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Preface

Coping with Global Change

Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, the international security agenda is witnessing profound change. We are confronted with a shifting face of violence. We are no longer – or at least no longer primarily – confronted with traditional threats, such as violence between states or coalitions of states. Today, most conflicts are of a non-traditional nature – from intrastate conflict to terrorism. This trend will continue.

In an increasingly globalised world, highly dynamic and fluid security challenges emerge that are the product of interlinked, but diverse, causes. Global warming will further encourage migration from the most hard pressed regions in the South towards the North and towards the sprawling urban centres in the South. Growing demographic imbalances will contribute to that trend. Raw material scarcities – from oil to food and water, soon also arable land – are likely to become more acute and may lead to open conflict, respectively to a new form of proxy wars. Urban violence is on the rise.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime (if not arms control in general) is slowly eroding – raising the prospect of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. Religious fundamentalism is on the rise – and so is nationalism. Conflicts leave deep wounds, often including aspects of genocide and violence against civilians, particularly women and children. The problem of residual, almost casual violence in post-conflict situations is steadily on the rise. And there are the explosive remnants of war – from anti-personnel mines to booby traps and unexploded ordnance. The easy availability of weaponry, most notably small arms and light weapons, the readiness to coerce children into the role of child soldiers, gender-based violence, and the possibility to finance conflict through the trafficking of human beings, drugs, arms, and all sorts of contraband render conflict for warlords, gangs, ethnic

militias, or simply criminal groups an ever more easy undertaking. Organised international crime is evolving into a threat of strategic proportions. We are witnessing not only asymmetric warfare, but conflicts between adversaries that pursue asymmetric objectives. The list of problems is almost endless.

The event

The 8th International Security Forum convened from 18-20 May 2009 in Geneva by the Swiss government, brings together some 550 experts from all fields likely to shape our future. The objective is to take a look at the problems of violence in the world in a comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and dynamic form.

The central concept

The forum is, for this purpose, structured in three parts. The first day, 18 May, under the title “Towards an Unruly World?”, will be dedicated to the question: which new challenges are looming over the horizon? On the second day of the conference, 19 May, the trends and challenges thus identified will form the subject of some 24 separate workshops – each dedicated to a specific and concrete aspect of the overarching problem. The concluding day, 20 May, will then under the title of “How to Cope with Change?” inquire into results already achieved, lessons to be learned and new approaches needed in order to cope with the future in a globalising world.

The forum’s contribution to the international debate is unique in the sense that it will bring together specialists not only from the security sector, but from all areas that will shape our future.

The ISF is financed by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sport; the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the participating institutes and organisations.

Welcome Address

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Participants,

It is my pleasure to wish you a warm welcome to the 8th International Security Forum in Geneva. Switzerland has a strong commitment to the promotion of international peace, security and stability and as a consequence developed a wide array of tools both at the bilateral and the multilateral level: good offices and mediation, humanitarian and development aid as well as peace support operations.

I am determined to further focus our efforts in areas of interest that call for specific action. The Geneva Centres – in their quality as internationally renowned security institutions – play an important role in this respect.

Over the last years, ISF has proved to be an especially valuable gathering for distinguished individuals who make and shape decisions relevant to international security policy. This year's conference is dedicated to the subject "Coping with Global Change".

This choice does not come as a surprise as we have been witnessing extremely complex and varying security challenges and even threats since at least the past ten or fifteen years.

Obviously, it has not been easy to identify the core fields of actions in a security pattern characterised by globalisation – and therefore continuing change – as well as scarce resources and budget constraints.

We are asked to develop comprehensive approaches and appropriate solutions while maintaining flexibility in order to react to the issues that arise from regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, violent extremism, natural and manmade disasters as well as climate change.

I would like to strongly encourage you to adopt a fresh look at these topics and to get actively involved with your comments and expertise during the various workshops. I am convinced that the setting of this

conference is just perfect to make us come up with new ideas how to address the pressing challenges of our time.



Ueli Maurer
Federal Councillor
Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence,
Civil Protection and Sport

Opening Remarks

Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues,
Friends,

It is my pleasure and privilege to formally open the 8th International Security Forum.

The subject – “Coping with Global Change” – could not be more topical – as is the subject of today’s first session: “Towards an Unruly World?”. The menace of swine flu turning into a pandemic is still with us – and a stern warning of the multitude of problems we face in a globalising world. Let me name just some of them: global warming, organised international crime, illegal migration and the trafficking in human beings, international terrorism, religious fundamentalism and nationalism, gender-based violence, a profound crisis of the international financial and economic system, the scarcity of natural resources, including water, piracy, the erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate force in many countries, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and small arms and light weapons, the explosive remnants of war that overshadow the life of millions, the ever more evident links between security, development and the rule of law. The list is almost endless.

We are not only faced, however, by a series of challenges; these challenges are interlinked. Thus each one amplifies the others. The problem cannot be solved at any specific front. We must understand the dynamics of the picture we face and react with well coordinated and integrated strategies.

This is what ISF is all about. The conference series was born some 15 years ago at the Federal Institute of Technology as a contribution of Switzerland to Partnership for Peace. It brings together all soft security programmes that the Swiss government, notably the Swiss Ministries of Defence and of Foreign Affairs, are supporting – as well as the partners

of those programmes. ISF is a platform for interdisciplinary debate, an opportunity to watch over the fence, a chance to come to better solutions by broadening one's horizons.

We are going to do this afternoon with a plenary that brings together Swiss Deputy State Secretary Anton Thalmann, UN Director-General Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Peace Nobel Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari, Carol Dumaine from the US Department of Energy and Environmental Security and Hamadoun Touré, the Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union. They will be introduced – briefly – by the Directors, Deputy Directors or Presidents of our partner institutions in this enterprise.

Let me list those partners and thank them for their invaluable assistance in preparing this conference: They are – next to the Swiss government and the governments of the Canton and the City of Geneva as well as the Austrian government:


- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
- The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
- The Center for Security Studies (CSS) and the
- International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.

Tomorrow we shall deepen in 24 workshops – each addressing a particularly burning issue – the analysis, before we try, on Wednesday, to chart a way ahead. For the whole meeting Chatham House rules apply.

We are working under a tight time schedule. I would therefore encourage our speakers to stay within the time frame allotted to them.

Let me close my remarks by thanking – and praising – the ISF organisation team headed by Anja Ebnöther, Assistant Director DCAF, and Col Ernst Felberbauer from the Austrian Armed Forces. Let me also cite Karin Grimm, Aurélie Carbon, Mélanie Piller, Claude Gosteli,

Evelyn Studer, Julien Harrod as well as Andreas Wannemacher and Vinzenz Kastner from Austria and the ICVolunteers that help us to run this event.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Theodor H. Winkler". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'T' and a long, sweeping underline.

Theodor H. Winkler

Director

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Opening Speech

Anton Thalmann

*Deputy State Secretary, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs,
Switzerland*

Excellencies

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honour and a pleasure for me to open the 8th edition of the International Security Forum in Geneva today. To unite, in one conference, more than 500 highly qualified security policy specialists like you, representing a wide range of general and sectoral expertise, is always an exceptional occasion and a source of profound satisfaction for the organisers.

This event was made possible through the efforts of a number of renowned security related institutions: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, the Centre for Security Studies at the Federal Institute of Technology, as well as the International Relations and Security Network of Zurich, have combined their expertise and their networks today in Geneva. Equally important, of course, is the presence of the States, international organisations, and non governmental organisations, which you represent, thereby enriching the next three day's debate.

The International Security Forum was conceived by the Swiss Confederation as a contribution to the Partnership for Peace of NATO, of which Switzerland has been a member since 1996. This present contribution is, however, designed to reach out beyond PfP by reflecting on major international security issues at a global level.

In a time of particular uncertainty, it is necessary to convene such gatherings, not only to express our points of view, but also use the International Security Forum as a laboratory to test new ideas. The

programme of the three coming days shows an ambitious mosaic of subjects rotating around the theme of global change and how to cope with it.

Let me now lead off our debate of the coming days by inserting a few stones of my own into this mosaic. It appears to me that the two main phenomena affecting international security today are globalisation and the change in the balance of power.

1. Globalisation

In general terms, we must recognise that globalisation is an unavoidable and irreversible trend, now that the underlying communication technology has become widely established everywhere. This trend is materialising at a very rapid pace. It is affecting all societies, everywhere. It brings priceless advantages in the promotion of education and the fight against illiteracy, against poverty and disease. But it is fraught with new security risks. For instance, breakdowns in the distribution of natural resources, most prominently energy, can affect wider circles of consumers than ever before in human history.

Globalisation also implies that States have to take care of and assume an increasing number of interests and responsibilities outside their borders. Each State is growingly integrated in the world system. Its commercial and economic relations are more and more developed. Citizens living, working or travelling abroad expect to easily obtain the assistance of their government in case of trouble (be it civil war, natural disasters or kidnapping). The infrastructure of globalisation is becoming ever more intertwined. Therefore, it induces a larger degree of dependency and vulnerability to the changes and the shocks taking place in the world.

Amplified by globalisation, the acute financial and economic crisis which has begun in mid-2008 is causing a severe recession seldom seen, the worst in our time. We witnessed the near collapse of entire economic systems in the industrialised world. The crisis will strike emerging countries even more severely. Probably, the number of people in extreme poverty will increase, the size of the new middle class will fall. It is also likely that some governments of highly indebted emerging

countries will default. The exact consequences of the crisis in the long term are for the moment difficult to foresee.

Nevertheless, the crisis has definitely called for a reinforced role of the State as a regulator. The crisis has undermined dogmas which are the foundations of the current economic model. The doctrine of rational markets has been seriously questioned, as the economic and financial recovery needs a massive intervention of governments. The maximisation of shareholder value as the best way to guide business has been profoundly discredited. After a long period of dynamic economic growth, controlled inflation and stable financial markets, the world is experiencing price volatility, economic decline and uncertainty. This could progressively undermine the values which are at the core of globalisation. Furthermore, the crisis instils uncertainty and anger among the most affected citizens. Mistrust against the institutions and the economic and political elites could grow. Protectionist pressures and measures could multiply. Not a very encouraging perspective!

2. Changes in the balance of power

In this globalised and multipolar world we live in, we are also experiencing a new distribution of economic and political power. The two Asian giants, China and India, are rapidly progressing in many fields and becoming world powers in their own right. Other countries have emerged as regional powers.

The West, namely the United States and Europe, will nevertheless continue to benefit from high standards of living for a large share of its population. But the relative part of the Western economies in the world gross domestic product is declining. This trend is underlined by demographic projections which are particularly worrisome for Europe. In 1950 the part of the European population in the world population was 22%. In 2000 it was 12% and in 2050 it will amount to 7%.

The continuous domination of the West since the beginning of the 19th century in the world economy and politics will probably come to an end in some form in the coming decades. An interesting question is to what extent the economic and financial crisis could favour China to the

detriment of Europe and the United States. China benefits from huge foreign currency reserves. Its financial centres like Hong Kong and Shanghai might become **the** world leaders in the coming years. And when you look to the world's largest democracy, India, you can easily imagine what the continuing economic development of this giant will bring in increase of political power.

I will leave it at that: It is clear that there are many more powers in waiting, as the recent convening of the G20 has shown. The fundamental second question concerning the emergence of these new powers is, of course, how to cope with and manage this historical change. Numerous world structures, political and economic, will have to be adapted. Paul Kennedy would certainly have to add a few chapters to his inspiring work on the Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.

3. Some specific challenges to international security

I would now like to focus on a number of more specific challenges to international security today:

A first challenge is of course the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are at a crossroads here, since many additional states have reached the threshold of nuclear powers in waiting or have even stepped over it. Some notable attempts are being made to relaunch new cycles of disarmament negotiations at the UN as well as bilaterally between the powers concerned. The Obama Administration, together with the Russian Government, has been improving the general climate for disarmament lately, and it is to be hoped that the UN Disarmament Conference will start negotiating again soon. In a European context, too, discussion initiatives, for example on conventional forces, are holding out hopes for a new start, in spite of the recent Georgian conflict. All responsible governments within the international community should mobilise their best people to support these efforts. I would go beyond my allotted time if I entered further into this subject here. So I shall leave it at that.

A second subject I would like to mention is the so-called "revolution in military affairs". It is proceeding at an unabated rhythm, and Donald

Rumsfeld may have underestimated its scope and complexity. New developments in this revolution have been initiated by the armed forces of various nations, as more and more mobile forms of force projection, based on new combinations of civil and military means, are being tested in theatres of operations far away. What is especially troubling is that most of them are taking place in a context of civil war with grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Numerous examples of failed or failing states offer ample illustration of this tragic phenomenon. Trafficking of all sorts and sheltering of terrorists make it worse, since they represent stake holdings in its continuation. An ambiguous factor is the increasing use of private security firms, since they are often necessary to enhance the achievement of military ends, but harder to control than regular armies when it comes to respecting international standards for legitimate combat behaviour. What seems clear is that the revolution in military affairs and the continuation of asymmetric warfare together have not led to more humane armed conflicts. So much for the situation in the developing countries.

The northern hemisphere for its part, to be sure, is privileged by disposing of much more potent means to solve its security problems. At the same time it has become a victim to new vulnerabilities. It is increasingly confronted with the question of how to best protect its critical infrastructures. Most modern infrastructures, in the civil as well as the military field, offer themselves as relatively easy targets for terrorism by non-state actors, given the liberal character of Western style democracies.

An interesting new development in Western vulnerability is the rise of piracy on the high seas in some parts of the world. In the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia pirates easily disrupt international maritime trade. Their lucrative business is often justified by the collapse of traditional fishing grounds through foreign over-fishing, but the other, failed state related reasons inciting them to become pirates are probably just as important.

Globalisation and its corollary, the free movement of people around the world, are obviously facilitating factors in the context of spreading new

threats around the globe. Another one is the clandestineness of some major security threats. While bloody terrorist strikes catch the most headlines, there is a battleground which is only beginning to sink into the public consciousness: Cyber warfare. Data misuse after accidental loss is becoming an everyday experience for credit card holders and occasionally for public administrations. The main resistance to the – now decided – introduction of biometric passports in Switzerland, for example, came from fear of this kind of misuse. But the really big threats, of course, lie in the possible penetration and sabotage of whole information networks which drive our economy and our societies. A particular challenge is to avoid stifling economic dynamism with never ending overloads of additional security systems. In this area that is largely hidden from the public eye, great challenges are lurking and the inventiveness of master criminals, as well as hostile governments, ever increasing.

The issue of energy represents another major challenge to security. The production, transportation, distribution and consumption of increasing amounts of energy in the world have become an issue of first significance for security. The control of the production and transit of energy have increasingly become a factor of power politics. Due to the limited stocks of fossil energy, the attempts to control them at the expense of others and the negative consequences of their use on the environment, a change in the world-wide policies of exploitation of this energy is unavoidable. This change will also impact on the relationship between producing and consuming countries. In face of the ever increasing levels of demand for energy and the question of climate change, the likely renaissance of nuclear energy and its consequences represent a further development which will need to be managed with care.

Climate change is indeed another major security challenge I would like to mention. The consensus among the scientific community indicates that greenhouse gas emissions are the driving force behind climate change. The discussion on the exact consequences of global warming is not yet finished. Nevertheless, we must take it for granted that climate change will strongly impact the living conditions of humanity. It will likely alter food production capacities, the quality of freshwater

resources, life on the coastline of many parts of the world threatened by rising sea levels and the frequency of storms and floods. Climate change will increase insecurity in many countries and cause large migration movements. By opening up new waterways, it will also create new opportunities for trade, tourism and military rivalry.

And finally I would like to mention pandemics. They have a large potential for disrupting international security, as the current case of the influenza A (H1N1) infection shows. Getting used to deal with such pandemics under the aggravating conditions of global mobility, without mass panicking, through medical and organisational strategies tailored to minimise disruptive effects on the world economy, is a daunting, but seemingly not impossible task

A last quick word on Switzerland's approach to all these problems: We are presently reviewing our current security policy white paper. Its new version should be published at the end of this year or the beginning of the next.

4. Conclusions

As concluding remarks, I would like to suggest 3 sets of measures to cope with the coming changes, out of many more that the brilliant experts assembled here today may add to the list in the days to come:

1. First, the reinforcement of international governance, at the global as well as the regional level, is absolutely mandatory. International institutions have the means and, if not, should be given the means to address global challenges. International institutions have the legitimacy to tackle those issues. What comes to mind first is of course the reform of the Security Council, but regional initiatives are equally important.
2. Second, in the field of finance, markets need a certain amount of regulation to avoid falling again into the errors of the past. Nevertheless, these measures should not stifle the economic dynamics needed to resume growth and fight poverty. In that

context, a successful re-launch and conclusion of the Doha Round could also do wonders.

3. Finally, as a recent international conference in Geneva convened by Switzerland, the UN, the World Bank, OECD and NATO showed, there is a need for increased coherence, coordination and complementarity between actors from defence, diplomacy and development, to deal with conflict situations around the world. While the need to bring all these strings together is increasingly recognised, the exact mix and sequencing still demand a lot of reflexion.

KEYNOTE SPEECHES: FIRST PART

Building Bridges for Sustainable Security

Martti Ahtisaari

Chairman, Crisis Management Initiative and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2008, Helsinki

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to thank the organizers of the 8th International Security Forum for inviting me to address this distinguished audience. I look forward to the program of the next two and half days. As a result, we should all be more aware of the trends and drivers of global peace and security.

We are here in this Security Forum to ask ourselves, “how to cope with global change?” I am afraid that, as much as we might wish it, our world is not becoming more stable, or easier to comprehend, or to cope with.

The World is experiencing rapid changes of an order of magnitude never before experienced in human history. These changes are complex. These changes are greatly interconnected to such an extent that traditional policy formulation cannot deal with them effectively. Increasingly, these changes are global in nature, and for that reason tend to defy responses that are constrained by national boundaries. These changes necessitate every nation to review and renew their objectives, their relation with regional and global institutions, and, above all, their place in this changing World.

Phenomena such as financial crises, resource scarcity, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fundamentalist political violence, and pandemics highlight the extent of interconnectedness, interdependence, and fragility in the global system, and the scope of risk therein.

The scope of risk tends to grow over time. Many developments often lead to new risks, but seldom do they lead to the radical removal of old

ones. Increasing complexity and interdependence make the network of effects of a single incident difficult to foresee and comprehend.

Climate change is a good example of such a development. Climate change will lead to a multitude of serious environmental, socio-economic and security consequences for both developed and developing nations alike. The exact extent of these consequences is difficult to gauge. The risks of climate change make it necessary to rethink current approaches to security. Traditional solutions can alleviate some of the symptoms of climate change, but if they strive to maintain the status quo and control insecurity they will ultimately fail. Rather than reacting to the symptoms of change, strategies need to tackle the root of the problem; emphasis needs to be on preventative strategies and ways to achieve sustainable security.

There is one constant in history – the power of contingency and surprise – that will continue to dominate our future, which will be influenced and punctuated by unexpected events, startling surprises, major discontinuities and the pervasive operation of chance. To make good decisions concerning these changes one needs good information. Yet, the knowledge base available for decision-makers is unavoidably inconclusive, controversial and often uncertain. For this reason, foresight in security is a must to try and understand how the array of risks can evolve over time.

The practice and tools for security foresight need to be improved in order to create a shared understanding on how best to prepare for the contingencies and uncertainties resulting from the inter-play of future developments in science, technology, economy and society. Also, risk management strategies need to better incorporate forward-looking methods, and in particular to evaluate and understand the impact of the driving forces of change.

From time to time, a more fundamental rethinking of policies is needed; policy-makers sometimes need to ask if current policies should be continued. Do these policies correctly realize and react to trends? Hence, do they block or slow down negative trends and capture favorable future developments? Foresight can help in picking up weak signals: weak, but very important hints that a fundamental reassessment and realignment of

current policies is needed. Foresight can serve as a crucial part of an early warning system, and can be used as an instrument for an adaptive 'learning society'.

In this world of rapid change, the notion of security itself evolves, as do risks and their perception. Security cannot be measured in absolute terms; it will always have a subjective element to it, since it affects and is affected by human beings. This puts the human being at the center of all considerations.

In the light of the numerous uncertainties and drivers of change, I see societal resilience to be the key for coping with change. Societal resilience rests on a combination of people and the social structures in which they live and work. Both the people and the social structures are vulnerable to changes. The resilience of a society depends on the interlinking of the two, on their mutual trust and confidence, and their actual capacity to support one another. This relationship finds its strength in the robustness of its communities that unite services of societal security, with the cultures of support and stability that surround them and with the public sphere that invest them with trust and potential depends upon them in times of crisis. The robustness of Europe's overall security will depend upon its societal resilience. Research and innovation on societal resilience will play a crucial role in preparing Europe for future security challenges.

Security challenges can present in myriad ways. In my mind, one of the most alarming ones is the growing gap between rich and poor. Already in 1998, the difference in income between the top fifth and the bottom fifth of the World was 74 to 1. The disparity in per capita GDP between the 20 richest and the 20 poorest countries has more than doubled between 1960 and 1995. It has grown even worse. Three billion people now live on less than \$2 a day. This situation is anything but sustainable. The physical, political, psychological and moral consequences of this disparity are enormous. The current global financial crisis has further increased the risk of growing inequality. Many of the regions and countries most affected by the withdrawal of capital from emerging markets and the collapse of international trade are already fragile, with many only just emerging from years of conflict. Growing inequality

between countries and within society exacerbates existing cleavages. The loss of welfare and employment opportunities easily leads to a loss of hope and faith in the future among those most vulnerable. This in turn fosters the rise of fundamentalism and violence, and creates breeding-grounds for crime, terrorism and war. We risk losing a generation to this financial crisis. With globalization and increased interdependence among countries, violence in one region will soon have an impact in another part of the world.

The World should pay particular attention to the potentially explosive unemployment rates, perhaps particularly in the Arab countries. Over the next decade, the International Labour Organization expects 1.2 billion young people to enter the global labor market. By traditional means we can employ only 300 million of them. The inability to support one's self and care for one's family, to see a future with prospects and opportunities will prove costly not only for these youths, but for their societies and their entire region as well.

According to the newest IMF estimates, the current financial crisis will cause a total of \$4.1 trillion in losses to the global banking and financial sectors. On many occasions, this particular crisis has been used as a benchmark of something that we have never seen before, something that costs more than any one of us can truly understand, and that by all means, should be prevented in the future.

Against this background, it is interesting to consider conflicts and security through an economic lens. According to a Mumbai-based think tank, the Strategic Foresight Group, conflicts in the Middle East have caused a total of \$12 trillion in financial losses within the last 20 years. This includes, in general costs, lost economic potential in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq among others. It does not include, for example, the costs of Western military actions or give any value for individual suffering and general insecurity. It is shocking to think that the pure economical cost of conflict for the Middle East alone for the last 20 years is several times greater than losses from this financial crisis.

We often do not really understand the magnitude of the cost of conflict. In this regard, our conflict prevention efforts feel half-hearted,

unprofessional, and lacking a systematic and effective approach. We should make better use of economic, social and environmental indicators to assess possible future conflicts, so that in the long term we can prevent them.

This financial crisis also highlights the importance of maintaining the commitment of the international community to peace-building and development cooperation. This crisis may prove to be another major setback for the developing world. The very poorest people are already being hit the hardest by climate change, rising food prices and lower levels of foreign trade. A reduction in foreign assistance and investment would be disastrous to badly needed economic growth. At this difficult time, I call on all governments to remain committed to their stated goals of eradicating poverty.

The financial crisis also illustrates several hard truths. First, economic interdependence creates shared risks as well as shared opportunities. Second, existing financial institutions reflect yesterday's realities and are not up to today's challenges. And third, the old G7 formula – counting on a club of advanced democracies to lead the world – no longer works. Emerging countries like China, India and Brazil have too large a share of the global economy – not to mention \$450 billion dollars of G7 debt – to be left out of the search for a more effective international system.

One of these opportunities brought by the economic downturn is the increased willingness for cooperation between the major powers, including US, EU, China and Russia. There is a silent acknowledgement that they need each other to survive this economic downturn. We need to use this momentum to engage all of these key players, also for the purpose of conflict resolution.

It is not enough that we think that future conflicts can be solved with actions in the future. We need knowledge on how future conflicts can be prevented with action today.

Ladies and gentlemen, to cope with global change we need foresight for peace. On this regard there is much to be done. Most future studies on conflict trends and drivers are conducted by organizations and institutes from the fields of defense and security. Unsurprisingly, their recommendations mostly focus on military aspects for the reduction of

threats caused by conflicts. Even if these exercises include analysis on economical, political, societal and environmental trends shaping the future conflicts, there seem to be a lack of analysis and advocacy on how to really influence the reasons and drivers behind them.

In the organizations and institutes that have a real ability to shape these drivers there are no systematic methodologies or practices in place to facilitate discussion and analysis of trends and drivers and their impact on future conflicts. Thus, actual conflict prevention activities may be partly neglected.

Currently, there are no proper methodologies to synchronize the preventative actions with our rapidly changing world. Nor do we have tools to facilitate joint actions that would receive adequate support and commitment from all relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, current conflict prevention efforts concentrate mostly on political conflicts. These efforts have to be integrated with foresight on social, environmental, technological and economic changes to provide a better early warning system.

Moreover, it is necessary to develop tools that can be used by civil society actors and other practitioners on the ground, in addition to policy-makers. Currently, such capacity is concentrated in developed countries while the conflicts themselves are predominantly in developing countries. Creating foresight capacity in developing countries is essential, so that policy-makers and peace practitioners in the developing world can shape their own future.

