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**THE RUSSIAN PERCEPTION OF THE AMERICAN
"WAR ON TERROR"**

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Introduction.

Social scientists knew a lot about Soviet and American perceptions – and misperceptions – of one another. Faulty perceptions, especially those of political elite in both countries, considered by various scholars as responsible for the deterioration of East-West relations after the World War II and the nuclear arms race¹. Less attention has been given to the study of perceptions of former adversaries after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile in post-communist epoch Russian and American perceptions and misperceptions of former enemy's intentions remain factors that form foreign and security policies to a certain extent.

In this paper we deal with the Russian perception of the American "war against terror" started after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon. The analysis is based on data of opinion surveys, official documents and messages conveyed to the public by the national electronic and printed media.

We show how the Russian perception of the American "war on terror" has changed during the first year of this war - from September 11th 2001 to September 11th 2002. The time frame of our analysis is very important, because it seems to us that the second year of the 'global war against terrorism' may differ dramatically from the first one.

It is worth remembering, in this connection, that the immediate mass reaction on any human tragedy is always a mix of emotions with more or less rational interpretation of what has really happened. The reaction on the terrorist attack on the USA was not exclusion. Any discussion of the Russian perception of the American "war on terror" should proceed from the assumption that in various evaluations, registered in polls, or declarations presented to the public the emotional and analytical ingredients are twisted together. Sentiments do matter and emotional details cannot be excluded from consideration if one explore the perceptions of events and policy actions by masses and the elite. But people do not rely only on emotions, president's declarations and media information making own assessments and judgements concerning foreign events, because historical memory and attitudes implanted in brains long time ago also influence perceptions and misperceptions.

It makes more and more sense, the farther in time we are from 9/11, to separate sentiments and popular explanations of what had happened and why it had happened, from the public opinion towards subsequent policy actions based on rational calculations and national interest. Conceptions of interests, if they are to be of any value, ought to at least be durable. Therefore such questions as why had Russia joined the anti-terror coalition and why does Russia disagree with the US proposal of the pre-emptive strike on Iraq lie in the framework of our analysis.

In our view, the proper understanding of the Russian reaction on 9/11 has global significance – it is central to step-by-step construction of a secure international system, in which the Russian Federation wishes to play an important role. It is the point that connects the "war against terror" with the Chechen war and NATO enlargement eastward as well as the whole set of global security, disarmament and arms reduction problems with the perception of identifiable threats, risks and dangers. The Russian perception of the American war on terror is linked with popular attitudes toward President Putin's foreign policy and a change of attitudes toward the USA occurred in the post-Cold war period.

The special attention is made on continuity of popular attitudes toward former adversaries both in Russia and America, on Russophobia and anti-Americanism and NATO-phobia. The change of attitudes is not the simple substitution of one static state for another, but an enduring process. Therefore history of the US-Russia post-Cold war relations are taken in account either. The paper shows how deeply such events as the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM treaty affected the Russian public's basic postures towards security and foreign policy affairs.

There is a view spread among the part of western experts on Russia that the Russian leadership is absolutely indifferent to domestic public opinion toward its foreign policy. It is just a myth, despite the fact that Russia is quasi-democracy. The variety and dynamics of attitudes toward foreign and security policy is carefully monitored by the authorities, because external affairs and a domestic political discourse are interconnected. Eventually, the approval or disapproval of foreign policy impacts voter's behavior to a certain extent and cannot be ignored by the president.

Because national media plays an important role in framing individual's attitudes toward foreign policy, the following comment seems to be necessary:

- Currently the presidential administration has a definite intention to enlarge the state influence on a media market in order to diminish the influence of oligarchs, who are still the actual owners of most of nation-wide newspapers and a set of TV channels. From sociological point of view there is nothing new in such policy: those who control the media control the brainwashing machine. The overwhelming majority of Russia's residents watch television, listen to radio and read newspapers every day or at least several times a week with the aim of finding out news about the political and economic life of their country and international events. It means those who own media resources have an effective instrument of manipulation of public opinion.
- The idea that the electronic media constitute a most important instrument for shaping public opinion is indisputable. Today the federal powers actually control the activity of main national television channels, and, perhaps, the electronic media at large, directly or indirectly, using licensing procedures. To reassert state control over media, the Kremlin went as far as to the crackdown on the national television companies exposed hostile criticism of state politics. The last year noisy scandal linked with NTV and TV-6, the country's independent private companies, could be mentioned as the example. Without doubts, the scandal that looked at the first glance a part of non-stop process of re-sharing of property was politically motivated. It was an action in a framework of Putin's course of consolidating information resources preparing for the next elections.
- Attitudes toward foreign policy and perceptions of states as friends or enemies are correlated with ideological inclinations of individuals and the political face of editions they prefer to read. The political polarization of the printed press is a factor responsible for a variety of attitudes towards the American war on terror either. The total circulation rate of nation-wide and regional newspapers and magazines is relatively small. Therefore the printed media's impact on the general public is

lesser than that of national television. However the influence of mainstream newspapers on the political and business elite's views should not be underestimated. The communist, leftist and national-patriotic editions also have their own audience despite the limited size of circulation rate of the left printed press.

The structure of this paper is as follows. The first section describes the immediate reaction of the Russian leadership, political elite, media and the public at large on the terrorist attack against the USA on September 11, 2001. Then, in the second section, we turn to the issue of interests and the Russian perception of the new US grand strategy. The third section focuses on how the public opinion toward the US and Putin's policy of reconciliation with the West was changing during the first year after 9/11. The fourth section compares the American and Russian public opinion long trends with the special emphasis on factors that shaped attitudes and policy developments after the collapse of the USSR. In the fifth section the popular perception of external threats and NATO is discussed. The paper ends with a brief conclusion.

The emotion does matter.

Let us begin by considering how Russians reacted on the terrorist attack against the USA on September 11, 2001.

Russia's president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to express his condolences to the American people over that tragedy², which had befallen the residents of New York, Washington and the whole American people. If one agree that the presidential rhetoric plays an important role in forming popular attitudes toward foreign policy, than Russia's President Putin's statement and telegram to the US President, made on September 11, 2001, and other declarations about the war on terror are helpful documents for proper understanding trends in the Russian public opinion (Box 1, 2).

Box 1

Unofficial translation from Russian

The Full Text of President Vladimir Putin's Telegram of Condolence to US President George Bush

"I am deeply shocked by reports of the tragic events that have occurred today on the territory of the USA. The series of barbaric terrorist acts, directed against innocent people, has evoked our anger and indignation.

Please convey our most sincere condolences to the relatives of the victims of this tragedy, as well as to all those injured, the whole American people. We well understand your grief and pain. The Russians have themselves experienced the horror of terror.

There is no doubt that such inhuman actions cannot be left unpunished. The whole international community must rally in the fight against terrorism."

The Kremlin, Moscow, September 11, 2001

According to Putin, Russia proceeds from the assumption that the challenge of international terrorism has been thrown down not only to the Americans, but also to all of humanity. Therefore Russia's support for Americans is rooted in what Moscow perceives as a common cause: the fight against Islamic radicalism.

It should be noted also that the theme of a fight against terrorism dominates in Mr. Putin's rhetoric. Perhaps, it is the only theme, with which the former Head of the Russian Federal Security

Service feels really comfortable. Since the autumn of 1999 the Kremlin portrayed the its' own second war in Chechnya as a struggle against international terrorists, Islamic fanatics and foreign mercenaries, responsible for the instability on Russia's southern borders. Moscow also emphasized the alleged links between Osama bin Laden's "Al Qaeda" and Chechen rebels³. It had been proofed later when the Russian citizens were captured by the US troops in Afghanistan as members of Taliban's military formations.

Box 2.

Unofficial translation.

Statement by President Putin of Russia on the Terrorist Acts in the US, Moscow, September 11, 2001

The United States today faced an unprecedented act of aggression on the part of international terrorism.

First of all, I express sincere and profound condolences to all the victims and the families of the dead.

The event that occurred in the US today goes beyond national borders. It is a brazen challenge to the whole humanity, at least to civilized humanity. And what happened today is added proof of the relevance of the Russian proposal to pool the efforts of the international community in the struggle against terrorism, that plague of the 21st century.

Russia knows at first hand what terrorism is. So, we understand as well as anyone the feelings of the American people. Addressing the people of the United States on behalf of Russia I would like to say that we are with you, we entirely and fully share and experience your pain. We support you.

The lower chamber of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, began its autumn session of the year of 2001 with a minute's silence in memory of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th⁴. The tragic events of September 11 had divided the Duma into several camps with very different views on whether or not Russia should participate in the prospective US retaliatory strikes. The revealed division of the State Duma was pre-determined by the ideological cleavage of the deputies' corps, which is strongly correlated with the party programmes and individual's attitudes toward the USA, NATO and the West as a whole. As far as the variety of immediate reactions of the political elite on the American tragedy is concerned, the following details are relevant.

During the parliamentary debates the leader of democratic and pro western Yabloko party Grigory Yavlinsky insisted that the

Russian leadership should do everything it can to co-operate with the United States in joint actions against the international terrorists. Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Union of Right Forces (SPS-Zoyus Prvich Sil), the party with an ample pro-western orientation, also stood for closest cooperation with the U.S. and its allies. The pro-president centrist factions followed the official position of the Kremlin blaming international terrorism and calling for a cautious approach in the case of co-operation with the USA in the military action in Afghanistan.

While the right-wing politicians considered the September 11th as the historic chance for Russia to choose the course of ultimate reconciliation with the West and join the US "war on terror", Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov categorically objected to any such proposals. He said, "Russia should not get implicated in that war" and reminded of the Soviet Union's disastrous invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing 10 year war.

The leaders of nationalist ultra-radical Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his deputy Alexei Mitrofanov shared a similar view, but, unsurprisingly, their statements were more radical. Mitrofanov, for instance, went on to say that "instead of sympathizing with the Americans, Russia should extend necessary assistance to the Taliban, who are now facing a humanitarian disaster". Zhirinovskiy called for Russia to side with the Islamic world: "The (United) States is waiting for Moscow's response to the recent events in the USA. If Moscow stands up to defend the Muslim countries, we will win. Russia will once again become a world superpower and will become the other centre of the world." It should be noted that a few days later Mr. Zhirinovskiy had radically changed his mind, and currently his party publicly supports the official Kremlin line, while the Communists and their allies stick with their initial stand as well as the right-wing parties do.

The heated parliamentary debates resulted in consensus in favor of Russia's not participating in the direct military actions, but providing intelligence information and other aid to the US-led anti-terrorist multinational coalition. The resolution was passed to give the president moral and political support, but not unfettered power to bring the nation to a new war.

As to the media coverage of the event, the following facts should be noted. All four national TV channels (ORT - Russian Public Television, the first channel; RTR - Russian Television and Radio, the second channel; NTV - Independent Television, the fourth channel; TV6 -Sixth Channel) kept viewers informed of unfolding events. These Moscow-based companies and some regional companies provided non-stop coverage of the events in the US, picking up CNN, ___ and EuroNews, simultaneously translated, with commentaries by the Russian anchors. They cancelled their scheduled programs and even all advertising (going further than America was willing or could afford to go), feeling that promotional jingles were inappropriate in time of tragedy. The bulk of Russians watched President Putin's television address devoted to that event. "Spontaneous grief for the attack victims revived an old-style Russian compassion long unseen since post-Communist capitalization", wrote Nina Khrushcheva⁵ in her comment on the Russian media coverage of September 11th, and we have to agree with her conclusion.

Concerning the printed media reaction, it chased the ideological inclination of the edition. "Armageddon Now," proclaimed *Kommersant Daily*, the right-wing newspaper, describing a "market collapse" and "currency chaos." The popular tabloid *Komsomolskaya Pravda* wrote: "This is not just a terrorist attack—this is a third world war started by terrorists." Centrist, state-oriented *Izvestia* declared a new political epoch, with "no superpower left" in "a war between civilizations." Only the anti-Western nationalistic *Zavtra* gloated, "Superpower Humiliated: The United States Has Been Taught a Bitter Lesson."

Regarding the immediate reaction of the general public, the author as a witness must say that everyone who saw on TV screens what had happened in New York City and Washington D.C. was shocked. Polls' data support this observation; for a lack of room we present only a single survey's result.

Several days after the terrorist attacks, Russians were asked the following open-ended question: "IF YOU HAVE HEARD ABOUT THE TERRORIST ACTS IN THE USA, PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT YOU FELT WHEN YOU HEARD ABOUT THE TRAGEDY." The overwhelming majority of them (77%) said they felt pity and sympathy for the American people, as well as fear, horror, shock, indignation, anger, weakness, helplessness and inconsolableness. 14% of respondents were unable to answer this question. And only

a tiny minority - 8% of those surveyed - was indifferent or even rejoiced ("everything is quite, there are no emotions"; "I don't care"; "the Americans have gotten on everyone"; "it was the revenge they deserved"; "I rejoiced at their putting the squeeze on them")⁶.

Media commentators had drawn attention to the fact that immediately after the terrorist attack Russians were laying flowers not only at the US embassy, but also in the places in Moscow where two years ago terrorists exploded the residential buildings, killing innocent people⁷. This was, of course, an accidental coincidence, but it was symbolic.

In autumn 1999 after the bomb blasts in Russian cities the Russian leadership called to combine the efforts of the international community in the fight against international terrorism. But the western leaders and parliamentarians were deaf and continued to criticize the Russian authority for cruelties in Chechnya. The reason was very simple: the West considered the Chechen war as primarily Russia's internal affair, not a threat to the global stability.

Russians said, Americans had waked up only on September 11th, because terrorist hurt them in a heart, they did not feel our pain. Why two years ago had not the American leader responded to the Moscow tragedy in the same manner as the Russian president had done in the case of the American tragedy? It was a rhetoric question, of course.

Box 3.

MUSCOVITES POLLED FOLLOWING TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST USA.

Who do you think should be blamed for this violent act of terrorism?	Sept. 2001	Sept 2002
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Islamic extremists - 49.8% • Religious extremist groups (Sects, etc.) - 7.6% • Secret services of other nations - 7.0% • US secret service - 3.5% • Radical anti-globalization groups - 5.4% • Other - 2.9% • No opinion - 23.8% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Islamic extremists - 46.7% • Religious extremist groups (Sects, etc.) - 7.7% • Secret services of other nations - 4.2% • US secret service - 6.4% • Bin Laden -22.3% • Other - 4.9% • No opinion - 8.5.8%

Source: the ROMIR telephone survey of the population of Moscow aged 18+ on the representative sample. Number of interviewed is 500 people.

