|
|
|
|
CIAO DATE: 5/99
Contentious Politics and Regime Change: New Perspectives on Democratization
Jens Rudbeck
and
Jesper Sigurdsson
January 12, 1999
Abstract
When is popular political protest likely to emerge, and how, and under what conditions, is it likely to lead to democratization in non-democratic regimes? Mainstream theory and research on democratization remain divided between structural and agency based approaches, the former stressing the role of distinct classes as the invariant carriers of democracy and the latter emphasizing élite negotiations in initiating transitions. The paper discusses an alternative “political process” perspective that conceives of popular contention as a relatively contingent process involving the conjuncture of favorable political opportunities, organizational resources, and identity-based framing of grievances and opponents. Centering on the dynamics of political opportunity this approach goes a long way toward explaining when popular contention arises and how it can impact on regimes. Thus, popular contention can move regimes toward democracy in five distinct ways, ranging in scope from revolutions to the incremental broadening of political opportunities, but the likely effect of protest remains contingent on rulers’ response and the institutional and coercive vulnerability of the regime.
1989 was a year when ordinary people in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere took to the streets demanding political reforms or democracy. In many countries popular movements succeded in ousting incumbents. In Africa, for example, wide-ranging political changes arose across the continent on a background of strong public outbursts of discontent with incumbent leaders. Here, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, frequently thousands of people demonstrated against growing poverty, unpaid salaries, and corruption, calling for the resignation of rulers and a transition to democracy. In twenty-eight of forty-two states in sub-Saharan Africa that were authoritarian in 1989, major street demonstrations demanding political reforms occurred prior to democratization. 1 In some countries organized social movements spearheaded the call for democracy while in others — especially in the Francophone part of the continent — seemingly spontaneous massive demonstrations led to the creation of national conferences as a forum for discussing how political reforms could be implemented.
Thus, to most contemporary observers, academics and otherwise, the mass upheavals in Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere were clearly in some regard instrumental in bringing about the fall of the old regimes and the transition to democracy. Yet, mainstream democratization theory lacks the conceptual framework to explain how and why these rebellions came about and what impact they had on the non-democratic regimes. In light of the prominent role of social movements and political protest in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and transitions to democracy within the last decade, the scholarly lack of interest in bottom-up democratization is somewhat mysterious.
How, then, does contemporary theory conceive of bottom-up dynamics of regime change? At present, theory and research on democratization are divided between, on the one hand, structural approaches that search for universal and invariant patterns in the advent of democracy, and, on the other hand, process- and actor-driven approaches that stress the individuality and contingency of these experiences. 2 Structural theories stress the economic and political interests of whole classes and status groups and therefore — given certain conditions that empower prodemocratic forces — conceive of democracy as a political system produced and upheld by these specific class actors. In contrast, the “transition to democracy” approach that now prevail in most theory and research emphasizes not only agency, contingency, and choice, but deliberate top-down agency, in bringing about democracy. Political élites, or even incumbents, in this view, play the pivotal roles in the game of choosing and implementing democracy over other political formats, while masses and collective actors play only peripheral roles.
As a consequence of this bifurcation of democratization theory into structural and élite-centered approaches that host mutually exclusive conceptions of the dynamics of democratization, the search for possible variation in the road to democracy tends to disappear from the scholarly debate. The question of when and how contingent processes of political protest from the bottom-up can overthrow or change non-democratic regimes, hence, constitute a huge unexplored area in the scholarly map of possible roads to democracy.
In this paper we discuss how scholars could reasonably address this latter question: the role of bottom-up dynamics of contention in bringing about democratization. We present the key concepts and core propositions of the “political process” perspective of contentious politics, 3 and discuss how and to what extend they can contribute to an improved understanding of the relationship between contentious collective action and democratization. While by no means offering a exhaustive theory of bottom-up democratization, a political process perspective of contentious politics paves the way for a more nuanced understanding of when and why social movements and other forms of mass political protest arise and how they sometimes lead non-democratic regimes in the direction of democracy. Although it departs from the view that democratization, or durable democracy, always and everywhere emanate from the top-down the political process perspective is largely in accord with the main current in the literature on democratic transition that emphasize strategic interaction rather than class as the starting point of analysis. 4
The argument is organized around three broad clusters of variables that have come to define the field. Students of contentious politics differ in the relative importance they ascribe to a) the political opportunity structure of a polity, b) mobilization of resources, and c), culture and framing, and in which elements of political contention they seek to explain by invoking these factors. 5 We discuss each in turn in order to see to what extend these factors contribute to explaining political protest and democratization from below. More concretely, we seek to address two broad questions:
An answer to the first question above entails an explanation of the actions of potential mass actors, while the second leads us toward an examination of the structural and institutional constraints on the likely effect of these actions. However, while political process scholars have produced an impressive set of explanatory tools that help account for when people rebel they have dug less deep when confronted with the possible macropolitical outcomes of that action. As a consequence we are at present on less secure ground when accounting for the conditions that favor democratization as a result of popular protest.
The conceptualization of the problem into two separate questions makes it possible to avoid any a priori assumption that popular political protest always (or, conversely, never) lead to democratization. It does, however, allow us to map the possible trajectories of the twin processes of political protest and democratization, how they impact on each other, and the conditions under which they are likely to go in one direction or the other. Therefore, without offering definitive answers in this paper, we briefly discuss some analytical and conceptual implications of viewing regime change and democratization from a process perspective, and how, and to what extend, dynamics of contention in non-democratic polities differ from the ones found in established democracies.
The paper runs like this: We start by uncovering the mainstream accounts of the role of élites vs. masses in democratic transitions, then turn briefly to a discussion of the concept of processes of democratization. Second, we present the three key concepts of political process theory of contentious politics — political opportunity, resource mobilization, culture and framing — and discuss how they address the questions of the emergence and outcomes of mass political protest. Third, on the basis of this literature, we lay out a preliminary typology of general mechanisms that help explain how political protest from the bottom-up can cause democratization. Finally, we offer speculations about how non-democratic rulers’ response to popular contention influence its likely outcome. Moreover, how different regimes’ institutional structure and capacity influence their vulnerability to movement-incited democratization.
Élites and Masses on the Road to Democracy
Almost three decades ago, Dankwart Rustow launched the idea of democratization as a political process consisting of several, separate but overlapping phases marked by their own internal dynamics. 6 To deal analytically with the differences between democratization as a political process and democracy as a political, institutional system, Rustow suggested a clear distinction, both theoretically and empirically, between the generic and the functional aspects of democracy. This distinction was needed, Rustow argued, because “the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence”. 7 Despite Rustow’s attempt to promote a two-strand research agenda for the study of democracy and democratization, most scholars continued to treat the process of democratization as a black box right up to the mid-1980s.
The structural theories that once dominated the field describe democracy as the product of specific classes or status groups that have an intrinsic interest in democracy as a political system. The structural theories come in both deterministic and in more probabilistic versions, 8 but they all search for the origins of democracy in the political interests or projects of specific socio-economically defined actors, and then seek to account for their leverage by the examination of diverse background factors that influence the relative power of democratically vs. non-democratically inclined groups, such as wealth, literacy, or local autonomy.
The structural approach implies a general belief that the whole process - leading from the collapse of authoritarian rule, to the inauguration of democratic institutions, and further to the consolidation of democracy - can be explained by the very same factors. The emphasis on historical and socioeconomic origins often entails an analytical jump from structural origins to outcomes — or vice versa — neglecting the process by which democratization occurs. Democracy, in this view, come as a package solution delivered if, and only if, the socioeconomic circumstances are right, and these circumstances precondition both the origin and the successful consolidation of democracy. As a consequence, strictly-minded structuralists have tended toward a pessimistic view of the spread of democracy by posing its structural origins in the, mostly Western, countries they have examined as necessary preconditions for democracy occur elsewhere.
