Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis

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What Comes Next? The Consequences of Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Presumed Death

By Gregoire Patte, Nathan Cohen and Andrew Mitzcavitch

As the cornerstone of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mokhtar Belmokhtar was intimately involved in all aspects of AQIM's operations, its tribal relationships, its smuggling operations, and its liaisoning with other terrorist groups. This paper provides details of Mokhtar Belmokhtar's role in AQIM and the effects stemming from his possible demise.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar, whose nicknames include "The Uncatchable", "One-Eyed", and "Mr. Marlboro", is a ubiquitous figure in the Sahel and the Sahara. He has been a key operator, facilitator and emir of the Sahel and Sahara regions for Algerian fighting groups such as the Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA), the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC), and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Following his own particular vision of jihad, Belmokhtar has become one of Africa's most wanted terrorists.

Figure 1: Mokhtar Belmokhtar at a young age. Photo Credit: Maghreb Politics Review

Belmokhtar was born on 1 June 1972 in Ghardaia, a city in central-northern Algeria. In an interview posted online in late 2005, he revealed that his commitment to jihad started after the assassination of Jordanian-Palestinian ideologue Abdullah Azzam in 1989. At the age of 19, after a short period in the Algerian military, he flew to Afghanistan to support the Taliban. He trained at Khalden, Jihad Wal, and Al Qaeda's Jalalabad camp and claimed to have networked with other Al Qaeda affiliated jihadists such as Abu Qatada, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Talal al-Masri. Belmokthar returned to Ghardaia in 1993 soon after fighting between the Algerian government and Islamist fighters began. In Ghardaia, he founded the *Shahada Katibat* (Martyrs' Battalion), which eventually became the ninth zone of operations for the GIA during Algeria's Civil War and then expanded its area of operations into southern Algeria and the Sahara.

Figure 2: Hassan Hattab, Source: Public Domain

Facing increasing disagreements with the GIA leadership, in 2002 Mokhtar Belmokhtar supported the creation of the GSPC alongside with Hassan Hattab. Belmokhtar remained the leader of the southern region of the GSPC, and started to build his reputation as a valuable supplier of weapons and materials to militant Islamic groups in the region. Belmokhtar and his followers financed these supplies by engaging in criminal activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking and kidnapping, and taxing the traffickers in the Sahara and the Sahel regions for protection. His smuggling acumen earned him the nickname "Mr. Marlboro" and some of his detractors consider Belmokhtar "*motivated more by money than ideology.*"

When Hassan Hattab was removed from the GSPC leadership in 2003, the group chose Nabil Sharaoui as a successor, despite Belmokhtar's credentials. When the Algerian security services killed Sahraoui, leadership passed to the unpopular and inexperienced Abdelmalek Droukdel, who remains the current leader of the GSPC, now labeled Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb *(*AQIM). Profoundly disappointed by Droukdel's nomination and opposed to his vision of jihad, Belmok-

htar distanced himself from the organization. While focusing on his activities in southern Algeria, Belmokhtar came to counterbalance Droukdel's leadership. However, despite his detachment from AQIM, Belmokhtar remained a critical supplier for the group, and his influence among the Sahel and Saharan Islamic groups continued to expand.

Figure 3: Abdelmalek Droukdel, Photo Credit: L'expression

Mokhtar Belmokhtar's prominence in the Sahel and the Sahara made him a natural point of contact for local and international *jihadist* groups. Belmokhtar acted as the channel for communications between Al Qaeda central team and the Algerian jihadist groups, and as the contact point for all Al Qaeda emissaries to the Algerian arena. Furthermore, Belmokhtar retains a deep connection to regional *jihadist* groups such as Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Thus the recent unconfirmed announcement of his death raises many questions on AQIM's future.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar, presumed dead

On 28 June 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) announced that Mokhtar Belmokhtar was killed while fighting alongside other AQIM fighters and MUJWA in Gao, a northern Mali town, on the previous day. However, his death has been falsely reported before. For example in 1999, the Algerian forces incorrectly reported his death and in 2008, he was falsely reported to have surrendered to Algerian authorities. Both AQIM and the anti-MNLA online forum kidal.info denied Belmokhtar's death. Indeed, on 30 June 2012, the jihadist web forum Ansar al-Mujahideen published a communiqué covering the events in Gao that was penned by Belmokhtar's alias, "Khalid Abu al-Abbas." However, the communiqué does not give any details post 28 June 2012 and thus until irrefutable evidence surfaces, his death remains unconfirmed.

If Belmokhtar's fatality is confirmed, then the structure of AQIM leadership may become less complicated. As previously mentioned, Belmokhtar mostly worked independently and had a contentious relationship with AQIM central. Droukdel, AQIM's emir, had sent Yahya Djouadi to assert control over Belmokhtar. However, Djouadi was removed in late November 2011. According to Mohamed Mahmoud Aboulmaaly, editor of the Nouakchott Info Newspaper,

Figure 4: Al Qaeda area of operation and influence in the Sahel region.

Photo Credit: Agence France Presse

"*Yahya Djouadi did not succeed, according to the organization, in activating and developing Sahara Emirate strategies.*" Djouadi was replaced by Nabil Makhloufi (aka Nabil Abu Alqama).