Opinions of residents of Moscow registered by the ROMIR polling agency on a day after the event showed that most Muscovites blamed Islamic terrorists for that act of terror and foresaw the angry American reaction on the terrorist attack. A year after this set of opinions has not changed, yet bin Laden is named separately (Box 3)⁸.

This brings us to popular perceptions of causes of 9/11. According to the author's personal observations, in mid-September 2001 many people in Russia considered what had happened in the USA to be the direct consequence of the 'double standard policy' carried out by the American government in the previous years when Islamic militants were often called "freedom-fighters" not terrorists. There is a saying, one that most people would probably agree with: "some days you feed the snake ... and some days the snake bite you". Russians said, 'because the US backed up the Taliban movement during the years of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and supported Albanian guerillas (KLA) in Kosovo, they got the September 11". And as the poll showed, the majority of the population agreed that the terrorist attack on the USA might be named an indirect outcome of the US imperial policy (Table 1).

Table 1. The Russian views on the terrorist attack on the USA, September 2001.

Question: "Some people name the terrorist attack on America as the payment for the USA policy toward other countries. Are you inclined to agree or to not agree with this statement?"	%
I am inclined to agree	63
I am inclined to not agree.	22
Hesitated to answer	15

Source: Data of the Public Opinion Foundation national survey carried out September 22 - 23 2001

Immediately after the September tragedy some anti-western nationalists had regarded the attack on the American cities as a certain kind of revenge for bombardments of Serbia in 1999. But the bulk of Russians did not support this particular view.

According to the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nation-wide survey conducted on September 15, 2001, almost three quarters of Russians (72%) answered negatively on the question "SOME PEOPLE DEMONSTRATED SATISFACTION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD GOTTEN THE PUNISHMENT IT RATHER DESERVED. DID YOU FEEL THIS WAY, AND IF SO, WAS THE FEELING STRONG OR WEAK?" Only one in each fifth polled gave a positive answer. (7% of those surveyed said their

satisfaction was very strong, and 15% said their satisfaction was weak; no surprise, most of those "satisfied" were Zuganov's supporters - 36%).

In October 2001 and August 2002 the Russian Center for Public Opinion (VCIOM) asked Russians concerning 9/11: "DO YOU AGREE THAT IT SERVES AMERICANS RIGHTLY? THAT NOW AT OWN EXPERIENCE THEY HAVE LEARNED HOW PEOPLE FELT UNDER BOMBARDMENTS IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, IN IRAQ AND YUGOSLAVIA?" The answers were presented to readers of the web-newspaper "Gazeta.Ru" under the notable heading "Russians are not sorry about 9/11" in the issue released on September 11th, 2002⁹. The article pointed out that nowadays, one year after 9/11, the general perception of the event has not changed. In August 2002, 52% of respondents answered on that question affirmatively, 42% disagree, 6% hesitated to answer, while a year ago, in October 2001, 50% respondents agreed and 43% disagreed. On this ground the newspaper's observer came to a conclusion that one out of two Russians think there is an American fault in the September 11th events.

In our view, the VCIOM poll's question was formulated incorrectly. It had two very different parts. Respondent may agree with the second part of this question, but disagree with the first one. While the first part referred to the perception of the terrorist attack as a fair punishment for the past US actions, the second part simply implied consent with the proposed statement. It was not directly asserted, but it seems to be implied.

Moreover, in our view, it was unethical to question people in streets about the feeling of satisfaction and fair punishment of Americans for sins of the US foreign policy in a face of deaths of thousands of innocent people in New York and Washington. It was politically incorrect. We doubt that above-described questions were specially designed to proof that Russians hate Americans, that the Russian people are heartless cool-blooded monsters. Nonetheless, the heading of the article in the "Gazeta.Ru" disorient readers.

We are absolutely positive, most Russians do have a feeling of compassion to Americans. But anyone, who watched the Russian television reports from the US in September-October 2001 or read Russian newspapers and magazines, might well had concluded that, expressing a grief for innocent people killed, Russians

emphasized the need to look deeper on the roots of events. They saw the roots of 9/11 in a hatred of American's imperial behavior and arrogant display of power and wealth widely spread among the poor nations. It was a reasonable point of view - to understand the nature of the new American war on terror, we need to look at its origins.

Russians coupled their sympathy to victims with expressions of concern over how the United States would retaliate and doubt the U.S. military in Afghanistan could find the right culprit and that no other innocent victims would die. They also rise up questions: What would be consequences, for Russia and the rest of the world, of the way Americans dealt with this new threat, their power and interests? What difference, if any, did it all make?

The mid-October 2001 survey reported a split of nation on the issue of the US bombardments of Afghanistan (Table 2). About one year after 9/11, the cleavage of the Russian society on this issue remains, but the number of supporters of the US action in Afghanistan has significantly decreased. The results of the FOM poll carried out on August 31, 2002 showed that twenty-nine percent approved and 45% disapproved of the US military operation in Afghanistan¹⁰. According to another recent poll, about two thirds of Russians are sure that there are hidden goals of the US campaign in Afghanistan beyond the announced objectives of the "war on terror"¹¹.

Table 2. The Russian public opinion about the US bombardment of Afghanistan, October 2001.

Question: "Some people say, that USA are doing the right thing dropping bombs on Afghanistan. Others say, that America is acting incorrectly. With what point of view do you agree – with the first or with the second one?"	%
With the first point of view	40
With the second point of view	42
No answer	18

Source: Data of Public Opinion Foundation national survey carried out on October 13-14, 2001.

Soon after the terrorist attack on the USA, many western politicians and reporters said the *world is not the same as before and a new era has began*. Did Russians also feel that the world

had dramatically changed since Sept. 11? It's difficult to give a straight affirmative answer—and perhaps, it's most impossible.

As the October 2001 poll showed, Russians had two very different opinions on this issue: 42% disagreed with the statement that the world is not the same after the September 11th, while 39% believed a new era had already began¹².

Certainly, the reported cleavage of public opinion might be interpreted as an illustration of how the public at large perceived the meaning of that event. But this may be a misleading interpretation. The positive answers on aforementioned question reflect the media impact on mass consciousness to a large extent.

The following data are also relevant to the case. There is an opinion that the acts of terror that shocked the entire world are perceived as primarily the American internal affair. But this point of view is not very popular in Russia: in August 2002 one out of four respondents shared this opinion. Yet the number of people with such view has increased during the first year of the "war on terror" (26% against 14% in October 2001), the majority of plain Russians are convinced that those acts refer to the entire mankind (70% in August 2002 and 81% in October 2001)¹³.

Everyone agrees that internally the USA has changed dramatically after 9/11. But it is not true for Russia. Personally the author doubts very much whether ordinary people living in Russia today are much more frightened or more worried about the international terror, going about their daily lives, than they were before the September 11 tragedy in America. Their own country does not become a more safety place after the launch of the American war on terror. It is the country, where policemen are used to false signals about bombs deployed in schools, train terminals and the apartment buildings. It is the country, where the non-stop anti-terrorists operation in the rebellious republic of Chechnya brings a dozen of casualties a week, and where killings of businessmen and politicians are not exclusion of rules but a way of doing business, etc.

Muscovites did not position the American tragedy on the top of the list of most important events of the year of 2001. The successive Putin's visit to the USA was also reminded only by a small number of people¹⁴. No surprise. because. according to the author's

research experience, plain people do not worry much about foreign events being preoccupied with their own business and domestic affairs.

To repeat, right after the terrorist attack on the United States, many voiced the opinion that this event changed the world and a new era had made a start. However, by late August 2002 in Russia the proportion of those who disagree with this view has grown up to 51% against 42% in 2001. The number of those still thinking the September 11 events marked the beginning of a new era has declined by 1.5 times - 39% against 26% (data in % of all those surveyed). These figures support the above-presented interpretation of the results of the October 2001 poll¹⁵.

September 11th emotionally shocked Russians much the same degree as it did other nations. Emotions did matter immediately after 9/11, but their influence had not lasted long time. By October 2001 the perception of September 11 was not influenced by emotions in the same manner as it was in a day after the tragedy. The initial euphoria of warmer relations with the United States appeared to have cooled somewhat by the end of the year, after the Bush-Putin summit in the USA in mid-November 2001. Foreseeing and precaution replaced sentiments. One year after the start of the American "war on terror" President Putin of Russia faces the dilemma whether to stay or to quit the US-led anti-terror coalition if the US unleash the war against Iraq. This brings us to the issue of interests.

After 9/11: solidarity vs. competing interests.

If one defines the most vital American interest as that of eliminating the Islamic terrorist threat - as President George W. Bush did define the aim of the war against terror - then the Russian Federation key interest matches the American one.

It is well-known fact, however, that the gap between what nations seek to do or declare to achieve and what they wind up doing is often as wide as for individuals. That fact alone ought to make people suspicious of what lie behind the initial intentions and declared goals. One can, through, raise the set of questions: What does a "global war against terror" mean? War against whom. and

for how long? Does the United States fight the *real* threat to *global stability*? Or is the scale of a danger of Islamic terrorism to the world exaggerated because the US is acting primarily in self-defense? And is "a war" a right name for the American response to the September 11, 2001? Do Americans in this war act in such a way as to improve (or preserve, at least) rather than degrade the quality of international environment within which they operate? What will be the next target of the US attack after Afghanistan? Why should the United States to be a one-nation tribunal of "regime change" wherever it detected "evil spinning on an axis"? And what are the other United States interests beyond the words about the war on terror? Is American foreign policy a hostage to oil? What might be long-term consequences of the appearances of the US troops near the south and southeastern borders of the Russian Federation look like?

We have no room to discuss all these questions and a range of alternative answers in this paper. There is no way to prove that the world will be better or worse off because the United States launched the war on terror. The future is, of course, unknowable, and will remain so until it gets around to becoming the present and the past. But threats to global stability and the US security will remain after the end of "Bush's war on terror", to be sure. They always will, as long as there are *interests*. And it is likely that the Russian and American national interests will not coincide in the coming future as it had happened at the very beginning of the US "war on terror", in the military campaign in Afghanistan.

Russia provided tanks and fuel, arms and food aid to the Northern Alliance anti-Taliban forces. Russian military cooperation with the Northern Alliance had made it much easier to isolate Al Qaeda and defeat the Taliban troops on the ground and ultimately to establish the pro-western regime in Kabul. In winter 2001/2002 Russians helped the new Afghan authorities to cope with specialized tasks such as mineclearing, repairing of the mountain passes and tunnels, etc. The medical hospital was brought to Kabul as Russia's gift to the Afghan people. But Russian troops did not participate in the air and ground operations, and Russia also has no plans to participate in the postwar international peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. There is a strong opposition to any involvement of the Russian military contingent in any operations in this country among the army generals and the public at large — which is not surprising, one may say, given Russia's sorry experience in its 1979–89 Afghan war.

Taliban and the certain circles in Saudi Arabia supported the terrorist groupings and the radical Islamic opposition to the local authorities in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that undermined the stability in the entire Central Asia region¹⁶. The break down of the unfriendly or even hostile Taliban regime was in the interest of the Central Asian states, first of all, and, of course, Russia.

But after the military victory over Taliban and the regime change the perspectives of peace and stability in Afghanistan are still vague. The leaders of Al Qaeda are not captured so far. The flow of drugs through the Afghan-Tajikistan border, where the Russian border guards backed by the Russian 203rd division are stationed, has even increased in 2002. The new Afghan central government is powerless and dependent on the US-led coalition economic aid and the peacekeeping forces. The US bodyguards, not locals, protect the new national leader, Mr. Karsai, and his ministers. The contradictions among the Afghan tribe leaders have not disappeared, therefore the internal situation is unstable, and if fighting between regional warlords happens, the puppet transitional government might collapse.

Russia's political support eased U.S. efforts to build international coalitions against terrorism to invade into Afghanistan. Vladimir Putin as a pragmatic man clearly understood that he could not stop other CIS states to join the US-led coalition. In the weeks after Sept. 11, four of the five governments in the Central Asian region offered military facilities to the United States. All five republics - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - welcomed the U.S. deployment. And now the American soldiers together with troops of other western allies are stationed in Russia's Central Asia backyard. In the 11th year of their independence, former republics of the Soviet Union had become military partners of the United States.

General Tommy Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for Afghanistan, has affirmed in August 2002 that U.S. soldiers would be in Afghanistan for "a long, long time." Describing the sort of commitment Afghanistan will require, Franks mentioned South Korea, where U.S. troops have been based for more than half a century. And, if one goes after the general's logic, he may easily reach a conclusion that the US troops in Central Asia may be also stationed for years, because, the US military may say, the effort to stabilize Afghanistan will depend on them.

The situation in the region really has changed after September 11, but what would be long-term consequences of all this changes? Nobody knows the definite answer. The Central Asian states are listed among 'no-freedom nations' by international human rights organizations such as Freedom House. The American money that came together with the troops in the Central Asian states is reinforcing the ruling regimes that are far from democratic standards. The contradiction between the declared American commitment to democracy and promoting democracy across the world¹⁷ and the real action is obvious here like in all previous cases of the US cooperation with dictatorships. But it is politics. The cooperation with these pseudo-democratic regimes serves the US interests. As to the American public, it is presented as a compromise to the declared principles because of the primacy of national security interests.

Frankly speaking, the Russian authorities also do not care much about democracy in that region. The Russian General Staff is not happy to see the increase of the US influence in that strategically important region for defense and security reasons. The Russian attempts to counterbalance the growth of the American influence in the region are not very effective so far¹⁸.

Oil and gas have primarily enhanced the region's strategic value. As experts say, by 2015, this zone may become one of the world's most important sources of oil and natural gas. It will have strategic consequences by lessening dependence of the western customers on Persian Gulf oil. The real gain for Russia is and will be a control over pipelines, which is one of the most important factors of its geopolitical influence in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. And, of course, Russia's economic interest in Central Asia, Kazakhstan as well as the neighboring Caspian Sea area is competing to the American one¹⁹.

Eventual control of the development of oil and gas deposits as well as the eventual pipeline routings will determine the political and economic future of the Central Asian and Caucasus states, and relations between Russia and other neighboring regional countries as well. It will determine positions of Iraq and Iran in the region and their relations with the West and the Russian Federation; it will determine the character of relationships between the US, Russia and China in the next decades. etc. Therefore the American

military interventions in the region should be considered as a part of the big geopolitical game, not just a revenge on 9/11²⁰.

