

AID COORDINATION AND ALIGNMENT: MYTH OR REALITY?

THE CASE OF THE ECOWAS REGIONAL AGRICULTURE POLICY

Jean-Denis Crola, Independent consultant

Saya Saulière, Intermón Oxfam

8 September 2011

CONTENTS

Acronyms	3
Executive summary	6
Introduction	9
1. Official aid for agriculture: investments spread thin, reducing effectiveness	11
1.1 The negative effects of the “project approach”.....	11
1.2 Difficulties in promoting the sector-wide approach.....	15
2. ECOWAP: a challenge for donors?	17
2.1 Building a common intervention framework: what is at stake?	17
2.2 ECOWAS’ political drive runs up against the TFPs’ and States’ usual approaches	19
2.3 Inequitable donor contribution to the NAIPs.....	22
2.4 Limited civil society participation in the national processes	23
3.The conditions for successful partner alignment on the regional agriculture policy	25
3.1 Understanding the alignment challenges	25
3.2 Transforming dialogue spaces into coordination tools	27
3.3 Overcoming political obstacles to alignment	28
3.4 Overcoming institutional and organisational resistance	31
Conclusion.....	36
Bibliography	38
Acknowledgements	47

Acronyms

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
ADB	African Development Bank
ADRAO	Centre du riz pour l'Afrique [African Rice Centre]
AFD	Agence Française de Développement [French International Development Agency]
ADF	African Development Fund
AFSI	Aquila Food Security Initiative
AGRA	Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa
ASWG	Agriculture Sector Working Group
BCEAO	Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest [Central Bank of West African States]
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
CCDR	Cadre de Concertation pour le Développement Rural [rural
CEP	Comité État-Partenaires [State-Partners Committee]
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CILSS	Comité permanent Inter-États de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel [Permanent Interstate Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel]
CMA-AOC	Conférence des Ministres de l'Agriculture de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre [conference of agriculture Ministers from West and Central Africa]
CORAF	Conférence des dirigeants de la recherche agricole en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre [conference of leaders in agriculture research in West and Central Africa]
CPF	Confédération Paysanne du Faso [Confederation of Burkina Faso Farmers]
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Aid Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DGCOOP	Direction Générale de la Coopération [Department of Development Aid]
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
ECOWADF	ECOWAS Regional food and agriculture development fund
ECOWAP	ECOWAS Agricultural Policy
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African states
EDF	European Development Fund
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FASDEP	Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy

FtF	Feed the Future
GAFSP	Global Agricultural Food Security Program
GDPRD	Global Donor Platform for Rural Development
GFRP	Global Food Crisis Response Program
GHC	Ghana Cedi
ICRAF	World Agroforestry Centre
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid-Tropics
IDB	Interamerican Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFDC	International Fertiliser Development Centre
IITA	International Institute for Tropical Agriculture
JSR	Joint Sector Review
MAHRH	Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques [Ministry for Agriculture, Water and Fisheries]
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDBS	Multi-Donor Budget Support
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
METASIP	Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan
MiDA	Millennium Development Authority
MoFA	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NIAP	National Agriculture Investment Programme
NIAP/P	National Agriculture Investment Programme/Priority
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMVG	Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Gambie [the Gambian River Basin Development Organisation]
OMVS	Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal [the river Senegal development organisation]
PASR	Programme d'Appui au Secteur Rural [Rural sector support programme]
PMU	Project Management Units
PNSR	Programme National du Secteur Rural [National Programme for the Rural Sector]
PO	Professional/Producer Organisations
PROSDRp	Programme Sectoriel de Développement Rural Productif [productive rural development sector programme]
RAIP	Regional Agriculture Investment Programme
RDS	Rural Development Strategy

RECA	Réseau des Chambres d'Agriculture [Network of Chambers of Agriculture]
SGA	Secrétaire Général Adjoint [Assistant General Secretariat]
SP/CPSA	Secrétariat Permanent du Comité de Coordination des Politiques Sectorielles Agricoles
SPONG	Secrétariat Permanent des Organisations Non Gouvernementales [Permanent Secretariat for Non-Governmental Organisations]
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TFP	Technical and Financial Partner
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WADB	West African Development Bank
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Agriculture, along with livestock farming and fishing, is one of the fundamental components of West African economies. Together they constitute over 35% of the Gross National Product and contribute over 15% of export revenues. They provide income to more than 60% of the working population, over half of whom are women working in production, processing or trade.

Despite its vital importance for the sub-region, West African agriculture is characterised by low productivity and beset with numerous economic, social and environmental limitations, requiring deep-seated structural reform to meet the food needs of the inhabitants of a region set to double in population by 2050.

In light of this, the escalation in food prices in 2008 and its negative impact on the most vulnerable populations gave fresh impetus to the implementation of ECOWAP, the regional agricultural policy of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). In 2009 and 2010, the ECOWAS Member States drafted, in a consultative manner, national (NAIP) and regional (RAIP) agricultural investment programmes, identifying the sector's priorities and the funding required to achieve them.

These programmes are unique reference frameworks for interventions in the agricultural sector and aim to facilitate alignment amongst technical and financial partners (TFPs) as well as bring about the adoption of a sector-wide approach. In signing multi-actor pacts,¹ ECOWAS partners and Member States have confirmed their commitment to better coordinating their interventions.

In the same vein, during the G8 Summit in L'Aquila (Italy) in July 2009, these partners announced substantial financial pledges for agriculture and food security, whilst reaffirming their commitment to the principles of aid effectiveness.

Based on a study of the process for defining and implementing ECOWAP in Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana and at a regional level, this research analyses the factors needed to ensure progress on partner coordination and alignment as well as for drafting and rolling out the national agricultural investment programmes together with the stumbling blocks impeding these processes.

Official aid for agriculture: investments spread thin, reducing effectiveness

In Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana, funding for the rural sector still largely depends on contributions from development partners. Coordinating their interventions therefore is crucial to ensure aid effectiveness.

However, despite repeated calls from ECOWAS and some Member States to make changes to the way aid is implemented and move towards a sector-wide approach, the agriculture sector remains largely dominated by the project approach. In Burkina Faso, for example, all of the 150 million US dollars allocated to agricultural sector support in 2009 were implemented solely by way of project aid.

This plethora of projects makes the exercise of introducing any sense of consistency problematic and impedes national ownership of the processes for drafting and rolling out policies. Furthermore State officials responsible for these projects dedicate an enormous amount of time to providing support to the technical and financial partners, as well as monitoring these projects, which fall outside of the national framework systems and so further weaken administrations.

Poor donor coordination is evident in the disparity in the funding received by the different sectors and regions, as illustrated by an analysis of the resources dedicated to the Rural Development Strategy in Niger, which have focused on in vogue themes.

Some countries seemed to have in fact multiplied the intervention frameworks and action plans in an effort to attract external funding. However, the example of Ghana clearly demonstrates that the existence of a single intervention framework and in-depth dialogue

on governmental internal procedures are not enough to bring about a radical change in approach among partners. Drafted in 2002, Ghana's first Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) was based on the country's Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy and has been broken down into an operational plan. However in 2011, the protocol agreement between the government and partners to effectively roll it out had still not been signed. In essence, resistance is still strong to adopting the sector based approach in the agriculture sector.

Is the ECOWAS regional agricultural policy a challenge for donors?

Adopted in January 2005, ECOWAP is one of the first sector-wide policies to see the light of day in the ECOWAS region. It was drafted with the involvement of the main stakeholders, in particular producer organisations, and clearly identified the objectives and strategies for growth in agriculture and food security, so essential for the region.

This policy was one of the first regional ventures drafted as part of the NEPAD Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and this policy too aims to facilitate aid alignment by creating operational intervention frameworks that are common to all stakeholders. The partnership pacts signed since 2009 clarified the partners' undertakings, roles and responsibilities.

As might be imagined, this process requires a (re)organisation on the part of partners and the way they work and collaborate so they can intervene on a regional scale. This also requires introducing funding mechanisms that will respond to the financial needs of the regional agricultural policy. However, the progress made in this area is still hesitant.

At national level, the study on the national investment plans shows that donors have taken part in the drafting process of NAIPs but in disparate ways. Far from driving a new way of doing things, the formulation process for these plans has on the whole reinforced pre-existing relationships between the different stakeholders. In Burkina Faso the NAIP has exacerbated tensions between partners and some government structures; whilst in Ghana the process has boosted the consultative approach that prevailed amongst the stakeholders.

At a regional level, a TFP coordination group, under the leadership of the Spanish overseas development agency, was created during the International Conference in Abuja in 2009. Even though it was meant to push forward the process of consultation and trust-building amongst the donors, so far it has been limited to being a space for exchanging information and has failed hitherto to give rise to any real coordination or harmonisation activities. For example the essential task of mapping donor procedures at regional level, one of its main objectives, has hardly begun.

Moreover, civil society involvement remains limited despite its importance and the role it was assigned in the CAADP process. Their participation is seen as a means to an end and there is a lack of political willingness to include them, meaning that civil society has not been allowed to be effectively involved, particularly producer organisations. Time pressures and the need to obtain rapid results have often taken precedence over rolling out an inclusive participatory process, a real challenge in terms of methodology, human resources, time and institutional know-how.

Conditions for successful partner alignment on the regional agriculture policy

In addition to the technical aspect developed on aid effectiveness, alignment and state ownership are above all political processes. They imply a change in the power relationships between donors and the governments receiving aid, handing back power to the latter to define their own policies.

The TFP sector consultation groups are a key coordination, alignment and harmonisation mechanism for partners. These groups, which differ in their make-up from country to country but have similar aims to exchange information and coordination, also obtain variable results. Some remain merely for protocol, and some even only exist on paper, although others are more active in implementing the agenda for effective aid. But in

general these spaces have not shown any notable progress in terms of coordination, harmonisation and division of labour.

Furthermore, some partners, despite their declared support for the aid effectiveness agenda have not undertaken the necessary reforms for institutionalising coordination and alignment. There is a lack of influential frameworks: little training on the Paris Declaration; no time allocated to coordination; and a lack of clear objectives for technical staff. In addition TFP procedures are often both complex and rigid, throwing up obstacles to using national systems, as representatives of USAID, AFD and the World Bank have stated. Moreover donor accountability is still very “Northern-centric”, in other words to their home governments who allocate funding. The TFPs thus have their own criteria for monitoring and evaluation and assessing the quality of their results, often a far cry from those of the local authorities. The visibility project-based interventions offers donors, means they can establish an “unambiguous” relationship between aid and results.

In contrast, some donors such as the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) have shown that it is possible to align, even in fragile contexts, by introducing support and capacity building strategies for stakeholders and national or local systems. This requires first and foremost the political willingness to put in place these international agreements.

ECOWAP is an ambitious response to the issue of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and faces major challenges to its implementation. It is therefore imperative that the TFPs honour their international commitments on coordination and alignment by adopting a sector-wide approach so as to support States in their policy-making. A paradigm shift is both vital and necessary.

INTRODUCTION

Agriculture provides employment for 65% of the West African workforce and constitutes 35% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the ECOWAS region (Economic Community of West African States).² It is a crucial sector because of the contribution it makes to revenues, food security and job creation as well as to the National budget, particularly in terms of export earnings. However, it faces considerable challenges demanding major structural transformation.

Appropriate staple food production needs to be scaled up to meet the needs of the growing urban populace, set to be 60% of the region's population by 2020³. However, dwindling natural resources and the growing pressure exerted on them (especially land and water), land grab, as well as the frequency of climatic shocks means that food security is a pressing challenge. This goes hand in hand with the need to still develop an innovative approach to agriculture; one that is more environmentally friendly and better able to adapt to climate change. Furthermore, the food crisis of 2008, triggered by an escalation in the price of raw materials on international markets, reminds us of the dangers posed to West African countries dependent on food imports to meet their populations' needs and calls for a profound paradigm shift.

As stressed by Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, president of the ECOWAS Commission in 2008, all these challenges demand massive reinvestment on the part of all stakeholders: States, entrepreneurs, the international community and producers. It also requires them to combine, in a coherent fashion, "clear and incisive State policies, stakeholder strategies and funding tools appropriate to the diversity of needs".⁴ In light of these challenges, during the G8 summit held in L'Aquila (Italy) in July 2009, the main donor countries undertook to dedicate 22 billion US dollars over three years to agriculture and food security for developing countries. In addition to these financial promises, the G8 countries also pledged to ensure better coordinated interventions and funding and to support country-led programmes consistent with the aid effectiveness agenda.⁵ In that same year, Oxfam raised concerns regarding official development aid (ODA) as it is implemented in the agricultural sector of three countries in the region: Burkina Faso, Ghana and Niger.⁶ Provided in the form of a host of projects by agencies with different, often contradictory, strategies and visions, the ways and means of implementing ODA does not allow for consistency across the agricultural sector and fails to respond to the food stakes in the countries of the region. Despite the fact investments by technical and financial partners (TFP) are relatively low compared to ODA, they still represent between 60 and 80%⁷ of rural sector budgets in the countries studied, and therefore donor coordination and alignment on national policies is crucial.

The adoption of the *Regional Initiative for Food Production and the Fight Against Hunger* by the region's Heads of State in June 2008 in response to the food crisis provided fresh impetus to rolling out the ECOWAS regional agricultural policy, ECOWAP. Since then, ECOWAS and its Member States have launched a new process, bringing together the objectives of this regional agricultural policy and those of the NEPAD⁸ agricultural initiative, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). This new process, called ECOWAP/CAADP, aims to bring together all the rural sector stakeholders into a partnership to re-launch growth in the agricultural sector and so achieve the first Millennium Development Goal: to halve the number of people suffering from hunger by 2015.⁹ In 2009 and 2010, ECOWAS Member States and the region entered into a concerted programming phase, with the aim of drawing up national as well as regional agricultural investment programmes (NAIPs and RAIPs), that are single entities, shared by all the stakeholders. These programmes detailed priority actions and the funding required to implement them. They endeavour to respond to the challenges of aligning aid with national priorities and of breaking away from the project approach found in the agricultural sector.