As a large number of countries during the past twenty-five years have turned their backs on authoritarian rule and introduced multiparty democracy, the apparent variety of such origins has lend the search for preconditions a certain aura of futility. 9 Impressed by authoritarian breakdown in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, several scholars began to re-evaluate existing theories. It was becoming increasingly clear that structuralist theory of democracy could not provide satisfactory explanations of the causes of the huge wave of democratization since the mid-1970s. Rediscovering Rustow’s “old” phase-model of democratization, these scholars then began to open what had usually been treated as a black box and started to investigate what actually take place when an authoritarian regime break down and a new democratic one is established.
In doing so, the new “transition” approach focused on the decision-making processes of incumbent élites in opting for democracy or not. They emphasized the importance of short-term dynamics during the democratic transitions which, they found, were often subject to unforeseen contingencies and unintended outcomes. 10 In contrast to the invariant explanations that characterize many structuralists theories, the transition approach arrived at the conclusion that every country passed through a unique process of democratization. Of course similarities in the transition processes could be traced, but no general pattern emerged and no pre-conditions were determining the rise of democracy. In this view, the political process inside the black box of democratic transition — where “different sets of actors with different followings, preferences, calculations, resources, and time horizons come to the forefront” 11 — display a complexity that render a unified theory of democratization virtually impossible.
However, the bifurcation of structural and agency-based theory did not, as one would expect, lead to prolonged intellectual struggle between the camps. Many scholars have started to bridge the gap between the structural and transition approaches. 12 In this spirit — but acknowledging that there are several ways a regime can change from authoritarian to democratic — Karl & Schmitter suggested that the possible roads to democracy cluster into four ideal-types of regime transition. 13 Depending on the democratizing agent (“mass” or “élite”) and the strategy deployed (compromise or force), democracy can emerge, they argue, by a pact in which élites agree upon a compromise among themselves; by imposition whereby élites use force to bring down incumbents; by reform wherein masses mobilize and impose democracy in a non-violent way; or by revolution involving masses resorting to violence in ousting the authoritarian rulers from office.
Still, reflecting a widespread understanding among scholars, Karl and Schmitter’s attempt to specify the various ways of democratic transition builds on two premises that unnecessarily narrow our comprehension of the complex mechanisms involved in democratization. First, they include in their analysis only those processes that — by a retrospective judgement — lead from autocracy to full and durable democracy. This means that processes that promote democracy but were interrupted or strained before democracy was fully consolidated or that — again by the authors’ judgement — might lead toward an unstable version of a democratic regime are precluded from the scheme. Second, explaining democratization as the product of a deliberate political strategy for achieving the system of democracy per se preclude those — probably quite common — instances where, as the political process unfolds, democratization emerges as a “fortuitous by-product” of struggle for more mundane ends. 14 Also these unintended forms of democratization fall outside of Karl and Schmitter’s scheme.
Moreover, for the purpose of illustrating the impossibility of arriving at mature democracy in a bottom-up (reform or revolution) fashion, Karl and Schmitter map the destinies a host of regime changes in their scheme. Their argument makes intuitive sense as an approximation of how processes of democratization have happened in southern Europe and Latin America but it can hardly be taken as a general argument that democratization only can happen from the top-down.
In sum, the transitologists’ way of conceiving of democratization only as the product of a willed, full-scale “transition to democracy” crafted by state élites made them to overlook important processes of democratization that emanate from the bottom-up or are generated by the strategic interactions of élites and masses, the outcome of which sometimes are unanticipated or unintended. While the “transition approach” has capitalized on the insight that democracy can take root in a variety of structural settings, it has ignored the facts that democratization might also happen in different ways and stem from different actors or their interactions, including, sometimes, mass actors.
Political Processes of Contention and Democratization
How we conceive of democratization obviously impact on how to explain it. From the above critique, it follows that no complete theory of democratization can allow a priori to exclude neither élites nor masses from the analysis. Rulers, regimes, and élites figure prominently along with mass actors in a political process account. However, in order to redress the theoretical balance toward bottom-up processes this paper focuses on collective action by challenging groups and its possible causal relation to regime change and, therefore, treat the standing of rulers and élites as factors conditioning this.
The stress on interactions precludes any strong prediction of the outcome of a long process, in this case, whether the polity eventually settles for consolidated democracy. It does, however, allow explanation of the salient features of the process of political protest as it unfolds and the exploration of its possible causal connections to the process of democratization where it occurs.
What type of outcome counts as democratization? Overall, adhering to Rustow’s arguments, we should take care to conceive of democracy as a distinct regime form, hence of democratization as a process involving any significant net movement toward a democratic regime form. We have reason to expect social movements to influence regimes in a broader range of ways other than leading directly and unambiguously to regular, free, and fair elections. But even so we concentrate on delineating the possible impact of mass contention on the political relations in a polity and the institutions undergirding this. Therefore, without stressing a specific definition, our inquiry is guided by a relatively broad notion of democracy and democratization.
Democracy, in this sense, includes more than the formal procedures by which governments and heads of states take office 15 but less than such eventual outputs as consolidation, legitimacy, a vibrant civil society, or a balanced political culture. Democratization, in turn, we understand to include, for example, the introduction or strengthening of formal mechanisms of preference aggregation (e.g., elections, parliaments), and any significant introduction, equalization or protection of civil liberties and citizenship rights throughout the population. 16 This understanding includes civil liberties that render formal mechanisms for electing governments and influencing policy meaningful at all, but excludes broad cultural impacts of social movements on society at large. Consequentially, the sharp distinction between processes of “liberalization” and processes of “democratization” frequently found in transition analysis 17 is not wholly warranted in this context; most instances of liberalization constitute necessary, but not sufficient, stepping stones toward democracy, hence imply democratization in the above sense.
Returning to contention, when do people engage in collective and contentious claim-making actions against incumbents? How, and under which conditions, are these actions likely to have a democratizing impact on the regime? The following section deals with the former question, while the subsequent ones take up the latter.
The Dimensions of Contentious Politics
Recently scholars have become increasingly aware of the quite similar mechanisms that make ordinary people engage in such diverse forms of collective action as popular protests, strikes, insurgency, riots, rebellions and revolutions. To capture the different forms of collective actions for analytical purposes McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 18 have suggested contentious politics as an umbrella concept that, in one end of the spectrum, borders on and includes revolutions, rebellions, and civil wars, 19 and in the other end, touches upon themes of hidden resistance, obstruction, foot-dragging, and underground culture. 20 In general terms McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly claim that all forms of contentious politics on the spectrum share some common features defined by two elements: “(1) it involves contention: the making of interest-entailing claims on others; and (2) at least one party to the interaction is a government”. 21 Defined this way contentious politics covers a wide range of collective actions involving claim-making that directly or indirectly bears on the government. However, for the purpose of this paper we concentrate on the relation between societal actors and the government. 22 In this manner, contentious politics can be seen as involving “an ongoing bargaining process between those who claim governmental authority in a given territory.... and those over whom that authority is said to extend”. 23
Social movements, in turn, are a relatively coherent, organized, and visible subspecies of contention. They feature “sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness”. 24 Further, in this view, whether such social movements engage in peaceful civil disobedience, violent revolutions or a third form of contentious politics depends on the ongoing process of interaction between contenders and the government. Social movements engaged in street protests may from the onset express dissatisfaction with for example declining economic conditions but if the government decides to clamp down on the movement, it may force it to dissolve, go underground, or provoke it to radicalize and widen its protest toward revolutionary demands. 25
Given these seemingly recurrent features, scholars have recently explored the potential for developing a single conceptual and analytical framework for studying the diverse forms of contentious politics. A starting point in this effort has been an attempt to flesh out common features from the vast body of literature on social movements emerging after the study of contentious politics took a tremendous upturn at the end of the 1960s. 26 In doing so, it is widely agreed that this literature, seen in a wider perspective, falls into three large categories — mobilization of resources, cultural framing or the political opportunity structure. 27 Studies of resource mobilization focus on internal mobilizing structures and organizational processes of movements; studies of cultural framing centers on the cultural, ideological, and tactical framing of movement action and grievances, while studies of political opportunity structures analyze the constrains and opportunities confronting movements.
