French Military Doctrine in the 1990s

Sten Rynning
Research Fellow, COPRI

This working paper is a chapter taken from my book, published by Praeger in October 2001 and with an introduction by French air force General and strategist Pierre M. Gallois:

Changing Military Doctrine:
Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958-2000

The book examines French military doctrine for the past forty years, identifying major and minor shifts and analyzing their causes. The book argues that change is provoked by national security crises, defined by relative power dynamics, but also that change actually is made in a complex political process involving centrally located political actors, major institutions, allied relations, and national prejudices. The book explores linkages between security crises and processes of change and, in accounting for French change and continuity, suggests an agenda for further research.

This working paper is chapter 5 of the book and deals with the significant changes French doctrine has experienced since the end of the Cold War.

The reader is encouraged to consult the book to gain a complete account of French change and the theoretical agenda.

Please consult Greenwood Publishing Group for further information.

- 88 Post Road West, PO Box 5007, Westport CT 06881-5007, USA
- http://info.greenwood.com/books/0275972/0275972860.html

Chapter 5

From Balance and Crisis to Community and Change: François Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, and Conventional Force Projections

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the strategic rationale for territorial nuclear deterrence have raised fundamental questions in relation to French military doctrine. Significant territorial threats have disappeared, and the main role for military instruments now lies on the peripheries of Europe or further beyond. For those who had invested faith in nuclear deterrence and strategic stability—and that concerns most actors not only in France but also elsewhere among NATO allies—this change of events has been a severe challenge. President Mitterrand symbolizes the pains of adjustment in many ways as he never seriously considered changing track and became instead an ardent opponent of profound reform.

Yet France has changed track, and most observers would rightly point to the crucial role played by President Chirac who for two years—1995–1997—propelled a strategic transformation on the scale of his Gaullist predecessor, Charles de Gaulle. France has over the decade from 1990 to 2000 effectively turned from national nuclear deterrence to nonterritorial, conventional force projection. Both presidents could benefit from the shock wave created by the end of the Cold War, but Chirac was the one to embrace reform. The key entrepreneur in the 1990s, then, has been President Chirac.

While it is tempting simply to refer to the personal inclinations of these two presidents when accounting for change in the 1990s, a thorough account must go further. Chirac's successful reforms can be understood only in the light of the exhausted atmosphere of the Mitterrand era and also the steps toward reform that had after all

been achieved early in the 1990s, almost in spite of the president. From this background emerged a unique opportunity to build a "community" of reform that Chirac exploited. In terms of agenda setting, the approach was classical—that is, the president defined and others executed. However, the ensuing process of reflection and organization effectively promoted a new consensus within the defense establishment. The greatest boomerang danger for the Chirac presidency has, then, been political. However, as the analysis points out, the 1998–1999 Kosovo crisis, combined with domestic political cohabitation, provided the presidency with a strong opportunity, which was successfully exploited, for tying political opponents to the rationale of the new military instrument.

DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL POWER

Mitterrand's doctrinal success of the 1980s was premised on conventional reform and nuclear continuity. If nuclear deterrence had been the overriding response to the Soviet threat, then surely the disappearance of this threat would question the deterrence logic. Nuclear deterrence has not been given up entirely but has, rather, been relegated by the nuclear powers to a recourse of last resort. Conventional deterrence and also active conventional interventions have become much more prominent in conflicts that do not directly involve the vital interests of nuclear powers. This general strategic agenda has been faced differently by Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac, but overall we note that in the 1990s France has espoused a "first-order" change in response to the "major security challenge."

Doctrinal Change in Several Steps

Doctrinal change was not the order of the day when President Mitterrand and other French decision-makers faced the changes sweeping the European continent. German unification, Soviet fragmentation, and European integration were the dominant headlines, and military questions were not addressed as long as political priorities were in flux. Military continuity consequently characterized the early French response to the political upheaval.

Mitterrand won another presidential term in May 1988 and called parliamentary elections to regain parliamentary control after

two years of cohabitation. The new government was formed by Michel Rocard, with Pierre Chevènement as defense minister. In order to mark a break with the cohabitation "consensus," the new government decided to undertake a new strategic review with a 1990–1993 program law. Defense Minister Chevènement (1990, 526) indicated that France, "perhaps more than others," was ready to think about the organization of a new Europe, because France had always sought to overturn bipolarity. However, the 1990 Program Law was markedly conservative or, in its own words, "vigilant" (Assemblée nationale 1990, 487–488). It proceeded from the established policy that France needed nuclear defense in order to "guarantee its independence and maintain its identity" and because in a volatile security environment "the French nuclear deterrent represents a stabilizing element." As for the long term, the program law states that "The construction of Europe must one day also extend to the domain of defense" (1990, 488), but the wish for change was tempered by a taste for continuity on both political wings. Socialist deputy Jean-Michel Boucheron argued that "It is not conceivable that France extends its nuclear guarantees to some European allies" (Assemblée nationale 1989, 83), while Philippe Séguin (1991) of the opposition wished for a broad series of reforms—nuclear continuity, a reinforced FAR, and shortened and diversified conscription—that did not fundamentally change the French defense organization. How, then, could France use its military forces to support its claim for a leadership position in a rapidly changing world?

Doctrinal innovation under these tough external conditions became difficult, and the endeavor was not eased by upheaval in French politics. Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, who took office in January 1991, did make another program law, this time for 1992–1994, and he argued that "Tomorrow's army is made with new concepts and doctrines, different force levels, and with adapted structures" (quoted in Gautier 1999, 235). However, while the government adopted the program law in July 1992, it was subsequently not introduced in the National Assembly, where political waves went high and where the opposition's victory in the March 1993 parliamentary elections provoked the replacement of Pierre Joxe by François Léotard. French decision-makers in government and parliament were largely aware of the need to connect a new European strategy to new military reforms, but they also found this exercise of seeking Europe by other means difficult

(cf. Howorth 1997, 1998; le Gloannec 1997). Apart from the political and controversial White Paper of 1994, designed to replace the Debré reference of 1972, doctrinal developments were therefore arrested rather than promoted. The White Paper sought, in the spirit of cohabitation, to combine continuity with change and ended up somewhere in-between. The most remarkable change was an attempt to abandon the logic of "circles" (France, Europe, the world) and instead establish "scenarios" that included various degrees of intervention and deterrence. (See Table 5.1.)

Table 5.1

Scenarios of the 1994 White Paper*

Scenario 1: a regional conflict that does not affect French vital interests

Scenario 2: a regional conflict that could affect French vital interests

Scenario 3: threats to national territory outside of metropolitan France (i.e., overseas territories)

Scenario 4: bilateral defense agreements (i.e., relations to African countries)

Scenario 5: operations to support peace and international law

Scenario 6: resurgence of a major threat to Western Europe

*Source: Ministère de la Défense (1994, 107-118)

The six scenarios related to the level of doctrine with which this study is concerned, namely *les concepts d'empoi des forces*. However, as the White Paper underscores (Ministère de la Défense 1994, 107), the scenarios were "hypotheses" that needed to be translated into doctrine, and at this level there was insufficient political backing to clarify resources and organizational conditions.

Hence, another program law adopted in 1994 for the years 1995–2000 referred generally to the White Paper (Assemblée nationale 1994, 9095) but was also widely perceived as an insufficient planning document.

The next step toward "first-order" reform occurred with the election of President Chirac in May 1995. The new president completed the conceptual reform that had been tentatively undertaken before 1995 by placing a distinct accent on conventional force projections, which clearly moved away from national and nuclear priorities. The scope of the Chirac reforms provoked Daniel Vernet of *Le Monde* (8 June 1996) to invoke no less than a "strategic revolution," while Jean-François Bureau (1997) likewise talks of challenges to French strategic culture. The scope can be gauged via the five-point agenda of the "strategic committee" that was established in July 1995 to articulate nuclear reductions, full professionalization of the armed forces, restructuring of the French armaments industry, and also new initiatives to strengthen the European pillar of security. Proceeding from the conclusions of the strategic committee, President Chirac pushed the combined set of priorities into the public arena in February 1996 and saw them adopted as a program law [1997–2002] by the National Assembly in June 1996 (Assemblée nationale 1996b).

This "strategic revolution" was directed and made possible by the flow of preceding events and defined a coherent framework for "first-order" change. Specifically, the armed forces developed a military doctrine [*concept d'emploi des forces*], which was published in July 1997 (Ministère de la Défense 1997). In the introduction the chief of staff, General Douin, asked rhetorically why this document was necessary, considering that it is based on the six White Paper scenarios. The answer, Douin underscores, is found in the logic of nonterritorial, conventional force projections, articulated most clearly by the 1997–2002 Program Law, and which demand combined, joint, and multinational force structures (1997, 3).

Conflict prevention and intervention are the centerpieces of the new concept, although deterrence and national independence are still upheld as the most vital mission of the forces. Without entering into detail, the concept outlines several new challenges. One is to develop force concepts that are combined and joint [*interarmées*] and which form the basis for more specific mission directives within each service. Moreover, as a significant sign of

change in relation to allies, the concept explicitly argues that "French doctrines must be compatible with those of NATO" (1997, 36). Another challenge is to plan for the infrastructure that substantiates the doctrine. Flexibility is generally the key word as French forces must be ready to combine in various ways in order to respond to volatile external crisis situations. "Modularity" is established as a founding organizational principle, along with the ambition to have a "combined reaction force" ready for immediate deployment, and moreover have "pre-positioned forces" in various theaters to reinforce the overall posture of conventional deterrence and deployment.[1]

Table 5.2

Doctrinal Change under Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac

	National Deterrence	**Force Projection**
Purpose	Intimidation and non-war	Conventional deterrence and protection of strategic interests
Scope	Continental France	Europe and its peripheries
Role of Policy-Makers	Oversee escalation Control nuclear forces	Assess patterns of conflict, coordinate responses with allies, and define the goals of military intervention
Role of Military	Limited test maneuver	Provide flexible organization capable of responding to urgent conflicts of various dimensions

1. The French army, for example, is organized into 85 modules: 51 regiments of maneuver, 19 support regiments, and 15 logistical regiments. The modular organization, derived from the army's previous tactical organization, is presented in Ministère de la Défense (1998).

The 2015 headline goal for the French army is indicative of the challenge at hand. According to the program law, the army must be capable of projecting either "50,000 soldiers in a major conflict zone in an allied operation," or "30,000 soldiers in a theater for one year with only a partial recycling of troops (corresponding to a total of 35,000 soldiers), while 5,000 soldiers can be engaged in another theater (corresponding to approximately 15,000 soldiers)." (See Table 5.2.)

A Major National Crisis

The reader will probably be in no doubt that the end of the Cold War and the decline and fall of the Soviet Union represented a "major national crisis," which was conceptually defined as an "abrupt and urgent" change to the state's relative position in the international system. Naturally, the fall of one superpower fundamentally recasts both the balance of power and alliance bargains. This is a challenge for any state because all instruments of foreign and security policy are called into question. This may be positive if a state gains power. However, in the case of France, the disappearance of the principal threat also signaled an abrupt end to a fairly comfortable geopolitical position behind West Germany and NATO's forward defense line. Moreover, the political logic of "transcending the blocs," which had gathered many followers within France and which informed French European policy, was now irrelevant because there were no blocs to transcend.

In strategic–military terms the Gulf War of 1991 was of cardinal importance in provoking new thinking. After all, the fall of the Berlin Wall was, if anything, a political victory, whereas the Gulf War bore painful testimony to the practical pains of projecting forces in a new security environment. In 1991 the French forces comprised no less than 670,137 service personnel, of whom approximately 300,000 were professional and 240,000 conscripted soldiers (Ministère de la Défense, series, 1991, 2). The French deployment to the Gulf, composed of approximately 16,000 soldiers and 4,000 in support, involved only approximately 3% of the overall armed forces or approximately 3.7% of the soldiers. Yet the deployment

was tremendously difficult to execute.[2] It was a classical illustration of the problems that arise when two strategic logics clash—in this case, a logic of territorial defense vis-à-vis force projection. Naturally, the distinction should not be exaggerated, because France always maintained forces for external intervention, just as at present France maintains nuclear forces for deterrence. Nevertheless, the transition from one emphasis to another was difficult, and the Gulf War can be pinpointed as the decisive moment at which fundamental, "first-order" change was put on the French agenda (cf. Heisbourg 1997, 24; Gautier 1999, 157–171).

But why did France adopt a force projection doctrine? Did it occur because France is incapable of turning tides of her own and must therefore flow with the stream of military modernization and import military knowledge from outside?[3] Pressure in the early 1990s was certainly strong, but not without ambiguity. For example, in 1991 it was not clear to what extent the Gulf War was representative of a new generation of conflicts, just as the so-called "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) always was strongly influenced by *American* ways of fighting wars (Freedman 1998). One could with reason argue in the early 1990s that the main challenge to France, namely the organization of Western and Central Europe, was above all a continental task that was not directly connected to a political–strategic role at the peripheries of Europe and that a European construction did have leeway for organizing its own particular approach to military affairs.

However, convergence rather than divergence has been the order of the day in military domains. France, like other allies, has embraced "force projection" as an idea and now seeks appropriate capabilities. Conflicts in the Balkans did much to undermine European diplomacy, favor a militarily capable NATO alliance, and

---

2. The French forces lacked sufficient numbers of light armored vehicles, cannons, and helicopters; French aircraft lacked night and all-weather capabilities; and the logistics of projection were insufficient (cf. Yost 1994, 270; Masson 1999, 467). The French force was, moreover, for political reasons forced to operate with professionals and volunteers only, and thus without conscripts. The Daguet force of approximately 13,000 soldiers consequently did not exist beforehand in any meaningful sense but had to be assembled from no less than 192 of 195 army formations (Gautier 1999, 162).