The Crisis Management Initiative, a peacebuilding organization I established in 2000, is leading the first pan-European security foresight project, called FORESEC. It aims to enhance the shared understanding of the complex global and societal nature of European security, in order to pre-empt novel threats and capture technological opportunities. In particular, FORESEC seeks to identify security responses in which there is a particular added-value and shared interest to work at the European level.

With partners from India and the Middle East, CMI is working to develop and test the use of participatory foresight methods in conflict regions. The key aim is to increase understanding of the impacts of the

economic, environmental and social trends on political conflicts and to involve research institutes and public authorities in practical conflict prevention work.

We need a shared will to transfer existing knowledge into joint actions. It is not enough to have knowledge on what will happen, and knowledge on how to influence it – we also need a shared commitment with all of the relevant stakeholders. We need to look beyond current crises and prevailing circumstances, as well as beyond national boundaries to help construct long-term security and development scenarios that are sustainable in a changing World – and this requires leadership.

In order to cope with global change we need to build bridges for sustainable peace and security. Forging effective cooperation against transnational threats is the challenge to the leadership of our time – and the time to start is now. Global leaders increasingly recognize that alone they are unable to protect their interests and their citizens – national security has grown interdependent with global security.

The greatest test of global leadership will be building partnerships and institutions for cooperation that can meet the challenge. Although all states have a stake in the solution, the responsibility for creating a peaceful and prosperous world will fall disproportionately to the traditional and rising powers. Rebuilding an effective international security system will require institutionalized venues for dialogue and negotiation among the major and rising powers, as well as mechanisms to achieve buy-in and legitimacy from a wider set of states.

The focus of these partnerships and institutions must also be correct. It is not enough to invest into reactive policies, designed to contain, treat and alleviate. Proactive security policies are needed to work with the causes of instability and conflict, and making preventative strategies work. This requires foresight: identifying, analyzing, and responding to changes before they become challenges.

Foresight, imagination, pragmatism and political commitment by effective leadership will be fundamental for coping with global change.

Common Security, Uncommon Challenges: Managing Risks in an Age of the Unthinkable

Carol Dumaine

Deputy Director for Energy and Environmental Security, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, United States Department of Energy, Washington DC

When we came into the conference room today, we saw those things that we have seen many times before at many other conferences: The rows of chairs. The podium. The name tags. Without being told, we know what the rules are – no singing, for example. But what happens if we are placed in an environment that is unfamiliar? We do not recognize the clues. We do not know what the rules are. We do not know how to act... so we do not act or we may act in ways that heighten the risk to ourselves. And, the consequences can be catastrophic.

If we recall those moments on the morning of 26 December 2004 just before the onset of the Asian tsunami, we can remember photographs of beachgoers in Thailand and elsewhere who, intrigued by the receding ocean and not understanding its significance, walked out onto the seabed to investigate. They had no concept of what the seabed foreshadowed. They did not recognize the clues. They did not recognize the danger they were in until it was tragically too late.

Today, we are similarly in a moment of fateful consequence, aware of an exposed planet strewn with hints of change. Like the beachgoers, many of us are inattentive to the dangers. Conceptual gaps prevent us from fully comprehending the interacting systemic current of change that loom – like subterranean fault-lines – just below the surface of our attention. These gaps keep many of us from realizing that the future requires our immediate attention. And, updating our conceptual framework is the necessary starting point. If we are looking at the world through outdated frameworks, our decisions will be wrong, and by not adapting our frameworks to our new circumstances, they will continue to

be wrong, triggering cascading impacts that we are not prepared to confront. As Louis Pasteur said, “Chance favors the prepared mind.”

As a traditional national security analyst years ago, I focused on a narrow slice of a larger problem. In the past two decades, my perspective on the challenges we face has broadened. I have come to realize that many of the most urgent secrets requiring our attention in the 21st century are not classified. While not classified or sensitive, this information affects the security of every nation. These “secrets”, like those which originally gave rise to science and the Enlightenment in the 18th century, are Nature’s secrets. They cannot be stolen, but rather need to be discovered. Understanding some of the most urgently important “secrets” we must unearth today – and acting upon them – will require us to handle them with extreme openness.

The secrets we must consider today are as serious – if not more so – than the specter of nuclear Armageddon during the Cold War. Gaining access to nature’s secrets holds the promise of understanding as soon as possible what the impacts might be on our collective security of worse-than-anticipated rates of climate change, the rising incidence of emerging infectious diseases, the loss of habitat and species, the shrinking availability of arable land, and the looming scarcity of fresh water. Such secrets, moreover, merge into a particularly dangerous mix of classical security problems, such as conflict over resources, urban unrest, organized crime, proliferation as well as failed and failing states. No single expert, agency, or government can understand, let alone remedy, the security challenges simmering in this volatile brew of complex systems. These urgent questions affect the security of every nation and every person. They involve understanding the interconnections among the physical, biological, economic, environmental and social systems that make up our world.

Recently, with government and non-government international partners, I have been engaged in creating an unclassified strategic intelligence, or foresight and warning, capability on the energy and environmental security issues facing us. Such a capability is meant to enhance our capacities for early recognition, not only of dangers, but of opportunities, and of potential unintended consequences. Our approach

considers energy and environmental security issues as an integrated whole as opposed to evaluating them separately. This is because these combined challenges global security risks that, with few exceptions, remain poorly formulated and understood.

Our work has made plain that unfamiliar global challenges require redefining our concepts of security in order to develop this strategic intelligence capability. Updated concepts of security would emphasize understanding the vulnerabilities, critical nodes, and methods for boosting resiliency of the systems on which civilization – on which our lives – depend. The linked challenges of energy demand, population increase, food and water scarcity, climate change, biodiversity loss, and economic interdependence pose a potential tsunami for the world. These challenges are “uncommon” in that they are unprecedented in human history; comprehending their significance and taking meaningful action comprises our common security dilemma.

The systemic challenges we face include demographic realities: the number of people on the planet, already more than four times greater than only a century ago, is set to increase again by thirty-five percent – that is, by another 2.4 billion – within forty years. Most of the population growth will be in the developing world. As a consequence, world energy use is expected to grow by more than sixty percent within this same time frame. Continued reliance on fossil fuels during this period is likely to overwhelm a range of critical systems and amplify climate change, ocean acidification, and species loss.

In addition, reports indicate that human activity worldwide is causing a loss of habitat and species extinction on a scale not seen for millions of years. There is also a strong scientific consensus that compels us to acknowledge our global climate system is now committed to a significant temperature rise, even if drastic reductions in greenhouse gases (GHG) are implemented. And, if current trends in GHG emissions continue for the next several decades, global temperatures are likely to rise by 3 to 5 degrees Centigrade, despite any future agreements leading to stabilization of atmospheric concentrations. These facts alone place our civilization – and us as individuals – in an age of consequences without precedent in human history.

The interactions among these systems – where a small perturbation in one vital system leads to a collapse in another – contain serious risks for our common security. These complex and highly interconnected systems are unpredictable and filled with the potential for faster-than-expected changes. Already, for example, the rate of Arctic ice melting has exceeded the worst-case projections of the Fourth Assessment Report (April 2007) prepared by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Global climate systems tend to be non-linear, meaning that when changes occur they are often quite abrupt and impacts will not be felt evenly across different regions.

Our work has shown that global security in the 21st century will be extraordinarily intertwined with scientific discoveries. Communicating these discoveries – and their potential consequences on our ability to cope with global change – will be critical to our common security. One area of our focus must be on the nature of knowledge itself – focusing, for example, on how disciplines that, up to now, have been kept apart can be recombined to create new insights and how these insights can be acted upon more quickly. Expertise isolated from other domains is vulnerable, just as species are vulnerable when their habitats are carved-up for development. Improving our understanding of biological systems might provide clues to ways for recombining our knowledge into resilient and diverse networks for enhancing global foresight and adaptability. One way our work to date has advanced this requirement is by prototyping an Energy and Environmental Vulnerability Framework. Our energy and environmental security work anticipates that the nature of the security challenges we face will stimulate a blending of science, security, and intelligence into an open global foresight “commons”.

Our work has further suggested that, to address such systemic risks, we must extend our understanding of national security to a concept of common security “owned” by all. This is a non-zero sum world in which even small-scale actions, or inaction, can have disproportionately large consequences on the whole. This is increasingly a world in which security for some is security for none. And, it is a world in which the premium on shared purpose has never been greater.

Unfortunately, the gap between the readiness of our 20th century national security institutions and 21st century security realities is ever widening. Seeing and understanding the “canaries in the mine” that warn us of impending dangers have never been more important. Yet, the history of most national security establishments is one of a profound inability to adapt in time to new security threats. Typically adaptation, if it occurs, is a reactive response to disaster after it happens – this is the classic problem of always preparing to fight the last war.

Our work demonstrates that government and intergovernmental organizations cannot tackle these challenges on their own as no one entity owns these issues. Clearly, in this volatile world, it is not just the “what” that has changed, but also the “who”. Today, we face security challenges that cannot be met without better equipping and enhancing the abilities of our societies as a whole to respond to them. Common security requires collective responsibility. As the response to the recent outbreak of swine flu reminds us, we must invest in nurturing open collaboration that relies upon society taking a much more active role. And, if everyone is going to be involved, clearly we cannot call the information we are handling “secrets”.

What can we do about these challenges? Our work has focused our attention on the need for a global foresight commons or “ecosystem” that connects diversity of expertise, non-specialists, and fresh thinking. Albert Einstein famously observed that “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking that created them.” In this century, we will need a concerted effort to invest in capacities of global mindfulness, relying on an interconnected web of prepared minds to address these challenges with new thinking.

Fortunately, we live in times when there are new possibilities for working quickly across domains. The evolution of early forerunners of collective learning and intelligence, such as Ebay and Wikipedia, as well as multinational corporations’ embrace of “open innovation” business models, provides clues to the future. Peer production and citizen science are other areas rich with hints of the future: from studies of bird populations to the health of reefs, online citizen science projects measure the health of native species and monitor the advance of invasive species.

Alternative reality games also show promise for increasing awareness of potential impacts of climatic changes as well as food, water, and energy scarcity on local areas, regions, and the planet. The alternative reality game “World Without Oil” provided an early example of this.

In recent years, I have been fortunate to begin engaging with people and institutions worldwide on energy and environmental security issues. We have focused on building relationships that – over time – will prove essential in enabling the collective intelligence and strategic foresight we need. We describe our evolving capability as an “ecosystem” approach to connecting diversity of talents and perspectives sufficiently capable of meeting these global challenges. We are experimenting with evolving smaller networks focused on specific topics that later will link across to other networks, forming the larger ecosystem in a bottom-up fashion. For example, this community has undertaken projects exploring ways to communicate the risks of abrupt climate change to decision-makers and the impacts of climate change on existing and future energy infrastructure. We are evolving an on-line platform to enable multinational peer-to-peer creation and evaluation of strategic insights and analytic products concerning energy and environmental security.

Our approach recognizes that most of the needed insights, diversity of talent, and innovative ideas will come from *outside* our respective organizations. Our international partners recognize that this system, like a garden, cannot be built or engineered, but must be cultivated with sustained care over time. Please note that the major “secret” here concerns how to cultivate ingenuity and harvest collective intelligence. Traditional organizational metrics and values will not help us achieve this.

Conferences such as this can advance the creation of extra-institutional networks tackling energy and environmental security issues. Participants such as yourselves will be essential to growing a global foresight commons to help explore the implications of our common security and common responsibility. And, this conference represents a critical opportunity to strengthen our capacities ahead of the coming tsunami of global change.

Global Cyberthreats and the Need for Cyberpeace

Hamadoun I. Touré

Secretary General, International Telecommunication Union, Geneva

Distinguished colleagues,
Ladies and gentlemen,

In just a few short years, information and communication technologies have become the keystone of modern society, as essential to development and prosperity as conventional networks like transport, power and water.

As technologies advance and applications multiply, high-speed always-on broadband access is an increasingly critical platform for business activity of all kinds, as well as for the delivery of services ranging from entertainment and interpersonal interaction, to education and health.

But the very tool that is bringing us a host of exciting and empowering new services is also bringing with it a special set of risks. The proliferation of always-on connections is creating a vast global network of open conduits which can carry all kinds of malware. Most of us are well aware of viruses and Trojan horses, but how many think to protect against spyware that installs itself on a computer and transmits personal information, secretly logging keystrokes, recording web browsing history, or scanning information on the computer's hard disk? How many people realize that most of today's viruses are not designed to disable a machine or destroy data, but rather to enlist a computer into a vast network of 'zombies' which cyber-criminals can use for nefarious purposes, without the user's knowledge?

Up to 80 per cent of all spam is now believed to be sent by such zombies. This not only helps spammers avoid detection, it dramatically cuts their costs, since the computer's owner also unwittingly pays for the bandwidth.

The World Summit on the Information Society recognized that information and communication technologies (ICTs), and the enormous benefits they can bring, cannot flourish in the absence of user trust and confidence in the online world. That is why, as facilitator of WSIS Action Line C5 on Building Confidence and Security in the use of ICTs, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) took the important step of launching the Global Cybersecurity Agenda, or GCA.

Remarkably, given the scale and global nature of the problem, the GCA represents the first international strategy to counter cybercrime. Designed as a framework for cooperation and response, it focuses on building partnerships and effective collaboration between all relevant parties.

I believe that one of ITU's greatest strengths is this ability to bring key decision makers together on an equitable footing, to share expertise and build consensus around critical issues such as these. We are most privileged to have the support of global leaders including Nobel Peace Laureate Dr Óscar Arias Sánchez, President of the Republic of Costa Rica, and President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. And we are proud of having forged a strong and highly supportive relationship with Malaysia's IMPACT – the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber-Threats – which last year culminated in a Memorandum of Understanding that has seen IMPACT's headquarters in Cyberjaya, Kuala Lumpur, become the physical home of the GCA.

The world's first global public-private initiative against cyberthreats, this collaboration provides ITU's 191 Member States with the expertise, facilities, information, and rapid access to resources to effectively address actual and potential cyberthreats.

IMPACT's state-of-the-art Global Response Centre has been designed to serve as the world's foremost cyberthreat resource centre, providing a real-time aggregated early warning system that helps countries quickly identify cyberthreats, and offering expert guidance on effective counter measures. It also provides governments with a unique electronic tool to enable authorized cyber-experts in different countries to pool resources and collaborate with each other remotely and securely, helping the global community respond immediately to cyberthreats.

The first phase of physical deployment has already been launched in some 20 countries, with further deployment in another 50 countries planned during the coming year.

To promote capacity building, IMPACT also conducts training and skills development programs delivered in collaboration with leading ICT companies and institutions. At the same time, the organization's Centre for Security Assurance & Research is working with leading ICT experts to develop global best practice guidelines, creating international benchmarks and acting as an independent, internationally recognized, voluntary certification body for cybersecurity.

Finally, under ITU leadership, IMPACT's Centre for Policy & International Cooperation is working with partners including governments, UN agencies, regional and international organizations and others to formulate new policies on cybersecurity and help promote the harmonization of national laws relating to cyberthreats and cybercrime. Complementing IMPACT's Malaysia-based facilities, ITU also hosts a "virtual showcase" here in Geneva, profiling the new early warning system, crisis management capabilities and real-time analysis of global cyberthreats.

These steps constitute great progress towards an urgently-needed coordinated global approach to cybersecurity. But they are still not enough. As family members ourselves, we cannot help but be aware that children are among the most vulnerable groups being targeted by online criminals. The web can be a dangerous neighborhood for children, who are often sent out into cyberspace alone and unprotected, simply because their guardians do not fully understand the risks.

That is why ITU recently launched our Child Online Protection initiative, a multi-stakeholder coalition under the GCA framework dedicated to the protection of children online. According to recent surveys, over 60 per cent of children and teenagers with access Internet access talk in chat rooms on a daily basis. Three quarters of children online are willing to freely share personal information about themselves and their family in exchange for goods and services. And one in five of those online children will be targeted by a cyber-predator or pedophile each year.

ITU's Child Online Protection initiative was presented at the High Level Segment of ITU Council 2008, where it was endorsed by Heads of State, Ministers and heads of international organizations from around the world. The initiative will see ITU work with policy makers, educators, industry, the media, NGOs, UN agencies like UNICEF, UNIDIR and UNICRI – and of course children themselves – to promote awareness and develop effective strategies to protect young people.

To throw the global spotlight on this issue, ITU Members chose "Protecting Children in Cyberspace" as the theme of this year's World Telecommunication and Information Society Day, which marks the founding of ITU on 17 May 1865, 144 years ago yesterday. At this morning's WTISD Awards Ceremony and launch of a year-long Child Online Protection campaign with Interpol, I was pleased to be able to salute the three laureates: former FCC Commissioner Deborah Tate; President Lula of Brazil; and Rob Conway, CEO of the GSM Association.

The net cannot flourish as a facilitator of learning, as a platform for e-health, as a key driver of trade and commerce, and as a global communications channel, if users lack faith in the security of the online world. Criminals should no longer be able to hide behind legal loopholes and regulatory inconsistencies. Nations with less well-developed ICT legislation should no longer find themselves host to nefarious online activities. And even the world's most disadvantaged states deserve to have an effective shield with which to safeguard themselves.

I believe ITU is uniquely well-placed to serve as the broker and coordinating agency for such a Code of Conduct. We have a long and successful history of building multi-stakeholder consensus on globally shared ICT resources – such as satellite orbits and the radiofrequency spectrum. We are a truly globally representative body whose mandate has always been based on cooperation, and on partnership.

TOPIC SESSIONS: FIRST PART

First Topic Session

Will Democracy Win?

Topic Session organised by GCSP.

Emily J. Munro

Introduction

The idea of liberal democracy, in its broadest sense, still remains very topical long after the end of the Cold War. Liberal democracy as a form of governance has been the uncontested preference of the West since the end of the Second World War, and today's society of states comprises more democracies than authoritarian regimes. The process of democratisation which created this development and which has been particularly successful in Latin America is not believed to slow down in the near future. However, the concept of "liberal democracy" is today challenged by representatives of the "Global South", arguing in favour of traditional forms of governance, and emphasising the primacy of sovereignty and the importance of national and regional stability. Other challenges stem from the failure of the Bush administration's democracy agenda in the Middle East and most recently from the financial crisis, the liberal school of thought – one which has provided the underpinnings of democratic governance – is about to lose its primacy in world affairs. *Ambassador Fred Tanner* (Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy) chaired the panel that explored these challenges and that attempted to answer the question: in view of such compelling constraints, can democracy in its current form prevail in a globalising world?

Summary of the individual presentations

Ambassador Herald Muñoz's (Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations, New York) presentation began by addressing the long-term structural and cyclical trends in democratic governance and by observing that despite certain set-backs in various countries the overall picture was optimistic. Three trends pointed in this direction: firstly, with the spread of democracy there was increasing difficulty in keeping violations (e.g. human rights) a secret with the existence of the internet, global civil society and networks of active NGOs; secondly, the end of the Cold War meant that promotion of democracy was no longer held with the suspicion it used to be; and thirdly, there were more instruments available to promote democracy. He cited in this respect the instruments development by the Organisation for American States (OAS-Democratic Charter adopted in 2001), the African Union (African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted, pending ratification), the Pacific Forum and the United Nations (electoral assistance, UNDP activities, 2005 World Summit Outcome document). He provided various examples where the regional organisations had used the instruments at their disposal, particularly the OAS.

Ambassador Muñoz closed by citing seven recommendations on how to promote democracy most effectively:

1. Use collective channels (multilateralism, international organisations).
2. Follow local needs and advice.
3. Allow regional organisations to take the lead in the pursuit of democracy.
4. Promote democracy through peaceful means and overtly.
5. Democracy promotion requires patience and a long-term outlook. Only if necessary use reactive tools.
6. Promote democracy without high expectations and realistically.
7. One size does not fit all. Many different situations exist on the spectrum.

Professor Assia Bensalah Alaoui (Professor, International Law Faculty, Université Mohamed V, Rabat) looked in her presentation at the domestic and external factors at play in democracy promotion in North Africa and the Middle East and she briefly looked at the current state of democracy in some of the countries of the region, from Lebanon to Iran to Morocco. Professor Alaoui presented a number of common challenges to the region, including: a loss of legitimacy to democracy due to the financial crisis; a loose link between democracy and development (e.g. China and Tunisia); failure of democracy to represent adequately all groups in societies and lastly, most importantly, the rise of political Islam.

To conclude, Professor Alaoui, noted that the promotion of democracy was encouraged in North Africa and the Middle East by the incentive of association agreements with the European Union but that there was a limit to what external actors could accomplish in this area. Democracy was at risk to a certain extent she contended due to the scepticism that democracy could deliver. To counter-act these tendencies she suggested that the search for new innovative tools in democratic governance should be encouraged.

Abdulaziz Sager (Chairman, Gulf Research Center, Dubai) then presented his thoughts on the difficulties in promoting democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. He began by questioning the efficacy of the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in bringing democracy to these nations. He then questioned the focus on democracy itself asking if security, poverty and other issues related to these were not more important than the promotion of democracy in these post-conflict contexts. This democracy imposed from the outside promoted division and did not improve the human security of the citizens of these countries.

Following this introduction, Mr. Sager explained that there were a number of different ways to promote democracy across the region as a whole and that the way in which the United States had promoted democracy in the Arab and Muslim world was problematic. He noted the behaviour of American troops at the prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, US history of supporting dictatorial regimes and the American use of democracy promotion as a means to achieve ulterior

foreign policy objectives as reasons for this failure. The citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan had unfortunately lost their belief that the foreign presence would lead to the establishment of democracy and a peaceful and just society.

Summary of the discussion

The panellists' presentations were followed by a rich exchange between the experts and members of the audience on a number of issues. The panellists were asked about the pressure to democratise from below and above and how in some places a national political party system had developed before a full state had developed. Professor Alauoi responded that a strong and functioning government and true political parties did not have to be confused with an organised civil society. The panellists were asked to comment on low voter turnout, particularly in Europe. Ambassador Muñoz postulated that this trend was as a result of democracy not delivering as promised and that elections were not enough to ensure a healthy democratic system. Professor Alauoi observed a fundamental gap between the political, economic and media timings, the later requiring an instant justification that did not work at the same timeframe as the legislative process.

Conclusions

The Chair, *Ambassador Tanner*, closed the panel on the promotion of democracy and the three panellists' attempts to answer the question "Will Democracy Win?" from their regional contexts, by summarising some of the central themes of the discussions. He remarked that democracy had to deliver in order for it to be sustainable and for it to be considered legitimate by the populace. He encouraged the issue to be thought of more regionally and country-specifically for those nations in transformation. Ambassador Tanner closed by stressing that the urgent issues of human security and human rights be addressed first and foremost and only then, he suggested, could a fully fledged participatory system of democratic governance be introduced.

Second Topic Session

The End of Capitalism?

Topic Session organised by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Jana Krause

Introduction

The current financial crisis is the most dramatic meltdown since the Great Depression. It has profoundly affected financial markets and national economies throughout the world. It has also raised serious questions about the basis of the current system and its national and international regulation. In addition to the financial and economic implications, the crisis has also raised fundamental issues dealing with the meaning of security. The panellists presented their interpretations of the causes of the crisis with their views on how to get out of the current situation as well as suggestions on how to avoid future crises of this size.

Summary of the individual presentations

Daniel Warner (Director, Centre for International Governance, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) pointed out that the fact that an entire ISF conference panel only dealt with economic issues underlines the crucial role of economics and finance for global security and the stability of societies. He further outlined that the panel would discuss the origins of the financial crisis as well as ways to overcome it and prevent future crises.

Global Financial Crisis and Economic Recession: Perspectives from Geneva

Ivan Pictet (Senior Managing Partner, Pictet & Cie, Geneva) emphasised the aptitude of the current crisis that hit every country and resulted in enormous financial losses and public deficits. He compared its magnitude to the financial crisis before the Second World War. During his presentation, he divided the crisis into three cycles. The first started in summer 2007. Since spring 2009, the financial system had shown signs of relief and was therefore entering the second phase. It remained unclear, however, if this phase presented merely stabilisation or indeed a recovery of the financial system. Mr. Pictet concluded by pointing out that the coming years until 2013 would be crucial as corporate debts would peak from 2012-2013. He emphasised that the banking system needed to properly function by then to absorb these challenges.

Capitalism and the Common Good: an Oxymoron

Paul Dembinksi (Director, Observatoire de la Finance, Geneva) commenced his presentation by asking rhetorically if the times of euphoric finance were over, as the last thirty years had been “years of finance” with great social and political consequences. He identified a growing moral and political autonomisation of the financial sector since 1989 as the notion of capital had become fuzzy with the inclusion of intangible assets. He emphasised that capitalism could survive without proper markets, but that it would lose its social and political backing if the financial system was not reformed. The concern for the common good could not be “outsourced” but needed to be addressed by the political systems. He concluded that the current crisis should be understood as a moment of clarification and reflection on the fundamentals of the financial system and its renewal.

The Evolution of Policymaking in Response to Crises

Cédric Tille (Professor, International Economics, Graduate Institute of International Studies and Development Studies) focused on the evolution of policy-making during the financial crisis. He outlined that all actors

from the central banks to fiscal authorities focused on large fiscal stimuli and government intervention. He emphasised that while capitalism was a system with weakness and limits, similarly to democracy, it remained the financial order that had pulled many countries out of poverty. He stressed the importance of avoiding overly simplistic policy frameworks. In his conclusions, Mr. Tille called for pragmatic policy approaches to address the crisis.