In the following, we will briefly discuss each set of factors with an eye to how they explain the rise of popular protest and, especially, to what degree they can also help explain the macropolitical outcomes of protest. The purpose, however, is not an in-depth discussion of this field of theorizing but the more modest one of introducing and evaluating the overall utility of a perspective that only recently has entered debates on democratization.
Political Opportunity Structures
The notion of a political opportunity structure has gained increasing importance in social movement and collective action theory, especially when it comes to explain the emergence of protest. The rationale is simple: collective action takes place in a context that is already structured by existing patterns of collective interaction between groups, organizations, and, most importantly, the state. These structures of opportunities and constraints, in turn, influence the moment of emergence of a movement and — if it emerges at all — its likely fate once its has come to the fore. More formally, a political opportunity structure contains the “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent — dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure”. 28
Conceptions of opportunity structures divide into institutional ones that emphasize the rigid and static dimensions of opportunity and processual ones that stress its dynamic and shifting aspects. 29 As for the first, comparatively minded scholars have taken political opportunity to be a function of more formal or informal aspects of a given country’s institutional make-up, comprising all “those aspects of a political system that determine movement development independently of the purposive action of the actors involved”. 30 In this vein, Kriesi and associates have provided a carefully elaborated analysis of the different form and fate in four Western democracies of the “new” social movements of the 1980s. 31 They emphasize how the degree of centralization in a given polity, along with its historically developed strategies for dealing with challengers, and the policy implementation capacity of the state, taken together shape movements differently from country to country.
Moreover, the kind of political opportunity structure in a country also influences the form and tactics of a movement. Exclusive states like the French risk alienating hence radicalizing protesters and inducing to build up centralized organizations in response, while inclusive states inadvertently tend to moderate their challengers and making them rely on more informally coordinated modes of protest. The static-institutional way of conceptualizing political opportunity in important respects resembles the reasoning behind state-centered and structural studies of revolutions and thus lends itself toward controlled, cross-national comparisons of institutional features. 32
Second, in the more dynamic versions of political opportunity, the main argument is, along with the main thrust of the political process perspective outlined above, that the process of contentious interactions between movements, counter-movements, and the state, acquires its own momentum once it is set into motion. We should therefore, it is argued, search for explanations at the level of the actual process of interaction between contending groups and organizations. It is salient alterations in the relations between the “challengers” and “members” of the polity that explain the ebb and flood of collective action. 33 Moreover, movements react not only to capitalize on political opportunities, once a movement has emerged, it inadvertently create rising or contracting opportunities for itself and others by way of its own actions. Over time, movements influence their own political environment by their impact on the political opportunity structure, but not always to their own benefit. 34 Accordingly, movements and other forms of protest — in an essentially opportunistic fashion — are likely to occur when
Methodologically, the dynamic perspective thus lends itself toward tracing the process of a single movement or a cluster of movements in a single country. In doing so, it also helps to account for the phenomenon of “cycles” of protest that start when “early riser” movements signal the vulnerability of authorities or alter the alignments that undergird the polity. 36 Thereby, initiators act as a catalyst for others to mobilize in order to gain advantages or to protect privileged interests. Similarly, cycles of reform occur when challenging groups are given concessions or allowed into polity “membership” by the government and therefore convert their activity toward blocking the way for other challengers. When they find themselves among les satisfes, recently privileged groups easily acquire high stakes in the routine functioning of the system. 37
Many scholars also invoke (most likely state) repression of movement activism and mobilization as an important variable external to movements that help determine their emergence and outcome. But it remains a contested issue how repression impacts on the different aspects of contentious politics. The main line of reasoning within a political process perspective follows that of the other facets of political opportunity — movements are expected to react as opportunists. 38 However, when state repression is mild and political opportunities abundant — as in an ideal pluralist setting — it makes for few outbreaks of contention because protest is channeled into legal and institutional forms; where repression is very strong the level of contention is also expected to be low as potential claim-makers may pay a high price for public displays of discontent. 39 But in-between no and very strong repression protesters have opportunity and reason to put forward their claim. Weak, erratic, shifting, or inconsequentially targeted repression is therefore likely to provoke widespread resistance. 40 Conceived this way, the relationship between state repression — along with opportunity in general — and political contention form a “n”-shaped curve. 41
In conclusion, shifting political opportunities to a considerably degree determine the emergence of popular contention and the institutional aspects of opportunity constrain its form, goal, and strategy. However, as will become clear, the macropolitical impact of a movement in terms of democratization remains less explored, but surely it cannot be accounted for solely by the factors that bring the protest into existence.
Mobilization of Resources
While changes in the political opportunity structure may signal a more favorable environment for political contention, people rarely take to the streets in spontaneous and unmediated displays of their discontent. Any sustained challenge to regimes always involves some kind mobilization of resources on behalf of the contenders. The rise and, even more so, the survival and prospering of a social movement depend to a significant degree on its capacity for leadership, communication, and fund raising. Taken together, mobilization of resources not only shapes the rise and subsequent development of a movement but also influences to what extend it is exposed to patronizing or co-optation by outsiders. First, this is an argument for making the entrepreneurial skills and organizational strategies of movements a major object of study. Second, the kind and density of the networks connecting members of a potentially contentious population significantly shape such mobilizing and coordinating efforts. We briefly discuss these two aspects.
Reacting to earlier social-psychological approaches, the resource mobilization approach builds on the assumption that the aggregate level of strain and discontent in a society is more or less constant and therefore bears no direct relation to the normally much more fluctuating level of protest. 42 In this view, a certain level of grievance may be regarded as a precondition for collective action but e.g. decreasing legitimacy of government as a result of such grievance neither qualify as a sufficient nor a necessary cause behind the emergence of protest. Often social movements in societies displaying high levels of discontent fail to emerge simply because contenders do not have the means to initiate protest activity. 43
Questioning grievance as a sufficient explanation of the emergence of social movements, McCarthy and Zald therefore suggested that, “the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment” by a social movement can be seen “as a crude function of the resources controlled” by activists or the organization attached to the movement. 44 Potential claim-makers’ coordinating and bargaining capacity and their access to assets like money, weapons, labor, internal loyalty, and the media, thus exercise profound influence on their possibility for collective action. Resource plenty also helps provide for the “selective incentitives” that often is thought to be critical in order to persuade people to join collective action. 45 This argument is likewise the main thrust of Gamson’s influential pioneer study of the careers of 53 American popular movements. Among other things, he concludes that development of formal “social movement organizations” (as distinct from the movement itself) greatly enhances the success of protest. 46
In an extension of this perspective, resource mobilization theorists regard bureaucratization and eventual cooptation of movements within existing structures of power as a quite likely outcome of protest. As in the so-called “iron-law of oligarchy”, leaders of initially radical movements often convert their activity toward institutional (interest group) politics and lobbyism in a way that almost invariably entails a bypassing of their initial grass-root setting. 47
A second aspect of the resource mobilization approach is the idea that contentious collective action is unlikely to emerge and to be sustained without a dense network setting that connects potential activists in the first place. Tightly knit communities solve problems of communication and mobilization much easier than, at the other extreme, disperse and atomized individuals. 48 Similarly, ties of interdependence to persons already involved in protest activity have been shown to be more important in predicting involvement in social movement activity than a person’s level of felt grievance. 49 One way of summing this up is to say that the conjunction of “category-ness” (e.g. ethnicity) and “netness” (e.g. strong ties of interdependence and communication) strongly facilitates mobilization of a population. 50
In conclusion, we learn from resource mobilization theory that contentious collective action arise only from hard organizational work, which, in turn, is heavily shaped by initial network setting of population in question. Further, leadership and sponsorship can sometimes pull movements toward de-mobilization and de-radicalization. Thus a direct link between initially stated grievances and the outcome of protest is blocked both by the initial level of available resources and by the process of resource mobilization itself..