This study does not aim to provide an exhaustive review of the ECOWAP/CAADP implementation process, three years after its inception in West Africa. Rather, this study is based on an analysis of the process in three countries (Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana), as well as at a regional level, and tries to report on this at an intermediate stage, illustrating the progress made and the obstacles encountered in drawing up the investment programmes and in the gradual alignment of the Technical and Financial Partners (TFP) behind these.

The first part of the study gives an overall snapshot of the TFP's intervention methods in the agricultural sectors of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Niger, updating, where possible, the results/findings of the study published in 2009. The second part focuses on the drafting process of the agricultural investment plans, illustrating the challenges that exist between stakeholders and good consultation practices. The last section focuses on the obstacles to TFP alignment on these new investment plans and processes; and then finally examines some lessons learnt and possible courses of action to be taken for the implementation of ECOWAP both at country and regional levels.

1. Official aid for agriculture: investments spread thin, reducing effectiveness

Official development aid (ODA) is a crucial funding component for the rural sector in Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana. However, despite ECOWAS' and some Member States' repeated calls for a change in the ways and means of implementing aid, the majority of technical and financial partners' (TFP) interventions remain a host of short term, poorly-coordinated projects, leading to high running costs and lost opportunities for the countries receiving the aid.

1.1 The negative effects of the “project approach”

Following the global food crisis of 2007/08, the amount of ODA dedicated to the agricultural sector and food security increased in several West African countries. In Burkina Faso, according to the department of development aid (DGCOOP) of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, aid to the agricultural sector increased by 59.35% between 2007 and 2009 and in 2009, it represented 12.17% of total ODA.¹⁰ Furthermore, food aid almost doubled in volume from 2008 to 2009, going from 14.13 million US dollars in 2008 to 28.06 million US dollars in 2009.¹¹

Funding for the rural sector depends largely on TFPs' external contributions. Thus in Niger, according to the *Rural Development Strategy Monitoring Report 2007-2009*,¹² published in May 2011, TFPs provided over 70% of funding for the rural development strategy (RDS). In Ghana, despite major efforts to mobilise internal resources, in 2010 TFPs still contributed to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture's budget¹³ to the tune of 52%¹⁴, compared to 63.3% two years previously.¹⁵

As highlighted in Oxfam's 2009 study conducted in Burkina Faso, Niger and Ghana¹⁶ the problem of the agricultural sector's dependency on external funding is further aggravated by the TFPs' intervention methods, the multiplicity of their initiatives and the diversity of their rural development approaches. These make aid management difficult and sometimes ineffective for the recipient countries. As long as this aid is granted in the form of a multitude of projects with varying durations and procedures, it will prove difficult for the States to guarantee coherency and feasible coordination for investment in the agricultural sector and ownership of the current process.

Managing a large number of independent projects in fact generates transaction costs, both in financial and human terms, as well as opportunity costs. Public officials in government are overwhelmed by the short term management of TFP projects and the manifold missions they incur, to the detriment of time spent on monitoring the sector using really effective tools.

An OECD report published in 2008 remarked that in Ghana “most aid continues to be provided in the form of stand-alone projects (in the agriculture sector)”¹⁷; despite government efforts to promote sector-wide budgetary support and improve national funding and procedural systems (see Table 1). In 2008, 52.5% of funding granted by the TFPs was still not managed by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) and a substantial portion of the funds earmarked for the sector was not referenced by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP). In November 2010, the exercise undertaken by MoFA to map TFP interventions in agriculture, the *Development Partner (DP) Activity Matrix*, counted 61 partner interventions in the sector.

Table 1: Donor funding for the agricultural sector in Ghana in 2008 (in millions of GHC)

	Donor pledges	%
Funds managed by MoFA	55.55	47.5
Funds not managed by MoFA	61.33	52.5
Total funds for the agricultural sector	116.88	100

Source: MoFA, 2008.

In Burkina Faso, this situation is even more marked. In 2009, all of the 149.56 million US dollars earmarked for the agricultural sector were spent via project aid.¹⁸ This rate is much higher than the average, which already stands at 63% (project aid) compared to 30% of sector-wide and global budgetary support, according to the planned 2011 disbursements¹⁹. Comparing donor contributions between 2008 and 2011 in Burkina Faso, it appears that the TFPs that most habitually used the classic project aid/programme model across all sectors were: the ADB, the WADB, Japan, Taiwan, Canada, the Global Fund and Luxembourg.²⁰

In Niger, despite the fact that the rural development strategy was drafted for a gradual move away from a stand-alone project approach to a programme approach, the vast majority of interventions in the rural development sector remain projects. Thus the *Atlas des projets et programmes*,²¹ [Map of Projects and Programmes], an initiative launched in 2010 that aims to map TFP interventions in Niger, found that by June 2011, 72 projects (i.e. 5 projects more than 2008), were implemented by 22 TFPs²² over the whole rural development sector.

The inconveniences associated with implementing aid in the form of stand-alone projects have long since been known and extensively written about. The Paris Declaration (PD) on aid effectiveness, signed in 2005 by donor and aid recipient countries, and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) adopted in September 2008, committed the signatory countries to improving the quality of their aid by combating the adverse effects of project aid. Observations in the field, unfortunately, show the way forward has been far from easy and progress slow, especially in the agricultural sector.

Analysis of TFP interventions in the agricultural sectors of Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana, reveals the following recurrent problems associated with a project approach:

- *The cost of project management units (PMU)*, implemented by many TFPs: a detailed analysis of some rural development projects in Niger shows that the funding dedicated to PMU accounts for between 15 and 60% of total project funding.²³ These major management costs are resources that do not make it to the field and question the effectiveness of the aid provided.
- By directly implementing the project funds through the PMUs, the *TFPs do not contribute to capacity building in funding and administrative management or to consolidating national systems*. The main arguments put forward by partners to justify using their own spending procedures are the lack of transparency in national funding structures and their general weakness. However, in bypassing the national systems and failing to devote resources to strengthening them, the TFPs are entering into a vicious circle. According to some technical assistants in Burkina Faso this leads to paradoxical situations where the ministerial civil servants are familiar with the expenditure procedures of many donors while remaining ignorant of the national procedures of their own ministries.
- *Undermining and harnessing of local capacities*: the growing number of projects undermines the governments' administrative and management capacities by diverting administration staff to daily project monitoring and fulfilling the procedures specific to each donor. In Ghana, the TFP exploration and evaluation missions have become so numerous that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) has had to

create a code of conduct on the matter and impose a “mission free period” during the months when the budget is being drawn up from 15th September to 15th November. In 2008, Ghana received 272 donor missions.²⁴

Some management staff, often the best educated or most highly skilled, are in fact directly recruited by the TFPs for their local offices to oversee the coordination of their projects. Despite the fact that the ministries need strengthening and should attract qualified and proficient human resources, the contract terms offered by the TFPs are more attractive and result in staff being appropriated from the administrations that they are meant to be supporting.

Finally in countries with chronic food crises and structural food insecurity, such as Niger, as soon as the alert threshold has been exceeded TFPs and NGOs quickly scale up their human and financial resources, proliferating the opportunities for recruiting senior staff from the public sector and thus creating a kind of “parallel administrative unit”, endowed with resources that are far superior to those of the government.

- *A short term approach and highly volatile funding*: working by means of short duration projects reflects the reality of TFP’s short-term management approach to official development aid, allowing them to respond quickly to the political priorities of the donor country governments.

In Niger, between 2007 and 2009, 31 institutions contributed funding to the Rural Development Strategy (RDS) programmes but only 17 provided financing over three consecutive years. 10 of them only supported programmes for a year. This unpredictable funding complicates enormously the management of State expenditures and administering the RDS. The funding for this increased by 25% between 2007 and 2008, but decreased by 38% from 2008 to 2009.²⁵

- Finally, the weakness of the consultation frameworks too often ends in disorganisation and even incoherence amongst the field interventions. *“Each partner promotes its own approach to agricultural development or food security and the final project is a strong reflection of the partner’s approach”*, explains an official from the Ministry of Economy and Finance in Burkina Faso. *“In the field, the TFPs have such different ways of working that they become incomprehensible for those they are meant to be helping”*.²⁶

This poor coordination is manifest in the disparity in the funding received by the different sectors and regions. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see donors focus on certain themes that are in vogue or regions that are more promising and so to see other less alluring sectors or areas, where results are less visible, abandoned (see Box 1).

Box 1. Niger: Rebalancing emergency and development interventions to promote even-handed regional focus ²⁷


The Rural Development Strategy (RDS), drawn up in 2003, and transformed into an action plan at the end of 2006, is made up of 24 programmes and sub-programmes, covering the whole range of rural development problems. Ideally, good coordination between the donors and the State would ensure balanced funding for the different programmes, but the *RDS Monitoring Report 2007-2009*, conducted in May 2011, shows major disparities.

Some productive investment programmes remain notoriously under-funded, despite their importance to building capacities and strengthening producers' resilience to climate change and supporting production in a context of structural food crisis. This is particularly true for programme 11 "Developing irrigation to combat food insecurity" which has recorded the poorest funding implementation rate (38%). In contrast, programme 9.1 "Prevention and management of natural crises and disasters" boasts a better completion rate (127%) and consumes 21.6% of resources allocated to the rural sector.

This situation can be explained by the fact that funding for emergencies in a crisis context is relatively easy to mobilise at an international level and the implementation procedures are often simpler and more flexible than for development activities. However, it also reveals the TFPs reluctance to intervene outside of the governance frameworks and implementation mechanisms with a good reputation, such as the national body for the prevention and management of food crises (DNGPCA) for example, which has a common funding mechanism that is relatively transparent and effective.

Moreover, the geographic distribution of projects by region remains widely disparate, failing to reflect the poverty indicators in the different regions. For example, while the region of Tillaberi has close to a quarter of projects, the regions of Maradi and Dosso receive strikingly less assistance, despite the fact that they contain practically the same proportion of poor populations.²⁸

Distribution of projects/programmes by region



1.2 Difficulties in promoting the sector-wide approach

The TFPs justify their fondness for the project approach – and the lack of coordination often associated with this – with the lack of leadership shown by governments to define and impose an agricultural development vision and an operational implementation framework, as well as weak national procedures and systems. Some countries have in fact increased the number of intervention frameworks and action plans to attract external funding. However, the example of Ghana clearly illustrates the fact that the existence of a single intervention framework and a comprehensive dialogue on the government's internal procedures are not enough to bring about a radical change in the partners' approach.

In 2002, the Ghanaian government drew up its first food and agriculture sector development policy (FASDEP), revised again in 2007.²⁹ This policy, based on the country's Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy,³⁰ has been broken down into an operational plan³¹, the first version being finalised at the beginning of 2010. However, the government is still struggling to convince the TFPs to provide financial support for its sector action plan by means of a SWAp (Sector Wide Approach). The SWAp implementation process, however, started in 2006, with the common training programme offered to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture's (MoFA) technical departments and the heads of the TFPs, with the aim of getting stakeholders to agree on defining a sector-wide programme and spell out the pre-requisites necessary for its implementation. A road map was then drafted by a mixed working group involving both the State³² and TFPs, setting out a list of activities to be put in place before adopting the SWAp. The TFPs actively participated in the last stage, drawing up an action plan covering 2009-2015, in the form of the agriculture sector working group.³³ However in 2011, the memorandum of understanding for the effective rolling out of the SWAp had still not been signed.

Despite positive experiences in sector budget support for agriculture from the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) over the last few years, most TFPs have remained attached to intervening by way of projects. However, when asked during the field study, the vast majority of partners recognised the efforts and progress made by Ghana to improve financial management and public procurement procedures. The Government, for its part, has demonstrated its willingness to reform aid strategies. In extending the various alignment and harmonization mechanisms implemented since 2005,³⁴ the Ghanaian government has made public its policy on aid,³⁵ clearly calling on the TFPs to back sector-wide budget support instead of stand-alone projects and to use national procedures.³⁶

Whilst the MoFA and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) would have liked to put in place pooled funding and promote sector budget support for rolling out the SWAp, the government had to finally accept the proposal to use TFP funds combining budget support and projects.

Globally the aid provided in the form of projects has increased between 2008 and 2009, going from 56% to 57.4%, despite improvements to the funding management system³⁷. A recent evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Ghana,³⁸ leading up to the next High Level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Busan, South Korea, in December 2011, stated that the TFPs are "used to their 'own style' [...] they have made limited improvement in aligning with country systems [...] and] the recent pace of harmonization is very slow". This study called on the "donors (...) to gradually shift from project funding towards programme or pooled funding [...]. This would ensure that the various projects are integrated into the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) and not remain dislocated and isolated".³⁹

In Burkina Faso, the opposite is the case. Some TFPs – especially the Danish and German development agencies – have been pushing for a sector programme since 2006. However, this drive "from the outside" has run up against a lack of ownership by the government.

Burkina Faso's strategic frameworks, particularly its Rural Development Strategy (RDS) and the Decentralised Rural Development Policy Paper (LPDRD), give a political vision of rural development and set out the decentralised implementation principles. However, they do not constitute in themselves operational implementation documents likely to bring about harmonisation and alignment in the TFP's interventions. In light of this, in 2006, following a workshop by the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development,⁴⁰ several partners proposed, in consultation with the government, to put in place a SWAp so as to make the RDS operational.