3. Pierre Gallois (1996) argues that this is in fact the case, while Theo Farrell (1998) provides a similar but general theoretical suggestion.

generally spur France on to "catch up" with the military capabilities of the United States and Great Britain. However, as the analysis will show, the French reform process was strongly influenced by historical antagonisms and deep-seated political priorities that fanned greater political–strategic controversies. Thus, despite the convergence in force structures, France still differed with the United States on the issue of organizing or reforming NATO. Likewise, within France the scope of organizational and political issues at stake provoked several years of tense debate over the shape and direction of military reform. In consequence, at no point can the French reform process be said to involve a simple "copying" of allied doctrinal blueprints.

DIVISIONS AND DEADLOCK

With an electoral mandate that ran until 1995, President Mitterrand was naturally well placed to influence French strategy and the framework for doctrinal thinking. However, Mitterrand soon became the centerpiece in a deadlocked environment where the presidency was regarded either as a sad break on necessary changes or as a bulwark against dangerous revisionism.[4] Why did this happen?

It might be tempting to conclude with French journalist Alexandra Schwartzbrod (1995) that Mitterrand was simply negatively disposed toward the military and therefore needed deterrence to impose civilian control. One could then add that in 1988, during the presidential election campaign, in a move partly orchestrated by Jacques Chirac's staff at the Matignon (Guisnel 1990, 60–61), 45 high ranking-officers argued in a public appeal that only Chirac could "conduct a realistic and modern defense policy," whereas Mitterrand "risked imperiling our security" (*Le Figaro* 3 May 1988).[5] This extraordinary military intrusion into the

---

4. The single best book that deals with this subject is the edited volume of Samy Cohen (1998), which contains contributions and comments from a wide range of French scholars and practitioners.

5. Among the 45 officers we find Michel Fourquet, former chief of staff and key actor behind the idea of "two tests"; Jean Lagarde, former army chief of staff under Giscard d'Estaing; Guy Méry, former chief of staff and father of the "enlarged sanctuarization" idea; Bertrand de Montaudoin, Giscard d'Estaing's last special chief of staff; Jean Delaunay, former army chief of staff, who had vigorously opposed Defense

political domain naturally upset Mitterrand, and Defense Minister Chevènement wrote each officer to warn them of their "grave mistake" (parts of the letter is reprinted in *Le Monde* 9 July 1988). Two months after the episode Jacques Attali (1995b, 84) observed that the military "does not like François Mitterrand. They respect him and admire his competence, but they do not like him." Finally, Mitterrand's special chief of staff, Jean Fleury, does not refer to the 1988 appeal in his memoirs but observes that "nothing irritates President Mitterrand more than the idea of the military going beyond its role" (1997, 191).

However, recourse to an embedded or transcendent civil–military conflict represents a poor account of the slow process of doctrinal adaptation in the early 1990s. First, Mitterrand had previously demonstrated in the early 1980s that he did not oppose reform as long as it corresponded to his strategic outlook. Moreover, Mitterrand worked smoothly with the military institution during the Gulf War, during which he took almost complete charge of all important questions (cf. Yost 1991; Cohen 1991, 1994a, 53–54; Howorth 1992a; Schmitt 1992, 177 ff.). As for the years following the Gulf War, President Mitterrand's special chief of staff, Quesnot, underscores an important point—namely that the president "never entered the domain of tactics, it was not his area. He operated at the level of the president, that is, at the strategic level" (interview with author).

Moreover, we do witness important changes in the military domain during the last Mitterrand years. Beginning in 1991–1992, for example, French UN peacekeeping contributions experienced a dramatic increase. (See Table 5.3.)

Minister Hernu; General Hublot, former commander of the First Army; and General Houdet, former commander of the First Army corps stationed in Germany. Also among them was former Chief of Staff Maurin (1971–1975) who, as one of the key initiators of the appeal, solicited a number of signatures by telephone without giving the participants the actual text of the appeal (interview with Guy Méry; also Cohen 1994a, 53).

Table 5.3

UN Peacekeeping and Great Power Contributions, 1990-1996*

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
France	545	565	5,183	8,661	9,775	5,448	8,346
Britain	823	843	1,234	3,709	5,344	13,685	11,810
USA	-	-	603	5,318	6,113	9,317	29,230

*Source: The Military Balance (London: IISS), 1991-1997.

The increase of more than 9,000 soldiers within just a few years represents a considerable change for a country the size of France. Moreover, nuclear expenditure significantly declined in these years, and the nuclear posture was correspondingly cut back, as Table 5.4 illustrates.

Yet doctrinal reform was a slow and frustrating affair, and this is the phenomenon we must explain. The setting for reform was organized, as we shall see, in the Defense Ministry, but the underlying ideas were poorly connected to Mitterrand's political designs for a new Europe built on the established wisdom of deterrence, which contained only a limited role for force projections. Moreover, as Mitterrand became pressured politically, he engaged in a nuclear debate with the domestic opposition and succeeded in portraying it as nuclear revisionist. In doing so, Mitterrand won a political battle, but he also painted himself into a status quo corner where ideas of force projection were unwelcome. In 1993–1995, political power was balanced between the presidency and the government, and neither side was capable of tipping the balance in its favor.

Table 5.4

Nuclear Reductions, 1990-1995

Nuclear expenditure*	Nuclear organization and policy
1990: 39,387 1991: 35,011 1992: 32,950 1993: 28,443 1994: 22,958 1995: 21,541 Total decline 1990-1995: 45.3 %	- 1991: a new generation of missiles (S45) for the Albion missile site canceled. The envisaged replacement, the submarine M5 missile, was never deployed because Chirac decided in 1995 to close the site. - 1991: the Tactical Nuclear Air Force (FATAC) reduced in size and collapsed organizationally with the Strategic Air Force (FAS). - 1992: the tactical nuclear weapon Pluton withdrawn from service and its successor Hadès would in reduced numbers (30 instead of 120) be "stocked" and not deployed. The Hadès was completely abandoned in 1995. - 1992: nuclear submarine alert status reduced from 3 to 2 submarines permanently at sea. - 1992: France announces a unilateral test ban of one year. The ban was extended under Mitterrand until Chirac resumed nuclear tests in 1995.

*Millions of 1997 francs. Source: Boniface (1997a, 165, annex 5).

The first part of the following section examines the potential for change that did develop at an organizational level, the second the strained relations between NATO allies, and the third the relationship between decision-makers and the military institution.

Foundations for Change

President Mitterrand was not unaware of the difficulties encountered during the Gulf War operations, and therefore in March 1991 he invited a great debate on French defense. The invitation provoked numerous reports and conclusions, among them an official synthesis of “lessons learned” from August 1991, which the following November was channeled on to the services to serve as a basis for reform.[6] While organizational reform and political design ultimately parted company, it remains crucial to assess the organizational reforms because they signal a willingness to change and also because they inform later stages of doctrinal reform. Two pillars of reform will be emphasized here, both relating to the central organization of the Ministry of Defense.

The first pillar concerns the chief of staff. We have seen in the previous chapters that this central military actor has had his position strengthened in various ways—ranging from enhanced institutional privileges to easy access to the presidential office. Reforms undertaken in the early 1990s again relied on the institution of the chief of staff, who now acted mainly as a lever vis-à-vis the remainder of the military organization. In sum, planning authority was moved upwards, from the services to the chief of staff, whose new authority was bolstered also by the creation of new institutions.

The chief of staff had always had a capacity for planning in the doctrinal division [*division emploi*] because military doctrines [*concepts d’emploi*] were part of his responsibilities determined by decree. However, his authority was also checked by the services, which combined “operational” and “logistical” functions in their separate planning efforts that only subsequently were pushed upwards in the system. Hence, according to the CEMA Decree (No. 82–138) of 1982, which remained in power until 1993, the CEMA should “collect planning propositions” and later “be kept informed” by the services and other organisms (Article 5, Ministère de la Défense 1982b). This division of labor granted significant power to

---

6. François Cailleteau (1992) provides a summary of conclusions—lessons learned—arrived at by the French military following the Gulf War. Cailleteau notably points to shortcomings in logistics, intelligence, and operational planning capabilities. The parliamentary report (Assemblée nationale 1992) preceding the 1992–1994 Program Law reaches largely the same conclusions but also points to a continued emphasis on nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantee of national independence as well as conscription as a means to link society and the armed forces.

the services, which de facto controlled most of the information concerning force structures. The CEMA was then dependent either on a strong mandate from the services or, conversely, on a privileged partnership with key decision-makers—General Méry being a case in point.

Under Defense Ministers Chevènement [May 1988–January 1991] and Joxe [January 1991–March 1993] the connection between "operational" functions and "logistics" was severed, with the former moving up to the CEMA and the latter being pushed down into regional–organic groups (i.e., following thematic rather than service lines: for example, munitions and personnel instead of army and navy). This separation of the operational and logistics in fact represented a significant step in the direction of a logic of force projection. While on the one hand centralization reinforced combined and joint planning—cutting across the services—logistical devolution on the other pointed to a flexible basis for assembling varying forces at varying times. The process took off with the *Armée 2000* plan presented in June 1989 by Chevènement. The plan was mainly an instrument for rationalization that consolidated previous districts into three main regions in order to enhance operational readiness, save scarce resources, simplify the line of command, and consolidate support functions on a joint basis (Yost 1994, 263).[7]

Further reforms were pursued under Pierre Joxe, who stepped in once Chevènement had resigned, given his hostility to the French participation in the Gulf War. The new reforms had the distinct purpose of reinforcing the CEMA and operational planning (Ministère de la Défense 1993a). We should take note of four sets of institutions, namely: (a) the joint planning staffs, *Etat-major interarmées* (EMIA) and *Centre opérationnel interarmées* (COIA); (b) the military intelligence service, *Direction du renseignement militaire* (DRM); (c) the Command for special operations, *Commandement des Opérations Spéciales* (COS); (d) and the joint war college, *Collège interarmées de défense* (CID). The joint planning staffs (EMIA and COIA) were an important addition to the

---

7. The Armée 2000 plan collapsed 6 army, 4 air, and 3 navy districts into just 3 military regions. Furthermore, the army's 1st Corps was divided and allocated to the 2nd and 3rd Corps, which thus became heavier and more compatible with other NATO divisions. The geographical division between the 2nd and 3rd Corps—to the East in Strasbourg and to the North in Lille—was maintained.

already existing doctrinal division because they substantiate the more general *concepts d'emploi* [military doctrines]. The EMIA produces operational "joint doctrines," while the COIA assumes the real-time command of deployed forces.[8] Hence, at the level of doctrinal planning a complementary set of organizations—Division Emploi, EMIA, COIA—produce doctrines ranging from the general to the specific and operational. Moreover, these bodies fall by decree under the authority of the chief of staff.

The DRM was a new overarching body designed to centralize the intelligence-gathering handled separately by the services. The essential rationale for the DRM was linked to the demonstration in the Gulf War of the importance of satellite images and communication. In June 1991, before the National Assembly just months after the war, Joxe underscored this as the last point in a series of observations (*Journal Officiel*, 7 June 1991, 2841; see also Joxe 1991).

> Finally, or perhaps above all, we must profoundly reform our intelligence systems at all levels, ranging from the strategic to the tactical. We did not have autonomous and complete access to necessary information because of our weak capabilities. Without allied, American intelligence we were almost blind. To maintain our capabilities in a state of insufficiency and dependency would with time considerably weaken our defense effort. In fact, in the long run we would be disarmed.

The decree of June 1992 establishing the DRM emphasizes that its purpose is to "lead and direct" military intelligence and that its "direction" is the task of the CEMA. Hence, the DRM represents another facet of the centralization of military planning. One should also note at this stage that the French defense budget henceforth increased the resources allocated to military satellite systems (Helios for reconnaissance, Syracuse for communication, Osiris for radar observation, and Zenon for electromagnetic observation) and that a WEU satellite center established in 1991 in Spain was

---

8. The factual information I draw on with respect to these organizations is found on the Internet site of the French Ministry of Defense: www.defense.gouv.fr/ema. The reader may also consult the exhaustive analysis of military policy during 1990–1995 contained in Gautier (1999).

prompted by French demands. Hence, the DRM will operate also with significant new sources of information.

The final components (COS and CID) are important to include because they underscore the new central CEMA position. The command for special operations (COS) brings together previously separated special units[9] in one command designed to plan, prepare, and undertake a great variety of preventive or combat missions. The missions and organization of the COS, again, are attributed to the CEMA. The joint war college (CID) builds on the former service colleges and deserves mention because it is an important part of the horizontal—joint—infrastructure that trains people to staff all the abovementioned organizations.

Table 5.5

Strengthening the Chief of Staff, 1991-1994

- **Operational planning**: EMIA and COIA. EMIA created in February 1992. Defense Minister Joxe in February 1993 provided for a dual EMIA structure, with one EMIA for European and another for extra-European operations. In March 1994 the new government collapsed the two into a single EMIA.
- **Intelligence**: DRM, created in June 1992 and supported by enhanced investments notably in satellite technology.
- **Special operations**: COS, created in June 1992.
- **Joint war college**: CID, created in December 1992.
- **Ministerial declaration**: August 1993.