Summary of the discussion

The discussion focused on a comparison of the impact of the crisis on the United States and the European Union. All speakers asserted that Europe had been hit as badly as the United States. It was further commented that in order to overcome the crisis, multilateral institutions needed to be used and protectionism averted. Much would depend on industrialised countries generating enough growth over the coming years to pay back their debts. Some commentators called for a more profound re-evaluation of capitalism and the political and social order it generated.

Conclusions

In his conclusions, Mr. Warner summarised that there continued to be optimism that the financial system was recovering and that the crisis could be overcome. It remained a moment of re-evaluation of the fundamentals of the system and an opportunity for correction and change.

Third Topic Session

Globalisation and the Five Dimensions of Global Security

Topic Session organised by GCSP.

Lisa Watanabe

Introduction

A brief introduction was given by the chair *Nayef Al-Rodhan* (Senior Geostrategist and Director, Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalisation and Transnational Security, GCSP). He explained that in a previous book, he identified five dimensions of global security and proposed a multi-sum security principle that stated:

“In a globalized world, security can no longer be thought of as a zero-sum game involving states alone. Global security, instead, has five dimensions that include human, environmental, national, transnational, and transcultural security, and, therefore, global security and the security of any state or culture cannot be achieved without good governance at all levels that guarantees security through *justice* for *all* individuals, states, and cultures.”

This panel analysed these five dimensions and their relevance to global security.

Summary of the individual presentations

Steven E. Miller (Director, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University) gave a presentation on the relevance of national and transnational security. He

began by noting that while the traditional national security paradigm never entirely reflected reality, today the sources of threat and solutions arise in the transnational domain. He sought to demonstrate this by drawing on the example of terrorism and the United States (US). US external policy, he argued, was shaped by counter-terrorism. Terrorism was described as a geographically diffuse, illusive, asymmetric, globalised enemy. The response, he contended, ought to be traditional security policing, restricting terrorist-related financing, the establishment of international rules and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the identification of the root causes of terrorism and an effort to win hearts and minds. The processes of globalisation were thought to be adding to security challenges by increasing economic inequality and friction between cultures.

Lisa Watanabe (Research Officer, Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalisation and Transnational Security, GCSP) spoke on the relevance of human and transcultural security. She noted that there was a lack of correspondence between security challenges and the concepts and mechanisms available with which to meet them. She argued that military security against external threats was not enough to secure the vital core of human beings. Moreover, the sources of individual insecurity might come from non-state actors. Human security was thought to have the advantage of encouraging prevention rather than reaction.

Transcultural security, she argued, reflected the need for new conceptual frameworks and mechanisms. Culture and nation, she noted, did not always overlap. Culture might also transcend state boundaries. Transcultural security was believed to have the benefit of recognising that there were relations that go beyond those between individuals and states, and that a political response to frustrations and calls for greater justice was required.

Simon Dalby (Professor, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University) spoke on the relevance of environmental security. He stressed that there was a need to update our conceptual framework. He argued against the notion that climate change would cause conflict. Instead, he highlighted the importance of recognising that

we had been changing the planetary ecosystem since the onset of industrialisation, so much so that we are now living in a new geological period. He stressed that globalisation should be understood as a physical process that takes place in the biosphere. According to him, we needed to think about security in the anthropocene. We needed to think more seriously about how we would cooperate in the future and how appropriate institutional responses to the problem would be constructed.

Summary of the discussion

During the discussion period, the issue of how to characterise terrorism was raised. The importance of understanding the motivation of terrorists was emphasised. Miller agreed that it was important to look at the objectives of terrorism and why they employed unconventional means. A question was also raised about what winning hearts and minds might mean. Miller stressed that it was important to act as though you mean it.

The question of whether governments were responding to security challenges related to the environment was also raised. According to Dalby, some governments were responding, while others were not. He stressed that we needed to think further about industrial strategies and resilience of infrastructure. One aspect of this would be to turn the scarcity narrative on its head and to focus more on the “abundance problem”. Dalby explained that climate change was caused by too much fossil fuel use and the “abundance” of CO₂.

In relation to human security, the questions of who should do the securing and how they should do it were discussed. Watanabe suggested that different actors and methods might be appropriate depending on the specific circumstances. She also noted that it would require priority setting, which needed to be further examined.

The issue of how to operationalise the concept of transcultural security without encouraging the instrumentalisation of culture was raised. Watanabe replied that there was a danger that “culture” could be instrumentalised, but ultimately an effort to identify fundamental values across cultures would be needed to avoid this. She remarked that it ought to be possible to promote cultural diversity while protecting and

promoting universal norms, given that it was unlikely that fundamental values significantly differed across cultures.

Conclusions

In summary, the processes of globalisation are making traditional ways of thinking about the state, security and citizenship increasingly untenable. Therefore, new ways of thinking about where we are and where to go from here are required.

PARALLEL WORKSHOP SESSIONS

Workshop Session 1

Strategic Technologies and Global Security

Workshop Session organised by GCSP.

Christina Lycke

Introduction

This panel looked at the global security implications of certain technological innovations, specifically the societal impact of information technology and the potential use and misuse of material and nanotechnologies. The discussions emphasised the need to encourage innovation and progress while still balancing concerns over geopolitical security and ethical and moral challenges.

Summary of the individual presentations

Chaired by *Nayef Al-Rodhan* (Senior Geostrategist and Director, Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalisation and Transnational Security, GCSP), the workshop began with a presentation by *François Géré* (President, French Institute for Strategic Analysis, Paris). Géré discussed the power of information and communications technology, a category that covered a wide range of mediums whose characteristics could range from cheap (a paper pamphlet) to expensive (broadcast television) or from flexible (the Internet) to rigid (cinema). Combined, these technologies had the ability to spread information (and misinformation) to an international audience at an increasingly fast pace. Géré explained that these technologies could be used in different variations to provide unique platforms and strategies for spreading messages and information. According to Géré, information and communications technologies themselves were amoral. However, the

applications of these technologies could range from relatively benign publicity to politically-motivated propaganda to the more sinister brain-washing of a population.

Concluding his presentation, Géré highlighted a few key trends in the information and communications technologies industries. Egoisation of media, or the replacement of mass media with more personal, individualised communication, was one of the most significant shifts in the media world, he said. Additionally, he noted that cyberspace and the growing human presence in outer space were becoming global security concerns. Géré argued that there was a need for new treaties and confidence-building measures in these realms. As important as new regulatory frameworks were, Géré also stressed that the regulation could not come at the cost of new innovations in the field.

Giovanni De Micheli (Professor and Director, Electrical Engineering Institute and Integrated Systems Centre at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne) followed Géré. De Micheli spoke about nanotechnology, a science that dealt with materials less than 100 molecules in diameter, and about materials science, the study and manipulation of all types of materials, from ceramics to wood to metal.

After giving a brief overview of the science of materials and nanotechnology, De Micheli focused much of his presentation on the potential applications and dangers of innovations in these fields. With regards to nanotechnology, De Micheli explained that nanoparticles would potentially help reduce air pollution, improve medical care and drug delivery, monitor the environment, and eventually, the field would result in materials that could construct and design themselves. Although nanotechnology had enormous potential to improve our overall quality of life, De Micheli cautioned that many of the risks and dangers of nanotechnology were not yet fully understood. For example, it was unclear how dangerous it was if certain nanoparticles were inhaled and whether discarded nanoparticles contaminated water resources.

Materials science would help create better and safer structures, products, and environments. From stronger, earthquake resistant bridges to clothing that could monitor body functions and allow a doctor to

administer treatment from afar, materials science would affect everything from health to military security.

Like Géré, De Micheli ended his presentation by encouraging the international community to develop policies that balance the security of communities with the security of individuals while still fostering innovation and scientific development. He cautioned that the greatest risks of materials science and nanotechnology were threats to privacy, potential misuse, disposal, and governments exploiting the technologies to implement Big Brother-like situations.

Summary of the discussion

During the Q&A, participants brought up questions about the pervasiveness of technology and wondered whether privacy was becoming an anomaly. Géré and De Micheli agreed that this was a possibility, and again they encouraged judicious regulation of these emerging technologies. In response to a question on the relation between media and politics, Géré stressed the significance of how fast information spread in this day and time and warned that we had to verify information before acting upon it.

Conclusions

To conclude the workshop, Nayef Al-Rodhan gave an overview of his theory on human nature called *Emotional Amoral Egoism*, arguing that humans were predictable and guided primarily by self-interest. For that reason, Al-Rodhan explained, we would inevitably pursue technologies that would improve or enhance ourselves or our environments, regardless of their potential dangers. According to Al-Rodhan, these tendencies of human nature implied a strong need for intelligent regulation of new technologies and our use of them. Al-Rodhan concluded the panel by thanking the presenters for their time and insight.

Workshop Session 2

Security for Sale: The Invisible Hand of the Market Reforming the Security Sector?

Workshop Session organised by DCAF.

André du Plessis

Introduction

The last thirty years have witnessed a paradigm shift of the provision of security from public to private actors amounting to billions of dollars spent annually on their services. This shift has called into question whether existing laws can effectively regulate these private actors, leading to problems of democratic accountability, impunity and the rule of law.

The panel “Security for Sale” considered whether the mass privatisation of security contributes to effective security sector reform. Panellists discussed some of the new trends including the privatisation of intelligence, the role of Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) in peacekeeping operations as well as the privatisation of security sector reform in post-conflict and fragile states. This was followed by some of the current initiatives to regulate these private actors.

Summary of the individual presentations

In his presentation, *Philipp Spoerri* (International Law Department at the International Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC, Geneva) outlined the background to the ICRC and Swiss government’s “Swiss Initiative”. In particular he referred to the Montreux Document, a non-legally binding document open for State endorsement which set out 27 existing

international humanitarian law and human rights principles that applied to PMSCs in armed conflict situations, as well as containing a section of 73 good practices for States in their relations with PMSCs. He concluded with details of several ongoing initiatives related to the Swiss Initiative, including encouraging further State endorsement of the Montreux Document, promoting incorporation of its principles into national practice and establishing an international Code of Conduct for the PMSC industry.

Tim Shorrock (independent journalist, American Federation of Government Employees, Washington DC) highlighted some of the concerns relating to the privatisation of intelligence operations. He described the shift towards privatisation, with an estimated 70 per cent of US spending on intelligence going to private companies. He noted that intelligence operations covered a wide variety of activities, from national security policy formulation through to interrogation of prisoners. He recommended that there should be a clear line drawn between activities that could and could not be outsourced. He concluded by emphasising that the extent and nature of outsourcing of intelligence work should be publicised widely to the public, but noted that it was often difficult to gain access to information due to its classified nature.

Doug Brooks (President, International Peace Operators Association – a PMSC industry association in Washington DC) introduced the work done by contingency contractors around the world, including the use of PMSCs in Peacekeeping Operations. He outlined the reasons that clients used these companies: typically they could respond faster on the ground to identified needs, were cheaper than national forces and often provided a better quality service. Within the contingency operator industry, he noted that only 5 per cent of the companies were security companies and that typically the number of expatriates within these companies was very low, with the vast majority of staff being locally hired. He concluded by emphasising the industry's support for better regulation, commenting that effective regulation is in the interests of those PMSCs that operate ethically.

Finally, *Anne-Marie Buzatu* (Coordinator, Privatisation of Security Programme, DCAF) gave an overview of several current initiatives to

regulate PMSCs together with some recommendations for the way ahead. After setting-out some of the unique challenges that the PMSC industry brought to effective regulation, she identified essential elements in any mechanism seeking to address this, including the need for effective investigatory and enforcement mechanisms. She concluded by informing participants of various initiatives seeking to improve the conduct and accountability of PMSCs, including an international PMSC Code of Conduct project led by the PMSC industry with support from the Swiss government in partnership with DCAF.

Summary of the discussion

In subsequent discussion, questions were raised relating to the scope of humanitarian law in respect of PMSCs, the degree to which the United Nations uses PMSCs/Stability Contractors in their operations and the degree to which there were cost-savings when PMSCs were used as opposed to national forces. Other issues raised by participants included the impact of the import of arms into fragile states by PMSCs, the ethics of hiring state armed force personnel into the private sector and concerns regarding the outsourcing of national security policy to the private sector.

Conclusions

Participants noted the wide range of work carried out by the PMSC industry, including in intelligence operations and peacekeeping mission, and considered the various ongoing initiatives for their improved regulation and accountability.

Workshop Session 3

Democratic Peace Revisited

Workshop Session organised by Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in cooperation with DCAF.

Abstract

Democratic Peace Theory has been one of the most elaborate and politically influential products of political science in the last fifty years: That democracies do not make war against each other and are probably somehow more peaceful than non-democracies is a powerful motivation behind democratisation and democracy promotion policies by Western countries, in extremis even justifying the use of military force. Recent work has revealed logical and empirical weaknesses in mainstream DP theory that are not without consequences for the political practice it informs. Of great interest is in this context the huge variance among democracies with regard to issues such as participating in military interventions, the constitutional control of the military, and the way the military is viewed by, and integrated into, society. The panel discussed these inner contradictions and shortcomings of the theory and dealt with important empirical consequences.

Workshop Session 4

Evaluating Peace Process Architectures

Workshop Session organised by the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Jana Krause

Introduction

This panel explored the lessons learned from the engagement of Switzerland on the architectures of peace processes. While peace processes are highly context specific, the careful design of a process can facilitate discussions and agreement on sensitive issues. Important elements include the sequencing of negotiation phases and issues, which actors to include, the role of external actors or the use of “carrot and sticks” as incentives or threats.

Summary of the individual presentations

The Chair, *Oliver Jütersonke* (Head of Research, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), introduced the panel that looked at Sudan and Nepal as two case study examples and at the role of civil society organisations as well as economic issues and tools in peace processes.

Economic Issues and Tools in Peace Processes

Achim Wennmann’s (Researcher, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development

Studies) presentation outlined the economic dimensions of peace processes. These ranged from the characteristics of conflict financing in the engagement of armed groups to the inclusion of economic issues in peace negotiations and their treatment during the transition phase after a peace agreement. He emphasised that peace negotiations needed to take into account that an agreement might undermine an armed group's financing strategies. At the same time, natural resources might become peace resources when included in context-sensitive negotiations.

The Nepal Peace Process

Günther Bächler (Senior Mediation Expert, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) outlined the Swiss role in peace negotiations that consisted of advising and analysing the objectives and the road to reach these, emphasising that the parties to the conflict remained “in the driver's seat”. He pointed out the importance of a suitable architecture to peace processes that needed to provide a solid fundament whilst remaining flexible for the timeline to determine the implementation process. The Nepal peace process did not follow one comprehensive approach, but developed step-by-step. The peace negotiations were exceptionally dynamic in that within one year a ceasefire was achieved, a political agreement reached, and an interim constitution drawn. However, the evaluation of the peace process remained difficult because it was unclear who would evaluate, what would be evaluated, and when evaluation should take place.

After Arusha: the Organisational Challenge of Building Burundi's Post-conflict Institutions

Susanna Campbell (Research Fellow, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) outlined the organisational challenges in implementing comprehensive peace agreements. Many aspects of the Arusha Agreement had been implemented despite complex politics of the former warring parties, weak state institutions and extreme poverty, including security sector reform, reintegration of refugees, and democratic

elections in 2005. However, a number of barriers to more profound implementation originated from organisational structures of the international community itself, such as the lack of leadership in the Implementation Monitoring Committee and lack of coordination between donors. Bureaucratic routines, a Western bias and external accountability left limited space for organisational learning. Conditionality only worked when it supported changes that the other party wanted to make. She concluded that the threat of resumption of violence remained a realistic scenario in Burundi.

The North-South Peace Agreement in Sudan

Julian T. Hottinger (Senior Mediation Expert, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) underlined that peace mediations had fundamentally changed toward developing a comprehensive vision of a peaceful order for a country. Mediation was no longer only about stopping the violence, but needed to incorporate social, economic, and potentially environment issues. The future process of implementation and evaluation needed to be reflected in the peace agreement. The life-expectancy of armed groups had also grown, and many came to the negotiation table with experience in previous negotiations and high expectations of what they wanted to gain. In the case of Sudan, previous negotiations had taken place, so that the “how to implement” was much more at stake than the “what to implement”. Crucial aspects included the unity or separation of the country, the form of the state and political representation, the religious aspects of the state, and wealth sharing.

Summary of the discussion

The discussion focused on the difficulty of involving women in peace processes. Comments were also made on transitional justice vis-à-vis pragmatic opinions of sidelining justice for the sake of political stability, economic development and the implementation of a peace agreement.

Conclusions

In order to ensure a lasting peace process, it was vital that the architecture of a peace agreement foresaw practical challenges of implementation and monitoring. The quality of implementation was given precedence over the quantity of implemented aspects.

Workshop Session 5

Energy Infrastructure as a Target: Risks and Implications

Workshop Session organised by CSS in cooperation with DCAF.

Jennifer Giroux

Introduction

Energy infrastructure within the oil and gas sector is increasingly threatened by political and criminally motivated attacks carried out by non-state actors. The rise in militancy and criminality in Nigeria's oil-producing region, the insurgency in Iraq that crippled oil production between 2003-2007, and the statements released by al-Qaida that attacks on oil facilities should be a priority, have presented another aspect of vulnerability to the world's energy resources. Overall, data reveals that energy infrastructure targeting is occurring more frequently and becoming more dispersed across a broad geographical range where small groups are empowered with technology, mobility, and possess abilities to leverage networks that ultimately pose significant challenges to states. Energy infrastructure attacks today not only serve as platform for small groups to air grievance but to also garner global notoriety and monetary gains that provide ample fuel to their violent campaigns. Given rising global dependence on oil and natural gas resources, such a trend could bring significant economic disruptions and challenges to states. In response to this phenomenon, this workshop examined such risks to energy infrastructure, the geopolitical consequences, and measures needed to mitigate risks posed to the energy industry.

Summary of the individual presentations

Gal Luft (Executive Director, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Washington DC) provided the opening presentation where he highlighted global trends related to energy infrastructure attacks and threats to oil and gas resources within the Middle East in particular. He noted that energy infrastructure targeting had been occurring for decades but reported that such attacks were happening with greater frequency.¹ Given that most of the world's energy resources are located in unstable regions, Mr. Luft suggested that small attacks – such as sabotage to oil pipelines and the like – were to be expected. However, it would be the larger attacks that could destabilise systems and pathways that should be prevented. In this regard, he called for enhancing the resiliency of energy infrastructure via incorporating more diversification and redundancy into the system so that oil and gas resources had a myriad of options for transport and distribution should one critical node be successfully attacked.

Alex Vines (Research Director, Regional and Security Studies; Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House, London) provided the following presentation that gave a comprehensive view of the militancy threat toward energy infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa; highlighting the piracy of the coast of Somalia and the energy infrastructure attacks in Nigeria and Sudan in detail where extreme poverty and instability fuels criminality and political violence. Mr. Vines highlighted the issue of illegal oil bunkering in Nigeria's Niger Delta where estimates ranged from 100,000 to 300,000 barrels being illegally exported per day, resulting in millions in financial losses. He also stated that "bunkering follows the oil prices, when it is really high, smuggling increases; it is also linked to the electoral cycle – its increases in the run – up to elections in Nigeria." To resolve this issue, he called for greater dialogue between the state and non-state actors as well as enhanced efforts to "reduce illicit financial and arms flows and networks, through technical assistance and multilateral anti-corruption measures."

¹ With this, Mr. Luft questioned whether the apparent increase in attacks was due to better reporting or whether attacks were indeed increasing.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen (Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge) examined responses needed to deal with such asymmetric, transboundary, overlapping threats. In doing this, he looked at the broader picture; noting that the 21st century had ushered in an era of collective security that needed collective action to gather and share intelligence throughout the global community. He recommended that a global intelligence organisation should be created so to develop a framework for collaboration and establishing requirements to meet today's common security challenges. He further suggested that "national and global intelligence entities should be viewed as complementary but different pieces of one whole."²

Summary of the discussion

Stefan Brem (Head, Risk Analysis and Research Coordination, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport) opened the discussion by highlighting a comprehensive model of analysis for energy infrastructure security. This provoked a discussion centered largely on the feasibility of counter-responses (i.e. potential difficulties in creating a global intelligence regime, monitoring illegal oil, and building alternative transport channels within a narrow timeframe) and enhancing the protection of energy infrastructure. Mr. Luft added that during this period of cheap oil, countries should work together to not only increase global stockpiles of oil but also develop a framework for when to tap into such resources.

Conclusions

Overall the panel successfully delivered a broad picture of the human-threats posed to energy infrastructure while also proposing some interesting measures to increase the resiliency of the energy supply chain, limit criminality, and opportunities to apply a holistic approach to modern day security issues. Minimising the risks posed to energy

² http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19036/global_crossroads.html

infrastructure is in the interests of all states and thus should be viewed as a collective issue to address and manage cooperatively.

Workshop Session 6

Explosive Remnants of War, Human Security and Development

Workshop Session organised by GICHD.

Ginevra Cucinotta

Introduction

Barbara Haering (President, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining) opened the discussion by emphasising that landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and small arms and light weapons (SALW) are all tools of armed violence that negatively affect lives and livelihoods after conflict. Mine action (i.e. demining, victim assistance, mine risk education and stockpile destruction) can make an effective contribution to programmes focused on armed violence reduction, peace-building, security system reform, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. The panellists discussed the experiences of mine action organisations in dealing with the legacy of ERW as part of efforts to strengthen human security and promote reconstruction and development.

Summary of the individual presentations

The Legacy of ERW in Afghanistan and Broader Human Security and Development Challenges

Dr Mohammed Haider Reza (Programme Director, United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan, Kabul) stated that landmines/ERW impeded development in Afghanistan, for example negatively affecting economic development, the delivery of government

services and the return of refugees. Mine action was a key enabler for security and development in Afghanistan. Power supply to Kabul had improved as a result of clearance along power supply routes between Uzbekistan and Kabul. Kabul University campus had been unusable seven years ago, but was now operating and producing graduates as a result of clearance of the campus. Clearance of the Aynak copper mine in Longar, south of Kabul would commence shortly, with the Afghan Ministry of Mines committing \$2.6 million for demining, the first time the Government of Afghanistan had allocated funding from its core budget for mine action.¹

From Humanitarian Mine Action to Human Security

Steve Priestly (International Director for Technical Development and Evaluation, Mines Advisory Group, Manchester) informed that the UK-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG), traditionally focused on humanitarian mine action, had in recent years broadened its scope to work on wider human security issues. MAG had first got involved with small arms and light weapons (SALW) issues during the mid-1990s by supporting demobilisation efforts in Cambodia and Angola, countries where it had already been working on mine action. MAG had started off by helping to destroy surplus and abandoned weapons and ammunition, and had since found that many countries also required assistance with safe storage. Stockpile management was becoming a serious issue in Africa and elsewhere. MAG had since established a Conventional Weapons Management and Disposal Programme through which the organisation:

- Assisted with the safe storage of arms and ammunition, collection and destruction of surplus arms, and training and capacity development of national police and militaries in countries like Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and the Sudan;

¹ https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/practitioners-network/wk-may2009/LMAD-Wk-ISF-MACCA-Gva-May2009.pdf

- Provided technical support to the Nairobi-based Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) for the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa.²

Community Safety: Promoting Armed Violence Reduction and Facilitating Development

Don MacDonald (Chief Technical Advisor, Danish Demining Group – a part of the Danish Refugee Council, Copenhagen) explained that the Danish Demining Group had originally started out as a mine/ERW clearance operator. However, in many of the conflict-affected countries in which the Danish Demining Group worked, they received requests from mine/ERW-affected communities to assist them with addressing broader community safety problems, often in relation to SALW. Somaliland for example, had the third highest SALW ownership rate after Yemen and the USA, with communities among the poorest and most armed in the world. Although initially working in Somaliland on mine/ERW clearance, the Danish Demining Group had recently initiated a community safety enhancement project. The project involved working with local communities and peace building NGOs to promote the safe storage of firearms, provide firearms safety education, deliver training in conflict management and resolution, and strengthen trust between local communities and the police. As opposed to previous failed attempts at forced disarmament, the Danish Demining Group was focusing on addressing the root causes of conflict and community insecurity.³

Summary of the discussion

Barbara Hearing and Dr Haider Reza stressed the importance of prioritising clearance activities on the basis of socio-economic information. Steve Priestley emphasised the development of residual national capacity to address mine/ERW contamination and SALW

² https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/practitioners-network/wk-may2009/LMAD-Wk-ISF-MAG-Gva-May2009.pdf

³ https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/practitioners-network/wk-may2009/LMAD-Wk-ISF-DDG-Gva-May2009.pdf

misuse and proliferation, while also ensuring that residual capacity was not translated into strengthened military capacity. Don MacDonald discussed the challenges of developing national capacity in countries like Somaliland with limited government capacity.

Conclusions

Mine action organisations are increasingly positioning themselves to address the changing nature of conflict and insecurity but contributing to broader peace-building and armed violence reduction programmes. Strengthening coordination with national and international actors working in these areas is therefore vital.

Workshop Session 7

The Geopolitics of Aerospace

Workshop Session organised by GCSP.

Christina Lycke

Introduction

Chaired by *Nayef Al-Rodhan* (Senior Geostrategist and Director, Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalisation and Transnational Security, GCSP) this panel looked at the geopolitics of aerospace and its relevance to global security. It addressed the evolving space policies of states in the context of technological innovations, national interests and pride. In addition, the panellists explored the implications of the peaceful and non-peaceful uses of technologies in space. These discussions highlighted the unique role of aerospace as a separate domain that enabled emerging innovations to influence geopolitical and geostrategic cooperation and competition.

