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The Lisbon enigma: crisis management and coherence in the European Union

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Summary

Before the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the several crisis management tools at the European Union's disposal were divided between two institutions: the European Commission and the European Council. The commission represented the community (the first pillar), and the council the intergovernmental systems (the second pillar). The creation of a new post of High Representative of the Union and the institution of a new External Action Service are intended to put an end to this commission-council dualism. The target of the reforms is clear: providing the EU with the capacity to adopt a comprehensive approach linking its several assets (including the military one) under a common, coherent, crisis management approach.

In reality the new provisions build a bridge between the competences of the commission and of the council. In particular, the coherence problem has been tackled by reinforcing the intergovernmental nature of the union's external action, to the detriment of the community and supranational dimension. However, several unanswered questions surround the Lisbon treaty, which show that the problem of coherence is still far from solved. The result is that beyond Europe's borders, the commission could become now a two-headed creature.

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Introduction

In the area of crisis management, the European Union has to be considered a new actor within the international community. This may explain why its place among more traditional actors (such as the diplomatic services of nation-states, the United Nations, and Nato) is still not clearly defined. True, the EU has in the past decade deployed more than twenty crisis management missions, so it already has some experience in the field; but most of these have been small in size, limited in time and space, and geographically and politically scattered. In short, where crisis management is concerned the EU hasn't followed a coherent overall strategy.

This fuels one of the main criticisms of the EU's foreign policy: its lack of a long-term vision. This gap will certainly not be filled by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). The reason is simple: the twenty-seven EU member states have different visions, and the adoption of a common one would require a political willingness to cooperate far more than new institutional arrangements as such.

The existing differences of view among the union's member states can be indicated by looking at some of their attitudes to current security issues. The United Kingdom is, as is well known, in large part sceptical about the EU's role as a crisis manager, because it fears that the creation of EU military structures will undermine the role of Nato. This position may change in the future, but at present it remains significantly different from the French and the German viewpoint.

At the same time, each half of the Franco-German "couple" doesn't automatically share the same ambition as the other. France has a "universalist" perception of the EU role's in the world, while Berlin is much more reluctant to embrace the "activist" approach this implies. France also wishes the EU to have more autonomy from Nato, though without questioning the strategic importance of transatlantic relations.

Moreover, the newer EU members from central Europe – such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic – have different priorities to those of the so-called "old Europe". They are essentially focused on the countries of eastern Europe (Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) rather than on developing countries, where they do not have strategic interests to defend, and they see Russia as the main potential security threat. Rome, Paris and Berlin are by contrast interested by a strong partnership with Moscow, and do not share the perception of their union partners.

In simple terms, the EU is fragmented. In some cases, it has contradictory priorities and interests to defend. Brussels, the political heart of the EU, stands at the crossroads of these different positions. Amid this complex framework, the EU has to develop its crisis management policy.

Why the Lisbon treaty?
The double problem of coherence

The European Union has been able, even despite these difficulties, to impose itself as a new crisis management actor. The EU's record in this area suggests that the Treaty of Lisbon – even if it has not produced a more "unitarian" vision among the EU member states – should improve the coherence of what the EU already does as an institution. But the key issue of coherence concerns not only the relationships *between* EU member states and Brussels institutions; it also concerns *internal* EU action. This makes it essential to understand the EU's fragmented institutional framework *before* Lisbon, in order to assess the reforms the treaty has brought about.

Brussels can deploy both civilian and military tools in the framework of a crisis management strategy. But the administrative complexity of its institutions has undermined its capacity to adopt a comprehensive and coherent approach. The EU's civilian and military missions have lacked connection with each other, thus highlighting the need for better coordination. It should be noted, however, that military missions have so far been marginal (except in the Balkans), while the EU has been much more active on the civilian side. And it is probable that this trend will be more

evident in the coming years. Alongside the important challenge of "civilian-military synchronisation", Brussels also faces difficulties in managing its several and scattered civilian assets. The implication is that the test of "civilian-civilian" coordination should be considered at least as important as "civilian-military".

