek origins Greece, for example, has been very enthusiastic about the choice of the name 'Euro.' But a big controversy remains whether the new coins will have written 'Euro' only in Latin or also in Greek letters, and, if the latter, whether this will apply only to coins minted in Greece or throughout the EU. I would like to thank Susannah Verney for bringing to my attention the specifics of the Greek case. Back.
Note 57: The Council of Europe adopted a European flag in 1955 which the European Parliament accepted in 1986: a circle of 12 golden stars on a dark blue background. By accident for some years the membership of the EC also matched the number 12. With the enlargement of the EU to 15, the number of 12 stars has not changed. I saw on Berlin streets in 1996 also cars from Poland, the Ukraine and Hungary which had added the EU symbol to their national plates, probably a combination of a substantive political statement and instrumental reasoning about how to get on the right side of the German police. Back.
Note 58: On passports see Antje Wiener, "European Citizenship: Practice and Parameters of a New Policy," Ph.d. dissertation, Carleton University, September 1995; John Torpey, "' The Surest Thermometer of Freedom': The Evolution of Passport Controls in Europe," unpublished paper, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy, February 1996; and Reiner Luykcn, "Ihren Pass, bitte!" Die Zeit 37 (September 17, 1993): 24. Back.
Note 59: Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Back.
Note 60: Paul Close, Citizenship. Europe and Change (London: Macmillan, 1995). Because of the long-standing differences in the policy of granting nationality based on place of birth, as in Britain or France, or on descent, as in Germany, this possibility is more remote for Germany than for other states. For an analytically sophisticated, comparative treatment of this question see Jeffrey Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Institutions: Identity Politics in-Post-Cold War Europe," paper prepared for delivery at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago Hilton, August 30-September 3,1995. Back.
Note 61: My discussion follows here Caryl Clark, "Confronting the Ninth: Beethoven's 'Ode' as European Anthem," unpublished paper, Music Department, University of Toronto. Back.
Note 62: Clark, "Confronting the Ninth," p.9. Back.
Note 63: European Parliament, Document A 2-0104/88 (June 9, 1988), pp.7, 9 as quoted in Clark, "Confronting the Ninth," p.12. Back.
Note 64: Sometimes even Beethoven's music is associated with nationality. During the 1996 European soccer cup BBC was heavily criticized for its choice of a German tune for a British-based tournament. BBC had been too European in thinking of the Ode not as a German tune but as the European anthem. See The Sun (May 27, 1996): 4. Back.
Note 65: Clark, "Confronting the Ninth," pp.13, 15. Back.
Note 66: Klaus Goetz, "Integration Policy in a Europeanized State; Germany and the Intergovernmental Conference," Journal of European Public Policy 3, 1(1996): 40. Back.
Note 67: See also Jeffrey J. Anderson, Unification and Union: The Domestic Sources of Germany's European Policy (forthcoming). Back.
Note 68: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht (November 1993), pp.61-65. Der Spiegel 47/1994, p.29. Back.
Note 69: "Grossere Ausgewogenheit angestrebt," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (July 22, 1996): 5. Back.
Note 70: The best data available suggest that the four Visegrad states would need between 60 and 90 percent of the 18 billion ECU transfer flowing in the mid-1990s from the structural and cohesion funds to the four Mediterranean member states of the EU. Economic growth in central Europe during the coming years and reductions in Germany's bilateral economic assistance may diminish the magnitude of transfer payments in a few years' time to perhaps below the annual estimate of 10-16 billion ECU. See Andras Inotai, "From the Association Agreements to Full Membership? The Dynamics of Relations between the Central and Eastern European Countries and the European Union," paper presented at the Fourth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association, May 11-14, 1995, Charleston, South Carolina,p.13. Back.
Note 71: This is not to deny the importance of political conflicts over identity inside Greece. Historically such conflicts occur between those who assign primary importance to the ancient rationalism of the Hellenic civilization as an ideological pathway to Europe on the one hand and those wishing to explore Orthodoxy and the dream of Constantinople and a Balkan or Middle Eastern identity of Greece on the other. See Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Religion, the State and Transnational Civil Society," in Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori, eds., Transnational Religion. the State and Global Society, draft manuscript, p.22. In the 1970s and 1980s political debates centered on Greece's competing west European, Balkan and national roles. I thank Susannah Verney for this clarification. Back.
Note 72: Michael P. Marks, The Formation of European Policy in Post-Franco Spain (Brookfield, Vt: Avebury, 1996). Back.