With Belmokhtar out of the way, Droukdel could insert another leader which would be in line with AQIM ideology and re-establish cohesion in the group. Possible successors would be Abou Zeid and Yahya Abou al-Hammam who were confirmed seen with Belmokhtar in Timbuktu in April 2012. Abou Zeid is a prominent AQIM commander and is reportedly operating in Mali and Niger. Yahya Abou Al-Hammam has lived in the Mali region for several years and reportedly became the local governor of Timbuktu in April.

How would Belmokhtar's death affect AQIM modus operandi?

Mokhtar Belmokhtar played a key role in the reorganization of the GSPC and AQIM's activities in the Sahel and the Sahara regions. Though traditionally active in northern Algerian towns and cities, in recent years militant Islamic groups have fled southwards toward the regions bordering Mauritania, Mali and Niger. The sparse governmental presence allowed AQIM to establish a secure zone of influence and connect to other insurgent and terrorist groups of the West Africa, Sahel and Sahara. To increase its control over these regions, AQIM reached out to the local Tuareg communities. Belmokhtar, for example, is reported to have married four wives from local Arab and Tuareg communities, including daughters of local commanders and tribal chiefs.

AQIM's illegal activities provided a financial source for the largely impoverished and unemployed local population. Western governments have paid handsome ransom fees to AQIM for the release of hostages. In turn, AQIM has reinvested a part of the ransoms in the enrolment of criminal and traffickers group from Western Sa-

hara to Niger. Attracted by the new opportunities, many young men are now under the AQIM criminal-wing umbrella and they will fight to maintain this source of benefits. Belmokhtar understood the importance of the hostages and the necessity to keep them alive to buy the allegiance of the local community and sustain AQIM's financial needs. Other leaders such as Hamidu Abu Zeid and formerly Yahya Djouadi are known to be more extreme and less strategic regarding the hostage issue; they do not hesitate to kill the hostages.

Figure 5: Hostages seized in Niger by AQIM. Photo Credit: Radio France Internationale

Kidnappings are not the only source for AQIM, or even its most profitable one. In 2010, Moroccan authorities arrested a network of 34 drug traffickers linked to AQIM and seized 600 kilograms of cocaine for an estimated value of USD 60 million. Comparatively, the estimated amount collected by AQIM from the ransoms since 2006 is about USD 70 million. Mokhtar Belmokhtar was the corner stone of the smuggling, trafficking, and kidnapping system in the region. If Belmokhtar died, then AQIM's capacity to raise funds, supply weapons and preserve its integration into the local society would undoubtedly suffer. Moreover, one may have doubts regarding the capacity of Hamidu Abu Zeid to take charge of the now powerful and independent Belmokhtar's el-Moulathamine. His vision, which he shares with the demoted but still influential Yahya Djouadi, of a "purer" Jihad that prohibits

criminal activities may not satisfy the local criminal groups. If they lose their financial benefits they may then turn against AQIM.

Figure 6: Mokhtar Belmokhtar with a member of the el-Moulathamine. Photo Credit: Echoroukonline

Belmokhtar's importance to other regional groups

Belmokhtar's importance to AQIM extends beyond his financial cunning. As previously mentioned, Belmokhtar's ability to ingratiate himself to numerous communities in the Sahel and the Sahara has benefited AQIM enormously. If the reports of Belmokhtar's death prove true, then AQIM has not merely lost a financier, but a gateway into the Sahel and the Sahara as well.

AQIM has played a substantial role in Ansar Dine's victories over the Malian Army and subsequently the secular Tuareg independence group, the Movement for the National Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA). Just a few weeks after Ansar Dine announced its existence, Belmokhtar, along with several other AQIM leaders, were spotted with Ansar Dine leader Iyyad Ag Ghali. Belmokhtar's personal links with Ansar Dine undoubtedly bolsters his and AQIM's sway within the group. He knows Ghali from 2003, at the very latest, when Ghali negotiated the release of Belmokhtar's 15 Western hostages. One of Belmokhtar's closest former aides, Oumar Ould Hama, is now among Ansar Dine's most powerful commanders. Furthermore, as alluded to beforehand, Belmokhtar's wives reportedly hail from prominent Tuareg and Arab

Figure 7: Ansar Dine fighters in Gao, Mali, June 2012. Photo Credit: Reuters http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/islamists-declare-full-control-of-malis-north/

tribes, the same tribes who stock Ansar Dine with zealous recruits.

Belmokhtar's political savvy may have also allowed him to cross sensitive ethnic fault lines that riddle the Sahel region. While Belmokhtar is deeply embedded into Tuareg society, he has also appealed to other communities, such as the darker skinned Songhai tribe. A brief published by the US National Counter Terrorism Center in 2009 stated that Belmokhtar *"wanted to attract black African recruits because they would agree more readily than Arabs to becoming suicide bombers and because poor economic and social conditions made them for recruitment."* A non-discriminating approach to recruitment would appear consistent with the Gao communiqué that disavowed any racism or sectarianism. Of course, whether this is an actual reflection of Belmokhtar's views or mere propaganda is another matter.

While it is hard to confirm whether Belmokhtar's recruitment succeeded or not, darker-skinned Africans have played a prominent role in the defeats of the MNLA. The battle between AQIM, MUJWA, and Ansar Dine against the MNLA in Gao provides the latest example. The fighting was sparked after the assassination of a Songhai city councilman. The militant Islamists quickly blamed the MNLA for the death, and

despite the MNLA's rebuttal, the situation conflagrated. Soon after the battle's conclusion, MUJWA released a video that featured strong Songhai nationalist overtones. MUJWA, with the vital collaboration of Belmokhtar's AQIM, seems to have capitalized on African tribalism. Furthermore, just like Ansar Dine, MUJWA's leader, Hamada Ould Mohamed El-Khairy, was once an AQIM member with links to Belmokhtar.