9. In 1998 these were one regiment of paratroops, an escadrille of helicopters, Marine commandos and supporting vessels, and an unspecified component of air support.

The process of strengthening the CEMA was capped in August 1993, when the new defense minister, François Leotard, in an administrative decision [*arrêté*] specified the new CEMA powers (Ministère de la Défense 1993a). The decision builds on the Decree of 1982, mentioned earlier, but enhances the CEMA powers via the new organizations and the attached prerogatives. Table 5.5 provides an overview.

The strengthening of the chief of staff was one component of the potential for reform that developed in the early 1990s; I will now briefly introduce the other. At issue is the office for strategic affairs, *Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques* (DAS), which was created in 1992 with the purpose of undertaking studies, analyses, and research in strategic areas that affect the military establishment. The DAS is a think-tank that operates outside the organization of the chief of staff but still inside the Ministry of Defense. In budgetary terms the DAS is a midget, as it takes up only approximately 15 to 17 million francs of the annual defense budget and as some 100 people staff it. Still, it is a significant innovation, because it speaks to the political–strategic area that has since Algeria been a taboo within armed ranks. In other words, DAS is an organizational bridge that connects the civilian and military domains, which had previously been rigidly separated under the nuclear umbrella.

In some ways DAS built on previous institutions, namely the GROUPES, which under Hernu had been involved in the FAR reform, and which was transformed in 1988 into a general studies office, *Délégation aux études générales* (DEG) (cf. Schwartzbrod 1995, 155). However, the DAS was also a significant departure from past practices (cf. *Le Monde* 15 February 1992) essentially because its predecessors had specialized in technical studies and left political research to the Foreign Ministry's think tank (CAP). Previously it had therefore been perfectly acceptable to decision-makers that a general should head the DEG precisely because the organization was apolitical. With the change from DEG to DAS, the baton of leadership passed from a general, Henri Paris, to a civilian, Jean-Claude Mallet. Driven by Defense Minister Joxe's wish for a new strategic debate (Ministère de la Défense 1993b; Lacoste, Barbé, and Bonnichon, 1994), the organizational agenda became decisively more political and dealt with issues relating to the domain

of high strategy and international affairs and their impact on military planning. The DAS was thus a natural meeting point for the civilian and military components of the ministry, still within the civilian part of the ministry's organization—a crucial point in a French historical perspective—and with a potential for reinvigorating strategic thinking.

The DAS had a potential to reform the framework of military doctrine, but as a new institution, it also had find a working relationship with its environment. In relation to the exterior, the DAS was in several ways a rival to the CAP, an aspect noted by French journalists in particular (cf. *Le Figaro* 19 June 1992; Schwartzbrod 1995, 151) but one whose impact is difficult to gauge in a general perspective. Inside the Defense Ministry, the DAS was also in some ways a competitor to the organization of the chief of staff, where strategic ideas are translated into military doctrine and practice. In other words, where the DAS may be inspired to seek great change, the military organization is likely to be less persuaded that a particular set of circumstances should force it to recast the foundation of its organization.

However, the potential for friction should not be overstated either. The DAS is, after all, part of the Ministry, and half its staff is moreover composed of military officers, who are complemented by military engineers, high civil servants, and academics. The DAS has in all likelihood received its particular status because decision-makers wanted to cultivate applicable "strategic research" while avoiding instigating the type of military thinking that led to a "cult of activism" under the Fourth Republic and one that could, moreover, make the chief of staff a formidable organizational player vis-à-vis the decision-makers themselves. Moreover, the DAS was also a response to the new security environment, as Louis Gautier, Joxe's adviser, emphasized in an interview (with author). "The military is only one element in conflicts that today are very political and which develop largely along nonmilitary lines. The military is thus becoming a minority in situations of conflict management."

Combining the two pillars of reform emphasized here—the strengthening of the chief of staff and the creation of the DAS—we arrive at the conclusion that the infrastructure for change had been put in place. These conclusions are important because, as we know, specific doctrinal change was only tentatively engaged in before the election of Jacques Chirac in 1995. We must therefore

identify the political–military blockages that developed during these years, their nature, and the way in which they predisposed the new president's strategic thinking.

Political Stalemate

The fall of the Soviet Union defined an era of upheaval and also an opportunity for launching great new designs. Some observers have noted that Mitterrand committed political errors in relation to the process of German unification in late 1989,[10] but the French president bounced back in 1990 to outline a new vision for Europe (quoted in Tiersky 1992, 139, emphasis in original).

> I would like to tell you what my plan, my *grand projet*, is. It is to turn the whole of Europe into one space, . . . a single and vast market and, at the same time, with constant and structural links established among all the European countries. . . . I would like to see a strong nucleus capable of making political decisions collectively. This is the Community. Within the Community and Europe, I would like to see France—we are working on it and it is not easy—become a model of economic development and social cohesion. That is my plan.

---

10. Dominique Moïsi (1990) observes "blurred signals of an ambiguous policy" where Hubert Védrine has noted that his political boss, President Mitterrand, found the process of unification "logical" and "legitimate" (1996, 427). It was notably Mitterrand's travels to Kiev and East Berlin in November 1989, where he met with Gorbachev and Modrow, respectively, that provoked speculations that the French president was encircling West Germany. In another sign of French skepticism toward German unification, President Mitterrand was absent from the ceremonial opening of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. John Newhouse (1997, 76) reports that Mitterrand was absent essentially because he was upset with Chancellor Kohl pushing unification through at high speed. Hubert Védrine (1996, 453) counters this interpretation by arguing that an official invitation was never extended to Mitterrand because the ceremony was a purely German affair. However, the recollections of Jacques Attali (1995b, 481) lend credibility to Newhouse's account. According to Attali, Kohl asked Mitterrand whether he would like to participate in the ceremony, but the offer was turned down because the latter did not wish to "legitimize" Kohl's rushed unification process. In his postpresidency memoirs, Mitterrand does not dwell on the specific incident but simply notes that his priority was the inviolability of European frontiers (that is, the German–Polish border) and that while his conversations with Kohl were "long and difficult," they also remained "friendly" (Mitterrand 1996, 33–34).

Articulated on Bastille Day, 14 July, the vision came just as the Gulf War began to unfold and as new Central and Eastern European states were questioning whether or not they should seek territorial revision after a long spell of Soviet overlay. Mitterrand thus underscored later in April 1991 that "An order has disappeared, the Yalta order. This order was unacceptable but convenient. . . . The order that follows may be more just and durable if it builds on state sovereignty. But I wish to pose the questions: will it not be more difficult and to some extent more dangerous?" (1991, 119).

With these two speeches we catch a glimpse of Mitterrand's post-Cold War vision— namely, to spearhead a new Europe that accorded France a prominent position and prevented fragmentation and competition.[11] However, the vision encountered severe international political difficulties that in the military domain caused Mitterrand to fear a domestic political boomerang that would take French military doctrine in a "flexible" direction. In response, Mitterrand tied the presidency to the nuclear status quo in such a manner that his office became disconnected from the organizational dynamics analyzed earlier.

NATO and United Nations Controversies. Mitterrand believed that the new causes of conflict were above all political and that "Europe"—in the sense of Western Europe with France—deserved the right to take charge of these issues. Considerable controversy was aroused because France thus confronted Atlanticist designs notably upheld by the United States, Great Britain, and a number of smaller allies, such as the

---

11. Mitterrand suggested, among other things, working toward a European Confederation, but the idea was poorly received by most Central European countries, where the French initiative was judged too light to tackle the full range of security issues, from the incipient Yugoslav war to territorial security. Mitterrand launched the idea in a New Year's Day speech in December 1989: "I hope to see a real European Confederation emerge in the 1990s, which will bring together all states on our continent in a commonwealth permitting interaction, peace, and security" (quoted in Rupnik 1998, 200). The idea was then presented to other countries in June 1991 at a Prague conference: "The nuances [of a confederation] are numerous and we will do what we wish to do. . . . What I would like to see is an effort to abolish the physical and psychological distance created by half a century of separation" (Mitterrand 1995a, 54). Hereafter the idea was taken off the agenda, but it nevertheless represents one view of the wider circle that was supposed to operate across Europe and within which we would have found France and the European Community at the core.

Netherlands. Germany played a bridging role in so far as Germany continued to adhere to a strong NATO but also bolstered Franco–German cooperation by supporting, in October 1991, the creation of the Franco–German Eurocorps of 35,000 soldiers. The Eurocorps built on the Franco–German brigade of 1987, which consisted of 4,200 soldiers, and was in part a measure designed to alleviate Mitterrand's 1990 announcement that the French First Army would withdraw from German territory. However, the governments also wished to use the Eurocorps to promote "closer military cooperation among the member states of the WEU" (*Le Monde* 17 October 1991) and possibly to substantiate the Maastricht Treaty's promise of "framing a common defense policy that might in time lead to a common defense" (European Union 1992, Title V, Article J.4.1). Former British Prime Minister Thatcher (1993, 798) provides a provocative description of Mitterrand's European design. Thatcher was dismayed to see Mitterrand betray the Gaullist "defense of French sovereignty" in favor of "a federal Europe" (1993, 798) in the shape of a European Union (EU), even though she had offered Mitterrand a partnership to balance the power of the greater Germany (1993, 791). But according to Gabriel Robin (1996), French Ambassador to NATO 1987–1993, Mitterrand did not simply cave in to German designs: The president was so confident that "the tide of history" favored France and French designs that he simply adopted a passive attitude toward NATO reform.[12] In the words of right-wing Prime Minister Balladur (1996, 18), Mitterrand remained particularly attached to the "traditional doctrine concerning relations between France and NATO." Mitterrand was aware of at least some of the obstacles to his vision of a new security order (cf. Mitterrand 1996, 138–139), and it is probable that he hoped that time—a key parameter in his approach to politics—would operate in France's favor.

If political cards were not stacked in French favor, France could still hope that its strong presence in Yugoslavia (see Table 5.3) would mobilize support for its general policy. Political calculations therefore motivated the comparatively early growth in French UN contributions. In the words of Hubert Védrine (1996, 652), at this point secretary general of the Elysée: "What was at

---

12. The Atlanticist François de Rose (1991, 1992) naturally found this policy of hesitancy futile and argued that autonomy would be gained only by integrating with NATO's command structure.

stake in our view was the control of our Bosnian policy and the future role of NATO in European defense specifically in relation to European institutions." Moreover, the UN policy was strengthened by the close working relationship established between the president and the minister for health and humanitarian action, Bernard Kouchner, whose paradigm of "humanitarian intervention" underscored the obligation to intervene in other countries for humanitarian reasons (cf. Védrine 1996, 642; Tardy 1999, 186).

However, EU impotency in Yugoslavia, rooted in Western European political disagreements, a strong U.S. attachment to NATO, and a controversial French role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide[13] implied over time severe difficulties rather than increasing success for Mitterrand's *grand projet.* NATO and not the EU began to appear vigorous, not least as in 1992 the Alliance accepted operating out-of-area under a United Nations (UN) mandate and became the de facto framework for handling peacekeeping missions.[14] In fact, this new operational role for NATO followed an internal strategic reform of the Alliance[15] in which Great Britain had received command of the most novel force

---

13. The genocide of between one half and one million Tutsis in mid-1994 discredited notably the UN, which failed to act, but also to some extent France. France did stage a multinational intervention, Operation Turquoise, in June 1994, in the wake of the genocide, but the humanitarian nature of the intervention was overshadowed by the support offered to fleeing Hutus, instigators of the genocide and traditional French allies.

14. At the time, NATO adherents argued that the Alliance had to go either out-of-area or out-of-business. In choosing the former, the Alliance also discarded the latter.

15. The reform of NATO had begun in London in July 1990 and reached a first conclusion in Rome in November 1991, where a new strategic concept was articulated (NATO 1990, 1991). In seeking broad dialogue across the European continent and simultaneous military reform, NATO made a decisive move in the direction of establishing itself as an indispensable security organization. NATO's external dialogue led first to the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which in 1997 was broadened into the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and which in 1993–1994 was deepened with bilateral military Partnerships for Peace (PfP). NATO was enlarged in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The new concept of 1991—in NATO-speak known as MC 400, replacing MC 14/3—defined NATO's main purpose as that of maintaining a strategic balance in Europe (the Soviet Union disappeared only after the concept had been articulated, albeit one month after) while also deterring threats to NATO territory. NATO's more recent strategic concept of April 1999 (NATO 1999b) places a more distinct emphasis on underlying values, such as democracy, and NATO's ability to uphold these values throughout Europe.

component, namely rapid reaction forces.[16] France did not have to compete with NATO in Africa and in the traditional domains of French influence: however, in Rwanda in 1994 "France had sleepwalked into a disaster on the assumption that past policy would continue to work" (Gregory 2000, 159), and France soon faced the same pressure of multinational cooperation in Africa as in NATO.

France had been associated with NATO's reforms—in the Strategy Review Group—but had generally adopted a passive role, as Robin (1996) also points out. In late 1992, France was forced to make some conciliatory gestures toward NATO, but they symptomatically remained of a limited nature. In December 1992 France and Germany accepted that their Eurocorps could serve in NATO as well as in other coalitions, and French Defense Minister Joxe declared that "we must, in our way, participate in the reform of the Alliance" (*Le Monde* 4 December 1992). That same month France also accepted that French officers could participate in NATO military staff work preparing UN missions (cf. Grant 1996). However, closer coordination at both military and political levels proceeded at a snail's pace[17] and was indicative of the continued wish to promote "Europe" rather than NATO. Symptomatically, in October 1993 the French president saw only "fractions of Europe, pieces of Europe, and I am not sure that they join together" (Mitterrand 1995b, 133).