Summary of the individual presentations

Michael Krepon (Co-founder, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington DC) began by highlighting the paradoxes and ironies of regulating outer space. Although outer space is a forum that should demand international cooperation, he said that we were actually experiencing a period of increasing contentions between the major space players. The United States, for example, had been pushing hard to exert its domination of space, but this move was not receiving much support either internationally or domestically. Despite geostrategists' protests to the contrary, it seemed that space was an inherently different domain where new international rules and guidelines applied.

One of the main challenges of outer space was space debris. According to Krepon, debris, produced by the intentional or accidental destruction of satellites (among other things), was increasingly clogging lower earth orbits and endangering the missions of satellites and space shuttles.

Krepon outlined two, non-mutually exclusive suggestions for space-faring nations to improve their space security. One was a code of conduct, which would provide legal guidelines for things like space traffic management. The second would be a narrow ban on destructive tests against manmade space objects; such a move would largely be driven by the desire to minimise the problem of persistent space debris.

James Lewis (Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC) addressed many of the same themes as Krepon. For example, he concurred that space was a forum of shared security concerns that no single nation could address alone and noted that more and more countries were developing at least a small space presence. Although space should be an area of international cooperation, military interests and the secrecy surrounding them often prevented countries from collaborating.

Lewis outlined some of the key opportunities for cooperation in space, and chief among them was climate change. Without space based sensors, it was very difficult for us to get a comprehensive view of how the climate was changing. Unfortunately, we lacked the networks and abilities for countries to share and compare their climate information with each other. As such, the sum of our global space investment was less than the total.

As a concluding thought, Lewis addressed the issue of space debris and the possibility of international collaboration to track debris in space. Again, such collaboration would be beneficial to all but is impeded by the secrecy of national militaries and general competitiveness between nations.

Theresa Hitchens (Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva) addressed the international efforts to avoid a space arms race after reiterating international concerns over growing levels of space debris and the overcrowding of space. She discussed China and

Russia's efforts to gain backing for a treaty banning weapons in outer space and discussed the United States' reluctance to agree to this, noting that the Obama administration's position on this issue was somewhat ambiguous. She also discussed the European Code of Conduct for Space Activities and Canadian efforts to provide "a third way" – between a code of conduct and a space-based weapons ban – for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament. Lastly, she stressed the need for all stakeholders – especially international institutions –to cooperate and collaborate to address the issue of long-term space sustainability and avoid tendencies to "stovepipe" their discussions of varying aspects.

Summary of the discussion

During the discussion, participants questioned the panellists on issues related to space tourism and the clean-up of space debris. The panellists explained that there was currently no feasible way to clean up the thousands of pieces of debris in orbit around the world and re-emphasised that this was a significant geostrategic problem. With regards to space tourism, one panellist noted that once civilians were regularly travelling to space, governments would have a greater impetus to regulate space and make sure it was safe. Another argued that private sector space tourism was fueling space innovation, helping make space gear lighter and more efficient. Some concluding remarks were also made on the United States' interest in an anti-ballistic missile system, with one panellist arguing that the United States had the most to risk and the most to gain in its space policy.

Conclusions

To end the presentations, Nayef Al-Rodhan thanked the panellists for their attendance and input, stressing the importance of outer space to 21st century geopolitics.

Workshop Session 8

Pariahs or Partners? Armed Non-state Actors and Security Governance

Workshop Session organised by DCAF in cooperation with the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform.

Danail Hristov and Albrecht Schnabel

Introduction

The workshop focused on the positive and negative roles played by armed non-state actors (ANSA) in security governance. Are they spoilers and/or partners in the design and implementation of security sector reform (SSR) programmes to maintain – or establish – constructive, effective, democratic and accountable security governance? What is done by, and required from, other actors of the security sector to assure that ANSA become assets and partners, and not nuisances and foes in security governance? How should states, international actors, non-governmental actors and ANSA themselves address this challenge – and cooperate with each other to mitigate ANSA’s potentially destructive role in fragile peacebuilding and SSR processes? The workshop drew on experiences and lessons learned in sidelining, engaging or regulating ANSA in conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding activities. Moreover, it identified relevant gaps in research, policy and practice, and offered suggestions to bridge those gaps.

Summary of the individual presentations

Mpako Foaleng (SSR Advisor, International Security Sector Advisory Team, DCAF) focused on “Engaging ‘Home-Grown Mercenaries’ and Other Armed Nonstate Actors in Peace and SSR Processes: Experiences from Africa”. She explained that home-grown mercenaries appeared mainly in states in, or emerging from, violent conflict. They were former combatants that had not found ways to move from military to civilian life. If demobilisation processes in particular were not coherent and compatible with local expectations and contexts, former combatants did not identify with the demobilisation process and moved across borders – where they could easily be recruited by foreign powers. She argued that when a peace agreement was reached and implemented, it was crucial to be as inclusive as possible. Rebel groups could not be excluded from the process, as they might constitute a pool of potential fighters, ready to migrate to further conflicts.

Claudia Hofmann (Researcher, Research Division Global Issues, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin) and *Ulrich Schneckener* (Senior Fellow, Research, DCAF) focused on “Security Governance and Nonstate Conflict Management: Opportunities and Limits of NGOs in Engaging Non-State Armed Groups”. They found that the engagement approach of NGOs differed from the one applied by States and international organisations. Often NGOs offered the only opportunity for ANSA to interact constructively with the external world. NGOs were flexible, did not need to comply with diplomatic constraints, and could engage with the marginalised and criminalised in a society. However, they were constrained by insufficient resources; they often needed the backing of bigger players in order to deliver promised incentives; they tended to lack monitoring mechanisms to evaluate whether commitments were upheld or not; they did not reach the top level of decision-makers; and they often lacked clear mandates and accountability.

Pascal Bongard (Programme Director for Africa and Policy Advisor, Geneva Call) asked: “‘What’s In It for Us?’ Incentives and Motivations

for ANSA Cooperation in Security Sector Governance”. He drew on the experience of Geneva Call, which, for the past 10 years, had been engaging ANSA – mostly guerrilla movements and independence movements – in landmine actions in conflict-affected areas. ANSA could play a positive role and contribute to human security. They could reduce mine-related threats and improve the welfare of local populations. NGOs, on the other hand, could influence ANSA’s behaviour. By contributing to the de-mining of land and infrastructure, ANSA not only contributed to long-term security and development, but also confidence-building between belligerent parties.

Finally, *Albrecht Schnabel* addressed the theme of “Engaging Armed Nonstate Actors in Post-Conflict Security Governance: Towards an Applied Policy Research Agenda”. Eventually, ANSA had to learn how to think and act as providers of peace and stability in non-violent contexts, and to embrace the principles of good security governance in order to reap the benefits of their struggle and gain the support of the population and the wider regional and international community. Empirically driven lessons, guidelines and recommendations were required on what works or not when engaging ANSA. Based on a proper understanding of the evolution, nature, interests, objectives and support structures of ANSA, responses had to be tailored towards the specific context and local dynamics of armed groups as they transformed from non-statutory to statutory actors within a country’s security sector.

Summary of the discussion

The subsequent conversation with the audience focused on the impact of states’ counter-terrorism agendas on opportunities to engage ANSA; the moral hazards for NGOs who engaged ANSA; and the role and legitimacy of violence as a tool to express dissent – by groups opposed to oppressive governments and by states defending themselves and society against insurgent violence.

Conclusions

ANSA are an unavoidable reality – the question is not if one should engage ANSA, but how, when and to what end. At the same time, if ANSA want to play a constructive post-conflict role, they need to engage with other security institutions in a joint quest for peace and stability. In the interest of the security of affected populations, the activities and roles of ANSA must be addressed during and after peace talks, and armed groups must be engaged in the search for a more peaceful post-conflict order.

Workshop Session 9

Somalia: A Forgotten Nation? A Forgotten People? A Forgotten Peace Process?

Workshop Session organised by CSS in cooperation with swisspeace.

Simon A. Mason and Matthias Siegfried

Introduction

Somalia briefly became a show place of the so called “war on terror” in 2006. The Council of Islamic Courts fought and won against a US backed war-lord militia in February 2006. In December of the same year, the Courts were ousted from Mogadishu by a US backed Ethiopian offensive. In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its forces, but it was unclear how it would react to the subsequent expansionist moves of Al Shabaab. Somali pirates have also become an international security topic, without much reflection on the background to this situation, which remains volatile. There have been various attempts at mediation, such as those of the Arab League, or the more recent and ongoing ones of the UN. These have been unsuccessful so far.

Summary of the individual presentations

Somalia is an explosive mix of a failed state coupled with dire poverty. Conflicts over political and natural resources are carried out along clan and sub-clan lines. Despite of a lot of commonalities (language, religion, ethnicity...), it remains an extremely divided society. Years of fighting

between rivaling war lords, as well as famine and disease, have led to up to 1 million deaths.¹

One can differentiate between three main historic phases: The first phase up unto 1991, ending with the demise of the rule of Siad Barre, and a deep distrust of Somalis towards a strong central state. The second phase from 1991 until 2006, ending with the invasion by Ethiopia. And the third phase from 2006 up until today, with ongoing conflict between warlords, Islamic Courts and a frail Transitional Federal Government.

Some 16 peace processes have taken place, but all of have failed to date. The aim of the UN backed Djibouti peace process was to set up a functioning government through negotiations with moderate Islamic actors, and thereby prevent extremist Islamists take over power. However, the Ethiopian invasion led to massive, indiscriminate violence towards the population, making it easy for hardliner Islamists to get support and widen their influence. Besides these external factors, there were also internal dynamics that led to greater extremism. There are indications that Al Shabaab have links to Al Quaida.

The major challenge in Somalia is: "Peacebuilding in the absence of a state". There is a lack of trust and no shared vision of the state. This is aggravated by the strong sub-clan divisions and the constant changes of alliances. It is therefore very hard to follow the classical model of peacebuilding through statebuilding. While there is a general consensus shared by many Somalis to develop some form of federalism, it is unclear which processes could work, and what would be the federal entities.

The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs got involved in Somalia in 1998, mainly focusing on the supporting the constitutional process. Today, some 9,200 Somalis live in Switzerland, the reason for a broader approach from the side of the Swiss Federal Administration. This was extended to the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport with the EU's request for Switzerland to participate in dealing with pirates in Atalanta.

¹ BBC Country Profile, Somalia
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm

Somalia illustrates all key security challenges of a globalised world, including: human trafficking, piracy, state failure, and fundamentalism. Somalia may be a reality towards which other countries and regions might also be heading to. While the international community tends to forget Somalia, Somalis remind themselves to us, if we like it or not.

Summary of the discussion

Do the pirates have links to Al-Qaida, what happens with the revenues? Pirates themselves receive only about 30% of the revenue. Additional 30% is spent in Somalia and in the sub-region. There is no link between the Islamist and the piracy, because the pirates are scared to be treated as “terrorist” groups. The solution to the pirates is on the land, and not at sea.

What is the impact of UN arms embargo / sanctions on Somalia? The arms embargo has been totally ineffective up to 6 months ago. The monitoring group has been very weak, but it has recently increases its effectiveness, there is hope that it will improve.

Workshop Session 10

“Who Makes Peace, Who Builds Peace?” National Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes

Workshop Session organised by the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, a cooperation between GCSP, the Quaker United Nations Office, and the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Andrea de Araujo Rivero

Introduction

The objective of the panel “Who Makes Peace, Who Builds Peace?” was to consider the challenges that the international peacebuilding architecture faces in order to successfully establish the foundations of a lasting peace in post-conflict societies. In order to assess these challenges the panellists examined the interplay between the imposition of an externally-led peacebuilding model and the need for local ownership by addressing issues such as: identifying and supporting local peacebuilders, finding ways to deal with “spoilers”, taking into consideration local specificities, and developing nationally-owned and context-sensitive peacebuilding strategies.

Summary of the individual presentations

The Strategic Alternative: Backing a Decent Winner

Professor Michael Barnett’s (Stassen Chair, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis) presentation centered on providing an alternative model to Liberal Peacebuilding that tackled the critical issue of how to build stable states

after war. He argued peacebuilding should not be about values (that barely worked in Western societies), but about setting institutions that would allow for certain principles to develop. Instead of having the ultimate goal be the consolidation of a liberal state in post-conflict societies, the international community should aim at a *least bad state* that would commit to principles and processes. He suggested three key principles:

1. **constitutionalism:** the important role of a constitution to provide checks and balances within a state;
2. **deliberation:** the establishment of deliberative mechanisms which would assure that once ideas were made public there would be more incentive to follow them through, and;
3. **representation:** a principle that ensured interests of the society were heard and realised.

Ultimately, he argued, the international community needed to be strategic: “less is more and less is better.” International actors had to be aware of the limits of liberal peacebuilding and be strategic about what in fact could be accomplished.

A Reluctance to Commit: Does the International Community Have the Required Staying Power?

Ambassador Alvaro de Soto (Associate Fellow, GCSP) acknowledged that national ownership was crucial, but insisted that external operations helped ensure that channels and institutions for the solution of disputes were established so that future grievances could be addressed without resorting back to violence. Therefore, even though the international community needed the collaboration of local actors in peacebuilding processes, it played a crucial role in keeping them honest. Ambassador de Soto remained doubtful, however, to what extent the international community had the determination of accompanying societies emerging from war: the “nascent architecture of peacebuilding” was left in wanting.

As a final remark, Ambassador de Soto addressed the issue of peacebuilding within the United Nations observing that since former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's epiphany of describing peacebuilding in the *Agenda for Peace* (1992) as an "integrated approach to human security", very little had happened until 2005 when the World Summit took decisions for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission. Despite some marginal improvements in issues of transparency between key actors (such as the Bretton Woods Institutions and the United Nations), the PBC had not been a successful step towards better dealing with peacebuilding operations. The creation of a separate body had in fact relieved the Security Council of the responsibility and the leadership it should have in ensuring the sustainability of a peace agreement. He concluded that the international community was reluctant to commit wholeheartedly to the peacebuilding agenda.

The Challenge of Building Broad National Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes

Scott Weber (Director-General, Interpeace, Geneva) began by explaining that local ownership was one of the key peacebuilding principles that underpinned the work of his institution, Interpeace. Peacebuilding was about rebuilding relationships of trust within societies; and not about how the international community could be more effective in a given country.

Issues about UN coordination were irrelevant and internal processes of change were what really mattered. He agreed with Professor Barnett that the international community had to be strategic; it could not impose democracy in a state where it did not grasp the depth of the conflict. Its only role was to help local actors sequence their peace processes. There were three imperative questions to be asked:

1. **how** do you get started? The first step is to do an actor (and conflict) mapping in order to be able to respond to the second question:

2. **who** needs to be involved in the process? Different groups in society have to be included: even “spoilers” need to be engaged and be given legitimacy and responsibility in the process.
3. **what** are key priorities for our society? Once the relevant actors are engaged they need to prioritize what should be implemented and in what order. Elections, which have been a priority for the international community, are usually a last priority for local actors.

As a final remark, Mr. Weber said that the international community needed to become invisible and leave credit and ownership for processes in local hands.

Summary of the discussion

Once the floor was opened to debate the main questions were centred on what role the international community should play and how to better involve local actors. There was consensus amongst the panellists that the international community was an actor and did have an important role to play. Mr. Weber, for example, suggested that the regional effects of a conflict could most successfully be addressed by the international community (like in Afghanistan). In addition, the international community should act as a facilitator to help move internal processes forward and complement what already existed on the ground.

Ambassador de Soto insisted that the international community played an important role and that the Security Council should be aware of the importance of a longer commitment. He stressed the key role of leadership to give a general sense of direction and how the choices of UN Special Representatives were crucial ones. However, there was heavy criticism from the audience on the fact that lead actors within the Peacebuilding Commission had no involvement in the countries that were on its agenda and that they were being strategic, but in regards to their own countries' agendas.

Professor Barnett commented on how in fact most international actors did not know what they were doing and that in reality context sensitivity did not exist. A better coordination of international actors was not enough when the machine overlooked internal processes. It was not just

about rebuilding trust but about building societal contexts that might not have had existed before.

On the issue of how to involve local actors Professor Barnett signalled that one of the main obstacles was the issue of accountability, which was directed towards donors and not towards locals. Ambassador de Soto said that if “spoilers” did not want to be involved then it was not worthwhile to attempt to engage them. Mr. Weber disagreed in saying that “spoilers” had cards to play that could be semi-constructive and necessary for peacebuilding processes.

Conclusions

The conclusions that can be drawn from the panel are that the international community has an essential role to play on peacebuilding operations but it should not dominate the peacebuilding process: priority should be given to internal processes above all. International actors should be strategic and know how to prioritise issues and build trust among local stakeholders. In order to operationalise this, however, the role of leadership is crucial and has to be a combination of visionary approaches (being able to keep long term sustained international attention and engaging peacebuilders and spoilers in the process) and humble qualities (not letting egos get in the way of national ownership). Even though international actors are good at producing stable peace agreements there is still a lot to improve, especially within the UN, in what refers to the “nascent peacebuilding architecture”.

Workshop Session 11

Resource Supply Security: Whose Responsibility? Whose Business?

Workshop Session organised by “Sicherheit und Frieden¹ – Security and Peace” Journal in cooperation with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg and DCAF.

Michael Brzoska

Introduction

The supply of resources, including but not limited to oil and gas, has been and continues to be a major concern in many nations. However, discourses on the relationship between domestic production and imports, as well as on the reliability and sustainability of foreign supplies differ markedly among various groups of actors. The primary objectives of the panel were to critically look at some of the assumptions and prescriptions behind notions of security of supply, and to contrast different views on how to deal with growing resource limitations in a world set to undergo major political and environmental change.

The panellists were asked to discuss four interrelated questions:

1. Is resource supply security something that can or should be left to the markets or that needs state intervention?
2. What is the role of actors such as business, the military and political authorities in resource supply security?

¹ www.security-and-peace.de

3. Should energy supply security be dealt with at a national, regional or global level?
4. How can resource supply best be secured cooperatively? Through markets, national policies, multilateral arrangements and institutions?

The panel was chaired by *Michael Brzoska* (Director, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy and editor of SuF) and experts from diverse professional backgrounds were invited in order to have a broad spectrum of views on resource supply security. Papers from the panel participants are planned to be published in a topical issue of the journal.

Summary of the individual presentations

Alyson J.K. Bailes (Visiting Professor, University of Iceland, Reykjavík and former director of SIPRI) began her presentation entitled “What’s Mine is Mine, What’s Yours is Negotiable – Self-Sufficiency versus Interdependence in Energy Strategy” by questioning wide-spread assumptions about the dangers of dependence. She pointed out a number of problems which come with autarky, as well as advantages of economic interdependence. She concluded that living with resource supply dependence overall offered more opportunities than dangers.

The following speaker was *Edgar Gnansounou* (Head, Laboratory of Energy Systems, Institute of Infrastructures, Resources and Environment, School of Architecture, Civil and Environmental Engineering, Federal Polytechnic School, Lausanne). His expertise is in technical and economic assessments of energy, with a focus on electric energy and bio energy. He first gave a brief overview over current trends in energy production and consumption. Based on his rather grim overview of future energy balances, he argued for a new paradigm for forming the relationship between economic development and energy. That paradigm needed to be based on global equality, intergenerational justice and sustainability. It required, in addition to expanding renewable energy sources and investment into new technologies also major change in the use of energy.

Heinrich Kreft (Advisor on Foreign Affairs, Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin) addressed the wider issue of the security supply of raw materials, particular minerals. A number of rare minerals, produced in only a few countries, were of great importance for instance in the telecommunications industry. At the same time, the export of natural resources was often a source of tension in producer states. Mr. Kreft then turned to the question of how global resource security could best be organised. He distinguished three levels – company, regional and global. While on the level of companies, functioning, transparent markets would be most important, cooperative regulation of markets among governments was necessary.

Finally, *John C. Gault*, (Private Energy Consultant and Associate Faculty Member, GCSP) spoke on “Market Liberalisation and Energy Security: Mutually Reinforcing Goals?” He argued that the current economic crisis indicated the necessity of rethinking the relationship between markets and regulation. In energy policy, regulation increased the likelihood among other things, of market stability, transparency, sustainability and the build-up of reserve capacity. However, regulation could also have negative effects. In any case, they needed to provide for level playing fields. Furthermore, Mr. Gault argued that investment in foreign countries were an important instrument to raise the level of true interdependence and thus to reduce the incentives for political interference. This applied to both upstream and downstream investments.

Summary of the discussion

A number of specific points on the topics introduced by the speakers came up in the discussion period. In addition, questions addressed the issue of mobilising resources for technical innovation into future energy production, floating Russian nuclear research reactors, arrangements for national distribution of income from exports of raw materials, as well as incentive structures for changing resource consumption and production patterns.

Workshop Session 12

Facing the Illicit: Efforts against Trafficking

Workshop Session organised by DCAF.

Cornelius Friesendorf

Introduction

Over recent years, much progress has been made in the fight against human trafficking. States have adopted new laws, arrested traffickers, stepped up cross-border cooperation, and contributed to victim protection and prevention. Alongside states, many international organisations and private actors have become involved as well. However, there are many remaining challenges.

Summary of the individual presentations

Jana Arsovska (Assistant Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York) discussed criminal justice responses to human trafficking, focusing on the role of the police. She explained that court cases against traffickers were often initiated by the police, which had frequent contact with victims, informants and offenders. She said that the police had to ensure that criminal networks were dismantled and that traffickers were arrested and had their assets seized. They also had to identify the victims and protect them from criminal retribution. However, law enforcement suffered from problems that included corruption and the lack of political will to deal with trafficking issues.

One of the key challenges related to national and international police cooperation and intelligence sharing. Examining the positive role of joint

investigation teams and proactive investigations, Jana Arsovska argued that the ‘Achilles heel’ of traffickers lay in the evidence generated as result of the commercial processes (advertising; renting premises; transportation; communications; financial transactions). She emphasised that we lacked knowledge on human trafficking and that top-down, law enforcement responses were insufficient to “fight” trafficking.

Richard Danziger’s (Head, Counter Trafficking Division, International Organisation for Migration, Geneva) talk focused on the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. Ten years after the initial negotiations, many positive results were visible, such as the drafting of National Plans of Action and targeted legislation, law enforcement trainings and establishment of shelters. However, all estimates of the scale of the crime remained much the same. The panellist argued that the complex definition of human trafficking in the Protocol led to two major constraints. First, it could often be extremely challenging to determine if an individual had been trafficked rather than having suffered exploitation and abuse without having fulfilled all requirements of the Protocol. Second, from the prosecution angle, human trafficking could be harder to prove than other serious, relevant crimes for which the penalties could be equally severe.

Possibly out of frustration in the inability to make any real impact on human trafficking, there had been a tendency to move away from an analytical to an emotional response. Moral outrage and a retreat into Manichean language (“evil, shameful, horrific”) often replaced the difficult but necessary task of analysing how the political and economic context of a globalised, post-industrial world had given rise to human trafficking and migrant exploitation. This duality was also superimposed on migrants themselves (victim of trafficking = good; irregular migrant = bad) and consequently the enjoyment of their full rights.

Richard Danziger concluded that while there was a place for the UN Protocol in specifically addressing trafficking as organised crime, as regards the broader prevention and protection needs it might be useful to move away from a trafficking discourse to objectives linked to more specific policy areas such as establishment of a sound and rights-friendly

migration management framework and implementation of international labour standards.

In her talk, *Victoria Ijeoma Nwogu* (United Nations Development Fund for Women, Abuja) showed that human trafficking in West Africa was quite widespread, following historical migration routes within the sub-region and beyond. People tried to escape from poverty, war or general insecurity, persecution, harmful traditional practices and gender discrimination, violence, and natural disasters. Women and children were the predominant objects of exploitation.

The speaker showed that responses included sub-regional frameworks for action, legal reform, and direct interventions in prevention, protection and prosecution. However, trafficking might well be increasing. The ECOWAS had so far focused on law enforcement, ignoring protection, prevention, and the promotion of rights. Moreover, legal frameworks were weak or confusing. The recently adopted ECOWAS Policy on Protection and Assistance to Victims of Trafficking provided the relevant framework for action to ensure that trafficked persons were assisted as a way of avoiding re-trafficking. It also incorporated preventive measures and the rights and responsibilities of victims, and outlined the role of the various stakeholders. Victoria Ijeoma Nwogu emphasised the need to support the ECOWAS Commission, relevant government agencies in member states as well as other stakeholders in implementing the Policy, and thus promote the rights of trafficked persons and migrants.

During the subsequent debate, the Chair *Steve Harvey* (Trafficking in Human Beings Group Leader, EUROPOL, The Hague) discussed the challenges of prosecuting traffickers, and the important role of EUROPOL in facilitating transnational police cooperation in Europe. Speakers from the audience underscored the importance of balancing law enforcement concerns with the protection of trafficked persons and the prevention of trafficking.

Workshop Session 13

Cyber Security: Threats and Prospects

Workshop Session organised by GCSP.

Gustav Lindstrom

Introduction

Policymakers are increasingly aware of the dangers posed by vulnerabilities in cyberspace – especially as societies become more and more reliant on information and communications technologies. Of particular concern are the possible “cascading” effects that may follow a breakdown in cyberspace, potentially impacting critical infrastructures such as the electricity grid, banking services, and telecommunications. Weaknesses in industrial control systems may exacerbate such effects across industrial processes of manufacturing, production, and power generation. Examples include water treatment plants, oil and gas pipelines.