Conclusion

Belmokhtar's possible death raises the vital question: how heavily does AQIM's relationship with Ansar Dine and MUJWA depend on Belmokhtar's personal links versus mutual organizational interests? With such a tangled web of ethnicities, ideologies, and personalities, pinpointing where Belmokhtar resides in that web is extremely difficult and by no means definitive. Rumors and scant information further obfuscate the answer. Nevertheless, all available evidence indicates that Bemokhtar has his fingers in every jar, making him an invaluable asset for AQIM. This leaves analysts speculating whether Belmokhtar's death could mean not only the demise of a man, but also the network he created.

Implications of Umar Patek's Conviction

By V. Arianti

The sentencing of Umar Patek, one of the last remaining hardcore and trained terrorists and a critical link between groups in South and Southeast Asia further weakens the Jemaah Islamiyah and its factions and demonstrates the synergy between a strong anti-terror operational framework and an effective legal regime.

The sentencing of Umar Patek to 20 years of imprisonment by the West Jakarta District Court on 21 June 2012 has multiple implications for the overall counter-terrorism efforts of Indonesia and also for other regional countries. Furthermore, the judgment was a milestone for the Indonesian judicial process. This is particularly so in the context of the initial reluctance of Indonesian authorities to extradite Patek from Pakistan to Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities knew it would be difficult to convict him under the 2003 Anti Terrorism Law because of the 2004 ruling of the Constitutional Court that the law cannot be applied with retrospective effect. This was based on a petition by the Muslim Defender Team (TPM), a group of lawyers who defended many terrorist detainees including Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and some others who were involved in the Bali bombers on the grounds that retrospective application of the law is a violation of the Indonesian constitution which the court upheld.

Umar Patek, once a high-ranking member of the terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), was found guilty of premeditated murder in helping to build a car bomb for the 2002 Bali bombings that claimed 202 lives and injured hundreds. The court also convicted him of conspiracy to commit bombings at six Jakarta churches on Christmas Eve in 2000 and possessing knowledge of a terrorist training camp in Aceh. Additionally, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms, explosives, identification fraud and document fraud. Patek's show of remorse and repeated apologies to his victims and families were some factors that helped reduce his sentence from a life sentence

Patek speaking to the court, where he admitted that he played a role in building the explosives in the 2002 Bali Bombings.

Photo Credit: Agence France Presse/Getty Images

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2140819/Umar-Patek-trial-Bali-bombings-Demolition-man-says-sorry-victims-9-years-attack.html

as demanded by the prosecutors. Many view Patek's conviction as too lenient as it does not reflect the scale of his crime. However, Patek's sentence is the most severe received by convicted terrorists in the last seven years.

Synergy between Legal and Operational Frameworks

All this demonstrates the synergy between a strong anti-terror operational framework and an effective legal regime to successfully reduce the overall threat in a particular country. Moreover, the sentencing of Umar Patek demonstrates the ways to overcome the limitations of anti-terrorism legal regime of a particular country. Many countries in the region have faced difficulties in implementing tough anti-terrorism laws to prosecute terrorist offenders. In Indonesia, the challenge was the retrospective application of the Anti Terrorism Law, in the Philippines, the concern for human rights violations has resulted in a weak and almost toothless anti-terror law,

going by the name of Human Security Act. However, it is possible to prosecute the terrorist offenders using existing criminal laws as was the case with Umar Patek.

Impact on JI

Patek's conviction further weakens JI and its splinter groups as most of its first generation members who fought in the Afghan war and underwent military trainings there have been convicted or killed over the years. The present generation of jihadists, belonging to JI, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), or other violent groups are not as militarily seasoned as their predecessors. There have been very few attacks of significance in the last two years. JI militants have been unable to effectively transfer knowledge and expertise, especially in regards to bomb making to their rank and file. The only casualties of the 2011 suicide bombings at the Cirebon Police Mosque and Solo Church were the bombers themselves. Online instruction manuals on

The damage caused by the 2002 Bali bombings. Photo credit: Associated Press (AP)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2140819/Umar-Patek-trial-Bali-bombings-Demolition-man-says-sorry-victims-9-years-attack.html

terrorist tradecraft, especially bomb making have proven to be equally ineffective thus far, at least in Indonesia.

Counter-Radicalization

Patek's display of remorse and his willingness to cooperate with the authorities, as shown during the investigation and trial, indicates that the government could use him for the counter-radicalization programme. Many would argue that this display of remorse is a calculated move by Patek to obtain a more lenient sentence. Nevertheless, Patek's potential to contribute to the government's counter-radicalization programme should not be undervalued. Few Indonesian terrorists have ever expressed remorse or apologized. However, those who have, such as Ali Imron, Nasir Abbas, and Khairul Ghazali, work with the state to persuade their rank and file to abandon violence, and to educate the community-at-large through their books and interviews. Indonesia would greatly benefit if Patek could be further persuaded to follow a similar path.