---

16. In some ways this British command was natural because NATO's new rapid reaction forces were organized around the British forces that had been stationed in Germany during the Cold War. NATO's other forces at this stage were Principal Defense Forces, located in Germany, and Reinforcement Forces, mainly U.S.-based. The British command was a measure with which the United States could motivate Britain to remain involved in European security. Moreover, while this involvement would add to the security of all allies, it was also, as Charles Cogan (1994, 185–186) has emphasized, a measure with which a European alternative to NATO could be outpaced.

17. An overview is provided by Grant (1996, 61–62). In April 1993 the head of France's mission to the Military Committee was allowed to participate with a "deliberative" rather than "consultative" voice; in 1993–1994 new military missions were established with NATO Major Subordinate Commands; the French defense minister, absent since 1966, attended a NATO defense ministers' meeting in September 1994; and the French chief of staff, likewise absent since 1966, attended a meeting of the Military Committee in October 1995.

A Bipolar Nuclear Debate. Doctrinal reform needed to focus on conventional rather than nuclear forces that remained tightly linked to French territory. As Dominique David (1991, 350) argued, perhaps such conventional reform could consist of enlarging the FAR, which had been the backbone of the Gulf War *Daguet* force, to include the entire army. Yet, after some years of debate on *nuclear* flexibility, Dominique David (1994, 80; 1996) seemed to resign and conclude that above all France "must define its role."

The nuclear debate of 1991–1993 had many facets, and here we need simply note its impact on President Mitterrand's attitude toward military reform.[18] What should the UN coalition have done if in 1990–1991 Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons? Mitterrand partly answered the question in February 1991 by declaring that French forces would not resort to weapons of mass destruction: "such an employment would represent a retreat towards barbarism that I refuse" (quoted in Boniface 1994, 85). However, such reluctance could more generally fragment world politics into nuclear islands where great power activity would be deterred by nuclear proliferation (Freedman 1994–1995), and where traditional French security policy would be undermined (Poirier 1991; Touraine 1992, 1993a, 1993b). Conversely, to the extent that Western Europe needed to consider these nuclear implications, they also represented a political–strategic opportunity for France to stimulate a European defense debate involving also the role of (French) nuclear weapons (Bozo 1992; Grovard and van Ackere 1992; Orsini 1992; Fricaud-Chagnaud 1996; Boniface 1997b). These issues provided the clue for a volatile nuclear debate in France.

In a plea for a new system of missile defense, François de Rose (1990) defined the new and central concept of "inverse proportionality"—deterrence by the strong of the weak [*du fort au faible*]. The issue of missile defense was linked to proliferation concerns and essentially the question of whether an Arab leader (i.e., Saddam Hussein) would "understand" the rules of deterrence. In France the new deterrence debate involved the Mitterrand status quo camp, a small segment of radical reformers, and then a large

---

18. The best overviews of the French nuclear debate and its connections to European integration are those by Morel (1993, 1994), Yost (1994–1995, 1995a), and Tertrais (1998).

group of people who believed above all that *conventional precision strikes* could serve as a novel deterrent against newcomers on the strategic stage. To an outside observer like David Yost (1994, 1994–1995), most participants in the debate respected the traditional view of nuclear deterrence and did not want to use nuclear weapons in offensive war and external interventions. Still, Pascal Boniface, adviser to Defense Minister Joxe, argued that a dangerous "Pandora's box" (1992, 156) containing advocates of "limited nuclear strikes" (1994, 5) was opening.[19]

In bipolarizing the debate, the Mitterrand camp had the easy status quo position that appeared reasonable but foreclosed, in linking conventional and nuclear deterrence, the reform debates that high-ranking officials wished to promote. For example, Air Force Chief of Staff—and former [1987–1989] Special Chief of Staff—Jean Fleury argued that the air force was a new "strategic instrument par excellence" because it could strike generally or surgically (1990, 19–22). His successor, Air Force Chief of Staff Lanata, argued that "our deterrence posture, which applies to *du faible au fort*, must today extend itself to *du fort au faible* postures" that include "flexibility and precision" (1993, 12–13). Defense Minister Joxe had also pitched in, as he argued that it was necessary to "develop more flexible weapons systems to create deterrence through precision strikes rather than the threat of general nuclear war" (*Le Figaro* 19 May 1992), and Chief of Staff Lanxade (1991, 1994; *Le Monde* 23 January 1993) likewise advocated investments in missile technology. Importantly, none of these major players argued that new missiles should be tipped with nuclear warheads. Instead—as Marisol Touraine, former advisor to Prime Minister Rocard [1988–1991], argued (1993b, also 1993a)—"we must clearly disassociate our nuclear strategy from our strategy of intervention."

Only a number of marginal actors wished to abandon "the concept of weapons of nonuse" (Roquefeuil 1993, 41; Debouzy 1994) because, as the RPR deputy Jacques Baumel frankly stated, some states do not yet "understand the rational rules of deterrence"

---

19. Boniface and Yost had an exchange of views in the journal Survival, in which Yost had published an article in 1994–1995. Boniface (1995, 183, emphasis in original) responded that "the line of division in the present debate *is* between 'war-fighting' and 'deterrence' approaches to nuclear weapons." In response Yost reiterated his view in the same issue (1995b).

(*Le Monde*, 6 November 1993; also 19 July 1992). However, a small number sufficed for the Mitterrand camp to invoke a dangerous drift toward smaller, more precise, and surgical nuclear weapons that would betray French security traditions (cf. Jean-Michel Boucheron 1994; see also Bérégovoy 1992, 32; Mitterrand 1992a, 48; 1992b, 44).

It was a natural political liability to be identified as a nuclear revisionist, and the opposition therefore sounded their retreat from the defense debate once they had won the parliamentary elections of 1993 and looked ahead to the presidential elections of 1995. Defense Minister Leotard declared that the government was firmly opposed to "nuclear banalization" (*Le Monde*, 16 November 1993) and Prime Minister Balladur (1994, 14) emphasized that "We refuse to envisage any change toward the so-called 'strategy of deployment' of nuclear weapons or toward the idea of nuclear battle weapons." Nevertheless, the president, who was now in the last year of his presidency and increasingly ill, had found (defined) an issue that he exploited to constrain the debate and build his strategic legacy. In May 1994 he thus gathered the defense establishment of politicians and officers to argue that in nuclear matters "it is the head of state who decides" (1994, 25). Moreover (1994, 29):

> Must we use nuclear weapons to settle problems that do not directly relate to our territory or vital interests? . . . Must we rally to the concept of surgical strikes, or even more picturesque, decapitating strikes, which could after all escalate to nuclear levels? The suggestions are to me a major heresy and I will under no circumstances accept them.

Innovation and Glass Ceilings

Allied deadlock and a status quo position in the domestic strategic debate are the main explanatory factors behind the disconnection between organizational reforms and presidential designs. The president was focusing on European union, the Defense Ministry on force projection, and the two connected poorly (cf. Heisbourg 1991). The 1994 White Paper directed by the right-wing prime minister, Balladur, was caught in this trap. While new scenarios of intervention overtook the idea of circles, the entire analytical exercise was marked by a divorce between assessments

of the strategic environment and French means. The president defined the limits of change—maintaining conscription and territorial deterrence—and then stayed above the fray.[20] In fact, he gave his special chief of staff, General Quesnot, strict instructions not to become involved. Moreover, Mitterrand intervened to maintain the strategic framework, which in practice meant that he rearticulated several passages relating to the use of nuclear weapons as well as the authority of the president vis-à-vis the prime minister.

A White Paper had been on the drawing board of Defense Minister Joxe in 1991, but this project had been withdrawn given considerations of the president's position in the defense debate (Gautier 1999, 246; also Gautier in interview with author). Subsequently the Balladur government was wholly unable to use the White Paper as a means of forcing change on the president. Instead, political differences were sharpened—which was perhaps also one of the purposes of the governmental exercise—and the outcome in strategic terms was one of "great immobility" (Géré 1997, 186).

Is this turn of events indicative of the futility of all entrepreneurial activity? Considering the problems with allies and the political opposition, had the Mitterrand presidency become a bulwark against change that would crumble only in 1995 with the presidential elections? The answer must be affirmative because all other entrepreneurial activity coming from military ranks ran into a glass ceiling: the president was simply not receptive to new ideas that implied a change of strategy. Illustrative is a meeting that took place between the president and General Fricaud-Chagnaud, the FAR entrepreneur, in mid-1991 and which concerned the problematic relationship between Europe and French nuclear deterrence. Briefly, Fricaud-Chagnaud explained how European union did not necessitate doctrinal change because "deterrence by recognition" [*dissuasion par constat*] already provided a new link between France and Europe (interview with author).[21] In

---

20. Mitterrand had surprised the military establishment by announcing in July 1990 that conscription would be reduced—an old 1981 electoral promise—from twelve to ten months. The decision took two years to implement because the military services, especially the army, demanded a recruitment framework that maintained operational efficacy (see Gautier 1999, 283 ff.).

21. *Dissuasion par constat* operated, according to Fricaud-Chagnaud, given the geopolitical context—which must be "recognized"—and was not dependent on the

consequence, European integration could be engaged apart from hot pursuits of new nuclear designs, precisely what the president wished to do.

The roles played by Special Chief of Staff Quesnot [1991–1995] and Chief of Staff Lanxade [1991–1995] allow us to probe this glass ceiling further. French journalists (Schwartzbrod 1995, 276; Coudurier 1998, 62–65) have argued that the Quesnot–Lanxade relationship was troubled. At times they emphasize their different service backgrounds (Quesnot representing the army, Lanxade the navy), at other times they emphasize different personal styles (Quesnot being direct and frank, Lanxade indirect and diplomatic). The relationship may not have been smooth notably during the cohabitation years, when Quesnot represented the presidency while Lanxade had both left- and right-wing superiors. Moreover, Quesnot had been elevated to the post of special chief of staff because he had attracted political attention given his criticism of a lethargic military institution in 1987–1988. Quesnot, at the time chief of the First Army Staff, in turn attracted heavy criticism from Army Chief of Staff Forray but also the attention of Defense Minister Chevènement, who appreciated Quesnot's new management ideas. In 1991, when Quesnot discovered his candidacy for special chief of staff, he therefore suspected that it had been promoted by Chevènement (interview with author). Admiral Lanxade's career path was more "regular": he first served in the military cabinets of Defense Ministers Giraud and Chevènement, then became special chief of staff in 1989, before capping his military career with four and a half years as chief of staff (April 1991–September 1995).

However, while these two high-ranking officers may have had different preferences in some domains, we should also note an area of agreement that has not been picked up by journalistic accounts. In essence, both Quesnot and Lanxade knew that they operated under very difficult political conditions and that reform had to be managed in a very delicate way. Quesnot underscored that his mandate was one of keeping the president informed. "Mitterrand

---

traditional strategic action–reaction competition between two hostile camps. The conditions were three: the small European space, interdependence between France and its neighbors, and the consequent difficulty of delimiting French vital interests. The argument was later published as part of the general French debate on nuclear strategy (cf. Fricaud-Chagnaud and Patry 1994, 75–77).

followed nuclear questions very closely because it is a political weapon. As far as conventional forces were concerned, competence was passed on to the Minister" (interview with author, see also Quesnot 1998). The minister in question was Pierre Joxe, and he relied heavily on Admiral Lanxade to spearhead the reforms already analyzed: strengthening the chief of staff and creating the DAS think tank. Coudurier (1998, 62–63) almost faults Lanxade for adapting his political profile, one day working for Mitterrand, the next for Balladur. However, reform demanded precisely someone who could operate in a volatile political environment, as Quesnot took care to emphasize in our interview. "Lanxade was ideal for the situation because he had a perfect knowledge of the political–military interface. He created COS, COIA, DRM, and so on in order to dispose of the organization necessary for responding to political decision-makers, partners, and allies."

In sum, Lanxade was a reformer or innovator suited for his time, one of political upheaval—and his presence informs us that the difficulties of doctrinal reform were above all political. As we have seen, strategic disagreements with allies and a charged nuclear debate were at the root of the split that developed between organizational reform and strategic immobility. The basis for doctrinal change was present. However, the political actor who could act on this basis, namely the president, refused to concede political defeat, while those who wished to move ahead, that is, the opposition, did not have the institutional means to do so. This was a formidable glass ceiling through which military entrepreneurs could not penetrate.

A PRESIDENTIAL ENTREPRENEUR

President Chirac was elected in May 1995 and gave birth to a process of strategic reform that turned past Gaullist principles on their head. Where France had been principally a nuclear power, France now aimed to focus on force projection while retaining nuclear forces simply as a backup. The chronology testifies to a rapid pace of change that benefited from a clear political mandate and also a favorable parliamentary situation. A strategic committee was established under Defense Minister Millon in July 1995 to review the global relationship between nuclear forces, professionalization, the armaments industry, and allied relations. The strategic committee generally took the White Paper scenarios

as its starting point and then sought to bring resources and policy in line with them.[22] The results of the committee were presented by President Chirac at the Military Academy—*l'Ecole Militaire*—on 22 February..

