CIAO DATE: 4/00

The Role of Government in the Production and Control of Scientific and Technical Knowledge

Francis B. Kapper

Secrecy and Knowledge Production
Judith Reppy, Editor
Peace Studies Program, Cornell University
Occasional Paper #23
October 1999

 

Introduction

This paper addresses the federal government’s role in the production and control of scientific knowledge and technical know-how. It describes some of the positive and negative aspects of national security (secrecy) controls on both knowledge production and its export to other countries. I conclude by posing a few questions for further consideration.

 

The Government’s Role in Knowledge Production and Control

The job of government is to protect and serve its people in an efficient and effective manner. ₁ By contrast, the bottom line of business is to make a profit. This difference leads to different considerations with respect to secrecy.

Our government has a practical as well as a statutory role in the production of scientific and technical knowledge and its export. A major concern of the government in these activities stems from its primary mission of protecting its people, institutions, and lands from destruction by external aggressors, both declared and potential.

The intelligence and weapons systems, which we rely upon to detect hostile actions as well as to defend the United States, are the intellectual property of our nation’s scientists, engineers, and many others in government, academe, and industry. Considering what was actually and vividly at stake during the Cold War years–namely the survival of our population and institutions–it was reasonable to expect that our government would protect such militarily critical technology and goods from the former Soviet Union and from any other potential adversary’s acquisition for as long as possible. For this reason and others, the government imposes certain restrictions on who has a valid “need to know.” These restrictions are implemented in a variety of ways, the security classification system being most prominent. Other mechanisms are used as well, including, among other things, the National Disclosure Policy (NDP) and the Armed Forces Patent Review Board (AFPRB). The NDP is used to determine the level of access to classified information that each country worldwide gets for a number of information categories. One of the categories is scientific and technical information and research. The AFPRB makes decisions on which patents pending should be covered by a patent secrecy order.

A nation’s science and technology achievements gives it both real and perceived power, in a military, economic, political, and diplomatic sense. From the national perspective, scientific and technological leadership in militarily critical areas can give a nation capabilities it could not possess otherwise. Again, in a national security context, it can provide a country a special edge, or competitive position relative to actual or potential adversaries, both in real as well as in perceived terms. Our nation’s capabilities in nuclear weapons design, computer technology, space reconnaissance, electronic micro-miniaturization, and stealth technology are obvious examples of such leadership.

The objective of “secrecy” classifications in these cases is simple. It is to preserve the lead time of the United States as long as possible. Experienced government professionals know you can’t keep scientific knowledge or technology secret forever. Their goal is to make the time it takes for a potential (or real) enemy to acquire the technology as long as possible, and to make its acquisition as costly as possible. I assure you that this was my goal when I had responsibility for making decisions on technology export cases for the U.S. Defense Department.

Do such secrecy precautions cost? Of course they do, sometimes inordinately so. Should some things be unclassified? Definitely! In a society where you may get severely punished for not classifying at the proper level but are not punished for over-classifying, you get the result you would expect: over-classification. But let me propose a rhetorical question: who among you has had to make decisions to classify or not to classify? If yes, did you ever classify anything Top Secret? Did you ever classify anything too low? Too high? In your discussions did you ever use the lowest classification to discuss a subject you knew probably should be at a higher level? If you had the CNWDI, SIOP or other compartmental clearances, ₂ would you chance making a mistake, particularly with someone you didn’t know very well? Do you know the potential consequences?

The bottom line here is that there is no substitute for experience and good judgment. The inexperienced need to be counseled to ask someone with solid experience for guidance. Unfortunately they usually aren’t counseled, and they normally don’t ask anyone for help. The key question that the classifier must ask, and answer as honestly as possible, is this: What would the operational and financial consequences be to the United States and its allies, if this information/product/technical know-how got into the hands of the enemy? With this as a reference point, it is easy to see how someone might be overly cautious. If you haven’t had to make these type of decisions consider yourselves lucky. In any case, please be gentle in your judgment of the honest and conscientious folks who have.

There is a class of people who are an exception to the honest and conscientious individuals noted above. These are the individuals who classify (or make “Privileged” or “Business Confidential”) anything that might bring them embarrassment or censure for poor or biased judgments, waste, fraud, or abuse of authority. There are many examples of such behavior. I have small sympathy for such people. Unfortunately, they abound not only in government, but in industry as well.

The government can do things that individual companies or institutions cannot. One of the most important is the ability to provide massive amounts of money over long periods of time. It can also provide a focus, unity, and national vision that transcend parochial interests. The government has the authority and ability to organize scientific and technological efforts on a scale no one can come close to matching. It has access to resources, intelligence, and facilities available nowhere else in the world. It has the option of bringing in similar resources and commitments from other nations, which, again, no single company or institution can do. These are pretty impressive capabilities in anyone’s book, and numerous examples of them in action abound–e.g., the Manhattan Project, the goal of a man on the moon in our lifetime, the Space Telescope, and the Global Positioning Satellite System.