Given the growing relevance of cyber security, the workshop analysed some of the principal threats to cyberspace as well as initiatives and measures to protect critical information infrastructures. Since cyber threats might also have implications for national security, the workshop also examined the principal lessons identified / lessons learned from the cyber attacks on Estonia, Georgia and Lithuania.

Summary of the individual presentations

Cyber Security Threats

Manuel Suter (Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) explained that ensuring Critical Information Infrastructure

Protection (CIIP) was a complex and multi-dimensional task. It was based on four distinct pillars: 1) prevention and early warning, 2) detection, 3) reaction and 4) crisis management. For CIIP to be effective, collaboration was essential between national agencies, the public and private sector, and national governments. Public-private co-operation was of particular importance as most critical infrastructures were privately owned and managed. At the national level, key players for ensuring CIIP included government agencies that could function as a clearing house, agencies that provided analytic support (e.g. within the intelligence community), and technical centres of expertise such as Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).

The growing interdependency of infrastructures required continued efforts to limit the ramifications of a cyber attack and to facilitate co-ordination among relevant stakeholders. Examples of recommendations to strengthen such co-ordination included:

1. Pooling existing resources at the national level;
2. Strengthening international collaboration – especially in the area of information sharing; and,
3. Structuring the collaboration patterns between the public and private sector

Lessons Identified / Learned From Recent Cyberattacks on Estonia, Georgia and Lithuania

Kadri Kaska (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn) outlined several lessons or common characteristics that could be drawn from the cyber attacks on Estonia (April-May 2007), Lithuania (June-July 2008), and Georgia (August 2008). The attacks had shared two common denominators: a political motivation underlying the attacks and the use of simultaneous strikes. They had included the defacement of websites, the use of distributed denial of service attacks (Estonia and Georgia), on-line propaganda and e-mail spam (Estonia). Among the targets had been public institutions, public and private e-services, network infrastructures (e.g. Internet Service Providers), and other targets of opportunity such as schools and NGOs.

To counter these threats, a variety of protective measures had been taken. Efforts had included co-operation and co-ordination between the public and private sector. Steps had also been taken to facilitate collaboration with other countries and international organisations. Among the technical measures implemented had been network filtering, increasing bandwidth, white listing, and blocking network access.

Interestingly, the effects of the attacks had varied according to the targeted countries' dependence on IT. For example, the effects had been felt more in Estonia which had an ambitious national IT agenda compared to Georgia, where less than 10 per cent of the population use the Internet. The Georgia attack had also stood apart as it had occurred simultaneously with an armed conflict.

Summary of the discussion

During the discussion period, several issues were raised:

1. It is very difficult to identify the perpetrator(s) of a cyber attack. In most cases, attacks originate from different parts of the world – effectively hiding the identity of the attacker(s).
2. Most countries do not seem well prepared to deal with a cyber attack. Thus, understanding lessons identified is crucial to limit the extent of future attacks.
3. Cyber crime still represents a grey zone when it comes to counter-measures. In spite of previous efforts – such as the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime – additional legal efforts seem warranted
4. Determining if or when a cyber attack translates to a physical attack is complex. The issue merits further reflection as it has implications for NATO's Article V.

Conclusions

Two recurrent messages were raised during the workshop: the need for information sharing across stakeholders to mitigate the effects of a cyber

attack and the importance of collaboration across agencies, sectors, organisations, and countries. In addition, raising awareness – especially among policy and decision-makers – was identified as an important component for enhancing cyber security.

Workshop Session 14

From Rhetoric to Reality: Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform

Workshop Session organised by DCAF.

Alan Bryden

Introduction

The concept of local ownership has become recognised as a key feature of good practice in the field of security sector reform (SSR).¹ A genuine commitment to the principle of local ownership requires an approach to policy making and programming that is firmly grounded in local contexts with national and international actors alike facilitating the design and implementation of participative national reform processes. Local ownership thus implies a long-term approach that recognises the need for national political will and commitment rather than just institutional change as a precondition for sustainable, legitimate SSR.

In practice, a strong case can be made in the context of SSR that the principle of local ownership is more rhetoric than reality. Weak institutions and limited capacities are frequently cited as impediments to local ownership. Yet challenging political, economic and security framing conditions should not mask shortcomings in policy and practice that ignore local actors, demonstrate a lack of flexibility in programmes and their financing, or political agendas and timeframes which may be inimical to local realities, interests and priorities. Local ownership is a central feature in frameworks such as the United Nations Secretary-

¹ See: DCAF Yearly Book 2008. Donais, T. (ed) *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform (Lit Verlag)*. All titles in the DCAF Yearly Book series can be downloaded free of charge from the DCAF website at: www.dcaf.ch/yearbooks.

General's recent report on SSR² as well as tools such as the OECD DAC's Handbook on SSR.³ The central challenge therefore relates not so much to policy awareness of this issue but in its practical application.

Key issues

The ISF 2009 Panel *From Rhetoric to Reality: Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform* brought together experts with academic, policy and practitioner expertise to consider different aspects of this crucial issue. Key themes addressed by panellists and picked up in the subsequent discussion are summarised below.

Understanding the context

Tailoring activities to the challenges and opportunities found in a given context is essential. However, a common SSR challenge highlighted by panellists is the frequent absence of such nuanced approaches. In particular, despite the politically sensitive nature of SSR, external actors often neglect these factors in the form and substance of their engagement. Externally-driven pressure to move forward on programming priorities is particularly counter-productive when objectives and timelines are de-linked from the necessary political will and capacity to develop policy and implement programmes at the national level.

Addressing the owners

Panellists emphasised the importance of widening understandings of ownership beyond political elites to include the range of actors with a role in security provision, management and oversight. Supporting the

² United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform", S/2008/39, 23 January 2008.

³ OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, 2007: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>.

meaningful involvement of parliament, civil society as well as local authorities and communities in SSR decision-making represents a key means to ensure that decisions are realistic and respond to local needs. Community consultations and communications strategies with national and local media can develop insights that should provide the basis for the design, implementation and sequencing of SSR programmes.

Developing the capacities

Supporting the development of relevant national capacities to design, manage and implement SSR programmes is essential to operationalising local ownership. Measures to enhance national capacities for democratic control and civilian oversight of the security sector are particularly important but remain under-emphasised. Support for parliaments in promoting accountability (and therefore trust) in SSR programmes and the important role to be played by regional organisations were highlighted as particularly important.

Conclusions

The importance of local ownership to the effectiveness and sustainability of SSR was emphasised by all contributors to the workshop. A number of points elaborated below identify principles to guide the more effective application of this concept in practice.

- There is no common definition of local ownership. However, the political realities, interests and sensitivities of a broad range of local stakeholders need to be central to the development and implementation of SSR. This means ensuring that local ownership is truly participative and extends beyond political elites.
- Current donor support to SSR is not necessarily compatible with the principle of local ownership. There is a need to develop coherent approaches among different bi and multilateral actors under common principles. Accountability of donors to national stakeholders and emphasis on long term national processes that

seek to influence “outcomes” over short term activities that only generate “outputs” represent key points of departure.

- There is a need to support the development of national institutional capacities. Local ownership can only be operationalised if capacity exists to plan, design and implement complex, long-term reform processes.
- An emphasis on security sector governance provides a key means to enhance local ownership. Reinforcing the relationship between the state, security providers and citizens through developing creative ways to enhance democratic oversight and accountability of the security sector is therefore of critical importance.

Workshop Session 15

After Pax Americana: American Foreign Policy in a New Era

Workshop Session organised by CSS.

Alex Wilner

Over the last 20 years, globalisation has been gaining breadth and depth. America's time of global dominance, the so-called unipolar moment, is over. The idea that new powers, such as China, India, and even Russia are poised to take over has much currency around the globe. Others suggest that Asia will be shaping the world's destiny, and thereby expose the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilisation. Upon moving into a post-American world – be it defined by multipolarity or nonpolarity – this workshop assessed America's foreign policy in a rapidly changing international system under a new administration.

This was an exceptionally engaging gathering. The discussion centered mainly on mapping out the future of American foreign policy given recent shifts in the global distribution of military power, economic interdependency, and rising challengers. The panel was chaired and introduced by *Victor Mauer* (Deputy Director of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich) who offered a thorough literature review on US primacy. Reflecting the Workshop's title, Mauer asked his panellists two things: What are the big ideas that will shape US foreign policy and thereby also international politics? What is the framework for a 21st century US security strategy? Can the US continue to lead global affairs? And, finally, what does the future hold for the transatlantic relationship?

Summary of the individual presentations

Bruce W. Jentleson (Professor of Public Policy Studies and Political Science, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham) opened by suggesting that the international system was at an “historical juncture” and that its defining characteristics were “post-pole” (neither fully uni- nor multi-polar in form). What mattered most, he asserted, was the shifting nature of security dynamics. Instead of great power “dominance”, Jentleson suggested that “disruption” and “destruction” were today’s guiding strategic principles. The first phenomenon was evidenced in global terrorism, fiscal crises, and pandemics, each disrupting the nature of state relations. The second was evidenced in proliferation, which levelled the military playing field between international actors. Together, these forces influenced the efficacy of US power and leadership. Jentleson then discussed US President Barack Obama, identifying his apparent strengths: his global charisma, plans for Iraq, diplomatic credibility, cooperative and internationalist nature, and shifts concerning Russian armaments, US-Iranian, Syrian, and Cuban relations, global environmental threats, and UN reform. Jentleson found that Obama’s foreign policy (so far) reflected neither a “grand” nor an “ad-hoc” strategy but adhered to unifying themes. First, Obama was dealing with policies he had “inherited” from his predecessor. Second, he considered the US a pre-eminent global “player” but only one of a multitude of leaders. Third, Obama emphasised diplomacy and multilateralism when dealing with adversaries and the global economic crisis. Fourth, Obama favoured “common security” when addressing global warming, pandemics, and genocide. And, fifth, Obama was using “tough-love multilateralism” to help reform faltering international organisations (like the UN) and weakened international concepts (like peacekeeping).

Robin Niblett’s (Director, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London) presentation offered an optimistic overview of the continued relevance of US power in global affairs. Focusing on Obama’s first “100 Days” in office, he found an Administration emphasising “a renewal of US leadership”. Niblett pointed to five “very

successful” Obama policies: increasing US “power of attraction”; boosting American leadership in the Middle East; using pragmatism in conflict resolution; accenting diplomacy; and re-engaging global challenges. Further, Niblett contested the notion that the US would be challenged over the coming decade. He posited that challengers, like China and Russia, paradoxically strengthened US leadership by forcing their neighbours into America’s sphere of influence. Likewise, Niblett suggested the US retained intrinsic strengths that challengers lacked (a robust economy, an educated populace, an attraction to immigrants, and an ability to “incubate technology and innovation”). Nonetheless, he identified factors that might limit America’s future leadership. First, the US was often considered “part of the problem” – an instigator of global crises rather than a solution. Second, many states were cynical of American aspirations – they simply did not believe it had the resources or resolve to do as it promised. Third, challengers would compete with US interests in regional spheres, constraining its global role. And fourth, while global telecommunications had created a generally pro-US, international “political awakening” at the sub-state level, the phenomenon lacked political weight required to foster changes that might augment US leadership. In sum, Niblett concluded that American leadership hinged on how quickly its economy would recover and on how well Obama would be able to fashion US power as a perceived global good.

The third presentation by *Oliver Thränert* (Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin and Visiting Fellow at CSS) focused on US global leadership with reference to trans-Atlantic relations. In his view, the US could lead by cooperating with European allies and by jointly strengthening international organisations. In the first place, European allies facilitated US leadership. The problem, Thränert suggested, was in European weaknesses. First, the European Union had its flaws (declining social systems, dependency on Russian gas, and diminishing military capability). Second, the EU was neither a united nor unified actor. Its members offered contrasting policies on global issues (like Russian foreign and security policy, Middle East peace, NATO engagement, and counter-proliferation). At times, these

divisions contrasted with US aspirations and weakened its potential leadership. In the second place, international institutions assisted US leadership. Here, too, however, Thränert identified the dilemmas. While the Obama Administration had signalled a desire for UN Security Council reform, its European allies were inclined to resist. Likewise, counter-proliferation regimes were being challenged by North Korea and Iran, whose nuclear developments undermined and discredited US efforts. While Obama had called for a “Global Zero” – an international freeze on nuclear armaments – the EU had been unable to find common ground. Europe’s division, Thränert concluded, impeded US leadership.

Summary of the discussion

The session concluded with an engaging question and answer period. Obama’s diplomatic engagement over Iran’s nuclear program was assessed, as were US fiscal constraints, renewed isolationism, the danger of a “rhetoric-ability” gap, and the consequences of another terrorist attack on US soil. In sum, the panel offered a robust discussion on all things pertaining to the future of US foreign policy and global leadership.

Workshop 16

OSCE Future Operations and Leadership

Workshop Session organised by the Centre for International Governance, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Jana Krause

Introduction

The OSCE is the only multilateral security organisation that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Its history is rooted in the Cold War and successful attempts to organise a forum for discussion on major security issues. Even with the end of the Cold War, the OSCE has met numerous challenges dealing with minority rights, election monitoring and military cooperation. Nevertheless, it is currently confronted with new challenges. The 7 August 2008 hostilities between Georgia and Russia highlighted the limits of the OSCE to use its soft power to prevent open violence.

Summary of the individual presentations

The Chair *Daniel Warner* (Director, Centre for International Governance, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) remarked that the panel represented a timely discussion as the OSCE was being severely challenged by increased political tensions as well as internal structural difficulties and competition from other international organisations.

The European Security Governance Debate

Andrei Zagorski (Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations) emphasised Moscow's unhappiness over how the security architecture had evolved over the last 15 years. He outlined that the European security order was largely about NATO and the Council of Europe. Moscow had tried to develop closer relations with both institutions. However, Moscow remained deeply concerned by the European security system. Mr. Zagorski compared the current situation to the European order during the 1930s when Russia had not been part of the Versailles system. He concluded there remained the challenge of how Russia might develop a sense that the changes taking place benefitted the country more than it believed to lose. Unless Moscow managed to develop a more positive perspective, the debate of how to integrate Moscow would not be fruitful.

The Relevance of the OSCE Today

Istvan Gyarmati (Professor, International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest) outlined that the current debate on the relevance of the OSCE today was not a new debate. He pointed out that the OSCE was the only security structure that included Russia, and that the integration of Russia and other former soviet states remained a major objective. Mr. Gyarmati argued that within Western countries, the OSCE was largely ignored, and added that the EU and NATO tended to monopolise responsibility for the security architecture. In his conclusions, he admitted that while the OSCE was not an ideal organisation, the weaknesses of the institution might also be its strength because they allowed for flexibility. Consequently, the OSCE would remain useful and relevant.

Current Trends and Prospects in the Pol-Mil Dimension

Herbert Salber (Director, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna) introduced the political-military dimension of the OSCE and stated that it was in principle the perfect forum to raise all the issues that had to be accommodated within the security architecture: the military,

the human, and the economic dimensions. He outlined the organisation's important role in providing mechanisms for clarification and conflict de-escalation, the monitoring work in the area of small arms and light weapons, and border management particularly in the Western Balkans. Mr. Salber explained that the OSCE was often forgotten because there was much routine built into its work, and many programmes remain invisible, but less media attention might be conducive to its effectiveness. The future relevance of the OSCE would remain within the hands of the participating states.

The Human Dimension: The OSCE's Real Success Story?

Christian Strohal (Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations Office and Specialized Institutions in Geneva) focused on the human dimension of the OSCE that included democracy, human rights and the rule of law. He outlined that OSCE leaders often faced reprisals when they tried to hold states accountable to their obligations. Violations of these norms and regulations were systematic among some of the member states, and included particularly human trafficking, migration, or hate crimes. He also mentioned an increasing criticism on the organisation for being too active within the human dimension. Mr. Strohal concluded that there was a need to maintain and strengthen the commitment to implementation and accountability, as well as the political will among member states.

Summary of the discussion

The discussion focused on the relationship of Western European states with Russia and the state of accommodation that was needed for positive relations. American pressure on the OSCE to engage in Afghanistan was a further point of debate.

Conclusions

All speakers asserted the contemporary relevance of the OSCE and highlighted its everyday “watchdog role” with regard to the military, the human and the economic dimensions.

Parallel Workshop Session 17

Geostrategic Paradigms for the 21st Century

Workshop Session organised by GCSP.

Lisa Watanabe

Introduction

A brief introduction was given by the Chair, *Nayef Al-Rodhan* (Senior Geostrategist and Director, Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalisation and Transnational Security, GCSP). The panel overall discussed the future of geopolitics in our increasingly transnational, connected and interdependent world. It began by laying the foundations of classical geopolitical paradigms and addressing two major parameters that are highly relevant to our times, namely climate change and technological innovations.

Summary of the individual presentations

The first panellist, *Graeme Herd* (Faculty Member, GCSP) provided an overview of traditional concepts of geopolitics deployed during the imperial age, the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period. He then identified two possible pathways in the current era. The first was a replacement of the status quo with a shift of power. In this scenario, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) were likely to become more connected and US hegemony increasingly eroded. The second possible pathway was thought to be the emergence of multilateral, interdependent world order, with the US in the lead. The question was whether great powers would cooperate or would they compete. If they cooperated, we would have a multilateral, interdependent world. If they competed, we would have the first scenario.

Michael A. Levi (Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, Council on Foreign Relations, New York) then gave a talk on the implications of climate change for geopolitics. He argued that climate change would intersect with many things that we deal with today. A number of issues were discussed: (1) scarcity as a result of climate change; (2) abundance; (3) the intersection of climate change with energy politics; (4) how we thought about relations between countries; and (5) geo-engineering.

In relation to scarcity, he argued that while tensions might be exacerbated by climate change, it was unhelpful to think about it as a primary cause of conflict. The result of abundance, he observed, also needed to be seriously considered. The intersection between politics and energy, he argued, would complicate things. Climate change would reshape how institutions function. In general, the need for a new way of dealing with the world and how we conceived of it was emphasised.

James Lewis (Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC) spoke on technological innovations and the future of geopolitics. He emphasised the linkage between technology and power. He argued that the global diffusion of technology had two major implications. First, states were measuring their power in different ways, generating competition based on the capacity for wealth creation. Second, it was changing the relationship between the state and the citizen. The advancement of technology was providing sets of individuals with the same technology as major powers and creating transnational communities of interest. According to him, this implied a diminishing relevance of locality and was affecting state legitimacy. Nevertheless, he concluded that national governments were still the most effective organisations to compete in today's world, though they needed to govern in new ways.

Summary of the discussion

During the discussion period, it was stressed that governments were no longer the only actors with sophisticated technologies. This, it was

argued, was creating new challenges for states. The question was raised as to whether governments would be able to make the leap in order to address contemporary security challenges. Lewis argued that the nation-state would remain the most powerful, but some would adapt more effectively than others. Levi emphasised the need for better coordinating mechanisms across government departments. Herd suggested that we might expect to see several sets of responses from states: states that failed to notice problems; those that noticed, but did not react quickly enough; those that instrumentalised the problem, but could act; and those that could adequately.

The attributes that states required today were thought to be the capacity for innovation, good internal governance, human capital, openness to investment, ideas and people, and forms of legitimacy that did not rely on performance alone.

The question of whether the G20 would be an appropriate forum with which to address climate change was raised. Levi argued that at minimum existing institutions had influence. Moreover, small forums might have the advantage of ensuring that climate change was discussed at the head of state level.

Whether developed countries should assist developing countries in dealing with climate change was addressed. Levi noted that there was a limited amount of development aid and it was important not to twist things too much towards climate change.

Nayef Al-Rodhan then thanked the speakers and audience, closing the panel.

Conclusions

In short, climate change and new technologies will have implications for the way states measure power and how they function. These two factors will also have an impact on the distribution of power within the global system.

Workshop Session 18

Risk Management in International Affairs and Security

Workshop Session organised by CSS.

Beat Habegger

The world is confronted with a broad variety of often unpredictable existing and emerging risks. Interdependencies, complex actor interactions, cascading effects, or externalities further complicate policy-makers' task of defining the strategies and instruments for adequately coping with the contemporary risk landscape.

At the same time, risk management has become a widely used conceptual framework and governance instrument in many areas and disciplines such as finance, insurance, epidemiology engineering, or environmental studies. In international affairs and security, however, thinking and conceptualising in terms of risk has only recently begun to attract more interest. This is surprising, because security policy is particularly concerned with the management of uncertainties, which is precisely where the core strength of risk management lies.

As most people are likely to agree that risk management is an important framework for managing uncertainties, why does its application to the field of politics trigger controversy? One reason might be that risk management cuts across policy areas and academic fields of specialisation, and thus implies a need for integration of traditionally separated government agencies and academic disciplines. It is not surprising that such a cross-cutting methodological approach encounters resistance both with policy-makers and academics.

The first speaker, *Paul Bracken* (Professor of Management and Political Science, Yale School of Management, New Haven) emphasised that management was about dealing with complexity and putting together a set of resources to achieve goals. Risk management was one particular expression of this task. Bracken gave a few examples of when it was poorly understood and done: For example, if someone said “I took a calculated risk”, ask him to show you the calculation; or, although the popular expression that the “greatest risk is not taking a risk” could be true, it also essentially legitimises any kind of activity. Instead of drawing up a list of potential risks, good risk management would ask how an organisation actually managed its risks. The crucial task, therefore, was to initiate and enable an organisation-wide “productive discussion” about risks that included the senior leadership, which often failed to see an organisation’s real risks.

The second speaker, *Ross Schaap* (Director, Comparative Analytics at the Eurasia Group, New York) focused on potential lessons of enterprise risk management for the public sector. He explained that enterprise risk management created a comprehensive risk profile and warning framework and established the rules, roles, and responsibilities for risk reporting and governance. The global financial crisis, however, had illustrated that while banks had had great enterprise risk management programmes in theory, they had failed in practice due to internal conflicts of interests (e.g. misaligned incentives) and conceptual failures (e.g. overreliance on models and data). The processes of enterprise risk management systems were actually straightforward, but the real challenge lay in managing the interfaces effectively. He also emphasised that many organisations – including public-sector clients – performed well in terms of risk identification and assessment, but frequently failed to translate their findings into organisational strategy and risk management practices.

The third speaker, *David Steven* (Non-resident Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University) argued that governments were getting better at identifying risks, but not at managing risks. The complexity of the risk landscape first of all necessitated the investigation of some simple, but crucial long-term trends, for instance, the increasing sizes of increasingly interconnected populations that

competed for scarcer resources. He outlined eight key reasons why states failed to manage risks: they were still focused on interests rather than risks; they concentrated on crisis management rather than risk prevention; they worked on the wrong time scale; they failed to invest in solutions because even small steps take a lot of effort; they did not know how to influence policies on a global scale; political institutions were not configured for the long term; political leaders lacked leadership; and leaders were not equipped to engage with broader networks as nation-states experienced competition from below and from the top. In conclusion, he proposed that the risk debate be changed to focus more on how societal resilience could be strengthened.

Risk management might not be the “silver bullet” to resolve all problems, and its implications and potential downsides had to be discussed thoroughly. Overall, however, the potential advantages of risk management promised to be substantial, as it might support decision-makers in creating a differentiated view of the many uncertainties they faced; it might allow them to anticipate strategic surprises; and it might help them to forge more resilient societies.

Workshop Session 19

Through the Cloud of Unknowing: Open Source Information as an Enabler of National Security

Workshop Session organised by CSS in cooperation with ISN.

Chris Pallaris

Global change is nowhere more evident than in the proliferation of security challenges we face. The securitisation of the national and international agenda has led to growing demand for knowledge on topics as diverse as defence, energy, food and the environment. The potential of open source intelligence (OSINT) is gradually being realised as governments rally to harness the knowledge and experience of an every wider-range of actors.

This panel brought together academics and practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss OSINT's potential as an enabler of national security.

Summary of the individual presentations

The first speaker was *Kristan Wheaton* (Professor, Mercyhurst College's Institute of Intelligence Studies, Erie, Pennsylvania). Mr. Wheaton's presentation argued that open source intelligence would be the death of the traditional intelligence cycle. According to Mr Wheaton, the intelligence cycle did not reflect the reality of how intelligence was done. Intelligence, like problem solving, was a non-linear process. Yet, the intelligence cycle assumed a linear workflow, which failed to capture the detail and nuance involved. Indeed, there was little to distinguish the intelligence cycle from decision-making models taught in business

schools. What then was its value?

Mr. Wheaton went on to present alternatives to the intelligence cycle. His own model distinguished between the operations and intelligence functions of an organisation, and the overlaps that existed between the two. The intelligence function was primarily externally oriented and explored what was likely to happen. Meanwhile, the operations function was internally focused and asked what should be done. Mr. Wheaton argued that this model allowed for a more interactive and reflexive approach to intelligence, one in which four primary functions – modeling (defining the problem and a collection plan), collection, analysis and production – occurred simultaneously, with each function dominating the entire process at some point.

The second speaker was *Axel Dyevre* (Director, CEIS Europe, and one of the founders of the European Open Source Intelligence (EUROSINT) Forum). According to Mr. Dyevre, OSINT placed man at the heart of the intelligence equation. As such, it demanded a greater level of professional competence. Today's OSINT professionals had to be able to collect, validate, analyse, synthesise and disseminate information from an ever increasing number of sources. Their skills set made the difference between being informed and possessing intelligence.

Mr. Dyevre went on to say that although OSINT made up some 80 percent of our intelligence needs, it was not a competitor to classified information gathering but rather a complements. OSINT allowed an agency's resources to be focused on gathering information that was more difficult to obtain.