The reason for the lack of coherence in the EU's external action is familiar. The split of competences between institutions has created a coordination problem within the EU's areas of action, while its complexity of procedure tends to delay the EU's reactions (especially when the European Council can't find consensus).

The problem of coherence is rooted in the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, which since the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) includes the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The creation of the CFSP and the ESDP reflected the desire of member states to see the EU acquire foreign policy competences that go beyond the economic and developmentalist dimension. At the same time, the member states have had no wish to relinquish control to the EU's supranational level (ie, the European Commission). This explains why the CFSP/ESDP has been placed under the control of the council (representing the EU member states) and a voting system that requires unanimity.

But during the period of the CFSP/ESDP's formation, the international security environment was changing greatly with the rise of new threats (among them terrorism, failing states, and international criminal groups), which made development cooperation a growing strategic policy. In the EU, it is the commission, in the framework of the community system, that manages development policy. In other words, the EU's crisis management assets found themselves shared between two institutions, two different ways of working, and two EU "pillars": the European Commission and the European Council. The commission represented the community (the first EU pillar), and the council the intergovernmental systems (the second pillar).

The allocation of competences between ESDP missions and development cooperation would at first seem evident: the provision of aid, managed by the commission in the framework of the first pillar, must adopt a long-term perspective, due to the structural impact that it can have on the targeted societies; the CFSP/ESDP would intervene more in the short- and medium-term. But this theoretical distinction conceals a much more complex reality in the field.

The ESDP was set up under the auspices of the CFSP in 1999 in order to give the EU new powers to act in the field of crisis management. However, the member states did not limit themselves to the military dimension alone. They also conferred upon the ESDP competences in the field of civilian crisis management; more precisely, in four sectors – the rule of law, the police, civilian administration and civilian protection.[1]

Yet the EU's development cooperation, which has existed for a much longer period, has never been confined to activities of an exclusively economic and social nature. It also extends to such areas as conflict prevention, reconstruction and post-conflict rehabilitation, as well as the promotion of the rule of law, human rights, democracy and good governance. The result of this situation is a juxtaposition of activities, one type alongside the other. This situation inevitably confuses the process by which the European institutions draw up a coherent strategy.

In sum, this is the double "problem of coherence" of the EU crisis management policy: a problem that describes the missing link *both* between the ESDP's civilian and military missions, *and* between these missions and the relevant programmes managed under the development cooperation policy. It is in this fragmented context that the reforms introduced by the Lisbon treaty in the field of foreign relations must be understood.

1 For further information, see A. Nowak, "Civilian Crisis Management within ESDP", in A. Nowak, ed, Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way, Chaillot Paper no. 90, June 2006,http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp090.pdf, accessed 20 May 2010.

EU institutions: before Lisbon

Development Cooperation
(1st pillar)

Community (semi-supranational) system managed by several Commissioners (European Commission)

Instrument for stability and other thematic cooperation programmes, including, among others:
- Support for human rights, state building, good governance and rule of law
- Support for local capacities in conflict prevention and reconciliation
- Support for international criminal tribunals
- Democratisation and electoral observation missions (among others in post-conflict countries)
- Support for local capacity in the fight against small arms proliferation
- Demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation (DDR) and reconstruction
- Fight against anti-personnel landmines
- Financing activities against WMD proliferation
- Improving local capacities against transborder threats (terrorism, drug, arms trafficking)

Association Agreements and geographic cooperation programmes (including the Peace Facility for Africa aiming at improving African peacekeeping capacities)

Political dialogue in the framework of aid conditionality

Humanitarian aid and civil protection mechanism

CFSP/ESDP
(2nd pillar)

Intergovernmental system managed by the council and represented by the High Representative

Development of EU military and civilian capabilities

Civilian crisis management missions:
1. Police
2. Rule of law
3. Civil administration
4. Civil protection

Military crisis management missions

Deployment of EU Special Representatives in crisis area

Occasional coordination of member states diplomacy: adoption of common strategies, common positions and common actions

Adoption of sanctions

The solutions suggested by Lisbon

The solutions suggested by the Treaty of Lisbon aim to "clarify" the competences of the European institutions involved in external policies. The goal is to provide the EU with the capacity to adopt a comprehensive approach linking the several instruments at its disposal (including the military one) under the same strategy.