The US is the dominant power in the twenty-first century world politics, and the American leadership is determined to maintain the American hegemony in the world. Less clear than the fact that Americans accumulated great power is their ability to wield power wisely.

Today it become transparently clear that the September 11th event may be used as the *casus belli* for the new American war against Iraq, although there is no evidence that Iraq is responsible for the September attacks on the USA²¹.

We'll not debate the issue of legitimacy of the US intention in this paper, because is out of the frame of our theme. The task is a regime change. Iraq poses no eminent danger to the USA and its allies, but the US does not like Saddam. In such context the pre-emptive strike is an illegal action, a violation of norms of the international law. What is more important in the context of this paper is considering what is Russians' attitude toward regime change and taking military action in Iraq and how is it perceived in the US.

For Americans, "the real issue isn't whether we want to overthrow Saddam, but what price we would have to pay to get the job done"²². For Russians, that war is not acceptable and they will not co-operate in any military action. According to the Kremlin officials, "this sort of issues shall be settled in due course in compliance with a relevant UN Security Council Resolution"²³. At this particular point we see the discrepancy between Russia's position and that of the United States, which, like in the case of Kosovo, is ready to act militarily without the UN sanction.

The Kremlin proceeds from the premise that the UN Security Council should be at the center of collective international efforts to battle terrorism²⁴. And, perhaps, the most important political goal for the UN now is to coordinate the response to new challenges to the international peace and stability to work out measures, which will allow the preventing such tragedies recurring in the future. While the US diplomacy is trying to marginalize the UN from this process, Russia is determined to act in accordance with the will of the international community, not the US joined by some its

traditional allies and clients. Russia is not alone in such approach to this issue²⁵.

Thus, despite the consensus in favor of uniting the world community's long-term efforts against terrorism in the aftermath of September 11th attack on the United States, the dissimilarity between Russia and the US concerning the use of force without the UN mandate remains. We have to remind that the mentioned dissimilarity was perceptible already in the days of the 1999 Kosovo crisis.

President George W. Bush tends to stress the predominantly American military action as a matter of punishment of the Iraq president Saddam Hussein. And he, like his father in the Persian Gulf War in 1999, wants to build a broad coalition of nations that is prepared to act in a full accord in the new US-led campaign against Iraq. It was not in interests of the USSR to join the anti-Iraq coalition in 1999, and Russia's position has not changed since that time.

Russia's historical, political and economic ties with Iraq make for a tangled relationship that could pose genuine problems for any American military campaign against Baghdad. Iraq's debt to the old Soviet Union totals at least \$8 billion, and Baghdad offered Russian oil companies billions more in concessions during the 1990's as it sought to build support in the United Nations. Russia is also Iraq's largest supplier in the United Nations' oil-for-food program, sending at least \$2.5 billion a year in non-military goods in exchange for cash raised by oil sales.

We have to note here that Bush administration officials are frustrated that warmer relations with Mr. Putin's Russia have not been translated into a support for the US administration's goals in the case of Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld recently warned that Russia's relations with nations the United States considers enemies, i.e. nations the United States calls an "axis of evil", threatened to erode its diplomatic and economic standing. "To the extent that Russia decides that it wants to parade its relationship with countries like Iraq and Libya and Syria and Cuba and North Korea, it sends a signal out across the globe that that is what Russia thinks is a good thing to do, to deal with the terrorist states," Mr. Rumsfeld said on August 21, 2002 (*The New York Times*, August 22, 2002).

For the beginning of September 2002, officials from both countries play down the possibility of a breach in the new partnership. Despite criticisms like Mr. Rumsfeld's, other American officials said that Mr. Putin's Russia remained a staunch ally in the campaign against international terrorism. However, *there are no eternal allies, but there are eternal national interests*. Perhaps, Mr. Rumsfeld doesn't want to agree that Mr. Putin's government is simply pursuing its own diplomatic and economic interest as much as Americans do.

Why should Russia's foreign policy be subordinated to American interest? Readers may reasonably ask, and we can begin to answer this question by noting the following point. *The Russian commitment to the international anti-terrorist coalition is not absolute*. After the period in which old adversaries became allies 'the cold peace' in the US-Russia relationships may come if the Bush administration exploits Russia's present weakness and support to its own advantage.

In the most recent American-led military campaign —the 1999 war in Kosovo— Russia's opposition made it more difficult to create the anti-Serb international coalition and to keep it united. But Russians could neither persuade the previous US administration not to go on war, nor protect Yugoslavia by the military means. If the Bush administration decides to proceed with the military operation against Iraq anyway, then the American ignorance of Russia's arguments repeats. Then like in the Balkans the Russia's influence in Iraq eventually will be demolished. Well, Americans cares about their own interest, not Russia's one²⁶.

Professor G. John Ikenberry from Georgetown University has characterised the new US grand strategy in the following words:

"In the shadows of the Bush administration's war on terrorism, sweeping new ideas are circulating about U.S. grand strategy and the restructuring of today's unipolar world. They call for American unilateral and preemptive, even preventive, use of force, facilitated if possible by coalitions of the willing -- but ultimately unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community. At the extreme, these notions form a neoimperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force, and meting out justice. It is a vision in which sovereignty becomes more absolute for America even as it becomes more conditional for

countries that challenge Washington's standards of internal and external behavior. It is a vision made necessary -- at least in the eyes of its advocates -- by the new and apocalyptic character of contemporary terrorist threats and by America's unprecedented global dominance. These radical strategic ideas and impulses could transform today's world order in a way that the end of the Cold War, strangely enough, did not²⁷.

Yet one may argue such definition of the 'new US grand strategy', it seems to us more important that, in fact, Professor G. John Ikenberry is talking about an *inherited imperial policy* adjusted to new circumstances.

It is fundamental change in America's national security and foreign policy doctrine compared with the previous one, nonetheless. Implicitly, Mr. Bush has agreed with connotations that follow the mentioned change in America's national security strategy²⁸. On August 29, 2002, *The Washington Post* wrote "the US president is no longer choosing between war and no war, but rather war alone or war with allies"²⁹. Which one sounds better?

Responsibility for the strike on Iraq will, somehow, lie with American imperialism (or neo-imperialism, if one prefers Professor Ikenberry's term). Why should post-Soviet Russian foreign policy and the 21st century world order be associated with American imperialism? Readers might reasonably ask again. Some good answers float in the air now. They have not yet found profound political support in Russia, but they could.

Are lessons learned?

At the start of the year of 2001, relations between Russia and the United States remained strained over various issues, including disagreements over NATO expansion, and Russia's objection to U.S. plans to deploy a national missile defense system. A series of expulsions of diplomats from Moscow and Washington in March 2001 for suspected espionage should be mentioned in this list as well. At that time over a half of Russians (52%) perceived the U.S. as the state hostile to Russia. And a strong majority of Russians thought Putin's foreign policy corresponded to national interest³⁰.

After the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, and President Putin's speeches in which he supported the U.S., the former adversaries started working together to address what all of

them view as the main common threat. As the mentioned mid-October 2001 poll showed, opinions concerning the impression about the change of relationship between the two countries were divided almost equally: 44% said "*Russia-American relations are improving,*" while 41% didn't agree and said, "*relations have not visibly changed.*"³¹ Hope more than facts determined opinions of the first group. And then, as many observers had underlined, the number of those who consider the U.S. to be hostile to Russia declined to 46%. Perhaps, the rapid shift toward co-operation between the two countries after 9/11 had caused more and more Russians to consider the U.S. to be a friendly nation.

Russia's co-operation with the U.S.-led antiterrorism campaign led to considerable speculations about concessions Moscow had made, about what the Kremlin might expected in return and what it actually gained, and why President Putin made the turn in foreign and security policy toward the West. Former US Secretary of State Prof. Henry Kissinger, for example, saw Russia's response as one of desperation: threatened with isolation, Putin joined with the United States to "pursue Russia's objectives by enlisting America's support"³².

That was a view from the American shore. At the same time, when Americans applauded Russia's joining the anti-terror coalition, the Kremlin continued to face opposition to its policy from those members of the political and military establishment, who remained wary of closer ties with the West.

As we said earlier, Putin is using the threat of international terrorism to promote his own political agenda both at home and abroad. In fact, the President of the Russian Federation had no choice but to support the American leader. For Putin, personally, the link between the American war against the Al Qaeda network backed by Taliban in Afghanistan and the war against Chechens quarrelers and Arab mercenaries who are fighting alongside the Chechen separatists was obvious. He could not change his stand on the issue of terror that brought him to the top of power even if he would like to do it. That was the basic psychological reason why Mr. Putin backed the U.S. campaign against terrorism, in our view.

In accord to the line of reconciliation with the former adversary Russia's leader pledged to close Russia's Cold War-era intelligence listening post in Cuba and a naval base in Vietnam. It was announced before Putin's visit to the USA. The reaction of the

Russian public and the military brass on this decision was far from overwhelmingly favorable³³.

Perhaps, Russia's president expected to get the Bush administration to stop criticizing Russia about the brutality of the Russian troops in the breakaway province of Chechnya. And, indeed, by mid-November 2001, the United States had reduced its criticism of the war in Chechnya on the occasion of Putin's visit to the USA. Americans noticed links between Al Qaeda and Chechens only after the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked because Osama bin Laden made them noticed September 11th and because he declared the United States his enemy. The Bush administration has never made Chechnya a high-priority issue and later in 2002 has gradually returned to its former line concerning this problem.

At the US-Russia summit in November 2001 the announcement on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons was the central point. It implied that the political atmosphere at the meeting was favorable, but, as for the essence of the issue, there is nothing new in that. Bush at the summit said the USA would unilaterally reduce arms to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next 10 years. Putin had already suggested that both parties cut their weapons to 1.5 thousand warheads each. We would like to remind here that back in 1997 both states signed a framework agreement calling for (the signing of) START-3, under which arms should have been reduced to about 2 thousand warheads each. The United States currently has about 7,000 deployed warheads to Russia's 6,000. Therefore, at their first meeting the presidents said nothing new on the crucial issue of nuclear weapons reduction. The discussions on that issue were continued, and as a result the new treaty on reduction of nuclear potentials of two states was signed in Moscow in May 2002. Many experts doubt it is an agreement that Russians wanted to have.

If Putin's team expected to see the US shifts on such controversial issues as the US national missile defense system and NATO enlargement as a response to these Russia's steps as well as the political support and the military assistance in the operation against Taliban, then it was a miscalculation. In mid-December, President George W. Bush announced Washington's intention to withdraw from the 1972 US-Soviet Union ABM Treaty in order to build a national missile defense system to defend against possible

attacks from so-called rogue states, such as Iraq and North Korea. Russia's objections were not taken into account. And in spring 2002 this Treaty became a part of Cold-war history. Bush's support to a plan to move NATO eastward, to the Russian border, had not been revised as well. Bush's ream commitment to the fundamentals of Republican's vision of US foreign and security policy, which always emphasizes the primacy on national interest, is strong, plus they understood the weakness of Russia quite well.

Russia's president was delighted to be included in the narrow circle of leaders of the G-7 (or G-8) group, that allowed him to enlarge personal contacts with major world and European leaders and, especially, with his American counter-partner. The USA and the EU officially recognized the Russian economy as the market-type one. The US president had promised to accelerate Russia's entry into the WTO. That is almost all what may be considered as gains obtained by Russia after its shift to closer co-operation with the West.

Some Russian observers have noticed that Putin's personal behavior and diplomacy during the first year after the September 11th resembled that of Michael Gorbachev, when the last was in power in the Soviet Union. On this ground they have jumped to a conclusion that in total Putin's Russia would be a looser again.

Now we have to refer to data exposing the state of minds at the end of the first year of the war against terror or not. According to the FOM poll, carried out on August 31, 2002, nearly half of those interviewed (44%) think the terrorist attacks on America had a positive effect on Russia-US relations. This is exactly the same figure as in October 2001! Hope is dying the last, the Russian proverb say. One out of four (27%) hold that Russian-US relations are unchanged, with as little as 6% thinking they have deteriorated³⁴. By November 2001, two thirds of Russians (65%) felt quite positive about the idea of the improvement cooperation between Russia and the USA within the framework of international anti-terrorist coalition, these people said they would like "*Russia and the USA to become more close*"³⁵. One year ago this mood has remained.

We have to point out Russians support the president's line to improving of relations with the West with a clear understanding that the possible alliance between the West and Russia unlikely

would be the union of equals. One in two (48 percent) of those interviewed in November 2001 did not believe that Russia would restore herself as the great power in coming 5-10 years; the overwhelming majority agrees that the Russian leadership depends on western policy to a too big extent³⁶.

A great many people in the world, particularly in the United States, are under the impression that the United States and the Russian Federation now have a policy of enlarging cooperation. The culmination of such efforts was signing of the new Treaty on reduction of strategic nuclear potentials in Moscow in May 2002. Americans have overwhelmingly approved of the arms agreement signed in May 2002 in Moscow by American President George W. Bush and Russia's President Vladimir Putin. The agreement is intended to significantly reduce the nuclear arsenal of both countries over the next 10 years. A Gallup poll conducted May 20-22, 2002, just before the signing of the agreement, showed that more than eight in 10 Americans approved it (82 percent). Only one in 10 Americans disapproved of the plan (11 percent)..

The reaction of a bulk of Russians was moderate. For the Russians it is clearly a triumph for a White House operating from a position of overwhelming growth, and only a "virtual" victory for Mr. Putin who needs something to show for the geopolitical concessions for the US since September 11, 2001. The treaty ratified what the Americans had already committed to, and that the Russians could not afford but to do. The signing of the treaty has not stopped the construction of the new US national missile defense system, which is now under way.

Similarly the new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) formed in May 2002 and the democratic title assigned to its participants, the NATO 20, while appearing on paper to be a major breakthrough, represent, in practice little change from the previous talking-show. Essentially Russia retains the right to vote on those issues for which there is mutual agreement, and not on those issues in which there isn't. The biggest change has been a noticeable increase in the level of politeness with which Russia should be ignored and, possibly, a new reason for existence for NATO.

The US missile initiative together with the expanding "war on terror" has forced the Russian government and parliament into sacrificing more for defense. The Bush's decision on that issue had

been defined in Moscow as 'an untimely and irresponsible step, which could lead to weakening strategic stability and security in the world'³⁷. The structure of the Russian missile forces has been reviewed³⁸, and other amendments in the military reform were made.