The road map of the Productive Rural Development Sector Programme (PROSDRp) thus aims to make real the political vision of the RDS by offering a programming, budgeting and monitoring and evaluation framework, into which different stakeholders can be inserted using their comparative respective strengths. However, this exercise has mainly been driven by a few TFPs and has not succeeded in garnering the government's support, as it has never really owned the process. As of 2010, little progress had been made, with the exception of the drafting of a concept paper and agreement on the road map. This programme remains little known by ministry workers and the decentralised bodies where it was perceived as "the TFPs' programme". But the PROSDRp has not brought together all the technical and financial partners either, especially in light of the slowness of the process, and therefore has not received the necessary funding for implementing the road map. In conclusion, the PROSDRp has not succeeded in establishing a clear framework that allows the TFPs to develop their ways of working and move from a project approach to a programme approach.

2. ECOWAP: a challenge for donors?

The ECOWAP/CAADP process aims, amongst other things, to meet the challenges of aid alignment and break away from the project approach by drawing up common operational intervention frameworks shared by all stakeholders – the national (NAIP) and regional (RAIP) agricultural investment programmes.

Following the long drafting process for these agricultural policies and programmes, “partnership compacts” have been signed since 2009 at a regional and national level by all the parties involved: ECOWAS, the African Union, States, TFPs, civil society organisations (CSOs), professional and farmer organisations and the private sector. These set out their commitments and clarify their roles and responsibilities in these new partnerships. The TFPs, on their part, have made a series of commitments, particularly to put in place a coordination and aid management mechanism to align, harmonize and coordinate all the support they provide for agricultural development and food security in line with the ECOWAP/CAADP priorities. In accordance with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, they also plan to increase their support to the implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP and improve the predictability of their aid by means of technical and financial programming over several years (see Box 4.).

The countries and the region as a whole already have different strategies or action plans for the agricultural sector but one of the challenges to drafting these programmes is to ensure they are based on these existing documents, while adapting them to the framework developed for the CAADP and the ECOWAP pillars, as well as developing synergies at regional and national levels.

2.1 Building a common intervention framework: what is at stake?

The ECOWAP was adopted in January 2005 by the region's Heads of State and Government, following wide scale consultation in each country and at a regional level, especially with producer organisations. It is one of the first sector policies to see the light of day in the ECOWAS region and also represents the first regional programme realised as part of the NEPAD Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP). ECOWAP sets out a vision and objectives and introduces a framework for agricultural growth and food security on a regional scale.

From the outset, ECOWAP aimed to define a new coordination framework and to ensure consistency across the main programmes, under the aegis of ECOWAS. At regional level, the West African agricultural sector has numerous stakeholders, various dialogue frameworks, and a host of activities and initiatives, reflecting the interests of national decision makers and TFPs in this strategic sector. In addition to the two main economic integration organisations – WAEMU and ECOWAS – there are a multitude of research and cooperation bodies, such as CILSS, CORAF, OMVS, ABN,OMVG, ICRISAT, IWMI, ICRAF, ADRAO, IITA, CMA-AOC, IFDC, ITC, etc., each with its own strategy or action programme.⁴¹

This array of institutions and approaches reflect the partitioning and institutional reasoning deployed up to now. Moreover, according to ECOWAS, these institutions' programmes are “for the most part implemented in a very partial manner and their coherence is far from obvious”.⁴² Hence, ECOWAP has been deployed as the framework to introduce coherence and integration.

Box 2. CAADP methodology and (theoretical) stages

The CAADP methodology, adopted in 2003 in Maputo by all the African Union Heads of State and Government, sets out the objectives and major stages for formulating agricultural investment programmes. Based on in-depth analysis of the stakes at risk for the agricultural sector at a regional level and in each of the countries, these programmes aim to define the strategy and actions that will help to achieve a level of agricultural growth greater than 6% a year, considered the minimum necessary for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. They also detail the financial resources required to meet these goals.

In order to ensure the commitment of all rural development stakeholders and to avoid superimposing a new action framework onto the existing one, drafting investment programmes must be an inclusive participatory process, reflecting the spirit of new partnership between the parties involved: the State, TFPs, the private sector, civil society organisations and farmers' organisations.

Programme development in theory involves four main phases: i) diagnosis and formulation of working assumptions; ii) carrying out simulations and highlighting areas of likely accelerated growth; iii) formulation of investment programmes to promote development in the sector; iv) drawing up and signing a partnership agreement for its implementation. This last phase needs to be sanctioned by holding a funding round table meeting ("Business Meeting") with the TFPs.

In reality, formulating investment programmes has sometimes proved a longer and more complex process than expected. In Burkina Faso, for example, drafting the NAIP was confined to a technical exercise, without any real participatory or inclusive process and so did not allow the different parties involved to own it (particularly farmers organisations or civil society). In Ghana, on the other hand, the NAIP helped to extend the multi-actor dynamic of the sector policy FASDEPII, by opening up different areas for participation. ECOWAS has always maintained its focus on the implementation of CAADP, setting it apart from other regions of the continent.

At the *International Conference on funding the regional agricultural policy*, which took place in Abuja on the 11th and 12th of November 2009, 12 countries had already drafted their national agricultural investment programmes (NAIP) and 9 had organised their round table and signed a partnership agreement. However, these pacts did not result in securing funding commitments from the TFPs as the NAIPs were considered to be inadequately prioritised and the funding needs too great (4.2 billion US dollars for Niger, 3.5 billion US dollars for Ghana and 2.4 billion US dollars for the Burkina Faso NAIP).⁴³

At the behest of ECOWAS, a "post pact" process was undertaken at the beginning of 2010 to come up with "investment plans". The final communiqué after the meeting of the ECOWAS Agriculture Ministers with the TFPs, held on 2nd April 2010 in Cotonou, highlighted the importance of "ranking priorities in the investment programmes so as to bring to the fore the interventions that are the most beneficial in terms of agricultural growth".⁴⁴ In the end, it was only during the "Business Meeting on funding the investment plans" held in Dakar in June 2010 that the countries and the region were able to present their plans in their quasi-final version. However, once again, the TFPs made no clear commitment on funding their implementation.

2.2 ECOWAS' political drive runs up against the TFPs' and States' usual approaches

New ECOWAS leadership

Initially absent from the CAADP organisational set up (which only recognises national and continental levels), ECOWAS has gradually established its leadership. In 2002, the Heads of State, meeting in Yamoussoukro (Cote d'Ivoire), decided to give ECOWAS the mandate for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of NEPAD in West Africa, including the CAADP; and this was adopted in 2003 in Maputo. This mandate was renewed in 2005 during the adoption of the ECOWAP at the Accra Summit. The region's Heads of State assigned the ECOWAS Commission responsibility for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the ECOWAP, as well as ensuring the ECOWAS action framework is consistent with that proposed by NEPAD. By being the region that has made the most progress continentally in drafting the NAIPs, ECOWAS has clearly demonstrated its legitimacy, desire and ability to lead the process in the region. It has become an irrefutable dialogue partner for any TFP wanting to support the agriculture sector in West Africa.

At a regional level, ECOWAS has seized the opportunity of drawing up the regional investment programme (RAIP) to bring together all the initiatives from the different stakeholders in the agricultural field and integrating food security into it as well. Three programmes have been identified (termed as the "mobilising and federating" programmes)⁴⁵ based on strategic priorities that need to be completed and fitted in with the investment programmes developed by the individual countries.

In its role as an institutional implementation body, ECOWAS has equipped itself with two key instruments. The regional food and agriculture agency oversees the technical implementation of regional programmes; its administrative independence means it can deal directly with the implementing agencies. The Regional Food and Agriculture Development Fund (ECOWADF), which is housed in the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), oversees the allocation and management of the internal and external resources earmarked for regional programmes. Whilst some TFPs have expressed reservations about the EBID's ability to carry out this mission properly, ECOWAS has already committed 150 million FCFA to the regional fund, showing its determination to implement the RAIP with its own resources and by doing so encouraged the AFD (the French international Development aid agency) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to commit resources.

ECOWAS has also been a driving force amongst Member States, proposing the calendar for drawing up the investment programmes and a canvas for drafting national investment plans and a road map detailing the different stages, with the aim of harmonizing the national processes. The regional body encourages the Member States to play their part fully, never hesitating to remind them of their commitments to establish a dialogue with all stakeholders and urging them to refuse donor funding outside of the framework defined by the investment plans.

Finally, by organising the Business Meeting from 14th to 17th June 2010 in Dakar, aimed at confirming the donors' commitments made following the Muskoka G8 (Canada) in June 2008, ECOWAS exhibited its considerable capacity to react to the international agenda and mobilise its Member States behind it. This meeting also displayed ECOWAS' capacity to mobilise donors behind its agricultural plan and its regional leadership. However, this event did not achieve one of its expected aims of encouraging the TFPs to give a clear position on the funding of the different investment programmes (see Box 3).

This process was largely driven by the Agriculture Department and its team. The transition period that has opened up with the expected renewal of the Executive Secretariat during 2011 is a decisive moment, testing the institution's strength and its ability to push forward the process and projects despite changes in leadership.

Essential (re)organisation of TFPs at regional level

To date the bilateral donors are little prepared to intervene on a regional scale and so to support the implementation of ECOWAS' agricultural investment programme. Bilaterally, the AFD and USAID were as of March 2011 the only donors to provide support for the introduction of the regional food and agriculture agency, even though their funding remains relatively low. In June 2011 AFD signed an agreement to provide 10.4 million Euros for the ECOWAP.⁴⁶

These two agencies have also supported the ECOWAP fund (ECOWADF). However it is still not attracting major donors such as Spain (the main donor to the sector in the region), which is only planning to channel a tiny fraction of the 90 million Euros promised but not yet disbursed.

At a multilateral level, the multi-actor fund, created following the 2008 food crisis, only partially responds to the regional agriculture policy funding needs. Thus the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) created in 2008 to support the CAADP process⁴⁷ does not provide funding for investment programmes. Similarly created in 2008 and endowed from the outset with 2 billion US dollars, the World Bank's Global Food Crisis Response Programme (GFRP) offers no window for regional funding.

Finally, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP),⁴⁸ created following pledges by the G8 countries at L'Aquila in July 2009 to dedicate 22 billion US dollars to food security, makes explicit reference to the CAADP, but remains widely under-financed. By April 2011, only 6 countries⁴⁹ had given a total amount of 420.8 million US dollars, less than half of the amount initially expected (estimated at 1 billion of the 22 billion promised during the L'Aquila Summit). For the sub-region, the GASFP outlined the adopted the same project selection prerequisite that the countries followed in the ECOWAP phases (Pact, Business Meeting), thus lending its support to the process. Two rounds of funding proposals⁵⁰ meant by June 2011 only 4 of the 15 countries of the region had received funding (out of the 8 countries that had applied)⁵¹ for a total amount of 168.5 million US dollars.⁵² One year after being approved, the funds have still not been disbursed due to the complex procedures.

The GASFP is therefore far from able to respond to ECOWAS' and its Member States' needs, estimated at 900 million US dollars over 5 years. Moreover, even though in its regulations the fund allows regional scale financing, to date no such opportunity has yet been offered.

For its part, the European Union, as part of its policy framework to assist developing countries to address food security challenges⁵³ created in May 2010, has undertaken to "Substantially increase support to CAADP applying effective division of labour in all agriculture-based Sub-Saharan African countries by 2015". However at a regional level it is not a signatory to the compact.

As for the undertakings to align the ECOWAS agricultural investment programme, the first steps were made during the Abuja international conference on financing the agricultural policy which met in November 2009. The "Regional Partnership Compact for the implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP" submitted for signature by all the parties involved,⁵⁴ reflects ECOWAS' firm wish to alter the way stakeholders work together, promoting compliance with the policies and strategies of the beneficiary countries and their leadership⁵⁵. This pact commits TFPs to "put in place a coordination and aid management mechanism, within the framework of the ECOWAP/CAADP institutional and funding body",⁵⁶ as well as all placing regional support behind the ECOWAP/CAADP directions, aims, programmes and actions.

The signatories of the pact thus adopted the regional agricultural policy as a single reference framework for planning and programming activities and coordinating international aid for the agriculture sector. They also undertook to improve their aid programming by signing agreements over several years.

However, not all the TFPs have signed up to this document. According to the latest information available, for the moment the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the

European Union have not yet agreed to it. This is hard to understand since these stakeholders support the CAADP at a continental level and have signed national partnership pacts with some of the countries of the region.⁵⁷ Similarly, the “non-traditional” donors, who nevertheless provide important support to agricultural sector funding for the region and continent, such as China and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the Gates Foundation, have not signed up to the pact.

The platform of technical and financial partners to ECOWAP, which came into being during this Abuja conference, met for the first time at the beginning of 2010, under the leadership of the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, nominated as the “lead agency” for the TFPs at a regional level. Amongst its objectives, this group has undertaken to map the TFP’s interventions and procedures in the region as well as work on a monitoring and evaluation body for their interventions. However, the mapping work has proved a laborious task and the document is currently only partially finished. Information sharing remains a sensitive area for TFPs, especially with regard to loans to private actors which are confidential, and so this has turned into an exercise in confidence building. In contrast, mapping procedures were late starting, due to a lack of enthusiasm and willingness to harmonize on the part of the TFPs.

The Spanish Agency for International Cooperation has also been working on putting in place an “e-network” to deal with the “lack of connection” between the sector leads at a national and regional level so as to facilitate information exchange and share good practices. It has also driven a dynamic of openness in this group of donors to welcome new actors such as Brazil, India, Israel, Mexico, Romania, or South Korea as well as some development banks such as the WADB and ADB, and bodies such as the Ford Foundation. This space is deliberately left open to members who have not signed up to the regional pact and to any organisation who supports or would like to invest in the future of ECOWAP, whether with financial means or technical support.

Despite the progress that has been made, the group remains mainly an information sharing forum; especially since it is the TFP representatives for Nigeria attending consultation meetings who often do not have a regional mandate. In some cases regional representatives do take part but are not necessarily agricultural sector experts.