Do secrecy and security restrictions make scientific and technical progress less efficient? I think the answer is an emphatic and definite yes. Is progress slower than it might be if there were no secrecy restrictions? The answer here is less definitive, but is still yes. Should all science and technology developments occur without the protective veil of secrecy? In my opinion, no. The powerful capabilities some militarily critical technologies provide demand responsible care and use, and not all national leaders have another nation’s best interests at heart. Neither are all individuals without malice towards others. Most of us would not like to see certain world leaders with the capabilities inherent in weapons of mass destruction. Hostile intentions do matter, but it is an enemy’s capabilities that can kill you.

 

Some Current Issues of Concern

Beyond the control of military information, there are other areas in which secrecy raises policy issues for the government. The encryption of financial data, for example, is not just an issue for the United States. It is a valid global concern for everyone. The difficulty in exporting encryption technology that software companies and other businesses have is just the tip of the iceberg. The problem is more pervasive, and a global solution is desperately needed, and soon. National solutions are nice, but other nations may not wish to trust another nation not to eavesdrop on their communications or to tamper with their financial well being.

Could a multinational effort to develop a global encryption algorithm and technology be successful? Sometimes a prudent sharing of selected and crucial technical knowledge, even with a real or potential adversary, can lead to greater regional or global stability. Take the example of the concept “Fail-Safe,” which was developed at the RAND Corporation and released to the public by the government on purpose so that the Soviet Union would learn how to use the “Fail-Safe” method for their own operational nuclear forces. While this knowledge gave the Soviets much greater operational capabilities, it also made for a nuclear environment with greater inherent stability, one that was less likely to lead to an “accidental” nuclear war. The U.S. gave away a technical advantage in order to achieve greater nuclear stability. Might this approach work for other issues such as encryption? What assumptions might we need to make? What should the trade-offs be for each side?

The related issue of computer piracy or of computer information system security is one of concern to all computer users. It is of even greater concern to business and government agencies. Financial losses, seldom reported publicly, are estimated to be enormous. Here is another case in which a national effort might be appropriate. The combined capabilities of academe, industry and government could probably solve this problem.

We generally speak of national security in strictly military terms, and that term is frequently invoked when justifying certain governmental actions. The reality is that economic security in today’s global and interdependent economy is as important as military security and sometimes takes precedence for limited periods of time. It is time we re-think and redefine more broadly the term “national security” and how this broader conception applies not only to key federal statutes (such as the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act) but also to decisions and discussions of U.S. national defense plans and policies.

The recent loss of highly classified nuclear weapons design information from our National Laboratories to the People’s Republic of China should have surprised no one. The relatively free access Chinese scientists had to their American counterparts, the apparent highly cooperative attitude of the lab’s senior staff, and the conscious Chinese tactic of using “friendship” to acquire what they want, greatly facilitated the transfer of scientific know-how to the Chinese. It is naive at best, and criminally irresponsible at worst to assume that foreign nationals from a potential adversary country (which the PRC is), will not try to obtain (read steal) highly classified nuclear weapons design information if given the opportunity to do so. The intelligence gathering objectives of visiting PRC scientists has been well known to the U.S. intelligence community for years.

What happened at the National Labs is to be expected under the circumstances given. It is apparent that proper information security procedures were not followed, and just as important, close personal relationships were allowed to exist. It is a basic principle of technology transfer that the more intense the personal contact, the more quickly and completely the transfer of technical know-how will occur. Will the nuclear weapon design information lost have potentially serious consequences for the United States and the free world? The answer is undoubtedly yes. In my view, it will permit the PRC to develop better nuclear weapons more quickly and at a vastly cheaper cost. Strategically, it could permit them to field smaller, more accurate nuclear and thermonuclear weapons more quickly, and consequently provide them greater diplomatic leverage in world politics.

What are the relevant lessons here? There are several. Key among these is the reaffirmation of the need to aggressively protect that information and technology which is truly vital to our nation’s security, and Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI) is information of a vital nature. A second lesson is that the nuclear information acquired will in time give the PRC an increase in both real and perceived power in a military, political and diplomatic sense. If our monitoring of PRC nuclear tests subsequently verifies unexpected advances, the international perception will reflect itself in military, political and diplomatic terms. A third lesson is that this loss of CNWDI information will ultimately exact a price, not yet determined. A fourth lesson, perhaps obvious but worth reflection upon, is that once technology is transferred, it is gone. You can’t get it back. Another, though not final, lesson is that everyone engaged in critical areas of military research should be extra sensitive to their own potential for compromise by people who have no real “need to know” the information they possess. They should be especially alert to foreign nationals from nations with competing international interests which are significantly different from our own. Should we continue to be friendly and cooperative with future scientific visitors from the PRC? Definitely yes, but we should be circumspect and realistic about what we share, and we should be security conscious at all times.

 

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Endnotes:

Note 1: It should be noted that when the term “government” is used in this paper, it generally refers to the Executive Branch of the federal government. In the discussion which follows, the primary role of the Legislative Branch is to provide the money needed to fund the research proposed by the Execu-tive Branch. Back.

Note 2: CNWDI: Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information. SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan (for use of nuclear weapons). Back.