Table 5.6

Chirac's Strategic Program, 1995-2015*

- Nuclear force reduced to two components: (a) 4 new generation submarines with improved missile (M51) and (b) air-to-ground missiles (*ASMP amelioré*) for air force and navy. Albion site and tactical Hadès abandoned.
- Full professionalization of all forces by 2002, entailing a combined reduction in manpower of 1/3.
- Force projection the new key word, with overarching goal of projecting up to 30,000 soldiers in a major theater of conflict. Navy long-term goal is to have two naval groups organized around two aircraft carriers. Air force to focus on Rafale aircraft.
- 15 % reduction in capital investment to off-set costs of professionalization.

*Source: Chirac 1996.

A program law was then fully articulated by the government and adopted by the National Assembly on 20 June. The program law, like many of its predecessors, has a five-year perspective:

---

22. The strategic committee consisted of five working groups dealing with nuclear forces, conventional forces, professionalization, industrial restructuring, and the organization of the Defense Ministry. Moreover, the strategic committee worked within the framework of the 1994 White Paper but gave emphasis to the dimensions of striking a new nuclear–conventional force balance and promoting Europeanization politically as well as industrially. See the parliamentary report (Assemblée nationale 1996a) for further details.

1997–2002. However, unlike its predecessors, it works within another more general 18-year framework [1997–2015] necessitated by the scope of the envisaged changes. Table 5.6 summarizes the major changes announced by Chirac in February 1996

Considering the scope of change involved, it was perhaps not surprising that in his introduction Chirac made reference to de Gaulle's historical speech to the armed forces in Strasbourg, in 1962, after the Algerian debacle. The context was, of course, different: Where de Gaulle had to begin a process of change, Chirac could build on an incipient movement of change that had begun in 1990, as DAS director Jean-Claude Mallet also emphasizes in his presentation of the program law (1996, 22). Yet it would be dangerous to assume, as this study generally has emphasized, that change can be commanded in a straightforward fashion. In the following I assess whether Chirac's program took the path of "community" or "balance of power," and I then consider the safeguards erected against opposition.

A French Community for Change

De Gaulle, Giscard d'Estaing, and Mitterrand had relied on balance-of-power dynamics to promote doctrinal change, and it would therefore be tempting to conclude that this is the prevalent method of change in French security affairs. Moreover, a glance at Jacques Chirac's personal background indicates that he has built his career on a hierarchical political machine, which he commanded via the resources flowing through his office in his simultaneous capacity as party chief and Paris mayor. In a portrait of Chirac, *Le Monde*'s editor Colombani—admittedly not one of Chirac's warmest supporters—describes the president as a Bonapartist leader who uses a small loyal group and a tightly controlled organization to establish a popular following (1998, 88 ff.). Disregarding the political affinities of Colombani, we note that the image describes the strategic reform process fairly well. The president defined the agenda for change and committees then defined the specific contours of change, which the president himself presented to the public at large. Still, in perhaps an odd turn of events, Chirac's preferred method of operation proved to be a vehicle of community rather than balance of power.

A balance of power is an accurate description for a process that excludes one or several of the principal interests in the reform process. In contrast, the 1995–1996 reform included these interests. The argument should be probed further in two notable respects.

First, the political environment remained split on some issues, notably the one of conscription. President Mitterrand had been a firm advocate of conscription, in line with the Jaurès tradition on the left wing—a position shared by key players such as former Defense Ministers Chevènement and Quilès. The former as a staunch Republican argued that "the country needs a defense with a popular dimension in which the citizen feels implicated" (quoted in Gautier 1999, 299). Quilès, on his part, argued in the context of the parliamentary debate on the program law that reform of the national service needed more discussion because "the objective of our national defense system remains territorial defense" (*Journal Officiel*, 21 March 1996, p. 1827). Conscription was therefore a divisive issue. However, as Chapter 1 emphasized, it is impossible to use the community concept across the political scene because politics ultimately involves a crude competition for power. In some instances we may speak of a political consensus, but it is likely to be volatile and may become part of the posited "boomerang" effect. Hence, we should look to the military world in order to assess the issue of community.

The real question concerns the army, because this service was set to experience the most dramatic change in the new reform process. Moreover, although it is difficult to gauge the depth of the issue, it is probable that a significant number of army officers believed that conscription in one form or another reinforced their organizational capacity. The position reflects the fact that the army relied much more on conscripts than did the navy or air force: almost two thirds (61%) of French conscripts entered the army (*Le Monde* 25 January 1996). Thus we see General Schmitt, former chief of staff [1987–1991], advocate a regime of a mixed armed force in which, revealingly, the air force and navy could embrace full professionalization, while the army maintained a semiprofessional status (Schmitt 1993). Moreover, just three days before professionalization was brought up in a *Conseil de défense* on 22 February 1996, the army's personnel office [*la direction du personnel militaire de l'armée de terre*] published a report that

decried the envisaged “brutal cutbacks” and emerging “major traumatisms.” The abandonment of conscription, the report continued, would introduce a “market soldier” who could give birth to “rampant syndicalism” (excerpts published in *Le Monde* 7 March 1996). As Table 5.7 illustrates, the army did indeed face a tremendous challenge that had already begun in the early 1990s.

Table 5.7

Force Structure, 1990-2015*

	1990	1995	2002	2015	Total reduction
Army	326,900	271,500	172,600	170,000	*156,900*
Navy	72,500	70,400	56,500	56,500	*16,000*
Air	98,600	94,100	71,000	70,000	*28,600*
Total	*498,000*	*426,000*	*300,100*	*296,500*	*201,500*

*Source: Loi de programmation 1997-2002 and other information on *www.defense.gouv.fr.*

Moreover, as Table 5.8 demonstrates, the government has not been able to meet the target budgetary goals of the program law—99 billion francs for Title III and 86 for Title V—because the cost of manpower has crowded out capital investment.

In fact, actual spending on capital investments for 1997 and 1998 combined fell by 14 billion more than originally projected (89 and 90 billion) and led Jean Guisnel of *Le Point* (1 November 1997) to conclude that “no one in the army believes a word of the government’s promises.” Somewhere at the crossroads of major personnel cutbacks, rising costs of professionalization, and declining capital investments, one could expect to encounter service criticism of the logic or *raison d’être* of Chirac’s strategic program.

However, the pains of change have not engendered a debate that in one way or the other criticizes the choice of force projection and the concomitant need to elaborate a new doctrine.

Table 5.8

Running Costs and Capital Investments, 1995-1999*

Title	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
III	99	101	102	104	104	*105*
V	95	89	84	81	86	*83*

*Billion of francs. Title III represents running costs (salaries, other labor costs, food, petrol products, and maintenance) while Title V represents capital investments (research, industrial investment, fabrication, and infrastructure). Figures for 2000 are projected. Source: *l'armée d'aujourd'hui*, February 1999 (no. 237) and *www.defense.gouv.fr/ministere/budget2000*.

The debate—or rather the occasional criticisms[23]—relate to resources and organizational reform, something that must be described as an inevitable facet of major strategic change. Public interventions by officers typically caution against the belief that the transition to a new military capability will be brief and smooth (cf. *Le Monde* 2 October 1996; *Le Point* 12 July 1997; *Libération* 30 September 1997; *Le Monde* 16–17 November 1997) without invoking criticism of the direction of change.

The absence of doctrinal criticism is in all likelihood due to the coherence of the new strategic program, which comes in the wake of several years of turbulence and hesitancy. Coherence and also a presidential passion for military affairs have probably created a better general atmosphere within the military community. General Quesnot, who briefly served as President Chirac's special chief of staff, underscored that "the military has generally appreciated the clarification that the election of Chirac, in fact the end of cohabitation, brought with it" (interview with author). The Quesnot assessment that congenial civil–military relations are good is credible because part of his motivation for resigning [1995] four years ahead of his formal retirement age was disagreement with

---

23. This criticism was on occasion articulated with the agreement of the Ministry of Defense (cf. Coudurier 1998, 125).

Chirac over the issue of conscription. Quesnot thus maintained that relations were positive in spite of his difficult personal situation.

One should also note that strategic coherence in this specific case implies more liberty of action for the French forces than they had enjoyed during the Cold War. Past traditions of mobility and action thus pervaded the assessment of General Mercier, army chief of staff [1996–1999], when in October 1998 he was asked to present a balance sheet of the reforms (Mercier 1998, 11).

> If we use the size of the army as the assessment criterion, one could think that its position and role today has diminished. . . . If we then take the use of force as a criterion, the picture changes. The new strategic context has rehabilitated the use of force compared to the previously dominating concept of nonuse. The possession of a force projection capacity has simultaneously become important. Projection and action are the two key words that inspired the president of the Republic when he adopted a new model for the armed forces. This is where, today, the army must excel and it is acquiring the means to do so.

In sum, President Chirac's strategic agenda appeals to a great variety of service interests and has not been challenged from within the military community, at least in terms of doctrine. We must therefore conclude that the top-down approach of mid-1995 has generated a type of policy community in which all major interests support the idea of force projection. Some observers might think that community-building necessitates a lengthy process of negotiation and bridge-building. In some respects the troubled years 1990–1995 represent this process because they wore down all participants who perceived a need for thoroughgoing reform but then had to recognize the severe political limits to the endeavor. In this sense Chirac arrived at an opportune moment at the helm of the French state and in fact managed to promote a community for reform using atypical means: namely, command and delegation.

Military Support for Doctrinal Clarification

The strategic framework of 1995–1996 built on the organizational reforms of the preceding years and permitted the chief of staff, General Douin, to underwrite a new doctrine in July 1997. The doctrine is a comprehensive translation of the general

strategic framework into options for military action, and it remains valid into the new millennium. Some aspects of the new doctrine are particularly important to note because of their political connotations—concerning the use of force and relations to NATO—and their subsequent potential for feeding a political reaction that could "boomerang" against the president.

The new doctrine has been particularly important for the general ability of the armed forces to connect "old" scenarios of confrontation with "new" scenarios of peacekeeping and crisis management. The end of the Cold War caused many observers to note a shift in patterns of conflict: major wars between states were becoming obsolescent, and new types of war provoked by failed states became all the more relevant. While pertinent, the observation was inadequate from a military perspective. Principles and guidelines for intervention were called for, including an articulation of the link between new and old wars that, according to military prudence, should not be discounted as outdated.

The French debate of the early 1990s did not clearly define this linkage, as major war was framed in the context of national deterrence and as interventions were defined as operations in support of UN policy. There is little doubt that the confluence of frustrated French NATO policy and UN problems in Yugoslavia caused the French military to resent a situation in which they appeared as political pawns of a failed policy. Louis Gautier (1999, 181) and Hubert Védrine (1996, 634–635) have both observed that UN mandates caused problems for the French forces. In opposition to political stalemate, French commander in Bosnia, General Morillon, in the Spring of 1993, forced his way into the besieged city of Srebrenica and thus provoked the UN policy of "safe havens" but also tense civil–military relations in Paris (*Le Monde* 3 June 1993). Later, in 1994, Morillon's successor, General Cot, was "relieved of his mandate"—fired—by UN General Secretary Bouthros-Ghali given his criticism of the international chain of command.

French policy was strongly influenced at this stage by Bernard Kouchner and the idea of humanitarian interventions rather than by the Ministry of Defense (cf. Tardy 1999, 186). Resulting military frustrations are perhaps best articulated by a retiree—namely, General Valentin (1995, 109).

> The soldier is made to fight. In order to receive blows and risk his life, he must have weapons to use with the ultimate goal of winning. The U.S. secretary of defense, William Perry, has made the strong point before the Congress in August 1994: “We are an army, not the Salvation Army.” Unfortunately, there have been almost no French politicians to articulate the same point.

Strongly reminiscent of U.S. General MacArthur’s “the purpose of wars is to win them,” Valentin’s remark highlights the tension that developed between the traditional military idea of battle and the new policy of conflict management and appeasement.

Steps to articulate guidelines were taken only tentatively, such as when the 1994 White Paper declared that French UN contributions henceforth depended on five criteria: (a) a clear political goal of the operation, (b) a correspondence between the operation and French strategic interests, (c) a clear chain of command, (d) a willingness to withdraw troops, and (e) explicit national and multinational political support (Ministère de la Défense 1994, 75–76). However, this political exercise did little to define the conditions under which force could be used in the gray area existing between peace and war. This void was finally filled by Chief of Staff Lanxade in March 1995, as he built on previous reflections within the central staff and also diplomatic work to outline what has become known as the “Lanxade directive” (Ministère de la Défense 1995). Lanxade, already bolstered by organizational reforms, articulated the new concept of “peace restoration” situated between the well-known missions of “maintaining” (Chapter 6, UN charter) and “imposing” peace (Chapter 7, UN charter) (Tardy 1999, 358–359). Moreover, the Lanxade directive argued that “peace restoration” necessitated the active use of military force and thus that strict neutrality was not a policy option. Rather, the use of force should be “impartial” in the sense that it should not aim to affect the local balance of power but serve to protect and create respect around French forces.

Developments on the Bosnian ground favored a rapid political acceptance of this new view, as Bosnian Serbs in May 1995 took hundreds of UN troops hostage. The fact that French forces now served under a white flag greatly upset the newly elected president and was a major determinant behind the launching of a Franco–British–Dutch rapid reaction force in the fall of 1995, as part

of NATO's *Operation Deliberate Force*, which from a French perspective represented a first implementation of the Lanxade directive (Coudurier 1998, 66 ff.; Tardy 1999, 280). Operation Deliberate Force was, moreover, a turning point in allied relations because it signaled the coordination of U.S. and European policies that produced the Dayton peace agreement of November 1995 and thus led to the deployment of the NATO "implementation force" (IFOR). Following the Dayton agreement, IFOR operated as a peacekeeping force but also as the instrument of a more forceful Western approach to conflict management.