Finally, Mr. Dyevre provided examples of OSINT initiatives in Europe, including EU-funded training programmes for security professionals, the development of various technologies to improve information sharing, and the launch of several FP7 projects to boost OSINT collaboration between European actors. Mr. Dyevre noted that OSINT provided a legitimate platform for greater security collaboration between EU member states.

The final speaker was *Thomas Quiggin* (Senior Research Fellow, Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa). Mr. Quiggin began by saying that traditional

notions of time, space, energy and the Clausewitzian notion of friction were in a state of flux. The compression of time and space, for example, could be seen in new forms of terrorism and cyber attack and the struggle on the part of policy and decision-makers to develop an effective response to asymmetric threats.

He went on to argue that in this environment it was necessary to rethink the role of intelligence. Currently, intelligence agencies were grappling with a range of problems, many of them self-made: a preference for process over function, limited information sharing, bureaucratic inertia, and the primacy of secrets over success. Today, most knowledge existed beyond the walls of the intelligence agency and information provided by open sources could be brought to bear on modern security challenges with considerable speed and effectiveness.

Mr. Quiggin ended by discussing the use of OSINT in a major counterterrorism investigation (Operation Crevice / Operation Awaken). OSINT was employed at a tactical level through a network of expertise to support the police investigation and secure convictions in the UK and Canada.

Summary of the discussion

The discussion that followed focused on how to better exploit the Internet for information and the utility of OSINT in tackling sensitive security issues such as Iran's nuclear programme. To conclude, the workshop noted that the discussion on OSINT was still in its infancy. Given OSINT's value and utility it would increasingly determine how we would work and learn; how we would share and collaborate; how we would organise for effect; and how we would educate the professionals who follow us.

Workshop Session 20

What Future for International Humanitarian Law?

Workshop Session organised by GCSP.

Introduction

In introducing the panel, the Chairman outlined the background to the question and asked panellists to respond to the subsidiary questions posed.

This is a most pertinent question about the continuing relevance of laws developed for the conduct of war. Those laws were largely the product of the years of World War (Geneva Conventions) and Cold War (Additional Protocols). Various relatively recent, largely post-Cold War, events provide the backdrop: the wars in the Balkans; the three major wars in the Gulf region (Iran versus Iraq; Iraq 1990/1; Iraq 2003); conflicts in Africa (Rwanda; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Sudan; etc); 9/11; the invasion of Afghanistan – as well as their consequences, such as Guantanamo Bay detainees, torture or inhuman and degrading treatment in Abu Ghraib, etc. All of these have proved controversial in one way or another.

In addition to these tangible events, there have also been several at times less tangible but equally significant and influential trends: the development of human rights law and the need to determine the relationship between the international humanitarian law and the human rights law; the development of criminal law through the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Sierra Leone Special Court and through the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute; the increasing asymmetry of conflict; the shift from

international to non-international armed conflict and the internationalising of the latter.

What is the significance of Customary Law? The Geneva Conventions are now universally accepted, but their Additional Protocols are not. The ICRC Customary Law Study has been controversial and it is likely that the soon to be published Direct Participation in Hostilities Guidelines will be similarly provocative.

All of these things generate questions that challenge the international humanitarian law. How does the international humanitarian law cope with:

- a more complex world with more complex conflict?
- new technology and new arenas of war – cyber war, for example?
- the increasing asymmetry of warfare?
- the problems of indentifying the status of people in conflict
- the issue of detainees and prisoners of war?
- the rise of human rights law and standards?

Discussion

- The international humanitarian law has a future – as long as there are conflicts, it will fit law to reality. Since 9/11, the issue has been about applying the rules to new situations. The question is how to apply existing rules instead of inventing new ones.
- Two tendencies:
 1. Extension of the international humanitarian law to situations where it should not apply. The global war on terror is a good example: criminals are not combatants and should not be targeted as such. There should be a case by case approach for assessing international humanitarian law applicability.
 2. Denial of the international humanitarian law to cases where it should apply. An example is Afghanistan. Some governments

deny that there is an armed conflict. There are many similarities between the international humanitarian law and the human rights law – but the differences are significant. There is a difference in relation to procedural safeguards for detention, for example. Force can be applied with consequential (albeit not intended) civilian casualties. This is the reality of war. In the human rights law, this is strictly not allowed; the international humanitarian law specifies when and where it is allowed. In relation to detention, the practical aspects are important. A 3-day detention policy in Afghanistan and the application of non-refoulement principle creates frustration: why are European human rights standards applied in Afghanistan? Some believe that human rights treaty law provides answers for conflict situations – but if that is the case, what is the international humanitarian law for? However, it is relevant to ask whether or not there is a conflict in all areas of the country.....the “three block war” phenomenon is most relevant here.

- Customary law applies regardless of the type of conflict.
- More states are party to the Additional Protocols than to any human rights conventions.
- Not all problems are legal problems. If something new arises it does not mean that there is a challenge to the international humanitarian law. There is a belief that old law for example would be of no help today in a highly-technologically developed situation – but there is no such technological development today that requires the modification of the international humanitarian law.
- Phenomenon of human shields (forced versus voluntary). Need to use old rules but think how to operationalise them.
- No need for new rules of the international humanitarian law – there is a need for interpretation of the rule in a practical situation. Commanders need to apply common-sense. Nothing is wrong with the rule; it just needs to be implemented.

- In the absence of a rule: there is a need for a treaty law to tackle this issue, because customary law is too controversial.
- Practical-technical issue: computer network attack and the right of defence – this is jus ad bellum issue and is therefore not an international humanitarian law question
- The use of UAVs and their ability to open fire automatically: This is a fundamental question which does not only apply to the international humanitarian law, but also in the human rights law context as well. If no human in the chain to authorise the attack, who will be prosecuted for a breach?
- Strategic Corporal: not a legal problem, but an issue of training. Soldiers should be well trained, not a problem within the international humanitarian law but with the knowledge of those in the battlefield
- The international humanitarian law is not about preventing war; it is about regulating war. If the jus ad bellum (the UN Charter provisions, for example) does not prevent war, and conflict ensues, the international humanitarian law becomes the governing law. The international humanitarian law is the compromise between military necessity and human rights. A number of key points to make:
 - There is not likely to be a “clean war” with zero or very few casualties. Technology does not prevent casualties.
 - The notion of asymmetric warfare is not a new one.....nor is it a legal notion. It is ridiculous to suggest this. All wars were and are asymmetric in one way or another. The opponent has to be surprised.
 - “War on terror”. Most of the answers are to be found in existing law – there is no need to develop a new body of law or substantially alter the existing law to cope with this.
 - Some of the perceived problems with the international humanitarian law are caused by a focus on secondary issues instead of the primary ones.

- We should be concerned by states failing to meet their responsibility to teach and train their armed forces in international humanitarian law.
- There is a dangerous tendency emerging to stress military necessity and to deny the legal restraints.

Workshop Session 21

The US – Europe – Russia: Redefining the Relations

Workshop Session organised by GCSP.

Pal Dunay and Siobhan Martin

Introduction

The three main actors largely determine international affairs in the region. Due to their combined global weight, and the means at their disposal, their influence in the world is arguably growing. One would be tempted to set against this the rearrangement of economic power relations as a consequence of the current world economic crisis. The process is inconclusive however. The global financial and economic crisis have also given fresh demonstration of the interdependence of those major centres.

The US administration has given indication that it is willing to open a new chapter in relations with Russia and possibly with Europe as a whole. It is open to question, however, whether this will be reciprocated by Moscow and whether an era of reconciliation will result, as Moscow might interpret the new policy of Washington as a sign of weakness. The first signs from Washington to redefine relations are no doubt promising after years of stalemate but it is also possible that there will be some factors spoiling relations. Such factors may emerge primarily in the former Soviet area where Russia claims privileged position, contested by some successor states of the former Soviet Union as well several actors in the world at large, including Washington.

The West has left its internal divisions behind. The change was certainly fostered by the taking office of new leaders in the key states. The EU, in

contrast to the US and Russia, is not a unitary actor in international relations. Washington expects more from its European allies in helping with the recovery of the world economy and the operation in Afghanistan, whereas the latter have been deprived of the excuse to limit their cooperation due to the unipolar determination of Washington and its contestable ideological foundations.

Summary of the individual presentations

From a European point of view overcoming existing divisions requires a focus on three key issues. Firstly, one must consider the nature of the EU in that it is only truly federal in certain areas such as trade etc., but foreign, security and defence policy are decided by the member states and it will only have a common policy on a case by case basis. Secondly, the EU's relationship with the US and Russia have had a very different history as the EU-US relationship is rather familial, though not necessarily always happy on the one hand, on the other it is rare to find an issue on which they cannot at the least agree to disagree. The EU's relationship with Russia is based on its proximity and "otherness", potentially either meaning confrontation or cooperation. It is also affected by the EU's closeness with the US but at the same time there are some areas of common enterprise. One should not forget the two main areas of concern to Russia in relation to the EU which are energy and enlargement. Thirdly, one must consider the impact of the financial crisis on the EU, US and Russia as it could potentially affect the prospects of each very differently, however, in its current form should not lead to any major changes in their relationship.

The Russian point of view focused on the relationship between the three actors and in particular on the new Russian Strategy for National Security which has one very clear message: Russia wants to join the Euro-Atlantic family, and propose a new "all European" treaty, a security system where Russia can be a member without joining the EU or NATO. This new strategy is important in demonstrating Russian commitment to legally binding treaties.. However, it was acknowledged that Russian insistence on the linkage between offensive and defensive would require a miracle for the negotiations to replace the START treaty

to succeed, in considering the disagreement over US ballistic missile defence in Europe. The Russian perspective also raised the issue that arms control should not be limited to the US and Russia alone; and at some point Russia and the US will have to move beyond strategic nuclear weapons and address the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and involve other nuclear powers under the “umbrella” of making a multilateral treaty. This, from a Russian point of view, would create a forum not just for a legally binding treaty, but create commitments to exchange information, transparency, non-proliferation etc. However, they still feel at a vulnerable stage and cannot exclude the potential for the negotiations to fail. Other areas addressed in terms of cooperation and dialogue focused on energy security agreements and partnership on Afghanistan. Overall, in considering the Russian relationship with Europe and the US twenty years ago, then there were great expectations which failed to achieve anything. Now Russia suggests trying again and there is genuine hope that it will be more successful on this occasion.

The US perspective¹ focused on the relationship with Russia in using the “restart” theme of the new administration. Russia is seen as both an essential partner and potential spoiler for the US. In focusing on areas of cooperation with Russia - Afghanistan, Iran, terrorism, energy and proliferation were given as examples, with particular focus on proliferation and the need to move rapidly to replace START 1. It was acknowledged that the US is willing to make substantial changes, though disagreed with the Russian perspective in the need to move beyond the traditional START treaty towards tactical weapons. In terms of ballistic missile defence, the programme has been reoriented but it would be extremely serious for the US to cancel it without good reason. It is, after all, about Iran not Russia. If the Iran issue can be resolved by other means, then the need for the programme would go away, such as through effective sanctions. In this regard there could be consequences for the US-Russian relationship if Russia tries to undermine or “water down” sanctions. In relation to the question of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO as a source of contention, it is seen as extremely unlikely at the

¹ The third speaker, who provided the US perspective, highlighted that it was his own personal view and not the official view.

moment and not a serious issue. From a US perspective, Russia needs a modus operandi with its closest neighbours which cannot be based on an idea of limited sovereignty. The issue needs to be discussed, as otherwise it is doubtful that the idea of a new European security architecture can progress. That said, there is certainly a need for a security relationship that integrates Russia. The US does not want Russia to be weak and the challenge on both sides will be to make sure that does not happen.

Workshop 22

Setting out a Global Armed Violence Reduction Agenda

Workshop Session organised by Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Jana Krause

Introduction

The panel reviewed trends and dynamics in armed violence and offered a critical assessment of the Geneva Declaration Process. The Declaration seeks to reduce the global burden of armed violence and generate meaningful improvements in human security by 2015.

Summar of the individual presentations

The Chair, *David Atwood* (Director and Representative, Disarmament and Peace, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva), introduced the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development as an innovative multilateral initiative supported by about 100 countries and non-governmental agencies. It calls explicitly for practical initiatives to prevent and reduce human, social and economic costs of armed violence, to assess risks and vulnerabilities, to evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence reduction programmes, and to disseminate knowledge of best practices.

Measuring the Global Burden of Armed Violence

Robert Muggah (Research Director, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) gave an overview on the global dimension of armed violence and its human and development costs, emphasising that armed violence undermined people-centred security and sustainable development. The bulk of at least 740,000 victims of armed violence per year were non-conflict deaths. In economic terms, armed violence decreased the annual growth of an average economy by around two and up to ten per cent for many years. In terms of distribution, Sub-Saharan Africa and South America were most seriously affected by armed violence, experiencing homicide rates of more than 20 per every 100,000 inhabitant per year, compared to the global average of 7.6. Mr. Muggah concluded that armed violence was a major development issue as it deepened and intensified poverty and increased the costs of investment and development.

Mainstreaming Violence Reduction and Prevention into Development Programming

Paul Eavis (Adviser, Armed Violence Prevention, Bureau of Crises Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, Geneva) explained that armed violence was a multi-sector issue and introduced the programmes that UNDP employed to address this. A whole range of factors and actors needed to be included, such as governments, local government counterparts, community level non-state actors, local chiefs, and women's organisations. For example, in rural Kenya, UNDP worked with perpetrators of violence, particularly young men, to address land and water conflicts in border areas. The overall objectives were to strengthen the local peace architecture and net capacities, to develop more responsible control over small arms and to manage access to water resources. A similar programme in urban Jamaica focused on local monitoring of crime rates, institutional capacity building, the establishment of peace and justice centres, safe schools, and police engagement with the community. In conclusion, Mr. Eavis called for the policy community to demonstrate that it could reduce armed violence through adequate programming.

Adopting a Public Health Lens

Alexander Butchart (Prevention of Violence Coordinator, Department of Violence and Injury Prevention and Disability, World Health Organization, Geneva) outlined the public health approach to reducing armed violence as a research based multidisciplinary and multi-sector approach emphasising primary prevention. It proceeded from surveillance to identifying the problems, causes of violence and protective factors to implementation of effective policy programmes that work not only with individuals, but with communities and societies. For instance, intervention in Diadema, Brazil, to reduce alcohol sales had resulted in a substantive drop of the homicide rate. In Cape Town, South Africa, new gun control legislation had achieved similar results.

Summary of the discussion

During the discussion, some commentators pointed out that the mundane everyday violence was not as threatening to national security as would be a rebellion or a war. Thus, the topic needed to be sold to the security community, while it was largely acknowledged on the development side. The speakers explained that some countries did not request enough support from the donor community to address the problem because they were not aware of the levels of homicide death due to a lack of different registration, and because governments were worried about other programme funding.

Conclusions

Integrating an armed violence reduction agenda into the Millenium Development Goals or into policy agendas that follow these goals is required to ensure that armed violence reduction is put on the global agenda. There remain political challenges in terms of weak or missing ODA support, and the practical challenges of competing priorities in reducing armed violence globally.

Workshop Session 23

Security in the Middle East: The Search for Order

Workshop Session organised by CSS.

Roland Popp

Introduction

The panel focused on the quest for a viable security framework in the Middle East amid growing US-Iranian strategic rivalry. Was the inauguration of a new US administration a major window of opportunity or yet another false hope? Or could regional actors themselves start to make a meaningful contribution towards regional peace and security while defusing the growing nuclear threat?

Summary of the individual presentations

In his presentation, *Steven Simon* (Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC) was generally cautious as to the likelihood of any progress being made on the key issues facing the Middle East. The Iranian nuclear question, the festering Arab-Israeli dispute, and ongoing fall-out from the Iraq war all presented significant problems for future regional stability.

According to Simon, the US was unlikely to want to put the cart before the horse by dealing first with Iran, rather than with the Arab-Israeli conflict, in trying to reach a regional agreement. If anything, the US would continue to impress on Israel that settlement of the Palestinian question would help to forge Arab unity on Iran. Timing would prove to be crucial to prospects of success. The Palestinians were barely in a position to negotiate a unity government amongst themselves, let alone

engage in protracted diplomatic tangles with Israel. At the same time, Iran was still seen as a strategic challenge by the US irrespective of how the Arab-Israeli issue played out. Given the initial Iranian reactions to US overtures, Simon regarded a diplomatic solution to the conflict as rather unlikely.

Shahram Chubin (Non-resident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) focused on Iran as the key state, its upcoming elections in June, the regional dynamics, and its relations with the US and Europe.

He described the positions on foreign relations held by the different candidates. He stressed that, irrespective of whether victory at the ballot box went to the hard-liners or to more progressive candidates, it was actually Khamenei as the Supreme Leader who had the final word on foreign and security policy. From Chubin's perspective, Iran would thus maintain a hard-line stance in order to preserve the Islamic Republic's supposed revolutionary achievements.

Volker Perthes (Director, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin) focused on the prospects for regional security in the Middle East being driven by local players rather than by international engagement. Three key factors were constantly at play determining the degree of leverage regional players could achieve; namely, the degree of pragmatism they were willing to apply, the extent of their perceived legitimacy in negotiations, and the degree to which vested interests might taint political engagement in a specific setting. The latter two remained particularly problematic, as they helped to explain why Egypt was not seen as an honest broker in Sudan, while Turkey could only have limited traction in Iraq given the Kurdish question. Given these limitations, international engagement still remained critical to regional agreements, both in terms of political support for accords reached and, more intrinsically, to offer comprehensive security guarantees on which regional cooperation could be built.

Summary of the discussion

The discussion focused on the general outlook for the US-Iranian rapprochement and its repercussions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. There were differing opinions on the linkage between the two problems and the most fruitful approach towards a diplomatic solution. Some of the discussants stressed the overriding importance of the conflict in Palestine and questioned the idea of a regional cold war between moderates and rejectionists.

Conclusions

The West should thus continue to invest its political capital in mediation processes and install effective regional and sub-regional security complexes in the Middle East designed to be as politically inclusive as possible, while avoiding the temptations of “divide and rule” strategies.

Workshop Session 24

Challenges of education and training in the internet age

Workshop Session organised by ISN in cooperation with Azusa Pacific University and the King's College.

Reto Schilliger

Introduction

The internet and related applications and services emerging at an increasingly fast pace have had an impact on all areas of life: e-mail and mobile phones have become central to our personal and professional communications. Online shopping and e-banking are widely accepted and have revolutionised the way we buy and pay, and in the last few years more applications have emerged on the internet that support networking and enable the interaction of individuals and organisations worldwide.

Education and training too have discovered the potential of new technologies. There are countless Learning Management Systems on the market to support education via internet, and there is a range of quality online-learning content available, from basic education to highly specialised professional training packages, growing daily.

Summary of the individual presentations

This panel, chaired by *Reto Schilliger* (Head of e-learning at ISN and chair of the Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium), elaborated on the potential impact of new technologies on education in general and defence and security

policy education in particular. The two presentations in this context gave a picture of what was currently possible and what might be expected in 2019 – just ten years later.

Educating the Armed Forces by Distance Learning

The first speaker, *Anne-Lucie Norton* (Executive Director, e-Learning Program, Department of War Studies, King's College, London) argued that the tempo of operations for NATO and other international armed forces was likely to remain high. And in today's conflicts the new doctrine was often being created on the ground. To succeed, people had to possess sufficient knowledge and have the necessary analytical skills to understand and implement substantial change.

With this background in mind, the Department of War Studies of King's College London had created a Masters degree that provided students with the intellectual tools to understand and the ability to analyse the challenges facing armed forces and the civil and military organisations they worked with in conflict zones today. The MA *War in the Modern World* was being delivered entirely online, and was available to students worldwide at any time of day. The student body was international, with 13 nationalities living in 24 countries. Launched in 2005, the part-time programme had been taught to 150 students, 70 percent of them active military officers. *WiMW* was a self-funded programme. The tuition was the same for all students: fees fell into a medium-high band, as defined in UK terms, but were subject to change. Further information was available at <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/wimw>.

The programme had been designed for busy people, often working on the move and from changing locations. One of the main challenges had been building the necessary flexibility into the programme while maintaining a high level of services for students. The programme developed took the concept of the "learning community" very seriously. Although students came from all over the world, they actively collaborated in acquiring and applying the content, following a broadly constructivist model of education. Additional working practices and models tailored to the programme requirements had led to uniformly positive feedback.

The MA *War in the Modern World* was meanwhile the second most popular course offered by the department, and many of the students had gone on to employment in their chosen areas.

Higher Education in 2019

Kathaleen Reid-Martinez (Ph.D., Vice President, Nontraditional Learning, Azusa Pacific University, Los Angeles) in her presentation focused on trends in education, the drivers of future higher education and the future of higher education.

The key trends in education might be summarised as follows: change in student population (increasing age, often nontraditional); strong shift in student expectations (course to meet context, competency based); changes to faculty (tenure being challenged, increase in non-traditional roles, higher workload for interactive distance learning); changes to organisations (flatter hierarchies, more specialised programmes for specific demands); changing institutional landscape (strong growth, focus on competencies, change toward learner-centered instruction for lifelong learners); and increasing use of Blended Learning (combining electronic distance learning with traditional settings).

The main drivers of future higher education were the shift of the locus of control from professors and administrators to the students and available technologies that enabled the delivery of more content than any school could ever handle. Technology itself would change the face of our campuses and redefine campus spaces (e.g. silent libraries turning into community friendly places with wireless capacity; room for group gatherings and discussions; quiet spaces with furnishings for relaxed reflection and study; online research; and some would even serve coffees). The high demands connected with fulfilling the students' as well as the market's needs and expectations might shift the costs, while at the same time global competition would become even harder based on available online-technologies. As university costs were actually rising three-times faster than inflation in the US, it was likely that pricing and allocation of capital would become critical in the educational sector.

Education issues of the future would increasingly address the following: accreditation and quality control, credentialing, IT security, intellectual property and copyright, 24/7 system access, financial models, globalisation and centralisation versus distributed organisational structures. The result in 2019 might be an education that was more relational with professors/facilitators, peers and communities of learners. More knowledge would be developed, culminating in wisdom for appropriate application in a diverse, global community.

Summary of the discussion

The key questions of the discussion were related to finances. As Anne-Lucie Norton illustrated, an online programme could already be financially successful today. When done properly, people were willing to pay the required tuition; they still saved a lot for travel and lodging and did not need to interrupt their professional work and income.

Questions related to technology's dependence on available infrastructure, both on the level of countries as well as families, were discussed. It was agreed that providing everybody with the infrastructure for technology-based learning would be one of the main challenges of the near future, as already recognised by companies and organisations actively supporting less privileged countries.

Conclusions

The two presentations made clear that distance learning at a high academic level for students distributed all over the globe was possible today and that technology-based forms of learning would increasingly shape the future of universities and other educational organisations, including those in the defense and security sector.

TOPIC SESSIONS: SECOND PART

Fourth Topic Session

Global Burden of Armed Violence

Topic Session organised by ISF and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Jana Krause

Introduction

This panel examined different facets of the scope, scale, distribution and forms of armed violence worldwide, drawing attention to particular conflict and non-conflict settings. It also explored some of the innovative violence prevention and reduction measures that are being examined in different conflict, non-conflict and post-conflict settings.

Summary of the individual presentations

The Chair, *Thomas Greminger* (Head, Political Affairs Division IV - Human Security, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs), underscored that armed violence increased development costs while underdevelopment and inequality fuelled conflict. The Geneva Declaration called for strong political commitment to strengthen efforts to integrate strategies of armed violence reduction and conflict prevention into national, regional, and multilateral development plans and programmes.

The Global Burden of Armed Violence: International Initiatives to Tackle the Problem

Keith Krause (Director, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding; Programme Director, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) outlined the recent shifts in perspectives on international security from inter-state war to focusing on armed conflict. He argued that the traditional understanding of post-conflict environments restricted analysis because post-conflict zones and countries without active conflict might be as violent as conflict zones. Some countries of Central and South America had homicide rates four times higher than the world average that top homicide rates in conflict countries. He called for more holistic approaches to addressing armed violence, bringing in stakeholders that were not traditionally part of the security expert groups, such as public and human rights activists. He concluded that the policy community needed to develop tools and instruments that worked across the sectors of criminal and political violence because these significantly overlapped.

Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings: the Burden for Women and Children

Sima Samar (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, United Nations; Chair, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Kabul) outlined how conflict and violence impact on everyone within communities in Afghanistan, resulting in a traumatised population. Women and children account for the majority of casualties as the government uses civilians as human shields and the Taliban employ a tactic of violent terror. Apart from armed conflict, violence perpetuates itself in many homes, resulting in large-scale domestic and sexual violence affecting women and children. Ms. Samar concluded that armed violence undermines women's and children's basic human rights, such as the right to life, education, access to health care, basic food supply, and freedom of expression. It restricts the movement of women and children and undermines their coping abilities in poor and violent settings.

Addressing Armed, Organised Violence from a Perspective of the Red Cross

Patricia Danzi (Head of Operations for Latin America and the Caribbean, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva) outlined the added value of a neutral, independent humanitarian approach to situations of armed violence in urban settings of Latin America. She focused on the work of the ICRC programme in Rio de Janeiro, presenting the impact of armed violence on school children's mental health in situations of chronic violence and child soldiers in armed gangs. Ms. Danzy emphasised the importance of understanding the local security situation, building trust, developing community root, and engaging with a multitude of local stakeholders for effective programming.