Severing Transnational Linkages

Umar Patek has built close relationships with various terrorist groups in the region and Afghanistan. His activities span several countries over several decades. From 1991 to 1994, Patek lived in Afghanistan where he received military training, including a two week advanced course in bomb making. In 1994, Patek returned to Johor, Malaysia where he became a JI operative. In 1996, Mukhlas, a senior JI commander-in-charge of Sumatra, Singapore, Malaysia, and Southern Thailand assigned Patek to the Abubakar Camp, a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) training camp situated in Mindanao, Philippines. Together with Dulmatin, Patek was also part of the JI contingent operating with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. He was later spotted and arrested in a safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan in January

2011 on his way to join the jihad in Afghanistan. Patek was considerably influential in Afghanistan and Pakistan where he was believed to be a key contact to many terror outfits. Patek's conviction effectively eliminates a critical node by taking out the point of contact between militants in Southeast Asia and South Asia.

This milestone conviction has demonstrated Indonesia's commitment in fighting terrorism by using criminal laws to charge hard-line terrorists. In a broader sense, it also demonstrates Indonesia's commitment to the rule of law. This conviction also weakens the groups in Indonesia and the region by taking out of circulation one of the last hardcore trained militants and the crucial link between different militant groups in South and Southeast Asia.

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Indonesian Prisons: A Think Tank for Terrorists

By Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin

Arresting and placing a criminal or terrorist behind bars exerts a nation's stance against the unlawful acts committed by an individual. However, without consistent and effective prison systems and management, unlawful acts continue in prison and even permeate into the society.

Since 2000, Indonesia has witnessed a number of high profile terrorist attacks. At the same time, the Indonesian authorities have also arrested almost 600 individuals on terrorism charges. This has made a significant dent on the capability of violent extremist groups in Indonesia. However, this hard approach alone cannot end terrorism and all activities related to it. In respect of terrorists/extremists detainees, for example, Indonesian prisons have become a breeding ground for terrorism related activities. Violent extremist inmates maintain their contacts with the outside world and amongst others, engage in activities subtle yet detrimental to Indonesian security. These activities along with extremist propaganda are aimed at gathering more supporters and sympathizers.

Publications from Prisons

Detained violent extremists continue to preach the pro-violence ideology and hatred through various articles and books which are disseminated both online and offline. Online, the materials are sold and at times provided free of charge through websites manned by individuals associated to terrorist groups such as muslimdaily.net and arrahmah.com, and individual blogs and Facebook accounts. Offline, they can be found in Islamic book fairs, and seminars held by extremist media companies such as the Arrahmah media. This way, they continue to contribute to the extremists' strategy of gaining popularity, acceptance and sympathy from the public and replenish the losses they sustain from the authorities' actions. The dissemination of the extremists' propaganda through the radical publishing industry and online platforms has seen a number of contributions by incarcerated extremists (Refer to Appendix). There are at least 17 titles from this group of authors. They are under the names of 7 individuals and sum up to a total 1911 pages. Most of these materials are available online at www.jahizuna.com, an Indonesian online library for radical materials.

A picture depicting extremist publications written by detainees in Indonesian prisons.

Photo Credit: Arrahmah.com http://arrahmah.com/read/2009/03/06/3553-ali-gufran-imam-samudra-dan-amrozi-akan-hadir-di-islamic-books-fair-malam-i.html

Significance

This represents a paradox. A prison is supposed to rehabilitate its inmates or at least prevent them from influencing and harming the society. Instead, the Indonesian prisons seems to be misused and have become a place for extremist inmates to continue their illegal activities. This represents a chink in the Indonesian prison systems and an Achilles' heel of the country's overall counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts. For one, it seems to feed the growing tolerance for extremism and acceptance of the terrorist community in Indonesia. With the existing terrorist narrative that paints an Indonesian government as malevolent and oppressive against the Muslim community, the arrested terrorist would gain sympathy, recognition, admiration and most importantly a support base. This is especially observed in the Bahasa Indonesia Islamist radical websites where arrested and neutralized terrorists are glorified as upholders of Islam vis-à-vis the condemnation of the Indonesian government. This support base provides a convenient start for these terrorists to disseminate their writings.

Historically, materials written by imprisoned movement leaders or ideologues have greater appeal to readers. Examples include Sayyid Qutb's '*Milestones*' and '*In the Shade of the Quran*', Imam Samudra's '*Aku Melawan Teroris*' and Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi's writings found in the website *Minbar Al-Tawhid Wa Al-Jihad (http://www.tawhed.net/)*.

Though the thinkers and ideologues represent a small percentage of the extremist community, the list of titles makes up a small percentage of the total number of Indonesian publications. The potential of such publications to radicalize the broader community should not be underestimated. Moreover, the fact that the authors of such publications are mostly incarcerated terrorists or extremists highlights the failure of the prison system. Many of such inmates have found it convenient to smuggle out radical materials with or without the connivance of the authorities from their cells.

Admittedly, this is not a new issue. Prisons have always been an ideological incubator for many revolutionaries. Many extremist materials have been produced behind bars. However, this should not rule out the importance of tackling the problem at hand.

An example of an Indonesian online library for radical materials. Source: www.jahizuna.com

Prisons as Think Tanks?

The weakness in the prison system has allowed the incarcerated extremists to have the prison function as a 'think tank'. Time spent in prisons is used to think, research and share their ideas with fellow radicals and Muslims in general.