This turn of events is decisive because it led to the political recognition that a bridge must be built between war and peace operations. Bosnia had in effect provoked a realization that new conflicts operate on a spectrum and that operations to "restore peace" fall within the ambiguous middle of this spectrum. Bosnia thus also built a civil–military bridge in Paris where the possibility of escalation from one operation to the other, or from one of the White Paper scenarios to another, is respected and brought actively into military planning. The Douin doctrine of 1997 is the tangible outcome.[24] According to Admiral Borgis (1997, 13), who headed the planning office where the concept was actually written, the concept is a "tree trunk from where the branches define the way in which our forces should organize, use, and optimize their means"—the Lanxade directive being found in the branch of "actions in favor of international peace and law."

We trace the effect in the paper trail that leads from doctrine to more specific instructions and which moves the emphasis from deterring "war" to controlling "violence."[25] In a lower-level doctrine written in June 1999, the French central staff (Ministère de la Défense 1999a) makes an explicit reference to the type of situations that also dominated the Lanxade directive: the goal is to "prevent, contain, and tightly control the escalation of violence." Moreover, Chapter 6 outlines three grand strategic options—prevention, restoration, and regular war—and again confirms that escalation is

---

24. Another tangible outcome, as Menon (2000, 106) mentions, was the 1996 nomination of General Jean Heinrich as commander of the new Army Operational Command. Heinrich had been second in command in Bosnia and thus understood the requirements of multinational cooperation.

25. In French the change is one from *concept d'empoi des force* to *doctrine*.

a key concern: “These families of strategic options in fact represent a continuum of possibilities.” And since escalation can in principle go far, “the principle of warfighting remains the foundation of action.” The statement by Colonel Bruno Neveux, head of the army’s operational staff, *Bureau de Préparation Opérationelle*, is illustrative of this flexible yet prudent view (Jane’s International Defense Review, June 2000, p. 47).

> Among the operational capability requirements (functions) that we see emerging are civil–military cooperation (CIMIC), operational communications, and psyops. These aren’t in themselves new, but they are more heavily emphasized than in the past. . . . The fundamental basis of all our training is still founded on waging war, even if it does not precisely reflect today’s operational realities. There are particular skills required for peace operations, but it has to be recognized that even the latter can be subject of ‘mission creep’ (that is, escalation).

The new doctrine thus reflects agreement that the use of military force is part of conflict management and thus may impact on French UN policy and other foreign policies. In consequence, the military should not abandon past practices but must prepare for these situations by grafting onto traditional missions new methods of training. This observation points to a political impact of military planning that is at least potentially controversial. Before we examine this potential, we should, however, also note another source of potential controversy—namely, the very tight coordination between French and NATO planning.

Within the central staff, the planning division [*division d’emploi*] is charged with the responsibility of writing and specifying military doctrines—naturally under superior supervision. In March 1997, three months before the publication of the new doctrine, the chief of staff passed a note to the planning division ordering studies of French–NATO interoperationability in four domains, one of which concerned doctrines, as Colonel Fréré, head of the Military Strategy section of the planning division recalled (interview with author). This study of interoperationability, which produced the lower-level doctrine referred to earlier (Ministère de la Défense 1999a), was carried out by Colonels Fréré and Gaitinos.

The process offers a window on the tight planning relationship between NATO allies, because the colonels used NATO Military Committee manuals—referring to the integrated command of which France is not a part—to adopt planning scenarios that would make French and NATO documents immediately compatible. Colonels Fréré and Gaitinos literally used the NATO vocabulary, which is as specific as any ordinary dictionary and perhaps even more precise, given the requirements of coordinating planning among the allies, to write the French document. Colonel Fréré underscored that this planning naturally does not precipitate an independent political decision. However, it is interesting to note that France, which continues to remain outside NATO's integrated command except for peacekeeping and -enforcement operations, is gradually merging with NATO at levels of doctrine. This at least highlights the difference between military and political levels—one being virtually integrated, the other remaining at arm's length—and brings us to the conclusion of this section.

The reforms spurred by the election of Jacques Chirac in May 1995 allowed political priorities to catch up with previous organizational reform and set the stage for the Douin doctrine of 1997. The distinct emphasis on force projection and allied coordination has not been contested by any significant interest group within the military community, and we may in fact see the reform process of 1995–1997 as an instance of "community" reform. This was a novelty under the Fifth Republic but was also the outcome of particular circumstances, namely the exhausting political controversies of the early 1990s that essentially blocked thorough reform in the new security environment. The political left wing cannot be said to be part of the reform community, thus providing potential for a political boomerang. Following the preceding analysis, focal points for political protest could be the "militarization" of French peacekeeping and "de facto integration" with NATO. The scope for such politicization would depend not least on the way in which allied relations were handled.

THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE

The skills with which domestic military reform has been handled have been difficult to identify in the relationship between France and its allies. France has presented unilateral concessions in relation to nuclear and alliance policy but has been frustrated in

the attempt to win Alliance reform. In conceptual terms we see the French policy-making center failing to control "allied threat collusion" and "mission constraints" to the effect that French NATO policy represented an opportunity to question the coherence of Chirac's policy. Moreover, Chirac involuntarily offered the opposition an institutional venue for such criticism as in the spring of 1997 he called parliamentary elections and lost them. The new government headed by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin did not fail to notice this presidential vulnerability.

However, the Kosovo crisis that erupted in 1998 granted the president an opportunity to define allied "threats" and "missions" in a critical setting where the left-wing government was institutionally and not least politically bound to "respect" presidential authority. An astute politician, Chirac used this opportunity to force the government to recognize explicitly the value of the new military instrument. Cohabitation and the empowerment of the opposition have not, therefore, politicized military doctrine, and the doctrine of 1997 remains firmly on track.

Alliance Troubles

President Chirac entered the stage of diplomacy with a sense of vigor that grew out of the deadlocked environment characteristic of the last years of the Mitterrand presidency. According to French journalist Hubert Coudurier (1998, 46), the sign of new times appeared in the message passed to U.S. diplomats: "France is back." However, when activism failed to unclench significant NATO concessions, it also became the prism through which opponents could highlight the shortcomings of the Chirac presidency. We detect the potential perils of charged diplomacy along two dimensions.

We turn first of all to the nuclear capability that served as the backbone for French strategy through the Cold War. We have previously seen how President Mitterrand presided over significant nuclear cutbacks and how President Chirac followed suit in 1996. In a long perspective there is therefore little doubt that Chirac has followed an established policy of reducing nuclear expenditure in order to promote conventional reform. However, continuity was overtaken by change in June 1995, when Chirac announced a break with Mitterrand's nuclear test ban policy. In fact, Chirac

announced a dual-track decision according to which France would conduct a series of new nuclear tests with the explicit purpose of joining a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that was under negotiation. Considering past French objections to international disarmament treaties, including nuclear controls, the announcement was a sign of progressive French policy vis-à-vis multilateral controls. However, international criticism focused attention instead on the tests themselves and thus obliterated the CTBT aspect. As Bruno Tertrais (1998, 30) observes, the government may have expected an outcry, but not one of this scope and duration. President Chirac sought to accommodate criticism by launching the idea of "concerted deterrence" among European states and by cutting the number of tests from eight to six.[26] Chirac also had to support the fundamental rationale of his decision, which in June 1995 he had argued concerned "the supreme national interest" and that the decision therefore was "irrevocable" (1995, 127). This discourse was subsequently upheld by Defense Minister Millon (1995, 15), who stressed that "nuclear deterrence guarantees our independence and represents the ultimate protection of our vital interests," and also by Foreign Minister Charette (1995a, 137), who argued that at issue was the French status as a "great power" and the essence of "French sovereignty." Prime Minister Juppé (1995, 15) on his part referred to the contrast between nuclear "autonomy" and past political dependency as witnessed by the 1956 Suez debacle.

The nuclear test controversy should be noted here because it caused President Chirac and his closest collaborators to identify repeatedly and strongly with the Gaullist policy of nuclear independence. The emphasis was particularly problematic because

---

26. The six tests were carried out between September 1995 and January 1996. Concerted deterrence was poorly received by other European governments and in fact represented a long-standing French concern with the connection between its national deterrent and its European political ambitions. In the early 1990s, French observers had suggested a low-profile strategy that, by focusing on proliferation dangers and Russian nuclear weapons, could stir a general European nuclear debate and thus a European awareness of the need for deterrence (cf. Bozo 1992). President Chirac (Le Monde 20 July 1995) likewise argued before the European Parliament that "it is not in the interest of Europe to reject these tests because she will need to defend herself." Among the EU member states, only Great Britain, the only other nuclear power, offered explicit support. John Major (Chirac and Major 1995, 266) thus declared at a press conference held with President Chirac that "when one is a nuclear power, one has certain obligations."

France is gradually becoming *dependent* on cooperation with the United States and Great Britain not only in the conventional but also in the nuclear domain. Chirac's nuclear decisions have an irrevocable character, not merely because the CTBT has an indefinite horizon, but because the Pacific test site has been shut down, along with two fissile material plants. France must henceforth rely on modeled computer tests, a relatively weak French capability (Tertrais 1998, 32–33), and the French government was in consequence quick to enter a test exchange agreement with the United States in June 1996. This agreement provoked French historian Georges Soutou (1996, 422) to observe that "from now on, in the nuclear field, the US is the vital partner for France. . . . This rapprochement between France, the US and the Atlantic Alliance will without a doubt carry ramifications for the perspective of a European defense and a Franco–German security couple." In other words, considerably deepened French–American nuclear agreements carry political consequences that clash with the discourse on "sovereignty" and "independence"—all the more so in a French context, where "independence" is opposed to U.S. influence.

This brings us to the second dimension, which also involves the United States, but this time in relation to NATO. Since France withdrew from NATO's integrated command in 1966, successive French governments have claimed that fundamental NATO reform was a precondition for French reintegration. Chirac's new activism essentially consisted of a bargain: in return for French reintegration, which symbolized also the recognition of NATO as the cornerstone of European security, the allies should grant more space for "Europe" (Charette 1995b; Chirac 1996; Juppé 1996). In late 1995 the French government initiated the process by announcing that the French minister of defense would henceforth take his place in NATO's Atlantic Council, and that French representatives would participate in the work of the Military Committee. Even NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was not off limits. Foreign Minister Charette (1995b) first argued that "We will not participate in the NPG. There is no change," but soon thereafter Defense Minister Millon stated that France "pursues a pragmatic policy and decides on a case-by-case basis whether to participate in the DPC [Defense Planning Committee] or the NPG" (*Le Monde* 16 December 1995, also 18 January 1996).

The French initiative appeared to bear fruit in June 1996, when the NATO allies at their Berlin summit agreed to translate the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) into practice by creating modular command structures—Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).[27] However, as negotiations focused on NATO's Southern Command, which France wished to Europeanize, and also NATO's enlargement, which France wished to broaden from three to five countries, the reform process lost momentum. In essence, Europeanization lacked European support (*Le Monde* 10 July 1997; Tiersky 1997; Gordon 1998). Chief of Staff Douin, who was in charge of the military aspects of these negotiations, noted afterwards that the United States was right to refuse a compromise because "NATO does not yet have a European component"—although Douin also maintained that "Europe must think like the Americans and pursue their strategic interests" (interview with author). Nevertheless, short-term NATO difficulties could be a major political liability because they highlight a contradiction—as François Géré (1997, 200) also noted—between Chirac's strategic program of multinational cooperation on the one hand and alliance deadlock on the other.

President Chirac could not eschew this troublesome question because the left-wing opposition won the French parliamentary elections just as the NATO negotiations turned sour. Paul Quilès (1996), Mitterrand's defense minister from 1985 to 1986, had already targeted Chirac's alliance policy by arguing that "this 'Europeanization of NATO' has very little to do with a European defense and will make the US the sixteenth member of the EU." The ardent Gaullist Paul-Marie de la Gorce (1996) joined Quilès by arguing that Chirac's NATO policy was "dishonorable." Hubert Védrine, the coming foreign minister, noted that "when the world does not adapt to France, France must adapt to the world" (1997, 181–182), but he then also accused Chirac in January 1997 of

---

27. The CJTF idea was originally an American concept, used by the U.S. Army for its own operations. It was first brought into NATO in 1993 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin with the purpose of enabling NATO to engage non-Article 5, nonterritorial operations. NATO CJTF headquarters are flexible because (a) they are geographically mobile (previous smaller headquarters were also mobile but not combined and joint) and because (b) they enable flexible national participation in specific missions. At the Berlin summit, June 1996, NATO declared (NATO 1996, paragraph 6) that CJTFs facilitated "NATO contingency operations" as well as "operations led by the WEU."

"playing all French cards at once." In consequence, Védrine argued, the United States was "less eager than ever to share power in an Alliance that would soon be enlarged but not reformed" (*Le Monde*, 7 June 1997)—an argument to which he added later in June the observation that "everyone knows" that NATO negotiations had not produced the result hoped for by the French president (quoted in Kessler 1999, 172). The newly elected prime minister, Lionel Jospin, also pitched in. Already in February 1996 Jospin had declared that Chirac was neglecting "national defense" (quoted in Menon 2000, 279). In June 1997 the new prime minister continued that conditions "were not ripe" for a NATO bargain and warned that the new government intended to partake in large political–strategic decisions (*Le Monde*, 29–30 June 1997). A year later this emphasis continued with Jospin's insistence on "renovating" NATO in order to promote a new "equilibrium" (1998, 23).