The presidencies

Lisbon's first important reform is to create the position of a permanent president of the European Council, elected by a qualified majority of the member states. The existing system of a rotating presidency, which a different member state government assumes every six months, is seen as one of the main causes of discontinuity in Europe's external action. The new permanent president will represent the EU at the highest level worldwide, with a mandate of two-and-a-half years that can be renewed once. This will ensure that the various policy dossiers will be handled more consistently.

The president of the European Council will now chair *only* the European Council. The various formations of the EU's Council of Ministers will continue to be subject to a rotating presidency of member states. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon separates the General Affairs and External Relations Council, which was composed of the foreign ministers, into two different council formations: the External Relations Council (still composed of foreign ministers, but now chaired by the High Representative for the Union), and the General Affairs Council (composed of European affairs ministers and chaired by the member states in charge of the rotating presidency).

The reforms of the presidencies introduced by Lisbon have so far created more confusion than clarification. Indeed, the General Affairs Council keeps important responsibilities in the formulation of the external policy of the union – for example, the preparation of European Council meetings. This means that the member states's rotating presidencies may still have an important role to play in external relations. So, if before Lisbon the EU was represented by three main actors – the member states in charge of the presidency, the High Representative (hereinafter "high representative"), and the president of the commission, after Lisbon responsibility could be distributed among four actors: the permanent president of the European Council (whose first occupant is Herman Van Rompuy), the member state in charge of the presidency, the new high representative for the Union (Catherine Ashton) and the president of the commission (who remains José Manuel Barroso).

The High Representative and the Commission

The most important reform proposed by the Treaty of Lisbon is the creation of a new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), whose aim is to restore order to the institutional and procedural labyrinth governing the EU's external action. The new treaty highlights one of the aspects of this order: ensuring the coherence of the union's external action. Implicitly, the main purpose is to end the council-commission dualism in this field by building a bridge between the council's competences (CFSP/CSDP) in security, defence and foreign policies and those of the commission (cooperation policy and economic relations).

To achieve this, Catherine Ashton – appointed as the new HR by a qualified majority vote of the European Council – must combine the preceding competences of Javier Solana (the former High Representative for the CFSP, and of the council) with those of the vice-president of the European Commission. This would make her the coordinator of the other commissioners involved in the management of development cooperation and of the commission's external activities.

The Council-Commission dualism

One foot in the council and the other in the commission, two hats for one head: that was the formula proposed in the European constitution and adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon in order to deal with the problem of coherence. Will this compromise be up to the task of ending the dualism between the two institutions?

In fact, the new provisions do not really modify the distinction between the community competences of the commission and the intergovernmental ones of the council. When, for example, the HR intervenes in the field of cooperation (traditionally a prerogative the EU in its "semi-supranational" capacity – that is, to a degree "above" the member states that compose it), she will do so in the framework of the European Commission's traditional competences and of its semi-supranational procedures, which have made the EU the world's most integrated regional organisation. But when Catherine Ashton acts in the field of politics, diplomacy and security (the CFSP/CSDP), she will switch hats and return to the situation of the CFSP *before* Lisbon: a representative of the (intergovernmental) council and the member states, rather than a political decision-maker in her own right.

The new provisions build a bridge between the two spheres of European action, but do not impinge on the council-commission dualism as such – and above all, do not strengthen the EU's competences in the field of external affairs.[2] Instead, they attempt to concentrate part of its competences in one single person, with the express intention of making European action more coherent and unitary.