Could the use of the words 'think tank' risk exaggerating the description of the problem? Could cells in prisons really function as a place for one to research, think and write? An analysis of the works produced in the prisons validates the appropriateness of the term used. They are not just personal diaries that were produced as an emotional outlet to cope with prison life, (titles no.5, no.6, no.7, no.8, no.13 and no.15 in Appendix) many of them contain researched contents that require serious thinking and decent resources (titles no.1, no.2, no.3, no.4, no.9, no.10, no.11, no.14, no.16 and no.17 in Appendix). These titles seek to legitimize and propagate the author's worldviews, theological orientation and violent tendency which revolve around a radical narrative and interpretation of Islam. Some were produced in response to critics or to deflect counter-ideological works that are targeting them. The objectives are to win over more followers and instigate actions (terrorism), exemplified by Imam Samudra's '*Aku Melawan Teroris'*.

Samudra was the operational leader of the cell that executed the first 2002 Bali bombing. He wrote the book while in prison and got it published and was available publicly. In the book, he insisted on the importance of the use of violence, justified terrorism and called upon others to emulate his actions as a response to what he considered repression against the Muslim community.

These publications have been effective in the radicalization and reinforcing of radical ideas to individuals including real terrorists on the ground. For example, the terrorists in Cipinang prisons are reading Aman Abdurrahman's articles and citing his ideas on the concept of *takfiri* (to accuse others of apostasy) in interviews conducted by the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) researchers. Cirebon terrorists and Solo based Lashkar Hisbah terrorists were also influenced by both his sermons and articles he wrote while he was in prison in 2010 and 2011.

This could be a systemic failure of prison management or collusion among the inmates and prison authorities as a consequence of widespread corruption in the system. If the titles were produced direct from the memory of the authors, which is doubtful, the question will be why they were allowed to pen down their ideas and get them distributed outside prison? If the titles were produced by referencing to reading resources, the question will be how and why these referencing materials are made available to the authors?

Life in the prison provides an inmate ample time to reflect on their wrongdoings. They should be guided towards rehabilitation or at the least be prohibited from writing and glorifying their actions for which they were incarcerated. The former could be realized with comprehensive rehabilitation programmes.

Recommendations

Despite the best intentions of the government, the problems in the prisons persist. Indonesian prisons would continue to be a "think tank" for extremists, and remain a haven where they could continue their contribution to the extremists' long term strategy. Countering this problem is a challenge for the resource scarce country. The international community should therefore assist the Indonesian government the same way it helped the country establish Detachment 88, the elite counter-terrorism unit that is largely responsible for breaking up the operational capabilities of violent groups like Jemaah Islami-

yah (JI). A special prison facility can be built under an internationally-assisted program where all incarcerated violent extremists are placed to serve their sentences. In this context, studies on the Saudi and Singapore detention centres where terrorists are placed in a special facility away from other inmates could be used as models. Such a facility should be one that would implement rehabilitation programmes and impose a strict restriction on inmates so that they will not be able to continually propagate their views to the society at large.

Appendix

The information in the list is gathered primarily from Maktabah Al-Tauhid Wa Al-Jihad (12 titles), an Indonesian online library of radical materials, and open sources (5 titles). It is not exhaustive and does not include books written by authors who use aliases to cover their true identities. Their prisoner status is identified via the website or open sources.

Authors	Publications From Prison
Name: Abu Hataf Saifurrasul **Status:** Imprisoned **Source:** jahizuna.com	**1.** *Koreksi Buku 'Vonis Kafir Antara Berlebihan dan Kurang Ketegasan* Karya Masud Lc'* (Correction to 'Takfir: Between Extremism and Laxity' Book By Masud et. al.) Publisher: Maktabah Jahizuna (Online) Year: 2011 Pages: 64 **2.** *Syarat Sebuah Negara Dinamakan Negara Islam* (Conditions for a Land To Be Classified as Islamic State) Publisher: Maktabah Jahizuna (Online) Year: 2011 Pages: 45
Name: Abu Musa Ath-Thoyyar **Status :** Imprisoned **Source:** jahizuna.com	**3.** *Menyoal Manhaj Takfir Luqman bin Muhammad Ba`abduh Dalam Bukunya 'Mereka Adalah Teroris* (Contesting Luqman bin Muhammad Ba`abduh's Takfir Methodology in His Book 'They Are Terrorist') Publisher: Maktabah Jahizuna (Online) Year: 2012 Pages: 141
Name: Abu Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman **Status:** Imprisoned **Source:** jahizuna.com	**4.** *Ya.. Mereka Memang Taghut* (Yes.. They Are Tyrants) Publisher: Maktabah Jahizuna (Online) Year: 2012 Pages: 61