However, despite the large number of studies on these aspects of social movements, empirical studies have established no general causal link between organization, resources, or tactics and the macropolitical outcome of protest. 51 Indeed, from a political process view mobilization of resources looks more like an important, perhaps necessary, and almost defining element of popular protest 52 that remains contingent on the dynamics of political opportunity. The larger context of political opportunity, we contend, shapes the incentitives and range of means for taking up the troublesome burden of mobilizing people and their resources. While resource mobilization remain an important aspect of many movements, this is why “even groups with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in movement, while those with deep grievances and dense resources — but lacking opportunities — may not”. 53
Culture and Framing
Like in most fields of the social sciences, culture has come to the fore in the study of social movements. Initially, the renewed interest in culturalist perspectives on social movements emerged in the light of the so-called “new social movements” of the 1980s expressing post-materialists identities like environmentalism, feminism, or anti-militarism. 54 Given the seemingly more identity-based, emotional, and cultural — as opposed to “instrumental” — dimensions of these movements, a number of scholars have come to question the somewhat mechanic image of mobilization inherent in the resource-based and political opportunity perspectives. Broadening the perspective toward movements in general, and toward a more agency-based way of conceiving of culture and cultural change, this approach has come to emphasize issues such as the social construction of identity of insurgency groups, processes of identification and articulations of goals, the role of the media, etc. Here we limit the discussion to three aspects: framing of identity and goal articulation, repertoires of contention, and diffusion of protests.
Framing The social construction of identities and strategies builds on two notions: that mobilization depends on the interpretation of the situation by participators and that interpretations themselves are heavily shaped by the dynamics of contention. First, it has been claimed that “no matter how momentous a change appears...it only becomes a an ’opportunity’ when defined as such by a group of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the situation”. 55 In seeking to address this issue David Snow and associates have argued that Goffman’s concept of cultural “frames” helps explain how seemingly objective conditions are channeled into overall, culturally endowed, perceptions of right and wrong. 56 Cultural frames consist of “interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the ’the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment”. 57 Usually new movements develop a “master frame” that, to be effective, must embrace both the essence of the claims and resonate with selected elements of the political culture of the larger population. Such master frames, for example “civil rights”, “democracy”, or “peace”, connect movement claims to potential followers’ more general, and perhaps, unconscious world-views.
Second, framing is tightly intertwined with the movements’ organizational work and with the exploitation of tactical opportunities. The process of framing thus essentially consists of “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”. 58 Therefore, rather than consisting of pre-existing, slowly evolving, cultural traits or discursive formations and rather than causing activist behavior in any straightforward way, the particular attempts at framing is to a considerably degree products of contention itself. Even though activists and entrepreneurs are constrained by the cultural pool of a population, movements themselves are also “constructing meaning through action” in a way that over time shape the identities of the followers and the political culture of the general population. Consistent with the political process perspective, the concept of framing thus provides a more agency-based and dynamic lens of analyzing the cultural dimension of protest than the notion of autonomous popular mentalities or political cultures. 59
Repertoires of Contention The analysis of the ways people act when they rebel has recently been given a more cultural twist. Charles Tilly has empirically shown how the array of contending performances that a group possesses and knows how to deploy — that is, their “repertoire” of contention — is a deeply cultural product at the intersection of current opportunity structures and the previous history of contention. Today’s taken-for-granted forms of contention like the demonstration, the strike, the public meetings, or, indeed social movements as such — visible and sustained challenges to opponents and power-holders — are historical creatures of the nineteenth century. A relatively universal “modern” repertoire has replaced the previous, more localized and parochial forms of contention, like shaming-ceremonies, grain-seizures, and petition to notables. 60
In this perspective, “people learn to break windows in protest, attack pilloried prisoners, tear down dishonored houses, stage public marches, petition, hold formal meetings, organize special interest organizations”. 61 But at any particular point in time, a group has access only to a limited number of performances that are “far narrower than the technical capacities of the parties would allow or their interests alone prescribe”. 62 A repertoire is embedded both in durable, routine social relations and in tactical innovations that arise from the process of contention itself. It changes as a product of those relations, that is, mostly incrementally, but sometimes in bursts. Like in the notion of framing, culture in this regard does not cause action in any strong sense of the word, but strongly constrains what actions are likely to be undertaken. For this reason we should expect repertoires to be important sources of variation between the kind of collective actions — for example the deployment of violence or not — that surface in structurally similar situations across time and place.
Diffusion of Protest Theories of collective contention — including the ones discussed above — have tended to adopt individual social movements as the fundamental unit of analysis. However, movements do not always come on their own, they are often accompanied by a whole contemporaneous ”family” of movements. As is well known from research within single countries, movements cluster their action in “cycles of contention”. 63 A relatively new, but important branch of social movement theory seeks to address the problem of cross-national diffusion. No doubt, the interest in such diffusion across borders has to do with the impressive interdependence of protest movements in the upheavals of 1988-1991 in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. For example what features of the Eastern European revolts were rooted in the condition of Soviet unwillingness to militarily back its clients, and what stemmed from latecomer movements emulation of the initiators?
McAdam and others have argued that diffusion rests on preexisting ties between initiators and emulators. 64 Depending on the existence of such ties, diffusion enables activists in one country to borrow frames, organizational models, and repertoires of contention from each other. In this manner, “initiator movements encourage the rise of latecomers not so much by granting other groups increased leverage with which to press their claims, but by setting in motion complex diffusion processes by which the ideational, tactical, and organizational ’lessons’ of the early risers are made available to subsequent challengers”. 65 In Kenya, for example, the FORD pro-democracy movement clearly emulated frames from the Civic Forum in distant Czechoslovakia in its attempt to bring the Moi regime to fall. 66 However, the opportunity structure of individual countries should be expected to play an important role in constraining diffusion, but it seems safe to conclude that emulation can reinforce or alter local dynamics of framing and resource mobilization.
To sum up: the field of contentious politics contains a diverse, but overall fruitful, set of core theoretical prepositions, a relative unified conceptual apparatus, and a host of sensitive studies that can enrich the study of democratization from below. The rooting in three different perspectives of contentious politics that center on the causal importance of resources, political opportunities, and cultural framing does involve a certain level of eclecticism. Insofar as they concentrate on explaining different aspects of contention, the three sub-perspectives do not, however, contradict each other. Especially, this perspective provides a fine-grained set of analytical tools for explaining movement emergence, form of action, and stated goals — including democratization. In doing so, it incorporates the interplay of bottom-up dynamics and top-down constraints.
However, the processes described above do not run their course independently, over time they intertwine and influence each other. The mobilization efforts of movement entrepreneurs may bring people together and thereby facilitate a particular framing of an issue; the sudden appearance of a window of opportunity may trigger the formation of previously non-existing grievances; the relative capacity of resources may change rapidly as political opportunities and constraints alter. 67
The concepts of resource mobilization, framing, and political opportunities are thus essential tools in any full account of popular contention. However, consistent with a political process perspective that focus on interactions among groups of actors, we conclude from the discussion above that mobilization and framing and their related processes to a huge extend depend on political opportunity structures and the processes they set into motion. In the next two sections we focus, first, on how these latter processes sometimes can cause democratization and, second, on the circumstances that facilitate this.