The External Action Service and the Commission Reform

In order to support the new high representative of the Union in her new duties, the Treaty of Lisbon also provides for the creation of a European External Action Service (EAS), composed of officials from

2 See N. Nuttall, "On Fuzzy Pillars: Criteria for the Continued Existence of Pillars in the Draft Constitution", CFSP Forum, vol. 4, no. 2, July 2004

the commission, the council and the member states. The external service is expected to contain around 6,000-7,000 staff once fully established (including the staff from the 136 EU delegations around the world); it is an essential piece in the institutional jigsaw that the Treaty of Lisbon has to assemble in the field of external relations.[3] A major challenge of the new service is how it will rationalise the several directorate-generals' (DGs) competences in foreign relations, currently scattered among the EU institutions. Before Lisbon, for example, whenever the European Commission intervened in the field of external relations and development cooperation it was splintered into six directorates-general headed by four different commissioners (and the president of the commission also played a role in this area). The council was also divided into many different bodies with various foreign relations competences (see annex 1 below). Thus, the overall success of the Lisbon reforms will also depend on how this new service will be organised and which competences it will gather from the commission and the council secretariat (see annexes 2 and 3 below).

Despite its strategic role, the Treaty of Lisbon remains vague on how the External Action Service should be organised and where it should be located. Such vagueness explains the tensions behind its creation among the member states. After hard negotiations, it has been decided to locate the new service in between the council secretariat and the commission, with the HR role in between these two institutions. The EAS will therefore be a *sui generis* body separated from the commission and the council secretariat.

The discussions about the composition of the service are also particularly difficult, as the member states and the commission are in competition to place their diplomats at the top of the new body. The nature of the new service will depend on the outcome of this competition. Indeed, the provenance of the personnel nominated to the higher echelons of the service will reveal if this new EU body will be more "intergovernmental" (and so answerable to member states) or if it will be more "supranational" (as the commission already is).

The most important challenge for the EAS concerns the competences that it will collect from the European Commission and the European Council. In the field of crisis management, it appears that all the tools at the EU's disposal should be placed in the new service. This should be considered an essential step in the rationalisation process of the EU's external competences. In substance, this means that the chief cooperation mechanisms with a strategic value in crisis management will be moved from the different commission services to the EAS.

Among the more important of these are the Instrument for Stability, one of the most important EU thematic programmes dealing with conflict issues (such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration [DDR], support for local capacity in conflict prevention and resolution, small arms, and reconstruction); and the Electoral Observation Missions that the EU sends to developing countries in the framework of its human rights and democratisation policy (which can play a vital role in crisis management and post-conflict strategies).

In the case of the other development cooperation programmes handling social, economic and cultural issues, their management should be shared between the EAS and the commission. Catherine Ashton's service should define the "country and regional strategy papers" for the several external financial instruments at the EU's disposal, as these define the strategic orientations and the overall allocations per country/region for five years, while the commission should be responsible for their mid-term planning and for their implementation. At the time of writing, however, such a division of competences has not been clearly defined. The new EAS service will also of course manage the CFSP/CSDP (including the CFSP budget) as well as the EU delegations.

3 For a deeper analysis of the issues at stake in the European external service, see "The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy", European Policy Centre (EPC), Working Document no. 28, November 2007, http://www.epc.eu/en/r.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=756 , accessed 20 May 2010.

Before Lisbon, these were under the commission's control. Their role will thus now be more important politically, rather than being purely as an aid donor in the field.

The EAS at the heart of EU crisis management

The External Action Service will, as mentioned, be the key body at the heart of the EU's crisis management and conflict prevention policy. The gathering of the CSDP's civilian and military tools such as the Instrument for Stability and the management of the Electoral Observation Missions under the same body should improve the EU's capacity to adopt a coordinated strategy in the service of agreed common targets. Furthermore, the possibility that the EAS would intervene in the long-term planning of the main development cooperation programmes will strengthen the EU's capacity to adopt a comprehensive approach to counter instability, even if it may also diminish the commission's role in the world.

The most important aspect of the Lisbon reforms, however, could be the improvement that they bring to the capacity of Brussels to exploit its civilian assets in diplomatic terms. It is frequently said that the EU is a "giant" as an economic power but a "dwarf" as a political actor. Through the HR's role and the establishment of the EAS, the EU should now be able to use its economic weight more efficiently in political terms. The new role of the EU delegations, directly linked to the HR, should improve the efficiency of the aid conditionality principle which animates the EU's development policy, a principle that has until now delivered poor results.