Box 3. The Dakar “Business Meeting”: tensions between stakeholders

The aim of the Dakar Business Meeting, held 14th to 17th June 2010, was to define a common approach for funding the investment plans presented by ECOWAS and Member States. It had initially been planned for the second semester of 2010, but had been brought forward to take advantage of the political opportunity offered by the Muskoka G8 (Canada) planned for June. ECOWAS’ aim was to push donors to detail the contents of their L’Aquila pledges for food security amounting to 22 billion US dollars over 3 years.

Speeding up the calendar in this way drastically cut the preparation time for the national investment plans, which was reflected in the technical quality of some plans. It also had a negative impact on the ability of various parties to be involved in the process, especially the farmers’ organisations and civil society.

Some TFPs, especially the United States, had disclosed their willingness to use this occasion as an opportunity to announce a financial contribution to ECOWAP. However, despite high expectations, only Spain reaffirmed its commitment to funding the investment plans to the tune of 240 million Euros. The United States’ presumed pledge (expected to be 150 million US dollars) was included in the first version of the joint declaration but was removed from the final one.

Despite TFP participation in the donors’ coordination group, chaired by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, the diverse declarations made revealed their inability to align behind a lead agency and to have a single voice in the name of the whole donor community. So, in addition to the speeches made by ECOWAS, the African Union and the President of Senegal who was hosting the event, eleven donors also had to speak during the opening ceremony, sometimes giving contradictory messages. While some were pushing for an announcement of concrete and immediate financial commitments (such as Spain) others were taking a more reserved line to avoid giving firm financial commitments.

During the last plenary session, the TFPs' attitude on the review status of the investment plans was also a catalyst for tension. At the last minute, they sought to apply conditions to their funding, taking into account the recommendations formulated by the reviews (in which some TFPs had taken part) which (re)introduced a feeling of interference, in contradiction with the spirit of partnership so much part of the process up until then. Moreover the United States delegation was seen as highly intrusive, particularly when it took the initiative to unilaterally draw up a draft final declaration, finally set aside by ECOWAS.

2.3 Inequitable donor contribution to the NAIPs

The process adopted for implementing the ECOWAP does not claim to impose new action plans, subject to TFP funding, but rather suggests drafting new investment programmes in a concerted manner that all the relevant parties can agree upon. This dimension of partnership was widely referred to during the regional conferences and defended by ECOWAS. In addition, TFP representatives stressed the need to move towards an approach of equal partnership with the government rather than formulate projects that widely reflect the donor's vision.

However, the tight timeframe fixed by ECOWAS to draft these programmes meant that effective dialogue with all those concerned was not possible, especially civil society actors, farmers' organisations and the private sector; and even in some cases with the TFPs themselves.

On this point, the countries studied differed greatly. In practice, elaborating the investment programmes largely reflected existing relationships between stakeholders. In Ghana for example, the process meant that dialogue was strengthened, giving new impetus to working together. In Burkina Faso on the other hand, the drafting phase exacerbated the underlying tensions between the TFPs and some State structures.

When Burkina Faso received technical and financial support from the ECOWAS commission and NEPAD as part of the CAADP/ECOWAP process to draw up its national agricultural investment programme (NAIP), it was the permanent secretariat for the coordination of sector-wide agricultural policies (SP/CPSA) that was responsible for drafting it. This same body was in charge of overseeing the road map for the Productive Rural Development Sector Programme (PROSDRp), under discussion since 2006 with a certain number of agricultural sector donors. However, these two processes were not linked together⁵⁸ and drafting the NAIP was done without consultation with the TFPs, leading some of them to reject it.

After a six-month standoff between the various stakeholders, a so-called "fusion" workshop for the NAIP and PROSDRp process was organised in Tenkodogo in May 2010, under the aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture. In reality, this meeting was an effort to reconcile the stakeholders and to kick start the process for a new *National Programme for the Rural Sector* (PNSR). In July 2010, the first review of the rural sector was organised to identify the main directions of the PNSR, even though it only brought together some of the sector TFPs.

In conclusion, the "Pact to draft and implement the National Rural Sector Programme" was signed on 22nd July 2010 by the various parties involved, bringing fresh enthusiasm amongst some donors and reflecting notable progress. Germany, Austria and Denmark created a pooled fund amounting to 1 billion FCFA so as to combine their resources for a sector-wide programme⁵⁹ and introduce activities set out in the road map. For their part, Canada and the World Food Programme (WFP) made their technical expertise available.

Even though this example illustrates the need for consultation and dialogue between State and TFPs on developing a national programme to be funded by the TFPs, it also highlights the power and ability the TFPs wield to throw up obstacles to a national process.

In Ghana, on the other hand, it seems the process for drawing up the NAIP gave fresh impetus to the dialogue between TFPs and the government. As we have already

indicated in the first part of this report, the situation at the outset in Ghana was quite different from that of Burkina Faso, since the country had already had a food and agriculture policy since 2007, which had been developed with the active involvement of all the parties concerned, as had the action plan adopted in 2010 after taking on board comments from the TFPs. So when Ghana drafted its agricultural investment plan as part of the ECOWAP/CAADP process, the government based the first draft on existing documents which it shared throughout 2009 with the TFPs.

The NAIP, also called the Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) was finally presented during the round table organised in October 2009,⁶⁰ in which several heads of farmers' organisations, private sector players and NGO representatives took part. During this meeting, the *Compact* was signed by all the parties who had committed to implementing it. Before this stage, the group of agricultural sector TFPs met several times to discuss the draft agreement and modify it, including inserting that it "is neither an international treaty nor a legally binding instrument"⁶¹, reflecting the reluctance of some TFPs. They nevertheless agreed to look for extra funding to support the implementation of the new sector programme.

2.4 Limited civil society participation in the national processes

Even though the ECOWAP/CAADP methodology explicitly includes civil society organisations in the process, they struggled to get their voices heard in the drafting of some NAIPs. As we have seen previously, the time dedicated to the consultation process and the lack of a specific methodology and political will were often the prime obstacles to the effective participation of civil society, particularly the producer organisations.

In Niger, the network of chambers of agriculture (RECA), who signed the charter on behalf of the producer organisations, noted an improvement in the circulation of information from the government since the process was launched. However, it deplored the speed with which they were consulted: "We only received the NAIP dossier 24 hours before the workshop was held", explained a RECA representative. "Even though we fully understand that this delay was not intentional, it was nevertheless far too short a time for the professional organisations' technical teams to study the documents and for the elected officials to discuss it and then be able to give their feedback and proposals (...). The professional organisations need to be consulted to give their position and joint proposals that reflect the concerns of all the socio-professional groups, including women and young people".⁶²

In Burkina Faso, the Confederation of Burkina Faso Farmers (CPF), an umbrella structure for farmers' organisations and the Permanent Secretariat of Non-governmental organisation (SPONG), both signatories to the pact, did not receive any information on the next phase of the PNSR for eight months after signing the pact, although it was being drawn up by the different Ministries concerned. This silence was the cause of unease among Farmer Organisations and civil society who had hoped that the pact was the start of a new sense of partnership and involvement in the different stages of the formulation process, not only in the final validation. It seems that participation was planned for the second phase. It is true that organising this participation is a real challenge in terms of approach, human resources, time and institutional know-how. Time constraints and the need for rapid results often take precedence over the inclusive participatory process. This is not unique to the West African process.

However, creating spaces where all can take part depends above all on political determination and vision. For the CSOs and FOs "participation" means they are involved throughout the different stages of the PNSR formulation process, so they can help shape its content. For the Ministry officials, on the other hand, participation is seen as more as means to an end and often is not considered before the technical validation stage. The civil servants are therefore convinced they have adopted a participatory approach while the CSOs and FOs feel excluded. The TFPs for their part do not seem ready to use their power to apply pressure to force the programme definition process to become truly

participatory, despite the fact that this disparity is one of the main reasons for rejecting the NAIPs and is a structural element of the CAADP process.

The CSOs' and FOs' participation is, however, crucial, from the standpoint of reinforcing participatory and democratic processes and to improve the technical quality of programmes: these are the stakeholders who truly know the realities on the ground and have essential expertise in drafting policies.

3. The conditions for successful partner alignment on the regional agriculture policy

The results thus far achieved in terms of coordination and alignment are still hesitant. This can be explained by a series of obstacles and some resistance at different levels (political, institutional, organisational, etc.) which limits getting any coherence between TFP activities and national and regional intervention frameworks, procedures and systems. Country ownership of policies and processes is also a determining factor in driving this desired change. In this chapter we will try to illustrate some of these obstacles, based on concrete examples.

3.1 Understanding the alignment challenges

Beyond the technical and administrative aspects described in the OECD Paris Declaration monitoring reports, alignment and ownership are primarily political processes. They entail a change in the power play between donors and the government, giving back the power to the latter to define their own policies. This requires a paradigm shift on the part of both recipient countries as well as the TFPs. The State needs to assume leadership in policy drafting, in consultation with the TFPs, as well as building up the capacities of their administrations, procedures and national funding mechanisms. For the TFPs this involves a break with their traditional intervention approach, aligning with national policies and gradually adopting national procedures and systems, be it for programming, consultation or funding interventions.

To understand the obstacles and the efforts made by some TFPs and also to try and evaluate their real commitment to implementing the principles of the Paris Declaration, it is useful to identify three levels of alignment that can be gradual as well as simultaneous:

- *Programmatic alignment* is often the most obvious; it consists of linking partner interventions to existing policy and operational plans in the recipient country or region. Programme alignment goes beyond ensuring a project fits in with the spirit or political vision set out in the sector policy. It also means the project's logical framework should be in synch with the specific objectives of the investment programme it is part of. By adopting similar monitoring and evaluation indicators as that of the national programme, it then becomes possible to measure the project's contribution to global results. Furthermore, in light of the fact that several agencies are working in the same domain, programmatic alignment requires dialogue and coordination between the TFPs which must be done under the leadership of the State so as to avoid duplication, ensure adequate funding for all programmes and promote complementarities between stakeholders.
- The second level is *institutional alignment* which consists of anchoring the bodies responsible for field supervision and management within the national institutions, whether at central government level, within decentralised departments or in the decentralised ranks. This means that the TFPs have to cease creating parallel management units and use the structures, bodies and procedures unique to the sector. Some TFPs that are moving towards institutional alignment also finance long term technical expertise in an effort to build up administrative capacities or develop good practices and guidelines with the government to monitor and evaluate the implementation of these interventions. Once again, consultation between the TFPs and the State is essential for coherence amongst the interventions, to define the responsibilities of each stakeholder and avoid multiple guidelines and procedures. Institutional alignment must often go hand in hand with a (sector) plan for capacity building and providing training for administrations, on which collaboration between the TFPs and State is fundamental.

- Finally, the most advanced level of alignment entails adding *fiduciary alignment* to the previous two. This involves TFPs using national financial channels, via Treasury funds, as in the case of budget support. Generally, budget support is tied in with performance and trigger criteria which govern the proper use of these funds. In order to maintain a certain amount of funding control, some TFPs use the national financial systems but place their funds in a commercial bank to avoid them being diluted into the national budget. Finally, in the case of sector budget aid, funding can sometimes be directly allocated to the Ministry/Ministries responsible for implementation. Coordination between TFPs is once again essential in fiduciary alignment, especially to define together with the government a certain number of common rules, as well as criteria for making disbursements.

Box 4. Alignment: repeated commitments, from global to national

The L'Aquila Food Security Initiative⁶³ (AFSI) joint statement, issued in July 2009 by the G8 leaders as well as 36 States and international institutions, reaffirmed the need for better “strategic coordination at national, regional and global levels so as to improve governance, promote better resource allocation, to avoid duplication of efforts and to identify any response gaps”⁶⁴. Investment in national strategies, policies and processes (“country owned processes”) was deemed a fundamental action principle.

Responding to, and consistent with the CAADP timeframe and methodology, the “pacts” signed in the 3 countries studied between 2009 and 2010 by ECOWAS, the States and all the parties involved (notably the TFPs, civil society and the private sector), commit them to a new multi-actor partnership and the implementation of the agricultural investment programmes.

In Burkina Faso, the *Pact for the drafting and implementation of the National Rural Sector Programme*, signed on 22nd July 2010⁶⁵ stressed the need to “carry out ambitious actions (...) in order to reform the provision and management of aid”. It takes into account “the desire (...) to gradually move from a project approach to a programme approach by drafting and rolling out the PNSR”.

In Niger, the *national ECOWAP/CAADP charter*, signed on 30th September 2009⁶⁶, expressed the “common desire to create the conditions for better policy coordination for rural development (...) to ensure there is consistency and harmonisation across the interventions carried out by the State and the development partners, in accordance with the SDRP, the RDS, the Paris Declaration and the Maputo protocols.”

In Ghana, the *Compact* signed on 28th October 2009⁶⁷ invited the TFPs to “step up their use of the national systems” via “budget support, government accounting systems and procurement procedures, common reporting requirements, universal measures for financial and risk management”. It also highlighted the need to deliver aid “with forward planning and over several years” (...) in order to “ensure better planning, budgeting” (...) as well as to “improve country ownership, reduce costs and accelerate implementation” of the agricultural policy (FASDEP II) and the sector action plan covering the period 2009-2015.

These multi-actor agreements are all explicit on the changes that need to be undertaken by the TFPs when putting in place their rural development and agricultural initiatives, sectors that are particularly lagging behind in terms of donor coordination and on using the common funding mechanism.⁶⁸

3.2 Transforming dialogue spaces into coordination tools

In each of the three countries covered in this study, sector-wide TFP consultation groups, sometimes including government representatives, have been created with similar objectives: to promote dialogue and information exchange between stakeholders and to improve coordination among interventions. In theory, therefore, they are one of the main mechanisms for aligning and harmonizing the TFPs. However, their composition and work and most of all their results vary greatly. Some remain merely for protocol, and some even only exist on paper, although others are more active in implementing the agenda for effective aid.