Note 73: Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society," NUPI Paper No.445, Oslo, May 1991. Back.
Note 74: Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe (London: Routledge, 1996). Idem, "Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other," East European Politics and Societies 7, 2 (Spring 1993): 349-69. Back.
Note 75: David R. Cameron, "National Interest, the Dilemmas of European Integration, and Malaise,"in John T.S. Keeler and Martin A. Schain, eds., Chirac's Challenge: Liberalization, Europeanization, and Malaise (New York: St. Martin's Press, forthcoming). Idem, "Transnational Relations and the Development of European Economic and Monetary Union," in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures. and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.37-78. And Gregory Flynn, ed., Remaking the Hexagon: The New France in the New Europe (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1995). Back.
Note 76: S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). S. George, ed., Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Back.
Note 77: Brigid Laffan, "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies 34, 1 (March 1996): 87. Back.
Note 78: Ronald D. Asmus, "In Germany, the Leadership's Vision Goes Beyond the Border," International Herald Tribune (April 12,1996): 10. Back.
Note 79: Pond, "Germany as a Regional Power," p.38. Back.
Note 80: Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). Back.
Note 81: Some of the best analyses of the European polity include Robert 0. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). Sbragia, ed, Euro-Politics. Jeffrey J. Anderson, "The State of the (European) Union: From Single Market to Maastricht, from Singular Events to General Theories," World Politics 47, 3 (April 1995): 441-65. Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Nicholas Colchester and David Buchan, Europower: The Essential Guide to Europe's Economic Transformation in 1992 (London: The Economist Books, 1992). Back.
Note 82: The TEU has put them under the jurisdiction of the Council of the EU that comprises also the second and third pillars of the EU dealing with issues of external and internal security. Martin Westlake, The Council of the European Union (New York: Stockton, 1995). Back.
Note 83: Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, The European Commission (New York: Stockton, 1994). Back.
Note 84: The 1987 numbers refer to roughly equal numbers of regulations and decisions, overwhelmingly issued by the Commission not the Council of the EU, formerly the Council of Ministers; the Council of the EU issued two-thirds of the 63 directives. See Peter Ludlow, "The European Commission," in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community, p.100. Back.
Note 85: In 1992 the Commaission sent 1,210 letters of formal notice, issued 248 reasoned opinions, and brought 64 cases before the Court. See 10th Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community Law 1992, COM(93) 320 final, April 28,1993. I would like to thank Simon Bulmer for providing me with these data. Back.
Note 86: Quoted in George Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.39. Back.
Note 87: Ross, Jacques Delors, p.49. Back.
Note 88: Smaller parties, however, look at times more like a conglomerate with somewhat similar leanings rather than corporate actors that subscribe to a similar world view. I would like to thank Beate Kohier-Koch for pointing this out to me. See also Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton, 1995). Back.
Note 89: The cooperation procedure stipulates that for two-thirds of the proposals contained in the Single European Act, on a second reading the Parliament can amend or reject a Commission proposal with 50 per cent of the votes. If the Commission agrees with the Parliament, the EU Council can override that Parliamentary vote only with a unanimous vote of its own; if the Commission disagrees, the Council can override with a simple majority vote. The assent procedure requires that the Parliament must agree to any future enlargement of the EU through full or associate members, as well as to certain trade agreements. The TEU institutionalized the co-decision procedure, which has tended to increase further the power of Parliament. Back.
Note 90: J.H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe, " The Yale Law Journal 100, 8 (June 1991): 2403-2484. Thijmen Koopmans, "The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions," The American Journal of Comparative Law 39, 3 (Summer 1991): 493-507. Francis Snyder, "The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools, and Techniques," The Modern Law Review 56, 1 (January 1993): 19-54. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization 47, 1 (Winter 1993): 41-76. See also a series of working papers written under the auspices of the European University Institute (Florence) for the project "The European Court and National Courts -- Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social Context," directed by Anne-Marie Slaughter, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone, and Joseph H.H. Weiler. Back.
Note 91: Mattii and Slaughter, "Constructing the European Community Legal System," pp.24, 28-29. Back.
Note 92: Lower national courts may appeal for such preliminary judgments; national courts of last resort must appeal. In 95 percent of the cases, lower courts tend to follow the judgments of the European Court. Back.
Note 93: Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany. The concept of semi-sovereignty refers in this book to the organization of power in domestic politics rather than the loss of sovereignty due to European integration or Allied prerogatives. Back.