How Contention Changes Regimes
Few social movement scholars have tried to measure and explain the impact of popular contention on institutional politics, especially in non-democratic settings. 68 The outline is therefore based on historical-sociological studies of long-run political change in Europe’s past that have provided important insights of how states are shaped and transformed from the contentious interactions of state agents and ordinary people. 69 In line with the processual view on movements and political opportunities these studies conceive of political regimes not as fixed entities but as contingent products of the political processes that sustain or change them. On this eclectic and preliminary basis, we feel safe to suggest five stylized ways of how domestic contention historically has impacted on regimes.
| Directness of Effect |
|
|
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||
| Purpose of Collective Action |
Even where a single mode gains overall importance, any concrete case of movement-incited democratization is, of course, likely to display the combination of two or more. Note also that of these five propositions of mechanisms of democratization from below, only the first three spring from movement action that actually intends to create democracy. Moreover, they can be distinguished analytically to the extent that they involve a) the direct impact of movement action on democratization, or b) operate more indirectly by inducing élites and incumbents to accommodation and anticipation. Mechanism (1), movement-ascendant democratic revolutions and transitions, and (4), inadvertent democratization, are examples of such direct impacts, while (2), constraining of élite pacts, and (5), opening up the political opportunity structure, illustrate more indirect ways. Finally (3), the formation of alliances between movements and élite segments, is a hybrid form.
Interactions, Institutions, and the Outcome of Protest
So far we have only discussed how, and under what conditions, popular challenges to regimes arise, and by which processes it might impact on those regimes. We have argued that the political process perspective of political opportunities — forwarded by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly — to a large extend is capable of explaining the emergence, timing, development, diffusion and eventual decline of movements and other challengers by pointing to the flow of shifting opportunities that spring from the interaction of the contending groups and the state. It also sheds some light on the processes whereby movements might impact on regimes.
Indeed, identification of the processes that tell us how movements may cause democratization is an important step toward rethinking the relation of popular contention to democracy. But not all movements — not even those committed to democracy — succeed in bringing about democratization. To paraphrase Rustow, we should therefore proceed from the notion that the factors that make democratization a likely outcome may not be the ones that brought the popular challenge into existence. 77 Formulated this way, the problem is the varied impact of movements on regimes. Why do movements of seemingly similar strength have different outcomes?
Overall, we suggest that differences in outcome stem not only from the varied strength of movements but also depend on the response of the regime. Accounting for rulers’ response to challengers, in turn, can be conceptualized in two complementary ways. First, how incumbents interpret popular challenges influence how they choose to react upon them: to repress, co-opt, give concessions, or perhaps even initiate a transition to democracy? Second, the nature of the regime — its overall repressive and institutional capacity as well as the patterns of alignments between incumbents and other major political actors — shapes the likely success of any of the above strategies. Therefore, without offering an exhaustive survey — much less an elaborated model — we will briefly discuss the role of incumbents’ interpretation of the political process and of the capacity of different regimes.
Incumbents’ Tactical Choices According to Dahl, there is an increasing likelihood that authoritarian regimes concede to the pressure for democratization when “the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration”. 78 This assessment entails that a successful outcome of contentious collective action rests on the ability of social movements to increase the costs of repression to a level that transcend the costs of toleration. In a similar vein prevailing accounts of Latin American and south European transitions (that build on the notion of élite initiation of regime change) stress that élites are prone to such prudent choices only when their future seems relatively secure. In this view, the granting of concessions will often require the challengers’ guaranty of the incumbents’ economic privileges and juridical immunity for previously committed atrocities. 79
Further, Bermeo proposes that, in terms of opting for democracy or not, the cost of toleration depends on the rulers’ expectation of who will form the first freely elected government and what deal they can expect to strike with the new rulers 80 . In this account, three possible scenarios arise. In the first scenario, the ruler is challenged by a social movement that — if it takes office — has no intention of sharing power and privileges with the old regime élites. The second scenario arises when incumbents believe that the opposition will win the first election but that it is also willing to strike a deal that protects their interests. In the final scenario, incumbents forecast that they are able to win the first election themselves.
From this perspective, rulers respond to challengers on the background of such forecasts. In the first projected outcome where rulers expect to be ousted and prosecuted, they will try to muster all available repressive capacity, if needed, to avoid any democratic concessions to the claim-makers — even if such repression may have very high costs in other regards. If they give in or leave the country, this is only likely to happen after a full-scale violent clash with opponents. The second scenario with a perceived powerful but moderate opposition makes for more ambiguity; however, if the costs of suppressing the opposition are also high, rulers may find it acceptable to give, most likely limited, concessions. This is so especially if incumbents have an intrinsic stake in the state’s overall stability or security. Third, when rulers expect to be able to manage a transition or win the first free election they will often opt for democratization.
However, a description of the strategic choices that rulers face merely begs the questions, first, how projections of the future are formed and, second, what structural features of states and regimes constrain the strategies available? On what basis are costs of toleration and suppression calculated? We mention two possible answers. Tarrow’s account of the interplay of “cycles” of protest, reform, and transition takes up the first, while state-centric historical sociologists’ analyses of state formation and regime strength provide some guidelines for how to approach the second.
On the basis of a large sample of contentious events, Tarrow has shown how the social movement cycle in Italy of the late 1960s transformed Italian democracy. 81 In this view, outcomes of social movements formed as by-products of the strategic interplay of movement actions and claims with those of their opponents and the government. 82 It follows that a mapping of these interactions, at least in principle, allows us to measure the impact of one party’s action on all the parties’ subsequent interactions. Thus, most of the effects of the Italian movements did not arise from the content of their claims or the immediate goals of their action. Inadvertently, an overall movement preference for revolution over time led to reforming concessions to moderates and repression of the rest. Similarly, in Spain’s democratization in the mid-1970s and in the failed democratization of post-First World War Italy, the divergent outcomes did not arise from the intended actions of any specific set of actors, but resulted from a process of mutual accommodation and anticipation between élites, incumbents, and masses. 83 In this way, a “cyclical” perspective of reform and transition goes one step further than Bermeo’s scenarios because it seeks to explain the opportunities, actions and preferences of the parties by examining their current and historical pattern of interaction. Properly conducted, it might therefore tell us when the individual mechanisms of regime change outlined above are likely to operate.
The Nature and Capacity of the Regime Anotherbasic premise for discussing outcomes, successful or not, is the state’s potential for repression of movement mobilization or action along with the nature of the alignments undergirding the regime. Many strands of theory point in this direction; we briefly mention three. Within democratization theory, Linz and Stepan assign great explanatory weight to the inherent nature of a few generic types of non-democratic regimes: “authoritarian”, “sultanistic”, “totalitarian”, and (the hybrid) “post-totalitarian”. 84 In this argument, each kind — because of its internal institutional make-up — strongly influences the likely ways that a transition can happen. Thus, in 1989-91, sultanistic Romania underwent a sudden, violent, but incomplete revolution, while authoritarian Poland experienced prolonged but eventually bridged struggle between the regime and civil society, and post-totalitarian East Germany and Czechoslovakia saw sudden, massive, but nonviolent outbursts of popular discontent followed by immediate regime collapse. 85
In an analogous line of reasoning, analysts of social movements within existing democracies who rely on static-institutional conceptions of political opportunity structures have repeatedly reported such inherent institutional rigidities as the most important factors constraining the likely outcome of protest. 86 In this perspective, the institutions that constitute structures of opportunities and threats for movements, conversely, from the point of view of rulers, contain the very means — and their limitations — for staying in power. Finally, historically and structurally inclined students of states, state transformations, and revolutions have also employed a quite similar approach to the institutional arrangements that constrains the scope and direction of political change in general. 87
Let us briefly discuss two common variables found in this perspective, the coercive and institutional capacity of the state and rulers’ dependence on other powerful actors. First, the coercive capacity of the state. Skocpol has pointed out that historically full-scale revolutions invariably were preceded by a significant weakening of the state’s overall coercive and policy-making capacity. Today, however, Western states possess overarching means of violence as compared to their internal challengers, and for this reason alone it is doubtful whether they will ever experience social revolutions in the manner of a Russia, France, or China. 88 On the other hand, many states in the Third and former Second Worlds are a far cry from possessing a monopoly of the means of violence in society, legitimate or not. Those states that have the most fragile hold on society when compared to their Western cousins have thus earned the label of “weak” or even “failed” states. 89 Here rulers, democratic as well as non-democratic, may not possess the means or the institutional autonomy to put down opponents at will; however, the same situation may extend to challengers. In many weak states the results of this are low-intensity conflict in peripheral areas, easily inflammable but hardly effective protest in shantytowns, or cycles of instability and abrupt regime change — often inhibiting significant democratization, or, at least, the consolidation of democracy.
