CIAO DATE: 04/03

Some Draft Remarks on the Conference Agenda

Abdul Sattar

50th Pugwash Conference On Science and World Affairs:
"Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security"
1-3 November 2002

Geneva, Switzerland

Question No.1: Pakistan- India Confrontation, and risks of conventional and/or nuclear conflict.

Risks of war are inherent in situations of tension as grave as that which have prevailed between Pakistan and India. The two countries have fought wars in the past. The danger of another war hovered over the two countries since early this year following the deployment of the Indian and then of Pakistani armed forces on the borders and the Line of Control in Kashmir. Fortunately, the danger has passed its peak. A few days ago, India announced a pullback from the border and Pakistan promptly announced it would reciprocate. The United Nations, major powers and friends of the two countries welcomed the decision, and counseled commencement of dialogue, especially on Kashmir, the root cause of endemic tension between the two countries.

To assess future risks, it would be instructive to evaluate the factors, which have contributed to the prevention of war in 2002.

The most obvious if not also the most powerful factor was the unanimity of world opinion in favour of prevention of war between Pakistan and India. The United States, the European Union, Russia, China and Japan all spoke with one voice to urge the two countries to enter into a dialogue. Washington was proactive as was the United Kingdom. President Putin met with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Almaty to urge restraint and offer good offices for a dialogue.

Whatever might have been India's aims or motivations in massing forces against Pakistan, foreign friends of the two countries seemed particularly concerned about the nightmare scenario of a local attack or even an accident unleashing a chain reaction that could escalate to the nuclear level.

Public opinion analyzed the implications of an India-Pakistan war in apocalyptic terms. Influential media and commentators urged restraint.

I would like especially to note the Pugwash Movement's contribution. It sent a mission to New Delhi and Islamabad, led by Dr. Paolo Cotta Ramusino. Now that he is Sectary General of Pugwash, he would, I hope, reinforce efforts in favour of peace.

Participants in this conference have a role to play. Experts an scholars can contribute to serious consideration of crucial questions. How important was the nuclear deterrent? Could it be said to have been decisive? Would the war remain confined to conventional arms? Might Pakistan be compelled to consider use of strategic forces?

Mature opinion has assumed - at least one hopes so - that nuclear weapons are weapons of war-deterrence and that their use for war-fighting is unthinkable, considering the horrendous destruction that would entail. Yet, the question has haunted thinkers: What if nuclear weapons fail to deter? There are not many precedents to guide the thought process. Only one instance is on the record. When during the 1973 war, Egyptian forces advance into the Sinai, Prime Minister Golda Meir reprotedly gave permission to activate Israel's Doomsday weapons.

Question No. 2. (a) CBMs to prevent nuclear conflict, notification of military activities, and removal of missile and nuclear installations from close to boundary. (b) Measures to prevent infiltration with possible use of international help to monitor LOC.

(a) Some CBMs are already in place. The two countries have entered into agreements not to attack nuclear plants and annually update lists of such installations and to notify each other on about ballistic missile tests. They further agreed in 1999 to begin a dialogue on strategic restraints. When such a dialogue begins, possible bilateral agreements on a test ban, regimes on testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, and fissile material production could and should be on the negotiating agenda, to the mutual benefit of the two countries.

(b) In the face of allegations of violations of the Line of Control in Kashmir by the armed forces and civilians, it would be both useful and fair to entrust determination of facts to impartial observers.

Obligations in this regard as also those regarding the holding of a plebiscite to peacefully determine the question of accession of Kashmir are specified in Security Council Resolutions of 21 April 1948, 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. These are mutually interlinked and interdependent.

Pending the holding of a plebiscite, the Security Council established UNMOGIP to monitor the Ceasefire Line. The Simla Agreement reinforced the obligation to respect the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. India, however, decided unilaterally to discontinue cooperation with UNMOGIP.

Question No. 3. (i) Reopening of Dialogue, (ii) Fresh look at pending questions including Kashmir, (iii) Reopening air and ground communications.

(i) Resumption of dialogue is dependent on India's decision to do so. With the pullback of forces from the borders, prospects seem to have opened up. Not clear yet is whether India will agree to the broad and all-inclusive agenda, which was all but signed at Agra in July 2001. It comprised settlement of Kashmir, strategic issues, terrorism, and other disputes as well as bilateral cooperation in trade and travel, to be taken up at periodical meetings between Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and Senior Officials.

(iii) Experience testifies to the need for implementation of the existing bilateral agreements on rail and bus services, and international agreements on civil aviation. Unilateral decisions to discontinue or reopen communications do not provide a satisfactory framework for such cooperation.