In relation to the more specific aspect of coordination between military and civilian missions, the Treaty of Lisbon does not introduce major innovations. Before Lisbon, the member states had already created administrative bodies in the council secretariat which sought to improve overall coordination. These bodies will be now located in the EAS, under HR control. They include the EU Military Staff (EUMS), whose civilian-military cell was created in 2003 in order to provide joint planning expertise. In the event, the military component ended up dominating, so in 2005 an equivalent body for the civilian side was created: the Civil Planning and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC), which some compare to a kind of civilian headquarters for the CSDP's civilian missions.

However, the main reform on the side of the CSDP's civilian-military cooperation is represented by the creation in 2009 of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). This sought to merge the two main council units responsible for (respectively) the military and civilian aspects of crisis management. The CMPD, headed by a civilian (the newly appointed Claude-France Arnould) and a military deputy, aims to unify civilian and military planning at the strategic level. It will be responsible (among other things) for writing the "Crisis Management Concept": this will define the overall strategic objectives of a CSDP mission from a civilian-military perspective, and will come into effect if approved by the unanimous vote of the twenty-seven member states.[4]

The main EAS departments responsible for crisis management missions are therefore the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the EU Military Staff and the Civil Planning and Conduct Capabilities. Their strategic role has earned them a special position in the EAS (as, before Lisbon, they had in the council secretariat), where they will link closely to the three member states committees involved in crisis management: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Civilian Committee (CIVICOM) (for more details on the redistribution of competences, see annexes 2 and 3).

The Lisbon enigmas

The elementary rules of "administrative sociology" teach that, when bodies and institutions proliferate without their hierarchical relationships being clearly

4 See Carmen Gebhard, "The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct Capabilities", CFSP Forum, vol 7, no. 4, http://carmengebhard.com/CFSP_Forum_vol_7_no_4_Gebhard.pdf, accessed 20 May 2010.

defined, they often enter into mutual competition. The result is a problem of coherence. In this event, trying to solve a division of competences through the establishment of coordination procedures rarely represents the solution – for in most circumstances, everybody wants to *coordinate*, but nobody wants to *be coordinated*.

These rules apply too to the reforms of the EU's architecture as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon. There is no doubt that the creation of the new External Action Service represents an important step forward in the rationalisation of the EU's assets in crisis management; but the overall post-Lisbon architecture remains deliberately vague on many points, particularly the definition of the hierarchical relations between the new actors.

Several unanswered questions show that the problem of coherence is still far from solved. They can be gathered in two main groups:

First of all, what will be the relationship between the HR and the president of the commission, who also represents the union abroad in spheres other than the CFSP?[5] A European commissioner is always accountable to his or her president – who, incidentally, can ask for the commissioner's resignation. But this hierarchical relationship will be compromised by the new HR, whose legitimacy is mainly derived from the European Council, by which the HR is appointed. When the high representative acts as a commission member, what kind of relations will she have with the president of the commission? Above all, if the HR is to coordinate the work of the commissioners who have external responsibilities, is there not a risk that she will impinge on the competences of the president of the commission – who, in the nature of things, is supposed to coordinate the work of that institution?

Beyond Europe's borders, the Commission will become a two-headed creature. And the Treaty of Lisbon, though very detailed in parts, remains vague on this issue. Not only does the dualism between the Council and the Commission remain intact, there is now also a risk that this dualism will be imported into the European Commission itself.

Secondly, what will be the relationship between the HR and the president of the European Council, who is also supposed to represent Europe to the world? The HR and the president of the European Council together embody the EU's foreign and security policy, each at his/her level. And yet no clear relationship has been established between these two figures. The Treaty of Lisbon is silent on this point.

The lack of clear hierarchical relations among the new EU actors has already produced some less than encouraging results. A case in point is a series of condolence messages sent to the Kremlin on 30 March 2010, the day after the terrorist attacks in the Moscow metro. The first came from the HR's office at 12:05, a second from the president of the Commission (José Manuel Barroso) at 12:25, and a third from the president of the European Council at 12:35. These three statements – from the same core institution, with the same purpose – show that (at the very least) the Treaty of Lisbon hasn't solved the notorious question posed by Henry Kissinger: "When I want to talk to Europe, who do I call?"