Second, most rulers undertake implicit or explicit alignments within the state apparatus (e.g. with the military) and with powerful groups in society. These ties of (sometime mutual) dependence serve foremost to undergird the regime, but often at the expense of the autonomy of incumbents. They limit the options of reform that are possible in the short to medium run. Rulers of contemporary African states often depend on such a system of relatively independent rent-seeking middlemen — distinguished by e.g. clan, ethnic group, or religious status — who wield extensive bargaining power vis-a-vis the government (cf. Snyder 1991). In the European past, this role was often played by noble landowners, clericals, and regional magnates. 90 Even in the former Soviet Union, infamous for its bureaucracy, the reform policies initiated by Gorbachev were only partly or selectively implemented by regional party leaders and the rank-and-file nomenklatura. 91 The web of alignments supporting and limiting a ruler, furthermore, often extends to international patrons and allies — great powers, international organizations, and even transnational companies. Thus, the impressing nonviolent displacement of most East European regimes no doubt stemmed also from the fact that incumbents were massively dependent on Soviet military backing — visibly withdrawn in 1989. 92
Summing up, it is clear that social movements and popular contention can reshape regimes, and even bring them closer to democracy, but how and why some regimes are more prone to this influence definitely deserves more systematic attention. In a preliminary fashion, we contend that major shifts in each of the conditions mentioned above — rulers’ interpretations of their conditions after democratization, the overall repressive and institutional capacity of the state, and the web of alignment undergirding the regime — all strongly alter the likely outcomes of popular protest. Even if identification of these factors at present does not allow neat predictions, they direct our intention from confined actors toward interactions and institutional vulnerabilities.
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that description and explanation of processes of democratization caused by contentious collective action from below — from social movements to revolutionary challenges — constitute an acute lacunae in democratization theory. Among the several roads to democracy some are heavily shaped by collective actors. Contentious claim-making can help generate not only the relaxing of non-democratic regimes, but also the hammering out of democratizing bargains, concessions and, sometimes, true democratic revolutions. For this reason, social movements and related forms of popular claim-making deserves more attention from students of democratization.
The political process approach to contentious politics is compatible and useful in such an undertaking. This perspective explains the emergence of popular challenges as a product of the conjuncture of processes of resource mobilization, cultural framing, and widening political opportunities. Any comprehensive study of bottom-up democratization should look carefully into each of the three. However, to reduce the complexity of such a study, the political opportunity structure constitutes a fundamental starting point for analysis. It is the configuration of and changes in political opportunity structure that sets into motion dynamics of resource mobilization and framing. Thus we propose to regard mobilization and framing and their related processes like repertoire formation, diffusion, and bureaucratization as dependent variables in the long run. This entails a focus on how political opportunity structures influence these processes and, along with the vulneralibility of regimes, determine the outcome of protest.
Moreover, the overall lesson of the political process perspective is, when seeking to comprehend collective political protest, we should not look for crude structural preconditions — economic, cultural, or otherwise. Instead, we should look harder at the more varied political processes that produce opportunities and threats to the contending groups in the polity. Next, we should recognize that to a considerable extend these contending groups themselves — and their ideological outlook and identity-based framing of opponents, allies, goals, along with resources and organization — are products of the previous history of contention in the polity. The eventual end-point of such a political process is not inscribed in antecedent factors or historical “origins” but emerges along the road as an intended or unintended consequence of the actors’ strategic interactions.
In order to delineate the scope of variation in the possible macropolitical outcomes of popular contention, we argue that it would be a fruitful avenue of research to explore and specify both contingent and durable aspects of the strength and vulnerability of regimes. We have pointed toward, first, rulers’ perceptions and tactical choices when confronted with challenges, and, second, how the possible range of their response is shaped by the nature and capacity of the regime. Further exploration of the regime-embedded constraints on outcomes would help us understanding social movements and political protest in general more firmly as phenomena embedded in their agents’ interactions with their environment. Such an undertaking promises a highly needed cross-fertilization of the twin fields of contentious politics and democratization theory and research.
Literature
Ash, Timothy Garton (1990): We The People: The Revolution of 89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague.Cambridge: Granta Books.
Ayoob, Mohammed (1995) The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Bermeo, Nancy (1997): “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions”, Comparative Politics 29 (3): 305-323.
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle (1997): Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brockett, Charles (1996): “A Protest Cycle Resolution of the Repression/Popular Protest Paradox”, in Mark Traugott (ed.), Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. Durham: Duke University Press (117-144).
Burstein, Paul; Rachel L. Einwohner, and Jocelyn A. Hollander (1995): “The Succes of Social Movements: A Bargaining Perspective”, in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. London: UCL Press (275-295).
Buzan, Barry (1991): People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era. 2nd edn. Hemel Hemptead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Cohen, Jean L. (1985): “Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements”, Social Research 52 (4): 663-716.
Dahl, Robert (1971): Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dawisha, Karen (1991): Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Di Palma, Giuseppe (1990): To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ertman, Thomas (1997): Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Friisberg, Claus (1975): På vej mod et demokrati: Fra junigrundloven 1849 til junigrundloven 1915. København: Fremad.
Gamson, William A. (1975): The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood: The Dorsey Press.
Giugni, Mario G. (1998): “Was it worth the effort? Outcomes and consequences of social movements”, Annual Review of Sociology 98: 371-93.
Giugni, Marco; Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds.) (1998): From Contention to Democracy. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Goffman, Erving (1974): Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. New York: Harper Colophon.
Goldstone, Jack A. (1998): “Social Movements or Revolutions? On the Evolution and Outcomes of Collective Action” in Marco G. Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds.): From Contention to Democracy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield (125-145).
Goodwin, Jeff and Theda Skocpol (1989): “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World”, Politics and Society 17 (4): 489-510.
Gould, Roger V. (1993): “Collective Action and Network Structure”, American Sociological Review 58: 182-96.
Gurr, Ted R. (1970): Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hadenius, Axel (1992): Democracy and Development. Cambridge. Cambridge University press.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1991): The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman & London: Oklahoma University Press.
Jenkins, J. Craig (1983): “Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements”, Annual Review of Sociology 9: 527-53.
Jenkins, J. Craig and Charles Perrow (1977): “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972)”, American Sociological Review 42: 249-68.
Karl, Terry Lynn (1990): “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, Comparative Politics 23: 1-21.
Karl, Terry Lynn and Philippe Schmitter (1991): “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe”, International Social Science Journal 128: 269-84.
Kitschelt, Herbert P. (1986): “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies”, British Journal of Political Science 16: 57-85.
Kitschelt, Herbert P. (1992): “Review Article: Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations”, American Political Science Review, 86 (4): 1028-1034.
Klandermans, Bert and Sidney Tarrow (1988): “Mobilization in to Social Movements: Synthesizing European and American Approaches”, in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement research Across Cultures. London: JAI Press (1-38).
Kornhauser, William (1959): The Politics of Mass Society. Glenoe, Illionois: Free Press.
Kriesi, Hanspeter (1995): “The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on Their Mobilization”, in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. London: UCL Press (167-198).
Kriesi, Hanspeter; Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Dyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni (1995): New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Perspective. London: UCL Press.
Kriesi, Hanspeter and Dominique Wisler (1996): “The Impact of Social Movements on Political Institutions: A Comparison of the Introduction of Direct Legislation In Switzerland and the U.S.” Working Paper no. 96/6, Institute for European Studies. Columbia International Affairs Online (https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/krh01.html).
Laitin, David (1998): Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Minority in the Near Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Levi, Margaret (1988): Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Linz, Juan & Alfred Stepan (1996): Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Lipset, Seymor M. (1980): Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Exp. edn. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Luebbert, Gregory M. (1991): Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mann, Michael (1984): “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results”, Archieves Européenes de Sociologie XXV (2): 185-213.