Authors	Publications From Prison
Name: Faith Abdurahman Hasan Ar Rihali **Status:** Imprisoned **Source:** jahizuna.com	**6.** *Diary Mathlubin* (Diary of a Wanted Person) Publisher: No Publisher Year: 2011 Pages: 4 **7.** *Berjihadlah, Maka Engkau Akan Mendapat Petunjuk* (Wage jihad and you will be guided) Publisher: No Publisher Year: 2011 Pages: 12 **8.** *Inilah Jalan Orang Yang Sedang Jatuh Cinta* (This is the path of those who are in love) Publisher: Maktabah Jahizuna (Online) Yeaar: 2011 Pages: 4
Name: Ali Ghufron @ Mukhlas **Status:** Imprisoned (2002-2008), executed in November 2008 **Source:** Open source	**9.** *Thaifah Mansurah Telaah Tentang Apa dan Siapa Yang Pasti Menang* (The Victorious Sect: Study on What and Who Will Attain Victory) Publisher: No Publisher Year: No date Pages: 160 **10.** *Risalah Untuk Sahabat-sahabatku* (Message To My Companions) Publisher: No Publisher Year: No date Pages: 103 **11.** *Mazhab Bermazhab dan Wahabi* (Mazhab Followers and Wahabi) Publisher: No Publisher Year: 2004 Pages: 65 **12.** *Jihad Jalan Hidupku* (Jihad is my way of life) Publisher: No Publisher Year: No date Pages: 103 **13.** *Mimpi Suci Di Balik Jeruji Besi* (A Sacred Dream Behind Bars) Publisher: Ar-Rahmah Media Year: 2009 Pages: 145

Authors	Publications From Prison
Name: Imam Samudra **Status:** Imprisoned (2002-2008), executed in November 2008 **Source:** Open source	**14.** *Bantahan Terhadap Tulisan Abu Hamzah Yusuf Al-Atsari Yang Berjudul Teror Berkeduk Jihad* (Refuting Hamzah Yusuf Al-Atsari's Article Titled 'Terrorism in Disguise of Jihad') Publisher: Jamaah Tauhid Wal Jihad Year: No date Pages: 127 **15.** *Sekuntum Rosela Pelipur Lara* (A Rosela to Console Sorrow) Publisher: Ar-Rahmah Year: 2009 Pages: 188 **16.** *Aku MelawanTeroris* (I am fighting terrorist) Publisher: Jazera Year: 2004 Pages: 280 **17.** *Satu Jihad Sejuta Vonis* (One jihad, A million verdicts) Publisher: Ar-Rahmah Media Year: 2008 Pages: 193
Total: 7	Total: 17

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Electronic copies of the articles (MS Word format) may be submitted to the Associate Editor, Uday Ravi at the following address:
isuravi@ntu.edu.sg

Community Engagement in Schools: The Singapore Story

By Salim Mohamed Nasir

This paper provides an overview of the community engagement efforts undertaken by schools in Singapore and the policies framed by the government in this regard.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and subsequent terrorist strikes in places like Bali, Madrid and London, the international community has reacted to terrorism with a plethora of military and "hard power" responses. In addition, a number of governments have formalized counter-terrorism structures and drafted new legislations and bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to criminalize acts of terrorism and facilitate the sharing of information among governments and their security forces.

In recent years, however, the surge in home-grown terrorism and radicalization have prompted governments to rethink their strategies in the fight against terrorism and shift the focus to "soft" counter-terrorism strategies aimed at contesting the intellectual and ideological justifications for violent extremism. Several countries, notably those with a Muslim majority or culturally diverse communities, have acknowledged that they are fighting a "war of ideas" and, hence, have devised rehabilitation and de-radicalization or disengagement programmes. Some of these programmes focus on a community-based approach that brings together local moderate Muslim community members and law enforcement authorities to counter-radicalization and counter-extremism.

Importance of Community Engagement in Counter-Terrorism

Indeed there has been a growing recognition among many states that community engagement is critical to a successful counter-terrorism strategy, especially those countries with diverse cultural and religious groups. Highlighting the importance of Community Engagement Programme (CEP) in counter-terrorism, the former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in his government's National Security Statement in November 2007 stated:

> *To deal with the challenge posed by the terrorist threat we have to do more, working with communities in our country, first, to challenge extremist propaganda and support alternative voices; secondly, to disrupt the promoters of violent extremism by strengthening our institutions and supporting individuals who may be being targeted; thirdly, to increase the capacity of communities to resist and reject violent extremism; and fourthly, to address issues of concern exploited by ideologues, where by emphasizing our shared values across communities we can both celebrate and act upon what unites us.*

Many studies have investigated community-based strategies to counter-terrorism. However, different states have their own community-based approaches towards countering terrorism which are unique to the cultural context in their respective societies.

In this context, the Singapore government has put in place a CEP, "*to strengthen the understanding and ties between people of different races and religions, and build up our society's skills and knowledge in coping with emergencies*". Community engagement is not something new since the country has been doing the same in the battle against drugs and crime for many years before the threat of terrorism took centre-stage. Right from the beginning, the government, readily embraced working with the culturally and linguistically diverse communities. It is acknowledged that an united effort of communities across all levels is necessary to reduce the threat of ter-

rorism. The CEP was, in fact, initiated to provide opportunities for various racial and religious clusters to attend regular briefings and activities to foster better inter-communal relations. Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Singapore's former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs remarked:

> "*The heart of the CEP is really the many people and groups on the ground who compose it by expressing it in their own way, through their diverse activities and efforts. Working together has always been the Singapore way. It has led us to achieve many things including a remarkable society on any account, enjoying ethnic harmony, safety and security in a troubled world. Let us work always for a Singapore United*."

The CEP brings together people from different communities in Singapore to work with each other to develop understanding and to prevent and minimize racial and religious tensions in the society after a crisis such as a terrorist attack. It targets different groups of people like those from various grassroots or religious groups, educational institutions (schools, polytechnics, univer-

sities), employers, unions, clan associations and the media. It is the aim of the CEP that the various organizations under each of these clusters will work among themselves and with those in other clusters to strengthen the networks and bonds within and between their respective communities. Since the launch of the CEP, there have been many initiatives undertaken by various communities in areas such as developing awareness of Singapore's diversity and the need for racial and religious harmony, building understanding and forging bonds, involvement and participation from the community and building capacity to enhance social resilience.