At the same time, the Lisbon treaty does constitute an improvement on the previous situation, especially in relation to the planning and implementation of crisis management missions. But it is important to stress that the solutions adopted in Lisbon will have a profound impact on the EU's nature and *modus operandi*. In particular, they have tackled the coherence problem by reinforcing the intergovernmental nature of the union's external action, but this will be to the detriment of the union's community and supranational dimension.

A simple question can demonstrate this assumption. Who will be the real boss of the high representative? Her real boss will be the European Council, ie, the heads of state and government – the HR is appointed by the European Council and can be dismissed by it. The

5 For a more detailed consideration of this issue, see G. Avery, "The New Architecture of EU Foreign Policy", in Challenge Europe – The People Project? The New EU Treaty and the Prospects for Future Integration, European Policy Centre (EPC), December 2007.

president of the commission is to be consulted in either event, but it is difficult to believe that he will be able to prevail over the member states if there is a difference of view. And yet the HR is supposed to integrate into the commission, taking over most of its external competences, notably in the "communitarised" field of cooperation. Does this mean that EU cooperation policy, a traditional supranational prerogative of the commission, will *de facto* be "intergovernmentalised"? Such issues illustrate the European Union's problems of coherence after the Treaty of Lisbon. They remain unsolved.

Annex 1:
The main EU foreign actors before Lisbon

The **European Council** brings together the heads of state and government of the member states at least twice a year, in order to lay down the overall direction and principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The **Presidencies of the European Council**. Every six months, a European Union member state takes over the presidency of the European Council and represents the union to the world. The presidency conducts the political dialogue with third countries, expresses the EU's views on international issues and implements certain decisions.

The **General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).** This is made up of the foreign affairs ministers, and is the main institution dealing with CFSP issues which takes concrete decisions, based on guidance from the European Council. It is chaired by the member state responsible for the presidency.

The **Political and Security Committee (PSC)** and the other committees. The PSC, made up of the member states's ambassadors, is a permanent structure attached to the council secretariat. It has the task of continuously monitoring the committee and, first and foremost, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The PSC therefore exercises political control over the CSDP crisis management missions. It is supported by two other key committees:

- **The Military Committee (EUMC):** the highest military structure integrated in the EU. It is composed of the representatives of the chief of defence of the member states armies; the EUMC advises the PSC on military issues.
- **The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVICOM)**: the member states committee dealing with civilian aspects of crisis management. The CIVICOM has also to support the work of the PSC.

The **High Representative for the CFSP** and the **Council Secretariat**. The high representative embodies the foreign affairs and security policy set by the member states within the European Council and the council secretariat (by unanimous vote). In his or her work, the high representative is supported by the external relations services of the council secretariat.

The European Commission.
The president of the European Commission represents the institution at the highest international level and has the task of ensuring the coherence of its action. In the field of external relations, the commission has six directorate-generals (DGs) or equivalent services, headed by four commissioners. The coordination of these four commissioners is the responsibility of the president of the commission. The European executive, however, is a collegiate structure in which the president is simply a *primus inter pares*. The president's capacity to prevail over the commissioners – who, be it recalled, are appointed by the member states – therefore depends more on the president's personality than on any institutional norms governing his or her role.

The **DG Relex** (external relations) and the **Commissioner for External Relations** are responsible for the commission's political relations with the rest of the world, notably as regards the political dimension

of cooperation (human rights, conflict prevention, democracy, promotion of the rule of law and good governance). They are also responsible for the development aid provided by the EU to all countries except the ACP countries (sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) and countries that are candidates for EU membership. The DG Relex also has a crisis centre (the Crisis Room) tasked with the 24/7 monitoring of developments in world political stability.