The political challenge for Chirac was clearly cut out. Nuclear tests and alliance politics had pushed the president to defend a Gaullist view of deterrence and nonintegration that corresponded poorly with French military reforms and doctrine. The political opposition had perceived these alliance problems and was from June 1997 on in an institutional position to make its voice heard.[28]

From Kosovo to a New Consensus

The left wing's ascendancy did not become a "boomerang" that struck at French military doctrine. Instead, a new consensus was established according to which French military forces continue to develop as envisaged in the hope that a stronger European pillar in defense will develop. As for the tight integration of doctrinal work between France and its allies, Prime Minister Jospin's strategic and defense adviser, Louis Gautier, recognized (in interview with author) that "strategic readings today are alike." However, Gautier also argued that these developments must be situated in the perspective

---

28. The opposition thus focused on alliance affairs more than on traditional issues, such as conscription, which had been a traditional source of political tension in France. Conscription was a means with which the French army could regain a direct connection to French society after Algeria. The absence of fundamental debate of this dimension in the late 1990s, as Jolyon Howorth (1998, 145) notes, was remarkable and eased the reform process. See Rynning (1999) for the argument that the main controversies arising from defense reform are attached to France's dual role in the Atlantic arena and in Europe.

of a new French consensus—"1997 and the issue of the Southern Command were a failure. We have since found a domestic compromise: France will pragmatically pursue allied cooperation, as in Kosovo, and wait for a European consensus to emerge." Why did this domestic compromise emerge instead of political controversy?

The answer is found with the Kosovo conflict in the former Yugoslavia. While conflicts between Serbs and Albanians in the Kosovo region were not novel in the late 1990s, international involvement took off in early 1998 and culminated with 79 days of NATO bombing in the spring of 1999 and with the subsequent deployment of the "Kosovo Force" (KFOR) peacekeeping force. The conflict was, naturally, not of President Chirac's making, but it was an opportune occasion for him to frame the intervention with popular values and to argue that only the new military instrument permitted their defense. In conceptual terms we are dealing with allied threat collusion that could also be used for domestic political purposes. Threat collusion refers to the identification of dangers that pertain to France and other allies and which as joint and binding statements can be invoked in the domestic political game.

The NATO heads of state were resoundingly in agreement that the conflict concerned embedded Western values. In April 1999 NATO (1999a, Paragraph 1) thus declared that "The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, for which NATO has stood since its foundation." Moreover, the new strategic concept of NATO, adopted in April 1999, makes reference to NATO commitments "exemplified in the Balkans" that reflect the goal of enhancing "peace and stability" (NATO 1999b, Paragraph 12). President Chirac stressed these same themes repeatedly in his many public interventions in France. On the first day of the 1999 bombing campaign, Chirac traced the roots of the conflict to the Serb regime's violation of human rights (Chirac 1999a), a point that was later accentuated (1999b): "we are facing a monstrous operation of ethnic purification planned and conducted with great cynicism and cruelty by the Serb regime."

Moreover, the Kosovo crisis spurred a general European awareness that current defense capabilities were insufficient for launching interventions and supporting more general EU policies, and the crisis has thus ignited novel steps in terms of establishing a comprehensive European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

Kosovo has in fact become the precursor for a new EU “overhead” goal of constructing a significant capacity for conventional force projection, that aims both to complement NATO’s capacities and to promote the European consensus for which French policy-makers are on the lookout.[29] This broader consequence has allowed President Chirac to argue that the “multipolar world” he has always worked for is now emerging and, furthermore, that “this system can exist only if the European Union becomes a real power” (1999c, 4).

Considering the values at stake, the broad Euro–Atlantic coalition in operation, and the active engagement of French soldiers, it was very difficult for the prime minister to mount criticism during this period. President Chirac voluntarily emphasized traditional French values (i.e., multipolarity, European interests, French leadership) and he also made the point on several occasions that he and the government were in agreement. Jospin chose never to contest this constraining framework but, instead, aligned himself closely with the presidential position. This alignment is politically astute as it de facto robs Chirac of steam because he can no longer claim sole patronage of new military missions and the new government is in charge of elaborating and implementing a new program law (cf. Rynning 2000). Prime Minister Jospin thus emphasized in June 1999 that “the government will pursue up until 2002 the implementation of the program law adopted in 1996 by the preceding majority” and that it will “take into account the effects of Kosovo on our military effort and also certainly correct the difficulties that appeared either at a European level or within our armed forces” (Jospin 1999).[30] One must therefore conclude that the long Kosovo crisis, beginning in 1998 and continuing into the new millennium

---

29. The main conclusions were reached at the Cologne and Helsinki EU summits, June and December 1999. The specific contents of the “overhead” goals are found in the statements of these summits (European Union 1999a, 1999b).

30 The lessons of Kosovo were outlined by the Ministry of Defense first in June 1999 with a preliminary report (Ministère de la Défense 1999b), then in January 2000 with the final conclusions (Ministère de la Défense 2000). The report notably concludes that NATO needs further reform because the United States ran significant parts of the operation outside joint control. As for the Europeans, the report calls for greater investment in intelligence, transport, and command capabilities and generally looks forward to political agreement in the ESDP process. A critical French view of the de facto operation of NATO during real crises can also be gauged in the analysis of Guillaume Parmentier (2000), who during 1995–1997 was working in the Defense Ministry with the NATO reform process.

with the KFOR deployment, has aligned political forces at the center of French politics. During the 1999 bombing campaign, several critical voices were raised, but they were located at the marginal political periphery robbed of influence (cf. Rynning 2000). In short, allied collusion permitted Chirac to strongly embrace the government, which chose to follow the political lead. Kosovo has thus spurred a political race to claim the mantle of military reform and the patronage of enhanced European cooperation. This race is intense and complex, not least because of its connections to Euro–Atlantic alliance politics, but it need not concern us here because it has effectively ceased to have implications for French military doctrine. We can thus conclude that although he exposed himself to a political boomerang effect, President Chirac benefited from the Kosovo crisis to maintain military reforms on track. Political disputes continue at the level of high politics—relating to the broad process of Europeanization—but they only rarely concern military strategy and virtually never military doctrine.

CONCLUSION

French military doctrine has experienced no less than a revolution during the 1990s, or, in the vocabulary of this study, a "first-order" change. Between 1990 and 2000, French forces have changed from focusing on territorial, nuclear deterrence to conventional force projections beyond the national territory. To be sure, forces were projected before 1990, and nuclear weapons are still found in the French force posture. However, an assessment of military thinking in terms of doctrines reveals that the approach to firepower and maneuver has changed radically during these years. The first-order change developed against the background of a major national security crisis represented by the end of the Cold War and notably also the Gulf War of 1990–1991, which revealed specific grave shortcomings in nonnuclear French capabilities. How do we generally account for the path that led from the Gulf War to the Douin doctrine of 1997 and its more specific translations?

We must, first of all, note that the two presidencies of Mitterrand and Chirac are crucial explanatory factors. Chirac's approach was a direct response to the political cleavages created under his predecessor. President Mitterrand had in the early 1980s presided over doctrinal change but generally failed to repeat his performance in the early 1990s. The French military instrument was

reformed in some respects in an effort to enable force projections but also remained tied to territorial defense components, namely nuclear forces and conscripts. In the early 1990s military doctrine was effectively caught between national ad international emphases, and attempts to bridge them could only be imperfect, of which the interventions in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the White Paper of 1994 are exemplary illustrations. Mitterrand's name is inextricably linked to the project of the European Union, which was a political response to what was no doubt a major political upheaval. One could in fact defend the doctrinal stalemate of the early 1990s by arguing that military reform necessarily had to await a clarification of the political impact of European transformations. Politics, after all, precedes doctrine. While this point merits careful consideration, we should also note the conclusions brought forth by this analysis. Mitterrand as a political player contributed to doctrinal stalemate by refusing to adjust to the considerable European support amassed by the "new" NATO and then by shaping the domestic debate on military reform by relying on established nuclear wisdom or dogmas. Mitterrand thus did not manage to use a reformed military organization as a pillar of support for his political designs but arrived instead at the conclusion that military reform was hostile to these designs.

The considerable organizational reforms undertaken below the presidential level by changing defense ministers and Chief of Staff Lanxade then played into the hands of the new president, Jacques Chirac. Chirac approached military issues with strong ideas that gave birth to a centrally organized reform process. While the organization was broad, the agenda was to a great extent defined *a priori* and was not open for lengthy negotiations that could engender a policy community. Chirac's "strategic revolution" therefore appeared as another instance of directed reform that could marginalize and outbalance dissatisfied interests. However, Chirac's reforms involved the entire military community, which was exhausted by the stalemate of the preceding years and which was in agreement that a more coherent approach was called for. The reforms of 1995–1997 therefore included all principal military interests and in fact mark the first instance of "community" driven reform.

The principal boomerang danger came from the political environment, notably from opposition parties that had not been part

of the reform process. Moreover, the parties had opportunities for criticizing the foundations of reform, because new doctrines presupposed new interpretations of nuclear deterrence, which Chirac failed to convey during the test ban controversy of 1995–1996, and a degree of allied cooperation that was not visible in 1996–1997. Moreover, Chirac almost invited this criticism as deadlocked NATO negotiations coincided with the right wing's loss in the parliamentary elections of 1997. A boomerang did not occur, however, not least because the Kosovo crisis represented a unique presidential opportunity to demonstrate the utility of the "new" military instrument while also tying the government to an allied policy that was based on broad and popular values. While Chirac found his leadership of military reforms contested, organizational work based on the 1997 Douin military doctrine continued unabated.

Literature

Documents

Assemblée nationale. 1989. *Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces d'Armées sur le projet de loi de programme (no. 733) relatif à l'équipment militaire pour les années 1990-1993*. M. Jean-Michel Boucheron, rapporteur, no. 897. Paris: imprimerie nationale.

———. 1990. "Loi de programmation no. 90-32 du 10 janvier 1990 relative à l'équipment militaire pour les années 1990-1993," *Journal Officiel: édition des lois et décrets* (12 January). Paris: imprimerie nationale.

———. 1992. *Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces d'Armées sur le projet de loi de programmation (no. 2877) relatif à l'équipment militaire et aux effectifs de la défense pour les années 1992-1994*. M. Jean-Michel Boucheron, rapporteur, no. 2935. Paris: imprimerie nationale.

———. 1994. "Loi no. 94-507 du 23 juin 1994 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 1995 à 2000," *Journal Officiel: édition des lois et décrets* (24 June). Paris: imprimerie nationale.

———. 1996a. *Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces d'Armées sur le projet de loi (no. 2766) relatif à la programmation militaire pour les années 1997-2002*. M. Jacques Boyon, rapporteur, no. 2827. Paris: imprimerie nationale.

———. 1996b. "Loi no. 96-589 du 2 juillet 1996 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 1997 à 2002," *http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/strategie*.

European Union. 1992. *Treaty on European Union*. Bruxelles: European Commission.

———. 1999a. "Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999," *http://ue.eu.int/newsroom*.

———. 1999b. "Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999," *http://ue.eu.int/newsroom*.

Ministère de la Défense. *Le budget de la défense*. Paris: SIRPA/DICOD.

———. 1982b. "Décret no. 82-138 fixant les attributions des chefs d'état-major," reprinted in Maurice Schmitt, *De Diên Biên Phu à Koweït City*, pp. 303-309. Paris: Grasset, 1992.

———. 1993a. "Arrêté: Portant organisation de l'état-major des armées," *http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/ema/arrete.htm.*

———. 1993b. *Un nouveau débat stratégique*. Paris: La Documentation Française.

———. 1994. *Livre Blanc sur la Défense*. Paris: 10/18.

———. 1995. "Directive Lanxade: Orientations pour la conception, la préparation, la planification, le commandement et l'emploi des forces françaises dans les opérations militaires fondées sur une résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU," reprinted in Thierry Tardy, *La France et la*

gestion des conflits yougoslaves (1991-1995), pp. 457-464. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999.
———. 1997. *Concept d'empoi des forces*. Paris: Sirpa.
———. 1998. *L'Armée de terre française à l'aube du XXIe siècle*. Paris: Sirpa.
———. 1999a. *Doctrine interarmées d'emploi des forces en opération*. Paris: Division Emploi, Etat-Major des Armées.
———. 1999b. *Premiers enseignements des opérations au Kosovo*. Paris: Sirpa.
———. 2000. "Les enseignements du Kosovo," *http://www.defense.gouv.fr*.
NATO. 1990. "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," *http://www.nato.int/docu.*
———. 1991. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept: Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991," *http://www.nato.int/docu.*
———. 1996. "Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996," *http://www.nato.int/docu.*
———. 1999a. "The situation in and around Kosovo: Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 12th April 1999," *http://www.nato.int.docu*.
———. 1999b. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," *http://www.nato.int.docu*.