Mann, Michael (1993): The Sources of Social Power: Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Markoff, John (1996): Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
Mason, David T. and Dale T. Krane (1989): “The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State Sanctioned Terror”, International Studies Quarterly 33: 175-198.
McAdam, Doug (1982): Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
McAdam, Doug (1995): “’Initiator’ and ’Spin-off’ Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles”, in Mark Traugott (eds.): Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. Durham and London: Duke University Press (217-39).
McAdam, Doug (1996): “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions” in McAdam, Doug; John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (23-40).
McAdam, Doug and Ronelle Paulsen (1993): “Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism”, American Journal of Sociology 99 (3): 640-667.
McAdam, Doug and Dieter Rucht (1993): “The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas”, in Russel J. Dalton (ed.): Citizens, Protest, and Democacy. (The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528). Newbury Park: Sage (56-74).
McAdam, Doug; John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) (1996): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McAdam, Doug; Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (1996): “To Map Contentious Politics”, Mobilization 1 (1): 17-34.
McAdam, Doug; Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (1997): “Towards an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution”, in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCarthy, John D. and Meyer N. Zald (1977): “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”, American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212-41.
McFail, Clark (1991): The Myth of the Madding Crowd. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Melucci, Alberto (1985): “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements”, Social Research 52 (4): 789-815.
Migdal, Joel S. (1988): Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Moore, Barrington Jr. (1973): Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Motyl, Alexander J. (1992): “Concepts and Skocpol: Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Study of Revolution”, Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1): 93-112.
Oberschall, Anthony (1973): Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Oberschall, Anthony (1996): “Opportunities and framing in the Eastern Ewuropean Revolts of the 1989” in Doug McAdam; John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) (1996): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (93-121).
Offe, Claus (1985): New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics, Social Research 52: 817-68.
Pagnucco, Ron (1996): “Social Movement Dynamics during Democratic Transitions: A Synthesis of Political Process and Political Interactionist Theories”, Research on Democracy and Society 3: 3-38.
Przeworski, Adam (1988): “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts”, in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.): Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, Adam (1991): Democracy and The Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich; Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens (1992): Capitalist Development and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Rule, James B. (1988): Theories of Civil Violence. Berkely: University of California Press.
Rustow, Dankwart (1970): “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative Politics 3: 337-63.
Sandoval, Salvador A.M. (1998): “Social Movements and Democratization: The Case of Brazil and the Latin Countries” in Marco G. Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds.) From Contention to Democracy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead (eds.) (1986): Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Scott, James C. (1985): Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Scott, James C. (1998): Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Skocpol, Theda (1979): States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skocpol, Theda (1985): “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds): Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (3-43).
Smelser, Neil J. (1963) Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press
Snow, David et al. (1986): “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”, American Sociological Review 51 (4): 464-82.
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford (1992): “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest”, in Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClug Mueller (eds.): Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press (133-155).
Snyder, Richard (1992): “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships”, Comparative Politics 24 (4): 379-400.
Stephens, John D. (1989): “Democratic Transitions and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis”, American Journal of Sociology 94 (5): 1019-1077.
Tarrow, Sidney (1989): Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tarrow, Sidney (1991): “’Aiming at a Moving Target’: Social Scienece and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe”, Political Science & Politics, March: 12-20.
Tarrow, Sidney (1992): “Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames:Contructing Meaning Through Action”, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.): Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press (174-202).
Tarrow, Sidney (1994): Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tarrow, Sidney (1995): “Mass Mobilization and Elite Exchange: Democratization Episodes in Italy and Spain”, Democratization 2: 221-45.
Tarrow, Sidney (1996): “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements”, in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) (1996): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (41-61).
Tarrow, Sidney (1998): Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
te Brake, Wayne (1998): Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500-1700. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Therborn, Göran (1977): “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy” New Left Review 103: 3 — 41.
Throup, David W. and Charles Hornsby (1998): Multi-Party politics in Kenya: the Kenyatta and Moi States and Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election. Oxford: James Currey.
Tilly, Charles (1978): From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Tilly, Charles (1992): “Where Do Rights Come From?”, in Lars Mjøset (ed.), Contributions to the Comparative Study of Development. Vol. 2. Oslo: Institute for Social Research. (9-36).
Tilly, Charles (1993): European Revolutions, 1492-1992. Oxford: Blackwell.
Tilly, Charles (1993-94): “Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performance”, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, XXXVIII: 1-30.
Tilly, Charles (1995a): Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tilly, Charles (1995b): “Democracy is a Lake”, in George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman (eds.), The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870-1990. London: Macmillan (365-387).
Tilly, Charles (1995c): “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834”, in Mark Traugott (ed.): Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. Durham: Duke University Press (15-42).
Tilly, Charles (1996): “Contentious Politics and Social Change”. Work-Organization-Economy Working Paper. Stockholm: University of Stockholm, Department of Sociology.
Touraine, Alain (1985): “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements”, Social Research 52 (4): 749-788.
Traugott, Mark (ed.) (1995): Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. Durham: Duke University Press.
Waterbury, John (1997): “Fortuitous By-Products”, Comparative Politics 29 (3): 383-402.
Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995): Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Endnotes
Note 1: Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 117. Back.
Note 2: Herbert P. Kitschelt, “Review Article: Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations,” American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1028-1034. Back.
Note 3: Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982); Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics,” Mobilization 1 (1996), 17-34; and “Towards an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution”, in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 142-173. Back.
Note 4: Ron Pagnucco, “Social Movement Dynamics during Democratic Transitions: A Synthesis of Political Process and Political Interactionist Theories,” Research on Democracy and Society, 3 (1996), 3-38. Back.
Note 5: Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 6: Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 3 (1970), 337-63. Back.
Note 8: For relatively deterministic approaches, see: Barrington Jr. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); Göran Therborn, “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy” New Left Review,103 (1977), 3-41; Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). For probabilistic approaches, see: Seymor M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (2nd edn. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1992). Back.
Note 9: Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23 (1990), 1-21. Back.
Note 10: Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and The Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Back.
Note 11: Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” International Social Science Journal 128 (1991), p. 271. Back.
Note 12: These include, most prominently, Karl; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman & London: Oklahoma University Press, 1991); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 13: Karl and Schmitter, p. 259. Back.
Note 14: John Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” Comparative Politics 29 (1997), 383-402; cf. Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 59-80. Back.
Note 15: As acknowledged by Huntington, p. 7, even the concept of democracy in a procedural and electoralist sense (which he applies himself) “implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns”. Back.
Note 16: cf. Dahl, pp. 1-10; Charles Tilly, “Democracy is a Lake”, in George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman, eds., The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870-1990 (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 365-387. Back.
Note 17: E.g. O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead. Back.
Note 18: McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics”. Back.
Note 19: Especially as analyzed by Charles Tilly in European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) and From Mobilization to Revolution ; cf. Jack A. Goldstone, “Social Movements or Revolutions? On the Evolution and Outcomes of Collective Action,” in Marco G. Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds., From Contention to Democracy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 125-145; and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Back.
Note 20: Famously analyzed by James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). Back.
Note 21: McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics”, p. 17. Back.
Note 23: Wayne te Brake, Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500-1700 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Back.
Note 24: Charles Tilly, “Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political Performance,” Berkeley Journal of Sociology, XXXVIII (1993-94), 7; emphasis in original. Back.
Note 26: The new perspective from the start centered on resource mobilization and evolved in particular as a response to the functionalist and/or social-psychological theories of “collective behavior” and “strain” that had prevailed since the Second World War. For the latter see, e.g., Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); William Kornhauser The Politics of Mass Society (Glenoe, Illionois: Free Press, 1959); Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press, 1963). For comprehensive outlines and critiques of the field see, most notably, James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), but also J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, 9 (1983), 527-53; Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movements: Synthesizing European and American Approaches,” in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds., From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures (London: JAI Press, 1988), pp.1-38; Clark McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978). Back.