The rural development consultation framework (CCDR) of Burkina Faso, created under a drive from Germany in 2002 to replace the 45 pre-existing informal working groups in the sector, meets on a monthly basis as a small committee of traditional partners.⁶⁹ Although information on the sector does circulate, sometimes preventing project duplication and facilitating the adoption of a common position – such as during the drafting of the NAIP –, there is still no clear progress made on harmonization, coordination or division of labour amongst partners. A few months after signing the pact, no new impetus has really been observed in the CCDR to make the promised coordination a reality. The tensions and obstacles surrounding the NAIP have had some repercussions as some TFPs remain sceptical or on the fence.

In Niger, the RDS plan has several consultation frameworks: the State-Partners Committee (CEP) for the overall steering of the Rural Development Strategy (RDS), the steering committees of the 14 RDS programmes and the regional consultation State-partner frameworks. The CEP, despite commitments made by the parties involved in its partnership framework⁷⁰, remains quite protocol based, meeting 2 or 3 times a year and not resulting in any real coordination work.

The steering committees of the 14 RDS programmes, created to coordinate and harmonise partners' intervention methods, mainly only exist on paper and even though there have been a few meetings they have only given a facade of coordination. Only the steering committee for programme 8, "Drinking Water and Sanitation", seems to really function and help with coordination.

In 2011, the executive secretariat of the RDS, the coordination structure for the implementation of the RDS, assumed the role for mapping projects implemented by the TFPs and making it available on line⁷¹. Systemising this information is an essential step in promoting better coordination between stakeholders.

Once again, the coordination processes in Ghana seem to be the most advanced of the three countries. There are two consultation bodies: the Agricultural Sector Working Group (ASWG) meets monthly and the MoFA Policy Forum meets each quarter. In order to improve the way the working group functions, the government has written a manual⁷² that sets out the principles of government leadership, harmonisation, dialogue, and monitoring and evaluation so as to strengthen mutual accountability amongst stakeholders. One of the factors for success is the active participation of a representative of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), who co-chairs the group with a TFP representative⁷³. The overall monitoring is carried out by an official from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP).

Moreover, the group is open to NGOs as well as representatives from the private sector, making a more dynamic group, and reflecting the diversity of those working in the sector. Finally, the creation of sub-groups for each theme within the ASWG has meant there is regular collaboration between the government bodies and the TFPs on operational aspects such as harmonizing procedures and managing human and financial resources. However, experiences with supervising joint projects are still too few in the eyes of the government and joint missions still rare.

Where stakeholders are investing in them or the government is really taking on leadership, these frameworks can make progress on developing joint tools for reviewing

the sector and coordinating projects. But in the majority of cases these frameworks limit themselves to circulating information on their sector, to a greater or lesser degree, sometimes managing to avoid duplications. This communication role is important in light of the problems with accessing information, but remains well below the more ambitious aims these groups had, as set out under the Paris Declaration principles. Indeed, those questioned stated that these groups very rarely deal with issues of harmonization and progress made on division of work is still not evident, even in the rare cases where mapping has been carried out.

Even though most “traditional” TFPs⁷⁴ participate in these groups, especially the bilateral agencies and to a lesser extent the multilateral ones, there are few groups that are open to civil society actors, NGOs or the private sector. Moreover, in the majority of cases the development banks, who are major donors in the sector, are noticeable by their absence. The development agencies of emerging nations also do not generally attend, although they are a growing presence in the sector. Of the 10 major TFPs for the agricultural sector in Burkina Faso from a financial standpoint 5 are absent from the consultation body: the IDB, China-Taiwan, ADF, the WADB, and IFAD.

Box 5. Spaces seldom open to producer organisations

In Burkina Faso, as in Niger, the consultation spaces for rural development remain generally closed to civil society actors. This despite the fact that as a representative from a producer organisation (PO) from Niger stress, they would like to take part “as these are places where decisions are made”.

In Ghana the MoFA policy forum, which meets quarterly, is in theory open to civil society actors and producer organisations but there were no active representatives in 2009 and 2010.

Producer organisations and civil society deplore this lack of openness on the part of the existing country consultation frameworks for rural development. In response, governments and TFPs are often quick to question the legitimacy and lack of representation of these organisations. This argument is often raised and serves to justify their absence from these spaces.

This is not to deny the difficulties linked to civil society actors and farmers’ organisations being involved, but to highlight the need to implement actions that would remedy this situation. Participation by civil society organisations and especially POs is in fact crucial to guarantee a democratic process and also because they are field actors and the prime beneficiaries of the development programmes to be put in place.

3.3 Overcoming political obstacles to alignment

Even though in international forums, the donor countries claim their willingness to be aligned to national strategies, in practice they run up against political obstacles. Each donor is in fact accountable to its home government for funding and to elected leaders who face their own electoral challenges. These challenges explain the TFPs inertia in the alignment process or to change the means of intervening in any significant manner. However, it is impossible for a country to implement an effective policy when it has to deal with the visions and intervention methods of different institutions.

Dealing with the ideological and political contradictions

Each donor has outlined a global framework and strategy for implementing its official development aid (ODA). However, these often conflict with the strategies or political visions specific to the country in which they are working. Dialogue beforehand with the local public authorities is essential to overcome these contradictions, but even this can

throw up obstacles to alignment processes, as they justifiably aim to change the power relationships between donors and government by handing back power to the latter to define policies.

As an example, it is fair to say that the refusal of some TFPs to sign the regional compact to support the implementation of ECOWAP proposed by ECOWAS could be linked to such political obstacles. ECOWAP's declared principle of food sovereignty and the trade protection measures proposed by ECOWAS in the RAIP to advance the development of the regional market, for example, are in contradiction with the aims of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) currently being negotiated between the European Union and ECOWAS. Although the reason might not be publically acknowledged, it is likely that the EU's resistance to signing the regional ECOWAP pact may be related to this, as some people questioned on this affirmed, despite its interest in supporting the creation of regional spaces and the implementation of a regional agricultural policy in West Africa.

Box 6. EPA objectives contradict those of the ECOWAP

Food sovereignty is defined as the right of people in a region or State to implement the food and agricultural policies of their choice, without affecting neighbouring countries. In this way the mobilising programmes of the RAIP are made up of a range of cross-border investment programmes, as well as political reforms, especially in the fields of external trade and fiscal policies, that allow agriculture to respond to state or regional needs and position itself on the international markets.

In particular, the regional investment plan proposes a revision of the regional Common External Tariff to protect regional products, but runs into conflict with the trade measures set out in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union and the countries and regional bodies in West Africa. These agreements involve in fact a drastic cut to the region's tariff protection, in exchange for the guarantee of safeguarding privileged access to the European market. Such a measure would, however, result in putting European agriculture, which receives some of the highest farm subsidies in the world, in competition with West African producers leading to the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs.

According to a spokesperson for the Confederation of Burkina Faso: "Although these agreements have yet to be signed, our agricultural/forestry and pastoral industries are in crisis over the disastrous consequences for our family-run farms. The European Union and ECOWAS are making their partnership agreement without knowing the West African producers' position; our irrigated gardens, our fields and our farms are under serious threat."

This reading of the situation also explains the behaviour of some States receiving aid: they accept donors' conditions whatever they may be for fear of losing access to some sources of funding or simply in an effort to safeguard the political impact that ODA represents independently of how effective it may be in the field. Coordinating interventions and aligning TFPs cannot make any progress until the State authorities show real leadership and political desire to radically change the existing power relations.

Promoting accountability amongst partners

Donor accountability is still largely turned to the "North" even though this principle is recognised as being essential to push forward the alignment process. Development agencies and institutions must answer first and foremost to their home governments who allocate the funding; only secondly (where relevant) to the national authorities, to civil society actors and the population of the countries in which they work. To do this, the TFPs have their own monitoring and evaluation criteria and means for assessing the quality of their results, which are often a far cry from those of the local authorities or

affected communities. As has often been reported by TFP agencies locally, the approach of “racing to present results” to the governing authorities sometimes leads to a break with the local processes and coordination needs on the ground. “If I don’t show results, I lose my job”, claims one head of project in a large agricultural project in Ghana.

Box 7. Ghana: a joint review of all projects?

The Joint Sector Review (JSR) for agriculture in Ghana reflects the efforts deployed by the government and TFPs to push forward on the implementation of the sector policy. In 2010, the JSR was inaugurated for the first time by the Ministry of Agriculture and several donors took part. Some, such as CIDA, GTZ, USAID and the World Bank, mobilised representatives throughout the process, thus demonstrating their backing for the objectives of the agricultural investment programme in Ghana and the JSR process itself.

However, the Joint sector review only assesses the Ministry of Food and Agriculture’s initiatives and institutional capacities, both human and technical, to implement the investment programme and budget support initiatives. It does not review the programmes rolled out by the TFPs. These programmes also, for the most part, do not yet use the Ministry of Agriculture’s monitoring and evaluation systems. In this context, therefore, it is impossible for the Ministry to assess the effectiveness and impacts of the TFPs’ projects.

Besides the fact that it allows them to maintain control over aims and funding, the TFPs’ fondness for the project based intervention mode is also due to the increased visibility that this offers for the donors compared to budget support, allowing them to build up an “unambiguous” link between aid and results. The field staff of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) explain their low participation in common fund initiatives by their “aspiration to ensure Japanese aid remains visible in the eyes both of the beneficiaries as well as back in Japan”. “The fact that precise results can be attributed directly to the aid provided by Japan is considered essential for meeting internal accountability requirements”.⁷⁵ This is no doubt true for many other donors.

However, actions that support long term processes such as improving national systems and strengthening procedures and the capacities of local administrations, are not only fundamental for poverty reduction but can also be more effective in the long term for the country’s development; even if the paternity of the results is less visible for the TFPs.

Lack of coherence between political commitments and reality

The L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security secured renewed commitment from the G8 countries to invest in developing countries’ agricultural policies and specifically mentioned the CAADP process as an effective mechanism to ensure that financial resources target the agricultural sector’s priorities. Furthermore, the G8 countries undertook to “provide resources – whether financial, in kind or through the provision of technical assistance – to support the CAADP and other similar regional and national plans”.⁷⁶ However, at this stage, it should be noted that not all countries have translated their words into action. In July 2011, two years after they committed to allocate 22 billion US dollars over three years (until 2012) only 22% of the initial promises had been paid.⁷⁷

In 2009 for example, France official aid for agriculture and food security reached its lowest level since 2007. An Oxfam study published in 2010⁷⁸ highlights that this state of affairs reflects France’s strategic choice to “deprioritise” agriculture in its development policy and increase its volume of concessional loans to the detriment of donations, which has resulted in a serious downturn in the funding allocated to supporting agricultural development. France maintains, however, that it unconditionally supports ECOWAS, as shown in Michel Barnier’s speech in June 2008, as French Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, who proclaimed ECOWAP to be “a *pilot initiative for a regional agricultural and food security development policy*”⁷⁹. Furthermore, the funding allocated to ECOWAS

remains relatively low compared to the amount France grants to the WAEMU common policy.

Box 8. Spanish development aid: securing means for coordination

In announcing a contribution of 240 million Euros to support the ECOWAP, Spain became the sub-region's prime donor to the agriculture sector and consequently assumed the role of regional lead for the TFPs in the rural sector⁸⁰. However, it is surprising to note the gap between the amount of funding allocated by Spain to the ECOWAP and the means deployed by the agency to support this strategy. Until May 2011 only one person in Abuja was responsible for Spanish development aid for all ECOWAS issues, the same person was also responsible for donor coordination in the agricultural sector at regional level. Coordination is, a highly time consuming role and the human resources dedicated by Spain appear to fall well below needs. The progress made in terms of coordination has largely been based on the determination and dedication of the person in charge, more than on the agency's institutional capacities. The same has been noted in Bolivia, El Salvador and Haiti for the coordination efforts led by the Spanish development agency.⁸¹ After numerous requests, the Abuja office should receive four extra staff during 2011 (including two agriculture specialists) which should improve the effective handling of issues. However, by May, this request had still not been met in full.⁸²

3.4 Overcoming institutional and organisational resistance

“Institutionalising” coordination and alignment

As we have stressed earlier, a number of TFPs in the three countries studied have still not aligned their projects with the national programme logical frameworks or fail to use the national monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. However, it is equally striking to note that TFPs within the same country can make major efforts on programmatic alignment on certain aspects of development aid, while other initiatives are developed without reference to the investment programmes. This is the case for example with US aid to Ghana, where the USAID agriculture development initiative, Feed the Future and the Food for Peace food aid programmes coexist alongside the Millennium Challenge Corporation all with some contradictory intervention approaches (see Box 9).

Box 9. Feed the Future versus Food for Peace and MCC

The USAID initiative *Feed the Future* (FtF) marks a real return of American aid to the agricultural sector. The 3.5 billion US dollars President Obama pledged during the L'Aquila summit to combat hunger kick started an ambitious programme to accelerate growth in the agriculture sector and improve food and nutritional security in developing countries. *Feed the Future* has a programme at regional level supporting the ECOWAP and in five countries in the region.⁸³ This initiative is a clear demonstration of a willingness to promote and support the country led processes and to align investments with national priorities, even if the programme still does not provide budget aid.⁸⁴ In Ghana, USAID has recently approached the Ministry of Agriculture to determine how to better align the FtF programme with the agriculture sector investment plan objectives, the METASIP, an approach which is seen as a welcome change by the Ministry.