Community Engagement Programme in Schools

Educational institutions, where young impressionable minds are easily the targets of extremist organizations, are one of the most important communities that the CEP aims to reach out to. Thus, it is not surprising that the Ministry of Education (MOE) is one of the major supporting agencies in steering the CEP. The ministry recognizes the CEP as a long-term effort to preserve communal harmony, strengthen the understanding and ties between people of different

Singaporeans participating in the Community Engagement Games Day 2009.

Photo Credit: Singapore United

races and religions, as well as build up society's skills and knowledge in coping with emergencies. Its CEP does not aim to reinvent the wheel but to work through existing structures and programmes by grafting the CEP perspective to existing community activities. It is constantly revisiting and reviewing its programmes and this has resulted in some key initiatives being introduced to better enhance the social and psychological aspects of the Total Defence framework underlying the CEP. For example, the emphasis on character building and citizenship education (CCE) is part of the MOE's effort to enhance the building of social resilience amongst Singaporean students and the initiative is an enhancement of MOE's CEP.

As CCE encompasses character education, it hopes to teach students to know others – to be socially aware of and to interact well with others, and nurture positive relationships; and in the face of any challenge, to demonstrate resilience. As for citizenship education, the MOE has outlined four long-term deliverables: firstly, the development of loyal citizens with a strong sense of belonging and identity, who are committed to the well-being, defence and security of the country; secondly, the ability to show care and concern for others and contribute to improving the lives of others; thirdly, the need to be socio-culturally sensitive and active in promoting social cohesion and harmony and finally, the students must be equipped with the ability to reflect on and respond to issues – community, national or global – in an appropriate manner.

The ministry also released the CCE Toolkit which features the 5Ps (**P**urpose, **P**upil, Ex**P**erience, **P**rofessional Development and **P**artnership) approach for effective implementation in schools. The 5Ps enables the school to adopt a 'whole-school' approach, ensuring a common alignment to its objective; the development of quality relationship between pupils and teachers so as to better customize programmes which are integrated within the schools' curriculum.

The infusion of CCE would allow students to enrich their school experience through meaningful activities.

The approach undertaken by the teachers and school leaders themselves play an integral role in the successful implementation of CCE. They too must be equipped with the right beliefs and passion to inculcate in their students the right values, social and emotional competencies and tools for active citizenry. Finally, establishing the right partnership between home, school and community will create the conducive environment for all to "work hand in hand" to better support the goal of nurturing a stronger Singapore through student-centric and values-driven education.

The CCE adds another dimension to MOE's CEP within the educational institutions cluster. It aims to further complement other key programmes implemented throughout the years, including Civics and Moral Education, National Education, the Community Involvement Programme, Social and Emotional Learning competencies among others.

The MOE's CEP is based on the "Head, Heart, Hands" (3H) framework adopted by the Committee on National Education in 2007 to enhance the original intent of National Education (NE) which was inaugurated in 1997. The objectives then were to develop national cohesion, cultivate the instincts for survival and instill in the students confidence in their future. The 3H framework expands on the ideas of "Love, Know and Lead Singapore" as stipulated in the NE which was rolled out in 1997. In 2007, the Committee on NE reviewed and listed 16 recommendations which were captured in three key thrusts: a) enabling and equipping educators; b) engaging and empowering students; and c) enhancing NE through strengthening school-community linkages. The thrusts, together with the new NE framework, became the new guidelines to bring NE into the next phase. The minis-

try has also identified four core events to commemorate NE throughout the year. The events are: Total Defence Day, International Friendship Day, Racial Harmony Day and National Day.

Each of these events serves a different purpose. For example, Total Defence Day is commemorated on 15 February annually to mark Singapore's fall to the Japanese in 1942. The event serves as a reminder to the younger generation that Singapore is defensible and is worth defending and they themselves must defend Singapore. International Friendship Day is commemorated on the third working Friday of Term Two. It is a day dedicated to understanding Singapore's relations with its neighbouring countries and beyond. It also serves to sensitize students to the importance of understanding the geo-political realities present and the need to foster greater friendships and the spirit of collaboration among different communities in the country.

Racial Harmony Day is commemorated on 21 July annually to mark the racial riots experienced by Singapore. It serves to remind students of the high costs of social division and that race and religion are potential fault lines in any society. Nonetheless, it is also a day to celebrate the country's success not only as a harmonious nation but also one that is built on the rich diversity of cultures and heritage. Finally, National Day, on 9 August, marks Singapore's separation from Malaysia and her emergence as an independent country in the community of nations. The National Day Ceremony was introduced in schools in 1998, with the purpose of creating greater awareness of the importance and solemnity of a nation gaining its independence. The Community Involvement Programme and Learning Journeys infused within the National Education umbrella also aim to build social cohesion, civic responsibility, instilling pride and understanding Singapore's constraints,

Picture capturing Year 5 and 6 students of River Valley High School, Singapore at a talk on Terrorism organized by the school's National Education Department. Source: International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR).

challenges and opportunities amongst others.