Note 27: McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, eds.; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, “To Map Contentious Politics”; and “Towards an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution”; Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; 2nd edn. as Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Back.
Note 28: Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, p. 85. Back.
Note 29: For a static-institutional perspective, see: Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on Their Mobilization”, in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp.167-198; Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Perspective (London: UCL Press, 1995); Herbert P. Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 16 (1986), 57-85. For a dynamic perspective on political opportunity structure, see: Tarrow , Power in Movement ; and “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements”, in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 41-61; Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain. Back.
Note 31: Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni. Back.
Note 32: E.g. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. Back.
Note 33: Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution; and Popular Contention in Great Britain ; Tarrow, Power in Movement ; and “States and Opportunities”. Back.
Note 34: Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, pp. 96-99. Back.
Note 35: Sidney Tarrow, “’Aiming at a Moving Target’: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe”, Political Science & Politics (March 1991), p. 15; see also his Power in Movement and “States and Opportunities”. Back.
Note 37: Ibid., see also William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1975). Back.
Note 38: Doug McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions” in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 23-40. Back.
Note 39: Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World ”, Politics and Society, 17 (1989), 489-510; McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency ; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution ; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. Back.
Note 40: Goldstone, p. 134. Back.
Note 41: Some studies suggest that when state repression is targeted indiscriminately against all groups in society — no matter their standing toward the regime - there is a higher likelihood that a broad coalition will mobilize against the incumbents than if repression is targeted solely at challengers or their leaders; see e.g. T. David Mason and Dale T. Krane, “The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State Sanctioned Terror”, International Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), 175-198. Others suggest that movement response also depends on the timing of repression within the “cycle of protest”. “Early riser” movements may be less sensitive to repression than those later in the cycle where other political opportunities also contract; see Charles C. Brockett, “A Protest-Cycle Resolution of the Repression/Popular-Protest Paradox,” in Mark Traugott, ed., Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 117-144. Back.
Note 42: John D. McCarthy and Meyer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology, 82 (1977), p. 1214. Back.
Note 43: John D. McCarthy and Meyer N. Zald; J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972)”, American Sociological Review 42 (1977), 249-68; Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973). Back.
Note 44: McCarthy and Zald. Back.
Note 45: McCarthy and Zald; cf. Mancur Olson , The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). Back.
Note 47: McCarthy and Zald; see also the critical discussion in McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, ch. 2. Back.
Note 48: Roger V. Gould, “Collective Action and Network Structure”, American Sociological Review, 58 (1993), 182-96; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. This proposition is opposite to the one found within many branches of collective behavior theory, e.g. Kornhauser. Back.
Note 49: Doug McAdam and Ronelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism”, American Journal of Sociology, 99 (1993), 640-667. Back.
Note 50: The concepts are from Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. Back.
Note 51: Marco G. Giugni, “Was it Worth the Effort? Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements”, Annual Review of Sociology, 98 (1998), 371-93. Back.
Note 53: Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, p. 18. Back.
Note 54: See e.g. Jean L. Cohen, “Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements,” Social Research, 52 (1985), 663-716; Alberto Melucci, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements,” Social Research, 52 (1985), 789-815; Claus Offe, “New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics,” Social Research, 52 (1985), 817-68; Alain Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” Social Research 52 (1985), 749-788; cf. however Craig Calhoun, “’New Social Movements’ of the Early Nineteenth Century” in Mark Traugott, ed., Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 173-216. Back.
Note 55: Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes — Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements”, in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 8. Back.
Note 56: David Snow et al. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”, American Sociological Review, 51 (1986), 464-82; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClug Mueller, eds., Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 133-155; Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper Colophon, 1974). Back.
Note 57: Snow and Benford, p. 137. Back.
Note 58: McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, “Introduction”, p. 6, emphasis in original. Back.
Note 59: Sidney Tarrow, “Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meaning Through Action,” in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 174-202. Back.
Note 60: Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, pp. 41-48; and “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834,” in Mark Traugott, ed., Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 15-42; Tarrow, Power in Movement. Back.
Note 61: Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, p. 42. Back.
Note 62: Charles Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Change”. Work-Organization-Economy Working Paper (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, Department of Sociology, 1996), p. 10. Back.
Note 63: Tarrow, Power in Movement. Back.
Note 64: McAdam, “’Initiator’ and ’Spin-off’ Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles” in Mark Traugott, ed., Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 217-39; Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, “The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas”, in Russel J. Dalton, ed., Citizens, Protest, and Democacy (The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528. Newbury Park: Sage, 1993), pp. 56-74. Back.
Note 65: McAdam, “’Initiator’ and ’Spin-off’ Movements”, p. 226. Back.
Note 66: David W. Throup and Charles Hornsby, Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: the Kenyatta and Moi States and Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), p.76. Back.
Note 67: McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, “Introduction”; Tarrow, Power in Movement; and“Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames”. Back.
Note 68: See, however, Gamson; Pagnucco; Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Change”; Paul Burstein, Rachel L. Einwohner, and Jocelyn A. Hollander, “The Succes of Social Movements: A Bargaining Perspective”, in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp.275-295; Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds., From Contention to Democracy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Sidney Tarrow, “Mass Mobilization and Élite Exchange: Democratization Episodes in Italy and Spain”, Democratization, 2 (1995), 221-45. Back.
Note 69: te Brake; Charles Tilly, “Where Do Rights Come From?”, in Lars Mjøset, ed., Contributions to the Comparative Study of Development. Vol. 2. (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1992), pp. 9-36; and Popular Contention in Great Britain ; John Markoff, Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1996). Back.
Note 70: Timothy Garton Ash, We The People: The Revolution of 89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (Cambridge: Granta Books, 1990). Back.
Note 71: Claus Friisberg, På vej mod et demokrati: Fra junigrundloven 1849 til junigrundloven 1915 [ Towards Democracy: From the June Constitution 1849 to the June Constitution 1915 ] (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1975). Back.
Note 72: Tarrow, “Mass Mobilization and Élite Exchange”. Back.
Note 73: John D. Stephens, “Democratic Transitions and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis”, American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989), 1019-1077. Back.
Note 74: Cf. Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts”. Back.
Note 75: Tilly, “Where Do Rights Come From?” Back.
Note 76: Bratton and van de Walle, p. 101. Back.
Note 77: This formulation also parallels the one found in recent studies of revolution, where some scholars have begun to conceive of “revolutionary situations” and “revolutionary outcomes” as two distinct phenomena in need of interlinked, but separate, explanations; see Goldstone; Tilly, European Revolutions ;Alexander J . Motyl, “Concepts and Skocpol: Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Study of Revolution”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4 (1992), 93-112. Back.
Note 79: Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts”. Back.
Note 80: Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions”, Comparative Politics 29 (1997), 305-323. Back.
Note 81: Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) . Back.
Note 83: Tarrow, “Mass Mobilization and Élite Exchange”. Back.
Note 84: Linz and Stepan. Back.
Note 85: Ibid., chs. 16-18. Back.
Note 86: Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni, ch. 9; Hanspeter Kriesi and Dominique Wisler, “The Impact of Social Movements on Political Institutions: A Comparison of the Introduction of Direct Legislation In Switzerland and the U.S.” (Working Paper no. 96/6, 1996, Institute for European Studies. Columbia International Affairs Online 29 Oct. 1998 <https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/krh01.html>). Back.
Note 87: See e.g. Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results”, Archieves Européenes de Sociologie XXV (1984), 185-213; The Sources of Social Power. Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-43; James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Back.
Note 88: Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 293. Back.
Note 89: Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Barry Buzan , People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era. 2nd edn. (Hemel Hemptead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), ch. 2; Goodwin and Skocpol; Joel S. Migdal , Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); William I. Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Back.
Note 90: te Brake; Tilly, European Revolutions. Back.
Note 91: Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge. 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Minority in the Near Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Back.
Note 92: Anthony Oberschall, “Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European Revolts of the 1989”, in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 93-121. Back.
Email this citation