In parallel to this ambitious programme, USAID is still supporting an older food aid programme, *Food for Peace*, in several countries of the region.⁸⁵ This programme which seeks to promote food and nutritional security, but with an operational approach – the direct distribution of food aid –has been widely criticised for its negative impact on local production capacities, and also for bowing to American interests to divest themselves of American agricultural surplus. Thus, with reference to US aid, the 2011 report to evaluate the implementation of the Paris Declaration

highlighted the fact that “food aid is becoming institutionalised; it has a negative effect on agriculture in the recipient countries”. Currently the United States still allocates more than double the resources to food aid than it does to agricultural development.⁸⁶

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a separate aid agency working in parallel to USAID, makes multiple references to ownership, alignment and coordination in its institutional documentation.⁸⁷ However, it should be noted that the MCC financial management, procurement and monitoring and evaluation is done by independent agencies.⁸⁸ In its guidelines on using national systems, the institution states: “even though MCC recognises that it is important to promote country ownership by using national systems, this should not be done at the expense of programme results, fiscal responsibility and accountability”.⁸⁹ Using national systems should be seen as a means for achieving better program results, not a detraction from them.

The MCC has opted for greater control over the implementation process, despite the fact that the beneficiary countries have to undergo a rigorous evaluation process of their own governance systems during the selection process. In Ghana, the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) is the national counterpart to MCC. “We are an effective programme because we do not use the national procedures, we have our own procurement system”, declared a team member, perhaps without seeing the contradiction this stance has with the commitments made under the Paris Declaration. Furthermore, despite the 241 million US dollars allocated to the agriculture sector (i.e. 44% of the agreed 547 million US dollars over 5 years of the MCC compact) the MiDA rarely attends the group coordination meetings for agriculture sector donors. Its intervention is not specified in the *DP Matrix*, the donors’ mapping exercise for interventions in the agriculture sector, which seeks to improve coordination and harmonization.

Similarly, some TFPs deploy efforts toward coordination and alignment in some countries but block or withdraw from the coordination process in others or at a regional level. This is the case for example for the European Union, alluded to above, which is the lead in the donor coordination group in Niger, but refuses to support the regional partnership pact.

These inconsistencies reflect the TFPs lack of institutionalised coordination and commitment to the principle of alignment. They also highlight the fact that coordination within a country is often down to individuals and not the institutions for which they work.

Alignment and coordination derive from the mutual learning process which requires specific human and financial resources and time dedicated to it. All too often these elements are lacking in the projects put forward by the TFPs, essentially centred on result-based aims. “*We do this in our spare time!*” lamented a representative of a bilateral agency in Burkina Faso.⁹⁰ Indeed field staff job descriptions rarely set aside time for coordination. Among those met, the AFD and World Bank staff also stated their interest in taking part in coordination frameworks but faced problems in finding time in their schedules and cited high pressure to obtain results leaving limited availability to participate in efforts to coordinate and consult among stakeholders.

There are, in fact, few institutions that have developed a real “culture” of coordination or a framework conducive to alignment, or reward staff for their efforts dedicated to this. On the contrary, as highlighted by a lead of the coordination group in one of the countries studied: “the more we coordinate, the greater the risk of losing our job”. One USAID official⁹¹, talking about American state aid (USAID and the State Department) explained that “we need to train USAID staff on the principles of the Paris Declaration and why they are good for development, even though they are hard. Right now there are probably no staff incentives for PD implementation (...).”⁹² Similarly, the Spanish development aid representatives for the most part declare they have received little training on aid effectiveness and its mechanisms of implementation.⁹³

Some TFPs are, moreover, confronted by the problem of coordination and internal consistency, especially between the various programming approaches (emergency versus development) which affects the effectiveness of aid and agricultural development.

Box 10. Emergency versus development – programming inconsistencies

In Niger, food crises occur on a frequent basis and mobilise ever greater funds from the international community. These crises exacerbate a structural crisis; yet funding destined for agricultural development remains stagnant.

This trend is also reflected in the budgets of some TFPs. This is true for FAO in Niger, which has seen both its human and financial resources increase, essential for dealing with emergencies, without unfortunately seeing a similar trend in funding for agricultural development which remains plainly inadequate.

This of course causes inconsistencies between “emergency” and “development” projects supported by the same organisation.

For example, FAO put in place a project to improve input supplies over four years in Niger. This project sought to strengthen the competences of the Producer Organisations and regularize the procurement cycle for fertilizer and seeds (by organising grouped orders, transport and distribution amongst the PO members). The process is often long and laborious, with complex procedures, requiring exact timing to arrive at the right moment in the hands of the farmers. But at the same time, the FAO is giving free inputs to vulnerable target populations as part of their emergency project. This distribution, which aims to give fresh impetus to agriculture, while necessary, deeply destabilizes the PO’s long term purchasing project. This emergency intervention undermines, in part, the capacity building efforts proposed by the same agency’s development activities.

Within TFPs, the contradictions caused by emergency projects superseding development projects are an underexplored subject; yet the Sahelian crises are recurrent and the emergency permanent. It is therefore essential to think about how to make these approaches consistent so that the emergency response also addresses the structural causes of these crises and sustainably strengthen POs and other specialist support structures so that they can be in a position to manage supply in all circumstances.

However, it would appear that the influx of significant emergency funding imposes a short term mindset, subject to the pressure of disbursements and results that are easier to justify and publicize, leaving little room for reflection on coordinating interventions for sustainable agricultural development. It is crucial that emergency programmes develop coping capacities in the long term.

Finally, “decentralised” TFP decision-making is a key aspect to ensure better coordinated interventions and procedural alignment in the recipient countries. Delegation of accrued powers to the TFP field offices would boost the capacity for adaptation, efficiency and effectiveness both of the international development agency and beneficiary government as well as coordination with other TFPs. Indeed, sometimes silence or poor participation by TFP representatives during donor consultation meetings above all reflects their low decision-making power. “Certain representatives do not take part, they gather information to pass on to their headquarters”, explained an active member of the Ghana coordination group.

Box 11. “Nordic plus”: the way forward?

The “Nordic Plus” group comprises of the overseas development agencies of Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. At different levels, these donors have undertaken internal institutional and organisational reforms to make progress on effectively implementing the principles of the Paris Declaration.

The majority of “Nordic Plus” agencies have embarked on a form of decentralisation, allowing local agencies to have a greater margin for manoeuvre in funding decisions. At an organisational level, the technical staff has been trained on the challenges and effectiveness of aid and are developing frameworks conducive to the introduction of these principles. For example, the technical staff with the Dutch cooperation agency are allocated time for coordination. On an annual basis they have to justify the positions taken in the field within the context of decisions taken by the donor group. This peer review mechanism encourages the development of common positions and ways of working.

Furthermore, these donors have put in place measures that encourage joint actions: Denmark has coordinated 80% of its country analysis in this way, compared to an average of 49% for all the countries in the OECD Development Aid Committee (DAC). Norway coordinates 56% of its missions in the same way, while Japan (not a member of “Nordic Plus”) only has an average of 2% and the average for countries on the DAC is less than 25% for joint missions.⁹⁴ In terms of alignment, these donors favour the use of country systems. Ireland and Norway have obtained the best results and at a global level use country procurement systems 96% and 69% respectively; placing them once again head and shoulders above the average DAC country (38%).

The Nordic Plus group of donors and Canada have put in place a delegated cooperation system, allowing one of the agencies to become a “silent” partner of another donor it finances, so alleviating the burden of procedures and negotiations with the government. Thus in Ghana, DFID (United Kingdom) was CIDA’s (Canada) silent partner until June 2009 on a sector-wide budget support programme for the implementation of the agricultural policy in Ghana (FASDEP II).

The donors often justify their recourse to Parallel Management Units by citing the weakness of national systems, the risk of corruption or internal accountability constraints arising from the administering authorities. The high number of PMUs indicates the donors’ desire to be in charge of the implementation process in countries with weak Ministerial capacities and poor national control systems.

Internal procedures governing donor activities are at times complex and strict and impede the adoption of approaches based on local collaboration and ownership. “Even if the country had a better financial and accountability system, we have internal restrictions that prevent us from aligning ourselves”. According to a World Bank representative interviewed, the only way for the Bank to be able to contribute to the pooled funding, is for the other TFPs to align themselves with the Bank’s procedures. Unfortunately, this stance is not unique to the World Bank; some TFPs have still not undertaken any procedural reforms to facilitate fiduciary alignment.

Conversely, some TFPs, with headquarters’ support, have taken the decision to introduce strategies to support and build stakeholder capacities and local or national systems. This is particularly the case for the Danish international development agency (DANIDA) in Niger, which has made quite a significant change in its strategy to provide support to the agriculture sector in Niger. The joint cooperation assessment by the European Commission, Belgium, Denmark, France and Luxembourg in Niger⁹⁵ showed that in 2007, DANIDA never used the state financial management systems and cited the high number of parallel management units used by the institution’s projects (13 across all sectors, compared to 7 for France and none for the European Union). In the light of this severe observation, DANIDA decided to put in place a rural sector support programme (PASR), begun in 2009,⁹⁶ as a precursor for supporting the implementation of a programme approach, consistent with the Paris Declaration (see the Box 12). Indeed, in this programme, DANIDA worked on strengthening the national systems and has thus shown that it is possible to align where other TFPs are still reticent, citing the weakness of these

systems to justify their lack of alignment. This approach is certainly more risky but means DANIDA is in line with the principles of aid efficiency and provides a long term response, necessary for building capacities and national systems.

Box 12. DANIDA plans for the actual implementation of sector-wide programmes

The Niger Rural Sector Support Programme (PASR), which works in the regions of Zinder and Diffa, was one of the first areas in which Denmark supported this sector under the programme approach. To this end, DANIDA sought to put in place programmatic alignment, by ensuring the PASR fitted in with the objectives, programmes and sub-programmes of the Rural Development Strategy (RDS).

At national level, the programme is under the supervision of the Inter-ministerial Steering Committee for the Rural Development Strategy (CIP- SDR); at a regional level, the PASR coordination is undertaken by a smaller unit of the RDS Regional Technical Committee of the Assistant General Secretariat of the Governorship (SGA), the focal point of the RDS in the region. The PASR, therefore, has no parallel management units and is executed in accordance with the national procurement system. Only one national technical assistant is employed by the Danish technical cooperation, supporting the SGA in its coordination role. The PASR also includes efforts for fiduciary alignment, using Treasury channels to allocate funding regionally. To do so, it makes use of a decentralised Treasury and the regional management structures. Nevertheless, we cannot yet speak of budget support, in so far as the fund is secured in the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). However, to disburse the funding, the State procedures must be applied, which is not without its problems for assimilation and implementation.

This project has inspired other partners such as the international development agency of Luxembourg. Following the PASR evaluation, this agency put in place a similar plan, only altering the ways and means of disbursement and putting in place a support fund for its implementation, a sort of regional pooled fund. Currently only supplied by Luxembourg, this fund could allow other TFPs to participate using the same mechanisms.

In contradiction to the arguments put forward by many TFPs, according to whom these changes require too much time, means and effort the example of the Danish development agency in Burkina Faso and Niger show that these changes can be brought into operation radically where it is driven and supported politically by headquarters.

Conclusion

The food crisis of 2008 put agriculture back at the heart of the political agendas of the main donor countries who, during the G8 summit in L'Aquila in July 2009, pledged to dedicate 22 billion dollars over three years to agriculture and food security, by investing in programmes defined and led by developing countries.

In response, ECOWAS re-launched the implementation of its regional agricultural policy, ECOWAP. The drafting and implementation of national (NAIP) and regional (RAIP) agriculture investment programmes should make this new partnership a reality between ECOWAS, Member States, technical and financial partners (TFPs), civil society, farmers' organisations and the private sector in order to promote growth in the agriculture sector and to achieve poverty reduction targets.

One of the aims of this process, proposed by ECOWAS, is to break away from the current system deployed to support the agriculture sector. This system is characterised by the coexistence of a large number of institutions and approaches in the field, which are often unconnected and at times contradictory. The aim then is to unite stakeholders around a common sector-wide programme.

This change in approach has proved complex and progress at times laborious both on the part of TFPs and States, despite ECOWAS' political drive. In the three countries studied, the common programming phase has taken time and sometimes given rise to a power struggle between some State institutions and the TFPs, as was the case in Burkina Faso when drafting the NAIP.

By the same token, the *Business Meeting* organised in Dakar in June 2010 also highlighted the problem TFPs face in responding to the regional and countries' expectations, despite the stated objective of finalising the programming phase and allowing the TFPs to commit to implementing new investment plans.

Notwithstanding ECOWAS' dedication to the process and its willingness to breathe life into a new partnership process, a paradigm shift is a long time coming to fruition.

At the country and community levels, the majority of TFP interventions in the rural sector are still project based, barely coordinated and poorly aligned on procedures, time lines and national systems. Some progress can of course be seen, such as the joint sector reviews in Ghana, Niger and Burkina Faso; the creation of a monitoring and evaluation system in Ghana and Niger; progress made on alignment by some donors in Ghana or the mapping of TFP interventions carried out at a regional level as well as in Niger and Ghana. There are ongoing debates on adopting the common fund in Niger⁹⁷ and Ghana, but these funds have not yet seen the light of day. Reticence over alignment remains high.

In addition to the technical difficulties often raised by TFPs to justify the slow progress made on implementing the principles of Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, the study presents the reserve and political resistance on the part of some donors to align themselves on the programmes drawn up by the countries and the region. This obvious contradiction with the commitments they made to support the country-led processes reflects the difficulties TFPs have in supporting endogenous development in the countries and regions they are working in. In essence it demonstrates the issue of stamping their own aims and visions specific to their ODA.

The study also highlights the reticence and profound difficulties the majority of TFPs face in implementing the necessary institutional and organisational reforms to ensure effective coordination of their interventions and real alignment on national procedures and systems. However, some donors such as DANIDA in Niger and Burkina Faso have brought about a radical change in approach with a certain amount of success, using existing systems where possible and engaging with the government to strengthen national procedures and capacities. The Canadian International Development Agency

(CIDA) and the World Bank have also led the way on sector budget support in Ghana, through their renewed commitment in the form of sector-wide budget aid.

“Traditional” donors have been joined by new TFPs that have recently entered the development space, especially in agriculture. They have initiated many projects and approaches that are not necessarily more virtuous or respect better the principles of aid effectiveness in terms of consistency and alignment. These new stakeholders make this already poorly coordinated sector even more complex.