Note 94: The case is argued forcefully by Douglas Webber in "The Second Coming of the Bonn Republic," IGS Working Paper Series No.95/1 (University of Birminghani, Institute for German Studies, 1995). Along many dimensions social conditions in unified Germany are considerably more homogeneous than is widely believed to be the case. See Wolfgang Zapf and Roland Habicht, eds., Wohlfahrtsentwickiung im vereinten Deutschland: Sozialstruktur, sozialer Wandel und Lebensqualitat (Berlin: Sigma, 1996). Back.
Note 95: This paragraph draws on the overview and various case studies in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., Making Policy in Europe: The Europeification of National-Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1993). Back.
Note 96: Adrienne Heritier, The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policy Making and Its Outcomes: Regulatory Policy as a Patchwork EUI Working Paper SPS No.96/2 (European University Institute, Florence, 1996). Adrienne Heritier et al., Die Veränderung von Staatlichkeit in Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland, Grossbrittannien und Frankreich in der Europäischen Union. (Leverkusen: Leske and Budrich, 1994). Adrienne Heritier, ed., Policy-Analyse: Kritik und Neuorientierung (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag,1994). Back.
Note 97: Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp.287-88. Back.
Note 98: Gary Marks, "xxx," Comparative Political Studies, 1996 (forthcoming). Back.
Note 99: Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, eds., Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, "Complex-Policy-Making:Lobbying the EC,"in Andersen and Eliassen, eds., Making Policy in Europe, pp.35-53. William Averty, "Eurogroups, Clientela and the European Community," International Organization 29, 4 (Autumn 1975): 949-72. Back.
Note 100: Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, "Organized Interests and the Europe of 1992," in Norman J. Ornstein and Mark Perlman, eds., Political Power and Social Change: The United States Faces a United Europe (Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 1991), pp.52-53. Back.
Note 101: Franz Traxler and Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Emerging Euro-Polity and Organized Interests," European Journal of International Relations 1, 2 (June 1995): 191-218. Back.
Note 102: Sidney Tarrow, "The Europeanisation of Conflict: Reflections from a Social Movement Perspective," West European Politics 18, 2 (April 1995): 238. Back.
Note 103: Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1970). Back.
Note 104: This is true, of course, of other European states as well. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp.73-74. Back.
Note 105: Bjorn Otto Sverdrup, "Institutionalising Cooperation: A Study of the Elysee Treaty and Franco-German Co-Operation 1963-1993," Oslo, University of Oslo, Department of Political Science, 1994, pp.58-59,100-01. Back.
Note 106: Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). It should be noted that Denmark, for example, is much concerned about the democratic deficit in the core institutions of the EU and has, through the use of popular referenda, slowed the process of European integration. More generally, in the small states public referenda check the power of governments that are opting for European integration and supranational policy coordination. Back.
Note 107: Taylor, "The European Community and the State." Idem, "The European Union in the 1990s: Reassessing the Bases of Integration," in Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining International Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.283-308. Back.
Note 108: I would like to thank Ulrich Preuss for this insight. Back.
Note 109: Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. Back.
Note 110: For an in-depth discussion of political and economic changes in the 1980s in a number of smaller European states see Paulette Kurzer, Business and Banking: Political Change and European Integration in Western Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). See also Christine Ingebritsen, "As Europe Changes, Will Scandinavia Remain the Same?" Scandinavian Studies 64, 4 (Fall 1992): 641-51. Back.
Note 111: Dietrich Rometsch, "The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union: Patterns of Institutional and Administrative Interaction," IGS Discussion Paper No. 95/2 (The University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies, 1995), p. 39. Back.
Note 112: This holds for both ends of the political spectrum. A conservative who once worked for the Commission in a high-ranking position, Manfred Brunner, was unsuccessful in contesting the constitutionality of the TEU before the German Constitutional Court; his attempt to compete for votes with a right-wing splinter party of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the League of Free Citizens (Bund Freier Burger), on an anti-EU plank was a flop. On the left, the SPD suffered defeat in three important state elections in the spring of 1996 in which, for short-term electoral reasons, it sought to articulate a modulated, anti-European stance. Back.
Note 113: This argument speaks to the centrality of Germany for the developments in various European subregions not to a domination of Germany over Europe. Put in realist terminology, the EU is dominated by a Big Three not a Big One. Back.
Note 114: Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," in Peter J. Katzenstein, and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Back.
Note 115: Chapter 7 summarizes 13 case studies that illustrate the political experiences of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. They are abbreviated versions of full chapters of a companion volume that deals with the role of united Germany in central Europe. Back.