As to the public opinion, the following data sound for itself. Asked about the reaction of the Russian leadership to such actions as the coming inclusion of the certain Eastern European and Baltic countries into NATO, the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the recent appearance of American troops in Central Asia and Caucasus, and a closure of the Russian naval base in Vietnam and the intelligence radio-centre in Cuba, near a half of respondents (44 percent) said, 'in all mentioned cases the Russian president made concessions to Americans in foreign policy', 'Russia is showing its weakness', and alike. Three in ten Russians (31 percent) hesitated to disclose their opinion, and only one in four called those actions as wise and realistic steps³⁹. That means over a half of nation actually does not approve Putin's foreign policy!

Thinking about this figure, reader should count the tight control of news coverage of Putin's actions after 9/11. According to our observations, there is no a large diversity of opinions at the national television channels which currently rather strictly follow the official line in their coverage of Russia's foreign policy. The bulk of media comments defined the outcomes of November 2001 and May 2002 summits and the creation of NRC as successes of the Russian diplomacy. Critics of this policy (mainly from the left side of the political spectrum) had not much airtime.

When President Putin took office in 2000 the majority of Russians approved the way he was handling his job. Since that time his personal rating persists on a very high level, which incomparably higher than his predecessor ever had (around 70% of Russians are confident in the incumbent president according to numerous polls, in late 1990s only about 5% trusted Yeltsin). It means the majority of Russians keeps a favorable view to man, who promised to revive Russia's dignity, status and might. But then why are they so critical concerning his 'concessions to the US'?

In our view, the poll's results are understandable. Many of attitudes and phobias reflect both the paranoia of the Cold war and the nostalgia for the 'old good times' when the USSR was the

second superpower and Americans respected its might and demands⁴⁰. The entire system of attitudes toward the USA and the West as a whole cannot change over night even under the pressure of 9/11. Looking at the May and August/September 2002 polls' data, one may suggest that now the Russian public is more likely to view the US as an unfriendly state, to say at least. This point of view has over a half of respondents (Table 3). This is a remarkable shift back compared to the start of "war on terror".

Table 3. The Russian public opinion about the USA as a friendly state in 2001-2002, %.

Do you feel that USA is an ally of Russia, is friendly, or is unfriendly, or is an enemy of Russia?	2001			2002			
	Feb.	Sept.	Dec.	Feb.	Mar.	May	31 st Aug.-1 st Sept.
Unfriendly	52	46	44	44	71	58	51
Friendly state	32	38	38	39	17	25	30

Source: Data of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nationwide polls.

Note: In the FOM poll carried out in March 2001 71 percent of respondents said the USA is the unfriendly state against 17 percent with opposite view. This was an immediate reaction on unfair decisions of judges and prejudice toward Russia's sportsmen at the Olympic games in Salt-Lake –City, the USA.

Turning back to most recent Russian polls' data, we have to say that in late August 2002 over half of Russians (53%) did not favor the American intention to go on war in Iraq, Libya and Somalia. This attitude has not changed since 2001 when the same negative opinion was expressed by 66% in October 2001, 53% - in November 2001 and 57% in December 2001. One out of four (26%) supported the military actions against nations suspected for supporting terrorists. Only 22% said contacts with Iraq, Iran and North Korea must be cancelled. The majority of 57% agreed it is necessary for Russia to continue dialogue with countries enlisted in the 'axis of evil'⁴¹. The dominant view is Russia should be neutral in the case of war in Iraq⁴².

The bulk of nation rejected the "theory of punishment of the wrong government" that justified 'accidental but unavoidable collateral killings of innocent civilians'⁴³. In condemning the US military ambitions, Russians pointed to hidden (and far from noble) motivations behind the war on international terrorism and the unjustified character of the proposed pre-emptive strikes.

Ordinary people in various countries share this view. In many countries hopes for a more safety world are yielding to disappointment, bitterness, and fear as the US focused less on a hunt of Al Qaeda leaders and more on Iraq. According to *Foreign Affairs* (September 10, 2002), " even before international attention began turning to where to take the war on terrorism after Afghanistan, a December 2001 poll by the Pew Research Center and the *International Herald Tribune* found widespread unease among U.S. allies about American "hyperpower" and unilateralist tendencies. Whereas 70% of American respondents said the United States was taking allied interests into account, only 40% of foreign respondents agreed. And this skepticism was shared across regions: the 71% of Middle Easterners surveyed who believed the United States was acting mostly in its own interests in fighting terrorism nearly matched by the 66% in western Europe who shared that opinion. Overall, this survey showed a broad belief that little had changed in US attitudes toward international cooperation since September 11⁴⁴."

As the latest polls showed opposition to the US strike on Iraq remains. Recent August/September 2002 Gallup polls in five countries -- the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Italy and Spain -- revealed major differences in the countries' reactions to a possible U.S. attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. While majorities of Canadians and Americans would support such a military effort, people in the other three countries are opposed, by margins of 10 to 19 percentage points⁴⁵.

The dominant view on Bush's war against Iraq in Russia does not differ from the opinion expressed by the president. As to plausible consequences of this possible Iraq war scenario, the following effect is most likely, in our view. Due to the ambivalent attitude toward Saddam's dictatorship in the Russian society, the American military action will not significantly affect Putin's popularity. While his criticism of the US in the case of the American attack against Iraq likely would be in muted tones, the hawks in the military and political establishment would strongly voice about the humiliation

of Russia, take it for granted. It may lead to a rise of anti-American feelings among the part of the public and elite and a small increase of a number of those who blame Putin's "myopic policy of reconciliation with the West". That brings us to the issue of continuity of attitudes toward the former adversary after the end of Cold War.

Perceptual changes and continuity of attitudes.

The Russian perception of the US policy is dependent on the US perception of Russia to a certain extent. That is why it is reasonable to compare the evolution of American attitudes toward Russia with trends of the Russian public opinion toward the US.

The Soviet Russia (the USSR) had been perceived as the ideological threat since the victory of Bolshevik's revolution in 1917. When the US perceived the Soviet Union to be an equal military power, it tended to perceive the direct Soviet threat to the West as preliminary military. Currently, Post-Soviet Russia is not perceived as a military threat yet she still has a huge arsenal of missiles with nuclear warheads. However, the US perception of Russia is not free of the heritage of the past. The empirical record of Moscow's policy, especially in its 'near abroad', is often interpreted in arrogant words that recall the 'old good times' of the Cold War. The American public opinion always mirrors government policy on foreign affairs. Therefore most Americans react to international affairs in the predictable way that creates opportunities for manipulation of opinion.

American attitudes toward Russia, toward the circumstances justifying the use of military force internationally, and toward cooperating with other countries are parts of a stable and well-defined system of beliefs behind data, which remained fairly stable for less-informed citizens when tested on separate surveys over time⁴⁶. As our studies show, the identical conclusion could be made concerning stability of an analogous set of Russian attitudes, including attitudes toward America, etc.

As to the public opinion trends, the following remarks are essential. In the early 1980s an alarmingly high percentage of Americans had negative feelings toward the USSR. Some 80 percent felt the Soviet Union is "unfriendly" or an "enemy", and as many as 70 percent agreed with the idea that "Russia seeks global

domination". It was Reagan's time when the Soviet Union was considered as the "empire of evil". But after Gorbachev coming to power in the USSR in 1985, the remarkable rise of favorable opinion occurred, and by the end of *perestroika*, in 1989 –1991, only 20-25 percent held unfavorable views. This was an unusually quick change in opinion. Then in the 1990s the ups and downs in Russia-American relations and the changing image of post-Soviet Russia led to cooling of the American perception of Russia.

When Clinton first took office in 1993 about 45 percent of Americans hold positive views on Russia and 19% - negative. In middle of 1990s the opposite tendency emerged. While Mr. Clinton and his aids once and once again repeated, "the US goal is to see Russia become a normal modern state", Republican's opponents of his policy amply expressed another opinion:

“ At its peak strength, Russia was capable of threatening the international security and economic systems; even today, as a failing state, it remains a serious source of destabilization. [...] Until recently, the U.S. has been very lenient toward Russian intervention in ethnic conflicts in the "near abroad" (for example, in Abkhazia and the Trans-Dniester region in Moldova). [...] The Clinton Administration even went so far as to support Boris Yeltsin's aggressive and disastrous policy in Chechnya. This lack of willingness to halt Russian imperialism may come back to haunt the U.S. in the near future. [...] Preventing the emergence of a new Russian empire in the lands of the former Soviet Union should be a priority for the U.S. and its allies”⁴⁷.

The half of those interviewed in March 2000 held unfavorable attitudes toward Russia (Table 4). The picture recorded in 2000, the ending year of the second Clinton's term, resembles the distribution of views on Russia of the early 1970s or even 1960s, i.e. the Cold War times⁴⁸. The reported shift may be also associated with disappointment with the poor results of Clinton's policy of westernization of Russia⁴⁹ and the subsequent revision of foreign policy's priorities proposed by Republicans, the Bush administration. That was a trace of the Kosovo crisis, when the Russia and US appeared to be at the opposite sides.

It is important to emphasize the impact of history on present perceptions. History remains us constantly that the international situation may change and do change rapidly and that policy-makers must stick to national interests, not misperceptions, and distinguish image and reality. It is also well known that perceptions change over time in response to events, to decisions, and to other factors, although changes occur slowly. While perceptions usually change rather slowly and tend toward continuation, there may be

specific international situations that may bring certain fast, sometime dramatic, change in the balance of opinions.

The NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 had a most profound effect on the Russian perception of the USA⁵⁰. The Russian press emphasized the idea that the aggression against Yugoslavia was the primarily American or - as some people say – Secretary of State Madeline Albright's war. In the eyes of Russians, the attack on Yugoslavia was made to prove that NATO is the decisive force in the post-Cold War Europe and to re-enforce the U.S. leading position in that organization. The Kosovo war showed that Western Europe could not handle with the on-going crisis in the Balkans without Uncle Sam's assistance.

The negative impact of the Kosovo crisis on perceptions of the USA in Russia can easy be seen on the diagram (fig. 1). As to Russia, there was a short-term rise of very unfavorable opinion to the USA in days of NATO's air strikes on Yugoslavia. By September 1999 the pre-Kosovo war pattern of public opinion toward the USA was restored. In the case of the American public the decline of anti-Russians feelings that was highly raised by that war took a longer time.




Fig. 1.
Source: Gallup and VCIOM polls

Whatever the strategic importance of South-Eastern Europe for NATO was, the symbolic significance of that anti-Russian message could not be overestimated. It more than any other events since the collapse of the Soviet Union revealed the weak standing of the Russian Federation in the post-Cold war world order⁵¹. Attacking Yugoslavia, the US was determined to show that Russia is not capable to prevent or stop NATO's aggression against the sovereign state, the Slavic nation. In total, the attack on Yugoslavia has taught Russians just what Americans can do and even more important what they cannot and do not want to do.

As for the Balkan crisis' impact on the domestic political discourse in Russia, there is no doubt that NATO's "humanitarian intervention" in the region gave extra arguments to those in Russia who look on the US and NATO with hostility and great suspicion. No surprisingly, they had argued that country's reorientation toward the West is a strategic mistake.

Different aspects of the Russian political, economic and social reality and foreign policy form western images of post-Soviet Russia. Over time the importance of certain aspects changes drastically, a process that will certainly continue. After the collapse of the communist regime, in early 1990s Western politicians and media paid more attention on reforms of political and economic systems, today it seems to be less important and Russia is mainly perceived as a deteriorating nuclear power defining national interest as other do. Russia's security policy and, especially, brutality in Chechnya became constant themes of the western media as well. Unquestionably, the Russian media and the public noticed the western views on Russia's developments and reacted correspondingly.

During the 1990s this country has been seen by some American policy-makers as simply irrelevant (in terms of Russia's real impact on world affairs), although the formula "Russia is not an immediate threat, but the potential threat to the West lies in Russia" was popular either. It was presented in many post-Cold war publications, which we do not review in this paper due to the lack of room. The focal point of the American politics was an opposition against the revival of Russia as another global pole of power. "It was in the best interests of America to keep Russia from again becoming a major player in Europe, the Middle East, and

other areas of the world", experts in US foreign policy often argued in 1990s.

In the post-Cold War circumstances one could not explain the rise of the proportion of people with negative attitude toward post-communist Russia referring to ideology and power rivalry like in the past ("to stop the world spread of communism", "to fight against the Russian expansionism"). That is why Russia's activity in many conflicts occurred in 1990s in the CIS, Russia's objections to the US-led aggression against Yugoslavia and NATO enlargement were interpreted as the 'revival of imperial ambitions' that would ultimately jeopardize American national interests and security. Little wonder that such an interpretation caused more Americans to think of Russia as an adversary than a partner.

Occasionally, the favorable and unfavorable image of the Russian leader contributes to a change of public perception of the entire country. In early 1990s western media lay stress on Boris Yeltsin's efforts to establish the pillars of democracy and to destroy the resistance of communists in the parliament, then, in late 1990s, on his sickness, drunkenness, and corruption scandals linked with his close entourage. As a result the proportion of Americans with favorable opinion of the first Russian president dropped from over two thirds (68%) in 1994 to about a half (47%) of the population in 1999 (Gallup data). In spring 2000 the second Russian president Putin was presented to the American audience basically as ex-spy, more oriented to restore good relations with Europe and Asia than with the US. After September 11th, 2001 he was pictured in brighter colors.

More concrete than the image of the president is economics. Russia is a large market for western products, a field for western investments, and an exporter of petrol, natural gas and other raw materials along with capitals, scientists and criminals. This country has a huge foreign debt to western banks. Therefore, the conditions of the Russian economy contribute to Western images of the Russian Federation and influences Western political strategies to a large extent.

At the beginning of the 1990s the Russian perception of the US was much more favorable than today. The deterioration of the general balance of opinion developed gradually in the second half of 1990s. The interplay of stereotypes and fears, external events and internal processes determined that process; the media shapes

it. To a certain extent the Russian perception of the US goes after the American policy toward Russia alike the US public opinion trends reported above.