After signing partnership agreements and entering the common programming phase signed up to by the ECOWAS countries, it is now time for all the TFPs to concretely commit to supporting the new agricultural investment plans and implement the necessary internal reforms to align with them. Although the implementation challenges remain immense, ECOWAP is an ambitious regional response to sub-Saharan Africa’s problems where 239 million people suffered from malnutrition in 2010⁹⁸ and the population is set to double over the next twenty years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BOND - ECDPM, (2010), *The EU and Africa - The policy context for development*, London.
- Cabral, L. (2008), *Accra 2008: The bumpy road to aid effectiveness in agriculture*. Natural Resource Perspectives 114. April 2008.
- Cabral, L. (2009a), *L'Appui Budgétaire Sectoriel dans la pratique – Étude documentaire sur l'agriculture au Mozambique*, London: Overseas Development Institute
- Cabral, L. (2009b), *Sector-based approaches in agriculture -Past experience, current setting and future options*, England: Overseas Development Institute, (ODI).
- CEDEAO - ECOWAS, (2010), *The Development of Agriculture in West Africa – The role of Chinese approach*, Bamako: Agriculture Direction & Rural Development.
- Communauté Européenne, (2007), *Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) Examen par les pairs*, France: Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques - OCDE.
- Coordination SUD, (2010), *L'aide publique au développement dans le projet de loi de finances 2011*, Paris: Coordination SUD – Solidarité Urgence Développement.
- DGPOLDE. (2010), *Evaluating the implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) within Spanish Cooperation*. Final Report.
- ECOWAP/CAADP, (2009), *Conférence internationale sur le financement de la politique agricole régionale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*, Nigeria.
- European Civil Society Organizations, (2008), *Advancing African Agriculture: The Impact of European policies and practices on African Agriculture*.
- European Commission, (2008), *Sector Approaches in Agriculture and Rural Development - Short version*, EuropeAid.
- European Union In The World, (2009), *EU Toolkit: for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour in development policy*, Brussels.
- Food and Agriculture Organization, (2010), *The state of Food Insecurity in the World 2010*.
- Forum de Haut Niveau, (2005), *Déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide au développement et programme d'action d'Accra*, Paris: OCDE.
- Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, (2008), *Agricultural sector experiences in implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, Germany: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation.
- Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, (2009), *Guide à l'attention des donateurs pour appuyer le processus du CAADP au niveau national*, Allemagne: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
- Grimm, S. Schulz, N. Horky, O. (2009), *International Division of Labour - Towards a Criteria-led Process?*, Bonn: DIE Research Project 'European Policy for Global Development.
- Helly, D. (2010), *L'UE et l'Afrique: les défis de la cohérence*, Paris: Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité Union européenne.
- JICA (2009), *The Nordic Plus Study Series. The ODA Systems of the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland and Finland*.
- Keijzer, N. (2010), *EU Policy Coherence for Development: from moving the goalposts to result-based management?* The Netherlands Pays Bas: ECDPM Discussion Papers.
- Mackie, J. Bilal, S. Ramdoo, I. Hohmeister, H. Luckho, T. (2010), *Joining up Africa - Support to Regional Integration*, The Netherlands Pays Bas: The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).

Nordic Plus (2006), *Barriers to delegated cooperation. Joint assessments of policies and administrative practices of the Nordic Plus donors*. Revision 1 (with inclusion of Finland).

OCDE, (2009), *Gérer les ressources pour le développement: L'utilisation des systèmes nationaux de gestion des finances publiques*, France.

OCDE, (2009), *Pour une meilleure aide au développement - Société civile et efficacité de l'aide, Enseignements, Recommandations Et Bonnes Pratiques*, Paris: Éditions OCDE.

OCDE, (2010), *Japon - Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) – Examen par les Pairs*. Paris.

ODI, (2010), *Sector-based approaches in agriculture - From expensive experiment to genuine impact*, London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

OECD, (2009), *2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour - Addressing Fragmentation And Concentration Of Aid Across Countries*.

OID - Mokoro, (2009), *Sector Budget Support in Practice - Study Methodology*, London: Overseas Development Institute - Mokoro.

One, (2011), *Agriculture Accountability Holding Donors to their L'Aquila Promises*.

Oxfam, (2009), *Aid For Agriculture: Turning promises into reality coordinating donor interventions in three west african countries*. Jean-Denis Crola.

Oxfam, (2010), *D'un G8 à l'autre. Suivi des engagements de L'Aquila pour la sécurité alimentaire*. Oxfam France. Juin 2010.

République du Niger - Comite Interministériel de pilotage de la SDR - Secrétariat Exécutif, (2010), *Rapport de suivi de la SDR - Exercice 2009*.

République du Niger, Comite Interministériel de Pilotage de la SDR, (2006), *Stratégie de Développement Rural Plan D'Action - Le secteur rural, principal moteur de la croissance économique*, Niamey: Comite Interministériel de Pilotage de la SDR.

République du Niger, *La place de la régionalisation des programmes de la SDR dans la mise en œuvre de l'approche programme dans le secteur rural*.

SEE, (2010), *L'évaluation conjointe de la coopération de la Commission Européenne, de la Belgique, du Danemark, de la France et du Luxembourg avec le Niger*. Rapport final.

Schulz, N, (2009), *La división del trabajo internacional: Desafiando al paradigma de la asociación Marco analítico y metodología para los estudios de país*, Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE).

Schumacher, S. Sawadogo, M. (2010), *Mapping sur la Division du travail et la Complémentarité au Burkina Faso, Burkina Faso | Mapping*.

Schutte, R. (2009), *Burkina Faso Field Report MCA Monitor Center for Global Development*, MCA Monitor Analysis.

Simmons, E. Shiferaw, E. (2010), *Expanding Commitments To Food Security And Agricultural Development, U.S. Assistance To Sub-Saharan Africa 2008 - 2009, U.S.: Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa*.

Schulz, Nils-Sjard. (2010), *Las políticas de desarrollo españolas: Obstáculos para el progreso*. FRIDE. Policy Brief. N°29

Schanbacher, W. (2010), *"The politics of food: the global conflict between food security and food sovereignty"* ABC-CLIO.

USAID. (2011), *Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: United States Government, Synthesis Report*.

U.S. Government Working Document - See Feed Change Future, (2010), *GHANA FY 2010 Implementation Plan*, U.S.

UK Food Group, *More Aid for African Agriculture Policy implications for small-scale farmers*,

England.

Williamson, T. Dom, C. Booth, D. (2010), *Project Briefing - Making sector budget support work for service delivery: wider policy implications*, London: ODI - Mokoro.

Wolter, D. 2008. (Ghana), Agriculture is Becoming a Business. OECD. 2008.
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/8/40533289.pdf

Wood, B. Kabell, D. Sagasti, F. Muwanga, N. (2008), *Evaluación de la implementación de la declaración de París*, Dinamarca: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Dinamarca.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ State, Civil Society Organisation, Producer Organisation, Private Sector and TFPs.
- ² www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/6/47427348.pdf
- ³ Compared to 40% today. Ibid.
- ⁴ Extracts from the speech by the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Dr Mohamed IBN CHAMBAS, made at the opening of the Forum 'Investir dans l'agriculture en Afrique subsaharienne', 8th December 2008, Paris.
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Dr_Chambas_Allocution_ouverture_8-12.pdf
- ⁵ See the AFSI Joint Statement. Joint Statement on Global Food Security - L'Aquila Food Security Initiative www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2009/global_food_security-securete_globale_de_nourriture.aspx
"In this respect, we welcome the commitments made by countries represented at L'Aquila towards a goal of mobilizing \$20 billion over three years through this coordinated, comprehensive strategy focused on sustainable agriculture development, while keeping a strong commitment to ensure adequate emergency food aid assistance. We encourage other countries and private actors to join in the common effort towards global food security through a coherent approach. We are determined to improve coordination of financing mechanisms and stand ready to ensure that new resources complement existing facilities and programmes and catalyse additional funds around country-owned strategies, in particular to increase food production, improve access to food and empower smallholder farmers to gain access to enhanced inputs, technologies, credit and markets." "We support the implementation of country and regional agricultural strategies and plans through country-led coordination processes, consistent with the Accra Agenda for Action and leveraging on the Comprehensive Framework for Action of the UN High Level Task Force and on existing donor coordination mechanisms."
- ⁶ Oxfam, 2009. *Aid For Agriculture: Turning promises into reality coordinating donor interventions in three west african countries*. Oxfam International research report.
- ⁷ Oxfam, 2009. Ibid
- ⁸ New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)
- ⁹ Millennium Development Goal "1.C – Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of the population suffering from hunger" www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml
- ¹⁰ "The financial resources allocated to this sector in 2009 were estimated at 149.46 million USD or 12.17 % of total ODA. In 2007, these resources were 93.79 million USD and 102.9 million USD in 2008. Between 2007 and 2009 the resources rose by 59.35% ». Report on development aid 2009 – Burkina Faso. *Coopération pour le développement. Coordination et efficacité de l'aide publique au développement au Burkina Faso: enjeux, réalités et perspectives*. 2009 report, Ouagadougou June 2010. www.dgcoop.gov.bf/attachments/015_RCD_2009.pdf
- ¹¹ In 2009 food aid represented 2.28% of total ODA for Burkina Faso. Ibid. DGCOOP, 2009.
- ¹² www.strategie-developpement-rural-iger.org/public/rapport_suivi_2007_2009_sdr_final.pdf
- ¹³ Ministry of Food and Agriculture – MoFA. www.mofa.gov.gh
- ¹⁴ Interview with a MoFA official, not data gathered officially.
- ¹⁵ Based on documents: 2008 MoFA's Annual Financial Report; 2009 MoFA's financial report for the first quarter.
- ¹⁶ Oxfam, 2009.

¹⁷ OECD. 2008. Ghana, Agriculture is Becoming a Business, Denis Wolter. 2008.

www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/8/40533289.pdf

"While donor harmonization in general is very advanced in Ghana, there is much room for improvement in the agricultural sector. Most aid continues to be provided through stand-alone projects which are associated with high costs in terms of human and financial capital due to individual monitoring, implementation, etc."

¹⁸ *Rapport sur la coopération pour le développement 2009 – Burkina Faso. Coopération pour le développement. Coordination et efficacité de l'aide publique au développement au Burkina Faso: enjeux, réalités et perspectives.* 2009 report, Ouagadougou, June 2010.

www.dgcoop.gov.bf/attachments/015_RCD_2009.pdf

¹⁹ Schumacher, S y Sawadogo, M. 2010. Mapping sur la Division du travail et la Complémentarité au Burkina Faso. Final report. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/18/46836723.pdf
Comparing donor disbursements between 2008 and 2011, the TFPs that most often use the classic project aid approach are : the ADB, WADB, Japan, Taiwan, Canada, the Global Fund, Luxembourg and to a lesser extent France and Germany.

²⁰ Schumacher, S. Sawadogo, M. 2010.

²¹ www.strategie-developpement-rural-niger.org/public/images/ressource/sdr16062011132734atlas_projets_15_juin_2011_web.pdf

²² I.e. 6 fewer TFPs working in the rural development sector compared to 2008 when 28 TFPs were present in the RDS. Oxfam, 2009.

²³ Oxfam, 2009. Calculations made based on compiling "project files", carried out in mid 2006 by the government of Niger, drawn from information given by technical and financial partners.

²⁴ Quartey, P. 2010. Evaluation of the implementation of the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: phase II. Ghana. Country Report. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/29/47083187.pdf

²⁵ Sources : SDR (2011) Rapport de Suivi de la SDR 2007-2009 et SDR (2011) Atlas des projets et programmes.

²⁶ Oxfam, 2009.

²⁷ Sources : SDR (2011) Rapport de Suivi de la SDR 2007-2009 et SDR (2011) Atlas des projets et programmes.

²⁸ Respective poverty indicators: 68.9; 79.7 and 67.3 according to the food security profile for Niger. CSAO-CILSS 2008.

²⁹ Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy II - FASDEP II.

³⁰ Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006 – 2009).

³¹ Agriculture Sector Plan, draft final report, August 2009.

³² Represented by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA).

³³ Agriculture Sector Working Group – ASWG.

³⁴ November 2005: Ghana Harmonization and Aid Effectiveness Action Plan (G-HAP); February 2007: Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS); Division of Labour exercise, etc.

³⁵ Ghana Aid Policy 2010-2015.

³⁶ "Sector Budget Support (SBS) tends to be used relatively less frequently than Project Aid (PA) in Ghana by DPs. However, Government considers the Sector Budget Support option as a preferred

form of aid as compared to project aid.” Ghana Aid Policy 2010-2015 : Towards Middle-Income Status (Phase One). December 2009.

³⁷ Country systems initiatives: a concept note for Ghana.

www.unpcdc.org/media/137671/ghana%20-%20country%20systems%20initiative%20-%20concept%20note%20-3.pdf

³⁸ Quartey, P. 2010. Evaluation of the implementation of the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness: Phase II. Ghana. Country Report. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/29/47083187.pdf

³⁹ Quartey, P. 2010. “DPs are used to `own style’ (...), they have made limited improvement in aligning with country systems (. and) the recent pace at harmonization is very slow” “Thus, donors should continually shift from project funding towards programme of pooled funding (... this will) ensure that the various projects are integrated into the GPRS to avoid stand-alone projects.”

⁴⁰ The Global Donor Platform for Rural Development (GDPRD) is a network of bilateral and multilateral agencies promoting the principles of the Declaration of the Paris and the Accra Agenda in the rural sector. www.donorplatform.org

⁴¹ Some examples of strategic initiatives underway in West Africa, conducted by the regional integration and cooperation institutions: the regional programme for food security (ECOWAS/WAEMU/FAO); the sub-regional action programme to combat desertification which covers all West African countries and Chad (ECOWAS/CILSS); the sub-regional programme for the integrated management of water resources in West Africa (ECOWAS); the WAEMU agriculture policy; the strategic framework for sustainable food security to combat poverty in the Sahel (CILSS); the IFDC regional programme for agricultural inputs (MIR); the current process as part of CAADP, etc.