Youth at Risk: Violence Prevention in Urban Settings

Peter Batchelor (Chief, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, Bureau of Crises Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, Geneva) presented six entry points for targeting armed violence prevention. These included the control of small arms and the collection of weapons; urban planning with regard to safety measures; natural resource management; youth empowerment; and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence. He emphasised that effective and sustainable intervention needs to local ownership and a multi-sector approach as well as intervention on both the national and local level. The development of monitoring capacity needed to be strengthened. He concluded that effective partnership between politicians, the media, civil society actors and international organisations was vital to reducing levels of armed violence.

Summary of the discussion

The discussion focused on the nexus between fragile states and armed violence and different policy programmes both aspects. Comments were also made on the difficulties of data collection of conflict and non-conflict deaths.

Conclusions

The panel provided an overview of the current state of knowledge on the global impact of armed violence, including multi-sector policy programmes aiming at violence reduction in urban and rural settings. It outlined the political processes that could lead to more effective international action to achieve measurable reductions in the incidence of armed violence worldwide.

Fifth Topic Session

Security and Development

Topic Session organised by ISF and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

Pascal Gemperli

Introduction

This topic session looked at how fragile countries could be stabilised in way that would enhance the prospects for sustainable peace and development. A fragile country can be defined as one characterised by internal and/or external security threats, ineffective government, political violence and low level of socio-economic development. The critical challenge is how to assist such countries so that both security and development can be improved in a way that they mutually reinforce each other. Given the fact that fragile countries often constitute a threat to regional stability, with potentially disastrous political, social, economic and environmental consequences, the stabilisation of these countries is also key from the perspective of international peace and security.

Summary of the individual presentations

Introduction

The Chair, *Martin Dahinden* (Director, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) reminded that today 1.2 million people lived in so-called fragile states. Especially the ones responsible for action faced an enormous complexity. Many failures of policy design and implementation had to be admitted. This situations reminded of a chess game.

Classical security issues were not a main objective of the Swiss development cooperation, but in contexts such as described above, security issues could be most important regarding human security, which was an issue for Swiss development cooperation. Nowadays, it would not be possible to achieve results in narrowly defined geographical or programmatic areas; integrated solutions were needed. For instance, many tribes brought their cattle to a new field. Other tribes who had been used to live from that field had no more food and migrated to cities where they became a social challenge.

Disarmament for Development

Jayantha Dhanapala (Former Ambassador of Sri Lanka; and Former Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations) stated that as a rule, one could not have security without development and vice versa and neither of that without human rights. Military security, development and human rights were the three pillars of the concept of security. Paul Collier had shown, that there was also a relation between disarmament and development.¹ We should develop guidelines to reach development through disarmament.

Talking about military expenditures. According to the International Peace Research Institute 1,339 billion USD were spent in 2007, this was equivalent to 2.5% of the global GDP and to 202 USD per person in the world. The United States alone spent 52 billion USD. 45% of total spending remained with the United States, United Kingdom, France and China.

Were we heading towards a new era of disarmament? On 5 April in Prague, the US President Barack Obama drew a new vision of a nuclear free world and reforms for other kinds of weapons programmes.

Today we were a highly militarist society. We could have security at much lower levels of arms. We had to go back to wisdom of

¹ Paul Collier is a Professor of Economics, Director for the Centre for the Study of African Economies at the University of Oxford and Fellow of St Antony's College. From 1998 – 2003 he was the director of the Development Research Group of the World Bank.

Eisenhower's speech on the impact of an industrialised militarised society. Only after World War II, the United States had started to develop a military industry. We had to address disarmament in order to address the issue of the bottom million.

Migration and Security: Ensuring a Balanced and Comprehensive Approach

Ndioro Ndiaye (Deputy Director General, International Organisation for Migration Geneva) reminded that as for the introduction, there were some important points to be made. Migration, if well-managed, could positively impact the origin and host countries. The focus today was less on stopping migration but rather on managing it in order to maximise potential benefits for all. It was known that the most corrosive form of irregular migration – smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings – had strong links to transnational crime and organised criminal groups. The latter challenged public order, and corrupted and undermined the institutions of a state. Furthermore, the lack of coherence of national legislations and failure to tackle financial aspects of irregular migration also favoured illicit drug trafficking trade across borders. These challenges were addressed by comprehensive legal instruments, such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.

However, regular mobility of persons should not be affected by actions taken. The challenge was to protect the society and to reduce irregular migration without stifling legitimate and needed mobility.

Addressing today's security threats required a broader concept of security, based on the promotion of development, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Regarding the challenge of migration, countries could for instance open up legal migration channels in order to allow for screening and selection of migrants and thus reducing irregular migration. Well-managed migration had the potential to contribute to economic growth and development of countries of origin and destination. Concrete actions could include: enhancing the developmental impact of remittances or micro-enterprise development to stabilise populations in regions with high pressure to migrate.

Ms. Ndiaye emphasised that irregular migration and not migration per se was the problem. It had to be tackled by multi-level, multi-actors and regional approaches. The keywords were: partnerships, regional cooperation and capacity building. She stressed that we needed to find an appropriate balance between security concerns and the facilitation and management of regular migration.

Transforming Security and Development in Situations of Fragile Statehood

Robin Luckham (Research Associate, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton) affirmed that transforming security and development in fragile statehoods was a main challenge. Why transforming? So far global, regional and national security structure had not done their job well enough. There were multiple securities and developments. The notion of fragile states became almost meaningless because there were so many differences and examples. Mr. Luckham identified 12 discords or tensions between security and development:

1. Traditional state centred conceptions versus new global forms of network violence, network power and new forms of risks: climate change, financial crises, etc.
2. State security versus security of citizens and human beings (human security). What does security look like? What do the concerned people say? Does state security deliver to you?
3. Complexity of multilevel nature of security versus its governance: local, national, regional, global. In some situations all levels are malfunctioning or under-resourced.
4. Notion of security as global and national public good versus reality of unequal security, or security as stabilisation of existing systems and elites. Some benefit more than others.
5. Public good or private asset? How can private companies be regulated? Can even warlords, etc. deliver security?
6. Spending on security versus spending on development. Costs of insecurity are even higher in conflict areas.

7. Discussions about causes and results, for instance between development and peace/conflict or poverty and conflict or successful development and conflict (when actors do not work in a conflict-sensitive manner).
8. Policy and practice of development versus policy and practice of security or securitisation. There is also raising dependency between civil and military actors.
9. Analytical and policy templates we have to look at fragile states vs. the very complex realities on which they are imposed.
10. Formal versus informal power relationships.
11. Security first versus institutionalisation first.
12. State building from above and building consensus from below.

Summary of the discussion

Being asked if there was today a window of opportunity towards new policies and approaches, the panellists responded in general positively, noting that efforts are necessary and, sometimes, some more modesty about possible achievements would be appropriate. The discussion was mostly centred on the issue of migration. Regarding south-south migration for instance, much more scientific work has to be undertaken in order to understand the challenges and to better manage the situation. There was a general consent, that triple win situations (home country, host country, migrant) are to be developed and brought on the international agenda. For instance might it be useful to go beyond the blame that best brains are leaving their countries, remittances are “useful”, migrants are private investors. They could be connected to the development policies of their home states.

Sixth Topic Session

Global and Regional Security Governance: Quo Vadis?

Topic Session organised by CSS.

Alex Wilner

Introduction

This session offered a high caliber and academic discussion on the development of regional and global security management systems. In his introductory notes, *Andreas Wenger* (Professor of Swiss and International Security Policy; and Director, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich) asked whether or not emerging security threats required adaptations to existing security arrangements. Wenger went on to question the panellists as to how states might shape and enforce systems of regional and global governance, constrain state, sub-state, and trans-state actors, and stabilise international relations.

Summary of the individual presentations

Thomas Biersteker (Curt Gasteyger Professor of International Security and Conflict Studies, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) centered his contribution on the “global mechanisms” for governance. In an altogether complex and multifaceted presentation, Biersteker introduced a number of governance matrices that he suggested explained the “institutionalised authority” management systems retained over state and non-state actors and the “mechanisms of governance” that existed under particular systems. For instance, in a

purely *Balance of Power* system, autonomous states were rarely effectively constrained by institutionalised systems of governance. In a *Collective Security* system, on the other hand, a hegemonic state enforced governance institutions over weaker actors. While in a *World Governance* system, where a “dominion empire” existed, there were high degrees of institutionalised governance that curtailed behaviour. The strength of global governance, Biersteker explained, depended on the type of system in place. Developing a world governance system depended on the “range of institutionalised players involved” in international relations. The actual mechanisms (or “bases”) of governance were influenced by related variables, notably, the type of international society, hegemonic structures, regime type, legal structures, international norms, and private (non-state) autonomy. Biersteker concluded that a complex combination of structures and variables dictated how well (or poorly) governance systems at the regional and global level would function in practice.

The second presentation by *Alyson Bailes* (Visiting Professor, University of Iceland, Reykjavík) focused on the definitional dilemmas pertaining to “governance”. Bailes suggested that the 1997 UN definition of governance – a “mechanism, process, and institution” whereby groups and citizens “articulate their interests” and “mediate their differences” – was problematic because of its rigidity and its failure to account for military and economic aspects of governance. For instance, she posited a link between economic collapse and governance failure, suggesting that economic weakness could lead to social damage and resentment that in turn would lead to political reversals, xenophobia, and state failure. Likewise, economic crises were usually associated with declines in military spending, which further reduced the role of states in supporting global governance initiatives. Both cases resulted in a weakened form of governance. One solution to these dilemmas, she suggested, was to think about economic agendas in terms of governance. Bailes found lessons to this sort of analysis in models of business control over security issues and in the context of private-public and sub-state security governance. She concluded her talk by applying these models to Arctic governance. In her calculation, changes to the Northern environment posed security

risks that demanded alternative governance structures. One solution was to apply business models of governance that functioned on market rather than state-based security principles. Doing so, Bailes concluded, might foster cooperation and multilateralism over the Arctic.

Bates Gill's (Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) contribution began with the notion that a typology of multilateralism existed. It could be based on commonly shared rules and norms of behaviour (Ruggie), value-based regulators (Caporaso), or third party mediation (Duffield). Gill found that in East Asia, multilateralism was based primarily on norm and rule institutionalism and was chiefly centered on thematic cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, Asia had witnessed an increase in the number of multilateral mechanisms developed in the region. Gill suggested the phenomenon was marked by two features. First, there was an "Asianisation of the multilateralism process", in which a geographically defined "Asia" had taken the lead in developing the mechanisms for regional multilateralism. The result had been a diminishment in the role played by "traditional" actors (US, Canada, Australia) in fostering Asian cooperation. Second, Gill found an increase in the prevalence of "ad-hoc multilateralism", where like-minded states came together to address particular issues as they occurred. Of importance was the fact that these ad-hoc ventures did not usually include the entire region. Gill then focused on the unresolved issues that undermined Asian multilateralism: defining the actors that belonged to East Asia; identifying the behavioural norms that were to be included in cooperative institutions; outlining the depth, degree, and scope of economic integration; and establishing a tenable mediation and conflict-resolution process. Gill nonetheless concluded that there was an increasing awareness in East Asia that multilateral responses and collective action were intrinsically needed to deal effectively with transnational demands. Furthermore, he suggested that the increasing "socialisation" of China into the East Asian "community" along with continued activity in collective action reinforced emerging multilateral trends.

Summary of the discussion

The session concluded with a lengthy and informative question and answer period. Of greatest interest was the role national bureaucracies, elites, and individual leaders have in shaping governance models, the importance the EU and US have in guiding global processes, and on the “grey zones” of global governances (the areas where no functioning system exists). In sum, the discussion offered a highly-intellectual and theoretically-driven investigation of governance that nonetheless relied on concrete regional and global cases studies.

KEYNOTE SPEECHES: SECOND PART

The Role of Civil Society in a Globalised World

Irene Z. Khan

Secretary General, Amnesty International, London

Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The role of the civil society in any country is to speak truth to power. It exists to make those in power accountable to those whose interests they are supposed to represent. Even in countries which have an exemplary record of a responsive government, and which protect and defend human rights at home and abroad, it is necessary for civil society to exist: not in order to oppose the government for the sake of opposing, but to remind the government of its obligations, to point out possible flaws in its approach to a problem, and to provide a deeper, wider perspective, informed by experience from the ground, to ensure that rights are protected.¹

Ladies and gentlemen, I am to speak about the role of civil society in a globalised world. That topic is entirely appropriate, because in a globalised world, the existence of a global society is necessary. As the world becomes more interconnected – through markets, through economic processes, through cultural exchange, and through the migration of people – societies evolve. Old barriers crumble, rejuvenating societies on the one hand, and scaring some people within those societies on the other. Whether it is goods made elsewhere, products sourced from far away, or ideas emanating from another region

¹ Examples: Swisspeace, which works with the Swiss Government to help build peace in conflict zones; Norwegian Committee on Human Rights, which looks at the conditions of plantation farm workers in Indonesia; OECD Watch, which receives funding from European official agencies, which investigates the conduct of companies in conflict zones such as the DRC, and helps NGOs from the south file complaints under the OECD's National Contact Point framework, to reform the behaviour of those companies.

or value-system, each of these processes of globalisation show how interdependent we are.

This notion of interdependence and interconnectedness is not alien to my ears. When we say that human rights are universal, belong to everyone, and that there is no division between political and economic rights, we have this interdependence and interconnectedness in our mind. Notions the business world, and international relations specialists take for granted – of an integrated, globalised world which is based on firm rules – are also notions underscoring the human rights agenda. Civil society groups mobilise people around the world for the greater common good, to ensure that the rules by which the world is governed, are applied uniformly, that there is no discrimination, and there is access for all.²

But the collapsing world order – brought about by renewed attacks in our cities by acts of terror, by armed conflict in distant parts of the world, and by the economic crisis – has made the world vulnerable and unruly not only for governments and intergovernmental organisations, but also for the global civil society. I live in London, where an individual is likely to be photographed at least 200 times a day in central London, due to the widespread presence of intrusive cameras. While we do not know if such use of cameras has led to any specific reduction in crime, we do know that it has led to several cases of intrusion of privacy, and people's private lives are becoming more public. It is possible, for a state that intends to misuse such information, to keep track of individuals it considers troublesome, by maintaining surveillance.³

² Examples here include Oxfam's campaign for fairer trade; WaterAid's campaigns to ensure access to water; Action Aid's campaign to hold governments accountable to meet their Millennium Development Goal targets; and, most importantly, the coalition of NGOs that come together as the World Social Forum, where they articulate their idea – Another World Is Possible – as an alternative to the large-scale, corporate-led economic globalisation exemplified by the World Economic Forum in Davos.

³ Since the protests against global economic meetings at Seattle and Genoa, police forces around the world have begun taking photographs of activists, even tracking them down subsequently. An NGO called Plane Stupid, which is protesting the proposed third runway at the Heathrow Airport, has alleged that its volunteers have been tracked by the British police, and some have even received offers

Governments are making it harder for civil society groups to demonstrate.⁴ The space between leaders and civil society groups has grown wider; police barriers prevent closer proximity for people to present their petitions.⁵ At the G20 Summit in London in April, the police resorted to a pattern of herding people in a tight space, preventing them from leaving. At Davos in Switzerland, for several years now, civil society groups which meet to protest the way market forces are shaped as part of the economic globalisation, are kept in a village miles away, far from the Congress Centre, in inhospitable terrain, often in adverse weather.

The surveillance technologies, which governments deploy in order to combat threats to public order, have been used to monitor civil society groups. China has indeed seen many examples of people who use the Internet to connect with like-minded people being found out due to the complicity of companies that provide Internet technology, and then jailed.⁶ In 2008, approximately 30 journalists and 50 other individuals in China remained in prison for posting their views on the internet.⁷ In other places, activists supporting gay rights, civil society groups sharing sensitive information concerning birth control measures, or exchanging political ideas, have all been arrested. This past weekend saw the first

subsequently, to testify against their colleagues. In other cases, environmental NGOs in Britain have said that the proposed laws against terror are drafted with such a sweeping definition that it can include what they consider legitimate protests against genetically-modified foods as well.

⁴ Many countries in Asia do not permit any demonstrations. In Singapore, even speaking at the so-called Speakers' Corner requires the permission of the police. Authorities in Mumbai disrupted a prayer meeting in the city on April 26, called by a civil society group trying to increase voter participation during the recent elections in India. The financial district in London has certain parts of what look like public space actually owned by the private sector, making it possible for protests there to be banned.

⁵ For example, the Shanghai Global Compact Summit of 2005.

⁶ Yahoo, of course, is the famous example; but Baidu.com has a record that's more extensive. Furthermore, China has prevented HIV activists from using the Internet more effectively, preventing dissemination of information important for health activists.

⁷ Amnesty International Annual Report 2009, p. 108.

ever Baltic Pride march in Riga, and although in Latvia it passed off successfully and peacefully, there was violence at similar events in Russia and Poland. In Colombia, human rights defenders and trade union members continue to be targeted, with at least 46 trade union members and 12 human right defenders being killed in the past year.⁸ Blogging, sharing files, and exchanging information and ideas – the cornerstones on which civil society groups thrive, become the conduits through which governments keep tabs on them, and where necessary, curb their activities using a variety of ways, which restrict a whole range of human rights.

It is important to remind ourselves of another issue: civil society groups are not homogeneous. They include a wide range of interests, and some of those interests may even contradict one another.

That is hardly surprising: All governments are not the same: they derive their legitimacy through different means, and their forms, as well as their representativeness, vary. Likewise, companies are different from one another: Some are large multinationals that are vastly different from small and medium-sized companies. Some are state-owned, while others are privately-owned. A company from Europe operates differently from a company from the United States, and indeed, from companies from China or India.

By the same token, civil society groups, too, are fundamentally different from one another. Groups protecting wildlife will view a forest differently from a group protecting indigenous people, as has happened in the case of the dispute between environmental and human rights NGOs in India over a new law that provides rights to tribal groups. Then consider the matter of trade: an environmental group may be opposed to trade liberalisation because increased trade leads to more carbon emissions, which harms the climate. A development NGO in the North may want trade to increase only provided the goods being bought are procured from small farmers, in order to promote anti-poverty strategies. A civil society group in the South, or a trade union from the South, may want to increase jobs at home, even if it means jobs from the North

⁸ Amnesty International Annual Report 2008, p. 114.

move to the South. A global civil society group which opposes such transfer on environmental grounds – industries that are considered “dirty, dangerous, and noisy”, as the Japanese example shows, are often the first to close in prosperous countries, and such technologies get transferred to poor countries – may find that local NGOs want such industries to invest in their countries, because it increases jobs. They may object to the global civil society organisations by characterising them as protectionist.⁹

An international human rights group may want to see restrictions on trade in certain commodities because that trade fuels conflict – let us recall the impact of the extractive industries in Africa; other development-oriented civil society organisations may want to increase such trade because it helps the poor; and a trade union may oppose the trade because the workers are not paid minimum wage, or operate under unhealthy conditions. Then again, a globally-oriented civil society group may wish to campaign for the elimination of genetically-modified foods;¹⁰ a local civil society group may want to have access to such crops because the products might be cheaper, or improve access to food.¹¹ We can recall criticism by international environment and development groups accusing the US of manipulating the southern African food crisis to benefit their genetically-modified food interests and of using the UN to distribute domestic food surpluses which could not otherwise find a market.¹² A global civil society group may also insist that those who abuse human rights should not get immunity for their activities in the past;¹³ a local civil society group may be governed by the idea of reconciliation, and opt for peacebuilding alternatives, which aim to end conflict first.¹⁴

⁹ Examples include Kenyan and Ugandan pro-trade NGOs as well as CUTS in India, and the approach of Greenpeace or Oxfam.

¹⁰ e.g. Greenpeace.

¹¹ e.g. CUTS.

¹² John Vidal, US “dumping unsold GM food on Africa”, *The Guardian*, Monday 7 October 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2002/oct/07/gm.famine>.

¹³ e.g. ICTJ.

¹⁴ e.g. FIP, Colombia.

And yet, in our unruly yet interconnected world, civil society groups can mobilise their members by intermingling. Many find it unusual when groups representing different agendas come together and march for social or economic justice, or to end a war. When climate change groups, wildlife protection groups, anti-poverty organisations, and human rights groups came together in London to express their views on the G20 summit, it was not merely an attempt to show strength: it was also a serious effort to unite diverse views on a commonly-agreed set of concerns.

While it is true that such demonstrations are impossible to organise in many parts of the world, it is troubling that it is becoming more difficult to organise such demonstrations in the first place even in societies which regard the right to protest peacefully as an essential democratic norm. But as such groups challenge the status quo, they are portrayed as enemies of progress, or possessing an anti-national agenda. Their leaders are arrested in some countries, and they are presented as threats to society. That is almost Orwellian in its intensity.

The pretext of an unruly time provides authorities to resist change. They prefer the status quo. They consolidate power. That is when it becomes all the more necessary to speak truth to power. And that requires a more open, more liberal space, for civil society to meet without fear or favour.

All of us have the right to seek, receive and impart information. We have the right to meet peacefully, to demonstrate peacefully, to participate in our public life. We have the right to express our views, and the right to be recognised as people, who have a point of view. Nothing – not the war on terror, nor the first great economic crisis of this century – should lead to curbing those freedoms.

It was Benjamin Franklin who reminded Americans at one time – that a society that trades off precious liberty for temporary safety deserves neither liberty, nor safety. More than two centuries later, his words still resonate; in this turbulent world, the civil society matters, and it must get the freedom and the space it needs to thrive.

The State has the legitimate obligation to provide security to its citizens. They must feel safe from terror attacks. But to do so, it needs to have the social contract with the people to be in place first. In order to do that, the

State needs to trust the people more. And the people should feel safe and secure to express themselves fully, in public, without fear of repression. Then the state will have the people on its side, and be able to deal with the threat more meaningfully. Whenever the State has sought to deny access to civil society groups, arguing for secrecy, the result has often shown that the society has neither felt more safe or secure, nor become freer. The persistent campaign of the American Civil Liberties Union to place checks and balances on American Government's instinct to establish more stringent controls, as well as the campaigns of groups like Liberty in Britain to restrain the State, have all been effective. As the unravelling of the torture and rendition saga shows, the civil society groups were right in calling for restraints, and those restraints on state would have ensured the security and safety of Americans, while guaranteeing their liberties.

Security and Development – Creating a Whole of Government Approach

Stephen Groff

Deputy Director, Development Co-operation Directorate, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.

The theme of this forum, “coping with global change” could not be more timely as the world forges a path from recession to regeneration. I am happy to say that key international organizations, including the OECD are attempting to rise to this challenge, as – to paraphrase from Ghandi – we set about becoming the change that we want to see in our world. With this goal in mind, OECD countries are today taking steps to re-create and re-brand a global economic system that emphasizes fairness, meaningful regulation and accountability. And it is the richest and most powerful countries that must take the lead.

This is a bewildering challenge, but we all have a part to play. In the field of aid and development, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee or DAC is no different. Our priority is to ensure that OECD countries hold their nerve in keeping to their promises on aid. Whatever the pressures are on budgets, now is not the time to retreat from international responsibilities and we must recognize that countries in the North and South are mutually vulnerable. I am pleased to say an OECD “aid pledge” was agreed late last year to protect development assistance, and we are watching events carefully.

We also need to take on board that the protection of aid is only one part of the response. In some 50 conflict and fragile states – around a ¼ of all countries – we must also hold the line on continuing to invest in security to protect the investments and fragile gains that are made in development terms.

In times of economic crisis, and where the evidence base for success is thin, how can we continue to make the case for the enormous financial

and human effort required to work in a comprehensive way on the security and development nexus?

My response to this question, simply put, is we have no choice. The point may be best illustrated by the case of Guinea Bissau . For years the fundamental development and security challenges faced in Guinea Bissau went forgotten and unaddressed. Guinea Bissau was just not on any strategic map and rampant poverty and deprivation accelerated. This failing enabled drug smuggling mafia groups (mainly from Columbia) to take advantage of the situation and today the vast majority of cocaine consumed in Europe is trafficked through Guinea Bissau. The state has been effectively captured by drug barons and the development agenda has been derailed. This reality leads to economically powerful and threatening drug trafficking gangs operating on European soil.

The Guinea Bissau case shows, firstly, the costs of prevention would have been far less than the costs of the crisis that Guinea Bissau faces internally and the wide ranging spillover effects the international community is now facing up to.

Secondly, this case shows the complexity of security and development questions in our turbulent world require early, complex, holistic and comprehensive responses. The many drivers of conflict, plus the hostility, fear and humanitarian fallout in places like the Swat valley in Pakistan today or the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia require a very sophisticated and nuanced response from the international community. The question is whether we are appropriately set up to respond to these 21st century security and development challenges? The question is whether the international community's hardware (ministries, international agencies, NGOs) and software (skill sets, budget lines, etc.) are fit to respond effectively and efficiently to the 21st century vulnerabilities that we face?

In order to respond to the 21st century vulnerabilities we need to work coherently on security and development, which requires an effective whole-of-government/system approach. To be very honest with you, developing an effective whole-of-government/system approach is very challenging and we seem to have reached a wall on this issue. However, we urgently need to climb that wall. To this end, the OECD DAC's

International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) is taking forward work on whole-of-government/system approaches. Through our work in this area we have gathered vital information on the successes and challenges in implementing such an approach. Based on OECD policy work, I would like to share with you the practical steps that we need to walk together in order to advance a common agenda. In this regard, I will address issues relating to 1) money, 2) the need for incentives, 3) and leadership.