Since mid-1990s many Russians were putting responsibility for poor results of Russia's economic reforming on the western, basically US, advisers, at least partially. In this regard Russians acted like those Americans who fed up with Clinton's foreign policy. The majority of Russian people judge the results of economic and political reforms supported by the West by outcome not process. During the time when the promotion of democracy and the market economy to Russia advanced rhetorically to be the most prominent goals of Western policies, the annual money flow out of Russia was much bigger than the inflow of western investments. And, for sure, the feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration were among causes of a gradual increase of anti-American sentiments registered by polls at that time.

To sum, the arrogant attitude to Russia resulted in the registered growth of anti-American mood during the 1990s. Currently Americans are warm to Russia. This is a direct consequence of Russia's behavior after 9/11. In May 2002 more than six in 10 Americans held a favorable opinion of Russia, and as many called it a friend of the United States – the most in nearly a decade.

The friendship is not deep, however: Just 8 percent of Americans have had a "very" favorable opinion of Russia; 56 percent said their view is "mostly" favorable. And just 10 percent have called Russia a "close ally," compared to 17 percent last October⁵². 53 percent said she is "friendly."

About three in ten Americans held the traditional Cold-war opinion to Russia: 24 percent felt Russia is "unfriendly" and 7 percent - "an enemy" of the US.

The times may be changing, but the story remains the same: Russians are still viewed as rivals and sworn enemies by the significant part of American public⁵³. Russo-phobia is spread in the third part of the American polity, at least, one may say. Security experts and policy-makers regardless declarations about cooperation and friendship say, 'even if Russia is currently no threat militarily, it's a good bet that it will not always be so weak'.

Is Russo-phobia still an influential feeling? Or are the reported data just an indication that today, at the beginning of the 21st century,

little agreement exists in the American society about the place and role of former main adversary in the New World order? Does the American public feel that the reconciliation with Russia is a real achievement of the Bush administration? The reader may speculate about these questions. We have no room to discuss the present-day American public opinion toward Russia in details.

After a comparison of the above reported American and Russian (Table 3) perceptions of one another as friendly or unfriendly states, one may conclude that in the present-day Russia mistrust to the USA is deeper than the mistrust to Russia in contemporary America. Really, in May-August 2002 one in two Russians called the US unfriendly against three out of ten Americans who consider Russia as unfriendly or enemy state. And this difference may increase if the US attack on Iraq.

Table 4. The comparison of popular attitudes toward the (former) adversary in 1966 -2002 (%).

	1966-79	1980-85	1985-87	1988-91	1991 Nov.	1995	2000	2002 May	2002 Aug.
Favorable attitude toward Russia/the USSR in the US	34	19	52	37	52	49	40	63	--
Unfavorable attitudes toward Russia in the US	59	78	44	26	35	44	51	28	--
Favorable attitude toward the US in Russia	--	--	--	--	70	65	66	61	67
Unfavorable attitudes toward the US in Russia	--	--	--	--	8	13	22	28	22

Source: Gallup, NORC surveys; VCIOM surveys.

Note: Table presents average figures for selected periods from 1966 to 1991. Examples of how international events sometime lead to abrupt opinion change, which are behind the average figures, are sharp rises of anti-Russian feelings in the USA in 1980s linked with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of December 1979 and the shooting down of the Korean airliner by the Soviets in 1983.

It must be emphasized that, according to the VCIOM polls, in the past decade more Russians held favorable opinion to the US than Americans to Russia did, as surveys' figures show (Table 4). It should be noted that this balance of opinions is rather stable, although there were fluctuations. These data differ from the mentioned FOM polls measuring attitudes to the US as friend/foe or ally/enemy due to wordings of questions.

Anti-Americanism and mistrust to the former adversary are deep-rooted feelings. However, there is no need to overemphasize the scale of anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. As we told earlier the idea of closer co-operation with the USA in various fields is widely supported in this society.

The majority of Russians favors Americans as the people (Table 5), although many Russians disagree with the US policy. Russians do separate the state, the state politics and the people; it is a specific characteristic of the Russian elite and mass consciousness that is often out of attention of the western experts. And this principal trait of the Russian mentality determines the peculiarity of the Russian perception of the US "war on terror".

Table 5. Russian's attitudes towards the American people, 2000-2002, %.

<i>What is your attitude toward Americans as the people?</i>	02 '00	05 '01	10 '01	05 '02
Favorable	78	82	85	77
Unfavorable	11	9	9	16
Hesitated to answer	11	9	6	7

Source: VCIOM. Press-information # 22, 09 September 2002
 [http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/press/press020909_22.htm}.

Polls show that Russians worry more about domestic issues, and their real security concerns are with domestic Chechen terrorists, drug traffic and illegal immigration from neighboring countries, crimes and other social problems than global dangers⁵⁴. This brings us to the issue of popular perception of external threats and phobias.

Perceptions of threats.

Like other great countries, Russians had traditionally associated their national interests with the safeguarding of territorial integrity and the balancing of power in the world. Like every country on earth, Russia wants to be strong and secure. Closely related to the definition of interests is the perception of threats, and here we have to say a few words about the contemporary Russian approach to the problem.

Historically, the major attention in the state politics is allocated to the military aspects of national security and relations with nations, which may poses external threats. "There are no external enemies to Russia today", recently said President Vladimir Putin. There is nothing new in Putin's statement, because the previous (Yeltsin's) national security doctrine, which was published in December 1997, clearly stated that foreign countries did not pose an actual threat to Russia's security.

The present-day official position on various threats and challenges is presented in such documents as the National Security Concept of Russia⁵⁵, the Military Doctrine⁵⁶ and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation⁵⁷, to name a few of recently updated documents. The point that needed to be stressed is that *international terrorism* is defined as the newly emerged threat, which challenges both global and domestic security along with other inherited external and internal threats.

There is no need to go here into more details, and we have just to note that the ongoing war against separatists in Chechnya is defined as the *key internal* threat to Russia's security. Safeguarding integrity of the territory and strengthening of statehood of the Russian Federation are top priorities compared with any foreign policy objectives.

The overwhelming majority of Russians never heard about or read the mentioned doctrines, yet they are available to the general public and revealed in the open press. In this regard Russians do not differ from other nations, as far as we know. The public like the security experts admits that the major threats to Russia are domestic, and crime, corruption, poverty, and other social decreases are permanent internal dangers.

Nowadays there is a national consensus in regard of the menace of religious extremism of Islamic fundamentalists⁵⁸. The bulk of

society still favors the military operation against the remains of Chechen rebels⁵⁹, although all Russians are tired of this war. In spring 2002 President Putin has stated that the "military phase of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya may be considered closed." But the military victory in Chechnya has already been claimed many times before, since the last capture of Grozny, the capital of the region, in 2000. In fact, the guerrilla war is continuing, and the ultimate victory of the federal army is still far away⁶⁰.

Although the public is well informed about the foreign mercenaries fighting on the Chechen side, it does not consider Arab sponsors of Chechen separatists as threats to Russia. The Russian press never was such hysterical in this regard as the American media was after 9/11. Most Russians do not consider the war in Chechnya as a part of the *global* war against *international* terrorism, because for them it is primarily Russia's backyard affair in which a few foreigners are involved. When they blame Georgia for providing a shelter for Chechen militants or Saudi Arabia for financial support of wahhabites, they do not regard these countries as enemies that should be punished by using the military force⁶¹.

In the post-Cold-war, there are no clearly identifiable foreign threats, but rather a variety of risks and dangers, says the government. The problem, insofar as we understand it, is a gap between the official position and the popular perception of external enemies. As far as the popular perceptions of military threats are concerned, until recently, the picture was different.

For instance, in the November 2001 poll, 13% of the respondents named the United States as the potential enemy, down from 48% who said so in 1999. Although the United States tops Russians' list of potential enemies, the number of those fearing it dropped almost four times. Just 2% currently perceive China as a threat compared to 3% in 1999⁶². The so-called "Chinese threat" worries basically security experts, governors of Far East regions and journalists not the general population.

For the public at large, the left-wing politicians and the military brass the main foreign threat is still associated with NATO and NATO enlargement backed by the US. The half of Russians, at least, has no doubts that *NATO is the military threat to Russia*: 52 percent of those interviewed by VCIOM in the May 2002 poll agreed with this opinion against less than one third (31 percent) with the opposite opinion. 17 percent declined to answer. This

image of the Alliance as the potential aggressor is deeply implanted in the brains of generations of Russians, because NATO was perceived as the main military threat for the Soviet Union and its allies for over 40 years. And, as the latest surveys show, the many middle-aged and older people cannot get rid of it up to nowadays.

Today the majority of Russians perceives NATO as the *aggressive not defensive* military alliance. In May 2002 over the half of Russians (54 percent) considered NATO as the aggressive bloc and only one quarter (24 percent) - as the defensive union (the rest declined to answer)⁶³. It means, for most of people the words about transforming NATO from the pure military alliance to mainly the political-military body is the simply misleading information.

In August 2000 approximately the same number of Russians (54 percent) felt, "Russia has grounds to be afraid of the NATO countries" (the opposite view shared only 32 %)⁶⁴. And, as the "humanitarian war" against Yugoslavia in 1999 had showed transparently clear, that perception of NATO was not entirely unfounded⁶⁵.

In early 1990s debates on post-Cold war NATO's strategy did not worry the Russian public very much. The ordinary people hardly ever commented on the matter, as they were more concerned with far more pragmatic problems, and domestic political battles attracted much more attention of the public than NATO's policy. In December 1995, only one in each hundred of respondents (0.7 per cent) expressed concern over NATO enlargement⁶⁶. Since that time the public anxiety about NATO expansion grew steadily from year to year: in 1996 the proportion of respondent who named themselves concerned raised up to 31 percent, in 1997 – to 51 percent.

In May 1997 Russian President Boris Yeltsin said that NATO enlargement became the cause of the biggest dispute with the US since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Since then, Russian officials continued to criticize the plan of NATO expansion, but their objections were not accepted. Moreover, on March 1999, the Alliance had admitted three new members: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. And soon after that event NATO attacked Yugoslavia.

Asked in May 1999, during the days of NATO bombardments of Yugoslavia whether the enlargement of NATO increased the

military threat to Russia or not, 64 percent of those interviewed answered positively⁶⁷. After the NATO victory, in July 1999, 66 percent of respondents said that NATO enlargement is the threat to Russia⁶⁸. One in two respondents expressed his anxiety about the intention of the Baltic states to join NATO in the next phase of enlargement⁶⁹. In 2002 the picture remains the same: near a half (48 percent) of Russians disapprove that idea⁷⁰.

We must also say here, most of Russians think that enlarging of NATO is linked with the American national interests. Via NATO the U.S.A. wants to maintain its military presence in Europe and simultaneously to counter any expansion of Russian role on the continent⁷¹. Therefore the admission to the alliance of former Soviet allies and ex-Soviet republics is interpreted in Russia as less the accession of these states to NATO and more the formalization of their security ties to the USA.

In February 1999 at a Washington conference on NATO enlargement Prof. Z. Brzezinski underlined that the very idea of expanding the alliance depends on the aim of NATO. He said: "If NATO expansion was particularly driven by the desire to enhance Europe's geo-political security against Russia, then no further expansion is needed because NATO has gained geo-strategic depth. It has enhanced its security by adding a chain of countries that further increases the scope of West Europe's security. But if Europe's desire to be a zone of peace and democracy was a driving element of NATO expansion, thereby creating a wider Euro-Atlantic system, then it follows that further expansion is mandatory. Historically mandatory, geo-politically desirable"⁷².

Rather soon after that convention, the enlarged alliance dropped bombs and occupied the province of Kosovo to "punish President Slobodan Milosevic" for not giving up as called for in the Rambouillet accords, to "protect the Albanians", to "prevent spillover of the conflict into the entire Balkan region", and, finally, to "protect democracy". It was a precedent.

The author recall distinctly how some people in Russia ironically questioned at that time: "If the United States and its allies intervened into internal affairs of Yugoslavia "to protect democracy", - even to the point of bombing Serbia, - why shouldn't they do the same in Latvia or Estonia, where the Russian minority is still limited in civil rights? Why are these counties listed for membership in the alliance?"

The US administration and NATO officials often say NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe is necessary to encourage the region 's new democracies to stay on the path to free markets and integration with Western Europe. It is only a part of truth, because as Prof. Dan Reiter from Emory University demonstrated, "NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in Europe. The empirical record during the Cold war is clear: Inclusion in NATO did not promote democracy among its members. Further, enlargement did not contribute much to democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999, and the promise of NATO membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries currently awaiting the decision on their request for membership"⁷³.

In the Russian view, the interest of the higher political leadership of Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO has been to a large extent initiated in the West and is still stimulated by the US proponents of enlargement⁷⁴. The feeling of irrational Russophobia backs it. These countries seek to join NATO due to desire to speed up integration into the Western community, to "return to Europe", if not through the main door, the EU, then at least through the "side door", which is NATO. Russians admit that the ruling elite of virtually all these states continues to fear the possibility that Russia will once again seek to dominate in the region; they thus see NATO membership as a guarantee against that possibility.

Speaking in Poland on June 15, 2001, President Bush "called for an Atlantic Alliance that would stretch all the way to Russia's border, delving more emphatically and aggressively than any of his predecessors into a matter guaranteed to make Moscow nervous"⁷⁵. Referring to the steady expansion of the alliance, which will be discussed in details at the NATO Summit in Prague in the autumn/winter 2002, Mr. Bush said, " The question of 'when' may still be up for debate within NATO, but the question of 'whether' should not'. He added, "As we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of free European peoples. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas".

Those phrases of Mr. Bush referred to historic facts. They disclosed his perception of the New World order. Observers in Russia questioned, whether the American president equalized post-Soviet Russia with Nazis Germany, referring to the Munich pact that assigned certain European countries to Germany's

sphere of influence. Others said, the Yalta conference created the post second world war order, and therefore Mr. Bush's remark should be interpreted as a sign that, in his view, the new order with the US dominance as a lonely superpower is the reality of the day.

"NATO, even as it grows, is no enemy of Russia", said President Bush, -" Russia is a part of Europe, and, therefore, does not need a buffer zone of insecure states separating it from Europe". But Russia, Mr. Bush seemed to say, could become a friendly partner to his world vision or might find itself alone. Thus, the American president had admitted that NATO further expansion objectively may lead to a new division of the continent that is, certainly, not in the interest of Russians.