Secondary sources

Attali, Jacques. 1995b. *Verbatim III*. Paris: Fayard.
Balladur, Édouard. 1994. "La politique de défense: essentielle et permanente," *Défense nationale* 50 (November): 11-25.
———. 1996. *Deux ans à Matignon*. Paris: Plon.
Bérégovoy, Pierre. 1992. "Intervention du Premier ministre, M. Pierre Bérégovoy, à la séance inaugurale de la 45e session de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de la défense nationale," *Politique étrangère de la France* (September): 30-35.
Boniface, Pascal. 1992. *Vive la bombe*. Paris: Edition no. 1.
———. 1994. *Contre le révisionnisme nucléaire*. Paris: Ellipses.
———. 1995. "Letter to the Editor," *Survival* 37 (2): 183-184.
———. 1997a. *Repenser la dissuasion nucléaire*. Paris: l'Aube.
———. 1997b. "La force de dissuasion nucléaire: quelle doctrine?," in Philippe Tronquoy, ed., *La France et sa défense*, pp. 59-68. Paris: La documentation Française.
Borgis, Contre-amiral Claude. 1997. "Concept d'emploi des force," *Armées d'ajourd'hui* 225 (November): 10-13.
Boucheron, Jean-Michel. 1994. "Exposé," in Pierre Lacoste, Jean-Christian Barbé, and Philippe Bonnichon, eds., *Débat: du Livre Blanc à la loi de programmation*, pp. 10-14. Paris: SIRPA.
Bozo, Frédéric. 1992. "Une doctrine nucléaire européenne: pour quoi faire et comment?," *Politique étrangère* 57 (2): 407-421.

Bureau, Jean-François. 1997. “La réforme militaire en France: une mutation identitaire,” *Politique étrangère* 62 (1): 69-82.

Cailleteau, François. 1992. “Les structures militaires à l’épreuve des faits: leçons de la guerre du Golfe,” *Revue française d’administration publique* 62 (April-June): 221-231.

Charette, Hervé de. 1995a. “Essais nucléaires -- Propos du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hervé de Charette lors du petit dejeuner avec la presse étrangère,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (June): 137-139.

———. 1995b. “Session Ministérielle du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, Intervention du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hervé de Charette,” (December 5), *http://www.france.diplomatie.fr*

Chevènement, Jean-Pierre. 1990. “La France et la sécurité de l'Europe,” *Politique étrangère* 55 (Fall): 525-532.

Chirac, Jacques. 1995. “Point de presse du Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (June): 125-129.

———. 1996. “Discours du President de la Republique, L'Ecole Militaire, Paris, 23 février 1996,” *http://www.elysee.fr*

———. 1999a. “Declaration de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur le Kosovo,” (24 March), *http://www.elysee.fr*.

———. 1999b. “Le discours de Jacques Chirac: texte intégral de l’intervention radiotélévisée sur l’évolution de la situation au Kosovo,” (April 6), *http://www.libération.fr/kosovo*.

———. 1999c. “Discours de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à l’occasion de la reception des ambassadeurs,” (August 26), *http://www.elysee.fr*.

Chirac, Jacques and John Major. 1995. “18e Sommet Franco-Britannique -- Conférence de presse conjointe du Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac, et du Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni, M. John Major,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (October): 264-268.

Cohen, Samy. 1991. “Le Président chef des armées,” *Pouvoirs* 58 (June): 33-40.

———. 1994a. *La défaite des généraux: Le pouvoir politique et l'armée sous la Ve République*. Paris: Fayard.

———, ed. 1998. *Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

Cogan, Charles G. 1994. *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Colombani, Jean-Marie. 1998. *Le Résident de la République*. Paris: Stock.

Coudurier, Hubert. 1998. *Le Monde selon Chirac: Les coulisses de la diplomatie française*. Paris: Calmann Lévy.

David, Dominique. 1991. “Programmation militaire: Des vrais enjeux,” *Etudes* (October): 341-350.

———. 1994. “France: L'Illusion de la Puissance,” in Koninman and Caracciolo, eds., *Les Fractures de l'Occident*, pp. 73-80. Paris: La Découverte.

Debouzy, Olivier. 1994. “Le musée de la dissuasion,” *Libération* (13 May).

Farrell, Theo. 1998. “Culture and Military Power,” *Review of International Studies* 24 (X): 405-414.

Fleury, Jean. 1990. "Stratégie aérienne et armée de l'air," *Défense nationale* 46 (April): 9-23.
———. 1997. *Faire Face: Mémoires d'un chef d'état-major de l'Armée de l'air*. Paris: Jean Picollec.
Freedman, Lawrence. 1994-95. "Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons," *Survival* 36 (4): 35-52.
———. 1998. "The Revolution in Strategic Affairs," *Adelphi Paper* 318.
Fricaud-Chagnaud, General Georges. 1996. "Dissuasion concertée: vers un partenariat stratégique," *Relations internationales et stratégiques* 21 (Spring): 88-92.
Fricaud-Chagnaud, Georges, and Jean-Jacques Patry. 1994. *Mourir pour le roi de Prusse? Choix politiques et défense de la France*. Paris: Publisud.
Gallois, Pierre. 1996. "Réflexions sur l'évolution de la stratégie mondiale," *Revue de sciences morales et politiques* 151 (3): 355-369.
Gautier, Louis. 1999. *Mitterrand et son armée, 1990-1995*. Paris: Grasset.
Géré, François. 1997. "France: La Rupture," *Stratégique* 19 (1): 179-201.
Gloannec, Anne-Marie le. 1997. "Europe by Other Means?," *International Affairs* 73 (1): 83-98.
Gorce, Paul-Marie de la. 1996. "Retour Honteux de la France dans l'OTAN," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (January).
Gordon, Philip. 1998. *The United States and the European Security and Defense Identity in the New NATO*. Paris: IFRI.
Grant, Robert P. 1996. "France's New Relationship with NATO," *Survival* 38 (1): 58-80.
Gregory, Shaun. 2000. French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century. London: Macmillan.
Grouard, Serge, and Patrice van Ackere. 1992. "Pour une dissuasion européenne," *Libération* (19 March).
Guisnel, Jean. 1990. *Les Généraux: Enquête sur le pouvoir militaire en France*. Paris: Éditions la Découverte.
Heisbourg, François. 1991. "Défense française: La quadrature du cercle," *Politique Internationale* 53 (Fall): 257-274.
———. 1997. "Une politique de défense nouvelle: L'évolution doctrinale et les réformes en cours," in Philippe Tronquoy, ed., *La France et sa défense*, pp. 23-29. Paris: La documentation Française.
Howorth, Jolyon. 1992a. "François Mitterrand and the "Domaine Réservé": From Cohabitation to the Gulf War," *French Politics and Society* 10 (1): 43-58.
———. 1997. "France," in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, eds., *The European Union and National Defence Polic*, pp. 23-48*y*. London: Routledge.
———. 1998. "French Defense Reforms: National Tactics for a European Strategy," in *Brassey's Defence Yearbook*, pp. 130-151. London: Brassey's.
Jospin, Lionel. 1998. "Discours du Premier Ministre à l'Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, Jeudi 3 septembre 1998." Paris: Service de presse du Premier Ministre.

———. 1999. “Déclaration du Gouvernement et débat sur la situation au Kosovo,” (June 8), *http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr*.

Juppé, Alain. 1995. “Allocution du Premier ministre, M. Alain Juppé, devant l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (September): 15-21.

———. 1996. “Une défense inscrite dans une perspective européenne et internationale,” *Défense nationale* 52 (11): 3-10.

Lacoste, Pierre, Jean-Christian Barbé, and Philippe Bonnichon. 1994. *Débat: du Livre Blanc à la Loi de Programmation*. Paris: Sirpa.

Lanata, General. 1993. “Faire face, l'ère des nouveaux défis,” *Défense nationale* 49 (August-September): 9-18.

Mallet, Jean-Claude. 1996. “Stratégie et modèle d'armée 2015,” *Défense nationale* 52 (July): 21-32.

———. 1997. “L'évolution du concept depuis le *Livre Blanc* de 1994,” *Défense nationale* 53 (July): 7-13.

Masson, Philippe. 1999. *Histoire de l’armée française: de 1914 à nos jours*. Paris: Perrin.

Menon, Anand. 2000. *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-1997: The Politics of Ambivalence*. London: Macmillan.

Mercier, General Philippe. 1998. “L’armée de Terre aujourd’hui,” *Armées d’aujourd’hui* 234 (October): 10-13.

Millon, Charles. 1995. “Essais nucléaires -- Communiqué du ministre de la Défense, M. Charles Millon,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (September): 15.

Mitterrand, François. 1991. “Allocution prononcée par M. le Président de la République à l'occasion de la clôture du forum de l'école de guerre “Quelle sécurité en Europe à l'aube du XXIe siècle,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (April): 118-123.

———. 1992a. “Interview accordée par le Président de la Republique à TF1, Antenne 2, Europe 1, France Inter et RTL,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (April): 42-49.

———. 1992b. “Interview accordée par M. le Président de la République à l'occasion du 14 juillet à TF1, Antenne 2 et FR3,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (July): 41-47.

———. 1994. “Conférence de presse,” *Politique étrangère de la France* (May 5).

———. 1995b. “Conseil de l'Europe, Vienne, 8 octobre 1993,” in François Mitterrand, *Onze discours sur l'Europe, 1982-1995*, pp. 133-141. Paris: EHESS.

———. 1996. *De l’Allemagne, de la France*. Paris: Odile Jacob.

Moïsi, Dominique. 1990. “From France, Blurred Signals of Ambiguous Policy,” *International Herald Tribune* (December 12).

Morel, Benoit. 1993. “French Nuclear Policy In A Changing World,” *Ridgway Viewpoints* no. 93-94. Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh.

———. 1994. “French Nuclear Weapons and the New World Order,” in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., *Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China*, pp. 105-118. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Newhouse, John. 1997. *Europe Adrift*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Orsini, Admiral Francis. 1992. “L'avenir de la dissuasion,” *Relations internationales et stratégiques* 17 (Summer): 101-106.
Parmentier, Guillaume. 2000. “Après le Kosovo: pour un nouveau contrat transatlantique,” *Politique étrangère* 65 (1): 9-32.
Quesnot, General Christian. 1998. “Temoignage,” in Samy Cohen, ed., *Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide*, pp. 185-186. Paris: PUF.
Quilès, Paul. 1996. “Défense européenne et OTAN: la dérive,” *Le Monde* (11 June).
Robin, Gabriel. 1996. “To the Editor,” *Survival* 38 (2): 188-189.
Roquefeuil, Henry de. 1993. “Les composantes air de la dissuasion nucléaire aujourd'hui et demain,” *Défense nationale* 49 (August-September): 31-43.
Rose, François de. 1990. “La dissuasion du fort au faible,” *Le Monde* (November 9).
———. 1991. “Esclaves de l'independence,” *Le Monde* (June 6).
———. 1992. “Inutile psychodrame,” *Le Monde* (July 10).
Rupnik, Jacques. 1998. “La France de Mitterrand et les pays de l'Europe du Centre-Est,” in Samy Cohen, ed., *Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide,* pp. 189-216. Paris: PUF.
Rynning, Sten. 1999. “French Defense Reforms and European Security: Tensions and Intersections,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 4 (1): 99-119.
———. 2000. “On Track or Derailed? French Defense Reforms after Kosovo,” *European Security* 9 (2): 61-80.
Schmitt, Général Maurice. 1992. *De Diên Bien Phu à Koweït City*. Bernard Grasset: Paris.
———. 1993. “Armée de métier ou armée mixte?,” *Défense nationale* 49 (4): 9-18.
Schwartzbrod, Alexandra. 1995. *Le Président qui n'aimait pas la guerre. Dans les coulisses du pouvoir militaire, 1981-1995*. Paris: Plon.
Séguin, Philippe. 1991. “La nouvelle armée française,” *Le Monde* (June 6).
Soutou, Georges. 1996. *L'alliance incertaine: Les rapport politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996*. Paris: Fayard.
Tardy, Thierry. 1999. *La France et la gestion des conflits yougoslaves: Enjeux et leçons d’une opération de maintien de la paix de l’ONU*. Bruxelles: Bruylant.
Tertrais, Bruno. 1998. “The French Nuclear Deterrent after the Cold War,” *RAND Paper* P-8012. Santa Monica: RAND.
Thatcher, Margaret. 1993. *The Downing Street Years*. London: HarperCollins.
Tiersky, Ronald. 1992. “France in the New Europe,” *Foreign Affairs* 71 (2): 131-146.
———. 1997. “French Gamesmanship and NATO's Future: The Context of “AFSOUTH”,” *French Politics and Society* 15 (2): 49-56.
Touraine, Marisol. 1993a. “La représentation de l'adversaire dans la politique extérieure française depuis 1981,” *Revue française de science politique* 43 (5): 807-822.
———. 1993b. “En finir avec le dogme nucléaire,” *Libération* (June 23).

Valentin, François. 1995. *Regards sur la politique de défense da la France: de 1958 à nos jours*. Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense.

Védrine, Hubert. 1996. *Les Mondes de François Mitterrand. A l'Élysée 1981-1995*. Paris: Fayard.

———. 1997. "France: le piano ou le tabouret?," *Le Débat* 95 (May-August): 165-182.

Yost, David. 1991. "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," *French Politics & Society* 9 (3-4): 141-158.

———. 1994. "France," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*, pp. 233-277. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. 1994-1995. "Nuclear Debates in France," *Survival* 36 (4): 113-139.

———. 1995a. "Nuclear Weapons Issues in France," in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., *Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China*, pp. 18-104. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

———. 1995b. "Letter to the Editor," *Survival* 37 (2): 184-186.