At the micro level, schools conduct workshops for students and teachers to introduce the CEP and concretize the CEP messages within the school context through numerous discussions and activities. Resources are also developed to ensure that adequate support is provided for teachers to implement the programme effectively through the Edumall portal, a shared resource platform designed for teachers by teachers. And for each of the core events, resource packages are developed for schools to integrate the activities into existing school programmes. Professional development opportunities for teachers are created in collaboration with various agencies like onepeople.sg or even the National Heritage Board. To measure the effectiveness of NE programmes carried out by the schools, the ministry uses instruments like NE Quiz, NE Study as well as the NE Award which aim to encourage and recognize schools for their NE efforts.

At the curriculum level, the Social Studies syllabus at the secondary school level, under the sections of Conflict and Harmony in Multi-Ethnic Societies and Managing International Relations, further stresses the importance of social cohesion – its current threats and challenges; as well as recognize that terrorism is a growing challenge to world security, its impact and measures to mitigate transnational terrorism.

The MOE, in its role as a major stakeholder in Singapore's CEP, has done its part to put in place the structures and processes to build social capital and resilience in the students. The stakeholders within the school communities know their roles and are in tandem with the purpose as set out in the CEP. In fact, there are schools which have come up with some constructive initiatives, like talks, workshops, learning journeys, quizzes and competitions, to foster greater understanding of and respect for the different cultures and heritage of various ethnic

groups in Singapore.

The Community Outreach Programme by Junyuan Secondary School is one such example. To complement the Social Studies syllabus, student-initiated programmes are encouraged and they organize projects to reach out to the general public. For example, the school's students promote understanding and social cohesion of the many races and religions within the school's precinct and the community at large. For its efforts, the school was awarded the Campus Changemaker Grant worth SGD10,000.

Another example is the teacher-initiated programme at Raffles' Institution which Year 3-4 students can sign up for. The electives in the Differentiated Module Programme cover topics like Understanding Social Deviance. The programme makes use of resources from the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and the Ministry of Home Affairs to work with students on the various manifestations of social deviance, its social and psychological causes, community and state responses and the roles that individuals can play to help deviants reintegrate into mainstream society.

The inaugural Heroes Seminar organized by Ngee Ann Polytechnic this year was another fine example of how educational institutions play to reinforce key messages of the importance of social cohesion, national security and community involvement. The seminar which adopted the "living books" approach was a resounding success based on the feedback received from its final year students.

Challenges Facing Community Engagement Programmes in Schools

Apart from the milestone NE Study and NE quizzes, schools use tools like reflection journals, surveys and rubrics to measure the attainment of NE objectives and the effectiveness of their

NE programmes. However, even though there are instruments to evaluate the effectiveness of NE programmes, the MOE and schools would be hard put to measure if these programmes have built social resilience in students. Perhaps, only in a real crisis it would be possible to assess the effectiveness of the MOE's NE programmes. In August 2006, the Committee on National Education found that variance in implementation had resulted in students having varied experiences. Key stakeholders suggested giving students greater voice and leadership opportunities as well as more opportunities to interact with leaders in government, business and community sectors. The Committee recommended that NE should place more emphasis on engaging students' hearts, and in order to do so, educators will need to rethink old ways of doing NE and customise the citizenry curriculum to "engage students' minds better, and get them to contribute in ways that are more meaningful to them".

Upon receiving such recommendations, schools would revisit their programmes to re-evaluate and suggest and implement new programmes. The main challenge for schools is how they can achieve the goals with optimum and efficient use of the available resources. The schools normally would be stretched to integrate such programmes or initiatives within the current system without increasing the heavy workload of the current system. Schools would be encouraged to innovate without reinventing the wheel and duplicating resources and efforts.

Conclusion

Clearly, despite the governments' good efforts in working in partnerships with their communities on issues relating to security and counter-terrorism, problems abound. Nevertheless, governments and those involved in counter-terrorism work must come to realize that communities are the long-term solution to terrorism, and they need to re-assess how they involve the different communities and stakeholders in tackling the problem of extremism.

Overall, these programmes promote greater understanding of why conflicts exist within and among nations, how Singapore ensures its national security and also how conflict in one region can affect the rest of the world.

GLOBAL PATHFINDER

The ICPVTR Terrorism Database – Global Pathfinder - is a one-stop repository for information on the current and emerging terrorist threats. The database focuses on terrorism and political violence in the Asia-Pacific region – comprising of Southeast Asia, North Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and Oceania.

Global Pathfinder is an integrated database containing comprehensive profiles of terrorist groups, key terrorist personalities, terrorist and counter-terrorist incidents as well as terrorist training camps. It also contains specific details and analyses of significant terrorist attacks in the form of terrorist attack profiles.

For further inquiries regarding subscription and access to the Global Pathfinder database, please email Ms. Elena Ho Wei Ling at the following email address: isewlho@ntu.edu.sg

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The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

ICPVTR conducts research, training, and outreach programs aimed at reducing the threat of politically motivated violence and at mitigating its effects on the international system. The Centre seeks to integrate academic theory with practical knowledge, which is essential for a complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from politically-motivated groups.

The Centre is staffed by academic specialists, religious scholars, as well as personnel from the law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies, among others. The Centre is culturally and linguistically diverse, comprising of functional and regional analysts as well as Muslim religious scholars from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North America.

Events and Publications

- Terrorist Rehabilitation: The US Experience in Iraq (CRC Press Taylor and Francis Group, 2011) by Dr. Ami Angell and Dr. Rohan Gunaratna

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
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