In 2003 the new phase of NATO enlargement will become a reality, and if the Baltic republics join the Alliance, then NATO comes to the Russian borders. President Putin says, Russia respects the will of the Baltic nations if they enter NATO, i.e. publicly demonstrated his indifference to that issue. Following president's words, Russia's Minister of Defense says, we are on afraid of NATO enlargement. However, on the eve of the entry of new members into NATO, Russia's military brass remains vehemently opposed to the alliance's enlargement eastward, which it considers strategically a direct threat to country's security. Some journalists, recalling the previous chain of events, have rise up the question, where could the next NATO war be? And this question is not just a not-clever joke, but also an indication of growing concern regarding the Alliance strategy.

After September 11 tragedy President Putin focused on reformatting of NATO-Russia links weakened by the Kosovo crisis. In May 2002 the new Council for deepening of collaboration between the Russian federation and 19 NATO member-states has been established in Rome. Its 'father-founders' insisted that, in spite of the problems that exist, the NATO-Russia Council would provide extensive opportunities for creating an atmosphere of trust.

This body can facilitate settling existing differences in our relations as well as establishing efficient and productive machinery for cooperation between the military establishments of Russia and NATO member states as well. The nearest future will show whether the publicly declared aim of this Council to serve as the main instrument of political-military cooperation between the West

and Russia will remain the bare declaration, as many experts think in Russia, or not.

The military from both sides, NATO and Russia, are still playing in the 'cat and mouse' game. Nobody buys the idea of Russia's joining NATO as a full member in the visible perspective⁷⁶. General (ret.) Igor Rodionov said recently to German journalist about his perception of NATO: "The advisory for Russia is NATO backed by the USA. The Alliance is not enemy, but it is the potential adversary till Russia does not become its member". General Rodionov, former President Yeltsin's Minister of Defense (1996-1997), is currently the member of Communist fraction in the State Duma. He is the prominent member of the Russian military-political elite, and therefore Rodionov's opinion may be considered as a representative indicator of views of the entire officer's corps⁷⁷.

The way of how NATO is pictured in the Russian media is determining popular attitudes toward this organization to a large extent. It is fair enough to say that the North Atlantic Alliance activity is monitored in Russia's press with a great attention. This is the Soviet heritage. The main national television channels, and the electronic media at large, currently are under the strict control of the authorities. While news reports on television usually present bold information about events without obviously expressed estimations and emotions, broader comments on NATO policy with a few exceptions resemble views and judgments expressed by representatives of the state institutions, responsible for the foreign and defense policy of the Russian Federation. Communist, leftist and national-patriotic editions with traditional anti-western views keep a traditional Soviet-aged opinion on NATO, a mixture of suspicion and hostility. The liberal and center-right newspapers and magazines look to the Alliance without open unfriendliness, although often criticize its policy.

According to the author's studies, after Kosovo there was no large diversity of opinions concerning NATO in the Russian mass media: NATO was pictured basically as the European policeman, whose behavior in the conflict areas is far from impartiality. Yet one may question the media ability to understand and cover peacekeeping, specifically, in a view of the dubious outcomes of the NATO-led missions in former Yugoslavia and events in Macedonia⁷⁸.

The Russian media stressed the point that Russia helps the US in the war against terror more than NATO and once again questioned

the objectives of the Alliance in the changing global security environment. The press put emphasis on the very fact that in reality NATO as the military organization had not been engaged in the multinational operation in Afghanistan, yet some national military contingents from NATO countries are taking part in the peace-enforcing action.

We have to say here once again that the war for the province of Kosovo revitalized old deep-rooted fears and phobias. Regrettably, sometime after the Kosovo crisis the attempts to articulate Russia's national interests, foreign and security policy resembled the anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric used in the 'old good times' of the Cold war. Since that war many Russians became sure that the NATO military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, including Russia, is possible even without the UN Security Council sanction. Because NATO is perceived as an essential instrument of the US policy in Europe, the interpretation of NATO behavior, especially in the region of Southern-Eastern Europe, in certain editions and on TV channels had reached a dimension of an anti-American mania. After 9/11 the anti-American tones in the discourse of external threats have disappeared for a while, and then came back in spring 2002 but without former strength and intensity.

Although NATO officials counter that the alliance has always been purely defensive and is not aimed at anybody, Russians do not buy such an explanation. Many Russian people said being interviewed: "If NATO is a collective defense organization, then show us, please, for God' sake, who, which nation, may attack NATO states in the current situation?" And added: "We all know very well that the Baltic states leaders are striving to join the Alliance talking about the protection against the 'possible Russian aggression' under the NATO nuclear umbrella. If Russia is not the enemy, then why NATO goes eastward? Perhaps, leaders in the West think that Russia will not be weak forever and have a profound mistrust to the Russians".

In the eyes of many people, NATO and Americans are winners and Russians are losers in the Cold war⁷⁹. It is a good thing to realize once again that the end of Cold war brought the obvious benefits for Europe and the USA: Soviet communism was defeated and the military threat from the East was eliminated. What is even more important in the context of this paper is that geographically Russia was back to its seventeenth-century borders. For those

people who equalized Russia and the USSR and considered the entire Soviet Union as their Great Motherland, it meant the loss of about 40% of its population, a quarter of its territory, and a status of a great power. The elderly feel this loss most keenly, but they are not only ones. And the number of people who regret the fall of the USSR is growing from year to year since 1992 till nowadays as polls show.

The feeling of nostalgia for the USSR has intensified after 9/11. It is one of ingredients of a so-called 'post-empire syndrome'. The impact of this syndrome on the internal political discourse and individual's opinions on security and foreign policy issues should not be underestimated.

Putin's team is exploiting the feeling of nostalgia for the USSR, which is still widely spread in the society and among the military, for own political aims, trying to disarm the left opposition in this respect. The aspiration to be integrated in the global economic system and to cooperate in the war against terror and to reconcile with West declared by the president as a new foreign policy course is realized on a background of increase of expenses on defensive needs. Add numerous actions directed to proof that Russia is the great Eurasian power, capable to unit around of itself weaker neighbors, and you will come to conclusion that pragmatism is the guiding light of Putin's diplomacy as well as in domestic policies.

Resuming, we want to say that new threats have arrived but old fears have not gone. Anti-Americanism and NATO-phobia are still alive in Russia like Russo-phobia in the United States and the West at large. The end of Cold war has been announced several times, but it seems to us that Russian and American perceptions of one another till nowadays are the enduring legacy of the Cold war.

The opinion of the half of Russians about the nature of NATO has not changed after 9/11⁸⁰. Asked about the national interest of the Russian Federation and that of NATO, only 25 percent said that these interests are more often coinciding than diverging, while the relative majority of 48 percent held the opposite point, stressing the divergence of interests (27 percent of polled hesitated to answer).

The feeling of mistrust had dominated the international arena for forty year of the Cold War. Perhaps, it is continuing to do so in the

21st century, to some extent at least. To go into the future without prejudices and mistrust is still a task to be achieved.

It looks like a paradox: despite the unfavorable image of the Alliance, the majority of Russians support the escalating collaboration with NATO⁸¹. It should be noted also that despite the fact that NATO is still perceived by the officer's corps as the potential enemy the military leadership supports the idea of closer co-operation with the Alliance. The number of respondents declaring themselves as supporters of the Russia-NATO collaboration significantly increased by the spring of 2002: from 45 percent in July 1999 to 62 percent in May 2002 (58 percent in September 2001⁸²). In our view, this was a shift caused by pure pragmatic reasons not a perceptual change.

Concluding remarks.

In many respects, the attacks of September 11th, 2001 seem to have opened a new chapter in the world history. The United States is at "war". The US troops are sent overseas to fight against a far different enemy from any they have previously prepared to see. The definition of US national security has been globalized and widened to include homeland security. The broad international alliance was formed to fight what is perceived as a common threat. Yet one year after 9/11, people from Europe to the Middle East, Asia and Russia are wondering how much in the world has really changed.

September 11 did not change the world much, at least from Russia's perspective. It altered many things, influenced the shift in the US-Russia and NATO-Russia relationships, but few in this country see it as an event akin to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps, US president George W. Bush hurried up and may be made a mistake when he chose to call his response to Sept. 11 a "global war against terror". Because this "global war", if war it is, is one that may go on forever. Terror's aim is political, not military.

Sympathy with the US was initially strong. But it is being eroded due to time and a US behavior, which is now considered as 'neo-imperial'. But in fact, the new American security and foreign policy doctrine is based on pillars of geopolitics inherited from the past.

Put it simply - the US *unlimited war* politics is becoming a factor jeopardizing global stability. Moreover, the American "global war on terror" is reviving and crystallizing deep-seated cultural, and ideological (if it's a proper word to characterize a specific vision of the world order), differences between the United States and Russia. The Russian public opinion remains skeptical with respect to the US ultimate goals in this war. As the US opinion surveys' data show the feeling of distrust to Russians and the suspicious look to Russia's foreign and security policy is not disappeared in America either. The perceptions of nations, policies and external threats based on phobias rooted in the remote past are still influential forces.

The US focus has been shifting from Al Qaeda to Iraq. In Russia there is almost no support for a war with Iraq. There is a real concern in Russia that the manner of the US response on 9/11 may be undermining the entire anti-terror international coalition, sowing disaccord between the USA and Russia, in particular. And - say it in plain words - Russians do not like how American president plays the role of the world sheriff. The rise of anti-Americanism in Russia and the entire world in the case of possible war in Iraq is a minor problem for President Putin of Russia, who can distance himself from President Bush of the USA. It is a big problem for Americans.

Day-to-day policy-making reacts to the immediate, and too often the focus of policy-makers is myopic. Certainly, the start of 'war on terror' brought remarkable changes in policies and public attitudes. But in many respects they have not changed so greatly. In early 1990s there was an impression that the arms race had halted forever, but today Russians believe it was a misimpression. After the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty it became clear that Russia's strategic arsenal should be renovated. The Bush principle of pre-emption is already being adored and exploited by other world leaders who have their own devious uses for it. Pakistan is worried that India will pounce in the Bush manner. And Mr. Bush's soulmate, Vladimir Putin, just warned the UN that he might pre-empt rebels in neighboring Georgia provoking a storm of anti-Russian sentiments in that country.

Interests are driving forces of politics. The national interest is not something that shifts back and forth from administration to administration or from crisis to crisis. If the September 11th attack

really is the equivalent of the start of the World War III (some people like this metaphor), then it is not too early to begin thinking about what could be long-term geopolitical consequences of this new global civil war. Just as World Wars I and II produced new orders and divisions, so too might this war.

Furthermore, the author believes that it is no longer safe to presume that the entire system of international relations is going to develop in the way that even as recently as one year ago seemed obvious and clear. The new concepts emerging from the Bush administration's war on terrorism will form the world order in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, and using force. These radical ideas could transform today's world order in a way that the end of the Cold War did not. The future shape of world and that of Russia are profoundly in question, but for a lack of room this question is out of our consideration in this paper.

"History never looks like history when you are living through it", said writer John Gardner. I'd like to end this paper with this quotation from John Gardner because it suggests how limited our view of the "war on terror" has actually been.

On September 12, 2002 the next year of the war on terror begins. The Russian perception of the American "war on terror" will change. But it will be another story.

September 11, 2002.

Endnotes.

¹ See, for instance, Ken Booth. "US Perceptions of Soviet Threat: Prudence and Paranoia". In: Jacobsen C.G. (ed.) *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*. Macmillan, 1990, pp. 50-71; .Intriligator M.D., Jacobsen H-A.(eds.) *East-West Conflict: Elite Perceptions and Political Options*. Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988.

² President Putin of Russia gave an immediate phone call to President Bush of the USA and announced on September 13 at 12:00 a minute's silence throughout the country as a token of mourning for the victims of this tragedy. National flags were flying at half-mast throughout the country.

³ There is unofficial information that during Putin's first meetings with President Clinton in the summer of 1999, Putin argued that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had forces working in Chechnya and planning acts of terrorism against Russia. However American experts interpreted his note as the intention to gain the western support for the bloody Russian crackdown in Chechnya, because at that time US officials and human rights activists were skeptical concerning alleged connections between the bin Laden network and the Chechen separatists.

⁴ It was Mr. Sergei Yushenkov, the deputy of the right-wing part of the parliament, who proposed that the chamber observe a minute's silence, however, the Duma chairman Gennady Seleznyov (who belonged to the Communist fraction at that time) questioned his proposal: "Yesterday (on Tuesday) the State Duma council discussed that issue. A special council sitting was dedicated to the tragedy, there was a presidential decree, everyone took part in the mourning procedures, that is why, maybe, it is not worth doing that now," he said. But, the lower house dismissed Seleznyov's reservations and backed Yushenkov's proposal, who argued that "all official events, soccer matches inclusive, are beginning with a minute's silence for the victims," and that it was right that the Duma should do likewise"(Maria Tsvetkova "Duma Rises for US Terror Victims - Debates Response".*Gazeta.Ru* [<http://www.gazeta.ru/print/2001/09/19/DumaRisesfor.shtml>], 20 September 2001).

⁵ Nina Khrushcheva. Russia Joins the Club. CFR publications on web, 2002.

⁶ Data of the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) Russia-wide poll of urban and rural populations conducted on September 15, 2001, the sample size -1500 respondents. Quoted from the FOM press-information released on web on September 20, 2001 (A. Petrova. "I cry because I feel so sorry for those people").

⁷ There were four apartment bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities during August and September 1999, which killed nearly 300 Russian civilians. Putin, then Russia's prime minister under the ailing President Boris Yeltsin, responded to these bombings by engineering a reinvasion of Chechnya.

⁸ The reader may notice that a few Muscovites put the responsibility of that action on the US secret service. The idea of internal conspiracy as a cause of the terror attack was expressed in the USA and some other countries as well. *Frightening Fraud*; the new book by Thierry Meyssan seeks to prove that the Sept.11 acts of terrorism were committed not by Arab terrorists but by US special services (Vasily Bubnov. 9/11 THE BIG LIE?, released on web-site Pravda.Ru on August 24, 2002).

⁹ The VCIOM press-information No. 22, released on web on September 9, 2002 [http://www.vciom.ru/vciom/new/press/press020909_22.htm]. Cited figures are taken from the diagram and the article in web-edition "Gazeta .RU" about findings of the Russian Center for Public Opinion (VCIOM) nation-wide survey carried out on August 21-27, 2002

([<http://www.gazeta.ru/print/2002/09/11/vrossiinezal.shtml>], September 11, 2002).