1) Money: Ladies and Gentlemen, it will come as no surprise that OECD policy research on whole of government/system approaches also indicates that money talks! For example, we have evidence to prove that joint budget lines foster more integrated and coherent planning that can link security and development agendas together coherently. For instance pooled funding is considered an important instrument to foster integrated planning especially relating to security and conflict programming. In essence pooled funding brings together that which may be classified as official development assistance (ODA) and that funding that is not ODA-eligible. Evidence suggests that for pooled funding to result in improved effectiveness on the ground, allocation decisions need to be delinked from political considerations about the ODA eligibility of specific activities.

In addition to joint budget lines, the capacity to undertake proper joint planning and analysis are key components of a whole of government/system approach. (In order to act together, we need to think together). We are beginning to see some progress along these lines in Liberia (through the G-Map process), DRC (through the Programme Actions Prioritaire – or PAP) and Afghanistan (through the Compact and National Development Strategy) for example.

2) The need for incentives: Distinguished colleagues, despite some progress having been made, we also need to be honest and admit that there are sometimes strong disincentives to working in close partnership with other organisations and across our own government departments. For example, cross organisation work requires more time and more consultation (I see this within my own organisation where cooperation both within the development cluster and between the development and

economic clusters takes time and effort, but remains key for policy coherence). It is also the case that cross organisation work may require compromise and a willingness to make trade-offs on one's own policy agenda. However, the challenges faced in conflict and fragile situations (Afghanistan or DRC as examples) require such a comprehensive multi-faceted approach. Therefore, we need to start incentivising whole of government/system work within our organisations. We need to reward whole of government/system efforts made by our staff. The instructions to work in this way need to come from the top and be actively encouraged by management.

3) Leadership: Beyond the question of incentives – both at headquarters and in the field – a whole of government/system approach brings with it a need for leadership and a need for a lead coordination role. However, we need to replace turf-wars over who leads a process and competition between departments and institutions with inclusive leadership. Leadership should come with legitimacy and we need to keep in mind that a government's engagement in a fragile situation covers different phases that require different types of involvement and leadership from different actors at different times (sometimes leadership can best be expressed by taking a step back and allowing other parts of our system to lead depending on the objective sought). In other words the role and involvement of actors should change according to circumstances.

The 3C Conference: The practical whole of government/system challenges and opportunities that I have outlined above provide a basis by which we can together bring about the change that is required in our systems in order to deal with 21st century security and development challenges. The recent conference on coherence, coordination and complementarity (the “3C conference”) hosted by Switzerland on 19-20 March 2009 in Geneva was an important step forward in moving the whole of government/system agenda forward. I take this opportunity to acknowledge and congratulate Switzerland on hosting the 3C Conference and successfully negotiating the adoption of a 3C Roadmap. I commend the Swiss decision to bring the World Bank, NATO and the United Nations system, as well as OECD on board as co-convenors for this conference. Through this approach Switzerland succeeded in delivering key stakeholders around the table. The high profile of the 3C

event, including an address by former President of Ghana, John Kufour, and a BBC World Debate on the issue, further helped to ensure that the issues of coherence, coordination and complementarity remain centre-stage.

In conclusion and in looking to the future and next steps, I am pleased to inform you that the issue of whole-of-government and system approaches in conflict and fragile situations will be under discussion by Ministers and Heads of Agencies at next week's OECD DAC High Level Meeting (HLM - 27-28 May 2009). We look forward to receiving an overview of the 3C meeting by Mr. Dahinden at the HLM and the OECD secretariat stands ready to help operationalise the 3C Roadmap so that we can more effectively cope with the change that we confront today and tomorrow.

Ecological Footprint

Mathis Wackernagel

Executive Director, Global Footprint Network, Oakland CA

Why we need the Ecological Footprint

One fundamental requirement for sustainability is using renewable resources slower than nature can replenish them. Societies who do not meet this minimum condition run ecological deficits.

To know whether we meet this requirement, and to properly manage our ecological assets, we need to measure our use of nature. We need resource accounts that keep track of how much nature we have versus how much we use. Ecological accounting operates like financial accounting: it tracks available capital, revenues and expenditures. As with financial assets, it is possible to spend more of our ecological assets than are being regenerated – for some time. But such overspending depletes the natural capital and cannot be sustained in the long term. Continued ecological deficit spending leads to environmental bankruptcy, eroding economies, lessened quality of life and societal instability.

In short, like any successful business that keeps track of revenues and expenditures, society needs robust accounts of its demand on, and supply of, ecological assets. This is what Ecological Footprint accounts offer.

Description of the Footprint

The Ecological Footprint is an indicator that measures people's demand on nature. This demand includes both the resources we consume as well as the waste we produce. We obtain these resources from forests, cropland, fisheries, and grazing land, among other ecosystems. The built environment compromises the land's ability to provide biological resources. Additionally, ecosystems absorb and assimilate the waste we produce as a result of resource consumption. The Ecological Footprint

adds up these ecosystem areas to measure total human demand on nature. In other words, Ecological Footprint analysis builds on “mass flow balance”, and each flow is translated into the ecologically productive areas necessary to support these flows.

Ecosystems have a limited ability to supply us with natural resources (this is based on factors such as available water, climate, solar energy, technology and management practices). This is called biocapacity. When a population’s Ecological Footprint exceeds its biocapacity, biological resource “overshoot” occurs.

Global Footprint Network calculates the Ecological Footprint of nations on an annual basis. From this data we undertake global analysis. Overshoot measured on a global scale is an indicator of unsustainability. Data shows that humanity’s resource demands and waste production began to exceed planet Earth’s ability to meet this demand around 1986. Today humanity exceeds the planet’s ability to provide biological resources by 30 percent – thereby dipping into the natural capital stock. While the world average capacity was 1.8 hectares per person, the world average Footprint was 2.2 hectares per person. In contrast, the average Footprint in EU-27 was 4.7 hectares per person against a biocapacity of 2.2 hectares per person.

National Ecological Footprint accounts can also inform us about local or regional ecological performance. An Ecological Footprint Assessment of the European Union sponsored by the European Environment Agency and published by *WWF International* shows, for instance, that Europe has an Ecological Footprint more than twice its biocapacity.¹

This means that more than half of the ecosystem area on which Europe depends is outside of Europe.

Europeans have about twice the Footprint of what is available per person world-wide (and this available biocapacity also needs to support wild species that are competing with people for food and space). All of the EU members have per person Footprints above what is globally available. All but three – Sweden, Latvia, and Finland – are running a

¹ http://www.footprintnetwork.org/newsletters/gfn_blast_europe05.html

national ecological deficit by using more than what is available within their boundaries. The Ecological Footprint of Europe has increased by almost 70 percent per person since the 1960s.

As underlined in many publications, the Ecological Footprint measures merely one aspect of sustainability: the availability of, and the human demand on, Earth's regenerative capacity. Other measures are needed to complement this tool for assessing social well-being, depletion of non-renewable resources, inherently unsustainable activities such as the release of persistent pollutants, or the degradation of ecosystems.

History of the concept

The original Ecological Footprint methodology resulted from collaboration between Dr. Mathis Wackernagel and Dr. William Rees at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. The publication of their book *Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth* in 1996 made the concept more widely accessible.

Global Footprint Network was founded in 2003 with the goal of advancing the scientific rigor and practical application of the Ecological Footprint, and making the Ecological Footprint as prominent a metric as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Global Footprint Network is made up of a 23-member advisory board of leading scientists and politicians, an office in Oakland, one in Switzerland, and, soon, one in Brussels. More than 75 organizations, spanning six continents, have become formal Global Footprint Network partners. The Ecological Footprint is now in wide use by governments, communities, and businesses to set targets and monitor their ecological performance.

The adoption of the Ecological Footprint as a trusted sustainability metric depends upon the scientific integrity of the methodology, consistent and rigorous application of the methodology across analyses, and on results being reported in a straightforward and non-misleading manner. To meet these goals, Global Footprint Network and its partners have created a consensus-based committee process for improving the

method and for developing international Ecological Footprint Standards.²

Examples of current activities

The tool is getting increasingly popular: a simple Google search yields hundreds of thousands of websites discussing the Ecological Footprint. The effort of advancing this accounting tool is also increasingly recognized. For instance, Global Footprint Network is the recipient of a 2006 Skoll Award for Social Entrepreneurship. Global Footprint Network is one of only 10 organizations honoured with the USD 1,000,000 prize paid over three years, in recognition of the most innovative and effective approaches to resolving critical social issues.

The Footprint is also entering new arenas. For instance, work with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation applies Footprint analysis to human development in Africa.³

New tools are available to calculate the Footprint for businesses and municipalities:

- www.footprinter.org (for business applications); REAP for UK municipalities
- <http://www.sei.se/reap/index.php>; or TBL3 (for business applications)
- <http://www.bottomline3.com>

A number of government organizations have active Footprint initiatives, for instance EPA Victoria in Australia⁴, the city of Calgary⁵, or Scotland.⁶

² www.footprintstandards.org

³ www.footprintnetwork.org/africa

⁴ www.epa.vic.gov.au/ecologicalfootprint

⁵ www.calgary.ca/footprint

⁶ www.scotlandsfootprint.org

Various countries have initiated research collaborations with Global Footprint Network to strengthen the Footprint analysis of their country: Switzerland, Japan, Belgium, and the United Arab Emirates. DG Environment has commissioned a study on how to use the Ecological Footprint for policy assessments – the final report should be available by the end of the year.

WWF has committed to help humanity reduce its Footprint to the size of one planet Earth by 2050. If you think this is radical, you are absolutely right (because it will take significant investments), and you are absolutely wrong (because it is profoundly necessary).

Future possibilities

The method of calculating the Ecological Footprint continues to be developed and refined under the scientific guidance of the National Accounts Committee, housed by Global Footprint Network. For detail regarding the key aspects of the methodology targeted for future work see Kitzes et al.⁷

Updates to the first edition of Footprint standards are in the works and expected to be released in late 2008. The next step is to establish a certification system for standards compliant applications.

In 2005, Global Footprint Network launched its “Ten-in-Ten” campaign with the goal of institutionalizing the Ecological Footprint in at least ten key nations by 2015. The aim of this program is to have ecological accounting be given as much weight as economic accounting and for the Ecological Footprint to become as prominent a metric as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

⁷ http://www.brass.cf.ac.uk/uploads/fullpapers/Kitzes_et_al_M65.pdf

International Security Implications of the Global Economic Crisis¹

Daniel R. Fung, SBS, SC, QC, JP²

In mid-2009, less than two decades after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, as Robert Kagan recently observed³ and Mircea Eliade has long predicted in a different context⁴, history has returned with a vengeance. And it was not just the inevitability of the passing of America's unipolar moment that has rendered the events of the past nine months so striking.

After all, 9/11 which took place almost eight years ago, signaled among other portents the less than surprising phenomenon, as explained by such commentators as Phillip Bobbitt⁵, that the overwhelming combined hard and soft power of the United States rendering it the singular superpower at the turn of the millennium sucking all the political oxygen out of the biosphere which mankind calls earth would inevitably trigger an asymmetrical, terrorist response with tragic consequences.

On the contrary, there is a case for arguing that it was not so much 9/11 which exploded Francis Fukuyama's myth of the end of history⁶. Rather it was 9/15 – September 15, 2008 – when Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy – which exploded that Hegelian myth. In this context it is salutary to recall that when Fukuyama published "The End of History" as an article in the *National Interest*, an American

¹ Keynote Speech delivered on May 20, 2009 in Geneva at the biennial International Security Forum hosted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

² Vice-Chairman, Salzburg Global Seminar, Board Member, East-West Center, National Delegate, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

³ Alfred A Knopf, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, 2008.

⁴ *The Myth of the Eternal Return or, Cosmos and History*, 1971.

⁵ Alfred A Knopf, *Terror and Consent: Wars of the Twenty First century*, 2008.

⁶ *The End of History and the Last Man*, The Free Press, 1992.

international affairs journal, in 1989, he was positing that the advent of Western liberal democracy heralded the endgame of humanity's sociopolitical development and shoehorned into position the permanent ultimate form of government.

Drawing on intellectual antecedents established by Hegel and Alexandre Kojève, Fukuyama argued that mankind's ideological evolution led inexorably to the universalization of Western liberal democracy exemplified by secular, free market, democratic dynamics with a multi-party system of political representation as the ultimate and most effective form of government beyond which no further or other form of political economic development could logically go.

Against such a triumphalist millennial intellectual construct, the self-immolation of the free market model that the world has witnessed over the past nine months starting with the Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 is all the more ironic and has surely punched a huge hole into any notion of Hegelian determinism. Couple that self-inflicted wound with the revelation of monumental market misconduct generated by breathtaking excesses of human greed on the part of Wall Street and City of London hedge fund and money market managers and the rationale and efficacy of the entire system was called into question. After all, no less an authority than the doyen of American legal-economic studies from the Chicago School of laissez faire market economics, Federal District Judge Richard Posner, has characterized this crisis as a failure of capitalism itself.⁷ More recently, the announcement by Goldman Sachs in July 2009 of multimillion dollar bonuses for its star managers after returning TARP money to the United States Treasury caused Nobel Laureate for Economics Paul Krugman to observe that Goldmans were very good at what they do, the only problem being that what they do is not good for the United States or, by extension, the capitalist system itself.⁸

Compound that further with what happened five years earlier when in 2004, media accounts emerged of the systemic torture and abuse of

⁷ *A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of '08 and the Decent into Depression*, 2009, Harvard.

⁸ *The Joy of Sachs*, New York Times, July 16, 2009.

prisoners in the US military-run prison in Abu Ghraib in American-occupied Iraq and we are witnessing a rapid succession of devastating, possibly fatal, body blows to arguably two of the greatest achievements of modern Western Civilization since the end of the Second World War, namely, the Rule of Law and Protection of Human Rights on the one hand and liberal free market democracy on the other.

Indeed, future historians may look back and ponder on the two milestones of 2004 (Abu Ghraib) and late 2008 (Lehman Bros.), like Shelley on Ozymandias (“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone stand in the desert... Near them, on the sand, a shattered visage lies... Nothing beside remains. Round the decay of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare the lone and level sands stretch far away”), as being far more portentous and destructive of those twin pillars of Western Civilization than the destruction of the Twin Towers in Lower Manhattan on September 11, 2001, tragic though the latter undoubtedly was. The destruction of Western authority, more particularly Western moral authority, makes for arguably a far more dangerous world than the paradigm immediately following 9/11 when the United States declared War on Terror, targeting especially perceived state sponsors of terrorism, namely, Afghanistan and, more tendentiously, Iraq. In July 2009 this was brought home by the poignancy of the video uplinked on YouTube of the captive US Army Pte Bowe Bergdahl⁹ paraded by the Taliban in Afghanistan amid angry denunciations by the United States that such conduct ran counter to international law. Whilst one readily appreciates the American position that such conduct breached the Geneva Conventions, how much more persuasive would the American case be if the United States had not broken both international and, arguably, domestic law in Abu Ghraib as well as through the implementation of a secret policy of special renditions after 9/11.

One of the more surprising, counter-intuitive consequences of this self-inflicted destruction of Western authority is that not only the relative absence of any gloating or posturing by the rest of the world but rather, more strikingly, the little, if any, evidence of strategic or military adventurism on the part of that rising world power which the collective

⁹ YouTube, July 19, 2009.

received wisdom of Western punditry would have us believe is the prime candidate to occupy the position of pretender to the superpower throne, namely, China.

On the contrary, all the major powers including, in particular, China, rallied round the developed world and have allocated some US\$2 trillion for stimulus packages to retard and, hopefully, deflect the global economic meltdown. All major economies have adopted aggressive monetary easing by lowering short term interest rates. Several nations have reduced rates to historically low levels. The allocation by the governments of the world's forty richest nations have accounted for 1.7% of global gross domestic product. G20 has committed an aggregate of US\$1 trillion to stimulus packages. Asian Governments pledged to pump US\$950 billion into their economies than increased expedition, tax cuts and cash handouts to kick start local consumer and business spending. China has launched a US\$586 billion package to stimulate its domestic consumer market to replace the moribund American one and recent reports suggest that such a policy has already given rise to a significant impact.

The \$64,000 question is "Why?" Why has there been so little gloating, lecturing or displays of *Schadenfreude* from the developing world or proposals to retrench alternative systems favouring state planning over the free market? The answer would appear to lie in one word – globalization. The reality is that we are all in this together. The effects of globalization are felt by all, whether within G8 or in the rest. Indeed, there is and has never been any decoupling of Asia from the West or of BRIC's from the G7. While globalization may yet recede as it did for some 70 odd years from the Treaty of Versailles to the Fall of the Berlin Wall, for the foreseeable future globalization remains the only game in town. To paraphrase Winston Churchill on democracy, the free market is the worst system ever devised by man to allocate resources and products, save for all the other systems tried by man and found desperately wanting.

All this was helped by a tremendous piece of historical good fortune, namely, that the Opening of China and the launch of the Four Modernizations Movement by Deng Xiaopeng in 1979 coincided with

the move up the value chain and the maturing of the Japanese economy by the 1980's. This allowed China to move into position as the workshop of the world for consumer products and thus preside over 30 years of close to double digit real growth resulting in the most successful poverty eradication programme ever carried out by a single government in human history. By raising a fifth of humanity from abject poverty subsisting on less than \$2 a day to a current per capita GDP of over \$1,700 per annum, China has not just performed a development miracle, it has been transformed from a fomenter of world revolution which was China led by Mao Zedong during the tumultuous decade of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution when China supported such radical Third World fighting machines as ZAPU in what was then known as Rhodesia and SWAPO in what was then known as South West Africa to a status quo power which is the China of today. Indeed, China is a conservative power with a small "c", not merely in supplying laptops, flat screen televisions sets, white goods and motor vehicles to both developed and developing world and being press-ganged into posing as the economic white knight coming to the rescue of the exhausted market of the West in its hour of greatest need, but more significantly conservative in the truest sense of the word in terms subscribing to the entire Bretton Woods architecture and supporting the Olympic Games and the United Nations when the original architect of Bretton Woods in its recent unipolar moment regarded that body as obsolescent, if not in fact obsolete.

Little wonder that "the financial crisis has shown that China and the United States are just like two sides of one coin," as observed by Yin Zhongli, a senior researcher at the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). "The two are inseparable from each other. China cares as much about the US economy as the Americans themselves," Yin said.¹⁰

Does this rosy spectacle mean that there no challenges remaining? No security implications arising from this economic crisis? Far from it, for a number of reasons, the most fundamental of which is the common sense proposition that reduced resources carry serious security implications.

¹⁰ China Daily, July 20, 2009.

First of all, even if the West including Japan were to have at best anaemic growth, at worst contraction, and China were to enjoy close to 8% real growth, the overwhelming military superiority of the United States vis-a-vis the rest of the world combined together with deepening, interlinking global interdependence makes great power rivalry leading to large scale conventional war unthinkable, rather as the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction or M.A.D. during the darkest days of the Cold War rendered even limited nuclear war in the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield too awful to contemplate.

Recent examples of great power restiveness such as Russian action in the Caucasus on the day of the opening of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008 and the more recent standoff between the PLA Navy and the Seventh Fleet in the South China Sea off the Chinese submarine base in Hainan Island much more of the usual friction emanating from great power assertion and re-assertion of their room to manoeuvre in their traditional sphere of influence. After all, one country's strategic adventurism may be another's assertion of its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, in much the same way as, during the heyday of the Cold War, one nation's terrorist may be another nation's freedom fighter.

Even medium size and smaller powers such as respectively Iran and the D.P.R.K. may find their room to manoeuvre constrained or mitigated by the collapse in oil prices and, in the Korean context the willingness of the R.O.K.'s policy of constructive engagement known as the Sunshine Policy following the Asian Financial Crisis of a decade ago, the precursor of the current global financial meltdown.

This combination of the carrot and the stick approach in the context of adverse global economic circumstances attains far less traction vis-a-vis non-state actors such as terrorist organizations, insurgents and criminal syndicates, given that these actors do not have to provide or preserve macro-economic stability for their constituents. The rapidly shifting strategic sands in AfPak, recognizing the reality of Afghanistan/Pakistan as a single geopolitical entity ignoring the Durand Line being in any event an artificial historical construct, is a case in point. Clearly the

challenge of terrorism, asymmetric warfare and the knock-on effects of failing and failed states will not disappear anytime soon.

Reduced aid flows and reduced investment flows into the developing world coupled with lower commodity prices arising from the economic slowdown will hit the poorest countries of the world the hardest. However, the collapse in oil prices and the consequent slowdown in the rise of prices of food constitute the silver lining to that particular cloud. Nevertheless these are temporary reprieves at best. The imminent onset of peak oil,¹¹ the many challenges of finding alternative energy and renewable resources means that the real challenges which will remain with us for the short, medium and long term are far more intractable and pressing than terrorism or asymmetric warfare, important though they are.

They are, in no particular order of severity, first, energy security, secondly, food security, thirdly, security of supply of fresh water and fourthly, non-renewable resource security covering metals and rare earths such as cobalt and titanium, platinum for the production of hydrogen cars, lithium for making batteries for electric cars, iridium for the manufacture of cell phones and flat screen television sets, uranium for operating nuclear power plants, the last of which begs the question whether nuclear energy is truly renewable, given that the supply of uranium is itself finite.

A fundamental question remains: how do you address the issue of man's continuing need for metals and rare earths after you have dug them all up? Unlike the issue of energy sustainability, humankind has not begun seriously to consider the critical question of natural non-renewable resource sustainability. The current approach of recycling cannot provide any long term solution since recycling is subject to the law of diminishing returns, since the technological envelope cannot at present be pushed beyond the 70% recoverability ceiling.¹² Thus, unless

¹¹ Kenneth S Deffeyes, *Hubbert's Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage*, Princeton, 2001.

¹² The best current available technology, developed in Germany, maximizes recycling of used metals at 70%.

humankind begins to explore the technological feasibility and economic viability of trans-planetary mining, the future looks bleak indeed.

The foregoing does not even touch upon immediate paradigmatic shifts such as climate change and global warming. What is to be done? The answer may tentatively be posited as follows. Just as trade protectionism riding on the worldwide retreat from the Doha Round of the WTO is no answer to the global economic recession, similarly, traditional national security in the absence of a robust architecture of international cooperation cannot provide a long term solution either.

The answer must lie in the provision of some form of international collective security, with the emphasis on the adjective “collective”. In this sense, the American unipolar moment has ended not a moment too soon. John Donne put it most elegantly and profoundly almost four centuries ago in his *Meditations*, “No man is an island”.¹³ Benjamin Franklin reminded us of the same point a century and a half later at the founding of the American Republic in typical New World colloquialism, “We must indeed all hang together or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.” And Bertrand Russell put it most directly after the devastation of the two World Wars in the second half of the last century being the bloodiest century in human history,¹⁴ “The only thing that will redeem mankind is cooperation.”

The Chinese expression for crisis comprises the twin constituents, “danger” and its obverse “opportunity”. This is an ancient spur to modern action, being also a much needed cross-cultural antidote to the much predicted clash of civilizations¹⁵ and is reinforced by Dante

¹³ *Meditation XVII*, 1624, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were. Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”

¹⁴ Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West*, 2008.

¹⁵ Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, 1996, originally published as an article in *Foreign Affairs* 1993.

Alighieri's observation that "the darkest places in Hell are reserved for those who maintain their neutrality in times of moral crisis." Winston Churchill puts it most pithily more than 50 years ago, "If we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future." As we contemplate action now, we can only hope the future is not lost, at least not yet.

Background Information on the ISF

The International Security Forum (ISF) was launched as the Institutes and Security Dialogue in Zurich in 1994 and has since been at the forefront of cooperation among international security professionals around the world. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has played a key role in that process, together with:

- The Center for Security Studies (CSS)
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
- The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
- The International Relations and Security Network (ISN)

The main financial contribution to the ISF comes from the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA).

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world's leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and makes policy recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector.

The ISF has established itself as a forum for discussing ways to increase communication and cooperation between institutions engaged in research related to international security worldwide. Over the years, the ISF has brought together hundreds of researchers, academics, civil servants, military officials, and media representatives from some 50 countries. The conference is organised every two years and is held alternately in Zurich and Geneva. Due to the success of the ISF, the

Swiss government continues to support the conference cycle with its international co-sponsors and partners. The ISF cycle has the following specific objectives:

- To create a platform for discussion and exchange of views on academic, military, political and practical aspects of security policy.
- To discuss humanitarian aspects of security policy and to encourage dialogue with humanitarian organisations.
- To promote practical cooperation between international and regional organisations and State representatives.
- To encourage professional education and the free flow of information on issues relating to international security.
- To foster an international and multidisciplinary dialogue that will identify future issues and trends in international security.

Past Conferences

- 7th International Security Forum (26 - 28 October 2006, Zurich)
- 6th International Security Forum (04 - 06 October 2004, Montreux)
- 5th International Security Forum (14 - 16 October 2002, Zurich)
- 4th International Security Forum (15 - 17 November 2000, Geneva)
- 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (19 - 21 October 1998, Zurich)
- 2nd Institutes and the Security Dialogue (12 - 14 September 1996, Geneva)
- 1st Institutes and the Security Dialogue (26 - 28 April 1994, Zurich)

Abbreviations

CSS	Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zurich
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDPS	Swiss Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
EU	European Union
FDFA	Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISF	International Security Forum
ISN	International Relations and Security Network at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zurich
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Institute
UNIDIR	United Nations Disarmament Research
US	United States (of America)
WTO	World-Trade Organisation