The **DG Dev** (development) and the **Commissioner for Development** have the tasks of, on the one hand, formulating the community's general development cooperation policy for all the developing countries; and, on the other, of managing development relations with the ACP countries. In this regard, the DG Dev administers the European Development Fund (EDF) earmarked for these countries. The EDF is the EU's most important budget line for development. The political questions relating to the ACP countries (among them human rights, democracy, and conflict prevention) are the responsibility of Relex. However, since development as a whole is seen as an instrument for tackling the underlying causes of conflict, the DG Dev inevitably plays an important role in the whole crisis management strategy for the ACP countries.

EuropeAid is the commission service in charge of the concrete implementation of the external aid programmes in all the developing countries, including the ACP countries. This service is headed by the Commissioner for External Relations.

Echo (the European Community Humanitarian Aid department) provides humanitarian aid, on the commission's behalf, throughout the world. As humanitarian aid has to be neutral and apolitical, Echo may be regarded as an agency that is autonomous of the other commission directorates-general, even though it is under the control of the Commissioner for Development. Despite its neutrality, humanitarian aid is often the first type of EU intervention in a crisis. That being the case, it should constitute a first step towards an integrated policy of conflict prevention and management.

The **DG Enlarg** (enlargement) and the commissioner who heads it are responsible for membership negotiations with the countries of eastern Europe, but also for the financial aid that accompanies these negotiations. These countries' EU membership prospects are undoubtedly one of the most powerful conflict prevention and crisis management factors at the EU's disposal. For example, when it is remembered that all the Balkan countries are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership, the major strategic importance of the DG Enlarg in these areas becomes clear. Moreover, the aid budgets earmarked for candidate countries are very substantial (more than €11bn in the 2007-13 period).

The **DG Trade** and its commissioner handle trade with all countries worldwide. It is worth recalling that trade can also be seen as an instrument for conflict prevention and the promotion of democracy, thanks to its economic and social impact and the availability of sanctions.

Annex 2:
The main EU foreign actors after Lisbon

The **European Council** brings together the heads of state and government of the member states at least twice a year, in order to lay down the overall direction and principles of the CFSP.

The **President of the European Council** chairs the European Council summits, with the aim of finding agreements among the member states. He has to be considered more as a facilitator than as a policymaker. The president represents the EU in the world at the highest level.

The **External Relations Council** is made up of the foreign affairs ministers. It is the main institution dealing with EU foreign policy and taking concrete decisions, based on guidance from the European Council. It is chaired by the HR.

The **Political and Security Committee (PSC)** and the other committees. The PSC is composed of the member states' ambassadors. It is a permanent structure attached to the council secretariat. It has the

task of continuously monitoring the CFSP and, first and foremost, the CSDP. The PSC therefore exercises political control over the CSDP crisis management missions. It is supported by two other key committees:

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- The **Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVICOM)**. This is the members states's committee dealing with civilian aspects of crisis management. The CIVICOM also has to support the PSC's work.

The **General Affairs Council** is made up of European affairs ministers. Its brief is to prepare the European Council's summits. The General Affairs Council can therefore play a role in the elaboration of the EU's foreign policy. It is chaired by the member state responsible for the rotating presidency.

The member states's **Presidencies of the Council**. Every six months, an EU member state takes over the presidency of the Council of Ministers (except for the Council of External Relation, which is chaired by the HR). In the framework of the General Affairs Council, the presidencies of the member states could still have an important role in the definition of the EU's foreign policy.

The **European Defence Agency (EDA)** is tasked to support the member states in their effort to improve their military capabilities through better coordination among industrial programmes. It has an administration council composed of the EU's defence ministers, chaired by the HR.

Between the Council and the Commission

The **High Representative for the CFSP** and **vice-president of the Commission (HR).** The HR wears a double hat: it embodies the CFSP/CSDP set up by the member states within the European Council, and as vice-president of the commission it coordinates the commission's external action and is responsible for crisis management activities in the community system framework.