¹⁰ Data of Public Opinion Foundation Russia-wide poll of urban and rural populations. August 31, 2002. 1500 respondents. The press-report released on 5 Sep 2002 presents arguments of those who approve and disapprove of US actions as follows. "The basic argument of those disapproving of US actions is that any war inevitably

leads to the deaths of civilians, which cannot be justified by anything. In condemning the US operation, many (20%) pointed to the unjustified character of those actions, or hidden (and far from noble) motivations behind the war on international terrorism ("*America has no right to interfere in the policy of another nation,*" "*they must look for the guilty ones, not destroy the nation,*" "*NATO is advancing under the cover of a fight against terrorism,*" "*it was all planned by the CIA to get closer to our borders...*") The military operation is justified because "*Afghanistan is a hotbed of terrorism,*" and "*terrorism must be wiped out.*" By invading Afghanistan, the US helped the entire world ("*Only the US would dare to attack them*"), and particularly Russia ("*they helped us by moving the borders back*" – 13%). In the opinion of 9%, the US military operation in Afghanistan was an act of justified revenge. Three percent approve by saying the US action was prompt, decisive and efficient" (Petrova A. "It was people, not the terrorists that suffered " [<http://english.fom.ru/reports/frames/eof023304.html>]

¹¹ Here are data of the Russian Center for Public Opinion (VCIOM) poll carried out on August 21-27, 2002. 22% of those interviewed said, in the Afghan military campaign "the US wanted to demonstrate who is a ruler in the world ", and 20% - "it was driven by a feeling of revenge". For 16% of respondents the aim of the campaign was to rise up the US prestige in the eyes of the international community; 11% - the US aspiration to strengthen its military presence in Central Asia; 6% - to rise up the rating of George Bush in the US. In total 64% felt that the US authorities in that campaign pursued other goals than declared. Only 15% believed the US wanted to eliminate terrorist's bases (all figures are taken from "Gazeta.Ru"

[<http://www.gazeta.ru/print/2002/09/11/vrossiinezal.shtml>], September 11, 2002)

¹² Data of Public Opinion Foundation national survey conducted on October 27, 2001.

¹³ Data of the Russian Center of Public Opinion (VCIOM) polls, the VCIOM press-information #22, 09 September 2002

[http://ww.vciom.ru/vciom/new/press/press020909_22.htm].

¹⁴ Hereby are the data of the ROMIR December 2001 telephone poll:

Most important events of 2001	% of the total sample
Lifting of <i>Kursk</i> submarine	40.6
Russian airliner crash due to Ukrainian missile hit	18.5
War in Chechnya	14.9
V. Putin's US visit	7.5
Situation around NTV channel	6.6
Civil Forum	2.1
Governmental reshuffle	2.1
Other	3.6
Don't know	4.1

A representative sample of 500 Muscovites aged 18+ were questioned by phone December 10-13.

¹⁵ Respondents who think a new era has begun were asked to elaborate on their views. According to the press-information, the answers could be divided in 3 groups. The first group (13%) are those who think the world has realized the scale and danger of international terrorism ("all nations started to think about their security," "people realized the hazard," "the nations drew closer in the fight against international terrorism"). Half as many (6%) focused on changes in US foreign policy and its stand on problems experienced by other nations, such as the Chechen conflict ("America took a tougher stand against other nations," "America found an excuse to affect world policy by force," "the Americans experienced themselves what Russia did " "Americans stopped criticising us for Chechnya"). Another 2% suppose

the split between Muslims and Christians has made the world change ("the Muslims and Christians are divided," "the world is split into two parts: the Arabs and the rest"). The fourth group - only 1% of those interviewed pointed to Russia's growing prestige in the world. This has been caused, they believe, by the fact that not only the US, but also other nations have changed their attitude towards Russia (Petrova A. "Has the World Changed after September 11?" [<http://english.fom.ru/reports/frames/eof023302.html>] Date of release: 05 Sep 2002)

¹⁶ The author touched this point in his previous COPRI Working Paper 20/2001 "Peacekeeping and National Interests". As to the religious discourse in the Central Asia states and the split of the entire Islamic community in the former Soviet Union as a whole the following comment is necessary. The problem is associated with the growth of influence of the Wahhabi sect. It should be noted here that Wahhabism has become a worldwide movement of radical Islam perpetuated by Saudi-sponsored madrassas that indoctrinate young males into this fanatical belief system, of which Al Qaeda is merely a symptom. Wahhabi's adherents are most furious Chechen fighters.

¹⁷ According to *The Washington Post*, "The State Department describes U.S. policy in Central Asia since Sept. 11 as "enhanced engagement." In testimony to the Senate earlier this summer, B. Lynn Pascoe, deputy assistant secretary of state, outlined the U.S. goal: to push the Central Asian states toward free markets and democratic politics to try to strengthen them against Islamic extremism and instability" (Robert G. Kaiser. U.S. forces put down roots in a troubled Central Asia. *The Washington Post*, Thursday, August 29, 2002).

¹⁸ There is no need to discuss here the steps toward a closer security cooperation between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (the so-called Shanghai Six) as well as decisions made in the framework of the Pact on Collective Security.

¹⁹ "We have an enormous economic and energy stake in this country," said a senior U.S. official in Kazakhstan. "It's part of our national energy strategy." (quoted from Robert G. Kaiser. U.S. forces put down roots in a troubled Central Asia. *The International Herald Tribune*, 29 August 2002, p.2 [<http://www.iht.com/articles/69118.html>]).

²⁰ Keep in mind, that among those plans there is also a project of a pipeline to the Pakistan part of Karachi, which may go through the part of Afghan territory.

²¹ James A. Baker III, who was US secretary of state from 1989 to 1992, explains the American motives: "While there may be little evidence that Iraq has ties to Al Qaeda or to the attacks of Sept. 11, there is no question that its present government, under Saddam Hussein, is an outlaw regime, is in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, is embarked upon a program of developing weapons of mass destruction and is a threat to peace and stability, both in the Middle East and, because of the risk of proliferation of these weapons, in other parts of the globe. Peace-loving nations have a moral responsibility to fight against the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogues like Saddam Hussein. We owe it to our children and grandchildren to do so, and leading that fight is, and must continue to be, an important foreign policy priority for America" (J. Baker. The Right Way to Change a Regime. *The New York Times*, August 25, 2002, Editorial-Op-Ed.)

²² William Pfaf. America's war on terror neglects lessons of the past. *International Herald Tribune*, [<http://www.iht.com/articles/68601.html>] August 30, 2002

²³ Cited from : RUSSIA'S POSITION CONCERNING US ANTI-IRAQI OPERATION REMAINS UNCHANGED. *Pravda.Ru*. 2002.08.24/14:46

²⁴ The UN General Secretary has established in October 2001 the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism. which aims are to identify the

implications and broad policy dimensions of terrorism for the United Nations and to formulate recommendations.

²⁵ In August 2002 French President Jacques Chirac repeated a demand that any military action against Iraq must be approved by the Security Council. "This runs contrary to the vision of collective security of France, a vision that is based on cooperation among states, respect for the law and the authority of the Security Council," Chirac said. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder accused the U.S. of undermining the UN's attempt to return weapons inspectors to Iraq. In an interview in the *Financial Times* on August 29, 2002, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that Britain was committed to the UN weapons inspections. (Kate Taylor. Allies urge the U.S. to hold off, and more on the debate over going to war. *Slate (on Web)*, 8/30/02)

²⁶ Other members of the U.S.-led war on terror are also beginning to chafe at Washington's apparent disregard for allied interests, and the US talk of a "crusade" against "evil-doers" is reviving old accusations of superpower arrogance. As *Foreign Affairs* has noticed: "Indeed, since the "axis of evil" entered the lexicon of U.S. foreign policy, the rhetoric coming from Paris, Berlin, or Beijing seems little different from those governments' complaints during President George W. Bush's first months in office" (*Foreign Affairs*, September 10, 2002; quotation from the web-version).

²⁷G. John Ikenberry. America's Imperial Ambition. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002. Citation from the web-version of article.

²⁸ The same conclusion was expressed by Davis E. Sander in *the New York Times* (Sander D. E. Bid to Justify a First Strike. *The New York Times/nytime.com*, August 5, 2002).

²⁹ E.J. Dionne. One Enemy, Two Camps. *Washington Post*, August 29, 2002 [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14074-2002Aug29.html>].

³⁰In the ROMIR poll conducted in February 2001 a strong majority of about 70 per cent thought the Russia foreign policy corresponds to national interest either "completely" (19.6 per cent) or "to a great extent (likely match)" (51.7per cent), and only 7 per cent of those interviewed believed the contemporary foreign policy "likely did not match" Russia's national interest, and 2 per cent said it "absolutely did not match" nation's interests (ROMIR press-release "Rossiyane o vneshnepoliticheskom kurse Rossii (Russians about the foreign policy course of Russia (http://www.romir.ru/socpolit/vvps/03_2001/foreign-policy.htm)).

³¹ To understand this result, the following fact should be taken in account. There was a difference between responses of respondents due to individual's attitude to the very idea of reconciliation with the US. The proportion of respondents with an affirmative answer on the question about the actual positive change in the US-Russia relations was higher than average over sample figure among the group of those people who wanted to see closer relations between former adversaries - 53% against 44%. And correspondingly the proportion of respondents reported no positive shifts had been higher than the average in the group of individuals with negative attitudes toward the improvement of ties with the USA - 61% against 41% in the sample. Certainly, plain people could make their conclusion only on the basis of media information. Therefore the reported survey's data reflected the interplay of propaganda's impact and attitudes.

³² Henry Kissinger, "Russia: A Partner, But Not in NATO," *Washington Post*, Dec. 7, 2001.

³³ Here are data of the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) Russia-wide poll of urban and rural populations carried out on October 27, 2001; the sample size was 1500 respondents. Over a half (59%) of respondents surveyed in November 2001 was informed about the decision to close the Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. Many Russians (40%) favored it, while about half as many of those

surveyed (23%) disapprove. What was the reason for closing the Russian military bases and what do Russians think about this decision? 40% of those surveyed agreed to answer this question. More than half (23%) mentioned economic reasons: they are a great expense, and the money could be spent more rationally. 8% of those surveyed mentioned such reasons as the technical wear on military equipment at the bases and their irrelevance to modern needs. These two notions correspond to official information given by military officials and the government on this issue. However, some respondents gave other reasons for closing the bases. 5% of those surveyed consider the closing of the Russian military bases to be a concession to the USA, as a movement to become closer to America ("to build better relations between Russia and the US"; "an act of kindness to the US"; "Putin decided to earn authority with the Americans"). According to 2% of respondents, Vladimir Putin obeyed the "will of the Americans." These respondents consider Russia leaving Cuba and Vietnam as a "capitulation" of our country ("Russia gave in without a struggle to the Americans"; "Bush demands – we submit"). 1% of respondents believe the base closings are a result of the aggravation of relations between Russia and these two countries ("they dislike Russians and asked for the withdrawal of Russian troops"). 1% of those surveyed believe the decision to withdraw the Russian troops is a result of the peace-loving policy of Russia: the fewer military bases and arms in the world the better, and the less possibility for their use ("fewer wars"; "we want a more peaceful life"; "to be neutral in military conflicts"; "let there be peace in the world"). 1% of respondents consider the geographical distance of the bases in Cuba and Vietnam as argument to close them ("it is more important to protect our borders," "there is no point in keeping soldiers so far from their country"; "this is foreign territory"). 1% of respondents gave other reasons: "they are not necessary, because the president decided so." (Petrova A. Military bases in Cuba and Vietnam: "additional expenses for our country". The press-bulletin released on the FOM web-site 01 ____ 2001).

³⁴ Petrova A. "The September 11 Terrorist Actions and Russia's Influence in the World" [<http://english.fom.ru/reports/frames/eof023303.html>]

Date of release: 05 Sep 2002.

³⁵ We have to note that the share of supporters was large in all social-demographic groups of the populace regardless to ideological inclinations and education of respondents. This idea was approved by the three quarters (74 percent) of respondents with the university degree, about the same share of Putin's adherents (73 percent) and over a half of communist voters (62 percent); over two thirds of people under 35 years old and over 50 (respectively 67% and 71 % % in these categories). See more about the results of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nationwide poll on the web-site: (<http://www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/310/761/2510.html>).

³⁶ The results of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) survey (<http://www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/310/761/2509.html>).

³⁷ We do believe, if Democrat Al Gore not Republican George Bush won the presidential elections in 2000, the outcome would be the same. Leon Fuerth, Vice-President Gore's national security advisor, speaking in July 2000 at the United States Institute of Peace, when questioned about Russia's resistance to U.S. plans for building a national missile defense program, said "the U.S. should not sacrifice its own national interests for the sake of Russia's".

³⁸ See the article in *Izvestia* on the president's view about the concept of reforming of the Russian strategic missile forces [<http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article22493>], 15.08.2002

³⁹ The results of the Russian Center for Public Opinion (VCIOM) survey carried out on 24-25 May 2002 quoted from the Internet edition "Gazeta.ru", 01 June 2001.

⁴⁰ In November 1999 a majority of Russians didn't believe "Western countries are friendly towards Russia". 41.1% of respondents said "the West wants Russia to be a "Third World" state, to become dependent on developed countries". 37.5% thought "the goal of Western countries is to break down Russia, to destroy it as an independent state". 11.5% assumed that "Western countries are rendering political and economic support to Russia in order to prevent a global crisis". And only 3.7% of Russians said, "the West is doing everything possible to help Russia become a civilized and developed state". Data of the public opinion poll was conducted by ROMIR on November 13-14, 1999 by the national representative sample (N=1500) in 40 federal entities (160 sampling points).

⁴¹ Data of the Russian Center for Public Opinion (VCIOM) nation-wide survey carried out on August 21-27, 2002.

[http://www.vciom.ru/vciom/new/press/press020909_22.htm] Sept.9, 2002.