⁴² Regional action plan 2005-2010 for the implementation of the ECOWAS agricultural policy (ECOWAP) and the CAADP/NEPAD in West Africa, ECOWAS

⁴³ Synthesis of national agricultural investment programmes. International conference on funding the regional agricultural policy, 11th and 12th November 2009. www.donorplatform.org/activities/caadp/latest/225-international-conference-on-ecowapcaadp-financing-concluded.html

⁴⁴ Final statement from the meeting of the Ministerial Technical committee specialising in Agriculture, Water, and the Environment of the ECOWAS Commission, 2 April 2010.

⁴⁵ (1) Promotion of strategic products for food sovereignty; (2) promotion of a global environment favourable to the development of regional agriculture; (3) Reducing food vulnerability and promoting sustainable access to food

⁴⁶ <http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=092&lang=en&annee=2011>

⁴⁷ This fund is endowed with around 50 million dollars for the whole African continent.

⁴⁸ The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) aims to improve revenues and food security for rural populations in developing countries through public and private investment and technical assistance to the agricultural sector.

⁴⁹ Canada (177.1 million dollars), Spain (94.2 million dollars), United States (66 million dollars), Australia (49.3 million dollars), Korea (2.9 million), Ireland (0.6 million). Sources: GAFSP webpage www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/content/funding

⁵⁰ June 2010, November 2010 and June 2011. www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/content/recipient-countries

⁵¹ Eight countries in the region have applied for funding: Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Mali, The Gambia, Senegal and Ghana.

⁵² Sierra Leone (\$50 million); Togo (\$39 million); Niger (\$33 million); Liberia (\$46.5 million).

⁵³ http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_PDF_COM_2010_0127_EN.PDF

⁵⁴ ECOWAS Commission, member States, the African Union (AU), Producer Organisations (PO), civil society organisations (CSO), the private sector and technical and financial partners (TFP)

⁵⁵ Ecowas president, Dr Chambas "il est temps de changer ses habitudes de travail, mais aussi de réfléchir à de nouveaux outils de développement pour accompagner les enjeux politiques en cours. [Il faut que nous sortions] d'une logique de modes successives, pour combiner dans la cohérence des politiques publiques claires et incitatives, des stratégies d'acteurs et des outils de financement adaptés à la diversité des besoins. Les partenaires au développement sont souvent impatients de voir nos stratégies traduites en actions opérationnelles. Cette recherche de cohérence d'ensemble, point de départ d'une révolution agricole, est très coûteuse en matière de concertation et de conception. Elle n'en est pas moins incontournable. (...) L'Afrique est fatiguée des colloques et des engagements internationaux sans suite"

www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Dr_Chambas_Allocution_ouverture_8-12.pdf

⁵⁶ "Regional partnership compact for the implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP" adopted during the international conference on funding the regional agricultural policy in West Africa, Abuja (Nigeria), 12 November 2009. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/38/44426979.pdf

⁵⁷ For example the United Kingdom has not signed the regional compact but has signed national agreements with Nigeria and Ghana. The British Department for International Development Aid is active in the CAADP process and includes the ECOWAP in its programme on West African food markets. The European Union is lead for the Committee/State/Partners. The EU resistance to signing the regional ECOWAP compact are explained in Box 6.

⁵⁸ According to some people interviewed this resulted in a lack of government ownership of the PROSDRp, or that it was too early to be considered; others saw it as an SP/CPSA desire to break free from TFP influence and the latter often perceived it as a wish to cumulate parallel funding opportunities. The drafting of the PNIA was therefore done without consulting the TFPs which led to it being unilaterally rejected by the donors. The TFPs roundly criticised the PNIA during the workshop for its lack of technical quality as well as its failure to link in with the PROSDRp road map; not to mention the amount of extra funding required to implement it (estimated at over 1000 billion FCFA, twice the current contributions).

⁵⁹ Austria has pledged to provide 50% of the pooled fund (i.e. 500 million FCFA); Germany and Denmark each contribute 25% (250 million FCFA).

⁶⁰ The METASIP was officially launched on 21st July 2011.

⁶¹ CAADP and country development programme 2010 IFPRI.

⁶² Appropriation and analysis of the national agricultural investment programme. Producer Organisations working group during the Niger Business Meeting, December 2010.

⁶³ L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security, L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). Endorsed by the G8 and by Algeria, Angola, Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Libya (Presidency of the African Union), Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, South Africa, Turkey, Commission of the African Union, FAO, International Energy Agency (IEA), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), IMF, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The UN Secretary- General's High-Level Task Force (HLTF) on the Global Food Security Crisis, WFP, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (who all attended the food security session at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila on 10 July 2009) and by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), Bioversity International/Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, and the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR).

⁶⁴ L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security. AFSI.

⁶⁵ <ftp://193.43.36.44/TC/TCA/CAADP%20TT/CAADP%20Implementation/CAADP%20Pre-compact/Burkina%20Faso/Signed%20CAADP%20Compact.pdf>

⁶⁶ www.nepad-caadp.net/pdf/Niger.pdf

⁶⁷ www.nepad-caadp.net/pdf/Ghana.pdf

⁶⁸ Cabral, L. (2008) Accra 2008: The bumpy road to aid effectiveness in agriculture. ODI.
www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1146.pdf

⁶⁹ The TFPs that meet regularly are Denmark, Germany (GTZ), Switzerland, Canada, Austria, Japan (JICA), France, Luxembourg, and from the multilateral agencies WFP, FAO and the EU. The World Bank, UNDP and FIDA attend the group but less regularly. The Arab international aid agencies, China Taiwan (9.58% of ODA in the sector in 2009), the banks (IDB which provides 24.91% of ODA to the agriculture sector, WADB) are also absent and the participation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) has recently been noted as this heavyweight actor has often been absent and its activities little known

⁷⁰ The aims of this framework are i) to offer a consultation framework on the programme directions and implementation means, ii) to ensure coordinate support by the partners in the relevant technical domains, iii) to identify, develop and use joint tools for programming, monitoring and evaluation and studies in an effort to apply the Paris Declaration . www.strategie-developpement-rural-niger.org/pagelibre-page-34-Dispositif-de-pilotage-op%C3%A9rationnel.html

⁷¹ Atlas des projets et programmes www.strategie-developpement-rural-niger.org/public/images/ressource/sdr16062011132734atlas_projets_15_juin_2011_web.pdf

⁷² Joint Guidebook on Sector Groups

⁷³ The KfW is the new sector lead (after replacing the CIDA).

⁷⁴ By “traditional TFPs” we mean the members of the OECD development aid committee and the main multilateral donors such as the United Nations agencies and funds or the Bretton Woods institutions (particularly the World Bank)

⁷⁵ OECD, (2010), Japan – Development aid committee (DAC) – Peer review, Paris.
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/45/45848553.pdf

⁷⁶ L'Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security. AFSI.

⁷⁷ One, 2011.

⁷⁸ D'un G8 à l'autre. Suivi des engagements de L'Aquila pour la sécurité alimentaire. Oxfam France. June 2010. www.oxfamfrance.org/IMG/pdf/Agriculture-securite-alimentaire-aide-publique-developpement_Note_OxfamFr100623.pdf

⁷⁹ Mr. Barnier, 09/12/2008

⁸⁰ Created during the International Abuja Conference on funding the regional agricultural policy in November 2009.

⁸¹ Schulz, Nils-Sjard. 2010. Las políticas de desarrollo españolas: Obstáculos para el progreso. FRIDE. Policy Brief. N°29. “Las experiencias reales de coordinación de la ayuda española con otros donantes europeos se restringen a unos pocos países (como Bolivia, El Salvador y Haití) y dependen fundamentalmente de la persona a cargo de la coordinación de la oficina de país.”

⁸² The recruitment process has taken place but not been successful. In May the position was going to be advertised.

⁸³ Ghana; Liberia; Mali; Nigeria; Senegal. To have access to the implementation plan : www.feedthefuture.gov/implementation.html

⁸⁴ One, 2011. Agriculture Accountability Holding Donors to their L'Aquila Promises.

⁸⁵ Burkina Faso ; Ivory Cost; Ghana ; Guinea ; Liberia ; Mali ; Niger ; Senegal ; Sierra Leone. In Ghana, this programme was maintained till 2009.

⁸⁶ One, 2011.

⁸⁷ "MCC and Country Ownership", "MCC and the PD: Managing for Results," "Guidelines for the Use of Country Systems in the Implementation of MCC Compacts," and "Aid Effectiveness: Putting Results at the Forefront."

⁸⁸ USAID. (2011), Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: United States Government, Synthesis Report. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ941.pdf

⁸⁹ "(the) use of a country's systems for elements of compact implementation can deepen this ownership. However, MCC recognizes that the desirable goal of country ownership achieved through the use of country systems should not be pursued at the expense of program results or fiscal responsibility and accountability. MCC thus is careful and thorough in its decision-making, taking into account possible risk factors of particular concern to US foreign assistance policies and programs. MCC will continually monitor and revise its decisions when agreeing to use country systems, including revoking decisions as warranted. A policy of maximizing use of country systems should be adopted within this results and accountability framework." Millennium Challenge Corporation Guidelines for the Use of Country Systems in the Implementation of Millennium Challenge Compacts.

⁹⁰ Oxfam, 2009.

⁹¹ Extract from an interview cited in the 2011 evaluation report for the implementation of the Paris Declaration. Schanbacher, W. 2010. "The politics of food: the global conflict between food security and food sovereignty" ABC-CLIO.

⁹² Schanbacher, W. 2010. "We need to train the USAID staff on PD principles and why they are good for development, even though they are hard. Right now there probably are no staff incentives for PD implementation (...)"

⁹³ DG POLDE. 2010. Evaluating the implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) within Spanish Cooperation. Final Report. www.ph7.dk/files/ftp/pd2011/content/pdf-countryreports/spain.pdf

⁹⁴ JICA (2009) The Nordic Plus Study Series. The ODA Systems of the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland and Finland. March 2009. www.jica.go.jp/uk/english/office/topics/pdf/nordicpdf_01.pdf

⁹⁵ www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/63/47196913.pdf

⁹⁶ Begun in January 2009 with a 2013 perspective and with a budget of 150 million Korona over the five years (about 2 million Euros).

⁹⁷ www.strategie-developpement-rural-niger.org/public/images/ressource/sdr15062011170325se-sdr_programme_activites_2011_14-04-11.pdf

⁹⁸ Food and Agriculture Organization. 2010. The state of Food Insecurity in the World 2010. www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1683e/i1683e.pdf

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research document was written by Saya Saulière and Jean-Denis Crola, with the support of Samira Daoud.

The authors would like to thank the following for their contribution to this study: Eric Hazard (Oxfam), Teresa Cavero (Oxfam), Georges Osei-Bimpeh (SEND), Alexis Anouan, Mohamadou Magha, Adam Sadat (Oxfam), Issaka Ouandaogo (Oxfam) and Etienne du Vachat (Oxfam). They also would like to thank Sarah Anglade for the translation work, Ana Candial, Déborah Galliot and Flora Cabranes and all the Oxfam International team.

The authors also thank all those who made themselves available to give us interviews, share their analysis and opinions with us before, during and after the field missions in Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana.

Oxfam Research Reports

Oxfam Research Reports are written to share research results, to contribute to public debate and to invite feedback on development and humanitarian policy and practice. They do not necessarily reflect Oxfam policy positions. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of Oxfam.

For more information, or to comment on this report, email ssauliere@intermonoxfam.org or jdcrola@yahoo.fr.

© Oxfam International September 2011

This research document was written by Saya Saulière and Jean-Denis Crola, with the support of Samira Daoud . The authors would like to thank the following for their contribution to this study: Eric Hazard (Oxfam), Teresa Caverio (Oxfam), Georges Osei-Bimpeh (SEND), Alexis Anouan, Mohamadou Magha, Adam Sadat (Oxfam), Issaka Ouandaogo (Oxfam) and Etienne du Vachat (Oxfam). They also would like to thank Sarah Anglade for the translation work, Ana Candial, Déborah Galliot and Flora Cabranes and all the Oxfam International team. It is part of a series of research reports written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues.

This publication is copyright but text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. E-mail publish@oxfam.org.uk.

For further information on the issues raised in this paper please e-mail advocacy@oxfaminternational.org.

The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.

www.oxfam.org

Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-84814-952-6 in September 2011. Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.

Oxfam is an international confederation of fifteen organizations working together in 98 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice:

Oxfam America (www.oxfamamerica.org), Oxfam Australia (www.oxfam.org.au), Oxfam-in-Belgium (www.oxfamsol.be), Oxfam Canada (www.oxfam.ca), Oxfam France - Agir ici (www.oxfamfrance.org),

Oxfam Germany (www.oxfam.de), Oxfam GB (www.oxfam.org.uk), Oxfam Hong Kong (www.oxfam.org.hk), Intermón Oxfam (www.intermonoxfam.org), Oxfam Ireland (www.oxfamireland.org),

Oxfam Mexico (www.oxfammexico.org), Oxfam New Zealand (www.oxfam.org.nz), Oxfam Novib (www.oxfamnovib.nl), Oxfam Quebec (www.oxfam.qc.ca), Oxfam India (www.oxfamindia.org)

The following organizations are currently observer members of Oxfam International, working towards full affiliation:

Oxfam Japan (www.oxfam.jp)

Oxfam Italy (www.oxfamitalia.org)

Please write to any of the agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org.

Email: advocacy@oxfaminternational.org

www.oxfam.org/grow

GRÖW
FOOD. LIFE. PLANET.

 **Oxfam**