The **European External Action Service (EAS)** is situated between the council and the commission with a *sui generis* status, and it supports the HR's work. The EAS should in consequence manage the CFSP/CSDP (including CSDP missions), as well as the main development programmes (community system) involved in conflict prevention and crisis management. These programmes will include the Instrument for Stability and the whole European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights or a part of it (at least the part concerning the EU Electoral Observation Missions). The EAS will be responsible for the EU delegations in third countries, which should acquire a more important political role.

At present, it is not clear if the EAS will also manage the Development Cooperation Instrument, addressed to Latin America, Asia and the Middle East countries that are not part of the neighbourhood policy of the EU. However, the EAS should be responsible for the definition of the main principles leading all the development programmes managed by the commission, and should therefore be in charge of the writing of the Country Strategy Papers and the Regional Strategy Papers (these documents define the development cooperation strategic priorities that the commission has to follow for five years). Finally, the new service will be responsible for relations with the developed world and with international organisations. In the field of crisis management, the main EAS directorates involved are the following:

- The **Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)** was created in 2009. It merges the former directorate of defence of the council secretariat with the former directorate of civilian crisis management of the same institution. It will now be a *sui generis* directorate in the EAS, aiming to unify civilian and military planning at the strategic level.
- The **EU Military Staff (EUMS)** is composed of mainly military experts. It works under the authority of both the HR and the EUMC, and provides early warning, military situation assessment and strategic planning for EU-led operations. A Civil-Military Cell and an Operation Centre have been created in the EUMS in order to improve coordination between the civilian and military dimensions of crisis and for planning support management.

The **Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC)** can be considered as the EUMS for the civilian dimension of crisis management. The CPCC plans and oversees civilian CSDP missions. It is headed by a Civilian Operations Commander, who works under the control of the CIVICOM and the HR.

SitCen + Crisis Room. The Situation Centre (SitCen) was the intelligence unit for the CFSP/ESDP in the council secretariat. Its aim was to promote information exchanges among members states at the EU level on matters of public security and early warning. The Crisis Room was an intelligence unit of the commission working exclusively on the basis of open resources. With the Lisbon treaty, the SitCen and the Crisis Room will be merged and located in the EAS.

The Commission

The **president of the European Commission** represents the institution at the highest international level and has the task of ensuring the coherence of its action. In the field of external relations, the commission is headed by three commissioners plus the HR/vice-president. The European executive is a collegiate structure in which the president is simply a *primus inter pares*. The president's capacity to prevail over the commissioners – who, it will be recalled, are appointed by the member states – therefore depends more on the president's personality than on any institutional norms governing his role.

The **Commissioner for Enlargement and the Neighbourhood Policy** and the relevant directorate-general (DG) merges the DG Enlarg with the part of DG Relex that was responsible for the neighbourhood countries. They are responsible for membership negotiations with the countries of central/eastern Europe and Turkey (including the financial aid that accompanies these negotiations), as well as for the relations with the EU neighbourhoods (south Mediterranean, Middle East, eastern Europe and the Caucasus). The commissioner manages the Pre-Accession Instrument (€11bn for 2007-13) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (€11.2bn for 2007-13).

The **Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid Crisis Response** manages the **European Community Humanitarian Aid Department (Echo)**. This provides humanitarian aid throughout the world. He/she also manages the Civil Protection Mechanism, with the aim of coordinating the member states's civil protection actions around the world. Despite its neutrality, humanitarian aid is often the first type of EU intervention in a crisis. That being the case, it should constitute a first step towards an integrated policy of conflict prevention and management.

The **Commissioner for Development** and the **DG Dev** have the tasks of managing development relations with the ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific). In this regard, the DG Dev administers the European Development Fund (EDF) earmarked for these countries. The EDF is the EU's most important budget line for development (€22.682 for 2007-13).

The **DG EuropeAid** is the commission service in charge of the concrete implementation of the external aid programmes in all the developing countries. This service is headed by the Commissioner for Development.

The **Commissioner for Trade** handles trade with all countries worldwide. It is worth recalling that trade can also be seen as an instrument for conflict prevention and the promotion of democracy, thanks to its economic and social impact and the availability of sanctions.

Annex 3:
EU external policy and crisis management structure according to the first Ashton proposal (end of March 2010)