⁴² In the February 2002 FOM poll Russians were asked the question: "SOME PEOPLE CONSIDER IRAQ TO BE AN AGGRESSIVE STATE, WHILE OTHERS THINK IT DOESN'T THREATEN OTHER COUNTRIES. WHICH OF THESE TWO VIEWS IS CLOSEST TO YOUR OWN OPINION?" Poll results showed there was no public agreement on this issue: 40% of those surveyed hold the first opinion, while 35% hold the second. However, if the USA starts military actions against Iraq as part of its fight against international terrorism, one-third of Russians (30%) would show sympathy for the "victims." Half as many of Russians (14%) said they would approve of military actions against Iraq. And almost half of those surveyed (45%) said they would feel neutral towards both sides if a military conflict takes place. According to the overwhelming majority (69%), Russia should remain neutral in case a military conflict breaks out between the USA and Iraq. As for the others, they are more likely to think Russia should support Iraq (12%), than the USA (7%) When respondents were asked if Iraq is friendly towards Russia, opinions split: 39% consider this state to be friendly, while 35% called it unfriendly. (From the FOM press-review on web released 28 Feb. 2002. Petrova A. "This is nothing to us" and "There is war in that country", [<http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/eof020802.html>]).

⁴³ The author has touched this topic in his work on *Peacekeeping and National Interests* (COPRI Working Paper 20/2001) describing the Russian position on NATO bombardments of Serbia during the war for Kosovo in spring 1999.

⁴⁴ *Foreign Affairs'* analysts emphasized that "this finding contrasts with numerous surveys of American opinion as to how the war on terrorism should proceed. *Americans and the World* has consolidated those polls, including a November 2001 survey by the Program on International Policy Attitudes which found that 95% of Americans said it is important "for the war on terrorism to be seen by the world as an effort of many countries working together, not just a U.S. effort." A similar Harris study found 95% in agreement, "even if this means exercising more restraint than we'd like" (*Foreign Affairs* (on web), September 10, 2002)

⁴⁵ David W. Moore "British, Italians, Spanish Oppose U.S. Attack to Oust Saddam Hussein". *Gallup Poll Analysis* on web. September 9, 2002 [<http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr020909.asp>].

⁴⁶ Russett, B., Hartley, T., Murray, S. (1994) "The End of Cold War, Attitude Change, and the Politics of Defense Spending". *PS: Political Sciences & Politics*. March 1994, p. 17 – 20.

⁴⁷ Cohen, A. "A New Paradigm for U.S.-Russia Relations Facing the Post-Cold War Reality". [The Heritage Foundation](http://www.heritage.org), Backgrounder No. 1105, March 6, 1997. The quotation taken from the web-version of the article.

⁴⁸ In May 1972 53% of Americans had unfavorable attitude toward Russia against 39% with favorable attitude (the Gallup survey).

⁴⁹ See, for instance, Mark Gage, *Looking Behind Potemkin's Wall: How American Policy Has Failed Russia*. Nixon Center Working Paper, October 2000; Cohen, S F

'American Journalism and Russia's Tragedy'. *The Nation*, October 2, 2000. Stephen F. Cohen, former Princeton professor, came to a conclusion that "the (western) prescriptions, reports and prognoses have turned out to be completely wrong. Nearly a decade later, Russia is afflicted by the worst economic depression in modern history, corruption so extensive that capital flight far exceeds all foreign loans and investment, and a demographic catastrophe unprecedented in peacetime. The result has been a massive human tragedy. Among other calamities, some 75 percent of Russians now live below or barely above the poverty line; 50-80 percent of school-age children are classified as having a physical or mental defect; and male life expectancy has plunged to less than sixty years. And, ominously, a fully nuclearized country and its devices of mass destruction have, for the first time in history, been seriously destabilized, the Kursk submarine disaster in August 2000 being yet another example' (the quotation was taken from the electronic version of the Cohen article on the site <http://www.thenation.com/>)

⁵⁰ Rukavishnikov, V. (1999) *Russia and the War in the Balkans: the change of Russian public opinion toward NATO, the reassessment of the balance of power in the Post-Cold War world*. Paper for the International Conference "NATO at 50 and in the future: public opinion in the East and the West", Sociological Research Center, Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, July 24 - 25, 1999, Sofia, Bulgaria. Reprinted as "Rusija i rat na Balkanu: promena ruskog javnog mnjenja prema NATO, preispitivanje ravnoteze snaga u posthladnoratovskom svetu". In: Mitrovic, L., and D.Zaharijevski (eds.). *Novisvetski poredak i Balkan (New world order and the Balkans.)*. Nis, Jugoslavija: University of Nis - Institute for sociology, 1999, p.139-148. (in Serbian).

⁵¹ Russia was forced to agree with the factual occupation of the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo by troops of the US-led coalition of states. The Kremlin felt humiliated, although the Russian peacekeeping contingent was afterwards included in KFOR, the international forces policing the province of Kosovo.

⁵² The results of ADC News Poll carried out on May 15-19, 2002 ; the report released on May 23, 2002. Ratings of Russia as a friend or close ally spiked in a Harris poll in October 2001 and remained there in May 2002, albeit with somewhat less intensity. Sixty-two percent called the countries friends, the most since 1993. And favorable views of Russia, at 63 percent, are among their highest in polls since 1989.

⁵³ The American public's specific attitudes toward the Russians have varied significantly with important historical events, but "a basic suspicion and dislike that manifested itself in some of the earliest opinion surveys mostly endured for decades afterward" (Page B. I., Shapiro R.I. *The Rational Public. Fifty Years of Trends in American Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992, p. 197). r.

⁵⁴ The comparison of risk perceptions of Russians and residents of Western Europe before 9/11 see in: Rukavishnikov, V. (2000) "Transformational risks and societal concerns". In: Cottam M.P. et al., (eds.) *Foresight and Precaution*. Vol. 2. Rotterdam: A. A. Balkema Publishers, 2000, pp. 1135 –1142.

⁵⁵ The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation was approved by the National Security Council on 5 October 1999; the full text of this document was published in Russian by the *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obosrenie (Independent Military Review)* the weekly application to the daily newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta (the Independent Gazette)*, #15 (237), 27 April 2001 (*Internet version*).

⁵⁶ The Russian Federation Military Doctrine was approved by the presidential decree of 21 April 2000. There are various views on Russia's new military doctrine which we cannot describe here in details. See, for instance: Alexei G.Arbatov. *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine lessons from Kosovo and Chechnya*. The Marshall Center Papers, No.2, July 20, 2000. In this pamphlet the shortened version of the military doctrine is presented as the appendix.

⁵⁷ President Vladimir Putin approved the new foreign policy concept on 28 June 2000. The new foreign policy concept replaces the previous concept of 1993, which was felt no longer to correspond to the realities of the contemporary international system. Perhaps the most significant feature of the concept is the emphasis it places on Russia's limited foreign policy capabilities. It notes "the limited resource support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural influence abroad." Elsewhere, the concept argues that a "successful foreign policy ... must be based on maintaining a reasonable balance between its objectives and possibilities for attaining these objectives. Concentration of diplomatic, military, economic, financial and other means on resolving foreign political tasks must be commensurate with their real significance for Russia's national interests". The concept can be found on the web-site: <http://www.mid.ru/vpcons.htm>

⁵⁸ At least 41 people, including 17 children, were killed in May 2002 when terrorists bombed a military parade in the southwestern town of Kaspiisk in the Republic of Dagestan—an attack that the Russian government blamed on local Islamic religious extremists (wahhabits) sponsored by Chechens.

⁵⁹ In March 2002, 40% of respondents supported the continuation of the military action of federal troops against rebels till the complete victory; and only 17% - an acknowledgement of the independence of this republic and the withdrawal of the Russian army from its territory (data of ROMIR polling agency, distributed by *Interfax* news agency and cited in "Gazeta Ru", 14.03.2002).

⁶⁰ According to newly revealed data of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nation-wide poll in June 2002, over a half of respondent (59%) have 'no hopes concerning normalization of the situation in Chechnya in the nearest future', against 27 percent with optimistic views on this point (Web-edition "Gazeta.Ru", 13.06.2002). Polls regularly conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) indicate a steady decline in public approval for Russia's military actions in Chechnya (data presented in % of all surveyed): from 64% in November 1999 to 53% in September 2000, 42% in June 2001, and 30% in August 2002. The growth in disapproval was first recorded in June 2001. But while a year ago, the number approving and disapproving was approximately equal, disapproval has now grown 1.6 times: from 23% in November 1999, 34% in September 2000, 46% in June 2001 and 48% in August 2002 (Source: Petrova A. "Approval for Russian Military Actions in Chechnya is Steadily Declining". FOM press-information released on the FOM web-site on 5 September 2002).

⁶¹ In 1999, Russians did not perceive Muslim countries, Georgia or Pakistan as enemies, while apprehension was expressed by 8%, 3% and 2% of Russians respectively in November 2001, after the US war against Al-Queda started. Data of polls conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in 2001 and 1999 (*Interfax*, Moscow, Nov. 9, 2001).

⁶² External enemies may unleash a war against Russia, according to 61% of respondents, down from 73% in 1999. In 1997, 44% of Russians feared that foreign enemies would start a war. These figures were obtained in polls conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) in 2001, 1999 and 1997 involving 1,500 residents each time (*Interfax*, Moscow, Nov. 9, 2001).

⁶³ Compared with the results of the poll carried out in February 1997, the results of the May 2002 Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) survey have showed a remarkable shift toward the more suspicious and unfavourable attitude toward NATO occurred during the last five years, including the year of 1999 and two first years of Putin's reign. In February 1997, 38 percent of respondents said that NATO is the aggressive bloc, while 24 percent considered the Alliance as the defensive organization. and 38 percent could identify its nature. The number of those who

agree with the first definition has increased on 18 percent, and the number of those who consider NATO as the defence union does not changed through the five years

⁶⁴ The results of the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM) survey conducted in August 2001. *Monitoring Objestvennogo Mnenia* (The Russian Public Opinion Monitor), Vol.1, January-February 2001, p. 15 – 30. Quoted p. 26.

⁶⁵ From this point of view, the USSR's first request to join NATO in 1949 may have not been entirely cynical. Moreover, the Soviet Union was the country then to fear a resurgence of German militarism and it had evidence of the hostility from the Americans and its allies to the USSR.

⁶⁶ The survey conducted by the Russian Center for Public Opinion (VCIOM) (*Segodnya* daily newspaper, 10 September 1996). Cited from Parhalina T. "On myths and illusions: Russian perceptions of NATO enlargement". NATO review, No.3, May –June 1997, Vol. 45, p. 11 –15. Web-edition: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9703-3.html>).

⁶⁷ The report of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nationwide poll revealed on 19 May 1999. 17 percent gave a negative answer, and 20 percent hesitated to respond.

⁶⁸ Data of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nationwide poll revealed on 14 July 1999. 14 per cent did not consider this process as dangerous for Russia and 21 per cent hesitated to answer

⁶⁹ Data of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nationwide poll revealed on 14 July 1999. 21 percent was indifferent to this issue, 18 percent expressed no concern, and 9 – declined to answer.

⁷⁰ 25 percent had indifferent opinion, 9 percent approved of the plan. The results of the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM) survey carried out in February 2002 quoted from *Monitoring Objestvennogo Mnenia* (The Russian Public Opinion Monitor), Vol.2 (58), March -February 2002, p. 34.

⁷¹ "Washington should be in position to counter any expansion of Russian influence in the region", - such a view was expressed by Samuel Huntington (Huntington, S.H. "The Lonely Superpower". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, March/April 1999, p.47).

⁷² Quoted from: Frank T.Csongos. "NATO: Expansion – How Far, How Fast?" <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/02/F.RU.990212141514.html>.

⁷³ Reiter D. "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy?" *International Security*, Vol. 25, No.4 (Spring 2001), pp. 41-67; cited from p. 42.

⁷⁴ This is a position of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the non-governmental think-tank: <http://www.svop.ru/doklad/en1.htm>.

⁷⁵ Frank Bruni. "President urges Expansion of NATO to Russia's Border". *The New York Times*, June 16, 2001 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/16/world/16PREX.html>).

⁷⁶ In late 1980s NATO lost his potential adversary, the Soviet Union and his allies. The Warsaw Pact was dismissed. It brought expectations that the western nations' alliance would soon be disbanded. But those expectations did not materialized. In October 1991 the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister visited the NATO Headquarters for discussions on joining the Alliance. In December 1991 the Soviet Union had collapsed, but its successor, the Russian Federation, continued the negotiation process from early in 1992. However, the Alliance did not admit post-Soviet Russia as a new member during the eight years of Yeltsin rule. In May 1997 the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed. This agreement created an illusion of improvement of relations between former adversaries. In 1999 after the war for Kosovo, it became clear for the Russians and the entire world that the Russia-NATO Founding Act had been discredited.

⁷⁷ Manfred Quiring ["Amerika wird in Afghanistan ein Fiasko erleben"](#) "Die Welt", August 20. 2002.

⁷⁸ In the Russian printed media the NATO action against Yugoslavia was condemned as the unjustified aggression, and the last year (2001) aggravation of the internal situation in Macedonia had been considered as a direct and sad consequence of NATO's policy.

⁷⁹ Our conclusion is based on the surveys' data. Answers on the question "who win the Cold war" given by politicians and scholars are as varied as their ideologies. For instance, there is a view that the USSR, in fact, was never defeated, but dissolved of its own will, leaving Russia to take all the blame for the crimes and offences of the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Russia has to be treated as 'by no means entitled to an equal and respected place in relations with other victors of the Cold War'. The surprising phrase 'other victors' is motivated by the view of Russia as 'a young and enthusiastic state that had torn the Soviet empire apart' (Arbatov, A., Chayes, A., Chayes, A. H. & Olson, L. (eds.) (1997) *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; p. 24). The cited author, Dr. Alexei Arbatov, is currently the MP with the Yabloko fraction in the State Duma, and therefore the quoted view can be regarded as a position of the liberal-oriented Russian politicians and intellectuals.

⁸⁰ This picture is a striking contrast with the state of minds registered in early 1990s, when many of Russian did not speak about NATO with suspicion and hostility. Ester P., Halman L, and Rukavishnikov V. *From Cold War to Cold Peace? A Comparative Empirical Study of Russian and Western Political Cultures*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1997, pp.183- 184.

⁸¹ The minority of 20 percent kept the negative view on the prospects of Russia-NATO cooperation, and the rest (17 percent) had no opinion on this issue. (Data of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nationwide poll carried out in May 2002 quoted from the Internet edition "Gazeta.ru" (<http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/05/27/rossiapopala.shtml>).

⁸² The proportion of opponents of strengthening of cooperation between Russia and NATO declined from 32 percent in July 1999 to 18 percent in September 2001 and 20 percent in May 2002. (Data of the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) nationwide poll carried out on May 4, 2002 ; the report revealed on May 17, 2002. (<http://www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/290/721/2359.html>).